SWP

Nach dem Abschluss des Fit for 55-Pakets wird die Klimapolitik der Europäischen Union (EU) in ihre nächste Phase eintreten. Eine der wichtigsten Entscheidungen wird sein, das übergreifende Emissionsreduktionsziel für 2040 festzulegen, das den Aus­gangs­punkt für die nächste Runde der Überarbeitung aller klimapolitischen Rechts­vorschriften der EU bilden wird. Das Europäische Klimagesetz sieht vor, dass die Europäische Kommission ein Ziel für 2040 vorschlägt, das unter anderem auf einem »projizierte[n] indikative[n] Treibhausgasbudget der Union für den Zeitraum von 2030 bis 2050« basiert. Dieses Budget wiederum stützt sich auf einen Bericht des mit dem EU-Klimagesetz neu geschaffenen Europäischen wissenschaftlichen Beirats zum Klimawandel. Das Kumulieren von Emissionen, die sich aus verschiedenen Minderungs­szenarien er­geben, kann bei der Bewertung der jeweiligen Ambitionsniveaus helfen; dagegen birgt die strikte Ableitung eines EU-Emissionsbudgets aus dem globalen CO2-Budget mehrere Fallstricke. Die Debatte über die Gestaltung der EU-Klimapolitik nach 2030 sollte sich indes nicht zu sehr auf ein »wissenschaftlich angemessenes« Niveau des Ziels für 2040 kon­zentrieren, sondern darauf, wie die Governance-Archi­tektur weiter­entwickelt, die poli­tischen Instrumente gestärkt und die öffentliche Unterstützung für eine ehr­geizige Klimapolitik befördert werden kann.

The summit in Brussels on 17–18 July will mark the end of a long eight-year hiatus in bi‑regional meetings between the European Union (EU) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Between 1999 and 2015, conferences were held every two or three years. Since the last conference, the international environment and regional contexts on both sides of the Atlantic have changed significantly. Brazil’s return to CELAC and the new Lula government’s efforts to reactivate the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) have given the region a new impetus, which was reflected at the respective summits of the two organisations in Buenos Aires in January and Brasília in May. In June, the European Commission presented a new agenda for the EU’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) that clearly shows Europe wants to intensify bi-regional cooperation. This has a chance of succeeding if summit diplomacy is approached in a spirit of renewal – not revival – and combined with substantive thematic cooperation and vibrant bilateral relations.

The SDG Summit will take place on 18–19 September 2023 in New York. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has called it the “centrepiece” of the UN’s work this year. Numerous reports for this year’s mid-term review of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs will lament the “lack of political will” to implement the SDGs. This research paper addresses the lack of analysis of country-level politics around the SDGs by assessing the political priorities of local elites in eleven countries. Alongside the specific findings for these countries, we present overarching conclusions on the significance of country-level politics for SDG im­plementation. Analysing political will and considering country-level constraints should be part of the mid-term review and inform the outcome of the summit.

The economic and financial crisis of 2008 disrupted the European Union’s (EU) enlarge­ment policy for the Western Balkans. At least since that time, the region has seen greater involvement by economic actors from non-EU countries such as China, Russia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Their engagement has been most evident in the areas of direct investment, trade and energy security. Investments from these countries can increase the risk of “corrosive capital”, which could have a negative impact on the development of the rule of law and democracy in the Western Balkans. In view of a visibly intensifying rivalry between the EU on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, the question therefore arises as to how the EU can react to and strategically counteract the intensified economic interconnectedness of the West­ern Balkans with these actors.

In der klimapolitischen Praxis sind plurilaterale Initiativen als Ergänzung zum multilateralen Forum der Vereinten Nationen zuletzt wieder wich­tiger geworden. Die Gründe dafür liegen vor allem im mangelnden Fortschritt bei der Umsetzung des Pariser Abkommens und den erschwerten Bedingungen im UN-Prozess. Das Potential der Zusammenarbeit kleinerer Gruppen von Vorreiter­staaten liegt darin, dass sie sich leichter einigen und auf diese Weise den Klimaschutz mit ambitionierteren Zielen und stringenteren Maßnahmen effektiv vorantreiben können. Das wiederum kann Strahlkraft über ein­zelne Initiativen hinaus entfalten, normativen Druck aufbauen und für Drittstaaten Anreize zur Kooperation schaffen. Auch plurilaterale Allianzen überwinden allerdings nicht per se die strukturellen Hemmnisse, die einer umfassenderen internationalen Klimakooperation entgegenstehen. Deshalb sollten die deutsche und die europäische Klimadiplomatie die spezifischen prozessualen Herausforderungen plurilateraler Initiativen antizipieren, unter den verschiedenen Optionen Prioritäten setzen und dabei Umfang und Ausgestaltung der einzelnen Initiativen möglichst frühzeitig präzisieren.

Plurilateral initiatives are again gaining importance in climate diplomacy as a complement to multilateral efforts – not least in view of the lack of progress in implementing the Paris Agreement and more difficult conditions in the UN process. New alliances are expected to facilitate agreement within smaller groups of countries wishing to lead by example and to effectively advance cli­mate action with ambitious goals and more stringent measures. This, in turn, can have an impact beyond individual initiatives and provide normative pressure and incentives for additional states to cooperate. However, plurilateral alliances cannot necessarily overcome the structural challenges that hamper more effective international climate cooperation. In light of this, German and European climate diplomacy should antici­pate the specific procedural challenges of individual initiatives, set prior­ities among the various options, and aim to specify the mandate and design of individual initiatives early on.

Die diesjährigen Zwischenverhandlungen der Klimarahmenkonvention der Vereinten Nationen (UNFCCC) in Bonn geben wenig Grund zum Optimismus. Verhärtete Fronten vor allem zwischen einigen großen Schwellenländern und den Industriestaaten präg­ten das Treffen. Un­einig­keit darüber, wie die »gemeinsame, aber differenzierte Ver­antwortung« und das Gerechtigkeitsprinzip auszu­legen seien, verhinderten substantielle Fortschritte. Die Vor­bereitungen für die erste Globale Bestandsaufnahme zur Ambi­tions­steigerung im Rah­men des Klimaabkommens von Paris, die bei der 28. Vertrags­staaten­konferenz (COP28) im Dezember in Dubai abgeschlossen werden soll, verliefen ent­täuschend. Gleichzeitig versuchten einige Schwellenländer und insbesondere China, die Bedeutung des sechs­ten Sachstandsberichts (AR6) des Weltklimarates IPCC als gemein­same wissenschaft­liche Basis zu relativieren. Sollte China bei dieser Haltung bleiben, drohen nega­tive Konsequenzen für den multilateralen Klimaprozess weit über die COP28 hinaus.

The context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has changed quite dramatically since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Interdependence now often means vulnerability, and new systemic conflicts call for a policy of European sovereignty and open strategic autonomy. Strategies of “de-risking” against revisionist countries and an economic security strategy that reduces vulnerability have become important.

Improving the efficiency of foreign policy-making

The German government is currently working together with the governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia and Spain within a Group of Friends on an initiative to extend qualified majority voting in the CFSP. It examines how the CFSP can be made more efficient within the framework of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

CFSP decisions are taken unanimously in the Council of the EU, with few exceptions. A single member state has a veto right and can block decisions. Yet unanimity allows third countries to prevent the EU from adopting common positions by instrumentalising the economic dependencies of individual countries for their own interests. With a qualified majority, 15 of 27 member states – representing 65 per cent of the EU population – would have to agree. Qualified majority voting blocks the gateway for third countries to overrule and divide the EU.

Against this background, the “Group of Friends” suggests the use of constructive abstentions in the Council (Article 31(1) TEU); the use of qualified majority voting for the implementation of decisions on civilian EU missions that were previously adopted unanimously in the Council (Article 31(2) TEU); the use of qualified majority voting for the implementation of declarations by the High Representative on behalf of the EU; and/or the use of the passerelle clause under Article 31(3) TEU for individual subject areas to define them as policy fields where qualified majority voting applies. Similar to the CSFP, emergency brakes should safeguard “vital and stated” national interests.

An important source of the political deadlock can be found in the fear that qualified majority voting would overstretch the readiness of member states to agree on highly sensitive issues. Some worry that its introduction would expand the already existing cleavages between Eastern (new) and Western (old) member states. These concerns must be taken seriously. An EU that is deeply divided over issues of war and peace will face hard times in maintaining its internal cohesiveness under conditions of external threat. Qualified majority voting should thus be pursued in resilience policies, apply a variable geometry among a coalition of willing states and proceed by implementing a roadmap that is open to all member states.

A roadmap for qualified majority voting

The EU must reframe the idea of the EU as a normative power in the CFSP, based on principles such as the rule of law, human rights and democracy, and the objectives set out in Article 21 TEU. Instead, it would be better to reframe the EU’s actions as a resilience power that is based on these principles and able to withstand crises, uphold international law and adapt to new challenges. The concept would help to broaden our perception of pressing challenges and extend the limits of a technical or legal understanding of the CFSP. It is open to the inclusion of the new tasks mentioned, that is, the strategic compass of the EU, such as countering hybrid threats, combating disinformation and defending against cyber attacks.

The EU should learn from past successes with variable geometry as it was first introduced with the Schengen Agreement in the 1980s. Schengen allowed for free movement among a few states and has shown that a coalition of willing states can act as an avant-garde, inviting other states to join. They would meet before formal Council meetings and use qualified majority voting to adopt a common position. The European Parliament would be invited to all meetings and would have different rights of participation, depending on the subject (e.g. consultation, co-decision or even veto). The Gymnich – an informal foreign affairs council meeting – already exists and can be further developed as a flexible format. Formalisation of the Gymnich proceeds by integrating qualified majority voting and the European Parliament’s consultation rights.

The success story of the EU market could be replicated by focusing on technical issues first and moving on to politically controversial issues. The new European foreign and security policy should distinguish between technical and politically sensitive issues. It should start with a phase that combines the least controversial instruments and includes preventive, cooperative and stabilising policies. Having successfully cooperated in this first phase, member states could then move on to the second phase and expand their ambitions to include restrictive measures. In the final stage, coercive measures would be added to complete the range of powers. The timing of the transition from one phase to the next would be decided by the member states and the European Parliament.

The harmonisation of European foreign and security policy is the ultimate goal. It helps to think about the unthinkable: the Europeanisation of European foreign and security policy, including the full parliamentarisation of this policy. The more far-reaching the decisions, the greater the demand for parliamentary control should be. The inter-parliamentary assembly for the CFSP, which consists of the national parliamentarians and the president of the European Parliament, only has an advisory role. The Bundestag is often not sufficiently informed about policy implementation. The European Parliament and the national parliaments have no powerful oversight mechanisms in place to follow these informal arrangements in European foreign policy-making. But if the European Parliament actually had a say in the CFSP, it would strengthen the acceptance of a transfer of sovereignty to the EU level.

 

The author is a member of the Group of Friends initiative’s Academic Sounding Board.

After Russia’s attack on Ukraine, an unprecedented series of sanctions was imposed on the aggressor. For example, around half of the Russian Central Bank’s foreign exchange reserves were frozen and Russian banks were excluded from the global banking communication system SWIFT. Many experts warned that the use of financial sanctions as a weapon would have a negative impact on the position of Western currencies in the international monetary system and lead to its rapid regionalisation and fragmentation. However, the latest figures published by the European Central Bank (ECB) in this year’s report on the international role of the euro show that nothing of the sort is happening. This is good news for Europe, because the impact of sanctions – including on the countries that impose them – is closely being watched by other potential aggressors, including China. However, the role of the single currency in the international financial system needs more attention.

The creation of the common currency was not geopolitically motivated, but mainly by the desire to eliminate exchange rate fluctuations in an increasingly integrated single market. Currently, more than 500 million people live in countries where the euro or currencies pegged to it are officially in circulation. The single currency is the second most important currency in the international monetary system after the US dollar. But what are the benefits of further strengthening its international role? What challenges stand in its way? Answers to these questions are particularly important right now. For the growing geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States and the gradual decline of the West’s share in the global economy raise the question of the euro’s role in a changing but still dollar-dominated international financial system.

Stable currency with structural problems

In principle, there is a consensus that a stronger international role for the euro would benefit European economies. It would lower the cost of raising capital, have a stabilising effect on the European debt market, reduce exchange rate risks, strengthen the autonomy of monetary policy and have a positive impact on the political standing of the European Union (EU). In the first decade of its existence, the euro also came close to dethroning the dollar, but the crises in the eurozone abruptly interrupted this trend. Since then, the euro has occupied a stable second place in the international monetary system after the dollar.

The problems in strengthening the international role of the euro reflect the challenges of integrating the EU politically and economically as such. Central to this is the diversity of the member states’ economies, many of which face enormous structural problems. Moreover, there is no single state behind the single currency, and it is hard to imagine that one could emerge. The financial markets, which are seen as key to the widespread use of a currency, are fragmented in Europe and lack transparency for international investors. The Capital Markets Union project is making relatively slow progress.

Despite a considerable increase in the issuance of common debt instruments, the EU does not have a safe asset that is comparable to what the United States has. Only Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have the highest credit ratings. The second- and third-largest countries in the Eurozone – France and Italy – have serious structural problems and difficulties in stabilising their public debt. In addition, Europe is dependent on the US financial infrastructure, for example in payment card systems. Although the political–military alliance with the United States appears stronger than ever today, it is unclear how the political situation there will develop in the future. Donald Trump’s presidency has shown that Europe should develop its own independent financial infrastructure. However, this is a very complex and time-consuming process that requires close cooperation between governments, financial institutions, regulators and technology providers.

A global euro: Overcoming national hurdles

For many years, efforts to use the euro internationally were also hampered by conflicting interests among member states. Some member states, including Germany, took the view that the internationalisation of the currency should be the result of market forces and not a deliberate action taken by European institutions. However, strengthening the international position of the euro does not require a meta-agreement between member states. What is needed is more of a commitment from them to solve the structural problems of their own economies and more ownership of important EU projects – Banking Union, Capital Markets Union, digitalisation and green transformation – all of which are progressing too slowly. The digitalisation of the economy requires comprehensive measures, from support for the development of European payment systems to better informing citizens about the opportunities and risks associated with digital investments, for example. A key challenge will be to bring the ECB-led Digital Euro project to the implementation phase. This project has the potential to develop a much-needed payment infrastructure in Europe.

Even if security policy issues, the EU enlargement process and institutional issues currently dominate the European agenda, it should not be overlooked that the basis of European integration is the economy. The EU internal market exists in symbiosis with the common euro currency. Both projects are far from complete and require much more political attention and thinking beyond partisan or national interests. However, this will be difficult in the near future, as the EU and member states are facing a series of elections at the European, national and regional levels.

Europe is committed to revitalising its relations with Latin America and the Carib­bean. This is evidenced by the numerous high-level visits from Germany and the EU to Latin American countries since the beginning of the year. In early June, the European Commission presented a “new agenda” for exchange with the region, and last month the German Bundestag’s SPD parliamentary group released a position paper on the ways and reasons to strengthen the partnership. Slated to take place in July, the up­com­ing summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) is expected to give new impetus to bi-regional relations. However, in order for such expressions of interest to be translated into a substantive reboot of the relationship, jointly developed initiatives will be needed. Such endeavours will need to account for and address changes in the triangular relationship between democracy, sustainable development and global governance.

Bei den Regierungen arabischer Staaten trifft Deutschland auf Ablehnung, wenn es darum wirbt, die Menschenrechte zu achten. Sofern sich die Adressaten nicht voll­ständig dem Dialog verweigern, stützen sie sich zumeist auf vier Argumentations­muster, um entsprechende Forderungen abzuwehren: (1) Die Menschenrechtslage im eigenen Land verbessere sich bereits, doch benötige dieser Prozess noch Zeit; (2) Anliegen wie wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Terrorismusbekämpfung hätten Vorrang gegenüber bürgerlichen Rechten; (3) Menschenrechte seien ein westliches Konstrukt und ignorierten die kulturellen Eigenheiten der angesprochenen Gesell­schaften; (4) westliche Menschenrechtspolitik sei geprägt von Doppelmoral. Deutsche Offizielle sollten diese Einwände kennen und ihnen proaktiv begegnen, wenn sie sich in den Dialog über Menschenrechte begeben. Vor allem mit den Vorwürfen von Kulturimperialismus und Doppelmoral sollte die Bundesregierung sich auch inhalt­lich auseinandersetzen, denn in der Bevölkerung arabischer Länder sind sie weit verbreitet. Um ihnen entgegenzutreten, sollten der universale Anspruch von Men­schenrechten gerade im Rahmen einer feministischen Außenpolitik stärker heraus­gestellt, mögliche konkurrierende Eigeninteressen klarer benannt und der Dialog über Menschenrechte mit konkreten Maßnahmen unterlegt werden.

Der vereitelte Putschversuch hat die angeschlagene Macht Wladimir Putins offengelegt. Was ein Kontrollverlust des Präsidenten für Russland bedeuten würde.

Seit Februar 2022 verteidigt sich die Ukraine gegen einen erneuten, diesmal voll­umfäng­lichen Angriffskrieg Russlands. Nachdem sich die Maßnahmen zur unmittelbaren Unterstützung der Ukraine – militärische, diplomatische, finanzielle und huma­ni­täre – ein­gespielt haben, gilt es nun, die langfristige Sicherheit des Landes zu kon­zipieren. Sicher­heitszusagen sollten politische, wirtschaftliche und militärische Pfei­ler um­fas­sen. Eine Nato-Mitgliedschaft wäre dabei zentral. Sie liegt im geostrategi­schen und nor­ma­tiven Interesse der Nato, auch wenn ihre Umsetzung risikovoll und schwierig ist. Die Alliierten sollten der Ukraine auf dem Gipfel im Juli praktische Schritte zum Bei­tritt aufzeigen, um den Übergang von Sicherheits­zusagen zu ‑garantien zu definieren.

Täuschung und Medienmanipulation sind seit jeher fester Bestandteil der Kriegskommunikation. Nie zuvor aber war es derart einfach, qualitativ hochwertige Fäl­schungen von Ton-, Bild- und Videoaufzeichnungen zu erstellen. Die menschliche Neigung, emotional auf diese Medien zu reagieren, eröffnet deren Produzenten eine völlig neue Dimension des Missbrauchs. Mit einem Kapitulationsaufruf von Präsident Selenskyj, der umgehend als Deepfake entlarvt wurde, liegt der erste Versuch eines Einsatzes der neuen Technologie in einem bewaffneten Konflikt vor. Derartige Fäl­schungen werden immer besser, die Erkennung immer aufwendiger und ein Ende dieser Entwicklung ist nicht absehbar. Ein Verbot von Deepfakes ist aussichtslos. Es ist deshalb Zeit, sich mit den aktuellen und potentiellen Anwendungsfällen und mit möglichen Gegenstrategien auseinanderzusetzen.