Plus d'un mois après son accident de la circulation survenu aux Etats-Unis, l'artiste béninois Rabby Slo a annoncé sa sortie de l'hôpital.
Victime d'un accident de la circulation le 25 août 2026 aux Etats-Unis, le chanteur béninois Rabby Slo a annoncé, ce mercredi 30 septembre, avoir quitté l'hôpital où il recevait des soins.
Dans une publication diffusée sur ses réseaux sociaux, l'artiste a partagé une vidéo montrant ses premiers pas depuis l'accident « Les médecins disaient que je ne remarcherais peut-être jamais. Voici mes premiers pas », a-t-il écrit.
Rabby Slo revient également sur les efforts consentis pour retrouver progressivement sa mobilité. Selon son témoignage, il a notamment eu besoin de l'assistance quotidienne de trois personnes pour réapprendre à marcher.
Désormais en convalescence à domicile, l'artiste attribue cette évolution à Dieu et adresse ses remerciements à ses proches et à son public pour les prières et le soutien reçus depuis son accident. La sortie de l'hôpital ne marque toutefois pas la fin de sa convalescence.
Retrouver la scène
Malgré les difficultés encore présentes, Rabby Slo pense déjà à son retour devant le public. « Mon plus grand rêve : remonter sur scène et chanter pour vous pendant des heures », a-t-il confié.
L'artiste reconnaît toutefois que ce retour n'est pas encore immédiat. Il dit poursuivre quotidiennement ses efforts pour retrouver pleinement ses capacités et se rapprocher de cet objectif.
Pour permettre à ses admirateurs de suivre directement cette nouvelle étape, Rabby Slo a par ailleurs annoncé un grand direct pour le vendredi 9 octobre 2026 à partir de 20 heures, heure du Bénin. Le rendez-vous est prévu sur l'ensemble de ses réseaux sociaux. A cette occasion, le chanteur promet de revenir sur la période difficile traversée depuis son accident et de partager avec son public des éléments qu'il n'avait pas encore eu l'occasion de raconter.
Dans un état critique après l'accident, l'artiste avait été annoncé mort sur les réseaux sociaux et par certains médias. L'information a été très tôt démentie par les proches de Rabby Slo.
M. M.
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VOTRE CROIX DU JEUDI 1er OCTOBRE 2026
Member of Smallholder Farmer Alliance in Haiti with tree she is about to plant. Credit: A.F. Cortes/SFA
By Hugh Locke
NEW YORK, Sep 30 2026 (IPS)
Years ago, standing in a small farmer’s field in Haiti, I began to suspect that we had agriculture backward. The development world saw a man in need of rescue. I saw a farmer who might help rescue the rest of us.
That distinction matters. Over the next 25 years, humanity will need to grow much more food on a planet with degraded soils, shrinking biodiversity and a destabilizing climate. The usual instinct is to seek a technical fix. I want to suggest another source of help: a moral idea rooted in religion.
I am not a theologian. I am a development worker. In 2010, Haitian agronomist Timote Georges and I co-founded the Smallholder Farmers Alliance. We now work with about 10,000 farmers throughout Haiti who grow more food while rebuilding degraded land. Our “tree currency” rewards them for planting and caring for trees with credits they can exchange for seeds, tools and training.
Hugh Locke
Development programs often define smallholder farmers by what they lack: financing, equipment, training and market access. Yet the farmer in that Haitian field had land, labor, family, community and intimate knowledge of one patch of earth. The Baha’i Faith offers a useful principle: people should be regarded as protagonists in their own development, not merely recipients of assistance.Roughly 475 million smallholder farms, each under five acres, already produce about 30% of the world’s food despite limited access to finance, markets or technical support. In my new book, Whole Earth Farming, I argue that if even half of these families received support to adopt regenerative methods, they could produce the additional food humanity will need through 2050 on 12% of the world’s arable land, with a climate benefit comparable to offsetting the aviation industry’s annual emissions.
The Green Revolution averted famine, but its gains often came with degraded soils, diminished biodiversity and polluted water. Regenerative farming aims not merely to limit damage but to restore soil, rebuild biodiversity, improve farmers’ wellbeing and deliver a net climate benefit.
That is the language investors expect. Yet a case study more than a century old anticipated this approach, and its foundation was not market logic but morality.
From 1901 to 1921, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, one of the central figures of the Baha’i Faith, directed a farming settlement called ‘Adasiyyih in the Jordan Valley. Long before the term “regenerative agriculture” existed, the community used crop rotation, agroforestry, water conservation and integrated livestock management to make the land productive without exhausting it. Just as important was the framework behind those techniques: the belief that the earth is one country and humanity one interdependent family, expressed through consultation, equality and a rejection of extraction for its own sake. Farming at ‘Adasiyyih was not simply commodity production. It was a way to build community.
Regenerative agriculture does not require religious belief. Many successful regenerative farmers are secular, and the science stands on its own. But ‘Adasiyyih addressed, on a limited scale, a coordination problem that still hinders the movement: how can independent farmers, financiers, governments and companies be persuaded to treat soil health, water and biodiversity as a shared obligation?
‘Adasiyyih began with a moral premise rather than a technical formula. That premise is worth borrowing, whether one calls it stewardship or enlightened self-interest. Farmers, buyers and governments must act as though what happens to one plot of land is everyone’s concern, because increasingly it is. For generations we have asked how much the earth can give us. We should also ask what we owe in return.
Regenerative agriculture is at a fragile moment. By my estimate, some 15 million farms and ranches worldwide now use regenerative practices, and some 25 million acres, mostly in the United States, are certified under third-party standards, though almost none of that land is farmed by smallholders. The movement is growing faster than the systems meant to support it. Farmers can face lower yields and higher costs during the transition, there is no consensus on how to measure results, and financing, training and market rewards lag well behind farmers’ interest. A shared obligation is what can turn these isolated successes into lasting change.
This is not a case for religious agricultural policy, which would be unworkable in a pluralistic world. Smallholders are not waiting for a new theology. They need capital, training and markets. But the case for providing that support may rest more persuasively on the old idea of shared stewardship than on another spreadsheet of carbon calculations.
The next great agricultural transformation may begin not on the world’s largest farms but on hundreds of millions of its smallest. Given the means, smallholders may help determine whether the next 25 years of food production heal the planet or finish degrading it.
Hugh Locke is president of the Impact Farming Foundation and author of Whole Earth Farming: Smallholders and the Great Regenerative Transformation (George Ronald Publisher, 2026).
IPS UN Bureau
Les habitués d’Alger-Centre vont devoir revoir leurs habitudes. Le parking de Tafourah cessera d’accueillir des véhicules dès le 1er octobre prochain, selon une annonce faite […]
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LOTO FORTUNE Tirage N°154
Vendredi 25 septembre 2026 (14H)
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40 • 62 • 65 • 43 • 25
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À ce stade, ça n'est plus une crise — même scélérate. C'est le Grand Alignement : un événement multifactoriel, isotrope (ça vient de tous les côtés), saturant, et surtout coordonné : toutes les dynamiques se potentialisent mutuellement, dans une synchronie de crise hors norme. Un événement d'une magnitude à mettre la perpétuation du capitalisme néolibéral sur la table.
- La pompe à phynance / Démocratie, Économie, Crise financièreAcademic freedom and independent scientific knowledge production are fragile achievements – first secured during the Enlightenment in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries – that now face substantial headwinds. In the United States in 2026, the Trump administration has advanced further proposals to reduce science spending (Grimm & Hornidge, 2025). Most notably, the White House foresees a 55 per cent cut in funding for the National Science Foundation in 2027 compared with 2026 levels (Garisto & Nature Magazine, 2026). However, the threats to science systems in the United States and beyond cannot be reduced to – drastic – budget cuts alone. Political interference in scientific quality assurance and decisions about which research receives funding is also reported to have increased substantially, particularly in the United States (e.g. Finucane, 2026). Although the Trump administration’s actions are notably blatant, attacks on science systems, academic freedom and knowledge cooperation, whether overt or subtle, can be observed in countries across income levels and continents. In Germany, the German Research Foundation recently published a position paper on threats to academic freedom and the German science system, explicitly referencing the positioning and influence of the right-wing political party AfD, as set out in its “government programme” for the state election in Saxony-Anhalt (Ad-hoc-Arbeitsgruppe, 2026). At the same time, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development announced in 2026 that China’s research spending had reached parity with that of the United States (OECD, 2026). This is also the year in which the African Union Commission and the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) launched the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2034 Implementation Plan. According to the AUDA-NEPAD, this marks “Africa’s determination to move beyond overreliance on imported technologies and towards the sovereign production of globally competitive knowledge, stronger industrial capabilities, and socioeconomic value creation” (AUDA-NEPAD, 2026). Moreover, in 2026 the European Commission adopted a recommendation on the first-ever European Union (EU) framework for science diplomacy. Finally, on the multilateral level, 2026 marks two years since the launch of the UNESCO International Decade of Sciences for Sustainable Development, with UNESCO holding a large international conference with the ambition to “spotlight how transdisciplinary research, open science and strengthened science-policy-society interfaces can drive more inclusive and equitable futures for all” (UNESCO, 2026). With these developments shaping science systems in 2026, how is Germany positioning itself through national science policy to further develop its science and innovation systems and invest in transregional science cooperation as an engine for mutual learning, innovation and change? In early 2026, the German Science Council addressed the rise of anti-pluralist and anti-academic forces in a paper envisioning Germany’s science system in 2040 (Wissenschaftsrat, 2026). In it, the Council identifies four possible scenarios. Two scenarios assume substantial investment in science and in the science system as a whole: Scenario one outlines a well-funded German science and innovation system in a geopolitically turbulent world marked by high levels of societal polarisation, security risks and non-alignment with EU partners; scenario four envisages a global research area in which science cooperation is closely coordinated by a supranational organisation, creating cross-regional innovation spaces but also less localisation, and a decoupling of research and education as well as of research and society and policy. The two remaining scenarios give science far lower priority. Scenario two envisions a system in which science is predominantly instrumentalised for economic gain, while scenario three depicts science as marginalised, struggling for funding and political attention, and barely able to realise its potential. In the following, we explore selected developments in science policy in 2026, differentiate between different types of innovation policy and argue for the role of knowledge cooperation in creating shared innovation spaces. Finally, we bring this analysis together with the German Science Council’s scenario perspective and propose an additional, more visionary scenario that policy- and science-system-related decision-makers should strive to realise.
Two features of AI stand out among technological innovations: It is exceptionally powerful, and its (computing) power is increasing faster than any previous technology in human history. AI is not a tool that can simply be added to the existing arsenal just for the sake of task automation and increased efficiency (Sinanoglu, 2025a). Its consequences are so profound that using it to advance broader development objectives requires changes to some of the ways development cooperation works. In this chapter, we go beyond more general assessments (OECD, 2025) of the use of AI by governments (OECD, 2026) and of the global development risks posed by AI (United Nations Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence, 2026). We argue that successful development cooperation for sustainable futures depends on collaboration with others in iterative and adaptive ways to exploit opportunities for positive change more effectively in challenging contexts. To this end, current development-cooperation structures and processes should be reformed to facilitate and encourage organisational learning (Brandi & Büge, 2026) and adopt a more iterative approach to cooperation. To what extent does development cooperation currently deploy AI tools for such organisational learning? By “AI”, we mean generative and agentic artificial intelligence. We also distinguish between “AI in development” and “AI for development”. Whereas the former refers to how AI is used in middle- and low-income countries, the latter refers to how the development sector can use AI. We catalogued how the supply side of development cooperation (donors, ministries, agencies, development banks, United Nations (UN) entities, humanitarian implementers and funders) uses AI in its own operations, programming, advisory work and evaluations. The database comprises 172 AI deployments and, while not exhaustive, provides a comprehensive primary-source snapshot that lets us answer three questions empirically: Who is deploying AI? What for? And how far has it matured? (See Figure 9) Our data suggest that almost 60 per cent of recorded uses fall into just two functions: getting services to people in the field (programme delivery) and speeding up the back office at headquarters (internal operations). Together, the functions most closely tied to organisational learning – monitoring, evaluation, planning and coordination – account for only roughly 19 per cent of deployments. In short, the sector is now using AI to do its existing work faster, but not yet to change how it works and learns.
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were agreed in 2015 in a political environment in which broad multilateral agreement still appeared possible. They reflected the belief that universal goals, shared language and collective implementation could organise international cooperation, even if
they were never free from contestation (Biermann, Kanie, & Kim, 2017; Chaturvedi et al., 2020). For global health, this mattered. The 2030 Agenda broadened the health agenda beyond selected infectious diseases and maternal and child health. It included universal health coverage, non-communicable diseases, mental health, sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the wider social, economic and environmental determinants of health (Murray, 2015; WHO, 2015). With only a few years left until 2030, progress remains uneven and many health-related targets are off track. At the same time, the political context for a future global development framework has changed substantially. Global health cooper-
ation is increasingly shaped by donor retrenchment, weaker multilateralism, geopolitical competition and ideological polarisation (Held, Kickbusch, McNally, Piselli, & Told, 2019; Kickbusch & Liu, 2022). Issues such as gender equality, vaccination, climate action and migration have become more contested. These tensions now affect financing, normsetting, institutional stability and the conditions under which cooperation remains possible. Three shifts are particularly important. First, financing has become more uncertain. Aid cuts and donor retrenchment weaken multilateral health institutions and create incentives for selective, interest-driven cooperation (Poddar & Rao, 2025; Witter et al., 2025). Second, ideological polarisation makes established health commitments more contested, especially around sexual and reproductive health and rights, vaccination, and climate and health (Greene, 2026; Khosla & Allotey, 2025). Third, the global health order is becoming more multipolar. Regional organisations, middle powers,
South-South cooperation and issue-based coalitions are gaining influence (Bull & Banik, 2025; Franz et al., 2024; Lal, 2026). Together, these shifts affect who leads, which priorities are defended and how ambition is defined. At stake is not only whether new commitments can be agreed, but whether the core principles of global health cooperation can be preserved. These include rights-based commitments, universality and equity, national ownership in implementation and international solidarity through coordinated collective action. These principles are grounded in the normative framework of the World Health Organization (WHO) and reflected, although unevenly, in the 2030 Agenda and subsequent declarations on universal health coverage (UN, 2015, 2019, 2023; WHO, 1948). The risk is not only stagnation. A more serious risk is selective rollback. Commitments that seemed relatively stable during the SDG period may become vulnerable in post-2030 negotiations. This applies particularly to sexual and reproductive health and rights, vaccination and climate-related health commitments (Haeuser et al., 2025; Khosla & Allotey, 2025; Romanello et al., 2024). If consensus becomes harder to reach, the price of agreement may be dilution. A future framework may preserve the language of multilateralism while narrowing the substance of global health ambition (see also Berger & Leininger in this volume).
Depuis quinze jours, l'auteur s'installait chaque matin à la table de l'huissier, seul au fond de la salle du banquet, et récitait ainsi des paroles sans suite.
- Contrebande / Identité culturelle, Langue, Littérature