By Jomo Kwame Sundaram
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Jan 19 2026 (IPS)
After condemning pragmatic responses to the 1997-98 Asian financial crises, the West pursued similar policies in response to the 2008 global financial crisis without acknowledging its own mistakes.
Jomo Kwame Sundaram
Politicised exchange ratesUS exports could barely compete internationally, particularly with Germany and Japan. During his first term, Trump initially pursued a strong dollar policy, which undermined exports and encouraged imports.
The September 1985 ‘Plaza Accord’ among the G7 grouping of the world’s largest economies, held at New York’s Plaza Hotel, agreed that the Japanese yen and the Deutsche mark must both appreciate sharply against the US dollar.
The ‘strong yen’ period, or endaka in Japanese, ensued for a decade until mid-1995. This made Japanese imports less competitive, enabling the Reagan era boom.
By accelerating reunification with the East and the new euro currency, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl prevented the mark strengthening as much as the yen.
Thus, Germany avoided the Japanese catastrophe after its decades-long post-war miracle ended abruptly with the disastrous 1989 Big Bang financial reforms.
Liberalising capital flows
As the IMF urged national authorities to abandon capital controls, East Asians borrowed dollars, expecting to repay later on better terms.
Meanwhile, the dollar only stopped weakening after the US allowed Japan to reverse yen appreciation in mid-1995.
Under Managing Director Michel Camdessus, the IMF began pushing capital account liberalisation. This contradicted the intent of the Fund’s sixth Article of Agreement, affirming national authorities’ right to manage their capital accounts.
Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, Camdessus’ IMF preached the ostensible virtues of capital account liberalisation.
East Asian emerging financial markets were initially delighted by the significant capital inflows before mid-1997. After the strong yen decade, the US dollar appreciated from mid-1995.
When financial inflows reversed after mid-1997, some East Asian monetary authorities were unable to cope and turned to the IMF for emergency funding .
Many paths to crises
The Asian financial crisis is typically dated from 2 July 1997, when the Thai baht was ‘floated’ and its value quickly fell without central bank support. The ensuing panic quickly spread like contagion across national boundaries via financial markets.
Financial investors – in Bangkok, Singapore, Hong Kong, Tokyo, London and New York – hastily withdrew their funds, often mindlessly following perceived ‘market leaders’ without knowing why, like animal herds in panic.
Funds fled economies in the region, like frightened audiences in a dark theatre hearing a fire alarm. Capital even fled the Philippines, which had received little finance, because it was in Southeast Asia, the ‘wrong neighbourhood’.
After earlier celebrating Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand as ‘East Asian miracle’ economies, confidence in Southeast Asian investments fell suddenly.
Central banks in the region were sceptical of IMF prescriptions but believed they had little choice but to comply.
Press photographs showed Camdessus standing sternly, with arms folded like a displeased schoolmaster, over the Indonesian President bowing deeply to sign the IMF agreement.
This humiliating image probably expedited Soeharto’s shock resignation soon after, in mid-1998, over three decades after he seized power in a brutal military putsch in September 1965.
Following an earlier financial crisis, a 1989 Malaysian law had prohibited some risky banking and financial practices, but the authorities sought to attract foreign investments into its stock market.
Thailand had become vulnerable by allowing borrowers direct access to foreign banks through the Bangkok International Banking Facility and its provincial counterpart.
Debtors could thus bypass central bank regulation and supervision. The Thai currency float prompted massive funds outflows from the country.
As market confidence waned, funds fled Malaysia’s bourse, triggering a massive collapse in the currency’s value against the dollar, which had steadily weakened against the yen between 1985 and 1995.
Following massive capital outflows, Malaysia finally introduced capital controls on outflows from September 1998, fourteen months after the crisis began!
The controls enabled Malaysia to stabilise its currency and the economy temporarily, but also ended the earlier decade of accelerated industrialisation and growth.
Learning from experience
Rather than acknowledge and address the worsening problem due to earlier capital account liberalisation, the Fund made things worse with its prescriptions.
It insisted on keeping capital accounts open and raising interest rates to reverse outflows. This slowed economic growth as borrowing – and hence, both spending and investing – became more costly.
As investment and spending are necessary for economic growth, IMF prescriptions exacerbated the problems instead of providing a solution.
The East Asian financial crisis was undoubtedly avoidable. Experience has shown that financial markets and capital flows do not function as mainstream theories claim.
Thus, financial dogma and its influence on economic theory and policy obscured more realistic understanding of how markets actually operate and the ability to develop more pragmatic and appropriate policy alternatives.
History never fully repeats itself. But better policymaking for financial crisis avoidance and recovery will only emerge from more informed, historically grounded analysis.
IPS UN Bureau
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By Mikiko Otani
TOKYO, Japan, Jan 19 2026 (IPS)
Thirty years ago, the groundbreaking report by Graça Machel, renowned and widely respected global advocate for women’s and children’s rights, to the United Nations General Assembly laid bare the devastating impact of armed conflict on children and shook the conscience of the world. It led to the historic decision of the General Assembly to create the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG-CAAC).
Special Representatives of the Secretary-General are high-level envoys entrusted with carrying out specific responsibilities on behalf of the Secretary-General. Appointed at the rank of Under-Secretary-General, the SRSG-CAAC has since served as the global advocate for raising the awareness about the condition of children affected by armed conflict as well as their comprehensive protection and reintegration in the society.
Children and armed conflict as a peace and security agenda
The children and armed conflict (CAAC) agenda has evolved significantly over the past three decades. As appropriately affirmed in Security Council resolution 1261 (1999), the impact of armed conflict on children constitutes a matter affecting international peace and security. Subsequent resolutions firmly anchored the CAAC agenda within the work of the Security Council and established critical protection mechanisms.
Among the most significant of these is the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM), created by Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). The MRM provides verified, credible, and timely information on grave violations committed against children in situations of armed conflict. It has become the backbone of the United Nations’ engagement with parties to conflict to halt such violations.
Credit: UN News
Through this mechanism, parties to conflict are encouraged to commit to ending and preventing grave violations through the development and implementation of time-bound action plans. To date, forty action plans have been concluded with parties to conflict, including non-State armed groups, in eighteen countries, resulting in full compliance by twelve parties.
UNICEF has played a pivotal role on the ground as the United Nations’ lead agency for children, supporting the operation of the MRM and monitoring the implementation of action plans.
Children and armed conflict as a fundamental child rights issue
Beyond peace and security, children and armed conflict is fundamentally a child rights issue. It was the first thematic area addressed as early as 1992 by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, the treaty body monitoring implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989.
That initiative paved the way for the Graça Machel report and the subsequent establishment of the SRSG-CAAC mandate in 1996. It also led to the adoption, in 2000, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.
In March of this year, the Human Rights Council will dedicate its annual day on the rights of the child to children and armed conflict and is expected to adopt a related resolution, underscoring the continued relevance of this agenda.
Thirty years after the inception of the CAAC mandate
Despite these advances, grave violations against children in armed conflict reached an unprecedented 41,370 cases in 2024 alone. Calls for accountability have understandably grown louder.
The impact of armed conflict on children extends far beyond the six grave violations identified by the Security Council. Today, one in five children worldwide lives in a conflict-affected area, where the full spectrum of their rights is compromised, directly or indirectly.
This stark reality demands renewed urgency, enhanced political will, and more focused action.
Toward child rights-based and child-centred accountability
Children who are victims of armed conflict have too often been excluded from accountability processes.
Some positive developments deserve recognition. In 2023, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court adopted a revised Policy on Children that explicitly embraces a child rights approach. In the same year, the Secretary-General’s Guidance Note on Child Rights Mainstreaming called for the systematic integration of child rights into the mandates of United Nations investigative and accountability mechanisms, including commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions.
Accountability must be both child rights-based and child-centred. Meaningful child participation is essential. Listening to children and taking their views seriously is fundamental to justice, remedies, and healing. Accountability processes must address children’s immediate and long-term needs, including education, psychosocial support, and family reunification.
Children as peacebuilders
Children want peace. Sustainable peace is the indispensable foundation for the full realization of child rights.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child guarantees the right of children to be heard and to have their views respected in all matters affecting them. Children also have the right to reintegration and to participate in efforts aimed at restoring social cohesion within fractured and traumatized communities.
In many conflict-affected societies, children constitute more than half of the population. Their role as peacebuilders is therefore not optional—it is essential. Recognizing and empowering children as agents of peace will also reinforce both the women, peace and security agenda and the youth, peace and security agenda.
Time for renewed mobilization, in partnership with civil society and children
Graça Machel reminded us that “universal concern for children presents new opportunities to confront the problems that cause their suffering.”
Children and armed conflict goes to the very core of our shared humanity. It demands broader public awareness, stronger political commitment, and sustained global mobilization.
Civil society organizations, working alongside children themselves, have a crucial role to play in advocacy, awareness-raising, and mobilizing support for the CAAC agenda.
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, created by the General Assembly, carries a unique responsibility as the Secretary-General’s envoy to strengthen cooperation and partnerships among United Nations entities, Member States, civil society, and children themselves.
Children and armed conflict must remain at the forefront of the global agenda and be treated as a central priority by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Dr. Mikiko Otani, widely recognized as an international human rights lawyer, is currently the President of the Child Rights Connect, a Geneva-based global NGO network promoting child rights. She was the Chair of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2021-2023) during her eight-year membership for two terms.
IPS UN Bureau
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