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By CIVICUS
Oct 7 2025 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses recent protests that led to a change of government in Nepal with Dikpal Khatri Chhetri, co-founder of Youth in Federal Discourse (YFD). YFD is a youth-led organisation that advocates for democracy, civic engagement and young people’s empowerment.

Dikpal Khatri Chhetri

In September, Nepal’s government blocked 26 social media platforms, sparking mass protests led by people from Generation Z. Police responded with live ammunition, rubber bullets teargas and water cannons, killing over 70 people. Despite the swift lifting of the social media ban, protests continued in anger at the killings and corruption concerns. Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak resigned, and an interim government has taken over, with a new election scheduled within six months.

What triggered the protests?

When the government asked social media companies to register and they failed to comply, it blocked 26 platforms, including Discord, Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, Signal, WhatsApp, X/Twitter and YouTube. A similar situation happened in 2023, when TikTok was banned and later reinstated once the company registered.

The government said the goal was to create a legal point of contact for content moderation and ensure platforms complied with national regulations. For them, the ban was just a matter of enforcing rules. But people saw it differently, and for Gen Z this was an attempt to silence them. Young people don’t just use social media for entertainment; it’s also where they discuss politics, expose corruption and organise themselves. By banning these platforms, the government was cutting them off from one of the few spaces where they felt they could hold leaders accountable.

However, the ban was the final factor after years of frustration with corruption, lack of accountability and a political elite that seems out of touch with ordinary people. Young people see politicians’ children living in luxury while they struggle to get by. On TikTok, this anger became visible in the ‘NepoKids’ trend that exposed the privileges of political families and tied them directly to corruption.

That’s why the response was so strong and immediate. What began as anger over a restriction on freedom of expression grew into a nationwide call for transparency, accountability and an end to the culture of corruption. Protests became a way for young people who refuse to accept the status quo to show their voices can’t be silenced.

How did the government react to the protests?

Instead of dialogue, the government chose repression. Police used rubber bullets, teargas and water cannon to try to disperse crowds. In many places they also fired live ammunition. By the end of the first day, 19 people had been killed.

The use of live ammunition against unarmed protesters is a serious violation of human rights. Authorities claimed protesters had entered restricted zones around key government buildings, including Parliament House, and argued this justified their response. But evidence tells a different story: footage and post-mortem reports show many of the victims were shot in the head, indicating an intent to inflict severe harm rather than simply disperse crowds. Police also failed to fully use non-lethal methods before turning to live bullets.

Rather than containing the protests, this violence further fuelled public anger. Protests, now focused on corruption and the killings, continued even after the government lifted the social media ban. Many realised the government was both corrupt and willing to kill its own people to stay in power. In response, authorities imposed strict curfews in big cities.

The political fallout was immediate. Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak resigned the next day, taking responsibility for the bloodshed. Within a day, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli also stepped down. An interim government led by former Chief Justice Sushila Karki took over, parliament was dissolved and a new election is scheduled to take place in the next six months.

What changes do protesters demand and what comes next?

We are demanding systemic change. Corruption has spread through every level of government and we are tired of politicians who have ruled for decades without improving our lives. While they grow richer, everyday people face unemployment, rising living costs and no real opportunities. We refuse to accept this any longer.

We want a government that works transparently and efficiently, free from bribery, favouritism and political interference. Leaders must understand that sovereignty belongs to the people and their duty is to serve citizens, not themselves.

We need more than just some small reforms. Nepal needs serious discussions about holding to the essence of its constitution, finding ways to amend it when dissatisfaction occurs instead of uprooting it entirely. Its implementation has to be strengthened to truly include diverse voices, reflect our history and be able to respond to future challenges. We are calling for new, younger and more competent leaders who can break the cycle of past failures.

The upcoming election will be a crucial test. Gen Z must turn out in numbers, articulate clear demands to the wider public and ensure the changes we strive for in the streets are carried into parliament.

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SEE ALSO
Nepal: Anti-corruption protests force political change despite violent crackdown CIVICUS Monitor 23.Sep.2025
Nepal: ‘The Social Network Bill is part of a broader strategy to tighten control over digital communication’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Dikshya Khadgi 28.Feb.2025
Nepal: ‘The TikTok ban signals efforts to control the digital space in the name of national sovereignty’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Anisha 11.Dec.2023

 

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In an interview with BBC Sport, Ashleigh Plumptre says she regrets losing the trust of some LGBT fans in women's football by moving to Saudi Arabia.

In an interview with BBC Sport, Ashleigh Plumptre says she regrets losing the trust of some LGBT fans in women's football by moving to Saudi Arabia.

More women must have a role in shaping peace agreements, security reforms and post-conflict recovery plans, UN Secretary-General António Guterres told the Security Council October 6. Credit: UN News

By Sima Bahous
UNITED NATIONS, Oct 7 2025 (IPS)

We meet on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of UN Security Council resolution 1325—a milestone born of the multilateral system’s conviction that peace is more robust, security more enduring, when women are at the table.

Yet the record of the last 25 years is mixed: bold, admirable commitments have been followed too often by weak implementation and chronic under-investment. Today, 676 million women and girls live within reach of deadly conflict, the highest [number] since the 1990s.

It is lamentable, then, that we see today rising military spending and renewed pushback against gender equality and multilateralism. These threaten the very foundations of global peace and security.

This anniversary must be more than a commemoration. Women and girls who live amidst conflict deserve more than commemoration. It must instead be a moment to refocus, recommit, and ensure that the next 25 years deliver much more than the last.

A belief in the core principles of resolution 1325 is shared by women and men everywhere. Whether through our work at country level, including in conflicts, or in the recent Member State commitments for the 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, we know that our women, peace and security agenda, our conviction for equality, enjoys the support of an overwhelming majority of women and men, and also of Member States.

Even in Afghanistan, UN Women’s ongoing monitoring shows that 92 per cent of Afghans, men and women both, think that girls must be able to attend secondary education. It is also striking that a majority of Afghan women say they remain hopeful that they will one day achieve their aspirations.

This, despite everything they endure under Taliban oppression. Their hope is not an idle wish, and it is more than a coping mechanism. It is a political statement. A conviction. An inspiration.

As we meet to discuss the women, peace and security agenda, the painful situation in the Middle East, especially for women and girls, remains on our minds and in our hearts. Two years into the devastating Gaza war, amid the killing, the pain and the loss, a glimmer of hope emerges.

I join the Secretary-General in welcoming the positive responses to President Donald Trump’s proposal to end the Gaza war, to implement an immediate and lasting ceasefire to secure the unconditional release of all hostages, and to ensure unhindered humanitarian access.

We hope that this will lead to a just and lasting peace for Palestinians and Israelis alike, where all women and girls live with dignity, security, and opportunity.

The trends documented in the Secretary-General’s report should alarm us. It is understandable that some might conclude that the rise and normalization of misogyny currently poisoning our politics and fuelling conflict is unstoppable. It is not. Those who oppose equality do not own the future, we do.

The reality is that globally, suffering and displacement will likely rise in the face of seemingly intractable conflicts and growing instability. And it is a painful fact that we must be prepared for the situation to become worse before it becomes better for women and girls.

This will continue to be exacerbated by short-sighted funding cuts that already undermine education opportunities for Afghan girls; curtail life-saving medical attention for tens of thousands of survivors of rape and sexual violence in Sudan, Haiti and beyond; shutter health clinics across conflict zones; limit access to food for malnourished and starving mothers and their children in Gaza, Mali, Somalia and elsewhere; and fundamentally will erode the chance for peace.

Yet despite the horrors of wars and conflicts, women continue to build peace.

• Women are reducing community violence in Abyei and the Central African Republic, and mobilizing for peace in Yemen, in Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

• In Haiti, women have managed to achieve near parity in the new provisional electoral council and increased the quota for women in the draft constitution.

• In Chad, women’s representation in the National Assembly has doubled.

• In Syria, the interim Constitution ratified this March mandates the Government to guarantee the social, economic, and political rights of women, and protect them from all forms of oppression, injustice, and violence.

• In Ukraine, women have achieved the codification into law of gender-responsive budgeting, including across national relief efforts.

Whether mediating, brokering access to services, driving reconstruction, and more, women’s leadership is the face of resilience—a force for peace.

The Secretary-General has just spoken to UN Women’s recent survey findings, which highlight how current financing trends are endangering the viability and safety of women-led organizations in conflict-affected countries.

We believe there is no alternative but to change course and to invest significantly in women’s organizations on the frontlines of conflict.

The last 25 years have seen an emphasis on investing in transnational security and international legal institutions. This has not been matched by attention to investing in national capacities and social movements.

And while attention to the women, peace and security agenda has been focused in global capitals and in major cities of conflict-affected countries, it must also become localized and reach the remote areas that are worst affected and where it makes the biggest difference. This is true for information, funding, policy implementation, services, and more.

Recent years have seen a much-needed increased level of attention to conflict-related sexual violence than ever before. We have taken huge strides in ending the silence, chipping away at the impunity that emboldens and enables perpetrators.

These efforts must be redoubled, giving greater attention to reproductive violence, gender-based persecution in accountability initiatives, and a more comprehensive understanding of atrocities disproportionately affecting women and girls in conflict.

In the next 25 years of the critical women, peace and security agenda, it is crucial that we see funding earmarked, robust quotas implemented, clear instructions and mandates, and accountability measures in place that make failures visible and have consequences.

So, allow me to leave you with five calls to action that need full attention in the coming years:

• First: Affirmative action to ensure women take their rightful place at the peace-making table and consistent support to them as peacekeepers, peacebuilders, and human rights defenders. This must become a hardwired feature of the way we conduct the business of peace.

• Second: Measure the impact of this agenda by the number of women that participate directly in peace and security processes, and by the relief women receive in the form of justice, reparations, services, or asylum.

• Third: End violence against women and girls, address emerging forms of technology-facilitated gender-based violence, and challenge harmful narratives both online and offline.

• Fourth: End impunity for atrocities and crimes against women and girls, respect and uphold international law, silence the guns, and ensure peace is always in the ascendency.

• Fifth: Embed the women, peace and security agenda ever-deeper in the hearts and minds of ordinary people, particularly young people, both boys and girls. It is they who will determine the future of our ambitions, ambitions that must ultimately become theirs too.

Above all, the coming few years should see Security Council resolution 1325 implemented fully, across all contexts.

When women lead, peace follows. We made a promise to them 25 years ago. It is past time to deliver.

This article is based on remarks by UN Under-Secretary General and UN Women Executive Director Sima Bahous at the Security Council meeting on “Women and peace and security” on 6 October 2025.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Excerpt:

Sima Bahous is UN Under Secretary-General and Executive Director UN Women

By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and K Kuhaneetha Bai
JOHANNESBURG, South Africa, Oct 7 2025 (IPS)

The World Bank’s 1981 Berg Report provided the blueprint for structural adjustment, including economic liberalisation in Africa. Urging trade liberalisation, it promised growth from its supposed comparative advantage in agriculture.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Berg promises
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Plan for Action by Professor Elliot Berg blamed government interventions for blocking post-colonial African economic progress.

Removing ‘distortions’ caused by marketing boards and other state interventions and institutions was supposed to unleash export-led growth for Sub-Saharan African (SSA) producers.

However, despite the supposed comparative advantage and trade preferences, African agricultural exports have not grown significantly due to protection by wealthy nations.

By the turn of the century, Africa’s share of worldwide non-oil exports had declined to less than half of what it was in the early 1980s.

African agricultural output and export capacities have been undermined by decades of low investment, economic stagnation and neglect.

Significant public spending cuts accelerated the deterioration of existing infrastructure (roads, water supply, etc.), undermining potential ‘supply responses’.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

However, high growth in East and South Asian economies boosted SSA mineral exports, often mined by foreign firms from the most significant economies in Asia.

Even the primary commodity price collapse from 2014 did not prevent Africa’s share of world exports from increasing.

Promises, promises
The 1994 Marrakech declaration, concluding the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, created the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995.

The new Doha Development Round of trade negotiations began in 2001, following the dramatic walkout by African trade ministers at the WTO Seattle ministerial conference in 1999.

The Public Health Exception to the WTO’s onerous new intellectual property rules alleviated this concern but was ignored during the deadly COVID-19 pandemic.

Developing countries were projected to gain US$16 billion in the most likely scenario, according to a 2005 World Bank study led by Kym Anderson, which estimated the likely effects of a Doha Round trade agreement.

However, various studies estimating the welfare effects of multilateral agricultural trade liberalisation – including Anderson et al. – suggest significant net losses, not gains, for SSA.

Gains from agricultural trade liberalisation would largely accrue to existing major agricultural exporters – mainly from the Cairns Group – not SSA.

Nevertheless, the World Bank and others continued to insist that trade liberalisation would benefit all developing countries, including SSA, although most studies indicated otherwise.

WTO trade rules have reduced the policy space for developing countries – especially in industrial, trade, or investment policy – although some claim that room for industrial policy remains.

African governments were told that a Doha Round deal would reduce agricultural subsidies, import tariffs and non-tariff barriers by rich nations, especially in Europe.

But the neglect of both physical and economic infrastructure over two decades of structural adjustment programmes left little effective capacity to respond to new export opportunities.

Worse still, trade liberalisation of manufactured goods also undermined nascent African industrialisation.

African market access to rich, mainly European, markets was secured through negotiated preferential agreements, rather than trade liberalisation. Hence, further multilateral trade liberalisation would erode these modest gains.

Additionally, most African governments – particularly those of poorer economies with limited government capacities – were unable to replace lost tariff revenues with new taxes.

African losses foretold
What was Africa expected to gain from a Doha Round deal?

Thandika Mkandawire warned the WTO trade regime would make Africa worse off, especially without preferential treatment from the European Union under the Lomé Convention.

Anderson et al. claimed SSA would gain substantially as “farm employment, the real value of agricultural output and exports, the real returns to farm land and unskilled labor, and real net farm incomes would all rise substantially in capital scarce SSA countries with a move to free merchandise trade”.

To be sure, the modest gains from trade liberalisation would be ‘one-time’ improvements projected by the models used.

Anderson et al. claimed that SSA, excluding South Africa, would gain US$3.5 billion, compared to roughly US$550 billion worldwide.

These projected gains of less than one per cent of its 2007 output were nonetheless much more than the tenth of one per cent for all developing countries!

World Bank structural adjustment programmes undermined the limited competitiveness of African smallholder agriculture. However, their projections ignored the reasons why African food agriculture declined after the 1970s.

Meanwhile, the agricultural exports of wealthy nations have benefited from higher production subsidies, which more than offset lower export subsidies. However, reducing agricultural subsidies would likely lead to higher prices of imported food.

Uneven effects
Uneven and partial trade liberalisation and subsidy reduction will have mixed implications. These effects vary with national conditions, including food imports and share of consumer spending.

Earlier estimates for all developing countries obscured the likely impacts of trade liberalisation on Africa. The one-time welfare improvement for SSA, excluding most of Southern Africa, would be three-fifths of one per cent by 2015!

With deindustrialisation accelerated by structural adjustment, Sandra Polaski estimated that SSA, excluding South Africa, would lose US$122 billion from Doha Round trade liberalisation.

Although former World Bank economists agreed the lost decades were due to Bank structural adjustment programmes, these were reimposed a decade ago.

SSA, excluding South Africa, would lose US$106 billion to agricultural trade liberalisation. Poor infrastructure, export capacities and competitiveness in both SSA industry and agriculture were responsible.

Most of the poorest and least developed SSA countries were likely to be worse off in all ‘realistic’ Doha Round outcome scenarios.

With more realistic model assumptions – e.g., allowing for unemployment – Lance Taylor and Rudiger von Arnim found SSA would not gain, on balance, from trade liberalisation.

Mainstream international trade theory cannot justify trade liberalisation for SSA. Worse, ‘new trade theories’ and evolutionary studies of technological development suggest trade liberalisation would permanently slow growth.

Export growth?
As economic growth typically precedes export expansion, trade can foster a virtuous circle but cannot trigger it.

Specifically, a weak investment-export nexus hinders export expansion and diversification, as rapid resource reallocation is unlikely without high investment and sustained growth.

Citing the World Bank, Mkandawire noted Africa’s export collapse in the 1980s and 1990s meant “a staggering annual income loss of US$68 billion – or 21 per cent of regional GDP”!

For Dani Rodrik, Africa’s ‘marginalisation’ was not due to its trade performance, although poor by international standards. Gerald Helleiner has emphasised, “Africa’s failures have been developmental, not export failure per se”.

With its geography and income, Africa probably trades as much as can be expected. Indeed, “Africa overtrades compared with other developing regions in the sense that its trade is higher than would be expected from the various determinants of bilateral trade”!

Vulnerable Africa
The Doha Round of WTO negotiations effectively ended over a decade ago as the backlash in wealthy nations – against globalisation and its consequences – gained momentum.

Meanwhile, trade liberalisation – as part of structural adjustment programmes – deepened SSA deindustrialisation and food insecurity.

With Africa unevenly integrated by economic globalisation, most of the continent exports little to the USA, making it less of a target of Trump’s tariffs.

Nevertheless, trade liberalisation has made developing economies more vulnerable to and unprotected from the recent weaponisation of tariffs and other economic measures.

Last month’s expiration of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) prompted some African leaders to scramble for an extension.

US AGOA imports in 2023 totalled US$10 billion, accounting for high shares of some countries’ exports. Tariff imposition will exacerbate problems due to AGOA’s demise.

Meanwhile, there have been great expectations for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Still, regional trade integration may not be very beneficial, as SSA exports are more competitive than complementary.

K. Kuhaneetha Bai studied at the University of Malaya and does policy research at Khazanah Research Institute.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Der ehemalige Schauspieler Florian Teichtmeister wurde am Oktoberfest in München beim Kokainkonsum erwischt. Trotz gerichtlicher Auflagen wurde er auf einer Toilette von einem Polizisten beim Drogenkonsum ertappt – und festgenommen.

Unter den Besten der Allerbesten tummeln sich auch zwei Schweizer: Die NHL sieht die beiden Captains Nico Hischier (New Jersey) und Roman Josi (Nashville) bei den Top-Stars.

Image: The White House 29.9.25 / Wiki Commons

By Ramesh Thakur
Oct 6 2025 (IPS)

Back in January last year, my Toda Policy Brief 182 was published with the title “Israel and Gaza: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”. On 29 September this year, President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a joint press conference to announce a peace plan for Gaza. The plan’s title could well have been “Gaza: Today, Tomorrow and the Day After”. Trump’s yearning for the Nobel Peace Prize is no secret, possibly out of Obama-envy. If the bold and audacious 20-point Gaza plan succeeds, he will surely deserve the award. For it entails the end of Hamas as a governing force in Gaza and a security threat to Israel, gives Arabs the stability they seek in the region, promises a terror-free future for Israel and keeps alive the dream of a Palestinian state. That said, however, potholes, there be a few on the pathway to Middle East peace.

First, the good news

Any viable peace plan must deliver on three core challenges: an immediate ceasefire that brings an end to the killings and a release of all Israeli hostages still in captivity, dead or alive (today); the removal of Hamas as a military, political and institutional force from Gaza and its replacement with a credible governance structure for the strip to oversee its reconstruction (the agenda for tomorrow); and appropriate provisions, backed by credible guarantees, to prevent the return of terror to Israel (the promise of the day after).

The plan calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces to an agreed line, the immediate cessation of hostilities and freeze on battle lines once all parties have agreed to the plan; the return of all hostages to Israel within 72 hours of the latter’s acceptance of the agreement; the release of 2,000 Palestinian prisoners by Israel (points 3–5).

The second part (tomorrow) is covered in points 6–16. After the exchange of hostages and prisoners, Hamas members who give up their arms and surrender will be granted amnesty and, if they wish, be given safe passage to third countries. They will play no role in Gaza’s governance. Aid deliveries into Gaza will resume and distributed without interference from any party. Gaza will be governed by a transitional, technocratic and apolitical committee of qualified Palestinians and international experts. An international high-level Peace Board will “set the framework”, “handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza”, and “create modern and efficient governance” to the “best international standards”. Trump will draw up an economic development plan. No one will be forced to leave Gaza. Israel will neither occupy nor annex Gaza. Instead, its forces will withdraw to agreed lines and on a timetable tied to Hamas’s demilitarisation. The US, Arab countries and other international partners will provide a temporary International Stabilisation Force to deploy immediately in Gaza.

The third and final element is addressed in points 1, 9, 14, 19 and 20. They envision Gaza as “a deradicalised terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbours”; a guarantee from Arab regional partners that Hamas and its factions will comply with the provisions and New Gaza will not pose a threat to its people or to neighbours; and, possibly as the most critical trigger to a direct US involvement if the agreement is violated, the new “Board of Peace” to be set up “will be headed and chaired” by Trump himself. As Gaza redevelops and the Palestinian Authority implements the necessary reforms, a “credible pathway” to realise the aspirations of the Palestinians for self-determination and statehood will emerge. The US will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians “for peaceful and prosperous co-existence”.

Now, the rest of the news

There are thus a lot of moving parts and the plan will work only if everything that can go right, does go right. Usually this is an overly optimistic basis for any peace plan.

To start with, Israel gets almost all its demands and conditions met on hostage release, Hamas disarmament and its removal as a military and political power, and a security buffer zone in Gaza. Its own withdrawal will be phased on Hamas’s compliance. Hamas, not so much. Hostages have been its most powerful leverage over Israel. Mass civilian casualties and humanitarian suffering have been its most potent weapon in the campaign of global delegitimisation of Israel. The few credible opinion polls show Hamas to be the runaway choice in the West Bank and, especially, Gaza. Trump has threatened to give Israel the green light to finish the job if Hamas rejects his plan. For an ideology that welcomes martyrdom for shahids, they might choose to die on their feet rather than survive on their knees on Israeli sufferance.

Conversely, the deal might be torpedoed by the more hawkish partners in Netanyahu’s governing coalition who demand a permanent security presence in Gaza, annexation of the West Bank, no release of the worst of the Palestinian prisoners and no amnesty for the killers of 7 October. Of course, it’s possible that opposition parties that want an end to the war could step in to keep Netanyahu afloat.

Third, both Hamas and Israel might feel compelled to accept the plan in order to escape the wrath of the infamously short-tempered US president. But both have a long history of sabotaging the implementation of agreements reached, arguing endlessly over the finer details and implementation implications of the agreement’s clauses, pointing fingers at each other, and so on. The region has never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

Fourth, to believe that the Palestinian Authority, with a president who is into the third decade of his four-year elected term, will quickly transform into a corruption-free model of competence and effective governance is a triumph of hope over experience.

Fifth, Arab governments were brought on board with Trump’s very public rejection of Israel’s agenda to annex the West Bank. When Israel attacked targets on its soil, Qatar discovered the limits of playing all sides in hosting the Hamas leadership and a big US military base while also acting as a mediator in the Israel-Palestine conflict. This helped concentrate its mind to seal the deal. But how long will the Arab regimes be able to resist their attachment to the Palestinian cause?

Finally, Tony Blair’s presence on the Peace Board as an eminence grise is a kick in the teeth of international idealism. He is thoroughly discredited for his role in the 2003 Iraq war. Putting “Tony Blair” and “Middle East peace” alongside each other in any plan for the region has as much chance of peaceful coexistence as Hamas and a Netanyahu government in Gaza and Israel. We can only conclude that Trump lacks awareness of just how globally toxic the Blair brand is.

Related articles:
The return of the ugly American
Donald Trump: Self-proclaimed peacemaker lacking fortune and expertise
Donald Trump’s overwhelming force/surrender style of negotiation and governing

Ramesh Thakur, a former UN assistant secretary-general, is emeritus professor at the Australian National University and Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He is a former Senior Research Fellow at the Toda Peace Institute and editor of The nuclear ban treaty: a transformational reframing of the global nuclear order.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Ali Kushayb led the Janjaweed, a group whose campaign of terror led to hundreds and thousands of deaths.

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Dominique Désiré Erenon was arrested on arrival in Bangui after three years spent living in France.

His brother says he found the door to the house broken and a large amount of blood spilled.

This is the second group to arrive in the southern Africa state following a deal with the US government.

A Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovációs Alapból meghirdetett felhívás célja a hazai kutatás-fejlesztési és innovációs ökoszisztéma szereplőinek együttműködését elősegítő, közösen megvalósított gyógyszerfejlesztési projektek ösztönzése olyan szervezetek támogatásával, amelyek, vagy amelyeknek tulajdonosai/vezető beosztású munkavállalói/ vezető kutatói bizonyítottan rendelkeznek gyógyszerfejlesztési területen tudományos/technológiai eredményekkel. A program célkitűzése Magyarország élettudományi kutatási és fejlesztési potenciáljának kiaknázása a kielégítetlen orvosi igények (unmet medical needs) megoldására fókuszáló, piaci hasznosítást célzó nemzetközileg versenyképes transzlációs projektek támogatásával, továbbá a kutatás-fejlesztési ökoszisztémában létrejövő, magas hozzáadott értékű egészségipari innovációk preklinikai fejlesztéseinek támogatása. Ennek keretében a konstrukció gyógyszerfejlesztések preklinikai vizsgálataihoz nyújt célzott támogatást, így a hazai egészségipari szektor szereplői mérsékelni tudják a klinikai belépés kockázatait, és felgyorsíthatják a fejlesztéseik piaci validációjához vezető utat.

Available data and research over several decades have consistently reached the same conclusion: Far-right extremists are more open to political violence, more likely to commit it, and responsible for far more homicides than far-left extremists. Credit: Shutterstock

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Oct 6 2025 (IPS)

Following the murder of Charles Kirk, a U.S. conservative activist, in Orem, Utah on September 10, various remarks, commentaries, and accusations have been made regarding politically motivated murders occurring across the United States.

In order for elected U.S. officials, policymakers, the country’s population, and others to have an informed understanding of politically motivated domestic murders, it is essential to consider the relevant facts, statistics, and research findings surrounding these homicides.

Although politically motivated murders represent a relatively small fraction of the overall number of homicides in the United States, these murders have a disproportionately large effect on the country. In particular, their symbolic impact, high visibility, media coverage, and threats to democracy make these murders especially significant for the United States

The starting point for this understanding is to define these types of homicides. Politically motivated domestic murders involve killings of people where the perpetrator’s primary motivation is ideology, politics, partisan affiliation, beliefs about government, or bias. Examples of such motivations include white supremacy, anti-immigrant sentiment, religious extremism, and political extremism.

According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), there were 22,830 homicides in the United States in 2023. Domestic politically motivated murders were relatively rare, with an estimated number of 20 extremist-related murders, representing about one-tenth of one percent of all homicides that took place across the country.

Additionally, between January 1, 2020 and September 10, 2025, 79 politically motivated murders were reported to have occurred in the United States. These murders accounted for approximately 0.07 percent of all murders during that time period, or 7 out of 10,000.

Although politically motivated murders represent a relatively small fraction of the overall number of homicides in the United States, these murders have a disproportionately large effect on the country. In particular, their symbolic impact, high visibility, media coverage, and threats to democracy make these murders especially significant for the United States.

Some political figures have suggested that left-wing groups are a greater threat than right-wing groups. However, research based on empirical data does not support these claims.

In recent decades, right-wing extremism, such as white supremacist, anti-immigrant, and anti-government ideologies, has been the most frequent ideology when it comes to politically motivated domestic homicides in the United States.

In contrast, while left-wing extremism, such as environmental or anti-police violence, is present in the United States, it is much less frequently associated with homicides.

Overall, domestic politically motivated violence in the U.S. is rare compared to total violent crime, but right-wing extremist violence has been responsible for the majority of domestic terrorism fatalities over the past several decades.

For instance, a study by the U.S. National Institute of Justice found that since 1990, far-right extremists have killed more than six times as many people in ideologically motivated attacks (520 people) as far-left extremists (78 people).

In the last five years, approximately 70% of politically motivated domestic homicides in the United States were committed by individuals with right-wing ideology, compared to about 30% by those with left-wing ideology (Figure 1).

 

Source: Cato Institute.

 

Furthermore, there has been a noticeable increase in plots or attacks in the United States targeting government officials, political candidates, party officials, or staff. The number of domestic attacks and plots against government targets motivated by partisan political beliefs in the past five years is nearly triple the number of such incidents in the previous 25 years.

The available data and research over the past several decades have consistently reached the same conclusions regarding domestically politically motivated homicides. In simple terms, far-right extremists are more open to political violence, more likely to commit it, and have been responsible for far more homicides than far-left extremists.

The rising threats and politically motivated domestic murders across the United Staes warrant countering the spread of disinformation, conspiracy theories, one-sided narratives, and violent rhetoric that have motivated many of the attackers and killers.

Political violence in the United States has risen in recent months taking forms that often go unrecognized. During the 2024 election cycle, nearly half of all states reported threats against election workers, including social media death threats, intimidation and doxxing.

The recent murder of Charles Kirk is just one in a series of politically motivated domestic killings that includes the June assassinations of Minnesota representative Melissa Hortman and her husband, Mark Hortman.

Almost 75% of the U.S. public views politically motivated violence as a major problem for the country. Additionally, a majority of the U.S. public, 62%, believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction, while a minority of 38% believe it is moving in the right direction.

Threats and violence are increasingly seen as acceptable means to achieve political goals, posing serious risks to democracy and society. In October 2025, almost a third of the U.S. public, 30%, strongly agreed or agreed that violence may be necessary in order to get the country back on track. This figure is a significant increase from the 19% who strongly agreed or agreed in April 2024 that violence may be necessary (Figure 2).

 

Source: PBS News/Marist Poll.

 

The population of the United States should reject political violence in all its forms and reaffirm that democracies depend on peaceful participation. Public discourse and government rhetoric should aim to reduce tensions, not inflame them.

Furthermore, elected officials and political leaders of the United States need to emphasize that differences should be resolved through civic debate and elections, not by violence.

If violence becomes acceptable or inevitable in politics, then political outcomes may be determined not by votes or debate but by intimidation or force. The primary message to the U.S. public should be zero tolerance for political violence, vigilance against radicalization and societal polarization, and commitment to peaceful democratic engagement.

In summary, politically motivated domestic murders across the United States remain a small fraction of overall homicides in the country and are disproportionately driven by right-wing extremist ideologies. However, their symbolic impact and threats to both human lives and U.S. democracy make them especially significant.

Countering and preventing politically motivated domestic homicides must be achieved without infringing on the constitutional rights of free speech, religion, or political expression. Elected officials, political leaders, and the courts should prioritize preventing and prosecuting criminal acts, reducing radicalization, and lessening societal polarization, rather than undermining the democratic principles, rights, and liberties of the United States.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population issues.

 

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