European Union

The EU’s Omnibus initiative has sparked heated debate on achieving a sustainability - competitiveness balance. MEP Kira Marie Peter-Hansen describes its legislative process as ‘a mess’.

European stocks plunged following the announcement.

Delegations

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig.

Since April 2025, the United States (US) and Iran have been engaging in talks over a new nuclear deal. The current multilateral agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear programme is considered defunct by most analysts, after the US withdrew in 2018 and Iran started breaching its provisions as of 2019.

Background

Iran has been under multilateral sanctions for its nuclear proliferation activities since 2006. On 14 July 2015, Iran and the E3/EU+3 (or P5+1) – China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, with the EU High Representative – concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement endorsed by the UN Security Council (UNSC), to limit Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. The JCPOA caps at 3.67 % Iran’s uranium enrichment (the weapons-grade threshold is 90 %), and at 300 kg its stockpile of enriched uranium; limits the number of Iran’s centrifuges and its nuclear R&D programme; and allows extensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran also committed never to seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons. In exchange, the UNSC gradually lifted its sanctions against Iran, while the EU and US ceased to apply some of their own. In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA, re-imposed all lifted sanctions and applied new ones, as part of a ‘maximum pressure‘ campaign against Iran. The EU remains bound by the deal, but maintains proliferation-related sanctions, alongside non-nuclear related ones. Although still party to the agreement, Iran started exceeding JCPOA limits in 2019, and fully stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments in 2021. Iran currently has a 275 kg stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 %. In October 2025, UNSC sanctions are set to expire, unless the JCPOA ‘snapback mechanism‘ to re-impose them is triggered.

Recent US-Iran diplomatic re-engagement

In a March 2025 letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader, President Trump reportedly set a two-month deadline to reach a nuclear deal, threatening Iran with (military) consequences otherwise. After an initial harsh reaction from Ayatollah Khamenei, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian left open the ‘path for indirect negotiations’. The first round of US-Iran talks took place on 12 April 2025; a fourth concluded on 11 May 2025. The Oman-mediated talks (the highest level since 2018) are indirect, although reports mention some direct exchanges between US and Iranian negotiators. The former Biden US administration sought to revive the JCPOA, but indirect talks with Iran stalled in the summer of 2022. A year later, secret indirect discussions aimed for an ‘informal’ pact to prevent further escalation between the US and Iran.

The US objectives in the talks are surrounded by some uncertainty. President Trump initially stated the objective of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. The US position then shifted, with Trump stating the goal of ‘full dismantlement’ of Iran’s nuclear programme, while likely accepting a civilian nuclear programme. The US Secretary of State has called for a complete halt to uranium enrichment (with a potential Iranian civilian programme based on imported enriched uranium), to its production of long-range missiles and to its support for terrorist groups and the Houthis. However, other administration voices suggest that the US agree to some uranium enrichment in order to get a deal and avoid a military strike that could lead to war. Iranian officials have condemned the ‘contradictory and conflicting’ US positions. Stressing its right to maintain a ‘complete nuclear fuel cycle’, as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has rejected the prospect of dismantling its nuclear programme and renouncing uranium enrichment, but would discuss concerns regarding ‘potential militarisation’. Iran has also rejected any discussion of its defence and missile capabilities, but suggested it would not build a nuclear-capable missile. At the same time, Iran has framed a deal as a win-win for both sides, inviting the US to invest in its nuclear energy programme.

Signs of progress …

Iranian officials have described as ‘very serious and productive’ the current discussions covering technical issues, such as the monitoring of Iran’s nuclear facilities and what would happen to its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. Iran aims to secure the effective lifting of sanctions and ironclad guarantees from the US that it would not renege on a potential deal. The IAEA has pressed for a role in the talks, as the agency would be required to verify implementation of any agreement. Initial reports indicated that US negotiators suggested capping Iran’s uranium enrichment at a low level needed to produce fuel for energy, as well as monitoring, just as Iranian officials indicated willingness to have a 3.67 % limit, as set by the JCPOA. A senior adviser to Khamenei stated that Iran, in exchange for lifting all sanctions, was prepared to sign a deal that allows it to enrich only to the lower levels needed for civilian uses and requires it to give up its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, with inspectors verifying compliance. Iran also reportedly floated the idea of selling enriched uranium to the US. After the fourth round of talks, the President Trump hinted that the parties were close to a deal, which would seemingly include zero uranium enrichment for up to three years to build trust, after which Iran would be allowed to enrich at civilian levels (likely the 3.67 % limit set by the JCPOA). In the meantime, Russia could provide Iran with uranium for its civil nuclear programme. Nevertheless, reports point to continued disagreements over the issue of zero uranium enrichment, and over the timing and location of the transfer of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile.

… albeit fragile

Besides their respective red lines in the talks, the high level of distrust between the US and Iran and a potential escalation in the region may prevent them reaching a deal. To build pressure on Iran, the US has increased its military deployments to the Middle East and stepped up the enforcement of sanctions. Moreover, President Trump may fail to deter, or may even consider supporting, an Israeli (or even a joint Israeli-US) strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In turn, Iran has threatened ‘a strong reciprocal blow’ in the event of a US military attack, including against the tens of thousands of American troops stationed at bases across the region or against Israeli troops – threats reiterated recently as it unveiled a new solid-fuelled medium-range ballistic missile. Iran has also stated that the US would be held responsible for any Israeli attacks on Iranian soil, and has condemned the US for expanding its sanctions campaign against Iran’s trade partners, notably China. At the same time, Iran has continued purportedly to foment instability in the region, through support to the Houthis and backing acts of sabotage in Jordan, a steadfast US ally.

Role of regional players

Israel regards any emerging deal with strong concern, particularly if it will not fully remove Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium. Emboldened by recent military successes against Iranian proxies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and the demise of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, Israel continues to push for targeted strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Conversely, the Gulf States, already on a course of rapprochement with Iran, are supportive of a nuclear deal, unlike in 2015. For them, a US-Iran compromise on the nuclear issue is necessary for Middle East stability and for achieving their economic visions. China and Russia have also expressed support for the talks. Moscow advocates a fair US-Iran deal, insisting on Iran’s legitimate right to develop its own civil nuclear energy programme. Russia has even offered to mediate the talks and to store Iranian enriched uranium. China, increasingly targeted by US sanctions over the purchase of Iranian crude oil, has backed Iran in the talks, also arguing in favour of respecting Iran’s right to use nuclear energy peacefully. After China-Russia-Iran trilateral discussions, the Chinese Foreign Ministry in March 2025 issued a five-point proposition on the Iranian nuclear issue, which states that the JCPOA framework should remain the basis for new consensus, and cautions against initiating the snapback mechanism.

European Union

EU-Iran relations have been at a low since 2022. However, the EU has a lot to lose from escalation in the Middle East and the collapse of nuclear diplomacy, and has called on Iran repeatedly to respect its commitments under the JCPOA. In November 2024, the E3 and the US censured Iran at the IAEA for lack of cooperation with the agency. Iran and the E3 then held several rounds of nuclear talks, most recently on 16 May 2025. While the EU is de facto excluded from current US-Iran talks, the EU High Representative hailed the talks as a ‘step in the right direction because we do not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon’, stressing the importance of a unified approach with the US on the matter. In late April, France, Germany and the UK announced they would trigger the snapback mechanism by August if talks with the US fail to reach an accord; they have rejected any military option.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Recent US-Iran talks on a new nuclear deal‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Health stakeholders insist the EU needs upscaled investment, deeper coordination and clarity across regulatory frameworks for a competitive Europe.

Two Israeli embassy staff members were shot dead outside the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington D.C. on Wednesday evening. The young couple were soon to be married. A 30-year-old man has been arrested and is expected to be charged with murder. According to police reports, he said he did it for Palestine. Commentators reflect on the causes and necessary consequences.

The right-wing populist candidate Sławomir Mentzen, who came third in the first round of the Polish presidential election, has submitted a list of demands to Karol Nawrocki and Rafał Trzaskowski, the two candidates competing in the run-off vote on 1 June, and made his support conditional on their fulfillment. Nawrocki and Mentzen have already had a meeting in which Nawrocki agreed to the conditions and even supported Mentzen's criticism of the PiS. The media takes stock.

After his phone call with Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, US President Donald Trump proposed the Vatican as a venue for peace talks on the Ukraine war. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has indicated that she would support Pope Leo XIV in the negotiations. According to the Wall Street Journal, these could begin in mid-June.

Russia's war against Ukraine is increasingly perceived not just as a military conflict, but as a battle against the Western way of life as a whole. A glance at Europe's media reveals that at many different levels the question of how to deal with direct and indirect Russian influence is being posed.