European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Carla Stamegna and Angelos Delivorias,

© bluedesign / Adobe Stock

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union specifies the maintenance of price stability in the euro area as the primary objective of EU single monetary policy. Subject to that, it should also contribute to the achievement of the Union’s objectives, which include ‘full employment’ and ‘balanced economic growth’. Responsibility for monetary policy conduct is attributed to the Eurosystem, which carries out its tasks through a set of standard instruments referred to as the ‘operational framework’. To tackle the financial crisis, the Eurosystem has complemented its regular operations by implementing several non-standard monetary policy measures since 2009.

The first strand of these measures had the primary objective of restoring the correct functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism by supporting certain distressed financial market segments, playing an important role in the conduct of monetary policy. A second strand of non-standard measures was aimed at sustaining prices and fostering economic growth by expanding the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet through massive purchases of eligible securities, including public debt instruments issued by euro-area countries. Net purchases were conducted between October 2014 and December 2018, after which the Eurosystem continued to simply reinvest repayments from maturing securities to maintain the size of cumulative net purchases at December 2018 levels. Due to prevailing conditions, however, in September 2019, the European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council decided to recommence net purchases in November of the same year ‘for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of its policy rates’.

The spread of the coronavirus in early 2020 has impaired growth prospects for the global and euro-area economies and made additional monetary stimulus necessary. In this context, the ECB has increased the size of existing asset purchase programmes, and launched a temporary, separate and additional pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP).

Read the complete briefing on ‘Developing a pandemic emergency purchase programme: Unconventional monetary policy to tackle the coronavirus crisis‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Simplified representation of the primary and secondary market for public debt securities

Written by Lieve Van Woensel and Mihalis Kritikos with Jens Van Steereghem,

New genetic technologies allow scientists to drastically accelerate the traditional breeding process, thereby achieving in years what previously took centuries. How will this change the way we produce food?

EP

The breeding of plants and animals has been happening ever since the advent of agriculture. It involves selecting individual organisms with desired traits and making them reproduce with other organisms without losing the valuable trait, subsequently using the offspring as new stock from which to select new desirable traits. Over time, the bred organisms develop so many new characteristics that they are markedly different from their wild relatives. The conventional process takes a long time. Breeders have to wait for valuable traits (larger fruit, resistance to disease, more meat, etc.) to arise spontaneously, by extensive screening of crops using classical mutagenesis, or by crossbreeding to utilise the strengths of existing stocks of desired traits.

However, modern genetic techniques can speed up this process. Now, scientists can use the large amounts of genomic data available through DNA sequencing, as well as an increased understanding of molecular biology to determine the traits certain genes engender, and subsequently modify these genes by editing the DNA sequence. Whereas conventional breeders have to wait for the edit of the gene to occur spontaneously, breeders can now introduce the edit with precision. The most popular editing technology currently in use is CRISPR-Cas – a straightforward, efficient and cheap molecular tool that can be programmed to cut specific DNA sequences. It is in repairing these cuts that the sequence can be modified, using the cellular repair mechanisms of the organisms themselves. Scientists can use this method to knock out genes (make them lose their function), edit genes (modify a single pair or a few base pairs, i.e. letters of the DNA code), delete regions of DNA, or add DNA (foreign DNA, referred to as trans/cisgenes). At the moment, the most accessible edits are knock-outs of genes that have a clear correlation to a trait. However, more understanding of gene networks and systems biology, and further optimisation of the technology is likely to lead to more fundamental engineering, changing the biology of agricultural species to produce food with prescribed qualities.

Potential impacts and developments

In plants, research has focused on increasing yields, improving tolerance to biotic and abiotic stress, and biofortification. Biotic stress consists of viral, fungal and bacterial diseases. Abiotic stress can be environmental – relating to cold, salt, drought and nitrogen, or deriving from herbicide exposure. Biofortification increases the nutritional value of the plant. One example is the genetically modified organism (GMO) golden rice, which is enriched with beta-carotene, a precursor of vitamin A. The main species being edited in research are rice, maize, tomato, potato, barley and wheat. Examples include development of a variety of wheat resistant to powdery mildew (a type of fungal disease), enhancement of seed oil composition in camelina, and inhibition of fruit ripening in tomato. It is hoped that many of these CRISPR-Cas edited crops will be part of a transition to a more sustainable form of agriculture.

In animals, research has produced hornless dairy cattle, removing the need for painful dehorning, pigs resistant to classical swine fever virus, and beef cattle with larger muscles, for instance. The example of hornless dairy cattle is one of several initiatives aimed at reducing animal suffering in food production. Other research is geared towards producing beef cattle with male-only offspring and egg-laying hens that lay only female eggs. In both cases offspring of the other sex are now culled because they are not commercially useful.

These engineered plants and animals are only edited, in other words they contain no transgenes, i.e. genes from other species (even though this is possible using CRISPR-Cas). This means that all changes introduced could have occurred by random mutation or classical mutagenesis in conventional breeding. CRISPR-Cas does have the tendency to produce off-target effects, which means edits occasionally occur in other parts of the genome that were not targeted. This is not really a problem, as mutations also occur naturally in organisms, often without effect. Moreover, the edit itself and potential off-targets can be checked by DNA sequencing, allowing the selection of organisms with only the desired edits. Scientists are also working hard to improve the CRISPR-Cas system to reduce off-target effects and make it specific to the targeted sequence.

Policy can determine whether the technology contributes to more sustainable food production or, on the contrary, leads to an unfair distribution of the surplus value resulting from innovative gene editing.

Anticipatory policy-making

Given the rapid pace of scientific developments in the field of gene editing, its regulatory oversight seems more necessary than ever. In February 2017, the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) noted that the debate about genome editing should address not only safety, but also broader societal questions, such as justice, equality, proportionality and autonomy. In July 2018, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that genome-edited organisms qualify as products of genetic engineering and hence fall under the scope of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC. According to the ruling, as genome-editing techniques have not yet demonstrated a long safety record in the open field or in a number of applications they cannot be exempted from the rules applying to GMOs.

The Commission is now working with EU Member States and stakeholders to implement the Court’s ruling. In October 2018, the Commission asked the European Union Reference Laboratory for GM Food and Feed (EU-RL GMFF), together with the European Network of GMO Laboratories (ENGL), to draw up a report on the detection of food and feed plant products obtained by new mutagenesis techniques. The report was published in March 2019. It highlights challenges and limitations relating to detection and identification, concluding that products of genome editing can only be readily detected in commodity products if prior knowledge of the altered genome sequence is available. During the 2014-2019 term, the European Parliament objected to every proposed authorisation of genetically modified food and feed, demanding the suspension of all GMO approvals.

In November 2019, the Council asked the European Commission to prepare a study on the status of new genomic techniques under EU law, by 30 April 2021, so as to minimise legal uncertainties in this area. The Commission is currently carrying out targeted consultations with Member States and EU-level stakeholders to gather information for this study. The main question that needs to be addressed is whether products developed using gene editing should be regulated on the basis of the process or the final product’s characteristics, or whether a hybrid approach should be taken.

As food safety is a sensitive matter of primary concern to all Union citizens, any policy initiative in this field should not only be informed by the findings of the Commission study and the respective public consultations, but also be grounded in the principles introduced by Regulation 2019/1381 on the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain and the need to accommodate conflicting value frames by broadening the scope of the risk assessment framework and/or by transforming ethical or socio-economic considerations into substantive regulatory standards.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if CRISPR became a standard breeding technique?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© denisismagilov / Adobe Stock

As the coronavirus crisis continues to take its deadly toll across the world, it does so with varying degrees of severity depending on the country. Some states are considering relaxing preventive measures against the disease, others are doing so already. Many analysts and politicians are beginning to turn their attention from short-term measures to contain the virus and save economies from collapse to longer-term challenges, such as the pandemic’s impact on international governance, defence, foreign policy and the international debt market.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the coronavirus and related issues. Earlier publications on the topic can be found in the previous edition item in this series, published by the EPRS on 15 April.

How the EU should co-ordinate an end to the Covid-19 lockdown
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Protecting employment in the time of coronavirus
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

In the corona crisis, who is the more reliable international partner?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, April 2020

The EU needs a more comprehensive vision to tackle pandemics
Carnegie Europe, April 2020

The global coronavirus crisis: An uneven recovery and rising political risk
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2020

Covid-19: La fin du leadership américain?
Institut français des relations internationales , April 2020

From Strategic Autonomy to the internationalization of the euro: Europe’s challenges and the impact of the Covid-19 crisis
Instituto Affari Internazionali, April 2020

Year of the Rat: The strategic consequences of the coronavirus crisis
Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, April 2020

L’UE face au coronavirus: Comment financer l’économie européenne en temps de crise?
Confrontations Europe, April 2020

A coordinated, unlimited and flexible insurance policy to respond to the pandemic
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2020

Eurozone passes coronavirus rescue plan, but political unity remains elusive
Atlantic Council, April 2020

The coronavirus threatens NATO: Let’s move to protect the alliance
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 2020

The armed forces and Covid-19
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2020

Call on European Parliament: Stop freight cabotage restrictions and save the Single Market
European Centre for International Political Economy, April 2020

Humanity, politics and politicians in Covid times
Friends of Europe, April 2020

The coronavirus as a yardstick of global health policy
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2020

Europe’s missing coronavirus exit strategy
Carnegie Europe, April 2020

Lessons from comparing the Covid-19 pandemic with the global cyber threat
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2020

Covid-19: Les réponses européennes
Fondation Robert Schuman, April 2020

What you need to know about the coronavirus pandemic
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Take me to your leader! Or how the EU could emerge stronger from the corona crisis
Egmont, April 2020

Coronavirus: How are countries responding to the economic crisis?
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Corona: EU’s existential crisis
Cligendael, April 2020

The EU can emerge stronger from the pandemic if Merkel seizes the moment
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Beware Russian and Chinese positioning for after the pandemic
Chatham House, April 2020

How are China and Russia responding to and capitalizing on the coronavirus crisis
German Marshall Fund, April 2020

Covid-19 in Latin America: Political challenges, trials for health systems and economic uncertainty
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2020

Pandemic may replace the nation-state: But with what?
Atlantic Council, April 2020

The perils of more debt
Bruegel, April 2020

A joint effort to increase production of medical masks in Europe
Cligendael, April 2020

The coronavirus: A geopolitical earthquake
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Covid-19 brings human rights into focus
Chatham House, April 2020

Covid-19: Can the EU avoid an epidemic of authoritarianism?
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

China was slammed for initial Covid-19 secrecy, but its scientists led the way in tackling the virus
Egmont, April 2020

The Covid-19 pandemic and European security: Between damages and crises
Instituto Affari Internazionali, April 2020

Coronavirus in conflict zones: A sobering landscape
Carnegie Europe, April 2020

Covid-19: America’s looming election crisis
Chatham House, April 2020

Europe’s debate on fiscal policy: Too much yet too little
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

Covid-19: The self-employed are hardest hit and least supported
Bruegel, April 2020

A proposal for a coronabond: The Pandemic Solidarity Instrument
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Three implications of the corona crisis in Iran
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020

Boosting Europe’s resilience with better health systems: Lessons from the Covid-19 crisis
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Will SURE shield EU workers from the corona crisis?
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

Social distancing: Did individuals act before governments?
Bruegel, April 2020

Anatomy of the coronavirus collapse
Brookings Institution, April 2020

Turkey preparing early release in response to crisis: Will political prisoners be excluded?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020

EU trade in medical goods: Why self-sufficiency is the wrong approach
Bruegel, April 2020

What the coronavirus pandemic teaches us about fighting climate change
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

How is the Covid-19 crisis serving the EU?
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Lessons from Taiwan’s experience with Covid-19
Atlantic Council, April 2020

A green recovery
Bruegel, April 2020

A European approach to fund the coronavirus cost is in the interest of all
Bruegel, April 202

Covid-19 and the Iranian shadows of war
Chatham House, April 2020

Could the coronavirus change the way we think about health?
European Policy Centre, April 2020

The pandemic offers new opportunities for South African leadership in the region
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Bouncing back again: How past crises can help Eastern Europe fight Covid-19
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Bojo’s Coronavirus fall out
Barcelona Institute for International Affairs, April 2020

The impact of the coronavirus on mortgage refinancings
Brookings Institution, April 2020

The refugee drama in Syria, Turkey, and Greece
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020

Don’t sacrifice democracy on the altar of public health
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Trouble for the EU is brewing in coronavirus-hit Italy
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Defeating Covid-19 in Gaza: Is it enough?
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Coronavirus: Between the global and the national
Barcelona Institute for International Affairs, March 2020

Coronavirus: Infodemics and disinformation
Barcelona Institute for International Affairs, March 2020

Conflict and peace scenarios in times of Covid-19
Barcelona Institute for International Affairs, March 2020

Covid-19: Le prix de l’incurie
Institut français des relations internationales , March 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Impact and challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak

Written by Anja Radjenovic,

© Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock

To curb the spread of coronavirus and to protect their populations, the EU and its Member States have restricted crossings of their external borders, and many internal EU borders, as well as restricted freedom of movement within their territory. These steps have also served to address the challenges the pandemic has posed to public order, public health and national security. However, the resulting restrictions on people’s movement and access to EU territory could disproportionately affect the most vulnerable, among them asylum-seekers-already in the EU or trying to reach its territory to seek asylum.

The situation of asylum-seekers during the current pandemic is especially critical in the EU hotspots; Greece, for instance, whose reception capacity has been stretched to the limit, is struggling to ensure the safety of the most vulnerable asylum-seekers, especially unaccompanied minors. While the EU has been assisting Greece to protect stranded asylum-seekers, NGOs and international organisations as well as the European Parliament have called for greater efforts to improve their living conditions and ensure the preventive evacuation of those at high risk.

Several Member States have adopted emergency measures to deal with the pandemic. To protect public health, they have closed their external borders and ports to asylum-seekers, suspended asylum procedures and returns, and imposed mandatory confinement in asylum reception centres to restrict freedom of movement. All those measures risk having a negative impact on asylum-seekers’ fundamental rights under EU and international law.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Tackling the coronavirus outbreak: Impact on asylum-seekers in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Shutterstock

As the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic intensifies, technological applications and initiatives are multiplying in an attempt to limit the spread of the disease, treat patients and facilitate the work of overworked healthcare workers. At a time when everyone needs better information, including epidemic disease modellers, state authorities, international organisations and people in quarantine, measures such as social distancing, and digital information and surveillance technologies have been unleashed in an unprecedented manner to collect data and reliable evidence in support of public health decision-making.

Countries around the world are authorising clinical trials involving experimental techniques such as gene editing, synthetic biology and nanotechnologies, in a race to prepare and testing future vaccines, treatments and diagnostics. Artificial intelligence, robots and drones are helping to track the disease and enforce restrictive measures while service robots are being deployed in various ways in hospitals.

Bottom-up technologies, such as 3D printing and open-software solutions are being harnessed to address the growing need for medical hardware (e.g. masks, ventilators and breathing filters) and optimise the supply of the necessary medical equipment to hospitals. Blockchain applications can meanwhile track contagion, manage insurance payments related to the disease outbreak, sustain medical supply chains and facilitate the performance of much-needed EU-wide clinical trials in an effective, transparent and credible manner.

At the same time, throughout this pandemic crisis, telehealth technologies have emerged as a cost-effective means to slow the virus’s spread and to maintain hospital capacity, by operating as a triage system, keeping those with moderate symptoms at home and routing more severe cases to hospitals.

But are these technologies safe and effective in the context of Covid-19? Have they been tested before in a public health emergency context? Are they ready to provide tangible and operative solutions that could facilitate governments’ efforts to address the many challenges associated with this pandemic? Do they strengthen the evidence-based character of the response measures taken worldwide? Can possible regulatory hurdles concerning their authorisation be by-passed via ad hoc fast-track procedures? Does their extensive or immediate use involve risks and threaten our values and rights in the long run?

EPRS in-depth analysis

This well-timed EPRS publication on the ten technologies central to the fight against Covid-19 offers some well-informed answers to these crucial questions. More importantly, it constitutes a much-needed analysis of what is at stake, amid the Covid-19 pandemic, in technological terms world-wide, paying particular attention to applications that have either been put in use or are being tested before operational deployment.

The analysis presents a non-exhaustive overview of the technologies currently in use, highlighting their main features and significance in the response to the coronavirus pandemic but also their possible limitations. It examines a wide range of technological applications developed to monitor and contain the rapid spread of the disease but also to ensure that public health institutions maintain their capacity to meet the ever-increasing needs generated by the pandemic.

However, given that most of these technological applications have been mainstreamed or put forward in a hasty decision-making environment where decisions are extremely reactive, careful thought must also be given to their potential repercussions. In the context of the current pandemic, governments have launched numerous data-collection and location-tracking technological applications by means of emergency laws that involve the temporary suspension of fundamental rights, triggering questions about the potential future impact on hard-won civil liberties and concerns about state authorities maintaining heightened levels of surveillance even after the pandemic has ended. Medical devices and in-vitro diagnostics vaccines are meanwhile in the pipeline for fast-tracked authorisation although most of these technologies have never been applied in a medical emergency context before. Furthermore, all this also raises the question of whether the fight against Covid-19 will facilitate even more aggressive automation of daily life when everything returns to ‘normal’.

The analysis addresses the possible lasting legal and ethical questions that policy-makers, legislators and expert groups that advise governments and international organisations and will be confronted with very soon and brings forward some preliminary considerations. It illustrates the main regulatory and socio-ethical dilemmas that the manifold use of these technologies poses when used in a public-health emergency context such as the current one but also those that will arise once the virus has subsided. The analysis identifies the legal challenges that emerging technologies, such as those currently employed in the context of Covid-19 pose to existing EU legislation, examines possible legal gaps and proposes options for the emergency authorisation of some of the technological applications under consideration.

Although the focus of this analysis is on technological applications presenting solutions to pressing pandemic-related problems, this piece of work does not aim to reinforce ideas of techno-solutionism. In other words, technological applications in their own right cannot solve complex societal challenges, such as those associated with the current pandemic. Rather, the main findings of the analysis indicate that technology cannot in itself replace or make up for other public policy measures but it does have an increasingly critical role to play in emergency responses in a variety of domains.

The current crisis has demonstrated not only the vulnerability of global public health systems but also the potential of certain emerging technological pathways to fight this pandemic disease at the levels of prevention, containment and treatment. The first major pandemic of our century, Covid-19 represents an excellent opportunity for policy-makers and regulators to reflect on the legal plausibility, ethical soundness and effectiveness of deploying emerging technologies under extreme time pressure. Striking the right balance will be crucial when it comes to maintaining the public’s trust in evidence-based public health interventions and for safeguarding the potential of promising – albeit immature – technologies to serve the public interest.

Read the complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Ten technologies to fight coronavirus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak,

© nimon_t / Adobe Stock

The crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic has, with tragic consequences, brought to the fore the fact that the European Union (EU) is dependent on non-EU sources for medical equipment such as personal protection equipment (including masks) and artificial respiratory equipment, as well as other products needed in the fight against the virus. In response to shortages, Member States have taken initiatives to produce and distribute medical equipment and the EU has put in place a number of coordinated responses, such as the creation of the rescEU stockpile of emergency medical equipment, and the restriction of exports of personal protective equipment outside the European Union.

A mapping of EU trade in four categories of product – pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, personal protection and medical supplies – shows that, in all four categories, as few as five trade partners provide about 75 % of EU imports. Exports are more diffuse, with five partners receiving approximately half of EU exports. In 2019, the EU was a net exporter of medical products in all four categories, with pharmaceutical products representing most of its trade surplus of medical products. The weaker domain is personal protection products. The main EU import partners are Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, and Singapore, with the first three appearing among the top four countries in all categories. Additional insights into the value chains of chemical and pharmaceutical sector production in the EU’s top five import partners suggest that China and other countries provide a far larger share in raw materials and manufacturing than direct imports suggest. These results imply that the production of medical products is far more scattered than direct import numbers would suggest.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU imports and exports of medical equipment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gregor Erbach (1st edition),

© Lightspring / Shutterstock.com

On 4 March 2020, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal for a European climate law, setting the objective for the EU to become climate-neutral by 2050 and establishing a framework for achieving that objective. This would involve the Commission reviewing the EU’s 2030 target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in light of the mid-century climate neutrality objective, exploring options for 50 to 55 % emissions reduction, and proposing a new 2030 target, if necessary. The Commission would be empowered to set out an emissions trajectory for the period between 2030 and 2050. The proposed regulation would also require EU institutions and Member States to build on their climate change measures. The Commission would have to carry out five-yearly assessments – aligned with the review cycle of the Paris Agreement – of progress made towards the objectives and of the consistency of national and EU measures with the objectives. It would be required to take corrective action and could issue recommendations to Member States whose measures were inconsistent with the emissions trajectory. Moreover, the Commission would have to ensure broad public participation.

The December 2019 European Council meeting endorsed the 2050 climate-neutrality objective. In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety.

Versions

• April 2020:  ‘European climate law‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law) Committee responsible: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) COM(2020) 80 final
4.3.2020 Rapporteur: Jytte Guteland (S&D, Sweden) 2020/0036 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Mairead McGuinness (EPP, Ireland), Nils Torvalds, (Renew, Finland), Syliva Limmer (ID, Germany), Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany), Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland), Silvia Modig (GUE/NGL, Finland) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Annastiina Papunen,

© Adobe Stock

The European Council video-conference meeting on 23 April 2020 is expected to shift EU leaders’ attention away from immediate and short-term priorities, such as limiting the spread of the coronavirus, to a longer-term strategic approach focused on a recovery strategy for the European Union, and the financing thereof. The recovery strategy could be based on four pillars: 1) the internal market, including the Green Deal, the digital agenda and the EU’s strategic autonomy; 2) an investment strategy, to be included in the next seven-year EU budget and reflected in the work programme of the European Investment Bank; 3) a global recovery strategy reinforcing the external responsibility of the EU and promoting multilateralism; and 4) strengthening resilience and governance for a stronger EU after the crisis. As the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the seven years from 2021 to 2027, which has yet to be agreed, touches upon all four pillars of the recovery strategy, EU leaders will engage in a strategic discussion on the MFF during their video-conference.

1. European Council discussion of the coronavirus outbreak to date

The European Council video-conference on 23 April 2020 will be the fourth of its kind in six weeks, the previous ones having taken place on 10 March, 17 March and on 26 March. The first three video-conferences focused on five priorities outlined by the European Council: 1) limiting the spread of the virus; 2) providing medical equipment; 3) promoting research, including the development of a vaccine; 4) tackling the socio-economic consequences of the outbreak; and 5) providing help for EU citizens stranded in third countries. Whilst, on 23 April, the EU Heads of State or Government will review the follow-up to previously agreed measures in the fight against the Covid-19 outbreak, they are likely to concentrate their attention on the recovery strategy for the medium and long term, and the related financial needs.

Since the last European Council video-conference, at which discussions were directed at finding appropriate financing instruments to help countries in fiscal difficulty due to the crisis, a comprehensive reflection has been carried out on ways of tackling the socio-economic consequences.

Tackling the socio-economic consequences of the outbreak

At their video-conference on 26 March, the EU Heads of State or Government invited the Eurogroup to present, within two weeks, proposals on ways to tackle the dire socio-economic consequences of the coronavirus crisis. The latest IMF World Economic Outlook projects that the global economy will shrink by 3 % in 2020, the biggest drop since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Eurogroup met in an inclusive format (with all 27 Member States) for a video-conference on 7-9 April. Whilst originally scheduled for just one day, an agreement among ministers advocating very different instruments to support those Member States most affected by the Covid-19 outbreak, proved more complicated to achieve. The gridlock reflected differing views on, i) the relevance of debt mutualisation, with Italy strongly backing ‘corona bonds’ and the Netherlands, in particular, vehemently against; and ii) on macroeconomic conditions for European Stability Mechanism (ESM) loans, which some countries, spearheaded by Italy, said were too strict.

The Eurogroup report of 9 April on the EU’s economic policy response to the Covid-19 outbreak states that it is ‘committed to do everything necessary to meet this challenge in a spirit of solidarity’. The ministers mention that a coordinated and a comprehensive strategy is needed to fight the coronavirus and its adverse socio-economic impact, and that the plan should include short, medium and long-term actions to maintain stability and confidence.

The Eurogroup agreed on a financing plan of more than half a trillion euro, consisting of several tools. To fight the pandemic, EU budget flexibility will be used, and the emergency support instrument will be activated, whilst three safety nets are being deployed: 1) to address the needs of workers suddenly facing unemployment, on 2 April, the Commission made a proposal for a Council regulation on a European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE); 2) to support the challenges EU businesses are facing, State aid rules have been adjusted, and the Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) have announced relief measures; and finally, 3) to help EU countries cope with the immediate consequences of the outbreak, the Eurogroup set up a Pandemic Crisis Support tool, under the ESM, amounting to 2 % of Member States’ GDP and which can be used for direct or indirect healthcare, cure and prevention costs.

The ministers also discussed the possibility of setting up a temporary Recovery Fund, but due to differing views on its financing, no decision could be taken. In his letter to the President of the European Council following the meeting, Eurogroup President, Mario Centeno, asked the Heads of State or Government to give the Eurogroup guidance on the next steps to be taken. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, referred to the agreement as ‘a significant breakthrough’, and stated that work would be taken forward at the video-conference meeting on 23 April.

2. Roadmap and action plan

Although mainly focused on the immediate response to the coronavirus outbreak, during their video-conference on 26 March, EU leaders asked the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council to ‘start working on a roadmap, accompanied by an action plan, to prepare an exit strategy and a comprehensive recovery plan, including unprecedented investment’. Charles Michel explained that this task included two pillars: 1) for the short term, submitting a roadmap for an exit strategy that is coordinated with Member States, which will prepare the ground for, 2) a long-term recovery strategy.

European roadmap towards lifting containment measures

On 16 April, Charles Michel and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, presented the first part of the road map to the European Parliament, focusing on the coronavirus crisis exit strategy. Put forward the previous day, their European roadmap aimed at coordinating the lifting of containment measures across the EU. In particular, it stresses that, prior to the lifting of restrictive measures, Member States should assess their readiness relying on three criteria: epidemiologic (spread of disease), sufficient health system capacity and appropriate monitoring capacity, including large-scale testing and contact-tracing. In addition, Member States should inform the Commission and neighbouring countries of their decisions to lift restrictive measures. EU leaders are expected to endorse the roadmap at their meeting on 23 April. The roadmap has not been wholly uncontroversial: although EU leaders had asked for such a plan to be drawn up, its presentation was postponed until after Easter as the Commission faced criticism from EU capitals on both the process and the timing.

Comprehensive recovery plan

Charles Michel indicated that the European Council video-conference on 23 April ‘will focus on the recovery plan of the roadmap’. At the Parliament’s plenary session of 16 April, he argued that this medium to long-term recovery strategy should focus on four pillars: 1) The internal market, 2) an investment strategy, 3) a global recovery strategy, and 4) resilience and governance.

Internal market

The EU’s internal market – based on freedom of movement of labour, goods, services and capital – finds itself significantly challenged, as the coronavirus has prompted Member States to close borders, and even in some cases, to impose national export bans on key products. Supply chains, that are often global, have also faced disruption. Before the coronavirus outbreak hit, the European Council had been expected to discuss the strengthening of the EU’s economic base as one of the main items on the agenda of its March 2020 meeting, which was eventually postponed. Ahead of that meeting, 15 Member States had published a joint contribution on the topic. The context is now quite different, yet the discussion probably more important than ever. Charles Michel stated on 15 April that the internal market needed to be repaired and improved, and would feature on the agenda of the next European Council meeting. He added that the industrial strategy, SMEs, the digital agenda, the European Green Deal and climate change were all important points for discussion in this respect.

Investment strategy

According to the European Central Bank, the global and European economies are likely to enter a severe recession as a result of the coronavirus crisis. Consequently, both Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen have called for a Marshall Plan for Europe’s recovery, which would consist of a comprehensive investment strategy including a series of tools. A key element to support recovery will be the Union’s long-term budget (MFF) for the years 2021-2027, which will be adapted to the new economic situation. Charles Michel also expects the European Investment Bank to play a vital role in developing an investment strategy to promote future economic recovery. Furthermore, the EU’s finance ministers expressed their commitment to do ‘everything necessary’ to respond to this unprecedented challenge posed by the virus. The European Parliament believes that ‘the necessary investment would be financed by an increased MFF, the existing EU funds and financial instruments, and recovery bonds guaranteed by the EU budget; this package should not involve the mutualisation of existing debt and should be oriented to future investment’.

Global recovery strategy

For the first time since the start of the Covid-19 outbreak, the European Council will consider the EU’s external responsibility and contribution to the global recovery effort. President Michel has notably stressed that the EU remains committed to multilateralism in its external action. In that context, he recalled the joint international efforts undertaken so far in different fora, including the G7 and the G20, to coordinate support to medical research as well as to provide economic and trade responses to the crisis. Cooperation with Africa on an equal footing, through a renewed partnership, comprising, inter alia, support to African health systems, represents one of the key priorities of the EU’s global recovery strategy. One of the goals is to ensure that no vulnerable country or community is left aside, without access to treatment or vaccination, when the latter becomes available.

Resilience and governance

Under this fourth pillar, Charles Michel expects EU leaders to reflect on the lessons to be learnt from the Covid-19 outbreak in order for the EU to be stronger after the crisis. The aim is also to achieve unity and show more solidarity among Member States. The two topics of unity and solidarity are recurrent themes in the European Council’s crisis response.

President Michel has stressed that the EU ‘must develop a more resilient system of governance, while upholding the principles of solidarity, unity and the fundamental values of freedom, rule of law at the heart of the EU’. While thus far, the President of the European Council has not directly linked this debate to the forthcoming conference on the Future of Europe, currently likely to start in September 2020, other actors, such as the European Parliament, have already established a link with that process. The Parliament considers that the current crisis only heightens the urgent need to start an in-depth reflection on how to become more effective and democratic, and that the planned conference on the Future of Europe would be the appropriate forum to do this.

Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)

The EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) is a horizontal tool, which addresses all policy areas of the EU; thus, it can be used to address the various new challenges posed by the coronavirus crisis, and play an important role regarding all four pillars of the recovery strategy. On 28 March, Ursula von der Leyen announced that the Commission will put forward an updated MFF proposal, including a stimulus package for the recovery, which is expected to published by the end of April. In order to provide some guidance for the Commission, Heads of State or Government will hold a strategic discussion on the long-term budget at their next meeting on 23 April.

In its resolution of 17 April 2020, Parliament insists ‘on the adoption of an ambitious MFF that has an increased budget in line with the Union’s objectives, the projected impact on EU economies by the crisis and citizens’ expectations on European added value, has more flexibility and simplicity in the way we use the funds to respond to crises, and is equipped with the necessary flexibility.’ Furthermore, it calls on the Member States to reach rapid agreement on this new MFF proposal.

3. Other items Libya

EU leaders may also discuss external relations topics, including the deteriorating situation in parts of the EU’s neighborhood. The humanitarian situation in Libya, where a triple – sanitary, security and migratory – crisis is unfolding remains of particular concern. Malta has warned of the deteriorating humanitarian situation and called for the Foreign Affairs Council meeting, prior to the EU leaders’ meeting on 23 April, to consider the possibilities of a humanitarian aid mission in Libya.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the video-conference call of EU Heads of State or Government on 23 April 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Costica Dumbrava,

© petovarga / Adobe Stock

Governments around the world have turned to digital technologies to tackle the coronavirus crisis. One of the key measures has been to use mobile devices to monitor populations and track individuals who are infected or at risk.

About half of the EU’s Member States have taken location-tracking measures in response to the spread of the coronavirus disease, mainly by working with telecommunications companies to map population movements using anonymised and aggregate location data and by developing applications (apps) for tracking people who are at risk. The European Commission has called for a common EU approach to the use of mobile apps and mobile data to assess social distancing measures, support contact-tracing efforts, and contribute to limiting the spread of the virus.

While governments may be justified in limiting certain fundamental rights and freedoms in order to take effective steps to fight the epidemic, such exceptional and temporary measures need to comply with applicable fundamental rights standards and EU rules on data protection and privacy.

This briefing discusses location-tracking measures using mobile devices in the context of the Covid‑19 crisis. It describes initiatives in EU Member States and provides a brief analysis of fundamental rights standards and the EU policy framework, including applicable EU rules on data protection and privacy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Tracking mobile devices to fight coronavirus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Using mobile phones to track location and trace contacts in order to fight Covid 19

Written by Nera Kuljanic,

© Sunny studio / Shutterstock

The digital transformation is fully under way, transforming the European economy and Europe’s society as a whole. New technical and soft skills are gaining in importance both in the labour market and as a means for fully participating in society. As a result, traditional roles, content and methods of education are being challenged – today’s education needs to prepare students for continuously changing tasks and roles both in the labour market and as European citizens. At the same time, today’s adults need help in reskilling and upskilling to enable them to tackle tomorrow’s challenges. Rethinking education in the digital age therefore constitutes a prerequisite for Europe’s future global competitiveness and for safeguarding European values such as equality, democracy and the rule of law.

Education in the digital age includes but is not restricted to digital education. It also encompasses the transmission of technical, soft and citizen skills, and refers to both formal and non-formal education throughout the entire lifespan of European citizens.

This new STOA study summarises the current state of play of education in the digital age across Europe, and anticipates trends and emerging issues across four stakeholder groups: policy-makers and public administration; students; educators and trainers; and employers and employees. Departing from the current strengths and weaknesses, and the upcoming opportunities and threats, the authors derived policy options for (European) policy-makers.

Main conclusions of the study

For approximately the last two decades, policy work has often focused on ‘soft’ factors, such as teacher training, teacher and student competence building, as well as content development. From around 2015 onwards, policy approaches have often included ‘iterative’ and ‘organic’ approaches, i.e. small-scale experiments that can, if successful, be upscaled and mainstreamed. In terms of providing digital infrastructure, digital equipment in schools is generally at a good level across the EU, but with large disparities between regions and countries. Emerging trends are the provision of platform and cloud solutions for schools, open educational resources and massive open online courses (MOOCs).

Students in Europe have high digital skills, although differences persist specifically according to educational background and country. Gender differences in skills are negligible among the young generation, but girls remain by far less likely to turn their digital competences into a career. In the future, soft and citizen skills such as computational thinking and entrepreneurship skills should be more strongly transmitted in European schools, and career guidance will play an increasingly important role.

Educators and trainers in Europe today frequently use digital tools, but it remains unclear whether they are sufficiently able to employ them in pedagogically meaningful ways. Furthermore, the vast majority of teachers do not, or only sporadically, participate in professional development focused on digital education. Teachers may, moreover, not be sufficiently prepared and/or not be offered the structural contexts for focusing their teaching more strongly on the soft and citizen skills that are urgently necessary in the digital age. At the same time, new teaching technologies could offer opportunities for personalising learning contexts, thereby improving student motivation and retention. When introducing corresponding teaching technologies, issues such as discrimination by algorithms and data protection will need to be discussed and solutions for them implemented.

Employers and employees increasingly operate in contexts of high work flexibility and a decreasing demand for mid-level qualifications. This influences education in the sense that today’s students need to be prepared for more flexible forms of work, a possibly more flexible labour market and more mobile and dynamic work biographies. At the same time, the existing workforce will have to undergo extensive upskilling and reskilling, increasing the relevance of lifelong learning and informal and non-formal education.

Options for policy-makers

The authors developed twenty policy options, out of which four are developed more in detail in the study:

• Incorporating education in the digital age more strongly into existing and future research frameworks to further promote evidence-based policy.
• Supporting the creation of a knowledge-sharing platform for education in the digital age to improve the dissemination and adaption of success models across Europe.
• Simplifying and harmonising the recognition and validation of lifelong learning to increase both value and quality of non-formal education, accelerate reskilling and upskilling, and to better match workers’ skills with labour market needs.
• Offering a harmonised, yet versatile cloud solution for the provision of (open) educational resources that can be adjusted to varying contexts (e.g. different countries, educational systems).

The study was carried out by VDI Technologiezentrum GmbH at the request of the STOA Panel, following a proposal from Eva Kaili (S&D, EL), STOA Chair.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2020 – Source: EP / Thierry ROGE

For the second time since the introduction of strict coronavirus containment measures, the European Parliament conducted its April plenary session with the majority of Members participating remotely, and used the alternative voting procedure put in place by Parliament’s Bureau for the March II session. This temporary voting procedure is available for use until 31 July 2020, unless extended by Bureau decision.

As in March, the session focused on a number of urgent legislative proposals as well as amendments to the EU’s 2020 budget to respond to the coronavirus pandemic. Members also heard from the Presidents of the European Council and Commission on the coordination of the European response to the Covid-19 outbreak. Parliament then adopted a resolution setting out its position on the response to the pandemic and its consequences, ahead of the next video-conference meeting of EU Heads of State or Government, on 23 April. In this resolution, Members called for a massive economic recovery package, greater coordination on cross-border health threats, and condemned national emergency measures that restrict civil liberties.

Amending Budget No 1/2020: Support for Greece on migration pressure, measures to fight coronavirus and reconstruction assistance for Albania

Members approved draft Amending Budget No 1/2020 (DAB1), which will provide additional funds of more than half a billion euros to help address the needs arising from the increased migration pressures in Greece, to assist Member States to limit the impact of the coronavirus outbreak through meeting equipment and medical product needs, and to contribute to Albania’s post-earthquake reconstruction.

Amending Budget No 2/2020: Emergency support for the healthcare sector

Prior to the vote on draft Amending Budget No 2/2020 (DAB2), Parliament gave its consent to the Council to modify the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework, in an amendment lifting restrictions on the scope of heading 3, ‘Security and citizenship’. Members then approved DAB2, which enables the use of three flexibility and last resort mechanisms (the Global Margin for commitments, the Flexibility Instrument and the Contingency Margin) and releases €2.7 billion in emergency support for the healthcare sector, to be used for development, production, procurement and distribution of medicines and medical equipment, including for testing. In addition, €300 million will be used to reinforce the reserves of emergency medical kit established by the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (rescEU).

Specific flexibility measures for ESI funds in response to the coronavirus outbreak

Members approved, by a large majority, specific flexibility measures for European structural and investment (ESI) funds to counter the coronavirus crisis, proposed by the European Commission as part of the second Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative (CRII+). This will temporarily allow programmes dealing with the impact of the crisis to be financed up to 100 % from the EU budget between July 2020 and June 2021, as well as greater simplification and flexibility in the rules on funding allocation.

Support for the fishing and aquaculture sectors

Members approved, again by large majority, measures supplementing those already agreed under the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative to support the hard-hit fisheries and aquaculture sector. These additional measures include support for a temporary end to fishing activities, including for aquaculture farmers, for storage costs, and for greater flexibility and simplified procedures in allocating the funding.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – Brussels, April 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak

Written by Jérôme Léon Saulnier,

© juliasudnitskaya / Adobe stock

In addition to the tragic loss of human lives, the ongoing novel coronavirus pandemic will have severe consequences for the European economy. Common action at EU level and coordinated long-term strategic action at international level is more necessary than ever before. In particular, in addition to the measures taken after the 2008 economic and financial crisis, a resolute move towards greater common policy action and a deepening of the single market, more strategic autonomy, increased common investment, and a reasonable deepening of risk-sharing within the economic and monetary union (EMU), could help to achieve a rapid, broad based and sustainable recovery. Our simulations, which use growth models based on long-term scenarios to 2035, indicate that the cost of complacency could be substantial.

In a pessimistic worst-case scenario, where the policy response is fragmented and where no risk-sharing takes place, potential added value growth would be reduced by 0.8 % in 2035. For 2020 to 2035, this would represent a cumulated €2.9 trillion of added value losses for the EU as a whole compared to the initial baseline. In a more optimistic scenario, we assume a decisive move towards more sustained common action at EU level. As a result, potential added value growth is initially less impacted and the common action boosts long-term growth prospects to levels surpassing the estimates from the baseline scenario. For 2020 to 2035, such a scenario would represent a cumulated gain of €0.5 trillion of added value for the EU as a whole compared to the initial baseline.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Added value of a common EU response to the economic consequences of the coronavirus pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi,

© F8 studio / Shutterstock

On 31 October 2019, the European Commission adopted a legislative package aimed at ensuring the continuation of the current common agricultural policy (CAP) until the legislation on the post‑2020 CAP is in force. The package includes a proposal for a CAP transitional regulation setting out a number of adjustments to current CAP regulations, concerning their applicability beyond 2020 with new financial allocations. This proposal introduces transitional provisions and amendments that are necessary to ensure the continuity of the CAP through a one‑year transitional period ending on 31 December 2021 and to smooth the passage to the new policy framework envisaged by the post‑2020 CAP proposals. It concerns all the basic acts which regulate how the CAP now works.

Versions

• April 2020:  ‘Transitional provisions for the CAP post 2020‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down certain transitional provisions for the support by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) in the year 2021 and amending Regulations (EU) No 228/2013, (EU) No 229/2013 and (EU) No 1308/2013 as regards resources and their distribution in respect of the year 2021 and amending Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013, (EU) No 1306/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013 as regards their resources and application in the year 2021 Committee responsible: Agriculture and Rural Development COM(2019) 581
31.10.2019 Rapporteurs: Elsi Katainen (Renew Europe, Finland) 2019/0254(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Álvaro Amaro (EPP, Portugal)
Clara Aguilera (S&D, Spain)
Bronis Ropė (Greens/EFA, Lithuania)
Ivan David (ID, Czechia)
Mazaly Aguilar (ECR, Spain)
Petros Kokkalis (GUE/NGL, Greece) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© pogonici / Adobe Stock

The von der Leyen Commission launched the European Green Deal as the new growth strategy of the European Union (EU), with a view to promoting the transition to a climate-neutral economy by 2050. Confirming the importance of financial resources for such a major objective, its investment pillar was the first initiative of the strategy to be presented.

The European Green Deal Investment Plan, also known as the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, aims to contribute to financing a sustainable transition, while supporting the regions and communities most exposed to its impact. By combining legislative and non-legislative initiatives, the plan addresses three aspects: 1) mobilising funding worth at least €1 trillion from the EU budget and other public and private sources over the next decade; 2) putting sustainability at the heart of investment decisions across all sectors; and 3) providing support to public administrations and project promoters to create a robust pipeline of sustainable projects.

The debate on the investment plan is interlinked with the ongoing negotiations on the EU’s 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which requires the European Parliament’s consent and unanimity in the Council. Parliament, which is traditionally a strong advocate of climate and environmental objectives, has called for an ambitious MFF, with resources commensurate with the goal of facilitating a just transition to a carbon-neutral economy.

Commentators have identified both positive elements and possible weaknesses in the Commission’s plan, arguing that it is a step in the right direction but would provide only part of the resources needed to meet the current climate targets for 2030. The impact of the pandemic has raised concerns that decarbonisation strategies could be derailed. However, analysts and stakeholders generally agree on their continued relevance, arguing that green investments from public and private sources must play a central role in any economic recovery plan.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Green Deal Investment Plan: Main elements and possible impact of the coronavirus pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen,

© kovop58 / Adobe Stock

The magnitude of the potential impact of the coronavirus pandemic is still unknown. But it is already clear that developed countries are being severely challenged by the crisis, and that many health-care systems around the world are under-resourced for dealing with a problem of this magnitude. The effects around the world in a wide range of linked areas – economy, political stability, security, human rights – are gradually surfacing as the pandemic spreads, and are likely to affect the global geopolitical balance. Against this backdrop, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell, have set out the EU’s global response to the pandemic. Council and Commission statements on the EU’s coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences are scheduled for the European Parliament’s plenary session on 16-17 April 2020.

Background

The scale of the impact of the evolving crises related to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is still not knowable, but it is already evident that this major shock to economies and societies across the world will have dire global consequences now and in the future. At the same time, the crises are accelerating underlying geopolitical rifts and weaknesses, and could potentially lead to a shift in the global balance of power. One symptom of the exacerbated global power struggle in the shadow of the health crisis is the combination of disinformation campaigns and heavily promoted health diplomacy, by Beijing in particular, capitalising on EU Member States’ preoccupation with the crisis in their own countries, as well as Washington’s disorganised response, which has diverted from the leading role it traditionally plays during international crises, such as the 2014 Ebola crisis. The influence campaigns have prompted the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) to caution against the ongoing ‘global battle of narratives‘.

The COVID-19 response package

Of the pledged package of €15.6 billion, €3.25 billion will go to Africa, including €2.06 billion for sub-Saharan Africa and €1.19 billion for the Northern African neighbourhood countries.

The EU is allocating in total €3.07 billion for the whole neighbourhood: €2.1 billion for the south, and €962 million for the Eastern Partnership countries. In addition, €800 million will go to the western Balkans and Turkey.

The overall package entails another €1.42 billion in guarantees for Africa and the neighbourhood from the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD).

The EU will support Asia and the Pacific with €1.22 billion. Another €291 million will go to the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific region, €918 million to support our partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, and €111 million to support Overseas Countries and Territories.

In terms of thematic division of the funds, €502 million go to supporting the short-term emergency responses; €2.9 billion to supporting research, health and water systems in partner countries and €12.3 billion to addressing the economic and social consequences.

Source: European Commission.

The EU boosts its global action

Against this backdrop, the EU is stepping up its global action in response to the evolving crises, focusing on the most vulnerable countries across the world. On 8 April 2020, the European Commission and the HR/VP presented plans for a strong and targeted EU response to help partner countries cope with the pandemic, as outlined in the joint communication on a global response to fight the pandemic. The collective ‘Team Europe’ package focuses on addressing the pressing health crisis and humanitarian needs, bolstering partner countries’ health, water and sanitation systems as well as their research and preparedness capacities to deal with the pandemic, and mitigating the wider impact on societies and economies. This will help reduce the risk of destabilisation.

As a global actor and the world’s leading international aid donor, the EU supports and promotes a coordinated multilateral response, together with the United Nations (UN), international financial institutions (IFIs), as well as the G7 and the G20. The EU’s global response to the COVID-19 pandemic integrates its strategic objectives vis-à-vis environment and climate, in line with the European Green Deal and the Digital Agenda.

The ‘Team Europe’-approach combines resources from the EU, its Member States and financial institutions, not least the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The Commission and the EIB have already pledged more than €15.6 billion from existing programmes. The package will help the most vulnerable countries in Africa, the EU’s neighbourhood, Asia, the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean. The first packages are already being implemented in the neighbourhood and in the western Balkans (see below). Consistent with the Union’s fundamental values, core interests and global strategy, the joint communication underlines the EU’s continued commitment to promoting and upholding good governance, human rights, the rule of law, gender equality and non-discrimination, decent work conditions, as well as fundamental values and humanitarian principles. The communication specifically reiterates that the ‘special and extraordinary measures required to contain the pandemic must not lead to backtracking on the fundamental values and principles of our open and democratic societies’, and that the EU’s action will be fact-based and fight any attempts of disinformation inside and outside the EU.

The four pillars of the ‘Team Europe’ approach

The strategy for Europe’s external response to the global coronavirus crisis rests on four pillars:

Team Europe priorities: (i) emergency response to the immediate health crisis and humanitarian needs; (ii) boosting health, water and sanitation systems, as well as the partner countries’ research capacities to address the pandemic; and (iii) tackle the immediate socio-economic impact.

Team Europe packages: coordination with implementing partners – such as the EIB, the EBRD and European development finance institutions, Member States’ development agencies and technical assistance providers, as well as IFIs – to create a coherent package for each country.

Team Europe for Global Preparedness: support for the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, which has set the global fundraising goal at €7.5 billion.

Team Europe for global coordination and multilateralism: as a major international aid donor, the EU will promote and lead a coordinated global response, together with the G7, the G20 and the UN. The EU and its Member States’ contribution will be presented at country, regional and global level, in particular the G7, G20 and the UN-led international response, to boost the visibility of EU support to partner countries.

Examples of the EU’s COVID-19-related support in partner countries

The EU provides over €100 million for immediate health needs, mostly through the World Health Organization (WHO) and UN agencies. This covers countries most in need in Africa, Latin America and Asia. It also includes €30 million for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine and €38 million for the western Balkans.

Examples include: Albania: 5 fully equipped ambulances, respirators, digital mobile x-rays and intensive care equipment; Bosnia and Herzegovina: 7 500 test kits and personal protective equipment (PPE); ­Kosovo: 30 respirators, 5 fully equipped ambulances and 400 hospital beds; ­Montenegro: 100 respirators, 10 mobile X‑ray devices and PPE.; North Macedonia: 20 respirators, 5 000 testing sets and PPE.­ The EU also funded 5 flights of cargo planes to transport 280 tonnes of emergency medical supplies procured by Serbia.

Under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, €90 million helps fund health infrastructure and equipment.

The EU has mobilised €10 million for Ethiopia’s Preparedness and Response Plan to the COVID-19 outbreak to increase the number of treatment centres, labs with COVID-19 diagnostic equipment and test kits. In Nigeria, the EU contributes €50 million for the implementation of the UN Response Plan to COVID-19. In Sudan, €10 million will increase access to clean water and hygiene and boost awareness about the virus.

In Venezuela and the region, the EU is providing €9 million to the Pan-American Health Organization and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent to help prepare the response to COVID-19.

In the Caribbean, the EU is contributing €8 million in regional support to the Caribbean Public Health Agency to cover the countries’ most urgent needs regarding outbreak control operations.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘The EU’s global response to coronavirus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© Stuart Miles / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) is having a major negative impact on employment. As part of the EU’s response to the crisis, the European Commission has proposed the creation of SURE, a temporary instrument to complement national efforts to protect employees and the self-employed from the risk of unemployment and loss of income. Under the scheme, the EU would be able to provide financial support worth up to €100 billion to ‘short-time work’ schemes and other national measures that have this objective. The Eurogroup has welcomed the proposal, which the Council should now fine-tune and adopt rapidly. While the instrument is linked to the EU budget through a guarantee scheme, Parliament is not involved in the legislative procedure due to the legal basis.

Background

The coronavirus pandemic is a public health crisis that, although at different paces, is having severe socio-economic repercussions across the world, including in the European Union (EU) and its Member States. The pandemic is predicted to have a far worse impact on employment than the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The United Nations International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that, in the second quarter of 2020, Europe will lose 7.8 % of its total working hours, equivalent to 12 million full-time workers (-6.7 % or ‑195 million full-time workers globally). Various analysts rapidly pointed to the need for coordinated and bold policy responses to mitigate the impact of the crisis on citizens, societies and economies. In its March 2020 communication on a coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the European Commission included a section on measures to alleviate the employment impact on workers and sectors, noting the effectiveness of ‘short-time work’ (STW) schemes in this respect and the EU’s readiness to support, where possible, Member States in meeting this objective. Under public STW schemes, found in different forms in many Member States, firms experiencing difficulties can temporarily reduce the number of hours worked by employees (either partially or to zero), but pay them for the hours not worked thanks to support from public sources. Such schemes, therefore, play a stabilisation function and provide support to both workers and firms, sustaining households’ incomes and avoiding large numbers of dismissals. As for the self-employed, similar measures may provide income replacement in an emergency.

European Commission proposal

On 2 April 2020, the European Commission put forward a proposal for the creation of a European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE).

Objective and scope

The SURE instrument aims to make available financial support, in the form of loans granted on favourable terms, to Member States that need to mobilise significant resources to alleviate the socio-economic impact of the pandemic through STW schemes or similar measures. Total loans could amount to up to €100 billion. The instrument, which would be temporary and tailored to the response to the pandemic, will be available to all EU Member States as a second line of defence to finance measures that help protect jobs. It would complement national measures as well as other support that the EU provides in this policy area through grants under the European Social Fund. The United Kingdom will not participate in SURE during the transition period, given the provisions of Article 143(1) of its withdrawal agreement from the EU.

Financing and prudential rules

SURE does not require any upfront cash contributions from Member States. To back the lending scheme, Member States would commit irrevocable and callable guarantees worth €25 billion to the EU budget, with each guarantee calculated on the basis of their respective share of EU gross national income (GNI). Such a system should ensure a high credit rating, enabling the European Commission to contract borrowings on the financial markets at favourable conditions, with the purpose of on-lending them to the Member State requesting financial assistance. Further to providing credit enhancement, the guarantees would protect the resources of the EU budget, for which they would constitute external assigned revenue according to Article 21(5) of the EU’s Financial Regulation. In addition, the proposal includes prudential rules to manage the risks related to the loan portfolio, such as the provision that, taken together, the three Member States receiving the largest loans cannot get financial assistance worth more than €60 billion.

Functioning

If a Member State experiences a sudden severe increase in actual and planned public expenditure for the preservation of employment because of its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, it can request financial assistance under the SURE instrument to cover part of this additional expenditure. Relevant expenditure concerns the extension or creation of STW schemes or similar measures designed to protect workers from the risk of unemployment and loss of income. Importantly, it includes relevant measures for self-employed people. After receiving the request, the European Commission consults the Member State to assess the increase in expenditure and define the terms of the loan. On this basis, the Commission submits a proposal for a decision to provide financial assistance, on which the Council decides by adopting an implementing act. A loan agreement between the beneficiary Member State and the Commission details the characteristics of the loan, including all the elements listed in Article 220(5) of the EU’s Financial Regulation. According to the CEPS think-tank, the SURE instrument has the potential to provide substantial relief to national systems, although a number of features (duration and cost of the loans as well as the overall size of the instrument) may partially reduce its impact.

Legal basis

The legal basis proposed by the Commission is Article 122(1) and (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Council may adopt, by qualified majority, measures to provide Union financial assistance to Member States faced with severe difficulties caused by exceptional occurrences beyond their control. The European Parliament is not involved in this legislative procedure. Article 122(2) TFEU underpins the lending component of SURE. In the past, it was used to establish the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary tool through which the EU provided Ireland and Portugal with financial assistance conditional on the implementation of reforms between 2011 and 2014 (and bridge-finance to Greece in 2015). Unlike the EFSM Regulation, the SURE proposal is also based on Article 122(1) TFEU (the Council ‘may decide, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, upon the measures appropriate to the economic situation…’) as far as the guarantee scheme is concerned. Once the requirements for the activation of SURE are met, the text limits the conditions linked to financial assistance to the provision that beneficiary Member States must use it in support of national STW schemes or similar measures.

Eurogroup and Council

On 9 April 2020, the Eurogroup welcomed the proposal for the SURE instrument as part of a package of three measures worth €540 billion to fight the consequences of the pandemic. Mário Centeno, President of the Eurogroup, stressed the magnitude of the response to the pandemic that monetary and fiscal authorities and regulators have put in place so far: ‘Nearly 3 % GDP of fiscal measures, enhanced flexibility, additional liquidity schemes of 16 % of GDP.’ Ministers agreed on the need to establish SURE as a temporary loan-based instrument for financial assistance, and committed to making it operational as soon as possible, noting that the legislative process should advance without delay. They confirmed the size of the instrument that could channel up to €100 billion, adding that it should build on the EU budget as much as possible, while ensuring sufficient capacity for Balance of Payments (BoP) assistance, and on Member States’ guarantees to the EU budget. The Council is now expected to fine-tune and adopt the legislative text.

SURE is a temporary instrument specifically designed for the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission stresses that this in no way precludes the establishment of a future permanent European unemployment reinsurance scheme under a different legal basis. Recently revived in Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s political guidelines, this long-debated idea could increase the resilience of economic and monetary Union (EMU) against economic shocks. Parliament has repeatedly insisted on strengthening the social dimension of EMU. Following the proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, the possible creation of a permanent unemployment reinsurance scheme could be a further step in that direction.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘Temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Magdalena Sapala,

© Duangjan / Adobe Stock

On 2 April 2020, as part of the EU response to the needs resulting from the coronavirus outbreak, the European Commission proposed to activate the Emergency Support Instrument and reinforce the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (rescEU). Provision of funding for these measures (€3 billion) requires mobilisation of flexibility and last resort mechanisms available under the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). In order to use the global margin for commitments for this purpose, the Commission proposes to amend the provisions of the MFF Regulation and lift the restrictions on the scope of application of this flexibility mechanism. Consent from the European Parliament for this urgent request is expected to be voted during the 16-17 April plenary session.

Proposal to activate €3 billion to support healthcare systems

In its Draft Amending Budget 2/2020 (DAB 2/2020) the Commission proposed to activate €3 billion in commitment appropriations and €1.53 billion in payment appropriations under heading 3, ‘Security and Citizenship’ of the 2014-2020 MFF (see EPRS ‘at a glance’ note on DAB 2/2020). The resources, channeled through the Emergency Support Instrument (€2.7 billion) and rescEU (€300 million), would support the healthcare systems in EU countries fighting the COVID-19 pandemic (see below). Since the resources under heading 3 have already been exhausted, and there are no available margins or scope for redeployment, the Commission proposes to mobilise amounts still available under three flexibility instruments provided for in the 2014-2020 MFF Regulation: the global margin for commitments (€2 042.4 million), the contingency margin (€714.6 million) and the flexibility instrument (€243.04 million).

Amendment of the 2014-2020 MFF Regulation

The global margin for commitments (GMC) allows the re-use of margins left below the MFF ceilings for commitment appropriations in previous years. According to Article 14 of the MFF Regulation, the scope of its application is restricted to the area of youth and employment, and since the mid-term revision of the MFF in 2017, to migration and security measures. The Commission proposes to remove this limitation and amend the wording of Articles 3(2) and 14 of the MFF Regulation. As a result, the GMC would become a flexibility tool of more general purpose, allowing its use for the financing of actions under the Emergency Support Instrument with amounts which otherwise would not have been available. The modification would not increase the financial obligations of the EU Member States.

Procedures in the European Parliament and the Council of the EU

For the amendment of the relevant provisions of the MFF Regulation, a special legislative procedure applies with the Council acting unanimously after receiving Parliament’s consent. The proposal has been treated urgently by Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (Rule 163 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament) and is expected to be voted, along with DAB 2/2020 and other acts, during the April 2020 plenary session. Adoption of the MFF amendment is a prerequisite for the adoption of DAB 2/2020. It is noteworthy, that while the budgetary implications of the activation of the instrument are subject to Parliament’s approval, the activation itself is carried out without any role for Parliament. The Council adopted the proposal for activation of the Emergency Support Instrument and DAB 2/2020 using a written procedure concluded on 14 April.

Activation of the Emergency Support Instrument

The Emergency Support Instrument is one of the main elements of the package of proposals put forward by the Commission on 2 April 2020 (others are the EU short-time employment scheme (SURE), and the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative plus). Created in 2016, at the peak of the refugee crisis, and then

equipped with a budget of €650 million for three years, the instrument has proved useful and relevant as a rapid and flexibile tool in emergency situations. As emphasised by the Commission, given the severe humanitarian consequences and the scope of the social, economic and financial impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic, it is also a suitable tool to apply in the current situation. Activation of this emergency assistance is based on the principle of solidarity enshrined in Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and requires the adoption of the Commission’s proposal for a Council regulation on the provision of emergency support within the Union (2016/369) with some provisions amended in respect of the COVID-19 outbreak. Despite the contribution to this instrument from the EU budget, the decision on its activation is taken by the Council alone, without Parliament’s involvement. The creation of such an ad hoc mechanism with strong links to the EU budget but without full observance of Parliament’s prerogatives as co-legislator was previously criticised when the Emergency Support Instrument was first used to address the refugee crisis.

The general objective of the instrument is to provide emergency support within the EU to address urgent humanitarian needs, assistance, relief and operations to preserve life. By taking coordinated action and providing financial means, the EU will assist the national administrations in managing the ongoing health emergency and its aftermath, including through:

• wider and faster stock-piling and coordination of essential resource distribution across Europe;
• import and transport of protective gear across the EU;
• cross-border transport of patients to hospitals;
• cross-border cooperation to alleviate the pressure on health systems in the most affected EU regions;
• central procurement and distribution of essential medical supplies to hospitals and emergency supply of protective gear for hospital staff, such as respirators, ventilators, personal protective equipment, reusable masks, medicines, therapeutics, and laboratory supplies and disinfectants;
• improvement of production capacities of EU enterprises to ensure rapid production and deployment of essential equipment, products, medicines and material needed to urgently address supply shortages;
• support for the construction of temporary field hospitals and converted facilities;
• increasing the production of testing kits and support for acquiring key basic substances;
• boosting the swift development of medication and testing methods;
• developing, purchasing and distributing testing supplies (testing kits, reagents, hardware).

These actions will be complemented by the reinforced Union Civil Protection Mechanism (rescEU). The Mechanism, for which the EU has allocated €80 million in March 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, will provide direct, 100 % financing for joint procurement and purchase of necessary equipment on behalf of the Member States. Managed at the EU level, the stock-pile of medical equipment will be hosted by one or more Member States and dispatched at short notice in case of insufficient national capacity.

The Commission proposed to introduce the Emergency Support Instrument for a period of two years as of 1 February 2020. This means that grants will be able to be awarded retroactively for actions started after that date. As explained by Gert-Jan Koopman, the European Commission’s Director-General for Budget, for the management of the assistance, the Commission has created a cross-department task force, which would cooperate with the national and regional authorities, NGOs and health organisations involved in the implementation of the instrument on the ground. Apart from the financing requested under DAB 2/2020, the resources dedicated to the instrument can be complemented by direct contributions from the national and regional authorities, foundations, individual donations and crowdfunding.

The instrument also applies to the United Kingdom, currently in the transition period under its EU withdrawal agreement, within the EU budget for 2020.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘Amendment of the 2014-2020 MFF regulation. Using the global margin for commitments to finance measures in the healthcare sector under the Emergency Support Instrument‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

Adstock/shutterstock

Pursuing its efforts to uphold vital democratic functions during this critical time, the European Parliament is again holding an extraordinary plenary session on 16 and 17 April 2020, using the temporary alternative voting procedure first used in March, and with a large amount of voting time on the agenda. Under Parliament’s rules, the urgent procedure (Rule 163) has been requested for a number of legislative and budgetary files concerning EU action in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Under the procedure, Members will first have to vote, on Thursday, to accept the use of urgent procedure, and would then go on to vote on the substance of the legislative and budgetary proposals, including on any amendments tabled, the following day.

Parliament will hear Council and Commission statements on EU coordinated action to combat the pandemic and its consequences on Thursday morning. This is likely to include news on progress towards SURE, the proposed temporary instrument to protect workers from unemployment and loss of income, complementing national efforts with up to €100 billion in support for ‘short-time work’ schemes and other measures. As Council may adopt measures to provide Union financial assistance to Member States who face severe difficulties outside their control, Parliament is not involved in this legislative procedure. However, should the Commission propose the creation of a permanent unemployment reinsurance scheme to strengthen the EU economy against such shocks in future, it is likely that Parliament will be fully involved.

Of course, the virus itself recognises no borders, and the EU’s international action will also be debated during the session. Even though international travel has been severely curtailed during the current lockdown, a global response is essential to prevent resurgence of the pandemic. The EU has already committed to a ‘Team Europe’ approach, using funding from the EU, Member States and financial institutions to prepare a €15.6 billion funding package to help EU neighbourhood countries and beyond tackle the health crisis and, further down the line, address health and preparedness capacity, aimed at reducing the risk of destabilisation in the face of worldwide crisis.

Members will undoubtedly focus on the measures to address the effects of coronavirus on which Parliament has to vote. Parliament’s Regional Development Committee has requested the urgent procedure for votes to take place on one of a second set of measures to tackle the crisis caused by the pandemic, the use of specific flexibility measures for European structural and investment (ESI) funds. Members are likely to vote on a proposal that would temporarily allow programmes dealing with the impact of the crisis to be financed up to 100 % from the EU budget between July 2020 and June 2021, as well as greater simplification and flexibility in the rules under which the resources are allocated.

Measures to prevent the spread of the virus, such as restaurant closures and travel bans, have hit the fisheries and aquaculture sector particularly hard. Parliament’s Fisheries Committee have requested that additional proposals to support the industry are considered under the urgent procedure. Should Members agree, they would vote on a package of measures to supplement those already agreed under the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative. These would include support for a temporary end to fishing activities, including for aquaculture farmers, for storage costs and for greater flexibility and simplified procedures in allocating the funding.

In addition to those specific legislative measures, Members are expected to vote on a series of budgetary measures, including changes to the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF) regulation and two amending budgets, to re-orientate current financing towards tackling the pandemic. The European Commission has proposed to amend this year’s EU budget to use three flexibility and last resort mechanisms (the Global Margin for commitments, the Flexibility Instrument and the Contingency Margin) to release €3 billion in emergency support for the healthcare sector. Complemented by €1.53 billion in payments for the reinforced Union Civil Protection Mechanism (rescEU), funding under the Emergency Support Instrument will be used for production, procurement, stockpiling and distribution of medical equipment, including testing kits, and construction of field medical facilities. However, lifting the existing restrictions on the scope of this flexibility first requires amendment to heading 3 ‘Security and citizenship’ of the 2014-2020 MFF regulation, for which European Parliament consent is required. This consent vote is thus expected to be held on Thursday, enabling the amending budget to be voted the following day. The move is not without precedent, as the ESI was extended to cover migration issues – however not without criticism of its ad hoc nature, as well as the lack of Parliamentary oversight of such measures that, conversely, a regulation would provide. A second proposal to amend the 2020 EU budget is also expected to be put to the vote, aimed at mobilising the Contingency Margin to alleviate the increased migratory pressure in Greece and earthquake recovery in Albania.

The procedure for voting during the session will follow that of the March II session, with Members voting by email.

Written by Naja Bentzen and Jakub Przetacznik,

© millaf / Adobe Stock

The true extent of the evolving coronavirus pandemic within the EU and across the world is still unclear, and the magnitude of the consequences is not known either. What is clear, however, is that the healthcare systems of many countries across the world are underfunded, and that even developed countries are severely challenged by the health crisis.

Moreover, the socio-economic impact of the crisis across the world will likely be grave, while the multiple crises related to the pandemic – including the global infodemic – may have lasting effects on the global geopolitical balance.

Against this backdrop, on 8 April 2020 the European Commission and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) presented a proposal for a strong and targeted EU response to help partner countries cope with the pandemic, as outlined in a joint communication. In its response, the EU is adopting a ‘Team Europe’ approach, combining resources from the EU, its Member States and financial institutions.

The collective package of €15.6 billion is to help here and now, but also has a longer-term perspective. It will focus on addressing the pressing health crisis and resulting humanitarian needs, bolstering partner countries’ health, water and sanitation systems and their research and preparedness capacities to deal with the pandemic, as well as mitigating the impact on societies and economies. This should also help to reduce the risk of destabilisation.

The EU’s financial support for the countries covered by European Neighbourhood Policy will amount to €3.07 billion: €2.1 billion for the southern neighbourhood, and €962 million for the eastern neighbourhood. Moreover, €800 million will support the six western Balkan countries and Turkey.

As a long-standing major international aid contributor, the EU will promote and lead a coordinated multilateral response, together with the United Nations (UN), international financial institutions, and the G7 and the G20.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU’s response to coronavirus in its neighbourhood and beyond’ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Funds for western Balkan countries announced on 30 March 2020

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© thodonal / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus crisis is beginning to show signs of abating in some countries, but not in others. Governments and local authorities have introduced, maintained, and in certain cases even strengthened, a range of tough measures designed to prevent, suppress or mitigate the advance of the virus. Many analysts and politicians are increasingly calling for stronger global-level action to combat the pandemic, while medical scientists still struggle to find an effective treatment and a vaccine for the disease.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the coronavirus and related issues. Earlier publications on the topic can be found in the previous edition item in this series, published by the EPRS on 3 April.

A European approach to fund the coronavirus cost is in the interest of all
Bruegel, April 2020

The G20 must step up to confront the global health crisis
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2020

The coronavirus: A political earthquake
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

A temporary, common fiscal stimulus to answer the mayhem of COVID-19
Bruegel, April 2020

Take me to your Leader! Or how the EU could emerge stronger from the corona crisis
Egmont, April 2020

How is the COVID-19 crisis serving the EU?
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Love thy neighbour?
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

How to pandemic-proof globalization
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Cities “on the front lines” of the coronavirus
Atlantic Council, April 2020

Europe should seize oil price windfall to fund its pandemic response
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2020

A joint effort to increase production of medical masks in Europe
Cligenael, April 2020

This time is different: The ‘COVID shock’ and future of the global oil market
Instituto Affari Internazionali, April 2020

Predictions and policymaking: Complex modelling beyond Covid-19
Chatham House, April, 2020

Europe’s economic emergency is also a geopolitical one
Atlantic Council, April 2020

Tackling Covid-19 calls for trust: Building confidence is part of containing a pandemic
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, April 2020

Beyond Corona: Getting EU economic security right
Egmont, April 2020

Does Covid-19 pose a threat to the EU’s climate neutrality efforts?
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Coronavirus: How are countries responding to the economic crisis?
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

The Covid-19 pandemic in Russia: No applause for Putin’s political play?
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, April 2020

The coronavirus in Eastern Europe: Avoiding another Chernobyl
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Emerging lessons from Covid-19
Chatham House, April, 2020

Supporting NHS cybersecurity during Covid-19 is vital
Chatham House, April, 2020

Trouble for the EU is brewing in coronavirus-hit Italy
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Come on Europe, we need you!
Friends of Europe, April 2020

Will the economic strategy work?
Bruegel, April 2020

What might have been: Globalization on the medal stand at the Tokyo Olympics
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2020

Digital technology and economic science can help during crises like Covid-19
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2020

Our finest hour
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

No more red lines left to cross: The Hungarian government’s emergency measures
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Can the coronavirus Reset the Abkhazia Conflict?
Carnegie Europe, April 2020

How local leaders can stave off a small business collapse from Covid-19
Brookings Institution, April 2020

How Jihadi groups in Africa will exploit Covid-19
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

The military, policing and Covid-19
Brookings Institution, April 2020

An emergency inside an emergency: How quarantine has changed life for women in Italy
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

We are already in a recession: Can we make it a short one?
Brookings Institution, April 2020

After the pandemic: Can the United States finally retool for the Twenty-First Century?
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

‘A Band-Aid on a gunshot wound’: How the restaurant industry is responding to Covid-19 relief
Brookings Institution, April 2020

Eight recommendations for universities and professors during the coronavirus pandemic
Brookings Institution, April 2020

Coronavirus deals a blow to Ethiopia’s elections
Atlantic Council, April 2020

Trade policy and COVID-19: Openness and cooperation in times of a pandemic
European Centre for International Political Economy, April 2020

Populists love the pandemic
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 2020

L’Italie, pays-cible de la propagande chinoise à l’heure du Covid-19
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, April 2020

L’Union européenne et le coronavirus
Fondation Robert Schuman, April 2020

Le Covid-19, nouveau venu dans le conflit en Libye
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, April 2020

Covid-19 et instruments numériques: La délicate gestion des données
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, April 2020

Coronavirus in Arab countries: Passing storm, opportunity for change or regional catastrophe?
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2020

La démocratie coréenne au temps du coronavirus
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2020

Coronavirus and the new oil prices: The case of Italy
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, April 2020

Why the EU will play a greater global role post-Corona
Friends of Europe, March 2020

Santé: Une plus-value européenne très perfectible
Institut Jacques Delors, March 2020

Will the Italians forgive the EU?
Friends of Europe, March 2020

Why are some stock markets in Asia less affected by coronavirus?
Bruegel, March 2020

The European Green Deal after corona
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2020

How the coronavirus threatens a geopolitical Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

How Covid-19 is laying bare inequality
Bruegel, March 2020

The fiscal consequences of the pandemic
Bruegel, March 2020

Is Covid-19 triggering a new emerging-market crisis
Bruegel, March 2020

After the pandemic: Why Europe must restore its economic and social safety margins
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020

China’s exports of protective medical equipment fell less than its exports of all other products
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2020

EU solidarity in exceptional times
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2020

Orbán exploits Coronavirus pandemic to destroy Hungary’s democracy
Carnegie Europe, March 2020

How journalists can help stop the spread of the coronavirus outbreak
Reuters Institute, March 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Policy responses to the coronavirus crisis‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak