Foreign Policy Blogs

Chart: Sunni provinces of Iraq and Syria in Turkish and Egyptian occupation zones. Click to enlarge.

Much debate has taken place on the topic how the Islamic State should be militarily defeated, including various combinations of US, Russian, European, Turkish, Iranian and Arab powers. However, too little is being said on the political solution after the military campaign. Maintaining united Syria and Iraq may be favored by Iran wanting to extend Shi’a rule over the Middle East or by Turkey wanting to prevent emergence of an independent Kurdish state on its southern border. Experience with the post-occupation Iraq (2013-16) clearly shows how national unity governments fail to achieve political stability in countries with progressing ethnic emancipation. In this article, I would like to describe the political solution for the Sunni Arab portions of Iraq and Syria after the defeat of the Islamic State: a temporary Turkish and Egyptian occupation.

As I argued in my previous article “Partition of Syria and Iraq: Lessons from Europe”, Iraq and Syria after the Arab Spring are different places than they used to be before. Arab Spring was mostly a Sunni Arab national revolution and the Sunni-Shi’a strife became much more about ethnic identity than religious dogmas. I argued that leaving Syria and Iraq united countries would lead to further tragedies. I showed examples of failed federations in the Third World and described why existence of united Iraq and Syria are obstacles in introduction of democracy as well as further Arab integration. Therefore, there is an urgent need for partitioning Syria and Iraq along ethno-religious lines.

In another article “Sunni Areas Post-ISIS: Occupation by Sunni Powers?”, I argued that Sunni Arab populations of Iraq and Syria are unable to govern themselves in the next few years while their ruling by the Shi’a regime in Iraq and Alawi regime in Syria lead to popularity of the cancer of Islamic State among the Sunni Arabs in the recent past. I argued that global powers like the US or Russia lost their popularity in the Middle East with their military occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. Therefore, they cannot be occupation powers in Iraq and Syria any more. I also argued why small and middle-sized countries cannot do this job after bad experience with international adventurism of their rulers like Qaddafi or Saddam. And I also mentioned why active role of Saudi Arabia and Israel are unacceptable.

Military occupation is a task that must be assigned to countries with a status of regional powers and with relatively stable political regimes and operational armies. After ruling out Saudi Arabia, the only two Sunni powers that are suitable to become occupation powers are Turkey and Egypt.

Turkish President Erdogan and Egyptian President al-Sisi stand on two opposite poles of the political spectrum in events related to the Arab Spring. Turkey was the main supporter of the revolutionary forces led by the Muslim Brotherhood while the current Egyptian regime is one of the strongholds of counterrevolution and return of the Ancient Regime. However, both Turkey and Egypt are regional powers and they are able to conduct on a responsible manner as regional powers do. Both powers have or renewed their historically good relations with the great powers—The United States, Russia and China, with another regional powers—Israel and Saudi Arabia, and their status is more or less respected by the Arab public opinion.

That is why after defeat of the Islamic State and after evacuation of Assad’s regime to the Mediterranean coast, Sunni Arab territories of Iraq and Syria should get under occupation authorities of two Sunni Muslim regional powers—Turkey and Egypt.

After July 15-16 coup attempt in Turkey, a presidential dictatorship has been installed that was previously rejected by the voters in the two elections of spring and fall 2015. Selahattin Demirtaş, leader of the pro-Kurdish parliamentary party HDP, was one of the first politicians to reject the coup and to support President Erdogan. Despite that fact, Kurdish voters became a target of oppression as their vote was the main obstacle for installing a presidential rule a year earlier. Also, hunt for sympathizers of Fethullah Gülen became a mission for the new presidential regime.

Nevertheless, the attitude of the political parties to the military coup attempt showed an unprecedented national unity among Turkish Islamists, leftists and nationalists of AKP, CHP and MHP. This unity allows for mid term political stability in Turkey. It is a guarantee for their common political interest in stability of the occupied portions of Iraq and Syria. Refocusing of the Turkish army to a military occupation of parts of Iraq and Syria could relieve Turkish population suffering under the witch-hunt against the Kurd and Gülenists.

In Egypt, the military regime is still preoccupied with eradication and elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood. This witch-hunt is accompanied with an unprecedented wave of terror and hunt for political opponents of the regime. Refocusing of the Egyptian army to a military occupation of parts of Syria and Iraq could relieve Egyptian population suffering under this terror.

Partitioning of Syria and Iraq to occupation zones ruled by regimes from the opposite poles of the spectrum of attitudes to the Arab Spring would guarantee that the Sunni parts of Iraq and Syria would not become dictatorships after withdrawal of the occupiers. Egypt would tolerate development of secular and nationalist political forces including Baathist/Assadist ones in its occupation zone. On the other hand, Turkey would attempt to restore Muslim Brotherhood in its zone. This is a prerequisite for future political pluralism in the new Sunni countries. However, eradication of relics of Islamist extremism and Jihadism would be the main task for the two occupation powers, be it linked to al-Qaeda or Islamic State, or Wahabism and Salafism promoted by Saudi Arabia.

In Syria, nine governorates can be considered predominantly Sunni Arab: Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor on the east, Aleppo and Idlib on the north, Hama and Homs in the middle and Damascus, Dara and Quneitra on the south. In Iraq, there are four old and one newly established governorates that are Sunni: Niniwe/Mosul on the north, Salahaddin and Diyala on the northeast and Anbar and the newly created Falluja (since January 2014) on the northwest. So there are 14 Sunni Arab governorates in total. They should to be split between the occupation powers—Turkey and Egypt.

Logically, an option with an equal number of governorates ruled by Turkey and Egypt, seven and seven, should be achievable. Further, northern governorates should be logically occupied by Turkey while the southern ones by Egypt. There are two dominant cities in the southern part of the Sunni Arab areas: Damascus, the Syrian capital, and Western Baghdad, a part of the Iraqi capital. Another two dominant cities with an original population of two million are in the northern part of the Sunni Arab areas: Iraqi Mosul and Syrian Aleppo. So the Turkish and Egyptian occupation zones would be equal as for the number of metropolitan areas.

Map: Occupation and Protection zones in Iraq and Syria. Click to enlarge.

The Turkish occupation zone on the north would logically include Iraqi governorates of Mosul/Niniwe, Salahaddin and Diyala and Syrian governorates of Aleppo, Raqqa, Idlib and Hama as well as metropolitan areas of Mosul and Aleppo.

The Egyptian occupation zone on the south would contain remaining two Iraqi governorates of Anbar and Falluja, and five Syrian governorates of Damascus, Dara, Homs, Deir ez-Zor and Quneitra as well as metropolitan areas of Damascus and Western Baghdad.

At the same time, it must be said that those Sunni occupation zones must exclude Kurdish and Christian portions of Diyala, Salahaddin, Niniwe, Hasakah, Raqqa, Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs and Damascus governorates as well as predominantly Shi’a districts of Diyala, Salahaddin and Niniwe governorates.

Individual provincial administrations should be under direct military rule of the occupation armies. Early free elections as well as a demand that only Syrians and Iraqis should decide on their own future are unrealistic and they would result in further mass suffering. Central governments of the Sunni parts of Syria and Sunni parts of Iraq (Jezira) should be created only after several years of pacification under Turkish and Egyptian occupation authorities—something similar to post-war Germany in 1945-49 and Austria in 1945-55.

Withdrawal of the Turkish and Egyptian occupation forces could be only possible after stabilizing of the Sunni portions of Iraq and Syria and after creating of the central government of Jezira (Sunni part of Iraq) and the Sunni Syria. On these territories, two Sunni Arab states would be created: the Arab Republic of Syria with Damascus as a capital and the Arab Republic of Jezira with Mosul as its capital.

Sunni Arab refugees from Iraq and Syria to Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and the EU would get an opportunity to to return to Turkish or Egyptian occupation zones of Syria or Iraq, as soon as the security situation allows that.

It is true that the Islamic State represents one of the worst political regimes that ever emerged in the Middle East, combining the most conservative attributes of Salafism with delusion and militancy of modern Jihadism and brutality and apostasy of Saddam’s and Qaddafi’s ideological militia, all wrapped in sophisticated mass manipulation techniques used by the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century and IT skills typical for the 21st century “Big Brother” regimes of Russia and China.

But the same Islamic State was successful in correction of historical injustices caused by the hundred years old Sykes-Picot Agreement and uniting the divided populations of the northern Mesopotamia, also called Jezira. The inhabitants of the Syrian territories of Mesopotamia—Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor—got an opportunity to reunite with their historical kins in northern Iraq under the rule of the Islamic State.

As the defeat of the Islamic State should bring a stable solution for Iraq and Syria, the population of the two provinces of Syrian Mesopotamia must be given an opportunity to decide in a referendum whether they prefer to remain part of Syria or become part of Jezira together with the Sunni territories of the Iraqi Mesopotamia

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In this virtual roundtable of six podcasts hosted by Professor Sarwar Kashmeri, the Foreign Policy Association aims to shed some light and serve as a catalyst for developing awareness, understanding and informed opinions on the key issues that face American policymakers as they seek to peer over the horizon to manage the U.S.-China relations.

In the fifth installment of the virtual roundtable, Stephen Roach—former Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and the firm’s chief economist, and senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute of Global Affairs—discusses the commercial and financial relations between the two biggest economies in the world.

When asked about the strategic significance of the shift in wealth from the West towards Asia—with China’s GDP overtaking that of the U.S. according to the IMF—Roach replied: “On a per capita basis there is still an enormous disparity, with China still qualifying as a high income developing economy.”

Roach counterbalanced this view, noting that: “Strategically, scale is important—China, because of its aggregate GDP, dominates many flows in finance, in trade, in the commodity markets, oil, natural gas, automobile demand. The strategic significance of China’s scale certainly cannot be minimized in Asia and in the broader global economy.”

On a slowdown of China’s economic growth, Roach explained: “There has already been a disruption: the manufacturing economy is clearly going more slowly in a weak global environment. The external demand for Chinese-made products has slowed dramatically, and the lagged impact of a stronger Chinese currency over the last ten years has taken a toll on Chinese competitiveness as has mounting wage costs of workers in export-intensive industries. That shock is already there.”

http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/S-Roach-WCOPY-081716.mp3

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Eager to relieve discontent at home and faced with entrenched issues of governability, stretched resources and security threats from regional Islamist insurgencies, President Mahamadou Issoufou’s government signed a controversial labour agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) late last year. The KSA has a dubious record of protecting the rights of migrant workers whilst Niger remains a source, transit, and destination country for men, women and children trafficked into various forms of modern day slavery, including commercial sexual exploitation, forced begging, domestic servitude and forced manual labour in sectors like agriculture or mining.

Much of Niger’s issues with slavery remain firmly domestic, including an estimated 43,000 people held in so-called descent-based slavery. Human rights groups say that this traditional practice is particularly entrenched in Niger’s Tuareg, Berber Arab and Fulani ethnic groups. However cases of forced labour or exploitation can be found across the country and are not just limited to traditional cultural practices or certain parts of Nigerien society. Such a lax domestic atmosphere around labour rights combined with weak government controls and serious issues of governability now help to foster a climate of impunity for people traffickers taking labour overseas.

Campaigners have long warned of Niger’s status as a regional source of slaves, such as the practice of ‘Wahaya’ where women or girls of slave descent are sold as so-called ‘fifth wives’ to men from local ethnic groups living in Niger and neighboring Nigeria. These fifth wives are seen by wealthy men as a status symbol, and are used for domestic and agricultural tasks and forced to have sex with their masters, who also keep any children they bear. Niger has also long been used as a transit point for sub-Saharan migrants being trafficked north to Europe or north-east to the Middle East.

However the addressing the domestic problem of slavery in Niger is being complicated by the worrying rise of new forms of exploitation and forced labour driven by demand overseas. Last autumn Niger’s Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security signed an agreement with the Saudi Manpower Solutions Company (SMASCO) after talks in Niger’s capital of Niamey. The agreement covered the recruitment of workers from Niger for jobs in Saudi Arabia, including roles for housekeepers, truck drivers, gardeners, nurses and cattlemen.

This is an issue because of the frequent reports which for years have raised concerns about the mistreatment of migrant workers in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Following negative publicity a number of countries have banned their nationals from working in the Kingdom. The Saudi record has raised alarm among migrant rights groups that Niger is simply repeating the experience of nearby Mauritania, whose government signed an agreement with the KSA to provide labour, only to be forced by adverse publicity into banning its nationals from working there after reports began to emerge of hundreds of Mauritanian nationals being mistreated or imprisoned by their employers.

While the conditions of Niger’s agreement with the KSA specified that its migrant workers are to be allowed free movement within Saudi Arabia, to keep their identity cards, and to give the female workers secure dormitories to live in, a warning by the Saudi Labour Ministry in June raises questions of how tightly the Kingdom supervises migrant workers’ employers in practice.

Dr. Mohammed Al-Falih, assistant undersecretary for inspection, warned Saudi citizens against the illegal recruitment of workers through social media, and using it for the provision of labour services or leasing of employment services to third parties. Recruitment of workers is theoretically only supposed to be done after obtaining a license from the Saudi Ministry of Labour and Social Employment. Meanwhile Saudi citizens interested in recruiting a domestic worker are only supposed to use the Ministry’s list of approved companies.

But in practice Saudi employers frequently bypass such official regulations and procedures while the idea that recruitment fees to workers are an investment to be recouped somehow has a strong cultural hold in Saudi minds. Rights groups have documented evidence of Facebook pages and groups being used for cross-border recruitment, of foreign workers transferred between employers in different Gulf countries to evade bans in their home countries on working in the KSA, and of some employers illegally renting out their workers during periods of high demand such as Ramadan.

Social media has become a particularly prominent marketplace for domestic workers over the past four years, and it has been recorded that some Instagram accounts ‘sell’ maids to other employers by arranging to transfer the workers’ visas to the online ‘buyer’. Nor is this the only dubious use of social media recorded in the GCC. In one Kuwaiti example from 2014 an Instagram account was used to post photographs of absconded maids and listed a telephone number for Kuwaiti citizens to share the maids’ pictures with one another over WhatsApp.

The account also listed instructions on how to trap the women in the country through reporting the case to the police rather than the maids’ recruitment agency. According to Kuwait’s employment laws absconding workers caught by the authorities can be forcibly returned to their sponsors or deported.

Recent reports from Mauritanian nationals to both civil society groups and their government’s law enforcement authorities highlighted the vulnerability of other West African nationals to exploitation and abuse in the KSA and indeed the wider GCC area. Yet Niger is even less governable and developed then Mauritania, ranking 188th on the UN Human Development Index, compared with Mauritania’s ranking of 156.

With many embassies reluctant to interfere in employer-employee relations abroad, and the Nigerien government’s record on the issue of slavery at home extremely mixed, Nigerien workers recruited for work in Saudi Arabia are at an especially high risk of abandonment should their employment situation turn against them.

While international attention has so far focused on maintaining Niger’s shaky democratic transition and helping President Mahamadou Issoufou’s regime contain the threat of regional Islamist insurgencies, agencies and donor governments should also investigate the situation of Niger’s workers once they start to return home at the end of their visas. Pressure should also be put on the KSA authorities to police Saudi employers more tightly. The protection of Nigeriens abroad could do a lot to improve the way the country treats its workers at home.

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Clay figures in Uzbekistan

Although it hasn’t been definitively established, late nineteenth and early twentieth century British politician and statesman Joseph Chamberlain has recently been credited with coining the phrase, “may you live in interesting times.” It has long been known as the “Chinese curse” despite the fact that no such Chinese saying is known to exist. However, whether meant as a curse or a simple observation, for three former Soviet republics situated just to the west of the Middle Kingdom, the phrase has become quite appropriate over the past few weeks.

The country with perhaps the most tenuous hold on stability is Uzbekistan. After a Francisco Franco-esque deathwatch, Uzbekistan’s president Islam Karimov is dead. Although apparently rumored to have shuffled off his mortal coil for several years, Karimov fell into a coma and expired in the evening of September 2 after having been admitted to hospital in an unconscious state almost a week earlier.

As Karimov had no plan for succession in place, Uzbekistan’s quest for future leadership is shaping up to quite Shakespearean in tone. Appointed as the top communist in the then Soviet republic in 1989, Karimov became president of the newly-independent state upon the USSR’s demise in 1991. From then on he kept hold of power via rigging elections and eradicating dissent, which reportedly included boiling dissidents alive. All the while several clans from the country’s seven regions have been attempting to maneuver their way into power. Now that Karimov is no longer in the picture, the struggle is almost certain to kick into high gear.

The three main contenders in Uzbekistan’s Game of Thrones are Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev, National Security Service (SNB) head Rustam Inoyatov, and Deputy PM Rustam Azimov. Inoyatov is the muscle that has helped keep Karimov in power to this point, as his SNB has made liberal use of illegal incarceration, torture, rape, and burning of real property. However, Inoyatov is notoriously reclusive—exactly one confirmed photograph of him in the past decade is known to exist. Mirziyoyev is the longest tenured of the trio, having been in office for thirteen years. His reputation for harshness is well known, but is considered to have more brawn than brains. Azimov is considered to be the less hard-line choice, however there are rumors to the effect that he has been arrested and is therefore out of the picture entirely.

The succession crisis is being played out before the backdrop of a mass exodus of its citizenry. Thanks to Karimov’s decades of brutal religious repression, a particularly virulent brand of Islamic extremism has festered up to the surface. According to reports, hundreds of Uzbeks are believed to be fighting for ISIS in Syria, and an Uzbek citizen is one of several suspects in the attack on an Istanbul airport earlier this summer.

To the east, Kyrgyzstan has found itself at the center of an international incident. A suicide bomber drove a minivan into the Chinese embassy Kyrgyzstan’s capital Bishkek last Tuesday, killing himself and wounding three Kyrgyz nationals on staff at the embassy. Although no group has yet come forward and claimed responsibility for the incident at the time of this writing, state security services are preliminarily fingering Uighur separatists from the adjacent Chinese province of Xinjiang.

The Uighur minority in China has had a longstanding dispute with Beijing over its heavy-handed treatment of their number in Xinjiang. Although one can trace the initial dispute as far back as 60 BCE, the most immediate cause of unrest in the region dates back to 1955, when Xinjiang became an autonomous region of China. Uighurs (and the other ethnic minorities in the region) have long bristled under the rule of Han Chinese, whom they view as interlopers, and Beijing has responded by resoundingly harsh crackdowns of dissent. The conflict intensified after Mao had a falling-out with Khrushchev in 1962, and the Soviets began backing Uighur uprisings.

Kyrgyzstan has a small Uighur population (around 1.1%), but the country has encountered problems with Uighur militants crossing illegally from Xinjiang. The issue came to a head two years ago, when eleven Uighurs alleged to be members of a militant group were killed by border guards.

The bigger problem faced by the country may be that of radical Islam. Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamic extremist group with ties to al-Qaeda, is believed to be active in the country despite it being banned a decade ago. And, along with Uzbekistan, a suspect in the late attack at the Istanbul airport is a Kyrgyzstan native, one of possibly hundreds who have joined the fight alongside ISIS in Syria.

Kyrgyzstan’s big brother to the north is probably the most stable of the three Central Asian countries figuring in the news recently. In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s government is certainly facing its challenges: earlier this year his government cracked down on widespread demonstrations against plans to privatize large tracts of farmland, and, a scant few weeks later, Islamic militants executed a terrorist attack in a city in the northwest.

Though many experts expect Kazakhstan as the next domino to fall into the chaotic abyss into which Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are teetering, it seems that the worst could be over for Kazakhstan. Astana hosted delegates from over four-dozen countries in a conference aimed at ending nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan seems a strange place for such a conference, until one realizes that its Semipalatinsk region was the Soviet Union’s version of a nuclear weapons firing range.

Between 1949 and 1989, the region was the site of over four hundred separate nuclear weapons tests. An area the size of Germany is contaminated by nuclear fallout, and over 200,000 people living in the region suffered varying degrees of harm to their health. In addition, as one of only four countries to give up its nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan has a degree of credibility on the issue that few other countries have.

Looking ahead there is more reason to expect Kazakhstan to maintain its relative stability. Astana will host next year the Expo 2017, which will turn around “Future Energy” and is expected to attract over five million visits from some 100 countries.

Though Kazakhstan is unlikely to be mistaken for a bastion of freedom any time soon, it is safe to say that, at least at the current juncture, it is charting its own course on the often-roiling waters of Central Asia. And, at least for now, reports of the region’s complete foundering are greatly exaggerated.

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The Chinese government’s paranoia is showing again.

On August 30, China’s State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) issued an official notice ordering all Chinese entertainment news outlets to cease programming that “promotes Western lifestyles” or pokes fun at traditional Chinese values. All programming must promote “positive energy,” according to the notice, and must comply with Chinese Communist Party ideology. Violators may be punished by having their programs suspended or their production licenses revoked (China Digital Times, Global Times, Shanghaiist, South China Morning Post, Xinhua).

This notice from SAPPRFT is only the latest in a series of anti-Western ideological measures by China’s current leadership under president Xi Jinping. Rules announced in June tightened restrictions on “foreign-inspired” TV shows, insisting that programming must promote “socialist core values, as well as patriotism and Chinese traditions.” In 2015, universities were ordered to clamp down on textbooks and other teaching materials that “promote Western values.” Chinese women have even been warned against dating foreign men because they might be spies. Noted as “China’s most authoritarian leader since Mao,” Xi Jinping has also taken China in a decidedly xenophobic direction.

While they engage in such silliness, China’s censors might wish to consider how it would look if the United States or some other Western government were to issue such a warning against the promotion of “foreign lifestyles” on TV. How would it look, for example, if the U.S. government warned against depictions of Chinese martial arts on American TV? How would it look if the British government warned against showing Bollywood films? How would it look if programming in any Western nation were banned for poking fun at itself or its traditions?

It would look ridiculous and weak, of course. No Western government would engage in such silliness, however, because Western governments are mature, legitimate world powers, not tinpot dictatorships in fear of their own extinction.

Nonetheless, China expects to be accorded “great power” status equal to the United States. A government that denounced a video game as a form of American “cultural aggression,” banned TV depictions of time travel, and censored comparisons of former president Jiang Zemin with a toad from Chinese social media wishes to be regarded as a “great power.”

China’s censorship rules have reached a “new level of absurdity,” writes China policy analyst J. Michael Cole. “The [Chinese Communist Party’s] gradual descent into regulatory madness suggests that it is losing its grip on reality and on the people whom it seeks to control.”

Wishing to appear strong and confident, China’s rulers only reveal their own weakness and fear through such absurd ideological campaigns.

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History never repeats; but it rhymes, and it often echoes. Robert Kaplan’s 1990 book Soldiers of God chronicled his experience reporting on the mujahidin (multiple spellings exist; I’ll be using Kaplan’s preferred spelling). These native Afghan militias resisted the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and ultimately repelled it. Kaplan’s book was republished following September 11, 2001 with the subtitle “With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan”. Kaplan’s examination of their brand of Islam, how it motivated their actions and their end goals, remains topical in the current climate of terrorism motivated by a violent brand of Islam. What can Kaplan’s study of the mujahidin teach us about ISIS?

The 9/11 attacks threw a spotlight on Afghanistan and the ruling Taliban regime that provided safe haven to Osama bin Laden. Before 9/11, the Taliban and Afghanistan itself received scant attention; it took terror attacks on the American homeland to bring them fully into America’s strategic sights. Similarly, Kaplan argues, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the carnage it caused was a “forgotten” war. Soviet failures there represented, in Kaplan’s view, “’premonitions” that the Cold War was in its final phase. The mujahidin, therefore—in a manner only clear in retrospect—were a bridge between America’s Cold War-era national security framework and the beginning of the age of global terrorism.

After the Soviet retreat and eventual collapse, however, America forgot Afghanistan again, to its own great loss. Kaplan’s description of the mujahidin includes elements ascribed to ISIS currently—namely an adherence to fundamentalist Islam and an adjacent willingness to fight and die on its behalf. From that point of commonality stem many differences in mujahidin ideology, tactics, and goals that make a comparison with ISIS worthwhile and instructive.

Kaplan observed mujahidin who were motivated by a fundamentalist Islam characteristic of ISIS. Where ISIS cultivates a communal religious fervor, the mujahidin were more individualistic. In Iran and much of the Arab world, Kaplan noted, prayer is often a mass activity with the “reciting of the worlds, syllable by heated syllable, begetting a collective hysteria reminiscent of the Nuremburg rallies. The cries of Allahu akbar carried a shrill, medieval, bloodcurdling ring.” These political overtones to prayer did not exist among the mujahidin to the same degree. They were defending their homeland from invaders; they were not at war against a entire foreign culture. “Afghanistan had never been industrialized, let alone colonized or penetrated much by outsiders,” Kaplan writes, and as a result “…the Afghans had never been seduced by the West and so had no reason to violently reject it.” Prayer itself was a solitary activity, not a group one.

Kaplan describes the mujahidin responding to Soviet campaigns that were wars of attrition; centered on skirmishes rather than traditional battles, and involving civilians fully. Soviet forces targeted civilians. Kaplan describes the protracted Soviet “carpet bombing” of Kandahar, and writes that Soviet mines killed approximately thirty Afghans per day throughout the conflict. Afghan forces strategized in kind. While previous conflicts from World War II to Vietnam had involved high civilian casualties, ISIS’ ability to capture large swaths of urban territory against state forces is an inversion of the mujahidin’s defensive successes against the Soviets. There are no battlefields in ISIS campaigns, and the Afghan people’s full participation in fighting the Soviets—as mujahidin fighters or as victims—foreshadowed the ISIS campaigns of the past several years.

Kaplan’s picture of the mujahidin differs from the portrait painted by the recent long-form New York Times story (“Fractured Lands”) of the long-term unemployment and political disaffection among Arab youth that provided fertile conditions for ISIS to thrive. Where ISIS both recruited in urban territory and took that territory militarily, Kaplan describes the mujahidin as “in many respects a bunch of ornery backwoodsmen, whose religious and tribal creed seemed to flow naturally from the austere living conditions of the high desert—unlike the more abstract and ideological brand of Islam of the Taliban”. Unlike ISIS, the mujahidin did aspire to create a new form of government; they were defending a way of life. Their aim was to obstruct a superpower from conquering their country long enough that it gave up trying to do so. Unlike the mujahidin, ISIS not only has to hold territory in the long term, it has to govern.

One of the benefits of looking back to history for historic parallels to current events is seeing the role that factors such as cultural distinctions, geography and demography play in world events. Islam is not a monolith. The groups that would manipulate it for violent ends are not either. Developing a security strategy against terrorism often invites an inappropriate “one-size-fits-all” mentality.

The terms “militant Islam” and “radical Islam” have been rightly criticized for unfairly staining the name of a peaceful religion with the actions of its violent fringe. Both terms could be applied to ISIS and the mujahidin—very different groups that were (in ISIS’ case, that are) not monoliths in themselves. Kaplan produced a qualitative study of the mujahidin that parallels the value of “Fractured Lands” in the depth of its detail. As an antidote to broad-brush, one-size-fits-all thinking, such studies are invaluable.

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Photo: PEAS

Nestled in the beautiful Ugandan hills two-hours west of the capital Kampala, sits Pioneer High School. The rural secondary school, set over 10km away from the next senior school, has a thriving student base of 472 student—54% of which are female. Headteacher Francis Kyanja sits on the steps of the staff dormitory at the highest point of the school grounds, looking back over the classrooms blocks to the rolling hills in the distance and, in the foreground, students reading and playing on the grass following a day of study. The school day here is long: lesson prep often begins at 7.30am and by the time the final bell is called at 4.30pm, teachers and students alike are ready for a hearty meal and some well-earned relaxation time.

Headteacher Francis has not only ushered a regionally cutting-edge and rigorous educational program, including history, science, arts, mathematics and religion, he was able to arrange an off-grid solar electricity system installed within the school grounds, providing electricity to the community for the first time.

In Uganda, as everywhere, it is inarguable the importance of education and the need to advance societies.

To that fact, there are bold global goals for universal education access, namely the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals. Too often, however, education ends at primary school and millions of students are unable to continue their studies due to financial, gender or regional limitations. To help bridge that gap, UK social enterprise PEAS (Promoting Equality in African Schools) has built and manages sustainable secondary schools to allow African children receive further education that otherwise wouldn’t. The organization attempts to ensure that all of their schools are financially self-sufficient enabling them to run, independent of international aid, for the long-term.

Headteacher Francis has situated himself at an elevated position in order to gain mobile phone signal, intermittent at best in this region. He has agreed to speak with me via Skype, the first time he has ever used the platform, to discuss the impact a power supply brings to student learning.

Pioneer High School is situated in a coffee growing community, not directly in a village, and is about 50 km outside of Kampala and about 7 km away from the main road. Its purpose is to hone their students’ skills and knowledge, along with providing boarding for students. The rural area does not lend easy connection to the national grid, thus there has been no access to electricity to date. In fact the closest power line is near the main road. Francis is unaware of any future plans for extension of the transmission and distribution network, thus localized generation has smartly been turned to through a small-scale solar system. Centralized generation with high-voltage, long distance transmission lines have a place, but for small rural communities, off-grid systems are the most effective option to gain access to electricity.

Electricity is, in many ways, an additional lifeblood of an advancing community. Without electricity there are no lights, refrigeration for vaccines, charging for phones, or using computers, among the myriad of other uses in today’s world. Electricity provides a conduit to open doors instead of being trapped in the cycle of poverty. Francis noted that with the electricity, there is now the ability to connect with the outside world, as our Skype call was testament to, and to relay events domestically and globally.

As well as speaking with the Headteacher, I had the opportunity to spend time talking to two ambitious, friendly and gracious students who were excited to share their new experience. Naudrine, a confident 17 year old boarding student, wants to become either a doctor or an engineer, and her favorite subject is chemistry. She explained, as I noticed her visible happiness displayed by her facial features, how having the access to electricity and lighting provides her time to complete her studies in the evening and to prepare for class the next day. She also stated that the electricity in the school along with the fenced areas surrounding the school provide an extra sense of security.

Peter, a smiley faced 16 year old, told me his favorite subject is mathematics and desires to become a businessman. He too echoed the opening the electricity provides for night time studying, thus being able to advance his studies. He continued that the solar electric system was a living science experiment to learn from.

Both Naudrine and Peter, who have faced various challenged in their youth, were unequivocal that education and electricity have transformed their daily lives.

The system power house is about 10 meters from the school and near the solar arrays, which houses the batteries, electric box, invertors, and other technical system materials, with the conduit running to the school. The system has been designed to be expanded in the future and to reach the local area to provide new development opportunities, which students—including some members’ children—currently benefit from. The electricity would be sold to provide income to further sustain the school or offset school fees.

Currently, though, a very important additional benefit of the current electricity system is the ability to have better security, which is extremely comforting to the students who attend only day classes. There is 24 hour security for the compound and there are plans to continue the security efforts to build lights down the path from the school.

The system installed consists of advanced technology, thus onsite maintenance was necessary to be learned before the installers departed. New Age Solar Technologies (NAST), located in Kampala, designed, installed and does assist with the system when problems arise. However, NAST educated students on maintenance procedures so they now assist in keeping the system functioning to avoid any system disruptions.

Away for the school, the region is poor and households are reliant on firewood for cooking, heating and light, without access to electricity or cookstoves. Unlike other regions, charcoal is not frequently used as well.

Gathering the firewood, almost exclusively by women—young and old, takes away from time that could be used more productively. Much of the economy is agrarian based— specializing in coffee—and the flow of money is sparse and access to markets in not readily available. Moving beyond firewood collection, more time in the day could provide, for example, the ability to start a small business and bring coffee to market. Increased income can help pay school fees and sustain attaining solar lanterns and keeping them charged, enabling openings of other aspects of socio-economic growth.

As we come to the end of our discussion, Headteacher Francis talks a little about his own experience. He has worked with PEAS for 5 years and his passion for the project is clear. He has acquired various additional skills such as: leadership and administrative skills and feels touched to work with the organization that has such a great mission and vision. He says solar has given them a great opportunity to improve the community’s outlook.

Francis stated the area is thankful for PEAS providing the opportunity, for the students and himself, to have the chance to deliver secondary education and for the school to have an off-grid solar system to provide electricity to bring the associated benefits. He knows the combination will enable great benefits to the region.

After the inspiring chat, I was left with the impression that Francis, Naudrine and Peter will be able to attain their goals thanks to their ability to attend Pioneer School and having new access to electricity.

The post Pioneer School Providing An Amazing Opportunity appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff talks with  President Michel Temer at the Planalto presidential palace in Brasilia, March 2, 2016.

In Canada, a country considered one of the least corrupt in the world, there are several scandals taking place involving government funds going to special interest groups. The offense felt by the general public over a pay-for-play system is very apparent. A system where those with influence and money have excessive power in choosing government policies that benefits them or their organization runs against basic democratic values.

It is unacceptable that the wealthy should have special access to political leaders, when average people end up with the bill and years of burdens from bad policies. In many countries there are similar issues, and the public sentiment likely mirrors that of those in my own community. One of the worst cases of this type of corruption is currently taking place in Brazil, and their President will likely be impeached because of it.

There is not a clear legal case for the impeachment of elected Workers Party (PT) leader and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, as the main charge over breaking budget rules is a meek accusation. The Senate hearing is using the budget rules issue as a catalyst for her impeachment, placing the responsibility of an entire corruption scandal involving mostly her PT party as well as other professional political agents on her Presidency.

With mass protests taking place against her government for the last two years and low approval numbers, the Senate seems to be making a political decision on her personally by way of scandals in her PT party. It has been predicted that her ouster as President will be successful, and the rest of her mandate will be taken up by the leader of an opposition party, Mr Temer.

President Rousseff has been fighting for her political career, claiming that this move by the other branches of government is tantamount to a coup. While the separation of powers in democracies does allow for other branches of government to check the power of the executive branch, a clear legal case might not be present in judging Rousseff’s actions personally. While there is no doubt her party is deeply involved in an atrocious corruption scandal, removing the President by means of a weak legal case may cause more political divisions than are required in this type of political scenario.

Rousseff should be aware that while the case against her is as much partisan politics as it is an unclear constitutional process, the extreme corruption that took place under the Petrobras scandal and damage to average Brazilian citizens has delegitimized her PT party greatly. Protests for Dilma and against her may take place several times before the end of the 2018 presidential term of office, but keeping her in office would be an awkward move considering many in her PT party may be removed promptly due to scandals.

Michel Temer, the current President was not elected himself, and the question of his party’s legitimacy without an election will give rise to more divisiveness in Brazil when a strong and legitimate government is needed to clean up politics and the economy.

An election is needed to confirm the right to lead in Brazil. While Temer may take advantage of his two years in power to put in austerity measures, whether they are needed or not, legitimacy in taking such actions should be confirmed by the people of Brazil. While the PT may opt for an election as opposed to impeachment, the reality is that many of the political leaders under scandal will not be returned to government.

As those of us outside of Brazil would want our pay-for-play political leaders removed from positions of power, Brazilians should be able to not only have those political leaders removed once a crime is discovered, but be able to replace them with legitimate alternatives chosen via a direct democratic method.

The post Impeachment Should be Legitimized by an Election in Brazil appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Nancy Ohanian / Tribune Media Services)

As the peak of El Niño wanes, it seems to signal the arrival of La Niña, and the impacts are having an extremely serious effect. Average global temperatures for July hit the 15th consecutive record-breaking surge: 0.87 ℃ higher than the average for the 20th century. This trend in global warming has heightened the probability of catastrophic natural disasters, challenging the risk management capability of governments.

In the Southern Hemisphere, one of the worst regional droughts in 35 years swept over southern Africa, leaving 23 million people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, according to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The international community, in response, pledged $2 billion worth of contributions to El Niño-affected countries. Yet, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that $4 billion more is needed to make up for the total damage.

Meanwhile, the flood-inducing El Niño in North America bombarded Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with 6.9 trillion gallons of rain in just one week, causing 13 deaths and $20.7 billion worth of damage to more than 110,000 homes. Battling with the worst natural disaster since the superstorm Sandy, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) urged affected residents to register for federal disaster relief funds for which more than 95,000 residents had applied as of 19th of August.

Nevertheless, FEMA’s limited resources, epitomized by the maximum grant of $33,000 per household, barely provide a safety net for the applicants. What is making the picture gloomier is the fact that only 42% of the FEMA-designated high-risk flood areas in Louisiana are insured through the National Flood Insurance Program; the number drops down to 12.5% in the neighboring vicinities.

Governments in the regions exposed to natural hazards are on the verge of failing to cope with the recent natural disasters’ enduring impacts on human life. The burdens, however, could be significantly lessened by action from the private insurance companies, namely their active engagement in the climate and natural disaster insurance industry in terms of workable Public-Private Partnership (PPP)-based arrangements.

The benefits of successful PPP in climate and natural disaster insurance are, in theory, synergetic. It ensures that governments at all levels can be certain of formal risk-transfer mechanisms upon the occurrence of contingent events, allowing for effective management of governmental budgets. In the insurance market, private insurance companies’ locally tailored products not only efficiently provide financial liquidity to insured individuals during the ex-post recovery process but also pre-emptively reduce the risks by altering these individuals’ ex-ante behaviors.

With well-functioning market mechanisms, the price (the rate) is gradually set and stabilized in a more transparent way, which incentivizes governments to set up more fairly priced policies. Partnering private insurance companies also benefit from taking advantages of the scale of PPP; it allows them to reduce operational and premium costs and to competitively enhance their capacity to deal with high volumes of client profiles and large-scale data analysis. In the end, insured individuals best-minimize their exposure to risks.  

Despite the assumed benefits, the engagement of private insurance companies with the climate and natural disaster insurance industry has, overall, been unenthusiastic. Whereas the average global weather-related losses rose by ten times from 1974 to1983 ($10 billion per year) compared with 2004 to 2013 ($131 billion per year), the average percentage for the losses that are insured dropped almost half over the last four decades. Attributing the decline to the increasing chance of being exposed to catastrophic natural disasters under intensifying climate change and urbanization, pundits propose that PPPs in climate and natural disaster insurance should be either reformed (in the case of existing PPPs) or updated to reflect the changes.

In the U.S., the debate over FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) reform is becoming heated prior to next year’s reauthorization of the program. In the aftermath of post-Sandy, controversies over fraudulent claims as well as partnering private insurance companies’ moral hazards of exploiting marginal profits, both policymakers and pundits are looking for solutions to reduce the program’s $23 billion deficit and to improve its efficiency.

Some of the suggested reforms are highlighted here: the introduction of risk-based rates, the provision of assistance to socio-economically vulnerable residents in high-risk areas, including the provision of the right to be informed about records held on property, the strengthening of the program’s accountability in monitoring, evaluating, and enforcing the program’s provisions, the modernization of the PPP’s outmoded bureaucratic technology, and, lastly, the sharing (diverting) of the risk through the private insurance market (including reinsurance).

All these options, however, require the market to function effectively. For instance, calibration of current government premium rates in high-risk areas to risk-adequate ones should be well-designed to offer private insurance companies incentives to attenuate their market exit, while encouraging the residents living in high-risk areas to move to safe areas. Also, the ability of the reinsurance market to assume the NFIP’s risks through the purchasing of the primary policy provider’s coverage plans should be carefully assessed.

The successful market-based modernization of some of the world’s mature disaster management PPPs such as the NFIP should bring a positive message about the role of the international insurance market; for example, in helping developing countries to minimize their climate-related risks through the use of innovative financial products like catastrophe bonds.

Although the climate and natural disaster insurance industry is still in the inchoate phase of its development in many developing countries, several pilot programs (involving trials of innovative insurance products) are being administered in areas that are susceptible to natural disasters. Microfinance is one of the products that has been designed to protect people on low incomes in exchange for a premium that is tailored specifically to their needs. Weather index insurance is another that pays out benefits based on a predetermined event index, rather than on loss itself.

The post Time for Public-Private Partnership Innovations in Natural Disaster Insurance? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In this virtual roundtable of six podcasts hosted by Professor Sarwar Kashmeri, the Foreign Policy Association aims to shed some light and serve as a catalyst for developing awareness, understanding and informed opinions on the key issues that face American policymakers as they seek to peer over the horizon to manage the U.S.-China relations.

In the fourth installment of the virtual roundtable, Professor Toshi Yoshihara, John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and professor at the U.S. Naval War College, discusses the U.S.-China relations in the light of the ruling against China’s claims in the South China Sea by the permanent court of arbitration in The Hague.

Asked about the significance of the ruling, Prof. Yoshihara responded “I think the tribunal’s ruling is a big deal because it sets the record straight in terms of the international law’s view of China’s claims which is that […] their historical rights in the South China Sea were superseded by the laws of the sea treaty.”

He went on to elaborate: “On the one hand, this represented a major diplomatic and legal setback for China. On the other hand, China is standing firm and has articulated that it will not back down from its claims, that it does not recognize the jurisdictional authority of the tribunal and that it will do nothing to enforce the court’s ruling.”

http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/T-Yoshihara-WCOPY-081716.mp3

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The Good Old Days of Michel Platini (1986 World Cup in Mexico)

Astronomical amounts of money are being spent on soccer (football) transfers. These days, no one is shocked at news of multi-million dollar signings.

When he was the president of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), Michel Platini stood by his view that the record €94 million which Real Madrid paid to sign Cristiano Ronaldo was “a serious challenge to the idea of fair play.” “Players are not free and they don’t even belong to clubs… they belong to financial holdings, companies, or people,” describing transfer amounts in a media conference a “form of robbery.”

Current transfer fees definitely dwarf those of older generations. In 1938, when Bryn Jones left Wolverhampton Wanderers for £14,000 (about £7 million in today’s money), politicians were outraged by the money spent and the subject was debated in the House of Commons.

Sports like soccer can be seen as miniature economies.Europe is considered the largest transfer market in the world: it has the most successful, well-known clubs and the best players are attracted to its national leagues. Its transfer environment is subject to different layers of rules and regulations established by sports governing bodies. Yet, ever since oil money arrived in the soccer world, the game has gone money mad. Following Paul Pogba’s reported world record transfer from Juventus to Manchester United for US$115.90 million on August 2nd, it is worthwhile to get a feel for soccer inflation with relation to the evolution of world record transfers since 1893.

Speaking of soccer inflation, have you ever wondered how much, for instance, David Beckham’s 2003 move to Real Madrid would cost in modern-day cash? When the transfer was unveiled, the global superstar described the €35.9 million move as a “dream.” In today’s money, adjusted for inflation, it is more than €43 million. Take another example: Cristiano Ronaldo’s €94 million move in 2009 would be of an adjusted fee of €102.4 million. The Bleacher Report has compiled a list of the top hundred most expensive transfers in history with inflation in mind.

I wonder how much a legend like Diego Maradona would cost in modern day soccer. Maradona was bought by Napoli from Barcelona for US$6.5 million in 1984, which is the equivalent of the Italian side paying him almost US$19.5 million today. Comparing Maradona’s adjusted fees with those of the other super-stars of today proves that soccer inflation is running wild.  And taking into account the inflationary trend of transfer fees, we will not be surprised to see signings approaching US$250 million, or even more, in the coming decades.

It is also interesting to look more closely at how this transfer expenditure is spread throughout the big five league clubs which shows that a process of concentration of investments is taking place. While clubs that invested the most in transfer fees are logically among the wealthiest (Real Madrid, Barcelona, Manchester United, Manchester City, Chelsea, and Paris St-Germain), teams having benefited from the ten most expensive football transfers in history of soccer also belong to the small circle of financially dominant teams.

This reinforces the increasing correlation between financial resources available and results, meaning that European soccer suffers from an important economic polarization: a limited number of clubs (those with the largest incomes and/or supported by economically powerful investors) makes the most important part of transfer expenditures.

Unlike the traditional way of thinking, the soccer industry is not simply a market of pure and perfect competition. In essence, Europe is slowly embracing a system of closed leagues (at the elite level) which is also reflected in the results of UEFA competitions year after year. We should consequently consider amendments to the regulatory framework governing transfers to achieve the policy objectives of a fair play, notably with regard to contract stability, which shall have a positive effect to fight against soccer inflation.

Analyzing the workings of competition within well-defined rules (just as we see in our economy) would also make it easier to effectively combat speculation and third-parties’ involvement in soccer in so far as the sums of all transfer payments must be spread over the entire chain of clubs having contributed to the sporting development of players.

The bottom line is: rather than merely looking at soccer transfers as monetary figures, UEFA and the national governing bodies should start studying any possible factors behind the existence of monopolistic structures in the soccer industry, both at the local and continental levels.

The post Soccer Inflation and the Transfer Market appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Associated Press)

When the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague announced the result of the arbitration on the South China Sea dispute case, the Chinese government and the public reacted strongly. The People’s Daily proclaimed: “Sovereign territory can in no way be less, even by a little bit,” while nationalism filled the Chinese microblogging platform Weibo.

The Global Times condemned it in writings, with articles suggesting China to consider leaving the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a fightback to its injustice, citing that if the U.S. could do so, why not China? Yet, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated firmly at the press conference on July 12 that China would uphold the Convention. In fact, there will be more harm than good if China indiscreetly denounces UNCLOS.

Before discussing if China should leave the UNCLOS due to the dispute in the South China Sea, we need to recall how the Convention was created and its nature. The concepts that are well-known today like ‘territorial waters’ and ‘exclusive economic zone’, which are related to national maritime sovereignty and interest, were not formed in the 17th or 18th century. The understanding towards maritime rights was not unified among the coastal countries in Europe at the time. For instance, the Dutch International Law expert Hugo Grotius once advocated to define the limit of waters which a country could exercise sovereignty by the limit of coastal defense artillery range. Today, such a definition seems inconceivable. As for the Eastern World, the International Law is such a modern concept to this region that even until this day, there is limited understanding of it. Without the convention, pure law of the jungle would return.

After World War II, each maritime country declared their territorial waters ranging from 12 miles to 200 miles, yet the operation was very confusing. In order to reach a consensus and to avoid unnecessary conflicts, the negotiation lasted for more than 30 years involving 168 countries. Eventually, delimitation of ‘territorial waters’, ‘exclusive economic zones’ and ‘international waters’, regulations on resources rights within the boundary, dispute resolving mechanism and so on were drawn. This is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is hence called by many legal experts as the ‘Constitution for the Oceans’.

Of course, just like other international treaties, there had been compromises and fierce debates during the process of negotiations of the convention. The final product is not perfect, and each country is still questioning the convention due to possible interest conflicts. The U.S., one of the earliest advocate of this convention, has yet to obtain an approval from her congress to join the convention. Many congressmen were concerned that it may harm U.S. maritime interests because the convention classifies resources in the international waters as ‘common heritage of mankind’. There are also concerns that this would be exploited by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. The attitude of the U.S. has been widely criticized by the international community, especially when she remained stubborn after the Cold War. This might be one of the reasons why China finds this convention contemptible.

Yet, the consequence of U.S. not joining the UNCLOS (and leaving some international institutions) serves as a positive reference for China. For example, in the level of international law, the U.S. accusation against China in the South China Sea ‘default’ loses its power due to its identity, and the U.S. loses many opportunities to act in the name of international law. Once China took the initiative to leave the UNCLOS, it would completely lose the moral high ground and the pivoting point for Beijing to wrestle with Washington, making it harder for China to avoid the U.S. military presence in the region.

Even worse, the withdrawal would be compared to the withdrawal of the ‘Axis powers’ from the League of Nations, which eventually leads to World War II. This definitely brings no benefit to China. Asia-Pacific countries would strengthen the promotion of “China threat theory” because of this. Other regional powerful nation who are willing to respect international law would cooperate with ASEAN countries, forcing China to adopt a passive diplomacy strategy.

Another school of thought views the contemporary international law as rules imposed by the previous winners of international politics onto everyone else. As China becomes more powerful, it can selectively obey favorable treaties and ignore the unfavorable ones. Such attitude is the basic logic of ‘status quo challenger’, which is a label China has tried to avoid being tagged. The consequence of China’s quitting UNCLOS would be worse than the consequence of U.S.’ absence from the convention as it means a denial of the international order when the UNCLOS was signed.

The international community is indeed actively avoiding any notion that indicates a sense of hitting the “restart button”. Although some countries are not happy with some terms, the current mechanism provides a lot of rooms for reservations and exemptions without getting the whole body moved. China understands this very well and has made good use of this sentiment upon joining the convention by submitting a written statement to the United Nations a decade ago stating that it would refuse to accept arbitrations for any dispute and advocated a negotiated settlement.

More importantly, the same convention brings China many significant maritime rights and interests, as well as related institutional protection. For instance, the UNCLOS provides the right of common development of resources in international waters, which protects those countries that possess relatively backward ocean mining technology, such as China. According to the convention, International Seabed Authority, which is one of the United Nations branches, is in charge of the coordination of resources development outside the exclusive economic zones. In 1991, as a signatory state of the International Seabed Authority, China was allocated 150,000 square kilometers of areas of exploration. 75,000 square kilometers of the said area’s exclusive rights of exploration and commercial exploitation priority rights was granted to China. This area, which was carefully selected by China, is a ‘treasure’ full of metal mineral resources.

China’s related rights are also protected by the convention. In 2011, China signed a contract with the International Seabed Authority and gained exclusive rights of exploration in 10,000 square kilometers seabed in the Western Indian Ocean. This has triggered India’s dissatisfaction, but China used the rights protection mechanism of the UNCLOS as a reason to refute India ‘s position. With the progress of China’s technology in offshore exploration and deep-sea mining, the maritime rights and interests gained and protected because of her membership in the UNCLOS will be fully utilized in the future. If China denounces the convention, the loss in the future deep waters mining rights would be inestimable.

In fact, even in the face of the current situation in the South China Sea, China can still make a case as a signatory state of the UNCLOS. This is exactly Chinese government’s recent official position: although the Chinese government can question the legitimacy of the arbitration result, it would be driven by ‘the maintenance of the dignity of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ other than denying it. In return, this might help China regain the moral high ground of the international community so as to hedge the negative impact caused by the arbitration. In the early days, China condemned western concepts like ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’, yet in recent years she knows how to ‘respect’ those words but emptying their meanings and interpret them in her own way in order to speak louder in the international community. This strategy also applies to the attitude of how China sees international law.

If China is determined to play the game by training a large number of professionals like what Japan did a hundred years ago, who handled international law with absolute academic attitude (for example, Japan’s arguments in the defense of her sovereignty on ‘Senkaku Islands ‘ were tailored with reference to international law), China would soon discover loopholes in the current system and could make good use of them for her national interests.

This is how a rising power could play the game: fairly, lawfully, reasonable, and serves the country’s interests. Perhaps the sheer force admirer might look down on this, but today’s international community is no longer in the era of muscle-power diplomacy. The so-called ‘international law’ and ‘diplomacy’ should be used at the right time and in the right context, or else they might mean very different things. These terms are indeed ingenious in its ambiguity. The commentaries that suggest China to leave the UNCLOS are doing more harm than good.

That is why even the Tai Kung Pao, a leading pro-China newspaper in Hong Kong, has published a signed article to alert relevant proposals like this. The seriousness of such irresponsible comments is apparent.

The post The South China Sea Dispute: Should China denounce the UNCLOS? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On July 15th, the world saw the consequences of the long-lasting struggle between religious forces and the secular military contending for control of the Turkish state. In the aftermath of the failed coup, the government in Ankara reacted with a series of purges unseen in Turkey’s recent history. Initially limited to the military, the punitive measures have now reached all corners of Turkish society. So far, more than 18,000 people have been reported detained, with another 60,000 suspended from office. Judges, journalists, academics, and civil servants have been among the victims of what some describe as the “biggest witch-hunt in the history of the [Turkish] republic.”

But the upheaval has not only highlighted the fragility of Turkey’s democracy; it has also revealed how little liberal democratic countries can interfere. The declaration of the state of emergency and the escalating number of arrests and suspensions has been deplored by civil society groups across the world. Outraged academics have denounced the arrests and suspensions of their peers. Journalists have decried the fate their Turkish confreres are facing. Many expected a firm condemnation of the illiberal actions the Erdogan administration orchestrated in the aftermath of the failed coup by their governments.

Much to their disappointment, most political leaders have limited their initial comments to carefully worded, deliberately vague reminders on the importance of the rule of law and the right of due process for the culprits of the coup. The gap between the normative expectations of how much foreign governments should be opposing the Erdogan administration versus what external actors actually can achieve through diplomatic means leads to a situation where public opinion is more outspoken than their respective governments in criticizing the actions of another state.

Those outside Turkey who demand more proactive checks on Erdogan’s expanding power base tend to disregard the limits imposed upon political leaders by the single most important ordering principle of the international system: state sovereignty. State sovereignty continues to govern our world and explains why leaders in democratic countries have exercised cautious restraint when commenting on the recent events in Turkey. This oft-overlooked but fundamental principle has both internal and external dimensions, both of which constrain a larger international response.

Internally, sovereignty defines “the highest authority within the state”.[1] In Turkey, the constituted power and hence the national sovereignty lie with President Erdogan and the elected government, who enjoy the authority to enact punitive policies against the alleged plotters and to restore order within the boundaries of the Turkish state. Of course, sovereign power does not automatically legitimize any measure taken by a state. Under international law, violations of peremptory norms— including the prohibition of genocide, slavery and torture—transcend inculpability, making the allegations of torture in Turkey especially serious. However, even if these allegations turned out to be true, external actors could only challenge the means but not the ends of Erdogan’s retaliatory policy.

External sovereignty applies more broadly to Turkey’s rights as an independent state. It is defined as a form of recognition that guarantees a state’s existence in an anarchic international society. In simple terms, states act according to a principle of equality where “none is entitled to command; none is required to obey”.[2]

The UN Charter explicitly prohibits intervention “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (Art. 2.7 UN Charter) unless these matters pose a direct threat to international peace and stability. This provision mandates international actors to acknowledge the Turkish government to handle the situation at its own discretion.

Moreover, whether or not a state is pilloried for its domestic politics by the international community not only depends on the acts and violations it committed, but also on the role and position it holds in the international system. Turkey remains one of the foremost allies and strategic partners of the Western world. Be it in the fight against global terrorism, as a valuable NATO member, or as key to Europe’s migration and asylum policy, Turkey is a much need ally. Member of the Group of 20, Turkey also offers a huge consumer market for outside goods and services. These factors taken together are shielding the Turkish government from any hasty and overzealous moral condemnations of their domestic policy-making.

Lastly, any effective condemnation of the Turkish government would necessitate agreement amongst the remaining actors. History has shown that in matters of state sovereignty, the international community agrees to disagree. Already, Erdogan has reached out to Putin in an attempt to improve their bilateral relationship in case relations with the West should turn sour.

It is true that the classical definition of sovereignty with its absolute claim for sovereign equality has been increasingly challenged. In a globalized world where market economies co-exist within a complex net of interdependencies and where policies, capital, and people cross borders more easily than ever before in human history, sovereignty appears to be an anachronism from another age. Yet rather than bidding farewell to the concept as such, sovereignty should be understood as a subliminal force—always somewhere in the room, but usually covered underneath alternative ordering principles. It remains largely invisible to the eye as long as politics follow a steady path and the ship sails in calm waters. Yet, once a major crisis breaks out, sovereignty comes back in the limelight to define the rules of the game.

The storm in Turkey is taking place now. Many advocates had hoped that the successive accession rounds between Turkey and the EU would help bind the Turkish state within the European value system. However, neither long-lasting negotiations nor the fact that the EU being among Turkey’s most important trading partners has prevented the Erdogan administration from unilaterally suspending the European Convention on Human Rights and announcing the planned reintroduction of the death penalty. The principle of sovereignty, which Thomas Hobbes equated with “an artificial soul … giving life and motion to the whole body”,  provided the power to ignite nationalist feelings and undo concerted action in a blink of an eye.

If there is anything to take away from the post-coup purges in Turkey, it is the inability of the international community to effectively halt an alarming process that has not yet evolved into a full-blown tragedy. Therefore, any attempt to overcome the present crisis needs to recognize Turkey as an equal and sovereign partner and should refrain from stigmatizing President Erdogan as the villain of the Bosporus.

[1] Lake, David. 2003. “The New Sovereignty in International Relations”. International Studies Review 2003 (5): 305.

[2] Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theories of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 88.

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Anti-China protester at Taipei airport, Aug. 22 (Storm Media Group, Taipei)

A visit to Taiwan by a top Chinese Communist Party official from Shanghai was met with angry protest on August 22-23. Sha Hailin (沙海林), head of the party’s United Front Work Department in Shanghai, was greeted at the Taipei airport August 22 by pro-independence demonstrators shouting, “Sha Hailin, go back to China” and “Expel propaganda communist, defend Taiwan’s sovereignty.” Protesters followed Sha and Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) to a Shanghai-Taipei cross-strait cities forum on August 23.

Sha’s visit has come at a time of strained relations between Taiwan and the mainland since Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party won the presidency of Taiwan in January. Beijing broke off official contact with Taipei in June following Tsai’s refusal to acknowledge the “one-China principle” on which Beijing insists as the basis of cross-strait relations. Sha is the first high-level mainland official to visit Taiwan since official contact was broken off.

The United Front Work Department is a propaganda agency under the direct authority of the Communist Party Central Committee charged with asserting party “leadership” over non-party groups in China and abroad. The “shadowy agency” has been noted for its role in Beijing’s efforts at gaining control of Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a renegade province of China. Mainland attitudes stand in stark contrast to those of Taiwan’s 23 million residents, the vast majority of whom are opposed to “reunification” with mainland China and consider themselves to be of “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese” nationality.

Beijing has shown little interest in the opinions or wishes of Taiwan’s people, insisting that “reunification” with the mainland is the only option for Taiwan’s future. The role of the United Front Work Department in Beijing’s efforts consists of attempting to manipulate public opinion and forging alliances with influential groups with the aim of neutralizing pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan. Given Beijing’s economic clout and close economic ties with Taiwan, much of this effort is directed at the island’s business and political elite, who have shown far greater willingness to bow to Beijing’s demands than ordinary Taiwanese.

Sha Hailin (Shanghai Municipal Communist Party Committee)

In typical form as a mainland official, Sha Hailin insisted on the “one-China principle” as the basis for cross-strait relations in a speech at the August 23 forum as protesters demonstrated outside. “I believe most Taiwanese support peaceful unification and closer exchanges and cooperation between the two cities,” said Sha in willful ignorance of Taiwanese public opinion, “Some Taiwanese who opposed the forum either lacked understanding of the actual situation or did it on purpose.”

For his part, Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je said prior to the forum that the United Front Work Department has been unfortunately “vilified” in Taiwan, citing this as an example of “cultural estrangement” between the democratic island and the authoritarian mainland. Said Ko at the forum with Sha: “When we understand and respect Beijing’s insistence on some aspects, we hope Beijing can understand and respect Taiwan’s insistence on democracy and freedom.”

Protesters don’t seem to have been convinced by Ko’s and Sha’s wishful thinking on cross-strait relations, calling the Taipei mayor a “sell out” and his mainland guest a “communist bandit.” Most of Taipei’s city councilors boycotted the forum, citing Sha’s “obvious ‘united front’ intention” among other complaints. Mainland Chinese media ignored the protests, trumpeting Sha’s visit and the Shanghai-Taipei forum as a “boost” for cross-strait ties.

Faced with the seemingly impossible task of “winning hearts and minds” in Taiwan, mainland leaders continue to live in a world of make-believe.

The post Shanghai Communist Party Boss Met with Protest in Taipei appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Tuesday’s attack on Istanbul Ataturk airport will only exacerbate Turkey’s tourism and economic woes.

On Tuesday, June 28th Islamic State-linked militants assaulted Istanbul Ataturk international airport. The attack was a coordinated operation conducted by at least three foreign militants armed with assault rifles and explosive vests. The death toll has so far reached 44 dead and 239 others were wounded.

The attack came as a stern reminder of the elevated terrorist threat faced by Turkey. It also underscores the fact that the country is currently located at the cross-roads of ISIS international and regional terrorist strategies. The attacks at Istanbul airport will deal an additional blow against the Turkish economy. They will also raise further questions concerning the security of in-country and international large civilian infrastructure.

The wave of terrorist attacks that has been marring Turkey’s security environment since July 2015 has had a major impact on the national economy. The most direct hit has so far been felt by the national tourism sector.

Since the beginning of 2016, hotel occupancy rates have steadily been dropping every month in comparison to the same periods in the previous year. In March, the occupancy rates of hotels in Istanbul were down by approximately 30%. Two months later, these overall rates in Turkey reached 57%, marking a more than 40% drop.

These indicators are directly linked to a steady decline of foreign travellers reaching Turkey for touristic reasons. The two main groups of foreign tourists, Germans and Russians, experienced a 30% and 90% decrease respectively since the beginning of 2016. While the number of Russians coming to Turkey may increase following the lifting of Moscow’s travel ban, the volume of Russian tourists will likely remain substantially lower than usual during summer 2016.

It is probable that the bombing at Istanbul international airport will further increase foreigners’ concerns over the overall security environment in the country. The attack will have its biggest impact on planned travels to Istanbul and will also lead to an overall decrease of the demand for holidays in the western and south-western coastal regions of Izmir and Antalya. Indeed, post-attack security operations targeted suspected networks in Izmir raising concerns over the potential presence of ISIS networks in the area.

The bombing in Istanbul underscored the overall deterioration of the local security environment. Since the beginning of 2016, the city has experienced four major terrorist attacks conducted by two of the principal terrorist groups operating in Turkey. Istanbul is exposed to operations carried out by both Islamist militants as well as Kurdish separatists.

It is noteworthy that ISIS militants have been carrying out operations in Istanbul, as well as Ankara, as part of the groups’ international strategy aimed at hitting high-level targets such as airports and key civilian places. Istanbul had previously experienced suicide bombings in touristic and commercial districts in which the perpetrators specifically targeted foreign nationals.

The selected targets are clearly chosen to hurt Turkey’s international standing in a bid to generate economic woes by hampering the national tourist sector and increasingly portraying the country as an unsafe place.

The latest attack raised questions over the Turkish security forces ability to prevent further terrorist operations. It also led to additional interrogations regarding the overall response to secure global airports.

While it has been positive that June’s attack in Ataturk airport did not lead to major air travel and operation disruptions like March’s attacks in Belgium, ISIS’ assault in Istanbul shows that airports continue to be a relatively soft target.

Security measures such as preliminary checkpoints, luggage and vehicle checks as well as identity controls may diminish the risk of attacks within the terminals but increase the volume of travellers exposed to potential violence on the outskirts of the airport perimeter.

As such, security managers of global airports and governments are increasingly looking for innovative ways to respond to the terrorist threat to airports. Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion international airport is attracting international interest over its unique system of airport security based on technical and human controls.

In the near-future, Istanbul and other international airports are expected to review their security measures to try to step up capabilities to mitigate the risk of additional attacks.

For Turkey, the elevated terrorism risk is unlikely to abate in the coming months. Kurdish separatist groups, Islamist radicals and far-left militants will continue trying to carry out attacks against security forces and institutions, as well as touristic and commercial areas.

This will result in an ongoing campaign against terror mainly directed against PKK-linked militants and ISIS-associated networks. Anti-terrorist operations will continue to occur in major cities, as well as along the southern border with Syria and in Kurdish-majority south-eastern provinces. Such raids increase the risk of localized violence and generate an overall risk of retaliatory violence.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI analyst Riccardo Dugulin.

The post The Wider Implications of ISIS’ Istanbul Bombing appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has joined a growing number of world leaders taking their message to one of today’s fast-growing social media platforms: Snapchat (@israelipm). Indeed, Netanyahu is already on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram.

His first snap is a series of jokes—professionally edited to look unedited—spliced with the message that “Snapchat is a powerful medium and I look forward to using it to tell the truth about Israel.”

Some of Netanyahu’s jokes in his first snap:

• He starts by announcing that today he is joining “Stopchat.” When corrected, he deadpans: “Snoopchat?”
• “Since Snapchat disappears, I’ve decided to conduct all secret conversations and communications with Snapchat.”
• “You can only talk for 10 seconds. I wish we had that in the government.”
• He concludes with “now I can finally tell you all of Israel’s most closely held secrets, like…” He is abruptly interrupted by static and the SMPTE color bars.”

Netanyahu understands the power of unfiltered words, spoken directly to the camera. He was a masterful representative for Israel when he served as their Ambassador to the UN. He understands America, speaks English as a native, and is a powerful orator with a deep voice and a smile in his eyes.

Even before becoming Prime Minister, he has one of Israel’s most strident spokespeople, whether sitting down for a one-on-one interview with the American press or addressing the world through the UN.

His understanding of video seems to have evolved of late. He has recently released several videos (that have subsequently gone viral) which feature him sitting at a desk and speaking directly to the camera. He shared a touching response to the heinous Orlando attack; the Financial Times called his video a “masterclass in responding to tragedy.” It has been viewed over 22 million times and shared over 667,000 times online.

After Hallal Ariel was brutally murdered in her sleep, Netanyahu again chose to respond at his desk, speaking directly to the camera. His video response became a significant part of the conversation.

Netanyahu has long understood the media. It is now becoming clear he is also quite adept at social media. His interest in Snapchat serves as an easy extension of his online brand and it will be interesting to see how he approaches this new medium of communication.

I know that I for one will be following along. Join me in the conversation on Twitter at @jlemonsk.

The post Netanyahu has joined Snapchat appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A store in Venezuela with a sign saying “no light.” Despite lifting mandatory electricity shutdowns, Venezuela continues to have food shortages and a flailing economy. (Getty Images)

On July 4, 2016 Nicolas Maduro, president of Venezuela, removed the policy of electricity rationing that had been in place throughout the country for over 2 months. During this time Venezuelans had to subsist without power for 4 hours per day.

Venezuelans have been suffering from many hardships in recent months, including a plummeting economy and food shortages. The limits on using electricity is the latest visible example of the country’s crumbling infrastructure, as well as the growing discord between the government and citizens of Venezuela.

According to Maduro’s government, the El Nino weather system caused a water levels in the Guri hydroelectric dam to drop to record lows. The lack of a sufficient amount of water needed to generate electricity led to the rationing. The government also cut civil servant working hours to 2 days per week to conserve energy, and Maduro actually recommended that women stop using hair dryers as an example of using “wasteful” energy. When implementing the power restrictions in late April 2016, Maduro claimed that Venezuela was “six days away from a collapse, we were facing having to turn off almost the entire country.”

But outrage against the government and its policies is growing as shortages of multiple supplies continue. Critics argue that the government caused the country’s problems through economic and resource mismanagement. They blame the energy shortage on over-reliance of hydroelectric power—about 2/3 of the entire country’s electricity is produced by the Guri dam—and failure to invest in Venezuela’s electricity production system. Beyond power outages, PBS Newshour’s Hari Sreenivasan pointed out that “Venezuelans are struggling with shortages of food, medicine and other necessities, with increasing finger pointing at Maduro’s leadership.”

Several factors have contributed to the current dire situation. Drastic declines in oil prices certainly have had a devastating effect. The price per barrel of oil on the world market has nosedived, dropping by more than half in 2016 from 2014. Oil accounts for about 95% of Venezuela’s export revenue.

But it goes beyond than this. Maduro has continued the policy of price controls on basic goods, such as sugar, milk and flour. Venezuela’s long-time ruler Hugo Chavez (Maduro is Chavez’s hand-picked successor) started this practice in 2003, hoping to make these items continually affordable for the country’s poor. Yet this caused producers of these goods to operate at a loss, and increase reliance on imports. Importing goods drove up prices as well as inflation.

With the weak economy overall subsidized goods disappeared from stores almost immediately after they arrived, increasing prices of basic items even more. The government has accused merchants of charging exorbitant prices to make profits, and people from hoarding goods to resell them on the black market. While the extent to which this occurs is unclear, it has been documented that Venezuelans often wait on lines for hours to buy small amount of basic necessities, riots over food and vandalism of stores are rampant, and many are going hungry.

Caracas resident Kelly Vega commented to the Associated Press, “We are eating two meals a day. If we eat breakfast, there’s no lunch. If we have lunch, there’s no dinner.” A recent Caracas university study found that about 12% of capital residents are forced to a skip a meal, a sharp increase from a few years ago.

So what can be done restore order? Especially if a growing number of people feel the government has caused the current situation, do they have an recourse to force a change? Some groups are committed to removing Maduro from power, it is remains to be seen whether or not they will be successful. In December 2015 opposition parties became the majority in Venezuela’s legislative assembly. They proposed an amendment to the constitution reducing Maduro’s term in office to four years (from six). But this past April the country’s supreme court rejected the proposal.

In May 2016 opposition leaders officially submitted a petition calling for a national recall referendum, which could remove Maduro from power. The petition accumulated 1.85 million signatures. Yet the government agency that oversees elections has not taken any action in response to the petition.

Nicholas Casey of the New York Times said on July 3, 2016 that it is unlikely basic food needs will be met before the end of the summer. Casey continues that it is unclear whether Maduro would accept a recall referendum, though also not assured that new government would do any better at making the necessary amount of food available.

It seems doubtful to me the government would allow a recall to take place. Chavez held an iron grip on power for over a decade, it seems doubtful Maduro would act differently. In the midst of much uncertainty, what does seem apparent is that Venezuela will not be able to rescue itself without help. Whether with a new government or the current one, civil society organizations, NGOs, and food relief agencies could make a significant difference. Though Venezuela has been resistant to allowing outside help in the past, hopefully its leaders can be convinced that the current situation necessitates involvement of other actors.

Venezuela could use help, or else the lights may go out again.

The post Venezuela Shortages: Past, Present, and Uncertain Future appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Boris Johnson, Conservative Euroskeptic prominent leader of the Brexit campaign, was expected to replace David Cameron as prime minister after winning the referendum, but he was unceremoniously dumped by his colleagues. Like everyone else, he had no plan for what to do if he won. (The Guardian)

The roiling stock markets and the plunging value of sterling on the day after the United Kingdom’s vote to abandon the European Union are not necessarily the last word in assessing this historic event. These specific trends are short-term reactions, and first reactions rarely settle an issue. Yet it is hard to predict a positive outcome. If nothing else, the U.K. is likely to become less productive and relatively poorer over time because of the vote, with the working-class people who voted overwhelmingly to leave likely to suffer the worst from the consequences.

Beyond that, the contagion of exiting could spread to other countries with disgruntled populations, and Britain could feasibly face the double disruption of losing Scotland while leaving Europe. Conflict could be rekindled in Northern Ireland, where the 1998 peace agreement was premised in part on both parts of the island being in the EU. Meanwhile, both of the U.K.’s major parties have been split by the vote, both are undergoing leadership crises, and no one—not even the leading Brexit* campaigners—has a plan for what to do now that the referendum has actually passed.

The next question—or one of the many next questions that Europe and Britain now face—is how the EU will arrange the U.K.’s exit (if it in fact comes about). European leaders face at least two dilemmas. The first dilemma concerns timing. On the one hand, the Brexit vote cast many aspects of the continent’s economy into uncertainty, and with the European economy barely holding itself together eight years after the 2008 crisis (despite repeated announcements of breakthroughs), uncertainty is the last thing that the continent’s leaders want to see. Some European leaders thus hope to dissolve the relationship with Britain as quickly as possible. On the other hand, the ties holding Europe and Britain together at all levels have grown over the course of decades and are now numerous, complicated, and interwoven. It seems reasonable to assume that any effort to rush the unraveling of this relationship could also have dire consequences.

At the same time, European leaders must face their second dilemma, how severely to treat the U.K. A harsh, vindictive approach, even if satisfying to some, could be counterproductive if it undermines the fragile British and European economies. On the other hand, an accommodating approach might encourage other member states in the belief that they, too, could rewrite their rules of participation or even abandon the EU with a minimum of disruption, thus encouraging the EU’s further unraveling. In addition, the desire to nudge banks and corporations into relocating from London to Paris, Frankfurt, or elsewhere on the continent could also militate against accommodation.

It would be difficult for anyone to fashion an optimal approach among these cross-cutting pressures. All the more worrying is the fact (or, at least, my perception) that the EU has botched one decision after another over the past several years, which inspires little confidence in how it will handle this one. The EU has serious problems, which are rooted at two different levels: structure and policy.

At the structural level, many of the EU’s issues grow from the fact that the continent has integrated itself economically and socially but not politically. There is a disconnect between the unified continental economy and the disjointed system of national governments. Thus 19 of its members share a single currency, the euro, and a single monetary authority, but for years they engaged in separate and often contradictory fiscal policies. Those 19 all sell euro-denominated bonds, but the bonds carry different risks depending on the government issuing them. The continent has open borders internally but is forced to rely on bankrupt Greece to control the flow of refugees from the Middle East and allows Belgium—a country with a weak, underfunded central government and multiple police forces that barely cooperate—to become a haven for terrorists.

Decision making at the continental level lacks an efficient mechanism; it requires building a consensus among 28 (soon to be 27) member states. Major decisions must often be ratified by all 28 parliaments. Thus every member has a veto, and the member least interested in an outcome can set the terms of debate. The difficulty in making decisions may well explain the tendency of European institutions to focus on long-term integration projects of little interest to most people while devoting relatively little attention to day-to-day citizens’ concerns that require quicker solutions.

This situation could theoretically be resolved by establishing a single, continental democratically elected government, but that would require citizens who think of themselves as Europeans first, rather than as Britons, Germans, Poles, or Greeks, and the Brexit vote shows how far they are from that.** In the meantime, multiple “small” decisions are relegated to EU regulatory agencies, which seek to enforce uniform standards to facilitate free-flowing trade, fueling resentment in places like the U.K. that people’s lives are governed by faceless, unaccountable, foreign bureaucrats in Brussels.

At the policy level, European decision makers have made a mess of their response to the 2008 financial crisis. Their focus has been on enforcing austerity to bring budget deficits under control and prevent inflation. In this they have been guided above all by Germany, the continent’s largest and strongest economy and a country with paralyzing memories of its experience with inflation in the early 1920s. (One U.S. dollar, worth about 4 marks in 1914, was worth more than 4 trillion marks in November 1923.) Europe’s current economic problems, however, are the opposite of inflation.

The consequences of austerity have been real. The IMF has estimated that for every $1.00 that Europe saved through fiscal consolidation (spending cuts and tax increases) during the crisis, economic activity declined by a larger amount, a realization that has caused the IMF, but not the EU, to revise its policy approach. Because of austerity and tight money, Europe fell into a second recession in 2011–12, and its pace of recovery has actually been slower than it was in the 1930s.

It avoided a currency crisis in 2012 only because the European Central Bank unilaterally discarded its mandated inflation obsession and promised to buy the government bonds of countries that could not sell them elsewhere. (More recently, the ECB, an outlier in EU decision making since 2012, has established negative interest rates, paying private banks to borrow money if they will, in turn, lend the money out for productive investments, while charging a fee to let money sit idle in deposits.) The U.K., which quietly eased its austerity policy around 2013, has done better than many other European countries, but some analysts have highlighted the irony that Prime Minister Cameron, who led the political fight against Brexit, is largely responsible for the economic malaise that fueled much of the Brexit enthusiasm.

We shall be waiting anxiously to see how the EU responds to its newest crisis. Perhaps it will react by addressing some of its deeper problems. Indeed, past crises have served as catalysts for advances in integration. Jean Monnet, one of the founders of the European Project, once predicted that “Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted in those crises.” We trust that the EU’s actions will be rational rather than emotional, but then many expected that of the British voters as well. In any event, let’s hope that its performance is an improvement on the past.

*The term Brexit, or British exit, was modeled on the earlier term Grexit, or Greek exit. Brexit, however, has always been seen as a voluntary phenomenon, whereas the notion of Grexit grew from the idea that the EU might expel Greece for its perceived failures to abide by the organization’s rules.

**This lack of legitimate institutions at the continental level is often described as the “democracy deficit.”

The post Brexit: Will the EU Botch It Again? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif gestures as he talks with journalists from a balcony of the Palais Coburg hotel where the Iran nuclear talks meetings are being held in Vienna, Austria July 10, 2015. (REUTERS/Carlos Barria)

When an Iranian opposition group released information showing secret activity, including the construction of a uranium enrichment plant and a heavy-water reactor which could theoretically both be used to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, it sparked a thirteen-year standoff between the West and the Islamic Republic. After the allegations about Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear activities became public, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) launched an investigation that concluded in 2003 that Iran had systematically failed to meet its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to report those activities to the organization.

However, while the IAEA said that Iran had violated the NPT’s safeguards agreement, it neither reported evidence of links to a nuclear weapons program nor did Tehran withdraw from the NPT like North Korea had done in an earlier confrontation over illicit nuclear programs. Instead, the Iranian leadership insisted that Iran had discovered and extracted uranium domestically in pursuit of its legitimate right under the treaty to obtain nuclear energy for peaceful aims. The United Nations Security Council did not find this a convincing explanation and sanctions were imposed on Iran, which were extended in 2010. These had a crippling effect on the Iranian economy though they did not end the standoff.

The sanctions did lead to further talks which, after a change in administrations in Iran, eventually led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful during the period the agreement would be in force. By signing the deal, Iran “reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.”

The IAEA has been put in charge of the monitoring and reporting of Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA. The deal, among other elements, demanded that Iran restricted its sensitive nuclear activities to two nuclear plants and to civilian energy production levels, defined at 3.67% (before the JCPOA, Iran’s enrichment was on average 20%). The JCPOA additionally stipulated that nuclear research and development would take place only at Natanz and be limited for eight years, and that no enrichment would be permitted at Fordo for 15 years. Since January 2016, Iran has drastically reduced the number of centrifuges which can enrich fuel, and shipped tonnes of low-enriched uranium to Russia.

The deal struck a year ago has since realigned actors inside and out of the Middle Eastern region; this article examines the trends amongst both NATO members’ partners and rivals which might destabilize further the regional balance in the future.

Renewed Saudi-Iranian Energy Rivalry

Despite the skepticism and hostility with which the JCPOA agreement was greeted in both Western countries and inside Iran, it has so far held firm. Since this agreement reduces the chances of war between the Western powers and Tehran, its arrival was certainly applauded by NATO. But the agreement has also had an immediate impact on Iran’s standing in the Middle East and the wider international community, in ways which have not been as positive for international peace and security. This has played out particularly in the field of energy politics.

In May, Iran’s Tasnim news agency, which has strong links with the notorious Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), reported Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh claiming that, thanks to the lasting implementation of the nuclear deal, Iran’s capacity to produce and export crude and oil products has doubled in comparison with the pre-sanctions era. The agency also quoted a recent report by the International Energy Agency as saying Iran’s oil production had returned to the level of pre-sanctions era, reaching 3.56 million barrels a day in April, and added that Iran’s crude exports had increased to 2 million barrels a day, close to the pre-sanction level. The result has been a dramatic increase of Iranian oil available on the international market at a time when oil prices remain at rock bottom, which energy importers like Europe and China largely benefit from.

But the return of Iran to the oil market has also had negative consequences, sparking tensions with traditional Western allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia. When ministers from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Venezuela, together with other non-member oil producers such as Russia, met in Doha in April it had been expected that the first agreement to freeze production in fifteen years would soon drive up oil prices. But when Riyadh suddenly demanded that Tehran limit its oil production, Iran proved unwilling to squander the opportunity that returning to world markets afforded. As a result, the expected agreement stalled and any agreement was pushed back to June. Saudi Arabia’s continued rift with its rival in both OPEC and the Middle East in general has played a large role in torpedoing the old effectiveness of the producers’ cartel.

This is good economic news for Western energy importers, but it signals a renewed regional hostility between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran which should concern NATO. The two powers are on opposing sides in two hot Middle Eastern proxy wars – in Yemen and in Syria. The civil war in Yemen is between a Saudi-led coalition and Zaidi Shia rebels known as Houthis, who overthrew the Yemeni government in cooperation with forces loyal to Yemen’s former dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Saudis allege that the Houthis are Iranian pawns, saying that Tehran has supplied weapons, money and training to the Shia militia as part of a wider pattern of interference in the region via Shia proxies.

There are longstanding fears in Saudi and NATO that Iran has exploited turmoil between Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain and now Yemen to expand its regional influence. Now, with the expansion of Iranian capabilities following the ending of sanctions, there is some danger that a rattled Saudi Arabia will use its influence to nudge the United States and NATO towards intervention of one of these quarrels despite the relative improvement in relations between Tehran and the West.

Negative Implications for Syria

While Saudi Arabia is not a NATO member and US-Saudi relations have been cool under the administration of outgoing US president Barack Obama, there is one particular area of overlap between the concerns of the Alliance and those of the leading Sunni Gulf power. In Syria, Iran is backing an array of pro-regime militias and has encouraged its Lebanese ally Hezbollah to join in the fighting as well. A major objection to the JCPOA agreement from Riyadh (and Tel Aviv) was that the lifting of sanctions and unfreezing of Iranian assets would act as a boost for Iranian funding of overseas armed groups, especially in Syria. The United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, estimates the Islamic Republic spends $6 billion annually on backing Damascus.

NATO has become concerned about the situation in Syria due to the joint Iranian and Russian intervention. Late last year, Major General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, the elite extra-territorial Special Forces arm of the IRGC, travelled to Moscow to solicit greater Russian involvement in the Syrian war. In September 2015, at a time of heightened Russian-NATO tensions in Europe and the Middle East, a Russian military intervention on behalf of the regime began to turn the tide in favor of Damascus. Iran and Moscow are now cooperating in Syria to restore the Assad regime’s control over the western parts of the country where most of the population lives.

NATO now faces a challenging situation whereby a resurgent Russia flexes its muscles in Eastern Europe and has drawn closer to Tehran over Syria, despite the friction this has caused with neighboring NATO member Turkey. This is not, however, a case of an Iranian-Russian bloc emerging to confront the West and its Arab allies. While Iran and Turkey have disagreed over their views on regional political developments in the last five years Turkish-Iranian relations are nowhere near as bitter as Saudi-Iranian ones. Since the January 16 “Implementation Day” of the JCPOA, Ankara has agreed to expand bilateral trade with Iran to $50 billion a year. It is maneuvering to become Iran’s first trading partner as a way to compensate for Russian sanctions.

Moscow-Tehran Relations and NATO

The signs are that Iran continues to see Moscow as a great power in the Middle East, and one which it can cooperate with on occasions to foil Western moves it deems anti-Iranian. Likewise, Moscow will work with Tehran on occasion. Despite participating in the sanctions regime, Moscow has continued to honor a nuclear deal struck with the Islamic Republic of Iran to construct a series of nuclear power plants at Bushehr in the south of the country. Moscow and Tehran both remain committed to rolling back Western influence in the Middle East and will work together on an ad hoc basis when it suits them both.

But despite their shared suspicions of the United States and NATO, Russia and Iran have had a long and contentious relationship. Just as the United States and European members of NATO have remained aloof  of Turkish and Saudi policy in Syria, Moscow has allowed the Western powers to enlist its help in curbing Iranian nuclear ambitions. Together with China, Russia was one of the nations which agreed to impose tough sanctions on Tehran to force it to the negotiating table. It has also helped ease the passage of the JCPOA by agreeing to recycle Iranian nuclear fuel in Russia, removing any justification for enrichment inside Iran. Moscow does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons while fearing that a nuclear agreement will lead to improved ties between Iran and the United States.

The return of Iran to the oil market has also disrupted Russian hopes for a price floor to be coordinated with OPEC producers thanks to Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Iran is pushing to find new ways to extract and export its vast natural-gas reserves, and has entered into preliminary talks with NATO-member Greece to provide a gateway for the Islamic Republic to supply fuel to European markets. Since the dispute between Russia and Ukraine disrupted gas supplies and sped up the EU’s bringing an antitrust case against the Russian gas giant, Russian energy exports to Europe have lost ground of which Iran is hoping to be a beneficiary. Tehran is also competing with Saudi Arabia and Russia in its energy exports to China; Beijing is the largest importer of crude from both Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Therefore, although the pair are happy to cooperate over Syria, whose regime was a longstanding ally of Iran’s dating back to the Iraq-Iran war and whose port of Tartus was the site of the only Russian military facility outside of the former Soviet Union, this was a coincidence of overlapping interests rather than a sign that Moscow and Tehran will draw closer together as Iran emerges from under the shadow of over a decade of crushing economic isolation from the global economy. Moscow does not want to be seen as affiliated with Iran by the mainly Sunni Arab world amidst the escalating Sunni-Shia conflict. Iran is wary of Moscow’s strong ties with Israel and its continued efforts to court anti-Iranian Arab states and longstanding disputes over the Caspian Sea continue to impede Russian-Iranian economic cooperation.

Relations between Russia and Iran will continue to be seen through a lens of shifting interests and alliances, in which they are neither quite friends nor enemies, but rivals. Moscow fears friendlier relations between Iran and the West following the JCPOA could, one day, allow former Soviet states in the Caucasus and Central Asia to export their petroleum to and through Iran, lessening their economic dependence on Russia. The possibility of improving Western-Iranian ties is therefore an alarming one to Russia at a time of deteriorating relations between itself and the West. It is therefore anxiously watching the progress towards reform of Tehran’s more liberal factions as these actors favor greater openness towards the West.

China and Iran

China is now Iran’s number one trading partner as a direct result of the sanctions regime imposed over Iranian nuclear activities, and this closer relationship has continued following the implementation of the JCPOA. In January, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Iran and signed a long series of agreements on economic and technological cooperation with his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani. Iran’s leaders have also announced they will cooperate with Beijing on its One Belt One Road initiative.

China and Iran do not share the history of mutual suspicion that divides Iran from Russia, which both have clashed with in the past. Moreover, the drawing together of Tehran and Beijing could ultimately threaten Russia’s economic interests in both China’s hydrocarbon market and Iran’s nuclear energy sector. China has agreed to construct two nuclear power plants in Iran and import Iranian oil on a long-term basis. Russia’s place in the Chinese oil market, which it turned to as an alternative following the Ukrainian crisis, could now be threatened while its monopoly position as the Islamic Republic’s nuclear supplier has been broken. Russian self-interest makes it very unlikely that a Beijing-Moscow-Tehran axis will emerge as a united front against the NATO powers, though all three will continue to cooperate together on an ad hoc basis, as Russia and Iran have in Syria.

Iran also acts as an important transport hub between China and Europe, part of a trading relationship dating back to the Iran-Iraq war, when a combination of the Islamic Revolution and the Cold War led Iran to purchase weapons from China instead of Russia or the reviled US. But with the end of sanctions and the tentative return of European states to rebuild their interrupted political and economic relations with Tehran, Chinese firms may find themselves facing increasing competition from outsiders, disturbing a cosy status quo which has been built up during the past decade or more. The visit of China’s president and the inducements he offers may be in part a gambit to pre-empt this, and one which Iran’s leadership seem to have accepted as a continued hedge against overdependence on the West. For now, Beijing is looking to deepen rather than limit its involvement in Iran, whose political elite seem happy to accept the Chinese overtures.

Conclusion

So far the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has been a surprising success for Euro-Atlantic diplomacy against all odds. A year on, the tensions with Iran are lower and progress towards an Iranian nuclear weapon, however obliquely pursued, has been halted for now, while trade and transparency have given the two sides a chance to recalibrate their relationship.

However, the agreement should not be seen as a panacea for everything which ails Iranian-Western relations. Iran remains aligned with a threatening Russia in Syria, which has put sanctions on NATO member Turkey amidst a plunge in relations with other Alliance member states. Tehran has also stepped up its proxy conflicts and economic warfare with Saudi Arabia, a major US and NATO ally in the region. It is moving closer into the orbit of a more assertive China which has its own territorial disputes with key NATO member America and is looking to gather allies into its own competing institutions. One year after the nuclear deal was signed, it is clear that much remains to be done before relations between the Alliance and the Islamic Republic can truly be said to have been reset; what prevails now is more of an armistice.

This article originally appeared in Atlantic Voices and reappears here with kind permission.

The post One Year On: Iran and the World appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Pete Souza / White House)

In June, Senator John McCain made a bold claim regarding the consequences of President Obama’s foreign policy decisions. He asserted that Obama’s policy on Iraq—specifically, his decision to remove U.S. troops at the end of 2011—was “directly responsible” for the carnage in Orlando, Florida.

McCain told reporters: “Barack Obama is directly responsible for it because when he pulled everybody out of Iraq, al-Qaeda went to Syria, became ISIS, and ISIS is what it is today thanks to Barack Obama’s failures—utter failures, by pulling everybody out of Iraq, thinking that conflicts end just because you leave. So the responsibility for it lies with President Barack Obama and his failed policies.

He repeated the charge several times at the behest of surprised reporters, who evidently wanted to give him a chance to moderate the claim. Soon afterward, he issued a statement that appeared to be moderated (changing his terminology from ISIS to ISIL in the process).

The new statement read: “I misspoke. I did not mean to imply that the President was personally responsible. I was referring to President Obama’s national security decisions, not the President himself. As I have said, President Obama’s decision to completely withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011 led to the rise of ISIL.”

It went on, arguing that “I and others have long warned that the failure of the President’s policy to deny ISIL safe haven would allow the terrorist organization to inspire, plan, direct or conduct attacks on the United States and Europe as they have done in Paris, Brussels, San Bernardino and now Orlando.”

How this differs in any meaningful way from the original statement frankly escapes me, but apparently both McCain and the White House were uninterested in pursuing the issue further and let it drop. Perhaps I am less forgiving than either of them, but the statement has stuck with me. I would like to examine this claim further. For one thing, I suspect that a lot of people will agree with it without devoting a much thought to the matter, so I think it is a mistake to let that slip by.

First of all, whatever one thinks of the link between Obama’s withdrawal order and the creation of ISIS, it is important to notice that the Islamic State had no direct contact with the Orlando attacker. The only connection is that the shooter appears to have been inspired by ISIS. The group does not need to control any territory  for that to happen. The shooter could as easily have said that he was inspired by the 19th-century abolitionist John Brown, and the fact that Brown has been dead for 157 years would not have prevented it. The efforts needed to counter shooting incidents like that in Orlando (or the one in Aurora, Colorado, for that matter) are unrelated to conflicts in the Middle East.

Second, McCain’s brief sequence of events stands out. That is, “…he pulled everybody out of Iraq, al-Qaeda [in Iraq] went to Syria, became ISIS, and ISIS is what it is today…” Is this the causal argument that McCain meant to present? Obama pulled the troops out of Iraq, so the enemy went to chaotic, war-torn Syria, where they became ISIS?

If we accept that going to Syria was a key element in the transformation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) into ISIS, how was that caused by Obama pulling troops out of Iraq? Did the creation of a vacuum in Iraq somehow blow them in the opposite direction? If U.S. troops had stayed in Iraq, would AQI then have been unable to go to Syria? If U.S. troops were still fighting them in Iraq, would that not have given them an even greater incentive to go to Syria? The causal relationship here is a bit confusing.

Finally, it is also necessary to mention—as many commentators already have—that the decision for the withdrawal was made by the Bush administration in 2008, in agreement with the Iraqi government. Of course, Condoleezza Rice stated subsequently that the Bush administration did not really mean it, which at first glance seems a curious kind of boast.

What she had in mind, naturally, was that the administration had hoped to negotiate some sort of small-scale, long-term U.S. military presence—short of war fighting—that might have bolstered the Iraqi military and perhaps served as a sort of deterrent. (We shall leave aside for now the fact that the introduction of a large-scale war-fighting force in 2003 did not deter a fight, but rather started one.) The fact is that the Obama administration was aware of this intention and attempted to do just that, but they and the Iraqis could not come to agreement.

The official reason for the failure to come to an agreement had to do with a technical issue: Which country would have legal jurisdiction over crimes committed by U.S. personnel in Iraq? Traditionally, U.S. agreements with host countries permit the United States to prosecute such crimes, but Iraq said no.

Although I cannot prove it, my suspicion is that the two sides could have overcome this impasse if they had really wanted to do so. It is quite possible that Obama was not interested in pressing hard for the privilege of staying in Iraq, but I believe the real obstacle was on the other side. After eight years of war, the U.S. military presence had become so toxic that no Iraqi politician wanted to be seen as favoring its continuation.

There were, to be sure, some Iraqi leaders who quietly confessed that a continued U.S. military presence would be useful, or even necessary, but they could not be brought to say so in public, much less vote for it in Parliament. Some American commentators have criticized the Obama administration for insisting on a public vote instead of simply doing what was necessary behind the scenes. But what would have happened in that case? The Iraqi public was not going to overlook that fact that troops were still there. The first time that something went wrong—and it would not take long for that to happen—the people who were unable to endorse a U.S. presence in public would start making statements like, “I didn’t ask them to stay. They just wouldn’t go.” Eventually the situation would be much as it is today, with two significant exceptions:

1. We would be in the middle of it.

2. The Shi’a would be shooting at us, too, because we wouldn’t leave

It is worth noting that even now, despite all the problems Iraq has had with ISIS over the past two years, no Iraqi leader has asked us to come back in with a full military presence.

What McCain has done is not unusual. Whenever a government chooses between two paths and the outcome is negative, people are quick to assume that the opposite choice would have brought complete success. Nonetheless, there is no sure way to know whether the opposite choice would have created a situation that was better, basically the same in all but the details, or even substantially worse.

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