European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Etienne Deschamps,

© L’hymne européen. Disque produit par la Commission européenne et par le Conseil de l’Europe, 1995. Dessin de Jean-Michel Folon © Union européenne

In the inter-war years, advocates of European unity began pondering the choice of an anthem that would convey the feeling of sharing a common destiny and common values. The creation of the Council of Europe in 1949 spurred further calls to this end. Proposals for scores and lyrics for an anthem for Europe began appearing spontaneously. It was not until 1972, however, that the Council of Europe formally adopted the prelude of Ode to Joy from Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony as the European anthem.

For their part, the institutions representing what would become the European Union chose the debates on a citizens’ Europe held in the mid-1980s to adopt Ode to Joy as their anthem too. On 29 May 1986, the European flag and the European anthem were officially adopted at a ceremony held in Brussels. Although the version of the anthem chosen had no lyrics, it has come to symbolise the European Union. It is played at official ceremonies attended by the representatives and/or leaders of the European Union, and more generally at many events with a European theme.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Story of the European Anthem‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alina Dobreva,

© calvste / Adobe Stock

This paper presents the issues related to communicating the EU budget, outlining its importance for the perception of democratic legitimacy of the EU and the challenges involved in presenting it to citizens in clear, comprehensible terms. The EU budget is a financial translation of the objectives and strategy of the EU and the means to execute its policies. Therefore, the EU budget has a key role in framing and building the image and perception of each EU policy and the EU as a whole. Given the difficulties associated with communicating the EU budget, it is ever more important to put emphasis and efforts on presenting it to the public in the best possible way.

Part 1 analyses the main features of the EU budget from the point of view of communication opportunities and challenges. It furthermore addresses some of the most popular myths regarding the EU budget and answers questions such as whether its size is justified and who decides on it.

The extension of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to seven years has had a positive impact on the predictability and stability of EU spending. However, it has also led to misalignment with the electoral cycles, which makes it harder to communicate the link between Europeans’ political choices and the political priorities of the EU budget. The introduction of new genuine own resources has the potential, on the one hand, to make Europeans see a clearer link between their own money and the EU budget, and, on the other, to weaken the strongest point associated with presenting the budget to citizens – the net balance of Member States.

While the expenditure side of the EU budget is what citizens are most familiar with, it is also the subject of misperceptions, among other things, as to who actually manages it. The language and structure of EU budget expenditure is a message in its own right and has an impact on citizens’ perception of EU spending. Each of the following institutions – the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, as well as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and the new European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) – has a role in communication addressed at citizens as regards the EU budget. It is paramount to ensure that this communication delivers what it promises to do. The performance of the EU budget and, even more importantly, the information that citizens have about it, play a key role in how people perceive and evaluate the EU budget. Therefore, the current emphasis on performance budgeting has strong potential to alter citizens’ views of the EU budget.

Part 2 presents the current outcomes of the process linked to communicating the EU budget, based on Eurobarometer data. It analyses two key questions – do Europeans support a bigger EU budget, and what is the picture of the EU budget drawn by citizens – as a perceived and as a desired EU budget. In 2020, support for attributing greater financial means to the EU stood at 48 %, at its highest since 2005, when Eurobarometer surveys on this topic began. It varied between 69 % in Portugal and 16 % in Denmark. The data show that public opinion does not strictly follow the dominant narrative of beneficiaries and contributors. Citizens of beneficiary countries such as Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia consistently offer much weaker support for increasing the EU budget than the EU average. At the other end is Italy – a contributor Member State, whose citizens consistently voice stronger support for increased funding than the EU average.

Citizens have been asked what they think the EU budget is spent on and what they would like it to be spent on. The pictures drawn by their perceptions and their desires are very different. Citizens considered employment, social affairs and public health as the top priority areas of EU spending in 2020. It had been an overwhelming priority for them for the entire period covered by the surveys and was the unanimous choice as a top priority for citizens in all EU Member States in 2015. Citizens’ preference for EU spending on climate change has grown, and demonstrates potential for an even stronger preference for financial backing in the future.

The difference between citizens’ perceptions of what the EU budget is spent on and their desired EU spending priorities creates two types of gaps. One is the ‘underspending perception gap’ – the share of people who perceive a certain policy to be an EU spending priority is lower than the share of people who express a desire for that policy to be an EU spending priority. The largest underspending perception gap is in the area of employment, social affairs and public health. The ‘overspending perception gap’ is when a bigger share of citizens perceive a policy to be an EU spending priority than the share of people who want it to be such a priority. Here, the largest one is as regards administrative and personnel costs.

Despite some fluctuations over time, Europeans have very stable perceptions about what the EU’s spending priorities are. The biggest increase in the share of people perceiving a category to be an EU spending priority is related to immigration issues, and the biggest decrease is related to assistance to EU neighbours, including candidate countries. In both cases, perceptions shift with some delay relative to the actual events linked to the change in EU spending on the respective policy areas. It would be fair to say that the shift in citizens’ perceptions of EU spending is rather slow even in the case of sudden events related to an actual change in EU spending.

The priorities of EU budget spending, as perceived by the citizens, are also very different from the real EU budget priorities, which accounts for a significant ‘reality gap’ between citizens’ perceptions of EU spending and real EU spending. For example, data show that the perception of an overgrown EU administration is rather strong and stable over time. Citizens’ perceptions and desires regarding EU spending on three policy areas – administrative and personnel costs and buildings, employment, social affairs and public health, and agriculture and rural development, is examined in detail in this paper. These categories present examples of very diverse patterns of preferences and perceptions about EU budget spending.

Knowledge and perceptions about the elements that make up the EU budget are shaped through various channels, many of them dependent on the national, rather than the European, public sphere and portrayal of the EU budget debate. However, differences in the way the EU budget is perceived cannot be explained only by national factors. Further research is needed on the personal-level determinants of these perceptions to account for the growing influence of the European public sphere and cross-border communications, as well as to bring messages closer to citizens by fine-tuning them to their interests and concerns. The build-up of communication challenges related to the EU budget outlined in this paper has contributed to the misconceptions of citizens and the gaps between their perceptions and the reality of EU budgetary affairs. Some of the misconceptions could be addressed through a dedicated and well-targeted communication strategy. Other reasons, irrespective of their political and/or financial justification, create communication complexities that will continue to be beyond the reach of the public. These can only be addressed through the concerted efforts of policy-makers in bringing the EU budget closer to EU citizens in communication terms. Significant steps in this direction are the growing focus on results in budgetary reporting and the reform of the own resources system, both of which have the potential to contribute positively to communication on the EU budget and make it more comprehensible to citizens.

Read this complete in-depth analysis on ‘Communicating and perceiving the EU budget: Challenges and outcomes‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Etienne Bassot,

© European Union 2021 – Eric Vidal/EP

When Ursula von der Leyen took office as President of the European Commission on 1 December 2019, she and her fellow Commissioners did so on the basis of certain key political priorities which she had set out in statements to the European Parliament in July and November 2019, first as candidate for Commission President and then as President-elect. Her six priorities were to pursue ‘A European Green Deal’, ‘A Europe fit for the digital age’, ‘An economy that works for people’, ‘A stronger Europe in the world’, ‘Promoting the European way of life’ and ‘A new push for European democracy’.

During the new European Commission’s first one hundred days in office, however, the European Union, and indeed the whole world, were to be profoundly affected by the sudden outbreak of the coronavirus crisis, with the developing pandemic soon evolving into a multi‑faceted global crisis. This crisis has inevitably had an impact on the Commission’s six priorities and its practical capacity to pursue them over its five-year term (2019-24), but the interesting feature is that the Commission has not chosen to abandon or significantly change these priorities – simply adding a de facto seventh priority to its existing portfolio, namely action to contain the coronavirus crisis and promote economic recovery from it – nor has it significantly reconfigured the portfolios of members of the College, in response to the crisis, as some might have expected. (For example, there was no move to give greater responsibilities to the Commissioner for Health and Food Safety).

The European Commission has made it clear that it sees the coronavirus crisis as reconfirming the relevance of its existing priorities, rather than eclipsing or recasting them. It also sees the crisis as offering an opportunity to move further and faster in certain fields, talking about ‘the great acceleration of change’ which the crisis has unleashed and ‘the great opportunity it [has] paradoxically presented’. This attitude is notably the case with the two most ambitious of the six priorities – ‘A European Green Deal’ and ‘A Europe fit for the digital age’ – where the Commission has sought to use the momentum of events surrounding the crisis not only to assert the increased relevance of these priorities – suggesting that radical changes in human behaviour are possible and that these are likely to be driven in large measure by digital innovation – but to operationalise them further through the €750 billion ‘Next Generation EU’ (NGEU) recovery fund, which itself helps carry forward the third priority, ‘An economy that works for people’. Defined percentages of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the key element of NGEU, are to be used for investment in initiatives that will advance Europe’s move to climate-neutrality as a continent by 2050 and in digital modernisation of various kinds (37 and 20 per cent respectively).

The Commission has also sought to use the climate and digital agendas as a means to assert its fourth priority, ‘A stronger Europe in the world’. They offer an opportunity for the Commission to try to lead opinion on two major areas of policy where it has a global agenda for change – even if the geo-political setting was largely inhospitable until the replacement of Donald Trump by Joe Biden as US President, and still remains complex and challenging. With the spotlight on the causal link between the loss of biodiversity and the pandemic, the Commission President has set Europe the objective of leading the world at the conference on the Convention on Biological Diversity, scheduled for October 2021 in China.

Under the fifth priority, ‘Promoting our European way of life’, which includes migration and health, the impact of the crisis has been paradoxical: although it delayed several initiatives planned for 2020, it has greatly increased the likelihood of the Commission achieving the ambition of building a ‘European health union’. Here it has outlined pro-active initiatives to strengthen the EU’s crisis-preparedness and management of cross-border health threats, and to reinforce the mandates of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).

The Commission’s sixth priority – ‘A new push for European democracy’ – was initially set back by the coronavirus crisis, with the Conference of the Future of Europe stalled for some time. However, even here, the relevance of the Conference now appears to have been enhanced by debates about whether Europe is adequately equipped to address new global challenges (such as health pandemics) where expectations of common European action can be high. Delayed due to lack of agreement among the three main EU institutions on a series of procedural issues, a joint declaration between them was finally signed on 10 March 2021 – captured in the photograph on the front cover of this publication – paving the way to the official launch event of the Conference on 9 May 2021.

The successive annual Commission work programmes for 2020 – published in January 2020 and updated in May 2020 – and for 2021 – published on 19 October 2021 under the title ‘A Union of vitality in a world of fragility’ – show a surprising degree of continuity. Even if some legislative proposals (notably in the digital field) have been introduced later than originally anticipated – there were delays on 12 of the proposals originally flagged up in January 2020 – very little has fallen by the wayside and some new, ambitious elements have been added, most notably the introduction of a more stringent climate target (55 per cent reduction in greenhouse gases by 2030) and the launch of NGEU.

The von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities: Legislative delivery to 31 March 2021

Our assessment is that of the nearly 400 initiatives foreshadowed by the von der Leyen Commission on taking office or since (397), almost half have already been submitted (192). Among these, one in five has already been adopted (43), while the great majority of the remainder are either proceeding normally in the legislative process (97) or are close to adoption (26). Conversely, a certain number are proceeding very slowly or are currently blocked (26). While the Commission’s first priority, the European Green Deal, ranks highest in the number of initiatives announced (87), the third priority, ‘An economy that works for people’, has the greatest number so far actually adopted (15). It is worth noting that almost one in six of the Commission’s initiatives are non-legislative in character, such as strategies, action plans and other communications. (All figures here relate to the situation as of 31 March 2021).

This paper forms part of a series that monitors the stay of play on the achievement of Commission priorities and which is published, in principle, once every six months. There has been a significant increase in the number of initiatives submitted by the Commission under each of its six priorities, compared with only six months ago – an increase of one-third overall, compared with early September 2020. This confirms that the Commission has now entered the very active phase, in the early middle part of the five-year EU political cycle, during which the executive keeps coming forward with a large number of proposals, whilst simultaneously the twin branches of the legislature (the European Parliament and the Council of the EU) are fully engaged in considering and (very often) amending them.

One underlying condition for the success of the von der Leyen Commission’s priorities is, of course, having the financial means to implement the various initiatives tabled. In December 2020, the adoption of an unprecedented budgetary package for the years 2021 to 2027 brought new momentum to the financial front. The new Own Resources Decision will introduce important changes to the system and significantly increase resources for the next seven years. However, it still needs to be ratified by all the Member States, and completing that process is the next major challenge that the European Union faces in spring to summer 2021.

The following sections of this paper analyse, for each of the Commission’s six priorities, the state of play on its initiatives, reporting progress made, delays suffered, and any specific impact as a result of the coronavirus crisis. The infographic featured on the next page illustrates, in condensed form, on one page, the degree of progress so far made – both overall and under each of the six priorities. It is based on a proposal-by-proposal assessment which is available on the European Parliament’s ‘Legislative Train Schedule’ website, also developed by EPRS and available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/

The next edition of this paper will be published in September 2021, in advance of President von der
Leyen’s annual State of the Union address to the European Parliament.

Read this complete in-depth analysis on ‘The six policy priorities of the von der Leyen Commission: State of play in spring 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka,

© European Union 2021 – Source : EP / Jan VAN DE VEL

The April 2021 plenary session featured a debate on the outcome of EU-UK negotiations and the vote on the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Members also debated the conclusions of the 25 and 26 March 2021 European Council meeting and the outcome of the 6 April 2021 high-level EU-Turkey meeting. Members debated ways to save the summer tourism season and provide EU support to the hospitality sector, and underlined the need for affordable Covid‑19 testing. Parliament also debated statements by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borell, on Russia, Alexei Navalny, the military build-up on Ukraine’s border and the Russian attack on an arms depot in Czechia, on Chinese counter-sanctions, and on the fifth anniversary of the Peace Agreement in Colombia. Parliament also voted on a mandatory transparency register for outside interests meeting with the three institutions.

EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement

Parliament debated and approved, by a very large majority (660 votes to 5 with 32 abstentions), a decision to grant consent to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed by the EU with the United Kingdom and adopted a resolution on the subject. The Council completed the final adoption of the agreement on 29 April 2021, bringing the Brexit process to an end.

EU Covid-19 certificates

Parliament debated and adopted a mandate under the urgent legislative procedure to begin negotiations with the Council on the proposed digital green certificate. Parliament agrees with the Council and Commission that the proposed ‘certificate’ should facilitate free movement for Europeans when safe to do so. To avoid confusion, Parliament proposes to rename the initiative the ‘EU Covid‑19 certificate’.

2019 EU budget discharge

An important tool used by Parliament to ensure correct use of EU funding, Members debated and granted discharge for the European Commission and other agencies’ implementation of the 2019 budget. Parliament also granted discharge for the EU institutions other than the European Commission, except for the European Council and the Council, due to Council’s continued lack of cooperation. Finally, Parliament granted discharge for 31 of the 32 decentralised EU agencies subject to discharge. A decision to postpone discharge for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), until financial and human resource management issues are clarified, was adopted by an overwhelming majority.

Rail passengers’ rights and obligations

Parliament adopted at second reading the legislation on rail passengers’ rights and obligations, which strengthens passenger rights while reducing burdens on rail companies.

Dissemination of terrorist content online

As existing self-regulatory measures appear to have failed, Members debated and approved an early second-reading agreement on a new regulation addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online. The ambitious proposal seeks quick and smooth removal of content that seeks to radicalise, recruit or incite to violence. However, Parliament has also insisted on the need to protect freedom of speech.

Joint debate on research and innovation

Members held a joint debate on research and innovation in the EU. They approved the new Horizon Europe programme, which will allocate €95.5 billion to research and innovation that addresses the Union’s key challenges, including climate change and digitalisation. Members voted on the agreed text of the programme itself as well as on the specific implementing programme, which sets out more detailed provisions. Members also voted on the final text of two proposals concerning the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) in Budapest, a key part of Horizon Europe.

European Defence Fund

Parliament adopted at second reading the proposal to establish the European Defence Fund. This first-ever multiannual financial programme supporting defence research and technology will aim at reducing costly duplication of military procurement, with a budget of €7 billion.

Digital Europe programme

Members approved (without a vote) the early second-reading agreement on a proposal aimed at ensuring that the EU does not fall behind in the crucial strategic area of digital capacity. The Digital Europe programme will now fund investment in large-scale digital capacities in five key areas (advanced computing and data, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and advanced digital skills), with a focus on technology such as supercomputers that would otherwise be too expensive for single Member States.

Union anti-fraud programme

Reinforcing efficient protection of the EU budget, Members adopted an early second-reading agreement on the Union anti-fraud programme, for which Parliament negotiated a budget of €181.2 million.

LIFE programme

Members approved an early second-reading agreement (without a vote) on the new LIFE programme. Although, given the EU’s current ‘green’ priorities, Parliament initially called for €7 billion, the final proposal nevertheless allocates €5.45 billion for environmental initiatives.

Union Civil Protection Mechanism

Parliament debated and approved a final agreement on the financing for the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, ensuring that civil protection, prevention, preparedness and disaster response are prioritised.

Justice and citizens, equality, rights and values programmes

Parliament debated and approved funding for a new justice programme, aimed at upholding EU values. Parliament is a keen defender of core EU values and has fought hard for adequate funding, set at €305 million, for the measures. These include further development of a European area of justice based on the rule of law, mutual recognition and mutual trust, promoting justice for all and in particular gender equality and LGBTQI rights – issues that have not met with universal approval among the Member States. Members also approved an agreement on a new citizens, equality, rights and values programme, within the justice programme and aimed at funding the fight against inequality and discrimination in the EU.

European Globalisation Adjustment Fund

Parliament approved (without a vote) an early second-reading agreement on a proposal widening eligibility for European Globalisation Adjustment Fund intervention to include victims of restructuring and the Covid‑19 crisis and speeding up allocation of funds. With a maximum annual allocation of €186 million (outside the MFF), the fund will be renamed the European Fund for Transition.

Single market, competitiveness of enterprises and European statistics programme

Members approved (without a vote) an early second-reading agreement on the proposed single market, competitiveness of enterprises and European statistics programme, aimed at tackling existing and new barriers to competition and boosting consumer protection. The programme allocates a €4.2 billion budget to improvements to EU law, market surveillance, sustainability and access to quality European statistics.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed the mandate for negotiations from the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee on the proposal for amending Directive 2004/37/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – April 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Zsolt G. Pataki with Katerina Mavrona,

© Adobe Stock

‘Hybrid threats’, i.e. actions aimed at harming their targets through overt or covert military or non-military means, are increasingly used by state or non-state actors seeking to undermine democratic societies, in pursuit of strategic aims, without the necessity of financing the real costs of a classical military aggression. Hybrid tactics threaten citizens’ trust in democratic institutions, exacerbate political polarisation, sow confusion through stealth and through concealment of attackers’ identities, and do so using tools that are widely available and therefore cost-effective (e.g. information distortion and its amplification through digital communication technologies). In this way, perpetrators, foreign governments or domestic affiliates, profit from turning civil liberties, such as the freedom of expression, into vulnerabilities to manipulate and attack. However, just as online platforms and social media help launch disinformation campaigns at scale, so can communication and digital technologies act as barriers to online subversion.

Ways to achieve this are the subject of the ‘Strategic communications as a key factor in countering hybrid threats’ study by Iclaves and commissioned by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA), following a request from the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE). Targeting audiences via online platforms is one of many instruments available in the hybrid threat toolbox. The study presents complementary tactics, including the funding of political parties and cultural organisations, employment of strategic leaks and cyber weapons, use of religious influence or the fuelling of concerns about migration. At the centre of these, however, the study discerns an all-pervasive ingredient: the informational component. Information manipulation can ultimately transform, exacerbate and distort people’s beliefs, attitudes or emotions. Yet, for the same reason, the authors highlight that information can redeem the impact of hybrid tactics and help counter disruptive narratives.

Disinformation campaigns begin with the manipulation of content, usually addressing real facts from a distorted perspective, rather than presenting audiences with entirely fabricated stories. While this strategy lends some credibility to promulgated narratives, it also requires that the message bypasses traditional ‘gatekeepers’: journalists, editorial desks or fact-checkers. Online platforms offer fertile terrain for successful manipulation: they act as technological enablers – perpetrators deploying bot accounts by the thousands to amplify narratives is routine practice today – as long as questions on platform responsibility for content moderation remain unsettled.

How can the cycle be broken? The taxonomy of responses comprises sequential stages of prevention, detection and response. Across these, the study examines different response actions, ranging from intelligence, legal, diplomatic or even military action to informational measures and initiatives. As the name implies, ‘strategic communications’ come into play with a twist, as they are not about disjointed responses to unsolicited adversarial activity, but are executed according to predetermined and systematic plans and are designed to advance distinct policy goals. As such, they demand high levels of coordination among stakeholders. What is more, strategic communications planners anticipate that audiences may find themselves in conflictual environments and subject to a constant ‘information buzz’ made up of distorted or blatantly false messages.

What do strategic communications entail for the EU and its Member States? While democracies face an asymmetric fight against actors with no reservations about deploying illegitimate methods or illegal tools, the response resides in adherence to the very principles under attack. Truthfulness and credibility, the understanding of cultures, ideas and identities, reliance on and practice of mutual comprehension are the themes upon which strategic communications are structured. To present and assess these ideas, the study explores seven case studies extensively, where hybrid tactics with informational components were deployed and concomitant strategic-communications-based responses were used (e.g., external financing of religious extremism in the Netherlands, foreign influence by Russia and China through academia and think tanks, the Russian intervention in Ukraine, disinformation campaigns against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Lithuania). The study derives a number of challenges to effective strategic communications campaigns from these case studies, followed by targeted policy options.

Likely digital solutions to disinformation include the deployment of artificial intelligence for detection, the use of hyperconnectivity – afforded by the upcoming 5G rollout – for conducting mass fact-checking campaigns, or investment in blockchain security to improve traceability and ensure the integrity and veracity of stored and disseminated information. In the study conclusions, the reader can find a comprehensive table listing the risks emerging technologies pose in the context of hybrid aggression, as well as the advantages they offer for defenders and policy-makers. To successfully incorporate technological options to strategic communication responses, however, a comprehensive policy approach is required, and this is reflected in the study’s policy options.

The proposed policy options extend from the regulatory domain to investment policy: the authors mention further EU legal framework harmonisation to specifically target hybrid threats, disinformation and foreign interference, arguing for example in favour of adaptations to the EU sanctions regime, and for streamlining upcoming regulation on artificial intelligence. They also make explicit reference to strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation, signatories to which are major online platforms. In the case of investment policy, greater use of financial instruments for innovation to close the technological gap between the EU and its global competitors is proposed. Finally, emphasis is also placed on EU initiatives for improving coordination across the hybrid-threat stakeholder ecosystem, both internally (in the EU) and with external actors and organisations, including NATO.

The STOA Options Brief linked to the study contains an overview of various policy options. Read the full report to find out more, and let us know what you think via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Issam Hallak,

© niroworld / Adobe Stock

The level playing-field (LPF) provisions of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) constitute a key part of the agreement, and became a major source of divergence between the negotiators. LPF provisions establish rules to safeguard fair competition between the parties’ businesses. A notable component are the rules on social provisions, labour, environment and climate change, often referred to as the ‘trade and sustainable development’ (TSD) chapters in other free trade agreements (FTAs).

The trading relationship between the EU and the UK is fundamentally different from that with other non-EU countries since, on the one hand, EU laws were applicable to the UK until the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020 and, on the other, these two economies neighbour each other and are strongly interconnected. The TCA is therefore designed to maintain sufficiently ‘convergent’ standards to safeguard fair competition, while providing each party with the freedom to implement its own approach to social and environmental protection.

To this end, the TCA requires that parties do not weaken or reduce their levels of social, labour and environmental standards as of the end of 2020 (non-regression); the EU commitments on climate change, in particular on climate neutrality by 2050, will also remain for both parties. In addition, the TCA introduces rebalancing provisions creating a mechanism whereby a party can take ‘proportionate measures’ in order to offset any (adverse) ‘material impacts on trade or investment’ resulting from ‘significant divergences’ between parties. It also allows either party to request a review with a view to amending the agreement, and either party can opt to terminate the trade chapters if the amendment is not satisfactory.

Although the TCA LPF provisions on labour and environment are in many respects similar to those in the EU’s new generation FTAs, they strengthen the enforcement of non-regression provisions by allowing for remedial measures, and also reinforce the precautionary approach. The TCA also represents a notable innovation with its rebalancing and review provisions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The level playing-field for labour and environment in EU-UK relations‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Parliament (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

Members of the European Parliament certainly have their work cut out for them this month with a very full agenda, featuring budgetary discharge in respect of EU financial management in 2019, spending plans for a number of EU programmes in 2021‑2027, and a number of other legislative proposals, including on the proposed digital green certificate. The session will kick off with European Council and Commission statements on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 25 and 26 March 2021 and on the outcome of the high-level meeting between the EU and Turkey on 7 April 2021, overshadowed by protocol issues. A key point on the agenda will be the vote on Parliament’s consent to the Council decision concluding the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (which has been provisionally applied since 1 January, and could thus come fully into force on 1 May). Members will also debate a number of foreign affairs topics with the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, in particular the latest developments with Russia, not least the build-up of troops on the border with Ukraine. Members will then debate recommendations on EU-India relations, ahead of the May EU-India summit.

In a joint debate scheduled for Tuesday afternoon, Members will consider granting discharge for the 2019 EU budget. This annual exercise is carried out through 52 separate discharge decisions. The first batch concerns the European Commission, executive agencies and the European Development Funds, where Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) recommends discharge is granted. However, not without sounding the alarm regarding a deteriorating level of errors in spending and increasing incidences of fraud, particularly in agriculture and cohesion funding. The second set concerns EU institutions other than the European Commission, where, as every year since 2009, the CONT committee proposes to postpone the decision for the European Council and the Council, due to Council’s continued lack of cooperation. The committee recommends granting discharge for the expenditure of all other institutions, including the European Economic and Social Committee – although for the latter, observations are made regarding past cases of harassment. Finally, while various shortcomings are noted, the CONT committee recommends discharge is granted for a total of 31 of the 32 decentralised EU agencies subject to discharge. The committee proposes to postpone the decision in respect of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), due to issues with financial management and recruitment, as well as allegations of violations of fundamental rights.

Moving on to a number of proposals for EU funding for programmes in the 2021‑2027 financial period, Parliament is due to vote on the proposed regulation to tackle such fraud against EU finances on Thursday morning. The Union anti-fraud programme would build on the Hercules III programme. Parliament has negotiated a rise in the overall budget to €181.2 million, as well as to set the maximum rates for co-financing for grants at 80 % of the eligible costs.

On Tuesday afternoon, Parliament will debate and vote on funding for a new justice programme, specifically aimed at upholding EU values. Parliament is naturally a keen defender of citizens’ rights and core EU values and has fought hard for adequate funding for the measures. These include further development of a European area of justice based on the rule of law, mutual recognition and mutual trust, promoting justice for all and gender equality and LGBTQI rights in particular – issues that are not the subject of universal accord among the Member States. Members are also expected to vote on an agreement on a new citizens, equality, rights and values programme on Tuesday afternoon, complementing the justice programme and specifically aimed at funding the fight against inequality and discrimination in the EU.

Parliament is expected to debate and vote on the final agreement on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism on Monday evening. Here, Covid‑19 has highlighted the limits of what Member States can do alone, especially in situations that cross borders, and consequently the need for better EU preparedness to tackle natural and manmade disasters. Parliament has ensured that, of the €3.319 billion allocated, civil protection, prevention, preparedness and response to disaster measures are prioritised. The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund intervenes when employees are made redundant, often due to companies relocating their operations outside Europe. With such emergency solidarity funding likely to be under pressure due to the pandemic, Parliament is expected to vote on Tuesday afternoon on formal adoption of a proposal widening eligibility to include victims of restructuring and the Covid‑19 crisis and speeding up allocation of funds. With a maximum annual allocation of €186 million (outside the MFF), the fund will be renamed the European Fund for Transition.

The crisis has also galvanised moves towards greater strategic autonomy. On Thursday afternoon, Members are due to vote on Parliament’s second-reading position on a proposal aimed at ensuring that the EU is not left behind by big players, such as the United States and China, in the crucial strategic area of digital capacity. The proposed digital Europe programme is intended to fund investment in large-scale digital capacities in five key areas (advanced computing and data, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and advanced digital skills), with a focus on technology such as supercomputers that would otherwise be too expensive for single Member States. Regulation of the digital space has been somewhat overshadowed by the coronavirus pandemic recently, however posting of hate, violence and terrorist propaganda online has nonetheless continued. As existing self-regulatory measures appear to have failed, Members are expected to vote on an agreement for a new regulation addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online on Wednesday evening. The ambitious proposal seeks to remove content that seeks to radicalise, recruit or incite to violence within one hour of it appearing online. However, Parliament has insisted on striking a balance between removing such content and the need to protect fundamental rights, including the freedom of speech.

On Thursday afternoon, Members are expected to vote on a proposed new regulation on the LIFE programme, dedicated to environmental and climate objectives. Although, given the EU’s current ‘green’ priorities, Parliament initially called for €7 billion, the final proposal nevertheless allocates €5.45 billion for environmental initiatives, including a high number of biodiversity and ecosystem protection projects. Meanwhile, for anyone wishing to improve their personal carbon footprint by travelling long distance by train instead of by air, the issue of missed connections has proved a deterrent. This should improve with changes to the legislation on rail passengers’ rights and obligations. Parliament is due to vote on an agreement on Wednesday evening that strengthens passenger rights while reducing the burden on rail companies.

On Monday afternoon, Members will hold a joint debate on research and innovation in the EU. The Horizon Europe programme will have a budget of over €95.5 billion for the seven years, to support research and innovation addressing the Union’s key challenges such as climate change and digitalisation. Members are to vote on the agreed texts of the programme itself and on the specific implementing programme, which sets out more detailed provisions on the programme’s planned elements. They are then expected to vote on the final text of two proposals concerning the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) in Budapest, a key part of Horizon Europe. The proposals for a revised EIT regulation and a decision on the EIT strategic innovation agenda (SIA) reflect new funding priorities and the increased need to encourage economic growth and job creation through the EIT-led knowledge innovation communities. While Parliament proposed a €4.8 billion budget, protracted MFF negotiations led to a more constrained overall Horizon Europe budget, with a lower share for EIT of only €2.965 billion.

On Thursday morning, Parliament will vote on its second-reading position on establishment of the European Defence Fund. The proposals aim at reducing costly duplication of military procurement and research and technology activities. Tested under the previous EU financial framework, if the Fund is approved, €7 billion will be allocated to the first-ever multiannual financial programme supporting EU defence research and development.

Finally, on Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to vote on a proposal to improve competitiveness. The single market, competitiveness of enterprises and European statistics programme aims at tackling existing and new barriers to competition and boosting consumer protection. The programme will allocate a budget of €4.2 billion according to six specific objectives, including improvements to EU law, market surveillance, sustainability and product safety, all underpinned by the availability of high-quality European statistics.

Written by Miroslava Karaboytcheva (1st edition),

© Visual Generation / Adobe stock

On 18 June 2018, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation establishing a Customs programme for cooperation in the field of customs over the 2021-2027 MFF period, a successor to Customs 2020. The programme’s main objective is to fund actions aimed at strengthening the customs union.

On 15 December 2020, the co-legislators reached agreement in trilogue. The Council adopted its first-reading position on 1 March 2021. On 8 March 2021, IMCO – the committee responsible for the file in the European Parliament – adopted its recommendation for second reading of the Customs programme by the Parliament.

The Parliament voted to adopt the first-reading position without amendments on 10 March 2021, and the final act was signed the following day. The regulation was published in the Official Journal on 15 March 2021 and entered into force immediately, and with retroactive application as of 1 January 2021.

Versions

• Customs programme: Supporting cooperation to strengthen the customs union (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the ‘Customs’ programme for cooperation in the field of customs Committee responsible: Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) COM(2018) 442
18.06.2018 Rapporteur:

Maria Grapini (S&D, Romania)

2018/0232 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Ivan Štefanec (EPP, Slovakia)
Morten Løkkegaard (Renew, Denmark)
Alessandra BASSO (ID, Italy)
Anna Cavazzini (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Adam Bielan (ECR, Poland)
Anne-Sophie Pelletier (The Left, France) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Procedure completed. Regulation (EU) 2021/444
OJ L 87, 15.3.2021, pp. 1–16

Written by Branislav Staníček,

© Oleksandr / Adobe Stock

Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are key elements in the EU accession process for all western Balkan countries. Serbia and Kosovo have both declared their intention to join the EU. However, despite some initial successes, such as the Brussels Agreement of 2013, the dialogue facilitated by the EU and initiated in 2011 has stalled. In 2020, the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue was relaunched and supported by the international community. The appointment of United States (US) special presidential envoy Richard Grenell and special EU representative Miroslav Lajčák reflected the importance of the normalisation process. However, a lack of coordination and communication between the US and the EU means that no real progress has yet been made. The reasons for the very limited results are multiple, ranging from the internal political situation in both countries, to ambiguous and asymmetrical expectations of the normalisation agreement.

Whereas for Kosovo the final goal is clear – recognition by Serbia of its statehood – for Serbia, normalisation of relations is interpreted in economic terms as an ‘economic normalisation’ and there is only limited space to go beyond those terms. Serbia also stresses that the process must remain within the framework defined by the Serbian Constitution, which considers Kosovo to be an integral part of the Serbian territory, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. Currently, the most sensitive issue, the setting-up of the association/community of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo, agreed in 2013, shows that the challenges are rooted deeply in history and have a much broader regional context.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Belgrade-Pristina dialogue: The rocky road towards a comprehensive normalisation agreement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Belgrade-Pristina dialogue: The rocky road towards a comprehensive normalisation agreement’ on YouTube.

Written by David de Groot,

© Yuliia / Adobe Stock

Racial and ethnic minorities face discrimination and its consequences on a daily basis. The exact scale of the problem is hard to gauge owing to a lack of data and general under-reporting of racist incidents. The pandemic has seen a major increase in reports of racist and xenophobic incidents, however, while racial and ethnic minority groups have been disproportionately affected by the crisis, with higher death and infection rates.

Although since 2000 the European Union (EU) has introduced legislation to combat racial and xenophobic discrimination, the problem persists, with the need for new measures recently highlighted by the global Black Lives Matter protests. A number of studies also point to the cost of racial discrimination not only for the individuals concerned but also for society as a whole. For instance, a 2018 EPRS report argued that the loss in earnings caused by racial and ethnic discrimination for both individuals and societies amounts to billions of euros annually. The problem is also acknowledged by EU citizens: a 2019 survey found that over half of Europeans believe racial or ethnic discrimination to be widespread in their country.

To address racial discrimination and its underlying inequalities, the European Commission has put forward a number of equality strategies and actions. The first European Summit against Racism was held on 19 March 2021. The European Parliament, meanwhile, has long been demanding an end to racial discrimination. In recent resolutions, Parliament has called for an end to structural racism and discrimination, racial profiling and police brutality, and for the right to protest peacefully.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU legislation and policies to fight racial and ethnic discrimination‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘EU legislation and policies to fight racial and ethnic discrimination’ on YouTube.

Opinion on how widespread ethnic discrimination is in the Member State

Written by Nicole Scholz (1st edition),

© m3ron / Adobe Stock

On 11 November 2020, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on serious cross-border threats to health. In the light of lessons learned from the Covid-19 crisis, it aims to strengthen the EU’s health security by revising Decision No 1082/2013/EU (the ‘Cross-Border Health Threats Decision’). The proposal was presented in a package that also includes proposals to strengthen the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA), as first steps towards a European health union.

Stakeholders widely welcome the proposal and the package. Some say it could be improved further, suggesting concrete elements, while others think it should go beyond crisis preparedness. Still others consider it a springboard to a bigger role for the European Union (EU) in health. Parliament has repeatedly called for stronger cooperation on health, for a new regulation to replace the Cross-Border Health Threats Decision, and for revised mandates of both the ECDC and the EMA.

Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety is responsible for the file and the rapporteur’s draft report is expected to be presented in committee on 22 April 2021. In Council, work is ongoing in the working party on pharmaceuticals and medical devices.

Versions

• Building up resilience to cross-border health threats: Moving towards a European health union (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 1082/2013/EU Committee responsible: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) COM(2020) 727
11.11.2020 Rapporteur:

Véronique Trillet-Lenoir (Renew, France)

2020/0322 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Esther de Lange (EPP, Netherlands)
Sara Cerdas (S&D, Portugal)
Joëlle Mélin (ID, France)
Kateřina Konečná (The Left, Czechia) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Discussion of draft report

Written by Ralf Drachenberg,

© European Parliament / EPRS 2021

Does the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) represent an evolution for the EU or déjà vu? On 14 April 2021, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) hosted an online policy round table with the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, discussing exactly this question. The first of two online policy roundtables to examine the recent negotiations on the 2021‑2027 MFF, the discussion concentrated on the lessons learned from the negotiations, as well as what the outcome delivers for citizens. There are at least four take-aways from the discussions.

1. Centrality of the European Council

All participants agreed that the centrality of the European Council in the discussions was clearly a case of ‘déjà vu’, as EU Heads of State or Government have always been heavily involved in long-term EU budget negotiations, as national governments have to provide the majority of the funding. While some argued that the role of the European Council has become more influential in recent years, others predicted that any alternative scenario in the current order of the European Union would be unlikely, as MFF negotiations are likely to remain forever Chefsache.

2. Important developments

At the same time, this round of MFF negotiations included important evolutionary elements for both EU integration and EU governance. One of the most important evolutionary aspects was the increase of the own resources ceiling. This clearly has the potential to radically change the EU’s own resources system, a point which was stressed both by the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, (S&D, Italy) and by Jim Cloos, Secretary General, Trans-European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) and former Deputy Director-General in the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. Another evolution was the new Recovery and Resilience Facility, and the possibility for the EU to borrow money on the markets. Participants agreed that another evolution in these MFF negotiations was the recalibration of ‘traditional’ alliances on the MFF, unravelling the two formerly solid blocks of net contributors and net beneficiaries.

3. An MFF agreement born out of crisis

Participants concurred that the agreement on the 2021‑2027 MFF was historic, but that it needs to be placed in the correct political and economic context, as it was clearly a result of the Covid‑19 crisis. In the view of Brigid Laffan, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, the MFF agreement showed how the EU as an organisation has learned from previous crises and as a result, the EU’s response was a lot less intergovernmental and rather more a collective agreement between the EU‑27 and the EU institutions. The discussions also aligned around the fact that Brexit had a positive effect on the MFF agreement, because there would have been no supranational instruments for the Covid‑19 recovery with the United Kingdom as an EU member.

4. What will the future bring?

While there was debate about the extension of qualified majority voting in the Council, most participants agreed that the Conference on the future of Europe could provide an ideal moment to take further steps towards EU integration in the budgetary field. One possibility would be to build on the achievements of the European Parliament, notably the legally binding agenda for the introduction of new own resources. Another possibility would be to find ways to make the evolutionary element of borrowing money on the markets more permanent, as requested by Antonio Tajani (EPP, Italy), Chair of the European Parliament’s Conference of Committee Chairs and Chair of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. In his view, in order to face future crises, the EU needs the continuation of the SURE programme, a strong EU4Health programme, a modern EU industrial policy and a reform of the EU decision-making process.

To engage EU leaders in the discussions on the Conference on the future of Europe and create the necessary political buy in, EPRS Policy Analyst Ralf Drachenberg, suggested a similar initiative to the 2019 series of plenary debates with EU Heads of State or Government on the future of Europe.

More information on the 2021‑2027 MFF negotiations.

Moderated by Astrid Worum, Head of the EPRS European Council Oversight Unit, the event was very well attended, with close to 300 participants. Those who missed the event can watch the recording or read the EPRS in depth analysis on The role of the European Council in negotiating the 2021‑2027 MFF praised by all speakers for its relevance and high quality. The second EPRS event on the 2021‑2027 will take place on 4 May 2021 at 13:30‑15:00.

Conference on the Future of Europe: https://futureu.europa.eu/

© Adobe Stock

Citizens frequently turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union is doing to enable citizens to access online content when travelling within the EU?

Between 2015 and 2019, the number of internet users trying to get cross-border access to content almost doubled, according to a Eurobarometer survey. In many cases, however, consumers were not able to access (or only partially) the service they had subscribed to, or they were not able to use the online content they had previously purchased or rented in their home country. New legislation on access to online content when abroad entered into force in April 2018, followed by legislation on unjustified geo-blocking in December 2018.

2017 Regulation on accessing online content abroad

Against the background of the Digital Single Market Strategy published in 2016 by the European Commission, the European Union adopted legislation to end restrictions on accessing online content abroad.

The 2017 legislation on portability of online content enables users to access, the same way as they do at home, their online film subscriptions and other digital products when temporarily present in another EU country. This is subject to prior verification of the country of residence of the subscriber.

To mark one year since the entry into force of the EU legislation on portability, the European Commission issued a press statement.

2018 Regulation on geo-blocking

Geo-blocking prevents consumers from purchasing consumer goods and accessing digital content online from other EU countries. According to the European Commission, 38 % of retailers selling consumer goods and 68 % of digital content providers that replied to an inquiry into the e-commerce sector answered that they geo-block consumers located in other EU countries.

The 2018 legislation on addressing unjustified geo-blocking ensures that buyers of goods or services from another EU country are treated like local customers. More details is available on the Legislative Train website. A review of the regulation by the European Commission, in particular the assessment of the scope, is overdue since spring 2020. In February 2021, the European Parliament, through its parliamentary Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), put a question to the European Commission whether it intended to address the implementation issues in an upgraded legislation.

The European Commission website on geo-blocking features more information on its action.

European Parliamentary questions

Members of the European Parliament regularly address questions to the European Commission on cross-border content portability, for example regarding access to online content services, the effects of geo-blocking, or exemptions.

Further information

• The Legal Framework for E-commerce in the Internal Market, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Study, 2020
• How to Fully Reap the Benefits of the Internal Market for E-Commerce?, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Study, 2020.
• E-commerce: Ban on unjustified geo-blocking and discrimination practices among customers, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), At a glance, 2018

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

© Theseamuss / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus crisis has underlined the need for the European Union to devote greater efforts to anticipatory governance, and to attempt to strengthen its resilience in the face of risks from both foreseeable and unforeseeable events. This paper builds further on an initial ‘mapping’ in mid-2020 of some 66 potential structural risks which could confront Europe over the coming decade, and a second paper last autumn which looked at the EU’s capabilities to address 33 of those risks assessed as being more significant or likely, and at the various gaps in policy and instruments at the Union’s disposal. Delving deeper in 25 specific areas, this new paper identifies priorities for building greater resilience within the Union system, drawing on the European Parliament’s own resolutions and proposals made by other EU institutions, as well as by outside experts and stakeholders. In the process, it highlights some of the key constraints that will need to be addressed if strengthened resilience is to be achieved, as well as the opportunities that follow from such an approach.

In April 2020, the participants in the inter-institutional European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), which aims to identify and analyse medium- and long-term global trends facing the European Union, were invited by the Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for foresight to offer ‘food for thought’ on issues arising from the coronavirus pandemic, with a view to helping refine collective thinking on how to increase the long-term resilience of the Union over the coming decade. In this context, this paper, the third in a series, follows on from ‘An initial mapping of structural risks facing the EU’ (July 2020), which set out some 66 potential structural risks confronting the European Union in the aftermath of the coronavirus crisis, and ‘Capabilities and gaps in the EU’s capacity to address structural risks’ (October 2020), which looked at those risks from the mapping which were considered as more immediate and significant, and considered ways in which the EU and Member States could address them, either with existing capabilities or through filling gaps in policies and instruments. The present paper drills down deeper in 25 areas presented in the previous papers, looking in greater detail at possible action by the EU and highlighting proposals from various quarters, including the European Parliament itself, and at potential or actual constraints that might hinder action in these fields.

Read the complete study on ‘Towards a more resilient Europe post-coronavirus: Options to enhance the EU’s resilience to structural risks‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mar Negreiro,

© Jackie Niam / Adobe Stock

Coronavirus has accelerated the rise of digital health, a broad concept that includes solutions for telemedicine and teleconsultation, remote monitoring, connected devices, digital health platforms and health apps. The concept also covers the related health data analysis and application in systems based on big data, for instance for epidemiological research and AI-enabled diagnosis support.

Digital technologies are becoming critical in the fight against the ongoing pandemic. They have been used, among other things, for online medical consultations from home and for increasing efficiency in diagnosis and treatment of patients through telemedicine, which, like teleworking and online education, has been a novel experience for many.

Likewise health workers have been using digital technology to diagnose the virus. For instance, China has developed new e-health apps allowing patients to assess their Covid-19 symptoms remotely. Patients with existing critical illnesses, reluctant to go to hospital because of the risk of contracting the virus, have been able to get online consultations from home and have in some cases been monitored remotely. Moreover, thanks to the availability of digital health records and e‑prescriptions in many EU countries, it has been possible to issue repeat prescriptions remotely, limiting unnecessary contact between doctors and patients and reducing the chances of exposure to the virus.

Nevertheless, there are many challenges to overcome as advances in digitalisation of healthcare come with drawbacks. They highlight a widening ‘digital divide’ that risks leaving behind the elderly and socially disadvantaged, who are less able to master or afford the technology. In addition, liability, reimbursement and cybersecurity issues are among the other key challenges that need to be considered, as cyber-attacks on hospitals are on the rise. Meanwhile, the transfer of personal health data is fuelling a debate over who owns and controls that data, raising questions over individuals’ rights to privacy. What is clear is that digital health is here to stay.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The rise of digital health technologies during the pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Percentage of people (aged 16 to 74) using the internet for health-related activities

Written by Andrés García Higuera,

STOA delegation virtual visit to the Joint Research Centre

Scientific and technological advances lie at the heart of economic growth, and will be key to the economic recovery post-coronavirus. In line with their mission to support technological innovation, the legislators on the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) recently took part in a virtual visit to the Joint Research Centre (JRC) site at Ispra, Italy – Europe’s leading research campus with a wide range of laboratories and unique research infrastructures. The JRC’s operations at Ispra are geared to providing science-based responses to policy challenges with scientific, technological and socio-economic dimensions, with a number of their key research areas being of particular relevance and interest to STOA, including their research on the economics of climate change, on energy efficiency and transport, and on knowledge for growth.

Initially scheduled for May 2020, this STOA Panel virtual visit took place on Tuesday 16 March 2021, following an introductory presentation of the JRC mission and activities and a formal invitation issued to Members by the Director-General of the JRC, Stephen Quest, at the STOA Panel meeting of 29 January 2021. Although it would have been preferable to visit the site physically to interact with the impressive team of JRC scientists, this virtual alternative allowed eleven Members of the European Parliament to attend the visit organised by Eva Kaili, (S&D, Greece and STOA Chair) – highlighting the relevance of the JRC’s work to policy-makers.

Stephen Quest welcomed the delegation, underlining the need for high-quality science and for information to be shared with policy-makers to provide a service, through them, to wider society. This JRC-STOA cooperation goes beyond research, to knowledge management and better communication between science and policy, in line with the mandate of both STOA and the JRC to assess science and technology and inform policy-making.

The visit began with a presentation of the JRC-Ispra work on Artificial Intelligence with a European perspective and its focus on the health sector. The JRC operates ‘AI Watch‘, the artificial intelligence (AI) observatory for Europe, in partnership with the European Commission’s Directorate‑General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CNECT), and supports the development of AI policy through its research activities. This was followed by a session dedicated to ‘The Green Deal’, another of STOA’s priorities, where the Knowledge Centre on Bioeconomy was presented. The next session was dedicated to ‘Quality of Life’, in which the upcoming Knowledge Centre on Cancer (KCC) was presented as part of the European Commission’s activities to tackle cancer, supporting the European Union’s Beating Cancer Plan, the Mission on Cancer, and connecting with some 12 European Commission Directorates-General. The visit continued with a remote tour of some of the JRC laboratories at Ispra, which began by presenting the Vehicle Emissions Laboratory (VELA) and its work in relation to car emission measurements. The delegation continued with a visit to the European Laboratory for Structural Assessment (ELSA) and an overview of its work in relation to energy efficiency and the seismic safety of buildings.

This visit served to provide STOA Panel members with much information and insight into JRC activities, as well as making useful links with experts, in view of future STOA work. The Ispra facility is the biggest centre of the JRC and half the JRC’s staff are based there, with 1 500 people working at its diverse laboratories and research facilities – connected by 35 kilometres of internal roads, at this unique site situated beside Lago Maggiore in northern Italy.

STOA looks forward to further collaborations with the JRC to exploit the synergies that became apparent through this visit, as well as to facilitating follow-up exchanges between experts and STOA Panel members on the topics addressed in these virtual sessions.

Read More: STOA delegation virtual visit to the Joint Research Centre site in Ispra | News

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Andrés García Higuera (STOA) with Marlene Arens and Jakob Wachsmuth (Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI),

What are the options for closing the carbon cycle through substitution of fossil fuel use and how can they help to meet the Green Deal objectives? How can the EU hydrogen strategy contribute to this objective?

These questions were addressed at a STOA workshop, chaired by Members of the European Parliament and STOA Panel members Tiemo Wölken (S&D, Germany) and Patrizia Toia (S&D, Italy), and held on 1 March 2021. The event provided a broad view of hydrogen and other solutions for decarbonising European industry for some 390 participants. Policy-makers, scientists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and industry representatives highlighted the opportunities and risks of a hydrogen economy. Several speakers discussed the hierarchy of hydrogen use (steel and chemical industry, aviation and shipping are commonly agreed upon), and where it should not be used (household heating and private transport, according to some). Some industry representatives and some scientists called for decarbonisation of the European industry, where hydrogen use is supplemented by technologies that enable closed carbon cycles, while NGOs and other scientists called for a clear phase-out of fossil fuels.

Key takeaways

STOA Panel member Timo Wölken opened the workshop and introduced the political context, mentioning key legislation and goals such as the long-term targets of climate neutrality in the EU and the publication of the EU hydrogen strategy. Additionally, he pointed to the proposed legislation on a trans-European energy infrastructure and the Fit for 55 package.

Stressing that private investment is needed to advance, STOA Panel Member Patrizia Toia emphasised the current strong European push for hydrogen and the ongoing technological research.

Birgit Honé, Rapporteur for the European Committee of the Regions’ opinion on clean hydrogen, pointed out that hydrogen could be a great opportunity for regional development, as the production of local green hydrogen might provide €30 billion of added value and 800 000 additional jobs. She concluded that the Fit for 55 package should entail becoming fit-for-green-hydrogen.

Sarah Nelen, Deputy Head of Cabinet of European Commission Executive Vice-President Frans Timmermans, addressed the urgency for climate action in industry, as 2030 is very close in terms of investment cycles, which are typically long in energy-intensive industries, meaning that the EU needs to prepare for a roll-out of hydrogen. Sarah Nelen also highlighted the advantages of the EU as a single market when it comes to the implementation of standards, certification or infrastructure.

Stating that meeting EU sustainability targets requires that we pass to a circular economy for carbon, Gabriele Centi, President of the European Research Institute of Catalysis, sees the need for a long-term vision on how to close the carbon cycles. He also called for a system approach, focusing on replicability and flexibility, and spoke of the need to create an innovation ecosystem with all relevant stakeholders, as well for a radical system change to replace incremental innovations.

Carl de Maré, Head of Technology Strategy at Arcelor Mittal, stated that betting on hydrogen was risky, as hydrogen is not yet available, is expensive, and current synergies would be lost. He saw smart carbon usage as an opportunity, because the emitted carbon could be used for other products, supporting circular carbon concepts. Carl de Maré concluded that taking CO2 as a resource was a ‘no-regret’ option, which should be developed further to achieve carbon neutrality.

Imke Lübbeke, Head of Climate and Energy at the World Wildlife Fund, pointed out that green hydrogen is a scarce resource and should therefore be used in selected sectors only, such as shipping, steel and chemicals, and not for large-scale heating and road transport purposes. Moreover, she stressed that blue and pink hydrogen are not sustainable options. She strongly argued for a clear phase-out of fossil fuels and that hydrogen should be produced only from additional renewable electricity. She also strongly argued for increased efforts on energy efficiency and for the inclusion of the public in decision-making. Imke Lübbeke concluded that hydrogen has a crucial role, but this role needs to be considered carefully.

Presenting the results of an almost finalised STOA study, Frank Meinke‑Hubeny (VITO/EnergyVille) pointed out the implications of a steel production transition to hydrogen. If Europe’s current coal-based steel production switched to green hydrogen, 37‑60 GW of electrolysis capacity would be needed, which is more than the current EU target for 2030 of 40 GW. He also warned that hydrogen based steel-making would not be available on a broad scale in the next five years and that green hydrogen would not be cost-competitive by 2030. However, considering the long-term perspectives, Frank Meinke‑Hubeny found that hydrogen-based steel-making was likely to be cheaper than coal-based steel-making by 2050. He added in this regard that grey and blue hydrogen might be available at lower cost than green hydrogen by 2030. The draft study he presented also analyses infrastructure needs and finds that repurposing of current natural gas grids seems preferable to building new pipelines.

Heiko Reese (IG Metall) stressed the importance of the EU steel industry as an employer of 330 000 people. He also underlined that both companies and employees support the European climate goals. In his view, hydrogen is a technically feasible option for decarbonising the steel industry, but this would imply the need for huge amounts of hydrogen and thus huge investment. Moreover, operational costs would increase, as hydrogen is more expensive than coal. Public support is therefore crucial to enable this steel transition. In addition, cross-border infrastructure is also needed, and not only for hydrogen.

Directing his audience to consider the challenges of switching the steel industry to hydrogen, Carlo Mapelli (Politécnico di Milano) noted that operational costs will increase and that storage and transport of hydrogen is a complex issue. He suggested that a promising future option might be to use the existing gas infrastructure when combining steel production with carbon capture and utilisation. In this context, he added that handling CO2 is not dangerous at all and that carbon could be utilised for products such as carbon nanotubes, graphite, bio-char or bio-methane.

Closing the workshop, Tiemo Wölken stated that, in his view, it is now the task of policy-makers to push for the realisation of cost-effective hydrogen supply and use.

Next steps

The STOA study ‘Carbon-free steel production. Cost reduction options and usage of existing gas infrastructure’, soon to be published on the STOA website, finds that a hydrogen-based industry may be more profitable than a fossil-based industry in the long term. In that sense, hydrogen offers a technically feasible and promising option for decarbonising European industry. However, there are huge economic implications for the current stock of production technologies and the energy system, in addition to operational costs. An additional, ongoing, STOA study on ‘The potential of hydrogen for decarbonising EU industry’, being developed by Fraunhofer ISI and the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, will provide guidance for this task by looking at policy options for decarbonising EU industry and realising a hydrogen economy. The final report is expected in October 2021. STOA continues to carry out its mission of providing Parliament’s committees and other parliamentary bodies with independent, high-quality and scientifically impartial studies to support the assessment of the impact of possibly introducing or promoting new technologies and identifying, from the technological point of view, the options for the best courses of action to take.

For more details read the full workshop report or watch the recording of the event.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Adobe Stock

Existing economic theories, based on foundational notions of ‘markets’ and ‘firms’, may not be sufficient to correctly interpret the behaviour of online platforms. This was one of the main conclusions of the study ‘Online platforms: Economic and societal effects’, which was carried out by Professor Annabelle Gawer of Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, at the request of the STOA Panel, following a proposal from Member of the European Parliament, Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece), Chair of the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA).

Online platforms, such as Google, Amazon and Facebook, play an increasingly central role in the economy and society. They have grown to an unprecedented scale, propelled by data-driven business models. Their rapid growth has caused concerns about market dominance and the widening information and power asymmetry between platforms and citizens, businesses and regulators. Online platforms have a massive impact on individual users and businesses, and are recasting the relationships between customers, advertisers, workers and employers. This has triggered a public debate on the economic dominance of platforms and their practices of pervasive data collection.

Their effects are distinct and identifiable, although they are certainly only one important piece in the puzzle of the rapidly reorganising global economy. For example, the platform operators, while still claiming to be only an intermediary, have gained unprecedented control over the organisation of work, as they are likely to generate fragmented work schedules and increasing levels of part-time work without the employment-related benefits that previously characterised much employer-based full-time work.

What are the very different and significant impacts that digital platforms may have on different social groups and employment sectors? How are the new models of the platform economy affecting employment (with the creation of new types of jobs), business models (with the appearance of new sectors of business activity) and the social fabric (need for insurance schemes and a welfare state that correspond to the new forms of the economy)? Are the recent legislative proposals contained in the European Commission’s proposed digital markets act (DMA) and digital services act (DSA) tackling the identified regulatory challenges sufficiently?

Against this background, the study offers a definition of digital platforms, provides a classification of the most salient types of digital platforms and pays particular attention to the ‘big tech’ companies (Alphabet-Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft). The characteristics of digital platforms are examined in detail, with a particular focus on how these platforms create value, the common economic, business and governance characteristics that they share, and their geographical distribution.

Professor Gawer presents a detailed synthesis of the literature, to assess how the new economic models have affected users, businesses, competition, innovation, employment and the social fabric. More concretely, the study sheds light on the multiple ways platforms create and capture value in the digital economy, including their positive effects on global innovation, such as their large investments in research and development, the stimulation of innovation in complementary products and services, and the special role of the design of the digital interface in solving the recurring tension between stimulating third-party developers’ complementary applications and maintaining platform control.

In addition, the study assesses how digital platforms are currently regulated under EU law and maps the main regulatory challenges that their operation (and expansion) is raising in the domains of competition and innovation, working conditions and labour markets, consumer and societal risks, and environmental sustainability. It documents a set of important issues not fully addressed by existing European regulation and enforcement, and provides a thorough overview, based on a state-of-the-art literature review, of these platform companies’ most significant effects on the economy, on workers, and more broadly on society.

In terms of the regulatory challenges, the report highlights four in particular: the limits of traditional antitrust analysis and tools; the violation of privacy and competition by the accumulation of data; the platforms’ systemic avoidance of sectoral regulations; and the difficulties in tackling illegal and harmful content online. The study’s findings suggest that the regulatory challenges that arise from platform employment include the mis-categorisation of platform employees; the disproportionate power of platforms over workers; and the low wages facing many platform workers.

The study offers a series of policy options for competition and innovation, working conditions and labour markets, consumer and societal risks, and environmental sustainability. These policy options are based on a set of substantive principles: freedom of competition; fairness of intermediation; the sovereignty of decision-making; access to fair social protection for all workers; access to dignified work and minimum living standards; and support of workers’ voice in the organisation of their work.

Where the report differs from the DMA and the DSA proposals is in calling for (i) a stronger merger control regime for gatekeeper platforms; (ii) a tailored, enforceable, Code of Conduct that each gatekeeper platform should have for itself; (iii) greater scope for national authorities to intervene where there are country-specific issues; and (iv) a new users’ right to reasonable inferences, in order to curtail the generation of ‘high-risk inferences’, i.e. those that are privacy-invasive, reputation-damaging, and have low verifiability.

The study is of high scientific and technological interest, not only due to its detailed analysis of the effects and challenges posed by the operation of online platforms, but also because the issues observed and presented cut across a range of areas, including competition and innovation, work and the labour market, and the integrity of the social fabric. The proposed policy options, including those on a new regulatory framework and on new institutional arrangements for regulation enforcement, will inform the ongoing discussion on the soundness and adequacy of the Commission’s DMA and DSA proposals.

Read the full report and accompanying STOA Options Brief to find out more.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Nera Kuljanic,

Europe is a space force and communicating the tangible benefits the European space programme delivers daily to all Europeans is an important priority. This was the leitmotif of the workshop on the use of artificial intelligence (AI), big data and space technologies in terrestrial management, hosted on 23 February 2021 by the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) and chaired by Member of the European Parliament and STOA Panel Member, Maria Manuel Leitão Marques (S&D, PT).

Manuel Heitor, Minister for Science, Technology and Higher Education in Portugal, welcomed the attendees on behalf of the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) and recognised the workshop as an ideal moment to launch a discussion about new policy options to enhance research, governance and regulation related to AI in the public sector.

With the aim of raising awareness of the opportunities offered by space technologies and AI, especially in view of the growing volume of space data and the potential of using AI in the public sector, the workshop featured presentations of projects that illustrate how space technologies and AI can help to address related issues at local, national, EU and international levels.

Capabilities in space for benefits on Earth

Monitoring land cover and land use is important for public policy in many ways: for land planning, agricultural, forest and water management, estimating and managing fire, flood and erosion risks, and mitigating climate change and related effects. Having reliable and detailed maps is key. Mário Caetano from the Portuguese Directorate-General for Territory explained the advantages of Copernicus – the EU’s Earth observation programme. It provides large volumes of data with high spectral and spatial resolution and a much better revisit time, while AI-based algorithms interpret and classify satellite images. Compared with traditional mapping, where the landscape complexity is often lost and the process is expensive and time consuming, Copernicus allows us to create more useful maps.

Miguel Bello, CEO of the Atlantic International Research (AIR) Centre, described some of the many applications in sea and ocean monitoring and management. Combined with satellite imagery, AI tools can predict and mitigate the effects of ocean pollution disasters, like oil spills or underwater volcanic eruptions, to protect coast and fishing areas; assist in monitoring natural disaster impacts all over the world; or provide early warning for aquaculture of harmful algae blooms that cause losses of several billion euro to the industry globally. The AI tools are also useful in the fight against piracy at sea and the control of (illegal) vessel traffic, where the behaviour of the boats can be identified thanks to machine learning.

As part of the EU Green Deal and the implementation of the Paris Agreement, important work is ongoing towards establishing the European capacity to monitor human carbon dioxide emissions (part of the Copernicus Atmosphere Monitoring Service (CAMS)). Richard Engelen from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) explained the data and tools supporting this work. Satellite observations show the total impact of anthropogenic emissions and natural effects on the atmosphere, and Earth System models help to translate satellite and ground-based observations into emission estimates. Large volumes of such data are used to train algorithms that are then able to translate new observations into new emission estimates. These can be used, for example, to detect and account for the effect of weather on atmospheric pollutants, which was important to correctly assess the impact of Covid‑19 lockdowns on pollutant emissions.

The new European Commission-led initiative ‘Destination Earth’ will develop a very high-precision digital model of the Earth to monitor and simulate natural and human activity, and to develop and test scenarios that would enable more sustainable development and support European environmental policies. Nicolaus Hanowski from the European Space Agency (ESA) explained how a combination of big data, AI and advanced computing will facilitate improved monitoring and predictive information at local, regional and global scale.

AI for smart, more liveable cities

The effective adoption and use of AI solutions represent transformative potential for municipalities. In the City of Amsterdam, AI, ubiquitous sensors and algorithms allow for a new view of the city and a better way to manage it. Maarten Sukel presented specific AI-enabled initiatives to detect and collect garbage and abandoned objects, maintain roads and infrastructure, and observe social distancing in Covid‑19 times in a transparent and privacy-friendly way. As a result, the city is safer, greener and better maintained.

How to translate more data into more benefits for all

European space infrastructure generates large amounts of data that can help understand how our planet is changing, but it can also bring opportunities for business and science, and feed into applications for citizens. Moreover, with the growing number of satellites and the large amount of data generated by them, AI will be crucial to help extract information from their observations, enhance analytic and forecast capabilities, and turn them into tailor-made products and services. The combination of AI and Earth Observation therefore offers great potential to better respond to major societal and policy challenges. How can we turn this potential into action? Ricardo Conde, President of the Portuguese Space Agency; Roya Ayazi, Secretary General of NEREUS (Network of European Regions Using Space Technologies); Matthias Petschke, Director at the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) of the European Commission; and Nicolaus Hanowski, Head of the Mission Management & Ground Segment Department at the European Space Agency (ESA), took part in the discussion.

Lack of dissemination on EU space initiatives, capabilities and possibilities was a recurrent point during the event, and all speakers agreed that industry, the research community and administrations at all levels must step up their dissemination efforts. Digital literacy is not to be underestimated in this respect, as it is important that citizens understand the impact of these new technologies, and they appreciate and utilise the open and freely available data and information (including algorithms). Space technologies and AI can play a role in reducing inequalities, as they enable new capabilities that allow us to see the world in a new way and therefore offer a new approach to addressing inequalities.

When it comes to the uptake of space technologies in regions across the EU, user realities differ. More cohesion is needed for the equal sharing of benefits, as Copernicus is seen as a fundamental instrument for green climate and digital transitions. Some of the factors that can help to bring this forward were specifically mentioned by the panellists. Administrations and policy-makers at different levels need to be familiar with the opportunities Copernicus offers. However, even with the best political will, administrative ambition and free and open data, ultimately, technical capabilities and skills are needed to translate the potential into products and services. Among local and regional administrations in particular, joining forces, sharing experiences and solutions, and cooperating closely is key for the successful uptake of Copernicus possibilities. On a national level, it is important to recognise the new opportunities for science, industry and society, and design and implement specific policies to facilitate development of downstream applications.

Member of the European Parliament and STOA Panel member, Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, ES), closed the event by introducing an additional element – inclusiveness, in particular with regard to gender – as a key ingredient of the green and digital transitions.

If you missed out this time, you can watch the webstream.

Your opinion matters! If you participated in the event, let us know what you think at stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

How can #AI help monitoring human carbon dioxide emissions? @RichardJEngelen: Earth system models versus machine learning: the best from both should be exploited. #Tech4Earth @EP_ScienceTech @ECMWF @CopernicusECMWF @CoCO2_project funded by @EU_H2020 pic.twitter.com/T8clyr7Vgj

— STOA Panel (@EP_ScienceTech) February 23, 2021

Closing the #Tech4Earth event @linagalvezmunoz calls for communicating better the important role of AI, big data & space technologies for green and digital transition and smart, resilient cities, the benefits for citizens and the programmes and projects on the EU and local levels pic.twitter.com/FbcUcs1NBs

— STOA Panel (@EP_ScienceTech) February 23, 2021

Feliz coincidência

Espaço e inteligência artificial é o tema do seminário que promovi no Parlamento. Nada combinado com a NASA. A escolha da data foi do @EP_ScienceTech, mas calhou bem!

Registo aberto até domingo no link abaixohttps://t.co/ujvppuWD3m

— Maria Manuel Leitão Marques (@LeitaoMarquesEP) February 19, 2021

Deputy Director of #CopernicusAtmosphere Monitoring Service @RichardJEngelen will be speaking at an @EP_ScienceTech event tomorrow about the @CoCO2_project and how #AI4EO can support @CopernicusECMWF services.

For more information and registration visit https://t.co/eTFBD7MWaW pic.twitter.com/RqTixTxh8G

— ECMWF (@ECMWF) February 22, 2021

Written by Ana Martinez Juan and James McEldowney,

© Jure / Adobe Stock

Although there is no legal definition of a ‘smart village’ within EU legislation, there are a number of distinguishing features associated with the smart village concept, with the involvement of the local community and the use of digital tools being seen as core elements. The concept implies the participation of local people in improving their economic, social or environmental conditions, cooperation with other communities, social innovation and the development of smart village strategies. Digital technologies can be applied to many aspects of living and working in rural areas. The smart village concept also suggests the adoption of smart solutions in both the public and private sectors over a wide range of policy fields such as improving access to services, developing short food supply chains and developing renewable energy sources.

The smart village concept is gaining traction on the rural development agenda, coinciding with the ongoing reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP). A key element of this reform will be a new delivery model based on each Member State developing a CAP strategic plan. In December 2020, the Commission published its recommendations for each Member State on the direction their plans need to take to achieve the CAP objectives and the European Green Deal targets. The Commission’s analysis highlight the gaps Member States must address if the Green Deal target of 100 % access to fast broadband internet in rural areas by 2025 is to be met. Much will depend on how Member States respond to these recommendations in drawing up their CAP strategic plans. The European Parliament has made a significant contribution to the smart village concept, taking part in a pilot project on smart eco-villages and supporting the European Commission’s 2017 action plan for smarter villages. The European Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee have meanwhile both indicated their support for the concept through events, opinions and communications.

Watch the video on ‘What is a smart village?’ on YouTube.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Smart villages: Concept, issues and prospects for EU rural areas‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Images Languages

Broadband in rural areas

Smart villages: rural NGA broadband coverage in Europe

Български (jpg | pdf) – Español (jpg | pdf) – Čeština (jpg | pdf) – Dansk (jpg | pdf) – Deutsch (jpg | pdf) – Eesti Keel (jpg | pdf) – Ελληνικά (jpg | pdf) – English (jpg | pdf) – Français (jpg | pdf) – Gaeilge (jpg | pdf) – Hrvatski (jpg | pdf) – Italiano (jpg | pdf) – Latviešu Valoda (jpg | pdf) – Lietuvių Kalba (jpg | pdf) – Magyar (jpg | pdf) – Malti (jpg | pdf) – Nederlands (jpg | pdf) – Polski (jpg | pdf) – Português (jpg | pdf) – Română (jpg | pdf) – Slovenčina (jpg | pdf) – Slovenščina (jpg | pdf) – Suomi (jpg | pdf) – Svenska (jpg | pdf)

Graphic taken from the EPRS Briefing ‘Smart villages: Concept, issues and prospects for EU rural areas‘.