Africa

By CIVICUS
Dec 19 2025 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses climate displacement and Tuvalu’s future with Kiali Molu, a former civil servant at Tuvalu’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and currently a PhD candidate at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji and the University of Bergen in Norway. His research focuses on state sovereignty and climate change in the Pacific.

Kiali Molu

In Tuvalu, one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable nations, rising seas and intensifying storms have made life increasingly precarious. Over 80 per cent of people have applied for Australia’s new climate visa under a treaty signed in November 2023. Under the treaty, 280 Tuvaluans can resettle in Australia each year through a ballot system. While recognising Australia’s willingness to host Tuvaluans, civil society continues to pressure major emitters, including Australia, to cut greenhouse gas emissions and fund climate adaptation measures in vulnerable countries to prevent further displacement.

Why have so many Tuvaluans applied for Australia’s climate mobility visa?

This visa is part of the Falepili Union Treaty agreed by Australia and Tuvalu. The treaty combines a special mobility pathway, guarantees around Tuvalu’s statehood and sovereignty and a broader security arrangement. Under the mobility component, Tuvaluans can apply for residency in Australia through a ballot system, without being forced to permanently relocate.

Many applications are driven by practical reasons, such as employment opportunities to be able to support families back home. Others value the ability to travel more freely, particularly given Australia’s historically long and uncertain visa processes. Access to education opportunities and social protections also matter. What’s important is that selection under this pathway does not require people to leave Tuvalu. It creates choice and security in a context where the future feels increasingly uncertain.

How is climate change reshaping daily life in Tuvalu?

Rising sea levels and frequent king tides regularly flood homes, public buildings and roads, interrupting community gatherings, education and work. Coastal erosion continues to reduce habitable land, while saltwater intrusion contaminates groundwater and destroys pulaka pits that are central to food security, as they’re used to grow staple root crops.

These impacts extend beyond infrastructure: higher reliance on imported food means families face rising costs, and stagnant water means a rise in waterborne diseases. Constant flooding is increasing anxiety about displacement and cultural continuity, and farming and fishing livelihoods are becoming harder to sustain. Climate change affects our food, health, housing and identity every single day.

What does potential resettlement mean for Tuvaluan culture and identity?

Our identity is inseparable from our community, our land and the ocean surrounding it. Tuvaluan culture is rooted in fenua – shared practices around agriculture and fishing, church life and the falekaupule, a community meeting house. Large-scale resettlement risks disrupting these foundations. The transmission of everyday cultural practices, language and oral history may weaken if younger Tuvaluans grow up away from the islands.

However, mobility doesn’t automatically mean cultural loss. Tuvaluan communities abroad are finding ways to preserve collective life, language and traditions through associations, churches and digital platforms. Initiatives such as the Tuvalu Digital Nation aim to safeguard cultural heritage virtually. Still, there is no substitute for ancestral land, and this raises profound questions about what it means to be Tuvaluan if our homeland becomes uninhabitable.

What climate adaptation measures does Tuvalu urgently need?

Adaptation for Tuvalu is not only about renewable energy and seawalls. While these remain essential, there’s also a critical legal and political dimension. The international system still defines statehood on the basis of physical territory, offering little protection to nations facing permanent land loss due to climate change.

We believe Tuvalu should push for a new global legal framework that rethinks sovereignty in the context of climate displacement. This would protect Tuvalu’s international legal personality, maritime boundaries and political rights even if parts of its territory become uninhabitable. This diplomatic strategy is needed as much as physical adaptation measures because it addresses national survival, not just infrastructure resilience.

What responsibilities do major polluters have towards climate-vulnerable states?

Major polluters have legal and moral obligations towards climate-vulnerable countries. International law increasingly recognises duties to reduce emissions, prevent environmental harm and cooperate in protecting those most at risk. Recent legal developments, including advisory opinions from international courts, reinforce that these responsibilities are enforceable, not optional.

These obligations go beyond emissions cuts. They include providing climate finance through mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund, supporting adaptation efforts and sharing technology. For countries like Tuvalu, this support is fundamental to preserving lives, culture and sovereignty. Continued inaction by major emitters should not be seen solely as political failure, but also as a breach of international law.

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Plus d'une semaine après la tentative de coup d'État déjouée au Bénin, le président de la République, Patrice Talon, s'est exprimé sur son état lors d'une conférence presse ce jeudi 18 décembre 2025.

« Je vais bien, je vais très bien même si mon moral a pris un petit coup. Pas pour moi-même, mais pour le pays entier », a confié Patrice Talon. Pour le Chef de l'Etat, les faits survenus ne remplissent pas les conditions d'un coup d'État au sens strict. Il qualifie cet épisode ‘'d'incident'' et non de tentative de coup d'État. « Il faut bien plus que ça pour soumettre un État entier », a-t-il insisté.

Au-delà de sa propre personne, c'est surtout l'impact de l'événement qui attriste le président. « Je suis peiné, j'ai été très malheureux, et je continue de l'être pour l'image que ceux-là donne de notre pays. C'est cela qui constitue ma véritable souffrance », a-t-il déclaré.

Le chef de l'État a rappelé l'attachement commun des Béninois à leur pays, malgré les divergences politiques. « Nous aimons tous le Bénin malgré nos divergences, nos heurts, nos disputes. Je pense que la quasi-totalité des Béninois était loin d'imaginer qu'un tel événement puisse se produire », a-t-il souligné.

A.A.A

La sélection nationale a donné le top de sa participation à la Coupe d'Afrique des Nations (CAN Maroc 2025), ce jeudi 18 décembre 2025. C'est à travers la cérémonie simple et empreinte de solennité de remise de drapeau, présidée par le ministre des sports, Benoît Dato.

Les Guépards, ambassadeurs du Bénin à la CAN Maroc 2025, sont désormais investis dans leur rôle de défense des couleurs nationales. Le drapeau, symbole de la Nation leur a été remis ce jeudi 18 décembre 2025. Un moment solennel chargé de sens qui leur rappelle le rôle important qu'ils doivent jouer pour inscrire le Bénin en lettres d'or à la plus grande compétition de football sur le continent.

Le capitaine Steve Mounié a rassuré à l'occasion sur l'unité et la cohésion du groupe. Résolument engagés pour la compétition, les hommes de Gernot Rohr entendent miser sur un jeu collectif pour arriver à bout des différentes équipes pour le bonheur du public sportif béninois.

F. A. A.

Farmers can now know and benefit from their contribution to climate change thanks to a formula that can be used to calculate the amount of carbon stored in fruit trees. In a project dubbed Fruit Trees for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in East Africa, the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT), in […]

Credit Jan Kopriva

By Gilles-Éric Séralini, Jérôme Douzelet and Gérald Jungers
PARIS, Dec 19 2025 (IPS)

Today, society is rightly concerned about the rising prevalence of autism among children worldwide; affecting up to 1% of children, it has a profound impact on families. Neuroinflammation and environmental origins are increasingly implicated. But what causes them?

Let us take a broader view. Depression among adolescents is widespread, without it being possible to clearly separate social from neurological causes. Even in China, scientists have demonstrated a link between pollution, asthma, and depression among young people.

Genetic factors, while not excluded, cannot explain everything, as they do not change rapidly enough to account for such a swift increase across the population. Likewise, when we include neurodegenerative diseases among older people, and even among younger adults, the number of people affected becomes staggering. Finally, environmentally linked cancers affect at least one in three people worldwide.

All these diseases and conditions are chronic and slow developing. Medicine primarily alleviates their symptoms, while their causes lead to extremely serious consequences for society. If we then look at the biosphere as a whole, species extinction and abnormalities, alongside climate disruption, we gain certainty about the role of anthropogenic effects in these problems. This is neither the result of individual ill will nor bad luck, but rather the rotten fruit of a system.

An increasing number of specialists believe that a paradigm shift is necessary to break free from this situation. Recently, forty-three of us from five continents co-signed an article in Environmental Sciences Europe, a high-impact scientific journal, detailing the malpractice surrounding the authorization of toxic substances, particularly pesticides and plasticizers.

The historical archives of Monsanto-Bayer have shown how doubt has been deliberately maintained through dishonest practices in order to keep society in ignorance, falsely believing that authorized products are properly assessed. These revelations, made possible through the U.S. justice system, led to convictions for fraud benefiting more than 100,000 cancer patients.

The issue is closely related when it comes to disabilities, yet these remain neglected. According to a recent French parliamentary report, 50,000 pupils are currently without appropriate support solutions, compared with 36,000 in 2024. Among them are many autistic children suffering from gastrointestinal microbiota disorders, one of the leading reasons for medical consultations. This highlights the devastation caused by ultra-processed food, which has harmful effects on food intolerances. We now understand how the nervous system surrounding the intestine, the “second brain,” connected to the primary one, malfunctions.

Let us already do, humbly, what we can where we are, much like Pierre Rabhi’s hummingbird parable, which seeks to extinguish a forest fire with the water carried in its beak: “At least I will have tried.” This is what the association LEX Les Enfants Extraordinaires does in Barjac, in the Gard region, France. It welcomes young people with disabilities who have no support solutions, offering them a social life alongside the village’s older residents. Organic gardening and cooking workshops are welcoming spaces, at least without adding pesticides and pollutants; work is done through short supply chains. Equine-assisted activities, animal-assisted therapy, and wheelchair repairs also allow participants to once again become givers of joy and creators of smiles.

Taken individually, these diseases are sometimes attributed to bad luck or to various social causes. But one inevitably thinks of epigenetic or transgenerational, therefore environmental, inheritance. We shudder at the effects of persistent, fossil-based pollutants, starting from the fetus and pregnancy, since we have shown that they cross the placenta, as do some of the world’s most widely used pesticides, such as Roundup, implicated in Monsanto-Bayer’s frauds. These substances accumulate in our environment, limited by the atmosphere; all forms of life are sensitive to and subjected to them.

We detect how pollutants embed themselves in all living tissues and are deliberately disseminated. They are laden with heavy metals, derived from carcinogenic and neurotoxic petroleum residues used in their manufacture. We have demonstrated that all endocrine disruptors are also neurotoxic through other cellular mechanisms, like sand gradually clogging and disrupting the brain and nervous system.

Solutions do exist. We can feed the world through agroecological agriculture, as specifically demonstrated by international reports from Olivier De Schutter. This requires raising fewer pigs, chickens, and cattle in intensive systems, as these practices saturate the ultra-processed food of wealthy countries with pollutants. Such intensive systems are unnecessary. Today, we maintain more suffering livestock than children worldwide.

Agroecological agriculture will regenerate ecosystems, fortunately highly resilient, through credible alternatives already implemented across the planet. Sadly, these are currently stifled by legislative gridlock generated by lobbying efforts designed to preserve the outdated, intensive post-war model. Outdated, because “growth” is a flawed concept, built on neglect and the deliberate omission of externalities. But we will get there.

Gilles-Éric Séralini was Professor of Toxicology and Molecular Biology at the University of Caen Normandy. Along with Gérald Jungers, an associate researcher, he is a member of the “Risks, Quality and Sustainable Environment” cluster of the MRSH.

Jérôme Douzelet is the founder and coordinator of the association LEX, Les Enfants Extraordinaires, in Barjac, of which G.E.S. is President

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, addresses the Security Council warning the Council it risks irrelevance without reform. Credit: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe 15 December 2025

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Dec 19 2025 (IPS)

A long-standing proposal going back to 1996—to establish a single non-renewable seven-year term for the Secretary-General of the United Nations—has been resurrected by former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

The original proposal was part of a study sponsored by the Dag Hammarskjold and Ford Foundations. According to the proposal, the seven-year term “ would give the SG the opportunity to undertake far-reaching plans free from undesirable pressures.”

Ban has said a single, nonrenewable seven-year term will strengthen the independence of the office. The current practice of two five-year terms, he said, leaves Secretaries-General “overly dependent on this Council’s Permanent Members for an extension.”

A former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt was deprived of a second five-year term when the US was the only permanent member state to veto his second term despite the fact that he received 14 of the 15 votes in the Security Council.

“As the highest policy-making organ of the United Nations, and as the ultimate appointing body, the General Assembly should adopt a comprehensive resolution establishing a single seven-year term and all key features of an improved process of appointing the Secretary-General,” the study said.

The same seven-year term, according to the 1996 study authored by Sir Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, should also apply to heads of UN agencies and UN programmes.

The study was titled “A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow’s United Nations. A Fresh Appraisal.” Sir Brian was a former UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Special Political Affairs and Childers was a former Senior Advisor to the UN Director-General for Development and International Economic Affairs.

Ambassador Anwarul K. Chowdhury, former Under-Secretary-General and High Representative of the United Nations and Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN, told IPS that, in keeping with the best interest of the operational credibility of the world’s most universal multilateral body with a global mandate, and as a conscientious UN insider, “I believe very strongly and quite comfortably that there is substantive merit in the long-standing, but surprisingly undervalued, proposal to establish a single non-renewable seven-year term of office for the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”

In an op-ed published on 20 June 2011 in IPS on Ban’s second term, and commenting in general on the re-election process, he wrote, “This unclear, closed-door, behind-the-scenes and exclusionary process results in the recommendation of a person who is dreaming of re-election for a second term from the very first day in office.”

Ambassador Chowdhury went on to underscore that “This very human temptation for a second term is so overwhelming, so intoxicating that the incoming secretary-general’s main effort in office is wholly conditioned by this desire.” Keeping fully in perspective the “veto element,” the wishes and inclinations of the P5 get the priority attention of the “Chief Administrative Officer” of the UN.

“I fully agree,” he said, “with the conventional understanding in the corridors of the UN that the debt that an SG accrues from the P5 during his first term for his re-election gets paid off during the second term. This arrangement serves both the secretary-general and the P5 well.”

More so, he noted, because they know full well that the broader membership of the UN is never able to agree to long overdue reforms of the unacceptable electoral process for the head of the secretariat. This encourages the possibility of a lacklustre leader to emerge, particularly if a P5 representative engages in the selection process at the instructions from the capital which is not supportive of the centrality of the UN’s global role.

Asked if the current Secretary-General António Guterres agrees with the proposal, UN deputy spokesperson Farhan Haq told reporters last week:

“Well, the current Secretary-General respects his role as Secretary-General to stay outside of the process of the Member States’ discussions. Obviously, any change in the terms of a Secretary-General would need to be agreed to by the Member States, and he trusts that they will work this out amongst themselves and find a solution.”

Haq said Guterres thinks that there are a number of reform steps that can be taken. Obviously, since he is the sitting Secretary-General, he’s not going to voice his views on this right now, while the Member States are considering it. And of course, you’ve seen his own support for the idea to have the first female Secretary-General. “But again, these are decisions that are not in our hands,” said Haq.

Dr. Palitha Kohona, a former Chief of the UN Treaty Section, told IPS some see merit in extending the term of office of the SG to seven years. But would such an extension add value? An effective SG could always seek re-election under the current set up and the GA has given a second term to most SGs.

The Member States could also refrain from re-electing an ineffective SG. If an ineffective SG were to be given a seven year term, the most important international organization in the world will have to suffer the burden of such an individual for an unfairly long and painful period, he pointed out.

An effective SG, subject to the political and financial constraints that he/she operates under, could achieve much in five years. What is required is the ability to operate in an volatile global environment, superior management skills and the knack for picking excellent staff, especially as USGs and ASGs. The current tendency to accept whomever big powers foist on the SG and to appoint lacklusture performers tends to reflect poorly on the leader of this august body and the Member States pay a heavy price, said Dr Kohona, a former Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN.

“What is really needed is the institutionalisation of a system that enables the UN to pick potentially efficient performers without the need to depend on whimsies of the P5. Major corporations operate in this manner. Successful performers will be retained for five or ten years. Those who fail will be dropped. The member states will be the best judges, he declared.

Sanam B. Anderlini, Founder and CEO, International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN), told IPS: “I think a 7 year term is an excellent idea – it would enable the SG to be courageous and imaginative in vision and practice. They would not be encumbered with the tasks of currying favour with member states or campaigning for votes for a second term.”

Additionally, with a seven-year horizon, they’d be compelled and motivated to ensure change and impact, because everyone ultimately wishes to have a good legacy, she pointed out.

But the key is ensuring that the selected leaders have the necessary courage, vision and values, she said

The 7-year terms should be staggered so we don’t lose the entire UN systems leadership team in one go. The idea of extending the United Nations Secretary-General’s term in office is a proposal that has been discussed as a reform idea, but the current, standard term remains five years, renewable once, declared Anderlini.

Recounting his IPS op-ed, Ambassador Chowdhury said he had underscored that “Another important idea to ensure independence of the Secretary-General would be to make the office restricted to one term for each incumbent.”

The seven-year term is adequate for any leader worth the name to deliver positive results and show what can be achieved for any global institution. Any change in the tenure of office and in the re-election process will require the amendment of the UN Charter and therefore the concurrence of the P5, said Ambassador Chowdhury, initiator of the UNSCR 1325 as President of the UN Security Council in March 2000, Chairman of the UN General Assembly’s Main Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matters and Founder of the Global Movement for The Cultural of Peace (GMCoP).

On 30 October 2023, in another op-ed in IPS, Ambassador Chowdhury recommended that “… in the future the Secretary-General would have only one term of seven years, as opposed to the current practice of automatically renewing the Secretary-General’s tenure for a second five-year term, without even evaluating his performance.”

The seven-year term is adequate for any leader worth the name to deliver positive results and show what can be achieved for any global institution. In any case, we need to remember that any change in the tenure of office and in the re-election process will require the amendment of the UN Charter and therefore the concurrence of the P5.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Three-time champion Michael van Gerwen overcomes Japanese debutant Mitsuhiko Tatsunami at the PDC World Championship.

David Munyua says there has been a "crazy" reaction in Kenya to his shock victory over world number 18 Mike de Decker at the PDC World Championship.

Le port d’Alger a accueilli jeudi une unité de la flotte militaire russe, composée du sous-marin “Krasnodar” et du remorqueur de sauvetage “Altay”, pour un […]

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Two of African football's biggest names, Achraf Hakimi and Mohamed Salah, are hoping to lead their nations to glory as the Africa Cup of Nations gets ready to kick off in Morocco.

Two of African football's biggest names, Achraf Hakimi and Mohamed Salah, are hoping to lead their nations to glory as the Africa Cup of Nations gets ready to kick off in Morocco.

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The Council of the EU and the European Parliament have provisionally agreed on an EU law establishing a list of safe countries of origin.

Council adopts measures to incentivise and simplify defence investments in the EU.

Joyce Msuya (right at table), United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefs the Security Council meeting on the maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Dec 18 2025 (IPS)

In recent weeks, the Russo-Ukrainian War has taken a considerable turn for the worse, with armed hostilities escalating in both frequency and intensity, causing extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and a significant loss of life across Ukraine. Attacks on energy infrastructures and the resulting power outages are forcing the most vulnerable civilians to deal with a “cold, frightening ordeal” in the winter season, warned the United Nations (UN) human rights chief.

“Nearly four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the plight of civilians has become even more unbearable,” said UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk. “As peace negotiations continue, our monitoring and reporting show that the war is intensifying, causing more death, damage, and destruction…No part of the country is safe.”

According to figures from the United Nations (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), between January and November 2025, approximately 2,311 Ukrainians were killed as a direct result of war—a 26 percent increase compared to the same period in 2024 and a 70 percent increase from 2023. Turk noted that between December 2024 and November 2025, there was a significant increase in the average daily number of long-range drones used by the Russian Federation, particularly in densely-populated frontline and urban areas.

November was especially volatile, with at least 226 civilians killed and 952 injured—51 percent of which being caused by long-range missile strikes and loitering munitions from Russian armed forces. The vast majority of civilian casualties occurred in areas that were controlled by Ukraine, while roughly 60 percent were near the frontlines of the conflict. On November 18, a large-scale combined missile and drone attack killed at least 38 people in Ternopil, marking the deadliest strike in western Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Short-range drones, aerial bombardments, and other munitions used in frontline regions have caused extensive damage to residential districts, rendering entire neighborhoods uninhabitable and triggering significant new displacement. Hospitals and clinics in frontline regions have sustained significant damage, forcing some facilities to shut down entirely and severely straining the operations of those that remain. Persisting insecurity prevents ambulances from reaching injured persons, while aid workers risk their lives to assist.

Additionally, attacks on water and energy infrastructure continue across Ukraine, disrupting access to water, heating, and electricity for millions—often for extended periods of time. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted that new attacks in Ukraine over the weekend alone have left more than 1 million people without access to water, heating, and electricity, particularly across the country’s southern region.

The Odessa, Kherson, and Chernihiv regions have reported district-wide disruptions to electricity, water, and heating services, severely straining lifesaving operations. Meanwhile, the majority of food shops and pharmacies in frontline areas—particularly in the Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy regions—have shut down. Some communities in these areas have also reported having no access to electricity for more than two years.

Residents in areas of Donetsk have also reported receiving poor-quality running water only once every few days, raising alarm among humanitarian groups given the close proximity of numerous abandoned mines and chemical plants, as well as the rapidly approaching winter season which is projected to exacerbate already dire living conditions.

According to World Vision (WV), Ukrainian children and families are expected to face the harshest winter since the wake of hostilities in 2022. Temperatures this season are projected to drop below –10°C, and repeated strikes on critical energy infrastructure have left children facing an average of 16-17 hours of power cuts each day. These prolonged outages deprive families of heat, electricity, water, and essential services at the coldest time of the year—exactly when they are needed most.

“In some areas, families go up to 36 hours without heating, electricity or water. This prolonged lack of basic services puts children’s health at serious risk, disrupts their education, and threatens their overall well-being,” said Arman Grigoryan, World Vision’s Ukraine Crisis Response Director. “Humanitarian support, including winter supplies, safe spaces, and psychosocial assistance, is urgently needed to protect them.”

World Vision noted that the harshest living conditions have been recorded in northern and eastern Ukraine, such as Chernihiv, Dnipro, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy. Additionally, education for children has been severely impacted, with roughly 40 percent of children studying through remote or blended learning due to power cuts making it increasingly difficult for schools and kindergartens to operate safely.

Living conditions are also especially dire for older persons and people with disabilities, many of whom are unable to leave their homes and lack access to appropriate transit services and suitable housing. Roughly 60 percent of civilian deaths in frontline areas have been individuals over the age of 60.

The UN and its partners have been working on the frontlines to assist in winterization efforts by providing emergency shelter and protection services. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has also been distributing cash assistance to vulnerable communities for winter-specific needs such as fuel and insulation.

UNHCR estimates that approximately 12.7 million people in Ukraine are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection in 2025. However, due to repeated funding cuts, the 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for Ukraine has been forced to prioritize support for only 4.8 million people— a notable decrease from the originally targeted 8 million. As conditions continue to deteriorate, the UN is urging for increased donor contributions and broader international support to meet growing humanitarian needs.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Lying on the other side of the globe, at first glance the Indo-Pacific seems as remote to European interests as it gets. A more careful consideration beyond the geographical distance reflected on the map, however, paints a rather different picture. The growing interconnectedness of the European and the Indo-Pacific theaters in the security realm, as well as trade dependencies in strategic commodities, such as critical minerals and semiconductors, necessitate the formulation of a more intentional EU Indo-Pacific policy recognizing the region’s centrality in Europe’s defense and economic security. At the same time, acknowledging the structural limitations of the prospective engagement is equally important. The delicate state of affairs in Taiwan and the brinkmanship in the South China Sea should also be factored in. The United States has long called for its European partners to shore up their presence in the Indo-Pacific not least to support Washington in its regional bras-de-fer with China. Besides Washington’s own agenda, a flare-up in the Indo-Pacific will have far-reaching consequences for the EU partners, both financially and strategically. After mapping the European interests linked to the region, this paper will explore the ways in which the EU may tangibly shift some of its attention to the Indo-Pacific demonstrating why this is critical and what constraints it is bound to face in the process.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Vasilis Petropoulos, ELIAMEP Fellow.

Introduction

The Indo-Pacific is the geographical space extending roughly from the eastern coast of Africa to the Western coast of the Americas. It encompasses South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania. This region hosts more than half of the world’s population, accounts for 60% of global GDP[1], and is home to the busiest maritime trade routes, such as the Strait of Malacca, the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China seas, featuring contested security flashpoints.

For Europe, the Indo-Pacific is a space where economic interests, strategic dependencies, and global stability converge.

The region is also the site of an intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, whose outcome will largely shape the future of the international order. For Europe, the Indo-Pacific is a space where economic interests, strategic dependencies, and global stability converge. Approximately 40 percent of the EU’s foreign trade passes through the South China Sea[2], and European industries depend heavily on supply chains rooted in East and Southeast Asia. Export controls on rare earths, disruptions in semiconductor production in Taiwan or delays in shipping through the Strait of Malacca would reverberate across Europe’s economy. Beyond economics, a military escalation in the region could fracture the transatlantic alliance and divert U.S. strategic focus away from Europe, leaving the EU more vulnerable on its eastern and southern flanks. But even absent an armed confrontation in Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific is directly tied to Europe’s security through the unprecedented dynamics to which the ongoing war in Ukraine has strikingly given shape. With North Korean troops fighting alongside the Russian invaders and with China implicitly bankrolling the beleaguered Russian economy -thus enabling the perpetuation of the Kremlin’s war effort- the Indo-Pacific theater appears to gradually become embedded into the security architecture of the Old Continent. Hybrid threats originating in the Indo-Pacific, such as organized crime and irregular migration, complete the heap of security-related matters that tie Europe to the region.

Recognizing these interconnections, the EU ought to turn anemic engagement into tangible presence. In doing so, Europe must navigate internal divisions and resource constraints, while treading carefully the geopolitical minefield of the U.S.-China rivalry. The question is not whether Europe should engage in the Indo-Pacific, but how, and to what extent, it can pursue its engagement effectively.

Skin in the game

Economic Security

As already hinted, Europe’s economic prosperity is tightly bound to the Indo-Pacific. The region hosts four of the EU’s top ten trading partners, including China, Japan, South Korea, and India[3]. Further, key European exports (e.g. machinery, automobiles, and pharmaceuticals) flow eastward, while the EU imports a vast array of goods from Indo-Pacific countries. Two sectors epitomize this interdependence most prominently: semiconductors and critical minerals.

Semiconductors

The EU’s economic model is anchored in high-value manufacturing, advanced automotive production, and digital innovation. Maintaining the momentum in these fields hinges on securing an uninterrupted supply of semiconductors. Modern vehicles -particularly electric and hybrid models- integrate hundreds of chips[4] that control everything from engine management and battery systems to safety sensors and infotainment. Increasingly, the move toward autonomous and connected vehicles depends on higher-performance chips fabricated at advanced nodes. Further, advanced chips are the central components of data centers, 5G and forthcoming 6G networks, and industrial automation systems[5]. The defence industry, too, depends on reliable access to semiconductors for advanced military aircrafts, radar systems, satellite communications, and command-and-control platforms[6].

Foundries in Indo-Pacific countries account for the bulk of chip manufacturing worldwide.

Foundries in Indo-Pacific countries account for the bulk of chip manufacturing worldwide. Indicatively, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors with a 71% market share and over 90% of the most advanced chips[7]. It is clear that a disruption to Taiwan’s semiconductor output would cascade directly into Europe’s supply chains resulting in production halts, escalating costs, and loss of competitiveness. It could also impede Europe’s digital transformation, compromise the rollout of critical communications networks, and affect sectors vital to national security. Semiconductors are dual-use technologies underpinning both civilian and military innovation. Therefore, any limitation in access to advanced chips would erode Europe’s technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy, leaving it reliant on the policy choices and geopolitical stability of other, non-Western actors. The graph below offers a visualization of Indo-Pacific’s dominance in global chip manufacturing.

Source: Ali Kamaly

 

Critical Minerals

Many of these minerals are mined or processed in Indo-Pacific countries, and the geographic concentration of production and refining adds a layer of systemic risk for Europe. […] While raw mineral deposits exist in many places, China has deliberately captured the downstream part of the value chain, which includes the refining, processing, separation and manufacturing of the final component.

The transition to a low-carbon, technologically advanced economy has placed critical minerals at the centre of EU’s industrial policy. Elements such as rare earths, nickel, cobalt, lithium, graphite and others form the backbone of batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, and advanced electronics. Many of these minerals are mined or processed in Indo-Pacific countries, and the geographic concentration of production and refining adds a layer of systemic risk for Europe. First, the role of China is pivotal. While raw mineral deposits exist in many places, China has deliberately captured the downstream part of the value chain, which includes the refining, processing, separation and manufacturing of the final component. For example, China accounts for about 65% of the world’s lithium refining capacity, over 70% for cobalt, and an astonishing 90% for rare earth minerals[8]. Second, Southeast Asia and other parts of the Indo-Pacific supply important raw and intermediate materials. For instance, Indonesia is the world’s largest producer of nickel, accounting for more than 50% of global nickel output in 2024 with Australia and New Caledonia also featuring in the list with the top ten global nickel producers[9]. The ASEAN Scoping Study on Critical Minerals Supply Chains found that Indonesia and the Philippines together account for approximately 72% of global nickel output and 14% of global cobalt output[10]. Crucially, these trends will continue to shape the critical minerals industry in the foreseeable future with Indo-Pacific (especially China) remaining at the epicenter. The tables below show projections about the dominant players in the six main critical minerals in 2030.

 

Table 1: Mining

Top 3 producers: #1, % #2, % #3, % Copper Chile, 23% DRC, 14% Peru, 10% Lithium Australia, 33% China, 23% Chile, 12% Cobalt DRC, 66% Indonesia, 10% Russia, 3% Rare earths China, 54% Australia,18% Myanmar, 9% Nickel Indonesia, 62% Philippines, 8% New Caledonia, 6% Graphite China, 82% Madagascar, 3% Mozambique, 2%

Source: IEA

 

Table 2: Processing/Refining

Top 3 processors: #1, % #2, % #3, % Copper China, 46% DRC, 7% Chile, 5% Lithium China, 57% Chile, 15% Argentina, 13% Cobalt China, 74% Finland, 6% Japan, 4% Rare earths China, 77% Malaysia, 12% Australia, 3% Nickel Indonesia, 44% China, 21% Japan, 6% Graphite China, 93% Japan, 3% U.S. 1%

Source: IEA

Because the supply chains for these minerals are globally interlinked, a disruption at any point (mining, refining, transport, processing) can severely undercut the EU’s environmental policies enshrined in the “Green Deal”.

Needless to say, the implications for Europe’s green transition are multifold. Europe is seeking to electrify transport, scale-up renewable energy and build digitally interconnected and resilient infrastructure (e.g., smart grids). Electrification means batteries. These in turn require nickel-rich chemistries (for higher energy density), cobalt (for stability in many chemistries), and graphite or other anode materials. Because the supply chains for these minerals are globally interlinked, a disruption at any point (mining, refining, transport, processing) can severely undercut the EU’s environmental policies enshrined in the “Green Deal”. Consider, for example, the battery value chain. The extraction may be in one country, but the ore is shipped to a refining complex in another country (often China) for conversion into battery-grade materials. The high degree of downstream concentration in one geography makes the supply chain vulnerable. Further, the OECD publication “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions” shows that China and Myanmar play dominant roles in processing, separation and downstream production of magnets, alloys and components[11]. From Europe’s perspective, this means that raw-material supply risks are not confined to mining. The biggest risk lies in the “mid‐stream” and “down‐stream” segments, that is, refining, separation, processing and fabrication of value‐added materials.

Because China maintains a tight grip on these segments, Europe and other jurisdictions are exposed to strategic bottlenecks. A mining source thousands of kilometers away becomes vulnerable if the processing plant is in China or if shipments must pass through geopolitical flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific. China’s preeminence in the strategic supply chains of critical minerals affords Beijing the opportunity to weaponize trade to pursue political ends. The placement of export controls on rare earths –a textbook measure taken by China in its bid to afflict the Western economies- has caused manufacturing disruptions, driving up prices and undermining the competitiveness of domestic products.

Similar to semiconductors, critical minerals are also irreplaceable for the European Defense Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB). Critical raw materials, such as graphite, cobalt, beryllium, and germanium are needed for the production of an array of weaponry, including fighter aircrafts, tanks, missiles, torpedoes, artillery, and ammunition, military hardware in which the EU strives to attain self-sufficiency. According to a risk assessment conducted by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies[12], the supply of many of the aforementioned materials is very likely to incur disruptions due to instability or geopolitical bickering.

Military Security

The globalization of markets is what has made the Indo-Pacific indispensable to Europe’s economic security. The intensified great power competition reminiscent of Cold War era-style establishment of opposing blocks is what renders the Indo-Pacific vital to Europe’s hard security as well.

A military escalation in the Indo-Pacific, especially around Taiwan, would have immediate consequences for Europe by drawing U.S. attention and resources away from the Euro-Atlantic theater.

A military escalation in the Indo-Pacific, especially around Taiwan, would have immediate consequences for Europe by drawing U.S. attention and resources away from the Euro-Atlantic theater. If Washington were forced to reallocate strategic bandwidth to Asia, the EU would face greater pressure to shoulder the security burden on its eastern and southern flanks, where threats from Russia, instability in the Middle East, and irregular migration already test Europe’s resilience. Even without open conflict, developments in the Indo-Pacific increasingly shape Europe’s security landscape, as seen in the Ukraine war. North Korea’s provision of frontline troops and weapons to Russia, along with China’s economic lifeline that sustains Moscow’s war machine, demonstrates that actors in the Indo-Pacific can directly amplify threats to European stability.

Hybrid Threats 

Equally destabilizing for Europe are hybrid threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific region. The overseas territories of an EU powerhouse are turning into a springboard for irregular migration and organized crime. Criminal groups have established themselves[13] in the French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and the French West Indies engaging in drug trafficking, illegal fishing, gold smuggling, and arms flows as they exploit the vast exclusive economic zones where maritime surveillance is inadequate. These groups wield substantial control of international migration routes using the French territories as transit nodes for migration flows that ultimately reach Europe. Civil strife, climate change, political instability, and economic disparities in the Indo-Pacific exacerbate this trend. Once migrants enter a French territory, they are closer to gaining access to the European Union’s legal space, creating concerns that organized networks could exploit these territories as stepping-stones or “side doors” into Europe. Combined, these pressures increase border insecurity directly impacting Europe’s internal security.

This growing entanglement shows that Europe cannot compartmentalize the two regions. The Indo-Pacific is now woven into the continent’s security architecture, giving the EU undeniable “skin in the game” in preserving stability and building partnerships across the region.

Pinpointing the main hurdles 

To do so, the EU has to step up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific. In formulating its strategy for a more active engagement, Brussels should take into account the limitations it is destined to face.

…the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is not designed for distant power projection.

First, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is not designed for distant power projection. Unlike the U.S., the EU lacks forward bases, logistical capacity, and naval assets suited for sustained Indo-Pacific operations. Any European military contribution would therefore be limited to symbolic deployments, joint exercises, or capacity-building missions.

Consensus-based decision-making and domestic political fragmentation across Europe also constrain the EU’s ability to act swiftly or decisively as a whole. Some member states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, prioritize transatlantic solidarity and view China with suspicion; others, like Germany and Hungary, emphasize economic pragmatism appearing more conciliatory vis-à-vis Beijing due to their tight ties in trade and investments. Furthermore, defense spending disparities among member states hinder the formation of a unified strategic posture. So does the divergence in threat perception: Austria or Ireland might not view the threats stemming from the Indo-Pacific as immediate as they seem to France with its overseas territories or to the Baltic countries with an aggressive Russia on their borders- backed by Indo-Pacific actors.

Compounding to the constraining factors is China’s central role in European trade, which creates strong disincentives for confrontational policies.

Compounding to the constraining factors is China’s central role in European trade, which creates strong disincentives for confrontational policies. While the EU recognizes the risks of overreliance, especially after the pandemic and the Ukraine war, full-scale decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable. Consequently, the EU must pursue a policy of de-risking without disengaging, a pursuit requiring deft balancing that might sound straightforward in theory but can prove a herculean undertaking in practice even for the most experienced European bureaucrats.

Finally, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine consumes Europe’s attention and resources. Other challenges facing Europe, though, have not magically disappeared. The EU’s southern neighborhood grapples with persistent instability. Climate change, energy security, and migration pressures further stretch European capacities. In this context, sustained Indo-Pacific engagement risks being deprioritized unless directly linked to core European interests. Well-constructed and clearly communicated policy messaging on why the Indo-Pacific matters to Europe can serve in achieving the latter.

Rising to the challenge 

Despite these obstacles, Europe, both collectively and at national level, has taken some initial steps toward strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific.

The 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific[14] marked a watershed. It framed the region as “vital for the EU’s interests” and called for cooperation in seven areas: sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, ocean governance, digital partnerships, connectivity, security, and human security. The strategy’s ambition is evident in its breadth, yet its implementation remains uneven. Unlike the U.S., the EU lacks a hard-power footprint in the Indo-Pacific. The strategy is therefore designed around partnerships leveraging diplomacy, trade, and development tools rather than military presence. The EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defense (2022) sought to fix that. Recognizing the growing assertiveness of China in the Indo-Pacific and the strategic importance of the region to Europe, the strategic compass expanded the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs) to the Indian Ocean while calling for more joint exercises and port calls in the Indo-Pacific with the aim to strengthen the EU regional presence.[15]

Beyond the collective front some EU member states have forged their own Indo-Pacific policies, contributing to a patchwork of European engagement. France maintains territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (La Réunion, New Caledonia, French Polynesia) and a permanent military presence. It views itself as an Indo-Pacific power and a natural anchor for EU engagement. Germany adopted “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific”[16] in 2020, emphasizing diversification of partnerships and a rules-based order. The Netherlands followed suit in 2020[17], focusing on trade and security cooperation. Italy and Spain are expanding defense dialogues with India, Japan, and ASEAN.

Given the vitality of the Indo-Pacific to the European economies and to the EU’s strategic autonomy writ large, the moment has come for Brussels to transform its hitherto timid engagement with the region into a vigorous and all-encompassing Indo-Pacific strategy.

Yet, coordination at the EU level remains limited. The EU Naval Mission Atalanta (operating in the western Indian Ocean) and joint exercises or port calls with partners like Japan and India represent embryonic steps toward a coherent European presence. On the other hand, initiatives, such as Global Gateway[18], promising €300 billion in sustainable investment, aim to enhance Europe’s soft power and support resilient infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific. However, questions remain about financing, coordination, and visibility compared to China’s extensive network of BRI projects. Given the vitality of the Indo-Pacific to the European economies and to the EU’s strategic autonomy writ large, the moment has come for Brussels to transform its hitherto timid engagement with the region into a vigorous and all-encompassing Indo-Pacific strategy.

The following policy recommendations aim to guide European policymaking in this direction:

• Maritime security

Maritime security represents the most practical entry point for upgraded European involvement; and probably the most instrumental one. Trade routes through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean function as Europe’s economic lifelines. The EU’s dependence on maritime security in these waters ties its prosperity to the stability of these distant sea lanes. Building on operations like Atalanta and AGENOR, the EU could expand naval patrols into the broader Indo-Pacific under a new Maritime Security Compact with ASEAN and regional partners within the framework of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). It could also reinforce the EU Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs) concept in the northwestern Indian Ocean and explore its extension to the western Pacific. Similarly, it can expand joint naval drills with Indo-Pacific partners both in geographical breadth and in scope. In particular, joint exercises may be conducted in more parts of the Indo-Pacific waters, while including training in war scenarios, red teaming, and breaking of potential naval blockades of critical sea lanes. Additionally, the EU could ramp-up investments in information-sharing mechanisms and capacity-building for regional coast guards. Such measures would not only safeguard critical trade routes but also demonstrate Europe’s commitment to free navigation and to a rules-based maritime order.

• Supply chain diversification

To reduce strategic dependencies, the EU should diversify semiconductor supply chains by strengthening partnerships with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, while supporting EU domestic chip production through the European Chips Act.

To reduce strategic dependencies, the EU should diversify semiconductor supply chains by strengthening partnerships with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, while supporting EU domestic chip production through the European Chips Act. Developing critical minerals partnerships with Indonesia, Australia, and India under transparent environmental and labor standards could also go a long way in feeding into Europe’s image as a global leader in sustainable development, while buttressing the diversification of the continent’s supply chains. A credible economic footprint would reinforce Europe’s relevance and complement its security engagement.

• Multilateralism and Diplomacy

Europe’s comparative advantage still lies in norm-setting and diplomacy. The EU should try to act as a mediating voice in U.S.-China tensions, emphasizing international law and open trade, while fostering regional crisis prevention initiatives, including confidence-building measures in the South China Sea. Regarding ASEAN, the EU may institutionalize the EU-ASEAN strategic dialogue with a permanent secretariat-level mechanism and build on the EU-ASEAN strategic partnership to revive sincere talks on a region-to-region free trade agreement, which will enhance integration and mutual economic resilience. Further, the EU would do well to upgrade the current format of talks from a ministerial to heads-of-state level dialogue. Such diplomatic activism would underscore Europe’s role as a stabilizing actor rather than a partisan power.

• Selected Bilateral Partnerships

The EU should deepen cooperation with established partners (Japan, India, Australia, and South Korea) and initiate partnerships with others through joint exercises, technology synergies, and joint research in critical technologies and cybersecurity. Triangular cooperation (e.g., EU-Japan-ASEAN infrastructure projects) could amplify impact while sharing burdens. A more robust presence would also send a message to China and North Korea that Europe is not a passive spectator of the latter’s intercontinental interference on Russia’s side in Ukraine. Rather, it will show that Europe can bring the competition to their own neighborhood, reinforcing its bargaining position. By strengthening the capacities of their own regional rivals while keeping channels of communication open, the EU can plausibly have a shot at persuading China and North Korea to dial down support to Moscow switching to a bold, but calculated, sticks-and-carrots approach.

• Leveraging NATO

While the EU should avoid duplicating NATO’s structures, closer coordination can align transatlantic and Indo-Pacific strategies. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept[19] already recognizes China as a systemic challenge. European contributions to Indo-Pacific security can thus complement, rather than compete with, Alliance objectives. For instance, enhanced interoperability between EU naval deployments and NATO partners in the region, along with coordinated sanctions and export-control regimes, can further reinforce collective deterrence.

Conclusion

The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a key node along the chain of the core European interests. Although pressing issues in its immediate neighborhood would not allow the EU to realize a “pivot to Asia” akin to that professed by the Obama administration back in 2011, the EU leadership would do well to formulate a holistic Indo-Pacific policy in its quest for strategic autonomy. Europe’s economic security largely rests upon intricate supply chains of strategic commodities, such as semiconductors and critical minerals. With upstream and downstream segments of these supply chains concentrated in Southeast Asia and even dominated by China, Europe is vulnerable to trade bottlenecks that can cause unmanageable setbacks in EU’s industrial production, green transition, and defense innovation. From a military perspective, the direct and indirect support of certain Indo-Pacific countries to Russia -namely North Korea and China- has laid bare the interconnectedness of the strategic theaters spanning the Eurasian supercontinent, while the Sino-American rivalry, if not tempered, risks to divert Washington’s resources away from Europe leaving the latter exposed to multiple threats. Expanding on the already existing cooperation mechanisms with Indo-Pacific countries and harnessing its central role in global diplomacy and multilateralism, the EU must prop-up its engagement in the region in its bid to safeguard the aforementioned interests. Coordination with NATO is also essential as the two distinct alliances work closely to achieve common goals in the Indo-Pacific complementing each other rather than going circles in an unproductive overlapping. Structural and systemic limitations may hinder deeper involvement, but the EU has the ability to navigate constraints to the degree that its Indo-Pacific engagement does not raise the risks of accentuating intra-EU divisions or exacerbating geopolitical tensions that might bring the region to the precipice of an armed confrontation.

[1] U.S. Department of State,” Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021–2025)”, 2021–2025, accessed November 2, 2025, https://2021-2025.state.gov/indo-pacific-strategy/.

[2] European External Action Service, “The EU Approach to the Indo-Pacific”, June 3, 2021, European External Action Service, accessed November 2, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-approach-indo-pacific_en.

[3] European Parliament, “EU – Indo-Pacific Trade Relations (Hearing, INTA, 1 September 2022),” European Parliament Think Tank, September 1, 2022, accessed November 2, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/events/details/eu-indo-pacific-trade-relations-/20220715CHE10501.

[4] Glenn Burm, “Semiconductor and beyond: Global Semiconductor Industry Outlook 2026”, PwC, 2025, 11–14, accessed November 10, 2025, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/technology/pwc-semiconductor-and-beyond-2026-full-report.pdf.

[5] Ibid. 16–20

[6] Sujai Shivakumar and Charles W. Wessner, “Semiconductors and National Defense: What Are the Stakes?” CSIS Commentary, June 8, 2022, accessed November 10, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/semiconductors-and-national-defense-what-are-stakes. csis.org.

[7] David Sacks and Seaton Huang, “Onshoring Semiconductor Production: National Security Versus Economic Efficiency.” Council on Foreign Relations, September 27, 2022. Accessed November 10, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/article/onshoring-semiconductor-production-national-security-versus-economic-efficiency. Council on Foreign Relations.

[8] Elvire Fabry, “A looming war for minerals?”, Jacques Delors Institute, April 2023, Accessed 23 November, 2025 https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/la-guerre-des-minerais-aura-t-elle-lieu-2/.

[9] Melissa Pistilli, “Top 9 Nickel-producing Countries”, INN, June 04, 2025, Accessed 23 November, 2025 https://investingnews.com/daily/resource-investing/base-metals-investing/nickel-investing/top-nickel-producing-countries/

[10]IGF on Mining, Minerals, Metals, and Sustainable Development, “The ASEAN Scoping Study on Critical Minerals Supply Chains”, ASEAN-IGF Minerals Cooperation, May 2023.

[11] OECD, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, May 14, 2021.

[12] Benedetta Girardi, Irina Patrahau, Giovanni Cisco, and Michel Rademaker. 2023. Strategic Raw Materials for Defence: Mapping European Industry Needs. January, 2023.

[13] Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN), “Revue Nationale Stratégique 2025”, Paris, 2025, p.20.

[14] European Commission & European External Action Service. “Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo‑Pacific” JOIN(2021) 24 final. Brussels, September 16, 2021.

[15] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense”, 21 March, 2022.

[16] Federal Foreign Office (Germany), “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific”, Germany–Europe–Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together”, Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 2020.

[17] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia”, Government of Netherlands, 13 November 2020.

[18] European Commission and European External Action Service, “Global Gateway: European Union Strategy for Sustainable Global Connectivity”, Brussels, 2021.

[19] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29 June 2022

 

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