European Union

Parliamentary elections are scheduled for early October in the Czech Republic. The polls give former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and his right-wing populist party ANO (Czech for "Yes") a clear lead. The party recently presented its election programme, in which it promises Czechs a better life without explaining how it intends to finance this. Czech commentators are critical.

Kyiv says security guarantees, backed by Western troops, are crucial to any agreement, in order to ensure Russia does not re-launch its offensive in the future

Aujourd’hui dans Les Capitales : Jusqu'où ira la « coalition des volontaires » ? La Slovaquie se rapproche de la Chine pour les matières premières.

The post Les Capitales : Jusqu’où ira la « coalition des volontaires » ? appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La mine de lithium à ciel ouvert a été désignée en mars comme un projet d’« importance stratégique » alors que l’UE cherche à garantir l’approvisionnement en matières premières essentielles.

The post Le Portugal nie avoir enfreint la convention des Nations unies dans le cadre d’un projet de mine de lithium appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La démarche de Robert Fico reflète celle de son allié hongrois Viktor Orbán, le dirigeant européen le plus ouvert aux investissements industriels chinois.

The post Matières premières : la Slovaquie se rapproche de la Chine et va à l’encontre des objectifs de l’UE appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Malgré le soutien du gouvernement, la plupart des Polonais s'opposent à l'adhésion de l'Ukraine à l'OTAN, ce qui met en évidence un clivage politique marqué et accroît la pression sur les espoirs de Kiev.

The post Une majorité de Polonais s’opposent à l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La proposition de référendums par ANO, le parti le plus en vue, suscite des réactions hostiles dans tout le spectre politique tchèque, les critiques avertissant qu'elle pourrait renforcer les forces anti-européennes, malgré les dénégations d'Andrej Babiš.

The post En République tchèque, la proposition de référendums du parti populiste ANO agite la campagne électorale  appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Les États membres de l'UE sont déjà tenus de reconnaître le sexe légal qu'une personne a obtenu dans un autre État membre.

The post Les personnes transgenres doivent bénéficier d’une carte d’identité conforme à leur identité de genre, selon la Cour de justice de l’UE appeared first on Euractiv FR.

In today’s edition: Donald Trump urges the EU to starve Russia of oil money as 26 nations back security guarantees, Ursula von der Leyen plans to restructure the Commission, and Israel calls Commissioner Teresa Ribera a 'mouthpiece for Hamas'

Plastic waste washed up on a beach in India. Credit: Ocean Image Bank/Srikanth Man
 
The international push for consensus on a legally binding deal to end plastic pollution proved beyond the grasp of weary UN Member States meeting in Geneva in mid-August, as they agreed to resume discussions at a future date, according to UN News.
 
“This has been a hard-fought 10 days against the backdrop of geopolitical complexities, economic challenges and multilateral strains,” said Inger Andersen, Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). “However, one thing remains clear: despite these complexities, all countries clearly want to remain at the table.”

By Craig Boljkovac
GENEVA, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

The debacle that was the latest round of negotiations for a global treaty on plastics (including in the marine environment); known as “INC 5.2” has already been written about at length by many colleagues on all sides of the issues. Despite all the very informative posts, articles, and other analyses, I believe I have several key observations to make, particularly about the process to-date.

After being absent from the previous two INCs (INC-4 and INC-5), I may have a slightly different perspective from those who have been completely immersed in the process all the way along. I managed to observe virtually every (painful) minute of INC 5.2, and, below, I list some things that participants may want to consider as the process continues.

Backing up a bit, for those who may be less familiar with the issue, we clearly have a problem with plastics globally. Mounting evidence of the presence of plastics and a clear lack of recycling capacities: from blatantly visible plastics in the marine environment (massive floating gyres of overwhelmingly plastic garbage in our oceans – particularly in but not limited to the Pacific) to the presence of microplastics in our bodies (and those of wildlife as well), including in the placenta and mother’s milk, and the use of clearly harmful chemicals (such as endocrine disrupters released when certain plastics are used) in the manufacture of at least some plastics – has led to decisions on the international level that merely complement significant action at other levels of governance that are already in place.

This situation resulted in the decision, from March, 2022, by the UN Environment Programme’s UN Environment Assembly, to pass a resolution authorizing a negotiating process (the “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, or INC) to realize a global plastics treaty by 2024 (a highly ambitious timeline that, to many, was likely unachievable).

And, here we are, late in 2025, after six unsuccessful negotiation sessions and some preparatory work, without an agreed treaty text, and with, it seems, a wide gulf of differences between UN member states that seems, frankly, virtually unbridgeable.

Much has been written about the various positions of UN Members States, who have informally organized themselves (for the negotiations) into the “Like-Minded Group” of countries that want the treaty to focus mainly on waste management and not impinge on their plans to not only maintain, but greatly expand plastics production; and the “High Ambition Coalition” countries who, in part, want a strong global treaty that addresses plastics at all stages of their life cycle, severely limit “single-use plastics” and include human health concerns, particularly with regard to the harmful effects of chemical inputs to plastics production (which the “Like-Mindeds” reject, particularly for what some delegations say is a clear lack of evidence of harm to human health and the environment).

In my long experience with international environmental negotiations under the UN rubric, such differences in positions are not unprecedented, and have been solved by having a team of negotiators that are solutions-oriented, and a secretariat (the UN staff assigned to coordinate and facilitate the negotiations) and chair (usually a diplomat or high-level civil servant from an environment or similar ministry) that work together to bridge differences in a transparent, inclusive, and participatory manner, where trust is built over time and solutions are eventually found.

Something is clearly blocking the process. The secretariat and bureau (including the chair, in particular) have shown commitment, but the goal of an agreed treaty, despite the presentation of many textual proposals by negotiators, several chairs’ drafts, and some movement on at least some of the issues, has not been realized over six energy- and resource-intensive negotiation sessions.

Why is this the case? A few thoughts/observations from my side (the list is not comprehensive):

1) Apart from some closed events earlier on in the negotiations, there now seems to be an almost total lack of intersessional activities (both formal and informal) essential for the further building of trust and understanding of each other’s positions (although some may be planned but are not yet announced). Regional efforts, in particular, might help to bridge some of the wide differences that are apparent, even within regions (where there is clearly a lack of consensus as well).

2) There has been a clear lack of transparency and communication in/from both subsidiary groups (such as contact groups, where various issues are “unpacked” and grouped for more detailed negotiations) and, more significantly and consistently, at the broader level (directly led by the chair/bureau and supported by the secretariat) such as plenary sessions (which were few and far between and even resoundingly brief – one was 43 seconds at the latest INC). Relatively untransparent processes have worked in the past (such as with the climate change negotiations); but from what I understand there was more trust and confidence in the chair/bureau and secretariat than exists in our present negotiations.

3) The chair, bureau and secretariat were always present, but rarely available. The absence of regular plenary sessions was keenly felt. There was also a clear lack of consistency in the way contact groups operated – some put textual proposals on a screen for all to see and negotiate with; while others simply heard interventions and then came out with proposals for text at the very end (not the most transparent of ways to operate!). In addition, there was a heavy reliance on informal negotiations throughout (this became apparent with news, in the final plenary, of a long, closed negotiation on the final day chaired by Chile and Japan). A lot seemed to be going on, but only a limited number of participants (including a fair number of government delegations that I conversed with) seemed only vaguely aware of them, if at all.

4) During the course of this, the sixth negotiating session, positions taken by both the Like-Minded Group and the High Ambition Coalition more closely resembled opening salvos that one might expect would be typical of the early stages of negotiations – not positions that would still be raised at such a late stage, when one would expect at least some compromises to have been made along the way. To me, this is symptomatic of a lack of trust in the process to-date.

This apparent situation (lack of clear negotiating milestones/organization, lack of visibility of the chair and lack of transparency) seems to have, in my opinion, possibly been used by delegations to hold back on reaching any sort of even basic compromises.

How to solve this as we try to move forward?

1) Make every possible attempt to put into place a proper, formal, and transparent intersessional process (along with informal and regional activities as needed), even if it results in a significant delay until the next INC (5.3). A rumour is going round that INC 5.3 may be scheduled for February, 2026. In my opinion this is far too soon if a properly designed intersessional process, focused on bridging the key gaps and reaching some sort of consensus, at least informally, is to be realized. An adequate “break” is needed to clearly think through all the options. If needed, even keep bringing in the UN Secretary-General to “knock heads together” to find some compromises in advance of the next negotiations. And report back to all INC participants regarding the process of intersessional work on a regular basis.

2) Hold in-depth “debriefs” and “lessons learned” sessions for the secretariat and bureau, with additional participants from the INCs who have valuable observations to contribute (both from government and observer delegations). A suggested focus could be on how to expand the obvious organizational strengths of the secretariat into other areas, such as a finer level of facilitation aimed at bridging differences among delegations through improved intersessional activities (see 1), above).

3) Without formally reopening the original (2022) resolution, seek backing from UNEA-7 for the original mandate (since delegations have clearly not followed the original resolution, particularly regarding the scope of the convention, during the INCs. A complementary resolution which could guide member states towards a possible framework convention would also allow negotiation of the difficult and time-consuming issues in a more extended, party-based process.

4) Once experiences and lessons learned are gathered, consider holding a special, more internally-focused intersessional process between secretariat and the chair and bureau, in order to have a detailed set of lessons learned so far, and to try to readjust the relationship as we move forward. Perhaps such a process could have a trusted and even renowned external facilitator that could help find some new and more effective way of working together. Such trust-building exercises were essential in other forums that I have participated in (although they were done more up-front, towards the beginnings of such processes, it’s never too late!).

5) At the next, eventual INC (presumably 5.3 will take place), put into place more plenary time (at least brief plenaries) where regular updates can be given. This would display more transparency, potentially build more confidence in the process, and benefit small delegations in particular, who cannot cover the breadth of different negotiations we saw in previous INCs.

In conclusion, there is no doubt in my mind that we have a huge task still at hand, but not an insurmountable one. Recently, Forbes published what I think is a fantastic, forward-looking piece that basically says the “train has left the station” for the plastics industry. Even if the global process fails (which I firmly believe will not happen), at other levels of governance from California to the EU and beyond, clear commitments have been made that are even above and beyond the current UNEA mandate.

This will drive the investments and planning of the industry for decades to come. The writing is on the wall. Now is the time to find compromises at the global level (even a framework treaty like the Paris Agreement on climate change would be a good start!) to ensure a sustainable future for all in this field. Otherwise, we may be facing a failure that results in a long-term stalemate where no treaty (or alternative) is agreed for the foreseeable future.

1 https://www.forbes.com/sites/trondarneundheim/2025/08/16/plastics-manufacturing-at-crossroads-pivot-to-lead-or-lose/

Craig Boljkovac is a Geneva-based Senior Advisor with a Regional Centre for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, and an independent international environmental consultant with over 35 years of experience in relevant fields. His opinions are his own. He has participated in several INCs and related meetings for the global plastics agreement.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Pour l'heure, la contribution des États-Unis à la protection de l'Ukraine contre de futures attaques reste à déterminer.

The post Emmanuel Macron annonce l’engagement de 26 pays à garantir la sécurité de l’Ukraine  appeared first on Euractiv FR.

What Russia lacks on the battlefield it compensates with brutality, plunder and war crimes. But there's no hiding its military decay and waning influence in the South Caucasus

Magistrates say Spain's attorney general should not attend Friday's ceremony at the Supreme Court, which is also investigating him for leaking confidential information

A proposed referendum law by front-runner ANO sparks backlash across the Czech political spectrum, with critics warning it could empower anti-EU forces despite Babiš’s denials

Despite government backing, most Poles now oppose Ukraine joining NATO – exposing a sharp political divide and adding pressure to Kyiv’s hopes

A héten zajlott a szolnoki helikopteresek szokásos kitelepült SAR gyakorlata, az Air Wolf Hunting Pipishegyen. Ott ugyan nem, de azért máshonnan nem lehetett nem megnézni őket ezen a gyönyörű estén a nyárvégi Mátrában :-)

15 szerint érkezik az egyik 145-ös, háttérben bölcsen figyel a Kékes.

A minap alpinoztak róla, most egy H225M repül el a (román olajfúrótoronyból avanzsált) sástói kilátó előterében.

Keleti terepről tér vissza az egyik 225-ös. Háttérben mátraaljai falvak.

Állóhelyen.

A Sár-hegy és Gyöngyös a nyugati terepek egyikéről visszatérő gép nyomvonalának hátterében.

Zord