Foreign Policy Blogs

Written by Loïc Burton

The Kurds are often hailed as the West’s most reliable partner in the fight against the Islamic State. From its victories in the border town of Kobani in Syria and in Sinjar in northern Iraq, the Kurds have taken advantage of the chaos in the region to get closer to achieving their dream of statehood.

On March 17, after the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—under the umbrella of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)—managed a streak of military victories, Kurdish leadership declared a federal region across much of northern Syria called Rojava. This in an attempt to formalize the semiautonomous zone controlled by Kurdish forces after five years of war, while falling short of complete independence from Damascus.

As a key ally in the coalition against ISIS, Syrian Kurds are in a much stronger position to bargain for their political autonomy. However this is anathema to both the Syrian and Turkish governments. The former—reinvigorated thanks to the Russian intervention—now believes that it could regain control over all of the country while the latter fears that increased Kurdish self-governance might increase tensions with its own Kurdish restive minority.

In Iraq, Masoud Barzani, president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, has announced his intentions of holding a referendum on independence by the end of the year—a first step toward achieving full-fledged statehood. However, some believe the referendum will be used to distract the population from more pressing problems such as the region’s flailing economy.

In February 2014, as a result of a dispute with Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was cut off from its share of the federal budget. In June, with the emergence of ISIS, security spending skyrocketed while an influx of 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons added pressure to its infrastructure and service delivery. The final blow occurred in mid-2014 with the global drop in oil prices hitting the region particularly hard—oil revenues account for as much as 80–90% of the KRG’s budget.

In addition to these recent developments, the KRG struggles with perennial issues. In a population of 5.2 million, 1.4 million are on the government payroll Moreover the practice of “ghost-employees”—arms of the government claim more staff than they actually have to inflate their budgets—is widespread. All these factors combined create an unsustainable economic situation and threaten to stall the momentum gained against ISIS: security services are currently only paid every four months.

Looking beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq, Turkey is the most concerned about the Kurds for the reasons aforementioned. As its fight against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party—to which the PYD has close ties—in Turkey’s southeast intensifies, Ankara has bombed Kurdish fighters in Syria and allegedly tacitly helped ISIS to prevent Syrian Kurds from forming a contiguous entity along its southern border.

Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter jet in November 2015 has put Ankara and Moscow at odds with each other. Since then, Russia has been much more inclined to support Syrian Kurds and the PYD, allowing the Rojava administration to establish its first overseas representative office in Moscow in February 2016.

Finally, the U.S. relation with the Kurds is complex: although the Kurds are reliable allies, Kurdish aspirations for autonomy complicate America’s strategic interests. Indeed, in addition to the risk of seeing the fragmentation of Iraq, American support for Syrian Kurds has increased tensions between the U.S. and Turkey—which allows the U.S. to use its military bases to conduct operations in the region.

Kurds are independent political actors whose interests are not always aligned with Washington. The coming months are essential for the future of their polity and the region as a whole.

Recommended Readings

Anne Barnard, “Syrian Kurds Hope to Establish a Federal Region in the Country’s North,” The New York Times (Mar. 16, 2016).

Zach Beauchamp, “America’s Kurdish problem: today’s allies against ISIS are tomorrow’s headache,” Vox (Apr. 8, 2016).

“Why Iraqi Kurdistan Is Struggling to Pay Its Bills,” Stratfor (Jan. 28, 2016).

The post The Future of Kurdistan: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A protester demonstrating against Taiwanese conglomerate Formosa during a rally in downtown Hanoi on May 1, 2016. (HOANG DINH NAM/AFP/GETTY IMAGES)

Last week, Rupert Colville, spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR), called on the Vietnamese leadership to respect the right of freedom of assembly, after security officials stifled city-wide protests over an environmental disaster engulfing the country.

In a press briefing note released by UNCHR on May 13, the agency said it is “concerned about the increasing levels of violence perpetrated against Vietnamese protesters expressing their anger over the mysterious mass deaths of fish along the country’s central coast.”  

In recent weeks, Vietnamese citizens have rallied in the cities of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Nha Trang, Vung Tau and Da Nang over reports that at least 100 tons of fish have died along a 200-kilometer stretch of coastland in central Vietnam since April.  Many of the protesters are angry over the slow response of the new leadership to pin the blame on a unit of Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics, which operates a $10.6 billion coastal steel plant in Ha Tinh province.

Vietnamese fishermen, whose income has been severely depleted by the pollution, led authorities to an illegal pipeline thought to be responsible for the poisoning of the fish, which was traced to the steel plant.  Formosa management claims to have safely treated the discharge, and initial government findings sought to deflect the blame from Formosa to a red tide caused by an algae bloom.  Newly-elected Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc has promised a thorough investigation, vowing “We will not shield anyone found causing the pollution.”

Yet Vietnamese citizens are losing their patience, and the urge to demonstrate has been building momentum, alarming authorities. Vietnamese security apparatus allowed the first two protests on consecutive Sundays to attract hundreds of demonstrators.

Security officials cracked down on demonstrators the second week, however, using tear gas was used to disperse the crowd, and reportedly beating around  300 people and arresting others, according to the UNCHR report.  Videos and pictures circulating on Facebook also showed punches thrown and protesters being dragged off into buses.

In response to reports of demonstrators being beaten and arrested, the UNCHR issued the following statement: “We call on the Government of Viet Nam to respect the right to freedom of assembly in line with its international human rights obligations.”  This statement drew a harsh response from the permanent Vietnamese representative to the UNCHR,  Ambassador Nguyen Trung Thanh, who called the statement “inaccurate, unobjective and unverified.”  

While Article 25 of the 2013 Vietnamese Constitution ensures freedom of assembly and speech for its citizens, stating “The citizen shall enjoy the right to freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the press, to access to information, to assemble, form associations and hold demonstrations,”  Ambassador Thanh noted that freedom of assembly must be exercised without detriment to public order “to ensure traffic order, security and safety for the people, especially the elderly, women and children.”

This past Sunday, Vietnam’s state television, and several other major state-run channels, warned potential demonstrators to ignore calls by “reactionary forces” who intend to disrupt public order, saying “their intention to abuse and disturb was revealed when many subjects called for using knives and petrol bombs to attack the functional forces and to overthrow the authorities.”   

Authorities were also quick to blame the demonstrations on an anti-government plot by a terrorist organization named ‘Viet Tan’ (Vietnam Reform). Viet Tan’s website claims it “engages in actions that empower the Vietnamese people”, with its mission to “overcome dictatorship, build the foundation for a sustainable democracy, and demand justice and human rights for the Vietnamese.”

While it is arguable whether the safety and security of the people were endangered by the demonstrations (or by Viet Tan), the state television broadcast, a shutdown of Facebook, and a heavy security presence in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City were enough to quell any significant gathering of protesters on the third Sunday of protest.  No more than 100 protesters gathered in Ho Chi Minh City, most of whom were quickly dispersed or detained.  

U.S. President Barack Obama was originally scheduled to arrive in Vietnam on May 22, a Sunday in which protests could flare again, and also the day in which Vietnam holds its election of the nation’s lawmaking National Assembly.  His trip has now been moved to the 23rd, and although his itinerary is still under discussion, events on the ground in recent weeks may give the issue of human rights more prominence.  

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(Flickr)

One might have expected British Prime Minister David Cameron, the host of last week’s anti-corruption summit in London, to have been a bit more cautious when speaking of the “fantastically corrupt” countries whose leaders were his guests. Cameron’s comments about Nigeria and Afghanistan were caught on tape as he described them—to the Queen, no less—as “possibly the two most corrupt countries in the world.”

Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, was shocked and embarrassed according to media and staff reports, but declined to ask for an apology, pointedly stressing that he would rather see recovered the many tangible assets hidden away by his countrymen in the UK.

For all the diplomatic drama—since, not to be outdone, Queen Elizabeth was caught on tape insulting the Chinese too—the anti-corruption summit moved forward with representatives of some 40 nations present and with Buhari delivering the keynote address. A final twist occurred when The Economist reported there had been speculation that Cameron’s indiscretion was actually intentional, designed to stir up additional media interest in the otherwise staid summit talks.

International cooperation in the fight against corruption

By most accounts, the summit was a good first step toward international cooperation on transparency and toward cobbling together a coordinated effort to target secretive tax havens and offshore financial arrangements tied to illegal activities. Of the 40 attending nations, ten are EU members.

These European participants are now looking to shut down the anonymous shell companies used for money laundering by developing registers of the true business owners involved. While Ireland will consider it, France, the U.K. and the Netherlands have pledged to make those registries public—albeit some of the U.K.’s overseas territories, like the British Virgin Islands, will not be forced to come clean.

Additionally, five EU nations pledged to increase transparency on corporate tax compliance, while the summit further addressed corruption in negotiating and awarding EU public contracts, protections for whistleblowers, and seizure penalties.

However, the fact that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry managed to shift attention away from America’s notoriously secretive states of Delaware, Nevada or South Dakota prompted many to argue that the West is more interested in pointing fingers at developing countries than addressing its own shortfalls. Looking ahead, participants agreed to hold a forum next year on asset recovery, one that will focus on assistance for challenged nations such as the “fantastically corrupt” Nigeria.

Nigeria and the culture of corruption

For his part, Buhari’s remarks referred to corruption as a “hydra-headed monster” that cannot be reined in without a coordinated effort. He detailed how four different Nigerian agencies are pursuing corruption investigations in a bid to respect his campaign promises from 2015. Buhari also addressed human rights issues in Nigeria’s fight against corruption, as well as the problem of oil theft, estimated at 150,000 barrels a day. The extent of Nigeria’s problem is reflected by data provided in the annual Transparency International index, which ranked the nation at 136 of the 168 countries evaluated.

Buhari, however, has so far failed to deliver on his lofty campaign promises to root out Nigeria’s endemic corruption. After a remarkably slow start to his term, which saw the country running without an appointed cabinet between May and November 2015, Buhari came under fire for using international aid money earmarked for cracking down on Boko Haram to fund a witch hunt against opposition politicians.

Indeed, according to reports, the nascent anti-corruption campaign has been targeting political enemies of the regime, raising fears that Buhari, a former military dictator in the 80s, is returning to his autocratic ways.

Beyond the shining example Buhari set for the wider region showing that democratic transitions can indeed be possible in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigerians are not faring any better.

The president who once claimed he could singlehandedly stabilize world oil prices is being sapped by a period of high inflation that has driven food prices higher, while the inefficient power grid and infrastructure are dragging down the embattled Nigerian economy. Improving just the grid would boost the country’s economy by a whopping 14%, but the process is stalled because of rent seeking and graft.

What’s most troubling though is the vicious circle of corruption in Nigerian society: the elites who avail themselves of the country’s assets cause the very suffering that they are then supposed to alleviate. The poverty rate among rural households has grown to some 80 % on the back of tumbling oil prices in an economy that has failed to properly diversify.

The ongoing conflicts with Boko Haram in the northeast—itself fueling, and fueled by, Nigeria’s corruption—and the unrest from Biafrans in the south contribute to the nation’s climate of instability.

Everything considered, Nigeria is one of the most revealing examples of the pitfalls of corruption, the way it warps and drags down the entire economic potential of a nation.

When coupled with incompetent leadership, the only hope for Nigerians would be for this year’s anti-corruption summit to yield practical results. A list of individuals hiding wealth in London’s ridiculously overpriced property market and laundering corruption proceeds through the U.K.’s overseas territories would be a good start, both for Nigeria and David Cameron.

The post Cameron’s Anti-Corruption Summit: A First Step in a Long Road appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A member of the Iraqi security forces holds an Iraqi flag at a government complex in the city of Ramadi, December 28, 2015. (REUTERS/Stringer)

Written by Loïc Burton

On March 22, terror struck Brussels with a twin blast at Zaventem Airport and the Maelbeek metro station, claiming the lives of 32 people and injuring over 300. The attacks claimed by ISIS came only a few days after a suicide bombing killed five and injured 36 in Istanbul—the fourth suicide bombing in Turkey in 2016.

The latest bombings have reheated the debate within the EU about tighter border controls—possibly foreshadowing the eventual breakdown of the Schengen Agreement. In addition, the attacks have hardened Europe’s determination to combat terrorism at home, with increased monitoring of ISIS fighters returning from the Middle East and improved intelligence sharing between EU members, and abroad, whether through ramping up aircraft deployments in the coalition against the Islamic State or by supplying weapons to local actors.

Experts have argued that ISIS’s increased activity abroad is a sign of weakness rather than strength. As the so-called caliphate begins to crumble—ISIS is thought to have lost around 20% of its territory in Syria and over 40% in Iraq since its peak expansion in August 2014—the group is allocating efforts and resources toward large-scale terrorist attacks abroad in order to influence the strategic calculations of the coalition member countries at a reduced cost.

Since ISIS’s “winner’s message” of “remaining and expanding” sounds increasingly hollow, this tactical shift is one way to catch global headlines and retain its legitimacy and ability to recruit.

Although the increased operational tempo of terrorist attacks is the manifestation of the group’s faltering, the ISIS underlying ideology is not expected to wither away anytime soon. Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the Treasury Department, argues that “defeating the formal military presence of a terrorist group will not significantly mitigate the threat of lone wolf or small independent cells that are based in the West.”

In its heartland, ISIS is definitely in retreat. According to Pentagon officials, U.S. airstrikes have killed over 25,000 Islamic State fighters and deprived the group of millions of dollars in revenue. Financially debilitated, it has halved salaries of its civil servants and is releasing hostages for sums as low as $500.

Indeed, ISIS has not scored a significant victory since taking Palmyra in May 2015. The ancient city was recaptured by the Syrian regime, supported by Russian airstrikes, on March 27, 2016, reducing ISIS’s ability to threaten Syria’s coastal regions.

In Iraq, after retaking Tikrit in March 2015 and Ramadi in December, the government in Baghdad declared on March 24 the beginning of operations to retake Mosul. The offensive to regain Iraq’s second largest city will not be easy.

After some initial success reclaiming nearby villages, progress in the military campaign was stalled. More sober prognostics have now replaced the once optimistic talks of pushing ISIS out of Mosul by the end of the year—military analysts estimate that there is little prospect of an assault on the city before 2017.

With about 10,000 fighters and almost two years to erect a multilayered defense, a force of at least 40,000 would be needed to overcome the group, according to estimates. Indeed, the current under-strength Iraqi division supported by U.S. military advisers looks woefully inadequate for the task.

Moreover, because of ethno-religious tensions, Kurdish Peshmerga seem uninterested in helping take a city that would never be part of an independent Kurdistan while Shi‘a-dominated militias—instrumental in retaking Tikrit—will probably be kept away for fears of sectarian reprisals following the conquest of the Sunni-majority city.

An important factor in the battle for Mosul is America’s involvement. The Pentagon wants to go beyond air strikes and the current deployment of military advisers and introduce additional special forces. However, this goes against Obama’s “no boots on the ground” pledge—although an increasingly tenuous promise, it rules out the deployment on the scale necessary to retake Mosul.

After attempting to train local forces—leading to the disastrous $500 million train-and-equip program for Syrian moderates that yielded little to no results—and bombing oil production facilities under Operation Tidal Wave II, the U.S. is now focusing on a leadership decapitation campaign, using special forces on the ground. In March, American forces killed Haji Iman, ISIS’s second-in-command, as well as Abu Omar al-Shishanim, the group’s “war minister.”

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter explained current U.S. strategy: “we are systematically eliminating ISIL’s cabinet,” in order to “hamper the ability for them to conduct operations inside and outside of Iraq and Syria.” Although the leadership is capable of regenerating itself and operating on the ground, taking out leaders reduces the group’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks abroad as they require a more sophisticated network and superior coordination.

Talks of a new training program—allegedly more narrowly focused—and Obama’s decision to add 250 military personnel to the 50 already on the ground in Syria are the latest development in the U.S. effort to capitalize on the momentum in  the campaign against the Islamic State. It remains to be seen whether or not these new policies achieve the desired outcome.

Recommended Readings

Max Fisher, “The Brussels attack is Europe’s new reality,” Vox (Mar. 22, 2016).

Eric Schmitt and Alissa J. Rubin “ISIS Spreading in Europe, U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns,”
The New York Times (Apr. 25, 2016).

“The last battle,” The Economist (Apr. 16, 2016).

The post The Rise of ISIS: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

“Departure for the coffee harvest by ox cart, Vale do Paraíba, Brazil, c. 1885” (image courtesy of Instituto Moreira Salles)

Of all of the countries in the Americas, Brazil imported the most slaves from Africa and was the last to officially abolish slavery. While slavery may have been abolished officially with the signing of the Lei Áurea (Golden Law) by Princesa Isabel on May 13, 1888, forced labor, or “trabalho escravo”, took its place.  

Forced labor, which the International Labor Organization (ILO) defines as involving “degrading work conditions and the impossibility of leaving the employer owing to fraudulent debts and the presence of armed guards,” was officially acknowledged by the State in 1995.  That same year, Brazil’s Ministry of Labor initiated a Special Mobile Enforcement Group to track down companies suspected of using slave workers.

In 2002, the ILO and the Brazilian government initiated a technical cooperation project called “Combating Forced Labour”. Since then, around 50,000 workers have been freed from slave-like conditions in Brazil.

Yet there is more work to be done as the practice continues to this day. This month saw the publication of a “dirty list” by the human rights group Reporter Brazil, which named and shamed 340 Brazilian companies caught employing people in slave-like conditions between May 2013 and May 2015. The companies had previously been identified and fined by Brazil’s Ministry of Labor, which accused them of using slave labor, forced labor, and employing workers for little or no pay in degrading conditions.

Companies were associated with clothing sweatshops, farming and cattle ranching, timber and charcoal production, and construction. More than 1,500 adults and 5,500 children were released during 2014.

While Reporter Brazil used the country’s Freedom of Information Act to reveal the names of companies and individuals found by government inspectors to use slave labor, the practice of tracking down forced labor in Brazil is a dangerous one. Three Brazilian judicial officials were murdered in January 2004 while looking into allegations of slavery on ranches near the nation’s capital, Brasília.

The following month, government inspectors discovered 32 slave workers on the ranch of right-wing Senator João Ribeiro in the northern state of Pará. The officials said the captives worked seven days a week without pay and had no running water or toilets.

In 2009, the ILO estimated that between 25,000-40,000 people were being exploited in Brazil, primarily in the states of Pará and Mato Grosso. Other organizations such as The Global Slavery Index put the number much higher in 2015, at around 155,000. These workers are primarily recruited from the cities of Brazil’s impoverished Nordeste region.

Recruiters, often referred to as “gatos” (cats), lure the poor with promises of good pay for hard work, and some are told the cost of their transportation will be deducted from future wages. The workers are then transported hundreds of kilometers away to work in logging camps, or on ranches raising cattle or tending to crops. Many workers are only told once they arrive at the camp or ranch that they will now be responsible for paying the costs of their transportation, which are often inflated.

In addition, if they are held in collection points for days or weeks, all food, housing and other expenses they incur are deducted from their future wages—usually at inflated prices. And the price-gouging does not end there. Since the camp or ranch is typically isolated from nearby cities or towns and transportation is limited, employers often charge a premium for bringing such provisions as food, drink, and other essentials to the site.

When you add the inflated upfront costs to the ongoing necessities of food, drink and shelter, it is little wonder the typical worker quickly becomes trapped economically. Why does the typical worker stay when he or she realizes his predicament? Isolation, threats, violence and sometimes homicide can make it a difficult and dangerous choice.

What can be done to curb the practice of slavery and forced labor in Brazil? The government has already developed a database of offenders, yet the aforementioned mobile inspection group could be strengthened, as could the rehabilitation program for former slaves which grants them three months pay, builds job skills and offers them legal assistance.  

A national pact has also been initiated with the help of ILO. It has been signed by almost 200 hundred private and public companies since 2005, obliging them to remove from their supply chains any inputs produced with the involvement of forced labor.

The efforts of the Brazilian government to combat forced labor, 120 years after the abolishment of slavery, have to date been laudatory, but must continue and intensify.

The post Slavery and Forced Labor in Brazil appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In most cases the scenario is similar: over the past decade, oil exporting countries used excessive revenues from oil to expand public services, or simply pursue populist policy in order to buy political stability. Once oil prices started to fall, the budgets did not shrink accordingly, which created a wide gap between the oil revenues and swelling fiscal demands.

In order to stem the rapid outflow of foreign reserves, the governments were forced to devaluate their national currencies. An unwanted consequence is almost always the rise in inflation and household prices, along with a decline in living standards and stalled economic growth.

Here are the five most affected countries by this devaluation trend.

The former Soviet republic is the first country to request a $4 billion emergency loan from the IMF and the World Bank in order to cover losses caused by low oil prices. Although the Azerbaijani government officially denied the need for a bailout, the country is in dire straits.

Income from oil and gas makes up around 75% of the country’s revenues, and the recent devaluation of the national currency manat by more than 30% incited public protests that might easily disrupt the political stability of the authoritarian regime of president Ilham Aliyev.

Venezuela has gone through an equally depressing scenario since July 2014. Although the country’s economy wasn’t sustainable even with triple digit oil prices, a prolonged period of low oil prices brought the economy close to a breaking point. Over the past two years, the national currency, the bolívar, lost more than 90% of its value. According to the IMF’s forecast, inflation will reach 720% in 2016.

Venezuela’s domestic woes are further aggravated by the government’s efforts to limit imports in order to raise enough cash to stave off default.

There is, however, an increasing danger that with a further slump in oil revenues, and with sovereign bonds yielding at around 30%, Caracas might default on its debts at some point in 2016. The real question is, how long will the Maduro regime be able to suppress the growing social discontent and increased pressures from the opposition-controlled parliament?

Africa’s largest economy was hard hit by the falling oil prices. The national currency, the naira, dropped against the dollar by 25% over the past year. On January 30, the Nigerian government requested a $3.5 billion loan from the IMF and the African Development Bank to plug its $15 billion budget gap.

The country’s oil revenues are expected to fall by 70% in 2016, while the hard currency reserves almost halved from $50 to $28 billion, and the state’s emergency fund went from $22 billion in 2009 to $2.3 billion currently.

Angola earned around $500 billion from oil exports between 2000 and 2014. But today the country’s economy is among the hardest hit in Africa. Inflation is at 14% and the national currency, the kwanza, devaluated by more than 50% since January 2015.

The country earns 75% of its fiscal revenues from oil exports, which make up around 95% of total exports. As a consequence, José Eduardo dos Santos’ regime is starting to feel the pressure from well-organized public protests that might turn into more widespread unrest if the economic situation continues to worsen.

Russia is going through some tough economic times, as the toxic combination of Western sanctions and low oil prices is devastating the country’s economy and living standards. Since June 2014, the rouble devaluated by more than 100% against the dollar. GDP is expected to shrink by 3.7% in 2016 alone.

How do these numbers affect the everyday lives of average Russians? Real wages fell by almost 10% in 2015, and the percentage of households that cannot afford sufficient food or clothing has increased from 22% to 39% over the previous year.

Although Russia is not an average developing, oil-exporting country, the severity of Russia’s economic and potential political troubles, which might come along with the low oil prices, puts the country well inside this infamous club.

These five countries are already feeling the effects of low oil prices and devaluation. And there are more candidates: Brazil, Ecuador, and even the rich Gulf countries are starting to feel the pinch, and it seems that the end to depressed oil prices is nowhere near.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI analyst Ante Batovic

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Source: Reuters

Written by Shehab Al Makahleh

Turkey, long hailed as a bastion of secular democracy in the Muslim world, could be spiraling toward an all-out civil war as conflicts between Turkish security forces and Kurds as well as other ethnic minorities continue to escalate. These conflicts have been exacerbated by the catastrophic war in neighboring Syria, which has created a refugee crisis in Turkey, expanded the government’s campaign against Kurds in Iraq and Syria, and pushed Turkish officials into collusion with ISIS.

The lurch toward autocratic rule by President Recep Tayyib Erdogan has long worried regional and Western observers, with curbs on freedom of speech and political repression of the Kurds. That policy has taken a bloody turn with the repeated bombing of Syrian and Iraqi Kurds and, since July 2015, escalating crackdowns at home.

The murder in November of Tahir Elci, a leading Kurdish human rights advocate and president of the Diyarbakir Bar Association in southeastern Turkey has dramatically increased tensions inside Turkey and put the Kurdish issue—seemingly settled only a few years ago—back on the agenda.

Turkey has other problems to contend with. The Russians—playing an increasingly important role in the region—have long maintained that Turkey is receiving oil from ISIS, through official complicity, illicit criminal networks, or some combination. The Associated Press corroborated Russia’s account by stating that upwards of 30,000 barrels of oil are being extracted each day by ISIS from Syria, with much of it ending up in Turkey.

While Erdogan and his ruling party have not been sanctioned by the U.S. or anyone in the West for that matter, one can only conclude that this willful blindness means that the U.S. is fearful for Erdogan’s political stability, not to mention Russia’s ascendant position in the region.

On the economic front, Turkey has recently lost a lifeline of non-energy trade with Russia–including agriculture and textile projects, tourism and construction—that supports tens of thousands of jobs in the country. It was severed following Turkey’s downing of a Russian plane flying combat sorties in Syria, a dangerous move by the Turks that could have easily (and perhaps justifiably) led to a Russian counterattack and a larger war involving NATO.

Russia held its fire, responding calmly when many expected escalation, and instead imposed economic sanctions against Turkey. This squeeze on vital elements of the Turkish economy could give rise to further internal discontent in the country. Lest we forget, bread riots helped start the civil war that toppled Egypt’s Mubarak, and economic issues sparked the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia.

A more subtle but no less powerful force is also at work against Turkey: regional resentment. The region has a long memory of the “Ottoman yoke” which was ended 100 years ago by the Hashemite-led Arab revolt and finally the expulsion of the Turks from Arab lands.

Turkey’s brash role in the region today—backed implicitly by U.S. and NATO firepower–is seen by some as coming at the expense of its Arab neighbors, especially as more evidence on Turkish involvement in illicit trade with ISIS grows. Turkey’s assertive role in a new regional triangular power structure with Saudi Arabia and Qatar has also created greater diplomatic isolation from much of the region.

The confluence of these internal and external factors has put unprecedented pressure on the Turkish state as a viable entity. The conflict with the Kurds seems to be tearing the nation at its seams—the very idea of the secular, pluralist state is at risk.

But other clouds—economic, diplomatic, and military—are looming over the horizon. What happens next is not entirely in Erdogan’s control. Will Russia’s military restraint hold? Will the fragile regional alliances against ISIS shift against Turkey? Will ISIS itself continue to shake the Turkish people’s confidence? Or will it be Erdogan’s own policies that ultimately undermines the Turkish state?

Shehab Al Makahleh is a journalist and co-founder of Geo-strategic and Political Studies of the Middle East Media.

The post Could Turkey Implode? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Lately, the Zika virus made its way into the spotlight with a sudden and explosive growth of micro-encephalitis in newborns across Latin America. As a result of Brazil’s climate, inadequate public health system, and poor system for sanitation and water supplies, the virus found an ideal location to develop rapidly. While Zika has a devastating effect on pregnant women, especially in the low-income population, this issue has also brought to light other prevalent concerns regarding the Olympics this summer.

Zika looms over the Brazilian population and future tourists traveling from the around the world to watch the Olympic Games. The government’s response has been slow and inadequate; the Brazilian healthcare system has been heavily underfunded in recent years, with many poor areas in Rio de Janeiro lacking even basic infrastructure. In January 2016, hospitals ran out of money to pay for drugs, equipment, and salaries. Some patients died after they were not allowed into underfunded public hospitals.

Brazilian officials expressed concerns over the possibility of visitors staying away from Rio de Janeiro out of fear of contracting Zika. The city has taken precautions to ensure that tourists and athletes of the Olympics do not feel threatened, and officials have announced that venues would be inspected on a daily basis four months in advance, aimed at eliminating any stagnant water that could serve as breeding grounds for mosquitoes.

These efforts have not been able to eliminate global concerns over the issue. With the World Health Organization declaring it a global health emergency, Brazil has already been criticized for downplaying the risks of contracting the virus at the Olympics and the ongoing Carnival celebrations, which attract 1.5 million tourists a year.

Recently, allegations of bribery against the Brazilian speaker of the lower house, Eduardo Cunha, and five construction companies involved in Olympics projects have emerged. Brazil’s attorney general, Rodrigo Janot, claimed that some construction companies, already under investigation for their ties to the Petrobras scandal, paid bribes totaling USD 475,000 to Eduardo Cunha to help secure contracts for the building of venues and other works for Olympics.

These allegations are another example of the large impact the Petrobras scandal has had on Brazilian politics and the economy. Companies involved in Olympics construction projects found themselves blocked from receiving bank loans and credit lines during the ongoing Petrobras investigation, forcing Rio de Janeiro’s city government to act as a bank and lend companies money to prevent an inevitable slowdown in construction. Despite their efforts, projects for the Olympics have already been delayed and sometimes halted, including essential repairs on sewers in Rio de Janeiro.

However, Olympic officials have denied any delays and vow that the games will be free of corruption, serving as an example of how business in Brazil can be done “above the board”.

On November 16, three days after the Paris attack, a leading French recruit for ISIS tweeted “Brazil, you are next”. Attacks by Islamist gunmen in Egypt, Mali, Paris and elsewhere in 2015 has raised the alarm for big international events like the Olympics. Brazilian security agencies have trained over 85,000 security personnel, 47,000 police officers, and 38,000 soldiers to guard the 10,500 athletes and thousands of tourists attending the 2016 Games.

However, the security forces will need to focus on more than terrorist threats for the Olympics.  Violent political demonstrations, increased levels of robberies and shootings, and a growing amount of areas that are considered dangerous have worsened the already poor security situation in the city.

Amid a deteriorating fiscal situation, the once proud member of the BRICS has gotten used to its degrading economic status. Olympics organizers have tried to cut at least USD 500 million from the USD 1.9 billion operating budget for the Games, and already laid off temporary workers. Despite their efforts, the cost recently increased with an additional USD 100 million for electricity generation, with the final budget totalling USD 9.8 billion.

Brazil might be heading towards one of the deepest recessions since 1931. The currency plunged 33% in 2015, state security forces face a budget cut of 25%, inflation has risen to at least 10%, and unemployment has been hovering around 9%.

Brazil has also faced challenges in improving its public transportation system, particularly in the critical subway extension project. If it cannot be completed on time, Rio de Janeiro will face huge traffic jams along its mountainous coastal roads and potential empty seats in the new Olympic venues. Additionally, critical levels of water pollution and delayed infrastructure project led city officials to admit that they failed to improve sewage system in lake areas and the Copacabana coastline by 80%, a promise that was made in their Olympics bid in 2009.

Even if Brazil is able to host the Olympics with all venues prepared on time, there will be bumps in the road. The combined challenges make it very difficult to believe in a positive Olympic experience for Brazil. The legacy has the potential to do serious economic and social damage, requiring a brutal prioritization and fiscal austerity from the government afterwards. Rio de Janeiro city officials’ promise of showing how business can be done in Brazil “above board” is becoming more of an illusion than a reality.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI analyst Alicia Chavy.

The post Is Rio Ready for the Olympics? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Many leaders who are currently in power were decision makers during the time the events of the Rwandan genocide unfolded. Despite peacekeepers showing evidence of what was occurring and Western leaders having full knowledge of the genocide in Rwanda, next to nothing was done to stop the violence.

The situation was ignored to such an extent that peacekeeping forces stationed in Rwanda at the time were left to fend for themselves, despite tradition, law and regulations requiring  assistance from their respective countries and the international community . The Rwandan genocide cost the world approximately two million people, distancing the lessons of the Nuremburg trial away from modern political expediency.

Debate and discussion is essential in ensuring that genocide does not become an expected byproduct of conflict in the modern world. Political motives for blurring the recognition of genocide, creating different parallel narratives, have the purpose of keeping leaders in power in places like Brussels and Washington D.C.

Governments are expected to remember the Nuremberg trials when the U.S. and the rest of the world agreed that genocide should “never again” be perpetrated while outsiders stand idly by. However, the Rwandan experience exemplifies the recent mass extinctions of small minority groups.

While group like CYCI out of Montreal, Canada seek to save individuals from their fates in troubled war zones directly, they operate outside the government’s policy goals and funding. Those groups are only successful due to the commitment of several exceptional and brave individuals who place humanity above all.

Canadian broadcaster Vision TV presented a video debate on the issue of refugees this week on the show The Zoomer. The Canadian government committed itself to assist a large number of Syria refugees. But with questions around ill-planned settlements, the lack of proper identity and security checks for the number of individuals, and the lack of specific assistance to vulnerable groups like Yazidis, Kurdish and Christian Syrians and Iraqis, a heated discussion ensued.

While the debate over Canada’s new refugee policy  is contentious, it is one that is not publicly acknowledged by most local media. Opening up the debate is the first step in preventing another genocide, followed by the acknowledgement of atrocities against minority groups currently fighting for survival in Syria and Iraq. You can watch the Zoomer debate here.

Refugees

The post The Value of Having a Heated Discussion on Refugees and Genocide appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Islamic State fighters on the border between Syria and Iraq. Photograph: Corbis/Medyan Dairieh

Mounting territorial losses and a return to terrorist tactics in Iraq, Turkey and overseas, suggests that the Islamic State’s favored strategy of moving fighters to take territory elsewhere when it comes under overwhelming pressure on one front is no longer working so effectively.

The Islamic State (IS) launched a small offensive last month against Syrian government forces inside the besieged eastern city of Deir ez-Zur. Media reports suggested that the militants had been driven back, but only after they had carried out indiscriminate killings of troops and civilians.

The failed attack comes at a time when the group is under pressure on multiple fronts as Russia, the U.S. and Iran, the major international players opposing it on the ground, have begun to support proxy forces arrayed against it more closely.

Islamic State has a sophisticated and well-run military machine for a militant group. It inherited many highly-trained personnel from Saddam Hussein’s armed forces and seized large stocks of equipment from the Iraqi army when the latter melted away during IS’ conquests of cities like Mosul or Ramadi. But it is not the strongest military power involved in the conflict and its victories have come from preparation, infiltration, nimbleness and a higher morale than its more numerous enemies.

Above all, the group benefited from the political vacuum left to by the collapse of old colonial era borders, the quarreling between Turks, Kurds and Arabs over how to reform their political communities and the mutual hostilities between Russia, Iran, America and Saudi Arabia.

Now the situation in both Iraq and Syria seems to have tilted against the group. In Syria, Moscow’s intervention seems to have injected new vigor into Damascus. Meanwhile the formal ending of a network of complex sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program has strengthened the hand of ‘moderate’ Iranian leaders who see a transactional relationship with Washington as politically possible.

That opens up avenues for future areas of cooperation such as military efforts inside Iraq, which have been weakened by the American’s refusal to operate alongside deeply sectarian Iranian-backed Shi’a militia groups doing most of the fighting. Benefiting from the release of formerly frozen funds, Teheran may now swing more of its weight behind the Iraqi government and army in the battles ahead against IS.

The group’s relationship with the leading Sunni regional powers, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, is ambiguous and also deteriorating. Although both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have backed militant jihadi groups in Syria, their proxies have clashed with IS militants repeatedly over territory.

Despite almost certain Turkish complicity in the movement of militants back and forth across the border and in the oil smuggling that funds the group, IS has repeatedly bombed Turkish territory. Up to now the Turkish government has found IS to be a useful counterweight to the Kurds and has refused to allow Kurdish forces to close off the last 60-mile long stretch of territory which is the group’s last access and exit point with Turkey. That calculation may be changing under American pressure and the gradual defeat of Turkish proxies by the Russian-backed Syrian army in the north.

Meanwhile the recent U.S. moves towards reconciliation with Iran have further disillusioned the Saudis with their American partners, but this has not meant that the House of Saud’s selective embrace of Islamic militants has grown to include IS. While Riyadh’s recent spate of executions drew international attention by including the prominent Shi’a cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, the vast majority were Sunni extremists.

Riyadh has further drawn the militants’ ire by declaring the formation of a global “Islamic Alliance” to fight terrorism. While Riyadh’s major focus is still on thwarting Iranian influence in the Middle East, it also regards the Islamic State as a dangerous competitor.

Lacking outside alliances and with the geopolitical situation slowly starting to tilt against it, Islamic State’s pretensions to act as a legitimate government seem to have its days numbered. IS has already lost substantial territory to Kurdish forces in Syria and major operations in Iraq to retake Mosul will begin in 2016 according to the Iraqi government.

This comes with the caveat that just seizing the areas IS has occupied will not destroy the group itself, unless the re-conquest is also accompanied by the offer of an alternative political program for the Levant’s Sunni Arabs, particularly in Iraq. Already there are reports of security problems in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, which was recently retaken from Islamic State.

It was the passive support of Iraqi Sunnis in Anbar province that allowed IS to rebuild itself after its previous incarnation Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was obliterated. IS also has deeper support there than in Syria, where it is competing with a host of other Sunni militant groups.

In Iraq, it was the sectarianism and corruption of then-Iraqi government of strongman Nouri al-Malaki that drove Sunnis into the arms of IS, presently the sole insurgent Sunni faction there. Malaki systematically froze Iraqi Sunnis out of political power and began a process of “sectarianizing” the Iraqi army, leading to its abrupt collapse when IS attacked Mosul in 2014.

If the world’s governments truly wish to see the end of the Islamic State, Baghdad’s numerous competing patrons will have to emphasise together that their support is contingent on allowing Sunnis in Iraq real representation inside the country’s political system.

The post Uprooting Islamic State? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Fauzan al-Anshori, right, an Islamic State recruiter in Indonesia, leads the “bayat”, an oath of devotion, to the leader of Islamic State. Photo: SMH/Screengrab

Should a country’s citizens be allowed to return home after fighting for the Islamic State (ISIS)?  It would seem at first a silly question to ask—why welcome home hardened fighters who have the skills and may have the determination to threaten your country’s population?  Yet according to law in a number of countries, many of these fighters are allowed safe passage home.

Some constitutional and human rights lawyers around the world argue that safe passage should be guaranteed—that every person has the right to citizenship and to remove it would in effect make a person stateless.  Some critics argue that citizenship should only be revoked under judicial review (e.g. conviction by a court of law of an act of terrorism directed at fellow citizens).  Conviction appears to be a high standard and forces the onus of prevention on local police officials. Since preventing terrorist acts is extremely difficult—why take any chances by allowing fighters to return?

Despite the opposition by lawyers, countries are starting to take action. Following the siege of a cafe in Sydney in December 2014, Australia moved to pass measures barring its citizens who join, support or train with extremist groups like the Islamic State from returning home from conflict zones.  The new laws not only apply to Australians fighting overseas, but to those who help raise money or recruit new members for extremist groups.

In Canada, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in October 2014 at the Canadian National War Memorial in Ottawa, the country amended its Citizenship Act last May. The amendment now allows the stripping of the citizenship of dual nationals found fighting with any international terrorist organization or found guilty of terrorism, treason, or spying for a foreign government.

Austria, Belgium and Britain have also revised their laws to permit the revocation of citizenship in terrorism-related circumstances, while France is considering a change in their constitution allowing to strip French-born dual citizens of their French citizenship in certain circumstances related to terrorism. The French justice minister, born in French Guiana, recently resigned over the government’s plan. Citizens with dual nationality are being targeted largely since the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness prohibits governments from revoking a person’s nationality if it leaves them stateless.

The latest high-profile country to reconsider its citizenship laws is Indonesia, in the wake of last month’s bombings by the Islamic State in Jakarta’s commercial district, which killed eight people and injured 30 people. Lawmakers and security officials are now busy considering the rewrite of the nation’s anti-terrorism laws, which currently permit Indonesians to return home after fighting with ISIS overseas. The fear is of returning experienced jihadis launching more sophisticated attacks than the one that took place last month, which resulted in the deaths of all four attackers.

Indonesia is now home to roughly 100 Indonesians who traveled to the Middle East to join Islamic State, and may have seen very little or no frontline combat before returning. Around 500 Indonesians have made the trip so far to join ISIS.  

The bombings and shootings in Jakarta last month were the first in Indonesia carried out by ISIS, with the last major attack by Jemaah Islamiyah militants occurring in 2009, when suicide bombers killed seven at two luxury hotels in Jakarta. Indonesian authorities are now on high alert following the publication of a new warning by Islamic State that shopping centers, offices and tourist hotspots in Denpasar and Singaraja may be the next targets.

Given the potential threat posed by some of those who left their countries to join Islamic State, immigration authorities in many countries are right to be nervous about letting potential terrorists back into their country.  Citizens in these countries are already reluctant to let in refugees from Syria and Iraq—even women and children. Yet the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness prohibits leaving persons stateless.  

Perhaps the UN convention needs to be revised and updated to specifically address the world we live in today. To date, the 1961 convention argues in Article 9, “A Contracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds”, whose intent is likely to protect non-violent persons from persecution. However, should those persons or groups turn violent, and threaten the state, the UN convention allows for in Article 8:

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, a Contracting State may retain the right to deprive a person of his nationality, if at the time of signature, ratification or accession it specifies its retention of such right on one or more of the following grounds, being grounds existing in its national law at that time:

(a) that, inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the Contracting State, the person

(i) has, in disregard of an express prohibition by the Contracting State rendered or continued to render services to, or received or continued to receive emoluments from, another State, or

(ii) has conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State;

(b) that the person has taken an oath, or made a formal declaration, of allegiance to another State, or given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his allegiance to the Contracting State.

Given proof that a citizen has travelled to the Middle East and trained as a jihadist, and represents a threat upon returning to his/her country of nationality, it would seem that citizenship could be revoked under (a) (ii). Furthermore, many recruits to Islamic State take an oath of allegiance, and if Islamic State can be defined as a State, citizenship can then be revoked under (b).  

Of course, human rights and constitutional lawyers need to fight for the rights of the innocents, but if my quick, non-lawyer reading of the Article is correct, it would appear that those citizens who travelled to the Middle East (or other regions) to join Islamic State, who took the oath, and who potentially threaten their home countries can have their citizenships revoked. With the proliferation of fake passports, however, these non-citizens will not be left stateless, and will be free to travel to and from weak and failing states, and perhaps even home.

The post Should ISIS Fighters be Allowed to Return Home? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

U.S. President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro adjust their jackets at the start of their meeting at the United Nations General Assembly in New York September 29, 2015. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

Written by Matthew Barbari

During his last State of the Union address President Obama made reference to his hope that the long-standing trade embargo between the United States and Cuba would end during his last term in office. “Fifty years of isolating Cuba had failed to promote democracy, setting us back in Latin America,” the President said adding further, “Recognize that the Cold War is over. Lift the embargo.”

Obama has already begun the process of normalizing relations with Raul Castro’s government. On July 20, 2015, diplomatic ties were restored and it was announced that the Cuban embassy in Washington D.C. would be reopened, along with the American embassy in Havana. However, since the embargo still holds, it seems that it will fall upon the next U.S. President to further Obama’s legacy and end the island’s economic isolationism.

Congressional approval has been the biggest roadblock in lifting the embargo. The Republican-controlled Congress opposes the change, still perceiving Cuba as an adversary and leaving little doubt that Obama will not witness the end of the embargo before he leaves office. While many other issues have been at the forefront of the ongoing Republican and Democratic primaries, Cuba is one that each major candidates has touched upon, providing their opinion on how to handle the relationship between Washington and Havana.

Republican Candidates’ Platforms

Sen. Ted Cruz and Sen. Marco Rubio,two candidates in the Republican primary, have been particularly vocal with regard to the embargo. Both Cruz and Rubio are of Cuban dissent and both have publicly denounced President Obama’s policy of normalization, calling for an end to the embargo. Cruz has called Obama’s policy a “tragic mistake,” arguing that it gives legitimacy to the Castro regime.

Cruz believes that opening trade with the island will harm Cubans that aspire for more freedoms by allowing the communist regime in Cuba to stay to place. This sentiment is shared by Rubio, a senator from Florida, the state with the largest Cuban American population. Rubio has long been a critic of the Castro regime, judging Obama’s policy towards Cuba dangerous.

For him, lifting the embargo “threatens America’s moral standing in the region.” He has also stated that if he were elected president that he would close both embassies in Washington D.C. and Havana and would instead tighten sanctions against Cuba until the Castro regime was overthrown. This puts him at odds even with Cruz who advocates for a gradual reduction of sanctions against Cuba conditional on the improvement of their human rights record.

Democratic Candidates’ Platforms

While Republicans tend to support the embargo, many Democrats have sided with Obama, viewing the embargo has a diplomatic failure and call for the relations with Cuba to be normalized. Sen. Bernie Sanders has publicly stated that he is against the embargo and for normalizing relations, while leaving the future of Cuba up to the Cuban people. He hopes that the island will eventually become a democracy and has a track record in Congress of voting for pro-Cuban legislation. In 2015, Sanders co-sponsored a bill presented to the Senate that would allow travel between the U.S. and Cuba.

The Democratic front-runner is former Secretary of State and New York Senator Hillary Clinton. Clinton has stated publicly that she too supports Obama’s call to normalize relations, despite her past record being in favor of the sanctions. She has stated recently that the embargo is an “albatross”on the U.S. in its maneuvering in Latin America and that American foreign policy no longer needs to be viewed “through an outdated Cold War lens.”

Clinton has also taken the stance that if elected she would push Congress to lift the embargo or use her executive power to reduce travel restrictions and increase trade. She claims that during her time as Secretary of State, she asked Obama to consider ending the embargo. However, the process of normalization only began after her time as Secretary ended.

Clinton has had to defend her current position on Cuba as it contradicts her past record, having supported the embargo during her 2008 presidential campaign. Even during her time as First Lady under President Bill Clinton, she was in favor of measures to strengthen the embargo such as the Helms-Burton Act of 1996. While Clinton is allowed to change her mind about policy issues, it raises the question whether she truly supports such policies or is looking to please her pro-normalization voting base in the bid for the Democratic nomination.

Regardless of candidates’ stances on the Cuba embargo, little will happen as long as Congress remains opposed to ending it. With Raul Castro set to step down in 2018, the coming years will be crucial in Cuban history. Whether we want the U.S. to be a part of it is ultimately up to us.

The post The Cuban Embargo After Obama: The Presidential Candidates’ Platforms appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

China’s African strategy

Speculations over China’s plans to set up a “logistical facility” in the East African country of Djibouti were put to rest following an announcement by the Chinese foreign ministry that the two countries have reached a consensus on the proposal. Although lacking a detailed timeline, the agreement will come as a natural conclusion to what has been an ever tightening of relations between the two countries, dating back to China’s involvement in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden back in 2008.

However, unlike NATO countries and Japan who are also conducting anti-piracy missions in Djibouti, China currently has no permanent naval base in the region. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Hong Lei, “In fulfilling escort missions, [China] encountered real difficulties in replenishing soldiers and resupplying fuel and food, and found it really necessary to have nearby and efficient logistical support.”

Djibouti was the natural choice for the Chinese given that the former French colony already hosts a number of European outposts as well as Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. expeditionary base from where drone operations in Yemen and Somalia are conducted.

In recognition of Djibouti´s geostrategic importance, the country has been the recipient of many financial blandishments from China over the past few years. These include the $590 million injection of funds for the development of its port, aimed at transforming it into a major transshipment terminal, and investment in the $4 billion railway connection between Djibouti and its landlocked neighbor, Ethiopia. It also comes on the back of a deal to set up a free trade zone for Chinese companies in Djibouti and allow Chinese banks to begin operating in the country.

While undoubtedly important, China’s first overseas military facility in Djibouti only accounts for a small piece in a much bigger puzzle being put together by Beijing. Djibouti, and its much larger neighbor to the north, Egypt, mark the final stage posts in the maritime leg of China’s ambitious One Belt One Road (OBOR) project: a vast trade route encircling half the globe and connecting China with Europe along the ancient Silk Road.

Supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund, the overland route will see massive investments in infrastructure, stretching from western China through central Asia and the Middle East into Europe via Russia, Greece and Turkey.

For the maritime route to be successful, it will require that Chinese merchant ships are able to reach the Suez Canal unhindered after traversing the Indian Ocean. Djibouti’s position on the cusp of the Red Sea, leading into the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean, makes it a vital node in that network.

Given that investment in OBOR is expected to top one trillion dollars over the next 10 to 15 years, it is no surprise that the People´s Liberation Army has been slowly moving away from its traditional stance of protecting the homeland and towards establishing a force projection capability in line with its expanding overseas interests.

This newfound assertiveness, of which the base in Djibouti is China’s first statement of intent, is being watched with caution by Western capitals. But according to Shen Dingli, a professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, as quoted in the New York Times, it is keeping in line with the behavior of any power whose financial interests abroad are in need of protection.

“The United States has been expanding its business all around the world and sending its military away to protect those interests for 150 years,” Mr. Shen said. “Now, what the United States has done in the past, China will do again.”

However, while China is free to pursue its political ambitions, its presence will most definitely have a negative impact on Djibouti’s freedoms. Beijing’s strict policy of noninterference means that President Ismael Omar Guelleh knows that Beijing will not be critical of his bid to run for a fourth term as president this coming April.

Ever since he inherited the presidency from his uncle in 1999, Guelleh has used a combination of coercion and bribery to keep his hold on power. In 2010 he amended the constitution and scrapped term limits, reneging on earlier promises to run for no more than two terms.

Since then the country has continued its slide down the international rankings for press freedom and human rights and political instability has grown. In 2014, Djibouti suffered its first terrorist attack against Western personnel in the country, stoking fears that the presence of foreign soldiers in a poor, oppressed Muslim country could provide a fertile breeding ground for Islamic extremism. And last December, up to 19 opposition activists were killed when police opened fire at a religious procession, prompting the International Criminal Court to officially place Djibouti on its watch list.

While Guelleh has promised to transform the country into Africa’s Dubai or Singapore, feverishly courting Beijing and Washington for continued financial assistance, the upcoming presidential elections will most likely dispel the fiction that Djibouti and its people are actually benefiting from international attention.

The post China’s Military Pivot to Africa just got Serious appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

From Iraq to Syria, in Lebanon and in Yemen, both are competing for dominance in an ever-deepening tussle for supremacy across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Yet to understand what may happen in the coming years, is to push past the one-tracked, sectarian explanation of current hostilities, and to construct a more multi-faceted and profound, realist-oriented discussion of the conflict.

Toby Mathieson- in discussion with the Council on Foreign Relations- described Riyadh’s use of sectarianism as a ‘tool they use’ to mobilize Sunni support both at home, and across the MENA region. Former US State Department adviser, Vali Nasr, concurs, attributing Nimr’s execution to a Saudi desire to ‘rally Sunnis at home’, as well as to shore up Sunni support from a variety of regional actors.

For Riyadh, a mobilization of internal and external Sunni support is necessary for purely realist reasons – to reinforce the House of Saud’s legitimacy, and subsequently to guarantee its survival, in the face of a revitalized Iran.

The hastily convened ‘Islamic Military Alliance (sans Iran and Iraq) is a convenient sectarian front for what is ostensibly a zero-sum competition for leverage in the Middle East. Further evidence abounds with the Saudis’ role in attempting a rapprochement between wary Sunni ‘bedfellows’, Egypt and Turkey.

Quite simply, Saudi Arabia is using the highly divisive issue of sectarianism to shroud its true intentions – to prevent the hegemonic rise of a re-energized and unshackled Iran. Its policy actions for a number of decades point to such a conclusion.

The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 was designed to counter Iran’s rise after its 1979 Islamic Revolution, and to support Saddam in his nearly decade-long conflict with Iran.

Iranian rancor at Saudi support for Saddam still remains to this day. The Islamic Military Alliance must be viewed in the same light as the formation of the GCC.

An attempt to assuage intra-Sunni squabbles (in the case of Turkey and Egypt) is a further policy prescription by which Riyadh can present a united front against Tehran.

From an Iranian perspective, since the ascension of the Ayatollah Khomeini to the position of Supreme Leader, Iran has sought to buttress links with co-religionists across the region, forming a Shiite crescent comprising Assad’s Alawites and Lebanon’s militant group, Hezbollah.

This ‘crescent’ is wholly fuelled by Iranian desires to return to what Tehran sees as its rightful place within the Middle Eastern order – as the true regional hegemon; a re-Persianization of Iran’s status if you will. Covert support for Yemen’s Shiite Houthi rebels is additional sign of Iranian strategic designs on the MENA region. Iranian exportation of its Shiite ideology across the region must therefore be understood within the context of a regional balance of power, and Iranian attempts to dominate as it has done so before.

The Saudi kingdom is afraid. Its grip on power is predicated upon its religious legitimacy and the social contract that binds the House of Saud to its citizens, in a sentence – bountiful financial benefit in exchange for continued support. Both of these legitimizing tenets have been jeopardized in the past year, through the Hajj disaster and the global collapse of the oil price.

Riyadh has been forced to dig into its (admittedly huge) foreign exchange reserves. It has also announced its first cut to benefits. Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has even announced that Aramco will be partly privatized. Saudi decision-making has always been of a politically realist nature. For the Al Saud family, survival is the goal. Thus its extraneous actions will always be predicated upon ensuring the regime and the state’s survival.

Currently, Riyadh is also facing the very real threat of the Islamic State, which looms large on its border, and even within the kingdom. Thus aside from its regional hegemonic battle with Iran, the House of Saud is being bedeviled by what it views as a number of existential threats.

Nimr’s execution can thus be understood as a Saudi ploy to illustrate its might and its determination to meet what it perceives as existential threats, with overwhelming force. Playing the anti-Shiite card is one small part of this strategy.

Saudi insecurity has also been irretrievably heightened by the Iranian nuclear deal, which Riyadh fears will draw Tehran closer to the United States. Since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, Riyadh has dominated America’s Middle Eastern relations. Thus with Iran slowly being accepted back into the international fold, a great Saudi fear is that in any future clashes between Riyadh and Tehran, Washington could conceivably side with Riyadh’s great enemy, a wholly unpalatable scenario for the Saudi rulers.

Today’s hostilities do not point towards a shift from cold to hot in what is already an extremely precarious situation.

The Saudis’ military capacity does not match up to the Iranians. Iran has around 500,000 ground troops, compared to less than 200,000 for the Saudis. From an economic perspective, oil sustains the Saudi regime. Oil revenue is used to buy support within the kingdom and friends outside of the kingdom.

The majority of this oil lies in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, a demographic disaster, as the area is predominantly Shiite. Therefore it is vital for Saudi Arabia not to incite trouble (or too much trouble) with Iran so as to ensure its safeguarding of the fundamental Eastern province.

Moreover, Iran will not want to jeopardize its recent welcome back into the international fold and the ensuing lifting of sanctions on the Iranian economy. As a longstanding US ally, Saudi Arabia would expect to receive American support, making overt Iranian aggression against Riyadh unlikely.

What will happen is an intensification of proxy Saudi-Iranian conflicts across the MENA region. Saudi military largesse in Yemen – estimated to be costing the kingdom in Riyadh the princely sum of $1 billion a month – is unlikely to be discontinued. The war shows few signs of abating, with recent talk of a ceasefire failing to staunch the frighteningly large amount of civilian deaths (said to be at nearly 3,000 according to the UN). Nimr’s execution has put a stake through the heart of any Yemeni peace process.

Nimr’s death is also likely to reduce the likelihood of an agreement on the Syrian track in Vienna, as both the Saudis and Iran both reinforce their stances behind their respective Syrian clients. Iran will harden its resolve to see Assad remain in power, while the Saudis will continue to support anti-Assad rebels in Syria, ploughing money and arms into extremist hands.

A solely sectarian-based argument as the catalyst behind the Saudi-Iranian conflict is missing the wider point of international relations. Of the recent spate of Saudi executions, only 4 (out of 47) were Shiite. Contrary to noise emanating from the White House, Nimr was not all that he was cracked up to be. He had clear, public links to Hezbollah al-Hejaz, an armed, Khomeinist group, highly active in the Saudis’ Eastern Province. Nimr has called for an armed struggle against the ‘illegitimate’ Saudi regime. Hezbollah al-Hejaz was even behind the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which killed numerous Americans.

Instead, the death of Nimr will serve to intensify the Middle Eastern, geopolitical competition of the past decade, as both sides seeks to shore up their claims of regional (and religious) leadership.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI analyst Sam Julius.

The post Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War’ Uses Sectarianism As Tool appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Written by Matthew Barbari

While Americans are focusing on the upcoming U.S. Presidential elections, the United Nations is beginning its own election season. With current Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon term ending this year, the search for his replacement has begun. The UN has stated that it wants this current election to be the most transparent. The difficulty with the nomination revolves around the approval needed from the permanent members of the UN Security Council—The United States, The United Kingdom, France, Russia and China—which have veto power over who is selected for the position.

Qualifications

There is a push for the Secretary-General to be from a region of the world that has yet to be represented, which is the case of Eastern Europe. They must have support from their government, as well as the support from most countries in the region. Previous experience in foreign affairs as well as the ability to communicate fluently in the official UN languages (minimum of 2) is required for the candidate.

This is also the first time that the calls for a woman Secretary-General are being adequately met. Many groups such as the 1 for 7 Billion campaign have called for a woman in the highest office of the United Nations. Under Ban Ki-Moon and the Sustainable Development Goals initiative, the issues of gender equality and the rights of women have been targeted as areas of improvement throughout the world.

Many critics of the UN would point out that only 25% of top UN positions are occupied by women. A major step in the fight for gender equality would be to have a woman as the face of the UN. These are the four current nominees with the best credentials and most support:

Irina Bokova

Bulgaria’s candidate for the position is considered to be the front-runner. The current Director-General of UNESCO as well as former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador, Bokova has a long and respected track record within the United Nations. With the ability to speak several languages fluently, as well as being highly respected for her communication and passion towards peacekeeping and dialogue, she enjoys support from the five Security Council permanent members.

Vuk Jeremić

Serbia’s candidate is the former president of the 67th Session of the General Assembly Vuk Jeremić. Jeremić is another strong candidate considering his work within the UN as well as his support for women’s education, calling for a United Nations Youth Assembly to hear Women’s Rights advocate Malala Yousafzai speak on her struggle for equal education rights in Pakistan. Jeremić had been selected as a potential candidate back in 2012 but was held back by his poor reputation among other countries in the region due to his steadfast denouncement of the 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence from Serbia.

Danilo Türk

The former President of Slovenia, Danilo Türk brings decades of experience working in the United Nations to his potential appointment as Secretary-General. Türk has overwhelming support from his home country as well as the rest of Eastern Europe. Starting as the Representative of Slovenia, Türk has been within the UN system for nearly 30 years, spending time as Assistant Secretary-General under Kofi Annan, as well as a member of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council. His experience and respect make him a very popular candidate and his history of supporting human and gender rights has garnered a lot of support.

Vesna Pusić

One of the founding members of the Croatian People’s Party, Vesna Pusić is a popular candidate for the next Secretary-General due to her support for gender equality, LGBT rights and liberal democracy. Having spent five years as the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs for Croatia she has some experience in foreign affairs. Her lack of United Nations experience is a negative as well as her very vocal support for the LGBT community might not be well received in Moscow.

The post Finding the next UN Secretary-General appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On Sunday, Pyongyang launched a long-range missile, despite the protests of the United States, South Korea and Japan that have immediately condemned the initiative as a further outrageous violation of the UN sanctions, preventing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from using any ballistic missiles technology. The UN Security Council promptly summoned an emergency meeting to express its strong condemnation. While China still opposes expanding sanctions on the DPRK, Washington has recently stressed its determination to support South Korea and Japan against the threat represented by the DPRK nuclear ambitions.

During the last few weeks, Washington has coordinated an intense diplomatic offensive, urging for a Chinese intervention in response to the dangerous escalation characterizing the latest missile crisis. Few weeks ago, Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Beijing to make the case for a more proactive Chinese role over the issue of the North Korea’s nuclear program, the main threat to the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

While both countries have agreed upon the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, Beijing has strongly stressed the need of supporting diplomatic initiatives, aiming to strengthen the status quo in the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK’s nuclear program activities have intensified after the alleged announcement concerning the North Korea’s acquisition of thermonuclear weapons, causing the unanimous condemnation of Japan, the United States and South Korea while China and Russia have expressed serious concerns about consequences of the DPRK nuclear program.

Albeit, China and the DPRK have shared a certain level of ideological affinity, their strategic partnership has waned over the last two decades. Beijing remains the DPRK’s biggest trade partner, providing a vital food and oil supply lifeline. But after the leadership change in North Korea, relations have cooled down. Kim Jung-un took the power in 2011, and quickly set the North Korean nuclear program as one of the top priorities for the regime. However, despite the evident erosion of China’s ability to use its leverage on Pyongyang, Washington demands from Beijing a more steadfast role with regard to the evolution of the Korean crisis.

Chinese interest in the Korean Peninsula

Since the end of the Korean War, Chinese leaders have valued the preservation of the balance of the power in the Korean Peninsula as the most important precondition for regional stability. To preserve the status quo, China strongly opposes the rise of the DRPK’s as a nuclear power. The pragmatic Chinese leadership is not per se concerned with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea but rather, it is worried about the consequences of a growing level of insecurity among the neighboring countries such as Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan, inclined to acquire nuclear weapons of their own  as a source of deterrence.

Eventually, the North Korean nuclear program could push Seoul and Washington to pursue a military intervention, resulting in a reunited Korea under the control of the South and an increased American military presence in  China’s backyard. Since the partition of the peninsula, the DPRK has played an important role as a buffer state between China and the South Korea where more than 30.000 U.S. troops are currently stationed. Moreover, this scenario could increase tensions between China and Washington and its allies, given Beijing’s growing perception a strategic containment fostered by Washington as part of the “pivot to Asia” launched by the Obama Administration in 2011.

From an economic perspective, the event of the collapse and assimilation of the North Korea would trigger a severe humanitarian crisis. This would be a serious challenge to the Chinese leadership, undermining its role in a delicate phase of transition that is currently characterizing President Xi’s rule. Consequently, preventing any alterations in the current Korean peninsula architecture is the main priority for Beijing.

The harsh rule that has characterized Kim Jong Un’ leadership keeps irritating Beijing especially after the execution of Jan Sung-taek in 2013. Due to his close relations with Beijing and role as a supervisor of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) located in the northeast provinces, close to the border, the execution of Jan Sung-taek was considered by many China watchers as a clear attempt to undermine Beijing’s influence while sending a warning to those opposing Kim Jong Un’s rule.

After the Jan Sung-taek incident, Beijing’s attempts to maintain a strong paternal influence over Kim Jong Un have produced limited results. Few days ago the special envoy for Korean affairs Wu Dawei returned to Beijing empty-handed. Additionally, recent remarks from the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang have alimented the speculations about China’s tense relations with Pyongyang on the nuclear issue.

Washington’s view

The challenge represented by the DPRK’s nuclear program unveils Washington’s concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. Besides threatening regional and global security, the advancement of Pyongyang’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities is eroding the international community’s perceived ability to compel nations to abide by rules and regulations expressed by the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

As mentioned earlier, China does not fear the DPRK as a nuclear power, yet the implications for the United States are different. Pyongyang’s ability to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the foreseeable future would enable the DPRK to strike targets within the continental U.S. in addition to the existing nuclear threat to neighboring countries.

(Source: International Maritime Organization, retrieved from Agence France Press)

Indeed, South Korea and Japan have increased the level of cooperation with Washington through the expansion of trilateral military exercises, improving the level of preparedness required for intercepting missile strikes. In the recent years, the impact of the nuclear threat has induced South Korea to take a more assertive stand against Pyongyang’s provocations. Japan, under Abe’s leadership, has launched a comprehensive package of security reforms to allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to fight alongside the U.S. troops after more than 70 years of self-imposed restrictions.

Many analysts in Washington have stressed the correlations between the advancement of the DPRK’s nuclear program and the growing instability of the young Kim Jong Un’s regime. Over the last three years, Kim Jong Un’s leadership has been characterized by a furious attempt to follow the steps of his grandfather Kim Il-Sung, the dynasty founder worshipped by millions of North Korean as a demigod.

However, the sudden appointment of Kim Jong Un as successor has surely left many influent members of the Kims close entourage skeptical about his real ability to rule. Beyond the propaganda façade, characterized by the blind adoration toward Kim Jong Un, his trembling power has mostly relied on purging powerful members of the party and granting privileges to his closest associates, following a pattern laid out elites selectorate model theory, common in authoritarian regimes.

Nowadays, Washington is calling Beijing for more significant and impactful sanctions to force the DPRK to abandon its nuclear ambitions. In order to achieve this goal, China is expected to use its leverage to bring Pyongyang back to the table of negotiations. Additionally, from Washington’s perspective, given its aspirations as a rising power, committed to contributing to the global peace and security, China should share  the responsibilities with the United States. It remains uncertain how President Xi will deal with the issue, but it is certain that the success or failure of Chinese diplomacy will strongly impact the region’s security environment.

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Last week, Twitter announced that it suspended 125,000 accounts since the middle of 2015 that it suspected of “threatening or promoting terrorist acts, primarily related to ISIS.” This statement was the first of its kind from one of the world’s most popular social media platforms and a favorite among extremist groups.

Twitter’s actions against ISIS accounts are not unique. Internet companies, especially those that manage massive social media platforms, have been combating a flood of terrorist propaganda that is saturating the digital landscape.

However, Twitter’s very public statement amounts to a declaration of war against ISIS contrasts with its contemporaries; many of whom chose to take a far less transparent stand in publicizing suspension activities against ISIS and other extremist groups.

ISIS has become so popular so fast that governments are struggling to keep up with the parasitic spread of its appeal. Twitter, being the preferred medium for recruitment, is facing a formidable challenge in its attempt to stop or, at the very least, stymie the proliferation of social media based propaganda operations.

The apocalyptic narrative ISIS is preaching has been buoyed by a grasp on the importance of creating and harnessing a prolific social media campaign that is capable of broadcasting a compelling narrative interlaced with religious extremism: in essence creating a Jihadist highlight reel showcasing its accomplishments to adherents across the globe.

The skills demonstrated on social media platforms are not that dissimilar to what the average millennial is capable of doing, but ISIS is the first terrorist organization to use it to such great effect. The ability of ISIS to spin the narrative to fit specific objectives makes offering up a counter-narrative very challenging—especially considering the lack of credibility Western nations have in regions where ISIS’ message is most popular. As long as ISIS is perceived to be winning the fight to establish a caliphate, whether based in fact or fiction, that message will continue to attract followers.

Twitter has dedicated a considerable amount of time and resources into identifying and suspending ISIS-related Twitter accounts. Unfortunately, given the nature of social media platforms and the anonymity of the internet in general, its efforts to curb ISIS participation is becoming a frustrating game of “whack-a-mole”; but that’s not to say that these efforts are without merit. The ramifications of not trimming the proverbial weeds, as it were, would be incredibly harmful, especially considering the alarming rate of metastasis in ISIS’s presence on social media.

It requires a tremendous amount of effort for ISIS to reconstitute social media networks that have been lost to account suspension—especially the type of massive crackdowns that Twitter announced. The rationale behind utilizing a comprehensive campaign of account suspensions to curb ISIS participation on Twitter is simple: if ISIS is spending its time recreating social media accounts lost to suspensions then it will spend less time spent actually operating those accounts to create and disseminate propaganda.

A study conducted by the Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World found that in September 2014, 8% of ISIS’s online activity was being dedicated to reconstituting its social media network as a result of increased suspensions. The Brookings’ study also states “the pace of account creations has lagged behind the pace of suspensions,” which is a positive sign that an increased suspension regime can have a significant impact.

Jared Cohen, Director of Google Ideas and Senior Fellow at The Council on Foreign Relations, while speaking at the Royal Institute of International Affairs discussed the idea of relegating ISIS to the outer fringes of the Internet, into the dark Web, the open-source network that lets you navigate the Internet anonymously—known as Tor.

These obscure and far-flung regions of the Internet, while difficult to track and monitor, are also difficult for the average person to access and require a higher degree of computer proficiency to operate—it’s not the prime digital advertising space that ISIS would prefer.

Traditionally, the process of radicalization has occurred directly, person to person. However, in the age of pervasive social media platforms and systemic access to the Internet, the gulf that previously separated a radical cleric in Raqqa and a potential adherent in Paris has been dramatically reduced. In the 21st century, it’s the indirect radicalization of an individual, or “self-radicalization,” that is proving the most difficult to combat.

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Sri Lanka has always been described as the Pearl of the Indian Ocean. It is never easy for a small island nation to remain a completely sovereign while being located just a few dozen miles off the coast of a behemoth-like country with 1 billion people. Thus, the power relations are distorted in all aspects. No wonder Sri Lankan scholars and journalists refer to India as “big brother.”

The cultural and religious affinities are present in a vibrant history of economic and social interactions. But concurrently Sri Lanka has also tried to remain independent from the politics and conflicts of India, ensuring that a unique identity was developed for the islanders. Sri Lankan Nationalism has been at the forefront of trying to protect that identity.

The long running relationship between the two countries has had quite a few hiccups. The latest has been over the furthering of the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement. It has been under negotiations since 2003 as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), now renamed the Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement (ETCA).

From the very beginning the CEPA has been  controversial in Sri Lanka. There has massive civil society protests against any government’s attempt to finalize the agreement. The current national unity government has also faced the same issue with ETCA.

Trade between the two countries is obviously one sided. In 2014, while Sri Lanka exported $700 million worth to India while India exported $3.1 billion worth to Sri Lanka. It is a massive trade gap for Sri Lanka, but it can do little about it. Indian products have a huge price advantage over Sri Lankan’s.

Ingrained in the memory of many middle aged Sri Lankans are the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accords. The accords involved altering Sri Lanka’s constitution by adding the 13th amendment and introducing a large Indian Peacekeeping Force. To them, their motherland was once again invaded by Indians just 40 years after the British marched away. So now when the government says a new agreement could allow Indians to enter the workforce in the shipbuilding and IT  industries, they see another invasion.

However it is worthwhile to take a brief look into the fledging Sri Lankan shipbuilding and IT industries. The shipbuilding is limited to basically two main operations. First is the Colombo Dockyard Company which is considered to be one of the leading dry-dock complexes in the South Asian region with a significant annual revenue. Second is the Sri Lankan Navy small  vessel construction for its use in littoral waters. Expanding these operations in the short term  will be tough due to the lack of skilled labor.

On the other hand the IT industry has been booming and expanding ever since the mid 2000s. Today,Sri Lanka has up to 80,000 IT professionals as a whole.  Firms like WSO2, Millenium and Leapset/CAKE Labs are entrepreneurial, earning  millions of dollars in revenues, with operations even in Silicon Valley.

However, entrepreneurs do confess that there is a dearth of skilled graduates for recruitment within Sri Lanka. The government wants to increase the IT export revenue five fold by 2020 requiring massive expansions.

Yet where the investments will come is an issue. The Sri Lankan IT industry resists opening up to foreign investors and labor, fearing that it could destroy budding local entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka already has its own version of Uber, Pick me,  Uber’s biggest local competition.

Liberal minded intellectuals and government politicians are calling the ETCA agreement a step forward to making Sri Lankan industries more competitive. Nationalists are calling it a threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and identity.

However, Sri Lanka’s identity is already defined by a number of communities who have migrated to the island over the centuries. The Moors, Malay, South Indian estate workers, Gujarati and Chinese traders just to name a few.

Sri Lanka’s current fiscal status quo is starving for Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). The island state risks to lose its fiscal autonomy if it has to default on its debt servicing and falls under the thumb of the IMF. If properly utilized by the government, ETCA can be used to present Sri Lanka as having a liberal attitude toward trade and foreign investment.

Nationalism has played a decisive role in Sri Lanka ever since it became Asia’s first democracy in 1933. Politicians know exactly how to use it to serve their own interests. Nationalism of the Sinhalese majority turned chauvinism sparked the civil war and massive nationalization of private enterprises and property.

It drowned the country’s dreams of becoming the “Gateway to Asia” despite its geographic location. Today, government action towards recreating that dream is being opposed by nationalism once again. Some politicians are manipulating nationalism, claiming to be defending the sovereignty that Sri Lanka is not losing, only to return to power.

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French President Hollande at the COP21 in Paris.

Written by Matthew Barbari

When delegates from nearly 200 countries convened in Paris in late November 2015, many were hopeful about the 21st yearly session of the Conference of the Parties or COP21. It could be a watershed moment when the world would unite and finally put forth a plan to combat climate change.

While similar sentiment was shared before the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 and the meeting in Kyoto in 1997, there was a feeling that now—with China, India and the United States on board—a universal climate policy could be agreed upon.

This, however, is not the end of the story. While an agreement was reached, many experts within the scientific community remain dissatisfied. The watershed moment for politicians arguing for their respective countries was not what environmentalists had envisioned, with many criticizing the agreement as nothing more than too little, too late.

Dr. James E. Hansen, a highly respected authority within the climate science community, sees the prospect of the Paris Agreement as “just worthless words,” and criticizing it as “no action, just promises.” Hansen makes a direct reference to the provision within the agreement that allows countries to set their own standards of emissions to keep the global temperature from rising by 2 degrees Celsius. Further arguments are also made about how much money developed countries should provide to developing ones in order to limit the latter’s carbon emissions, as well as any prevent any catastrophic events that climate change could trigger.

Dr. Hansen argues that the notion that renewable energy sources will magically replace countries’ dependence on fossil fuels is silly as long as those fuels remain the cheapest source of energy production. Dr. Hansen also argues for an increase in nuclear energy, which puts him at odds with some within the community.

He believes that nuclear power is necessary to combat climate change as it provides a massive source of energy that does not involve burning fossil fuels. Those against nuclear power point to the massive construction costs of nuclear facilities, events such as the disaster at Chernobyl and Fukushima power plants or the issue of getting rid of nuclear waste.

While the Paris Agreement aims high, it also limits itself to being nothing more than a promise: no penalties are imposed should nations not reach their own targets for limiting carbon emission and developing renewable energy sources. There are also several provisions within the agreement that are not binding, such as the fact that countries can withdraw from the agreement at any time without any penalties.

Further issues arise with the 2 degrees target. Environmentalists argue that this temperature rise would still cause a drastic change in the global climate and that the cuts need to be more severe. This is the biggest concern with the Paris Agreement: it does not attempt to stop climate change but only to mitigate the damages.

Besides these criticisms, there is much positive about the agreement. First, there is a formal agreement, as previous attempts have seen major powers such as the U.S. and China walk out of meetings. The biggest challenge of a universal agreement is the different level of economic development of each individual countries combined to the inherent asymmetry of climate change effects. This is why the agreement pushes for each country to develop a climate policy for themselves.

While the agreement might not have gone as far as some would have liked, it shows that nations around the globe are now finally getting serious about climate change. And that is something to be hopeful about.

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Source: Getty Images

Written by Lillian Marx

In a move that the South Korean government has dubbed “immature,” this week North Korea began sending propaganda balloons across the border filled with trash, including cigarette butts and even used toilet paper. The garbage is accompanied by leaflets, some of which refer to South Korean leader Park Geun-hye as a “filthy president.”

The timed detonations reached border cities, including the capital, Seoul. While leaflet-packed balloons have caused some incidental harm–damaged cars and rooftop water tanks, for instance–the North’s propaganda campaign faces little chance of inflicting psychological damage on the Republic of Korea.

Balloons are a classic component of the inter-Korean propaganda war that has raged, on and off, since the Cold War. The tactic was dispensed with after successful inter-Korean summit talks in 2000, as was the practice of blasting broadcasts over loudspeakers across the border.

Independent South Korean activists continued to send balloons carrying everything from dollar bills, to Western entertainment media, to leaflets condemning the Supreme Leader. It was only when a North Korean torpedo struck a South Korean warship in 2010 that Seoul broke the propaganda ceasefire officially instituted in 2004 and reintroduced loudspeaker broadcasts.

When South Korea accused North Korea of planting mines in the DMZ last August, injuring two South Korean soldiers, Seoul again responded with broadcasts. When North Korea tested out a purported H-bomb this January, the South began the blasts and balloons anew–a move the North reciprocated, until the back-and-forth culminated in an exchange of artillery fire.

Now, as the South Korean Ministry of Defense warns that North Korea is preparing to launch the long-range missile it promised to deploy sometime in February, the propaganda war reflects, and in fact increases, the pitch of the tension. The pressure that built up in August was diffused after North Korea gave in to diplomatic wrangling and expressed regret for the maimed soldiers. But it would be entirely anathema to Kim regime legitimacy to apologize for the country’s nuclear program.

The content of contemporary South Korean propaganda remains similar in spirit to that of the Cold War–the contrast between a free and wealthy South and an oppressive North being the central message. But with loudspeakers blasting at a volume that carries K-pop, weather reports and denunciations of Kim Jong Un 12 miles beyond the border, the overall effect is as much profoundly annoying as ideologically persuasive.

President Park entered office with her signature policy of trustpolitik, which sought Korean reconciliation through mutual trust-building. Yet, for instance, the aggressive back-and-forth propaganda that followed North Korea’s nuclear test in January contributed to the overall risk of what U.S.  Department of Defense spokesman Commander William Urban termed a “cycle of escalation.” The intensifying animosity was coarsely expressed by a North Korean leaflet at the time: “Let us beat to death Park Geun-hye’s gang of dogs for resuming propaganda broadcasts and deteriorating North-South relations!”

The arrival of North Korea’s trash balloons this week accompanies the country’s far more belligerent promise to launch an earth-observation satellite into orbit (understood as a flimsy decoy for developing ICBM technology) before February 25. The trash stunt may be “immature,” but it perpetuates a level of tension that was tellingly illustrated by initial concerns that the deployments of detritus might be biochemically hazardous. This trash was just trash; meanwhile, South Korea has resolved to intercept any debris from the North’s anticipated rocket launch.

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