Diplomacy & Crisis News

/ Syrie, Conflit, Guerre civile - Proche-Orient / Syrie, Conflit, Guerre civile - Proche-Orient

Numerology is a potent force in human affairs. So is a deadline—especially when it’s clear fateful consequences will come to pass once the cutoff date arrives. The wry English wit Dr. Samuel Johnson was on to something when he quipped that “when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.”

But what happens if you talk yourself into believing a deadline is impending when it’s not? Maybe the executioner is not on a set timetable. An approaching date may concentrate your mind, as Johnson prophesied. And that can be a healthy thing. Deadlines are forcing events. They spur thought and action, compelling you to set aside indecision and sloth. But, perversely, a deadline might goad you into doing something rash—something with dire strategic and political import—in hopes of eluding the hangman’s noose. And then you’ll be stuck with the consequences of your actions—potentially, consequences of cataclysmic proportions.

Even though the hangman was never coming for you in the first place. Being decisive could be self-defeating.

Such are the dangers of a phantom cutoff date. Now to the news. Here are two numbers that have come to fixate officialdom in Washington, DC over the past few years: six and 2027. Both originated in a single committee meeting in Congress. In 2021, while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, outgoing U.S. Indo-Pacific Command chief Philip Davidson reported that “Beijing is pushing across the globe to diplomatically isolate, economically constrain, and militarily threaten Taiwan.”

No kidding.

That was abundantly true then, and it had been for some time. Fully twenty years ago, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) magnates transcribed their threat to use arms into Chinese domestic law in the form of an “Anti-Secession Law.” The law set the conditions under which China would use force and made—surprise, surprise—CCP leaders the arbiters of whether those conditions had been met. Nor was this mere bombast on Beijing’s part. In the ensuing years, as Chinese military might has swelled, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has taken to deploying sea and air power around the island. As a matter of routine, PLA forces now practice amphibious landings, bombardment of key infrastructure, destruction of the Taiwan Navy and Air Force, and associated precursors to conquest.

The Anti-Secession Law has taken on an increasingly martial hue as China acquires the means to enforce it.

None of what Admiral Davidson told senators in his prepared testimony was especially novel, let alone radical. His prepared remarks were boilerplate. While fielding questions from the committee, though, he had this to say: “I worry that [the Chinese are] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order, which they’ve long said that they want to do ... by 2050. I’m worried about them moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then. And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years” (emphasis added).

That last became the tagline for the admiral’s remarks. 6 + 2021 = 2027. There’s your numerology. The threat posed by China had become plain enough by 2021. Threats are composed of intentions and capabilities, and by then, Beijing had loudly and often trumpeted its intentions while at the same time amassing fearsome capabilities. But when the threat might cascade into war, if ever, it remained abstract and ethereal. There was no proof that Johnson’s hanging had been scheduled or ever would be. Or maybe the execution would be postponed if it were on the docket. However imposing, the threat emanating from China fell short of wonderfully concentrating minds.

It was possible to dither. And that’s what human beings do best.

Davidson changed all that. He provided specifics. His six-year timeframe was almost instantly dubbed the “Davidson Window,” shorthand for an interval of maximum peril in the Taiwan Strait. The metaphor concentrated minds. Now, that being said, it remains unclear to me precisely why policymakers and opinionmakers locked onto 2027, the endpoint of the Davidson Window. Obsessing over 2027 implies that Taiwan, America, and regional allies still have a couple of years’ respite to get ready for a trial of arms.

No.

Davidson meant to broadcast a more alarming message than that. He meant to tell Congress that the allies had no leisure to prepare, even back in 2021. China could act against Taiwan at any time during his six-year timeframe—including the day he testified, or today, or tomorrow. This hangman is on no fixed timetable. The allies should make haste lest he show up unannounced—as well he might, according to Davidson. That there can never be too much deception in warfare is baked into Communist Chinese strategic culture.

General Secretary Xi Jinping is not about to telegraph the timing of a drastic move like an assault on Taiwan. This hangman hides his thinking.

Which is why it’s also unclear to me why so many influential folks seem to regard 2027 as a deadline. Such a view is not entirely unreasonable. Chinese vest great importance in anniversaries, and 2027 marks the centennial of the founding of the Red Army, the forerunner to today’s People’s Liberation Army. Pomp might warrant extraordinary measures. It is also true that Xi has instructed PLA commanders to have a military option ready by that year, in part to commemorate the centennial and in part because political and military leaders covet having plentiful options. That’s what a capable armed force provides.

But creating an option is not the same as executing it. Human choice remains.

So beware of 2027 mania. Look both left and right of that date. If it hasn’t been already, the Pentagon needs to be laying contingency plans to intervene in a China-Taiwan war should one erupt today. And it could. Not just Phil Davidson but Carl von Clausewitz says so. The sage of Prussia postulates a case in which a weaker contender “is in conflict with a much more powerful one and expects its position to grow weaker every year.” He goes on to ask rhetorically, “If war is unavoidable, should it not make the most of its opportunities before its position gets still worse?”

He concludes that the lesser contender “should attack.”

Apply that to East Asia. If Xi sees military, economic, demographic, or other trendlines turning against China—if he believes the correlation of military might will be worse in the future than it is now—then the CCP supremo might roll the iron dice. If today is as good as it gets, Clausewitzian logic suggests today is the prime time to act.

Opportunism and risk calculations could prod Xi to be a gambler.

And he could gamble at any time. But neither should we regard the 2027 centennial year as a graven-in-stone deadline. Deterrence has worked and could work. What the allies do could change Xi’s mind. Clausewitz observes that there are three ways to prevail in contests of arms, and only one requires a combatant to throw down its antagonist on the battlefield and impose terms. He maintains that “inability to carry on the struggle”—the swiftest and surest route to martial triumph—“can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost.”

The latter two mechanisms operate in peacetime as well as wartime. An antagonist can be disheartened by the military situation or by cost/benefit calculations. It could desist from aggression by being rational.

Bottom line, it would be a mistake to succumb to either complacency or fatalism in the Western Pacific. It remains possible to convince Beijing its position in the Taiwan Strait is untenable. If Xi believes the People’s Liberation Army stands little chance of prevailing in 2027, he should refrain from ordering Chinese forces into action because of some arbitrary date. Or if the allies can persuade Xi that the cost and hazards of conquering Taiwan are more than the island is worth to China—or beyond China’s means entirely—he should likewise relent.

The year 2027 is just a year. We should remain watchful as it approaches, lest the prophets of automatic warfare prove correct, but we should neither relax our guard in the meantime nor resign ourselves to a certain clash of arms. Let’s not give up on efforts to defeat Chinese aggression without fighting.

We have a say in whether Johnson’s hanging happens—and how we react to it.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Faculty Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.

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On Friday, President Joe Biden presented the highest military award for valor to seven U.S. Army soldiers at a ceremony at the White House. It marked the final time that Biden would award the Medal of Honor to a U.S. serviceperson.

Sadly, six of the awards were issued posthumously, for actions taken by the recipients during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The individuals included Pvt. Bruno R. Orig; Pfc. Wataru Nakamura; Cpl. Fred B. McGee; Pfc. Charles R. Johnson; Gen. Richard E. Cavazos; and Capt. Hugh R. Nelson Jr.

The seventh, Vietnam War veteran then-Private First Class Kenneth J. David, was present at the ceremony.

"I'm deeply privileged to honor seven American heroes," Biden said. "That's not hyperbole. These are genuine, to their core, heroes. Heroes of different ranks, different positions, and even different generations. But heroes who all went above and beyond the call of duty. Heroes who all deserve our nation's highest and oldest military recognition, the Medal of Honor."

History of the Medal of Honor

The origin of the highest military decoration dates back to the American Civil War when Iowa Senator James W. Crimes introduced a bill to "promote the efficiency of the Navy" by authorizing the production and distribution of "medals of honor." Within months, a similar bill was introduced for an award for privates of the U.S. Army. The wording and nature of the bills changed, including that this award would be for soldiers of all services and all ranks.

On July 12, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln signed into law the authorization of the Medal of Honor. At the time, it was the only U.S. military decoration. As a result, a total of 1,527 medals were issued during the American Civil War.

The very first recipient of the Medal of Honor was Private Jacob Parrott of Company K, 33D Ohio Infantry, who was one of twenty-two men—later known as "Andrew's Raiders"—who penetrated nearly 200 miles south into enemy territory and captured a railroad train at Big Shanty, Georgia, in an attempt to destroy the bridges and track between Chattanooga and Atlanta. Captured during the raid and severely tortured, Parrott was later part of a prisoner exchange. Parrott continued to serve in the Union Army for the remainder of the war, earning a commission and rising to the rank of First Lieutenant.

The Highest Honor

With the introduction of other medals and awards in the latter half of the nineteenth century, by the Spanish-American War, the Medal of Honor became the supreme honor. In the more than a century and a half since it was first issued, it has been awarded to soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who went above and beyond the call of duty.

"They're the finest military in the history of the world," Biden said of the seven recipients, but the words were true of all of those who have received the decoration. "Today we award these individuals a Medal of Honor. We can't stop here. Together as a nation, it's up to us to give this medal meaning, to keep fighting, to keep fighting for one another, for each other, to keep defending everything these heroes fought for and many of them died for: the ideals of America, the freedom we cherish, the democracy that has made our progress possible."

Notable Medal of Honor Facts:

-Enlisted recipients of the Medal of Honor are entitled to a supplemental uniform allowance.

-Children of recipients are eligible for admission to the United States military academies without regard to the quota requirements.

-It is a federal felony to falsely claim to be a Medal of Honor winner. Under the Stolen Valor Act, it is also against the law to sell or buy a Medal of Honor.

-The Medal of Honor has been presented nine times where the circumstances are "unknown" or "classified."

-The term "Congressional Medal of Honor" is incorrect. The Medal of Honor is presented by the president on behalf of Congress, and the confusion may come from the Congressional Medal of Honor Society, which was formed by an act of Congress in 1958.

-A total of nineteen recipients have been awarded more than one Medal of Honor, and current regulations specify that an appropriate award device be centered on the ribbon. This is an oak leaf cluster for U.S. Army and Air Force medals and a gold award star for the Navy version.

-William "Willie" Johnston remains the youngest recipient, who at the age of thirteen served as a drummer boy in Company D of the 3rd Vermont Infantry during the American Civil War. His division was routed during the Seven Days Battles in the summer of 1862, and Johnston was the only drummer to return with his instrument—a fact that was noteworthy as many soldiers threw away their guns and equipment during their retreat.

-March 25 is "National Medal of Honor Day," which serves to "foster public appreciation and recognition of Medal of Honor Recipients." The date was chosen because it was on March 25, 1863, that the very first Medals of Honor were presented to six members of Andrews' Raiders during the American Civil War.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
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L'État vient toujours au secours d'une grosse banque menacée de faillite : « too big to fail ». Mais ce précepte — « trop grand pour sombrer » — ne vaut pas dans le cas des pays en développement, qui ont collectivement contracté 29 000 milliards de dollars de dette en 2023. Leurs créanciers travaillent (...) / Spéculation, Droit, Dette, Banque, Tiers-monde - 2025/01

Ukraine is set to receive as many as ninety American-made F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole combat aircraft—while around two dozen of the fighters are now in service. Yet, even as more aircraft could arrive in the coming weeks, the Ukrainian Air Force may lack the pilots to fly the warbirds into action.

Last week, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense announced a bold plan to address the issue. Namely that it would cut the training time.

"The basic training program needs to be optimized. This will enable us to train more pilots to defend our country," Deputy Defence Minister Serhiy Melnkyk said in a briefing last week. "Ukrainian combat aviation must eventually gain air superiority, as this paves the way for the success of our actions on the front line."

Aviation experts have warned that training on the F-16 can't be rushed, and even experienced pilots trained on Soviet legacy aircraft could face a steep learning curve on the American fighter. Then there is the language barrier.

"One major concern from the very start has been the language barrier among Ukrainian candidates, many who have struggled to reach an adequate level of English proficiency to allow them to fully absorb the details of the complex systems of this fourth-generation fighter aircraft," the Kyiv Post reported. It added that "inexperienced pilots may struggle to adequately perform in high-pressure situations that could increase the risk of accidents and mission failure."

Just weeks after the F-16 entered service with the Ukrainian military in early August, Ukraine also lost its first Fighting Falcon reportedly due to pilot error.

Understanding the Training Needed to Fly the F-16

Colonel Alex Mahon, United States Air Force (ret.), a fighter pilot with decades of instructor pilot (IP) experience, offered insight into the basics of F-16 training.

"The core training is done in the 'Conversion Phase,' learning how the basic systems work: engine, hydraulics, electronics, etc.; takeoff; landing; acrobatics; taking the airframe to its inner and outer limits of flyability; instrument flying; getting the 'feel' of the aircraft so you can hear it when it talks to you," Mahon explained in an email to The National Interest.

"Notwithstanding the very little I know about today's MiG/Su fighter aircraft, I am confident that a fighter pilot who can stick-and-rudder a Russian fighter can handle an F-16. It's akin to a guy who drives a 1992 Ford F-150. The 2024 Lincoln he rents at the airport may have more buttons and hidden comm features, but he'll figure it out and get where he needs to go," Mahon added.

Mahon further described that the United States Air Force focuses on the "procedures" (the "what") and the "techniques" (the "how"). These are important distinctions.

"Everyone flying a particular aircraft will follow the book procedures, e.g., flying down initial at 1,500 feet AGL/300 kts.; pull the power back, roll into a 60-degree bank turn, and pull 2 Gs for 180 degrees to downwind; lower the gear when abeam the intended touchdown point; descending turn to 'final' when the runway threshold is 45 degrees behind your shoulder; roll out on final 1 mile from the threshold; 2½ degree glideslope; slow to calculated airspeed/AOA bracketed; touchdown 1,000 feet from the threshold; aerobrake until 90 kts.; etc.," said Mahon.

"'Technique' is how any particular pilot controls the aircraft to meet those procedural parameters," the instructor continued. "The Ukrainian pilots were taught USAF F-16 'procedures.' Their individualized 'techniques,' learned/honed over time/experience in Russian fighters, should translate well and will inform them how to meet the procedural requirements."

Continuity is extremely important, Mahon further emphasized.

"I need to be able to fly at least three days per week to keep my head and hands in the game. An average training sortie takes almost five hours to complete—start pre-flight briefing two hours before takeoff time; fly about 1.5 hours/700 miles; land and regroup/take a pee/get a Coke—30 minutes; debrief the entire flight performance in great depth = 1 hour)," he noted while suggesting that even if the training can be abridged, it really can't be rushed.

"These missions are quite arduous—the average trainee can't handle more than one a day," warned Mahon. "The flying schedule would be built around the 'average' student—if I was a quick learner, flying four times a week could speed things up. Conversely, if performance was marginal, extra sorties/more time to reach the target competence level might be required."

Thank you to Col. Mahon for his insight.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

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En désavouant la décision du président Joseph Biden de livrer des missiles à longue portée à l'Ukraine, M. Donald Trump a confirmé qu'il entendait, sur ce dossier, rompre avec les priorités de son prédécesseur. Dans les autres régions du monde, « l'Amérique d'abord » signifiera l'extorsion de concessions (...) / États-Unis, Géopolitique, Armée, Matières premières, Relations bilatérales - 2025/01

When one thinks of America’s baddest units to serve in the Vietnam War, chances are the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF, aka “Green Berets”) and Rangers, along with the U.S. Navy SEALs, come immediately to mind.

However, not so many people realize that even the “kinder, gentler” U.S. Air Force (USAF) had its own band of rough and ready ground-pounders who took the fight to the Communist enemy in Vietnam. We now recognize the USAF’s Combat Security Police (CSP) units.

Origins

Among other things, the Vietnam War ushered in a new type of threat to U.S. airbases in forward deployed locations. Clearly defined front lines and safe rear areas were absent. Thus, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) targeted air bases on a regular basis and destroyed a large number of aircraft early in the war. Ergo, the USAF was forced to redirect its attention from internal security to providing a well-trained, well-armed, and highly motivated combat security police force capable of repelling raids by experienced enemy sapper units.

Thus, it came to pass that the 1041st USAF Security Police Squadron (Test) was formed at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Designated by the codename "Operation Safeside,” the 1041st USAF SPS (T) first arrived “in-country” at Phu Cat Air Base on January 13, 1967. A year later, it would be succeeded by the 82nd Combat Security Police Wing’s 821st Combat Security Police Squadron (CSPS) and 822nd CSPS (the 823rd CSPS would follow in 1969).

Operational History/Combat Performance

When I was a 1st Lieutenant attending the Security Forces Officer Course at Lackland AFB, Texas, back in 2004, one of the noncommissioned officers in my instructor cadre stated that these CSP units actually had the highest kill-to-loss ratio of any American military unit in the Vietnam War. Alas, I haven’t been able to find any independent corroboration of that lofty claim. Nonetheless, the CSPs definitely made an impact.  

This was most starkly demonstrated on January 21, 1968, during the Tet Offensive, more specifically during the concurrent defense of two key South Vietnamese airbases: Tan Son Nhut Airbase and Bien Hoa. The excellent 2014 book Sky-Cops and Peacekeepers: Uniforms and Equipment of the USAF Air Police and Security Police, tells the story better than I can, starting with Tan Son Nhut:

“The only thing between some 1500 VC and the flight line was bunker 051, manned by five Security Policeman [sic]; Sergeants Louis R. Fisher [actually, Louis Harold “Lou” Fischer], William J. Cyr, Charles E. Hebron, Roger B. Mills, and twenty-one-year-old Alonzo Coggins … Soon Fisher, Cyr, Hebron, and Mills were all killed. Coggins would survive but was badly wounded. He took cover among the bodies of his dead buddies … Before they stopped counting, Airmen from the 377 SPS noted 962 enemy bodies inside and immediately outside the TSN perimeter.”

Meanwhile, at Bien Hoa:

“At 0320 hours, CSC received notification that Bunker 10 was under a vicious attack by approximately 1,500 enemy troops. At Bein [sic] Hoa there were 350 SP’s and 75 augmentees to blunt the attack, a nearly five-to-one advantage for Charlie … Security Police casualties were two dead, including an augmentee and 10 wounded. Inside the base perimeter, 139 VC were killed and 25 taken prisoner.”

Multiple well-deserved decorations (sadly many of them posthumous) for heroism were awarded to SPs as a result of these two battles: twelve Silver Stars; twenty Bronze Stars with “V” for valor; one Legion of Merit, awarded to Col. Billy Jack Carter; and one Air Force Cross, the USAF’s second-highest decoration, and the first of its kind to be awarded to a non-aviator, Capt. Reginald V. “Reggie” Maisey (regrettably, his Medal of Honor nomination was disapproved).

CSP Legacy

Today, the Louis H. Fischer Award is awarded to the top graduate of the USAF Security Forces Academy Security Apprentice Course (i.e., the enlisted Air Force cops’ technical training course). Mind you, merely being the top graduate of the class doesn’t automatically guarantee a trainee the Fischer Award; you have to earn a 97 percent academic test score average, receive zero derogatory paperwork, pass all evaluations on the first attempt, qualify as an “Expert” with the M17 (SIG P320 9mm) service pistol and M4 carbine (back in my day it was the Beretta M9 pistol and full-size M16A2 rifle), and be recommended by a primary instructor cadre and military training leaders.

(A top graduate of a given class who doesn’t meet these stringent requirements instead receives the Top Performer Award, which is still a tremendous honor in its own right.)

I myself was a recipient of the Sgt. Louis H. Fischer Award back on February 4, 2000, when I graduated from the Security Forces Academy with the inaugural Team 11 of the 343rd Training Squadron. I was twenty-four years old at the time, and now, twenty-five years later, I still consider that one of the proudest achievements of my entire life.

As far as current units are concerned, the legacy was proudly revived at Moody AFB, Georgia, on March 27, 1997, in the manifestation of the 820th Security Forces Group, which was officially renamed the 820th Base Defense Group (BDG) on October 1, 2010. According to the Moody AFB 23rd Wing Public Affairs Office, the 820th BDG serves as “the Air Force's sole unit organized, trained and equipped to conduct integrated base defense in high-threat areas.”

(For anybody wondering about the semantics, the name of the Security Police career field was officially changed to Security Forces on Halloween Day 1997. Personally, I’m not fond of the newer moniker; in my opinion, “Security Forces” as opposed to “Security Police” makes us sound like the East German Stasi or Saddam Hussein’s Mukhabarat, as “SF” makes us sound like wannabe Green Berets as opposed to the Blue Berets that we actually are. But I digress.)

To the old-school CSPs and present-day 820th BDG SF troops alike, a hearty “HOOAH!”

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

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Canada finds itself in a sticky geopolitical situation. The incoming Trump administration seems to believe that it is going to at some point annex Canada. Meanwhile, the Russians are breathing down Canada’s neck in the Arctic, with the Russian military challenging Canada for dominance over key strategic points in the High North.

Ottawa also faces a territorial dispute with Washington over portions of the Northwest Passage, which is quickly evolving into a key strategic waterway.

To better combat these threats, the Canadian government has announced its intention to build twelve nuclear-powered submarines that will be dedicated to securing Canada’s vast interests in the Arctic. There’s only a small problem: Most experts I have spoken with are skeptical that the Canadian bid to build twelve Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines will ever happen. And, even if it does, it is unlikely to occur in any meaningful timeframe. 

Our North, Strong and Free?

Ottawa is calling the program “Our North, Strong and Free,” and it is billed as a comprehensive strategy of deterrence. But Canada’s problems are much deeper than just being unable to field submarines. 

Currently, Canada's navy is in shambles. Last summer, for instance, a Canadian warship dispatched to the U.S.-organized RIMPAC military exercises at Hawaii had been sidelined from the Pacific exercise due to a major cooling water leak onboard. In fact, multiple headlines have proliferated since last summer about the massive flooding problems with Canada’s warships. What happened in Hawaii was not an isolated incident.

That’s to say nothing of the personnel crisis affecting the Canadian Navy. Basically, Canada’s navy is not attracting talent in any meaningful way. Canada’s military is, therefore, withering both in terms of platforms and personnel.

Oh, and the Canadian submarine force is especially laughable. Currently, the Royal Canadian Navy operates just four Victoria-class diesel-electric submarines. When these subs aren’t being repaired in port, they are deployed to distant locations in the Pacific, taking them far away from the far more important (for Canada, at least) strategic zone of the Arctic. 

That’s part of the reason behind the Canadian investment in the twelve new AIP-breathing submarines.

The new submarines for Canada’s Arctic strategy are specifically designed to stay under the ice for protracted periods. Meanwhile, the first submarines are to be deployed by the mid-2030s, around the same time that the Victoria-class subs are set to be decommissioned. Yet, given the aforementioned problems with Canada’s defense industrial base, the likelihood that this program will ever get moving beyond the conceptual phase—or that the twelve submarines will be built—is very low.

Real Problems 

And the longer the Canadians wait, the greater the chance they will lose their claim on the Arctic—if not officially, then unofficially—as both the Russians and Americans move to dominate the region. 

At the same time, there are so many structural issues within Canada’s defense industrial base as well as its overall defense community that the idea the country could ever muster a real challenge to a true near-peer rival, such as China, is laughable. 

Bottom line: the Canadian Navy is broken. It will not be repaired any time soon. Expect more, not fewer, egregious problems as the Canadian Royal Navy continues its downward spiral. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

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Just days into the New Year, Kyiv launched a fresh offensive in the Russian Kursk Oblast, reportedly catching the Kremlin's forces off guard on Sunday. According to commentary from social media, columns of Ukrainian armored vehicles advanced toward the village of Bolshoe Soldatskoe, after clearing mines overnight.

Rob Lee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute shared images of the Ukrainian forces on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter, citing commentary from pro-Kremlin military bloggers. Lee posted, "Some Russian channels have been warning recently of a Ukrainian build up near Kursk and a potential offensive."

Fierce fighting had occurred throughout the weekend with dozens of engagements. However, the size of the operation remains unclear.

"Ukrainian and Western military analysts said that the attacks could be a deliberate attempt at misdirection, trying to force Russian troops to shore up defenses there in the hopes of weakening them on the front line in Ukrainian territory," The New York Times reported.

The paper of record added, "Although Ukraine now holds less than half of the territory it seized in the Kursk offensive last summer, it has managed in recent weeks to slow Russia's advances despite repeated waves of Russian counterattacks, including assaults bolstered by thousands of North Korean soldiers."

Kyiv's invasion of Kursk, which began last August, was the first ground invasion into Russia since World War II. It caught the Kremlin largely off guard, and despite repeated counteroffensives, Ukraine has managed to maintain a foothold in the Russian Oblast. The counteroffensive has been seen as a major embarrassment for Russia.

General Winter is Engaged

Throughout history, armies have often hunkered down during the winter—but that hasn't always been the case in Russia, where both sides have taken advantage of the frozen ground.

The current offensive serves as a reminder of the First Winter Campaign that the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) carried out against the Bolsheviks during the Ukrainian-Soviet War in late 1919 and early 1920. The campaign, which has earned comparisons to General George Washington's raid on Trenton on December 26, 1776, had a similar impact. It raised the spirit of the UPR's forces when it needed it most.

This new offensive could have a similar result.

"The Russians in Kursk are experiencing great anxiety because they were attacked from several directions and it came as a surprise to them," Ukraine's top counter-disinformation official Andriy Kovalenko wrote on the Telegram social messaging app.

Kyiv may need to show that it isn't out of the fight and the rumors of its impending defeat are being greatly exaggerated.  As the BBC also reported, "Kyiv's forces are reportedly suffering from manpower shortages and have been losing ground in the east of Ukraine in recent months, as Russian troops advance."

Taking the fight to Russia won't deliver a knock-out blow, but it could show the Ukrainian people—and the West—that the Kremlin hasn't won yet. The timing of the attack came just over two weeks before President-elect Donald Trump is set to take office. He has vowed to end the war quickly, without explaining how he will do so but most believe it would involve pulling U.S. support while encouraging Kyiv to cede territory to Moscow.

It was in October that U.S. military analyst Michael Kofman suggested that Russia's numbers advantage could significantly diminish in 2025 —which helps explain why Moscow has had to turn to North Korea to bolster its numbers. Given that fact, Ukraine may be seeking to gain ground should it be forced to the peace table.

A Truly Cold War

As previously reported, winter has long been one of the greatest allies of the Russian people. Known as "General Winter" or "General Frost," cold harsh weather has been credited with helping defeat foreign invaders.

The cold had played a significant role in the Swedish invasion of 1707, the French invasion under Napoleon in 1812, the Allied intervention in Russia in 1918-1919, and most notably, the German invasion in 1941. However, the cold also aided Kyiv in the late winter of 2022 after Russia launched its unprovoked invasion—and it may now be helping Ukraine in its current offensive operations in Kursk.

It is also likely that the attack was mounted before the spring and the arrival of the "Rasputitsa," the Russian term for the late fall and early spring seasons of the year when travel on unpaved roads across the vast open plains becomes difficult.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Seneline / Shutterstock.com

Ancien ambassadeur de Singapour aux Nations unies — dont il a présidé le Conseil de sécurité en janvier 2001 et en mai 2002 —, le professeur Kishore Mahbubani avance une analyse singulière de la situation politique internationale. Au réflexe atlantiste des médias occidentaux, il oppose une connaissance (...) / Chine, Géopolitique, Diplomatie, Relations internationales - 2025/01

The consensus among historians, journalists, and analysts has long been that President Jimmy Carter’s four-year presidency was a low point in a decent man’s century-long life. In fact, the implicit rap on Carter was that he brought a naïvete to public office that, at best, required a certain moral flexibility. Now that Carter has passed at the age of 100, this simplistic and conventional narrative of his presidency should be reassessed. 

Let’s not forget that the voters chose Carter’s principled approach in the 1976 election because of the long national disillusionment surrounding the JFK and MLK assassinations, LBJ and Nixon’s dishonest debacle in Vietnam, Nixon’s criminal activities during Watergate, and Gerald Ford’s trashing the rule of law by pardoning his predecessor even before charges were filed. Voters yearned to bring back some semblance of morality and honesty to government. 

Upon arriving in office, Carter was so squeaky clean that he refused to intimidate lawmakers or horse-trade with Congress to adopt policies on his agenda. If Republican Richard Nixon is regarded as the last progressive president before Barack Obama, Democrat Carter was the first conservative president since Calvin Coolidge. Carter laid the basis for more conservative policies before Ronald Reagan perfected the sales pitch. In addition to opposing interest groups feeding at the public trough, Carter championed limiting the federal government, cutting the federal budget, deregulating industries, and greater local and personal responsibility. He believed welfare eroded the family and the work ethic. 

In a herculean effort, Carter fully or partially deregulated four sectors of the economy: finance, communication, energy, and transportation, making them more efficient. At first, Carter contributed to the inflation left over from the Vietnam War and Nixon’s permissive monetary policy. However, Carter then appointed inflation hawk Paul Volcker as Fed chairman, who slammed on the monetary brakes, which caused a soft economy and then a recession but made possible the economic growth during Reagan’s administration.

Analysts have rightly claimed that Reagan defeated Carter in the 1980 election because of stagflation (a sluggish economy and inflation) and the Iran hostage crisis. In the long term, Carter helped solve both of those crises, but at election time, the results weren’t in yet. In the hostage crisis, he didn’t fall victim to the hawks’ criticism that he should attack Iran, which would have gotten the hostages killed. Of course, at election time, this made him look weak. Reagan apparently succeeded in delaying the release of the hostages until after he was elected president, but Carter had negotiated their release. 

Even Carter’s substantial domestic achievements were eclipsed by his foreign policy successes. His negotiation of the Camp David peace accords and Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is one of the few lasting peace agreements in the Middle East (even the later Oslo accords have failed). Disregarding the hawks, Carter ended the embarrassing U.S. colonial presence in the Canal Zone in the middle of sovereign Panama. Furthermore, Richard Nixon’s opening to China got all the attention, but the improvement of relations between the United States and China languished until Carter formally recognized China. Finally, Carter signed the SALT II agreement with the Soviets, which limited nuclear arms but was never ratified by the Senate. Nonetheless, both countries abided by its terms.

In my book, Recarving Rushmore: Ranking the Presidents on Peace, Prosperity, and Liberty, which ranks the presidents on the end results of their policies, I found that no president was perfect. Carter was no exception. He overreacted to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, believing that the Soviets were making a play for Persian Gulf oil. In reality, Moscow was trying to support its client government in Kabul and prevent a potential Islamist revolution from spreading into the Soviet Union. Yet, Carter boycotted the Olympics in Moscow, instituted a grain embargo that merely hurt American farm exports, and proclaimed the “Carter Doctrine,” which stated the United States would use military force to secure its vital national interests (read: oil) in the Persian Gulf against an outside power trying to control it. 

In the end, although subsequent presidents could have disavowed the doctrine, especially after the Cold War ended, they unfortunately and eagerly embraced it by building up U.S. forces around the Gulf. This included the needless meddling in the Iran-Iraq War, including conducting the “tanker war” in the Gulf against Iran and two Gulf Wars later against Iraq. Yet Carter and subsequent presidents should have realized that the best and cheapest way to obtain oil is by paying the world market price. Finally, Carter was so scarred by the Iranian Revolution’s oil price hikes that he fully embraced the canard of the need for U.S. energy independence and attempted to popularize expensive synthetic fuels via the boondoggle of the failed Synfuels Corporation.

However, in sum, Carter can rightly be celebrated for his many heroic deeds after leaving the White House. Still, his presidential accomplishments in foreign and domestic policy should not be neglected—which they often are—because they vastly outstripped his more limited failures.

Ivan R. Eland is a Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute and Director of the Independent Institute’s Center on Peace & Liberty. Dr. Eland graduated from Iowa State University with an M.B.A. in applied economics and a Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University.

Image: Consolidated News Photos / Shutterstock.com.

President-elect Donald Trump’s recent lament that the United States ceded control of the Panama Canal to Panama under the Carter administration is both strategically sound and historically resonant. Trump, the most consequential conservative president since Ronald Reagan, shares with the Gipper both an instinctual understanding of U.S. national interests and, more specifically, a healthy skepticism about the logic of ceding the American-built canal.

Trump’s recent comments echo closely those of Reagan during the 1978 debate over the ratification of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties that ended U.S. sovereignty over the canal. Reagan, preparing to challenge Jimmy Carter in the 1980 election, said he would “talk as long and as loud as I can against it” and warned presciently that “I think that basically the world is not going to see this [giving away the canal] as a magnanimous gesture on our part, as the White House would have us believe.”

Like many of Trump’s foreign policy initiatives, Reagan’s persistent opposition to the cession of the canal earned him the derision of the foreign policy cognoscenti of his day. Even William F. Buckley, Jr., the patron saint of the modern conservative movement, broke with Reagan and supported returning the canal to Panama. Yet Reagan, like Trump, understood the American interest in the canal went beyond U.S. relations with the Panamanians or the potential for gaining an amorphous quantum of “goodwill” from the Third World (today, often called the “Global South”) by granting local control.

First, as in Reagan’s time, the Panama Canal today serves essential military purposes for the United States, which alone justify continued American control. Moving the preponderance of U.S. naval power in a crisis from the East to West Coasts and eventually into the Pacific Theater itself will require unobstructed access to the canal. This was the early twentieth-century logic that compelled President Theodore Roosevelt to undertake its construction in the first place and that dictated the dimensions of U.S. naval ship construction well into this century to ensure naval vessels were capable of traversing the canal’s lock system. While today’s ships are larger and warfare more complex, the basic necessity of moving significant naval tonnage along the shortest route remains unchanged since the canal’s completion in 1914. 

Second, like during the Cold War, the canal is on the front lines of great power rivalry, this time between the United States and China. While Washington has been mired in forever wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a Hong-Kong-based company acquired two of Panama’s five principal ports and is constructing a deep-water port, cruise terminal, and a fourth bridge across the canal. As is the case from Africa to the South Pacific, China uses such infrastructure to gain coercive economic and political control, as manifested in its pressure campaign to force Panama to cease recognizing Taiwan in 2017. It would be the height of naïveté to assume Beijing’s interest in Panama and the canal has nothing to do with the strategic significance of the waterway for U.S. national defense. 

Finally, Reagan saw U.S. control of the canal as directly related to American influence on the world stage and the seriousness with which Washington’s words were taken in foreign capitals. “What does this say to our allies around the world about our leadership intentions, our international role, about our own view of our national defense capability?” Reagan asked during the debate over the canal’s transfer. Like his predecessor, Trump appears to view the ability of the United States to influence and counter adversary influence over the canal as a test case for Washington’s global sway. If one of the great marvels of American engineering know-how and national grit can be recklessly handed away, in spite of all strategic logic, and placed under the perpetual threat of foreign interference, what message would be sent to adversaries from Tehran to Moscow to Pyongyang?

Trump’s comments suggesting a possible American reacquisition of the canal were met with predictable howls from Washington think tanks and even Chinese Communist Party propaganda rags. Yet our forty-fifth and forty-seventh president, much like the fortieth president before him, possesses an innate sense of America’s core national interests, which seems to elude Washington’s great and good. As Trump returns to the Oval Office, this discernment will find a world in desperate need of an American president willing to pursue controversial causes for the strategic advantage of his country and the safety of its citizens. 

Alexander Gray served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff of the White House National Security Council, 2019–21.

Image: Jose Mario Espinoza / Shutterstock.com.

Last February, images of Russian President Vladimir Putin sitting in the pilot’s seat of a Russian Tupolev Tu-160M long-range strategic bomber have gone viral across Russian social media. Putin was celebrating the fact that the legendary Soviet-era United Aircraft Corporation’s Tupolev Design Bureau was significantly upgrading its iconic “White Swan” bomber. Just a few weeks ago, the Russian Aerospace Forces received the first tranche of these upgraded birds. 

As the Ukraine War progresses and Russia’s strategic situation becomes more tenuous in the face of Western resistance, the Russian military has embraced a rapid modernization program that is nothing short of stunning (especially considering the, frankly, ridiculous claims from Western media sources that sanctions would break the back of Russia’s economy and defense industrial base).

Equipped with new NK-32-02 engines, with a reported maximum speed of over Mach 2.05, the swept-wing long-range strategic bomber has an entirely new lease on its storied life. Tupolev retained the variable-sweep wing design that its predecessor sported, allowing for the bird to adapt to subsonic or supersonic speeds. What’s more, the combination of its original variable-sweep wing design coupled with its NK-32-02 engines, the Tu-160M White Swans now have a wildly extended strike range and maneuverability, as well as an impressive speed.

Understanding The Tu-160M

In terms of her armaments, the Tu-160M is a highly formidable warbird, carrying up to twelve cruise missiles, including the nuclear-capable Kh-55 series and the newer Kh-101 and Kh-102 long-range air-launched cruise missiles. Each of these classes of cruise missiles has been modernized to incorporate enhanced stealth features, such as reduced radar cross-sections, allowing for these weapons to penetrate enemy air defense systems more reliably. Its progenitor was nuclear-capable, and Tupolev ensured that the Tu-160M had a versatile weapon capacity, meaning these birds could fly with both conventional and nuclear weapons in her bomb bays.

Advanced cruise missiles and gravity bombs allow for missions that are variegated and equally lethal to Russia’s enemies.

Tupolev’s advances for the Tu-160M involve multiple mechanical upgrades. More importantly, though, Tupolev has bettered the bird’s avionics, navigation, and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The aircraft now features a glass cockpit and unique technological accouterments, such as the Novella NV1.70 radar system as well as anti-jamming equipment, providing pilots with an insane amount of situational awareness and a greater ability to penetrate enemy air defenses to deliver killing blows with their robust onboard ordnance.

The Tu-160M’s role in Russia’s nuclear triad (which includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBMs) is pivotal. The White Swan’s ability to launch a variety of weapons at standoff distances makes this bird a key element in Russia’s nuclear deterrence. It was a smart move by Moscow to authorize the modernization program that Tupolev wanted for their Tu-160s.

The History of the Tu-160M

These birds can be traced all the way back to the heady days of the Cold War. When Soviet Russia collapsed, so too did the power of the Soviet military machine. The successor government of the Russian Federation tried to maintain as much of that legendary military prowess as possible.

Still, the Tu-160’s production line was halted in 1992 as a direct result of the USSR’s implosion. Moscow eventually restarted production on the birds in 2015, unveiling the Tu-160M (which ultimately flew in January 2022).

A Significant Challenger For The U.S.

Tu-160Ms have been showcased across multiple Russian areas of operation, most notably in the Arctic, a region that Moscow has highlighted as their most strategically significant zone since 2008. Indeed, when I briefed the Air Force intelligence team three years ago at Joint Base McChord, I was informed of intercepts involving the Tu-160 off the coast of Alaska, marking a significant escalation by Russia in the Arctic.

Washington has erred significantly in antagonizing the post-Soviet regime in Russia. We were told that the Russians did not matter anymore geopolitically and that they could easily be ignored and pushed around.

Indeed, this assumption formed the basis of U.S. foreign policy in Eurasia for the last thirty years. The evolution of the mighty Tu-160M is but one more example of how wrong those assumptions were—and how Americans today have been made less safe because of it. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: FastTailWind / Shutterstock.com.

For the second time in just over a month, a United States Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carrier has made a port-of-call visit to Port Klang Cruise Terminal, Malaysia. The Nimitz-class USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) arrived on Sunday. The visit follows that of USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), which arrived at the same terminal on November 23.

“Malaysia is a key partner for us in the Indo-Pacific. Our visit reinforces the importance of this partnership to the United States,” said Rear Adm. Michael Wosje, commander of Carrier Strike Group ONE (CSG-1). “Visiting Port Klang provides us with an important and unique opportunity to collaborate with our Royal Malaysian Navy counterparts, continuing to build upon our strategic and mutually beneficial partnership, while also providing our Sailors well-deserved downtime to explore the area and build connections within the community.”

“The back-to-back visits of the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group and the USS Abraham Lincoln to Malaysia underscore the depth and strength of our security ties­an enduring cornerstone of the U.S.-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership,” added U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia Edgard D. Kagan. “Building on decades of close collaboration, we continue to bolster our security partnership and remain committed to working with Malaysia to advance our shared vision of a free, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.”

Moving Past The “Fat Leonard” Scandal

The back-to-back carrier visits could be a sign that the United States Navy is moving past the unfortunate scandal involving Leonard “Fat Leonard” Francis, whose company Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA), previously operated the Malaysian Port Klang facility when it was known as the Glenn Cruise Terminal.

The corruption scandal—described as the largest in U.S. Navy history—involved nine members of the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet, who were indicted in 2017 on charges of conspiracy and bribery. GDMA consistently overcharged the U.S. Navy for goods and services. Francis had been due for sentencing in 2022 after acknowledging that he masterminded a decade-long bribery scheme in which officials were given millions of dollars in bribes and other luxury gifts.

As previously reported, in November, Francis was sentenced to fifteen years for overcharging the U.S. Navy $35 million for his company’s services. However, he skipped that sentencing and fled the country. U.S. officials lured him to Venezuela last year, and he was brought back to the country. In addition to the fifteen-year prison sentence, his company was sentenced to five years of probation and was fined $36 million.

“Mr. Francis’ sentencing brings closure to an expansive fraud scheme that he perpetrated against the U.S. Navy with assistance from various Navy officials. This fraud conspiracy ultimately cost the American taxpayer millions of dollars and weakened the public’s trust in some of our Navy's senior leaders. Mr. Francis’ actions not only degraded the 7th Fleet’s readiness but shook the Fleet's trust in its leadership who furthered his corrupt practices,” said Kelly P. Mayo, director of the U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).

According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the overarching fraud and bribery case had resulted in federal criminal charges against thirty-four U.S. Navy officials, defense contractors, and Francis’ company, GDMA. The felony convictions of four former U.S. Navy officers were vacated, however, following allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.

More Visits To Come

Prior to the visit of CVN-72 in November, the last U.S. carrier to visit Port Klang was USS George Washington (CVN-73) in October 2012. It would seem that with Francis sentenced and heading to prison, the U.S. Navy is again looking to forge closer ties with Malaysia.

“On behalf of America’s Favorite Aircraft Carrier, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to the people of Port Klang and Kuala Lumpur for welcoming the Sailors of USS Carl Vinson with such enthusiasm and warm hospitality,” said Capt. Matthew Thomas, commanding officer, USS Carl Vinson. “We are delighted to welcome Malaysian Navy and government officials aboard Vinson, and we are grateful for the opportunity to immerse ourselves in the rich history and culture of Malaysia.”

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

December 12, 2024, marked the end of an era of the proud history of the British Royal Navy’s submarine service. As noted by The Lochside Press:

HMS Triumph, the last of the Royal Navy’s Trafalgar-Class attack submarines, sailed for the final time from Faslane this week…HMS Triumph sailed into Plymouth Sound today, to her home port of HM Naval Base Devonport…It was the final voyage by the nuclear-powered submarine and Triumph flew her decommissioning pennant as she was escorted by tugboats and vessels from the naval base…Commander Aaron Williams, HMS Triumph’s Commanding Officer, said: ‘As HMS Triumph prepares to decommission, we reflect on her legacy with immense pride…The submarine has served not just as a vessel, but as a symbol of commitment, courage, and camaraderie…And while this chapter of HMS Triumph’s story ends, her spirit will endure in the memories of all who served aboard her, and in the gratitude of the nation she helped protect.’

As my fellow naval history buffs are well aware, the word “Trafalgar” stirs much pride in the hearts of Royal Navy sailors past & present, as the Battle of Trafalgar is not only one of Great Britain’s greatest naval victories but indeed one of the most strategically decisive naval battles of all time. So, we at The National Interest reckon this is as good a time as any to tell the story of the submarine class that bore the Trafalgar name.

Trafalgar-Class Submarine Early History and Specifications

The Trafalgar-class boats were designed as successors to the Swiftsure class and designated as “hunter-killers” within the Royal Navy’s nuclear submarine force. The lead ship of the class was (appropriately enough) the HMS Trafalgar (Pennant No. S107), which was laid down on April 15, 1979, launched on July 1, 1981, and commissioned on May 27, 1983. She was followed by six more ships in the class: HMS Turbulent (1984), HMS Tireless (1985), HMS Torbay (1987), HMS Trenchant (1989), HMS Talent (1990), and HMS Triumph (1991).

Built by Vickers Shipbuilding & Engineering Ltd., Barrow-in-Furness, Cumbria, UK, the Trafalgar subs had the following technical specifications: a surface displacement of 4800 tons, a hull length of 85.4 meters, and a maximum speed of thirty-two knots. 

Operational History and Combat Performance

Three warships of this mighty class have fired their TLAMs at targets in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Indeed, HMS Trafalgar, in particular, made history as the first Royal Navy sub to launch Tomahawks against Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, doing so as part of Operation Veritas in 2001.

Regarding HMS Triumph specifically, she played a key role in the 2011 military intervention in Libya, firing her missiles at Muammar Qaddafi’s forces on three different occasions: March 19, March 20, and March 24, with her primary targets being the Libyan air defense installations around the city of Sabha.

Triumph also made history in a peacetime operation in 1993, whereupon she conducted a 41,000-mile (66,000 kilometers) submerged transit to Australia, the longest unsupported solo passage of any nuclear submarine.

Where Are They Now?

Out with the old, in with the news: the Trafalgars are being replaced by the Astute-class undersea warships. Alas, there are no known plans to preserve any of the Trafalgar-class subs for posterity as museum ships. The first six ships of the class are a 3 Basin in Davenport, idly waiting the requisite decades for their reactors to fully cool before finally being dismantled.

HMS Triumph will eventually be sent to 3 Basin as well. In the meantime, officially remain in service with the Royal Navy until the official decommissioning ceremony, due to be held sometime this month. After that pomp and circumstance is concluded, the proud old vessel will be staffed by a skeleton crew for several more years as on-board systems are shut down and removed. Name plates will be removed from the submarine, at which point she will lose her HMS designation.

Fair winds and following seas, Trafalgar class. You served your King, Queen, and Country well.

About the Author: Christian D. Orr, Defense Expert  

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for the National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can oftentimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

Image: Kev Gregory / Shutterstock.com.

Les groupes armés d'opposition ont pris le contrôle de plus de la moitié du territoire du Myanmar (anciennement Birmanie). La junte revenue au pouvoir par un coup d'État le 1er février 2021 essuie défaites, défections et désertions. Mais qui sont ceux qui lui font face, dans les banlieues industrielles (...) / Birmanie, Guerre civile, Guérilla, Coup d'État, Mouvement de contestation - 2025/01

For all the talk about how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is rising to dominate the Indo-Pacific not only economically but militarily, many often overlook China’s arch historical nemesis and neighbor, Japan.

Sure, China dwarfs Japan in terms of size and its overall economic output, but Japan is probably among the most advanced nations in the whole world. Indeed, the technology Japan possesses is likely (at least for now) far ahead of the technologies currently available either to Chinese citizens or the Chinese military (again, this is already changing and is likely to continue changing over time). 

One area where Japan is lightyears beyond China technically is in its navy. But all the technological advantages of Japan are being utterly wasted by Tokyo on things like its Izumo-class helicopter destroyer. 

That’s because the Izumo-class is really a light aircraft carrier. And, if America’s recent experiences against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen haven’t shown, aircraft carriers are to the modern maritime battlefield what the battleships of yore were to the naval battles of World War II. 

They’re obsolete, no matter how many whizbang technologies the Japanese incorporate into them. 

The Ship

The Izumo-class “helicopter destroyer” is a miniature aircraft carrier. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) possesses two of these ships, the JS Izumo (DDH-183) and JS Kaga (DDH-184). They account for being the largest vessels that Japan has built since the end of World War II. These warships were originally intended for anti-submarine warfare and disaster relief. Tokyo, however, quickly refashioned them into secret aircraft carriers as the Japanese watched China becoming more belligerent at sea. 

Indeed, it is feared that China’s objective of conquering Taiwan is not the end goal of Chinese maritime revanchism, but only the start. Once Taiwan is captured by China’s military, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would have a better chance of successfully blockading China’s major regional rival, Japan. Already, China is outproducing military equipment compared to the Japanese Self-Defense forces.

Ditto even for the militaries of the United States and its other allies.

Japan’s Izumo-class helicopter destroyers displace around 27,000 tons when fully loaded and are comparable in size to light aircraft carriers (that’s actually what they are). The Izumos can accommodate up to twenty-eight helicopters or fourteen larger aircraft. When the boats were primarily used as anti-submarine warfare ships, they had an initial complement of seven SH-60J/K anti-submarine warfare helos and two search-and-rescue helicopters. 

On the flight deck, they can accommodate the launch of up to five helicopters simultaneously. Originally, Japan’s war planners had not intended for fixed-wing aircraft to be deployed from these boats.

Yet, the Japanese designers of the Izumo-class helicopter destroyers included aircraft elevators and deck coatings that hinted at potential fixed-wing aircraft operations in the future. And wouldn’t you know it, with Japan’s purchase of Lockheed Martin’s F-35B Lightning II fifth-generation multirole warplanes, which have vertical-takeoff and landing (VTOL) capabilities, the Izumos are now aircraft carriers in all but name. 

Indeed, by bringing fifth-generation warplanes into their complement of aircraft onboard, the Izumo-class now punches well above its weight as a “helicopter destroyer” warship. 

The Age of the Aircraft Carrier is Over

Here’s the problem, though, that many cheerleaders in the West are missing. It’s the same problem that most Western navies are facing: a lack of reliable production quotas and little ability to overcome China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) advantages.  

Even with a complement of F-35Bs onboard, if the Izumo-class warships were ever deployed into areas of the Indo-Pacific that China covets, they would immediately run into the melee of China’s A2/AD systems that form protective “bubbles” over territories that China holds. 

So, while technically superior to most Chinese PLAN warships, the small number of these boats in Japan’s fleet and the fact that most surface warships are under extreme risk from China’s A2/AD bubbles in the contested Indo-Pacific, means that the JMSDF should seriously rethink its overall strategy involving these helicopter destroyers.

Further, Tokyo, like the other Western powers, has done little to address the Chinese A2/AD threat to its surface warfare fleet.

Even when deployed alongside U.S., British, Australian, or other allied naval powers, the Chinese A2/AD threat to surface warships is so profound and complex that whatever technological advantages the Izumo-class has over its Chinese rivals are less important than the advantages that Beijing’s forces have amassed in the region. A better use of Japanese resources and technological innovation would be developing systems to destroy those Chinese A2/AD systems and to threaten China’s mainland (such as hypersonic weapons). 

Alas, Japan has made the exact same mistakes that all Western navies have made. They are preparing for tomorrow’s wars today using yesterday’s best tactics and strategies. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: viper-zero / Shutterstock.com

For many years, the outlook for the world oil market has rested heavily on China, as it has been by far the most significant driver of demand growth in this century. But now, twenty years after the landmark 2004 surprise, when Chinese demand reached over 3 million barrels per day year-on-year, stoked fears of scarcity and drove up prices, there is a growing consensus that China’s oil demand will soon peak. That does not necessarily mean that global demand will peak shortly thereafter, as it reflects the specifics of the policy context in China. Still, it makes it a lot harder to envision a period of lasting market tightening in the future, which many oil bulls and OPEC+ producers had predicted would take place in the mid-to-late 2020s.

The two largest state-owned oil companies in China, CNPC and Sinopec, both issued studies in December that showed that the demand for transportation-sector goods has already peaked, with total demand set to peak soon. Both expect full-year data for 2024, when released, to show declines in gasoline and highway diesel usage, which has been accelerated by the faster-than-previously-expected gains in sales of electric vehicles (EVs) and the increasing use of natural gas as an alternative fuel for heavy trucks. The only oil-based transportation fuels that are still growing are jet fuel and kerosene. Sinopec forecasts diesel use to fall by 5.5 percent in 2025 from 2024 levels and gasoline use to fall by 2.4 percent. Fully 22 percent of new heavy trucks sold in the first three quarters of 2024 used natural gas as a fuel, and EVs are expected to displace 15 percent of gasoline consumption in 2025 relative to where it would have been otherwise. 

The decline in oil use as a transportation fuel is being more than offset in the short-term by gains in demand for industrial consumption, which Sinopec shows increasing by 55 percent from 2023 to 2035. Still, total demand in their forecast tops out in 2027 and begins a gradual decline as the fall in transportation demand accelerates. CNPC has a slightly more bullish forecast but still shows the peak for total demand being reached in 2060.

Global oil demand forecasts from major agencies like the IEA and OPEC have diverged sharply in recent years, driven in large part by differing assumptions about how much government policies will shift in response to the desire to mitigate climate change. Both have been accused of being influenced by politics and wishful thinking, with the IEA’s baseline scenario envisioning rapid adoption of mitigation measures and OPEC foreseeing a world in which demand growth is adequate to keep most participants in OPEC+ financially comfortable. 

The IEA baseline has global demand peaking by 2030, with the much less realistic “Announced Policies Scenario,” in which all countries meet their stated climate change mitigation goals, showing a peak in 2025. OPEC shows slow growth after 2035 but has no peak. In my opinion, the OPEC forecast is the less credible of the two. The IEA’s baseline is probably still too optimistic (from their perspective) about the impact of mitigation measures on demand. Still, the impact of Chinese policies on demand is now not open to disagreement.

We are still likely to see a wide range of demand outcomes, which will see demand continuing to grow elsewhere after China peaks. In the United States, the incoming Trump administration is set to undo much of what Biden put in place. This may include ending the $7,500 tax credit that subsidizes EV purchases and rolling back Biden’s automobile emissions standards, which would have effectively forced EVs to contribute to half of U.S. passenger vehicle sales by the mid-2030s. 

As India takes China’s place as the largest source of demand growth, government policy remains aimed in a protectionist “make in India” direction with no major incentives to decarbonize transportation. New Delhi is, however, trying to lure Tesla into investing in the country, aiming for its high-end market segment with lower tariffs for expensive cars. One big question at the moment is how the rest of the world will treat lower-end Chinese EVs, given that they have been able to produce some models with prices as low as $12,000. If others do not raise protectionist barriers to Chinese EVs, they could start replacing the inexpensive Japanese and Korean gasoline cars and light trucks that have dominated most developing automotive markets—a move that could bring global peak demand closer.

It is still true that aviation and petrochemical demand for oil in the developing world has a lot of room for growth, which will probably take peak global demand out past 2030, if only for a few years. However, it is much more difficult to envision a future period of renewed concerns about the scarcity of oil without continued demand growth from China. Countries like Russia and Saudi Arabia, which had planned to be able to replenish their coffers with one last period of scarcity and high prices, are likely to be disappointed.

Greg Priddy is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and does consulting work related to political risk for the energy sector and financial clients. Previously, he was director of global oil at Eurasia Group and worked at the U.S. Department of Energy.

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Before Russia launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago, few would have expected the role that small drones and other unmanned aerial systems (UAS) would play on the modern battlefield. However, another popular civilian product of the twenty-first century is now being employed in an unexpected way.

Enter the charge of the electric shooter!

According to a report from Interesting Engineering, "Russian soldiers were filmed using off-road electric scooters to maneuver through the damaged roads during an assault on Toretsk, an industrial city in eastern Ukraine."

The soldiers were able to use the scooters to move rapidly to the front, dodging caters and debris in the roadway. While not exactly "mechanized infantry," the reports suggest the troops were able to move more quickly over a short distance than if they ran.

Scooters in Russia

It is unclear if the scooters were provided to the Russian troops or obtained by the individual soldiers in a nearby city. Electric scooters, which have been a bane or a blessing for many Americans in urban centers, have surged in popularity in Russia.

As many as 245,000 were sold last year, and in Moscow and St. Petersburg, e-scooter rentals have seen remarkable growth—with many residents using them for daily transport instead of cars and taxis in the summer months. However, the quick uptick has resulted in a marked increase in accidents, which led to calls for a ban last year.

Other European cities—with Paris taking the lead in September 2023—have pushed for bans on electric scooters on roads and sidewalks.

Last Month's "Scooter Bomb"

The use of scooters by the Russian soldiers comes just weeks after one was used to kill a top Russian military officer outside his apartment in Moscow.

In mid-December, as Russian Lt. Gen Igor Kirillov, head of the Radiation, Biological, and Chemical Defence Forces, was leaving the building, a scooter packed with explosives exploded, killing the high-ranking officer. So common is the sight of electric scooters on the streets and sidewalks of Moscow that Kirillov likely never gave the seemingly abandoned item outside his apartment building's entryway a second thought—if he noticed it at all.

Ukraine's SBU security service described the general as a " legitimate target," and accused him of carrying out war crimes. That may increase the calls for scooters to be banned, and perhaps Moscow will then send the devices to the front.

History of Using Technology of the Day

It is doubtful that commercially-made scooters will become as common as drones in the war in Ukraine or even in other conflicts. For one thing, even the current rugged "off-road" scooters require a well-traveled, reasonably level path to travel on—and second, charging stations aren't readily available at the front.

However, necessity remains the mother of invention, and soldiers need a way to get to the front quickly. That explains why last summer, another video circulated online that showed around half a dozen golf carts rushing Russian infantry to the front!

It is a reminder that more than a century ago, rumors circulated that French soldiers were "rushed to the front" at the Battle of the Marne in Parisian taxicabs. The story quickly took on legendary status, and in 2014, the French government even honored the centennial of the "Taxis of the Marne" with a parade of ten taxis from the era. The truth is that only about 4,000 of the French 6th Army's 150,000 men rode in taxis—the bulk arrived at the Marne by train.

Yet, less than two years later, 5,000 American troops under the command of General John J. Pershing were sent across the Mexican border in pursuit of Mexican bandit/revolutionary Pancho Villa. Ford trucks carried many of the men on the expedition.

"It was the first time that trucks and aircraft were used in American combat operations," Curbside Classic reported. It wasn't the last, and trucks continue to play a vital role in moving men and materiel. A shortage of Russian trucks has been seen as a problem on par with Russia's shortage of tanks and aircraft.

Later the same year that Pershing used trucks in Mexico, the first tanks rolled into action at the Battle of Somme in September 2016, so maybe in the future we could see some form of militarized scooter take shape. If ordered into action, riding a scooter might beat taking the "shoe leather express."

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
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After nearly three years of heavy fighting in Ukraine, the countryside has become a graveyard of military hardware, notably main battle tanks (MBTs). What is unique about the conflict is how the armored behemoths from essentially different "eras" are now rolling over the same ground, often meeting the same fate.

Platforms that might have been considered obsolete are also used alongside cutting-edge technology—and the newest hardware clearly has the advantage.

That fact was noted as drone operators from the Rarog Battalion of the 24th Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine released a video that allegedly showed four Russian tanks being destroyed by unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the Bakhmut sector earlier this week.

The tanks were T-62s, a model likely older than some of the parents of the current tank crews!

How Did Old Tanks End Up on the Front

Before launching its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine nearly three years ago, the Russian military had the world's largest tank force—at least on paper. However, even then, military analysts saw Russia's tank force as a "paper tiger" as many of the vehicles dated back decades and were kept in storage with little to no ongoing maintenance. Questions were raised as to how many of those antiquated vehicles were operational and how effective tanks from the 1960s would fare on the modern battlefield.

The answers came after Russia was unable to deliver a swift victory in Ukraine, and saw hundreds of its modern MBTs destroyed. As the war dragged on, and losses outpaced the production of new tanks, the Kremlin refurbished those old tanks from the Cold War, returning them to service.

It is apparent that Russia was desperate.

Some of the tanks sent to the front lines would seem better suited in a museum or in a historical reenactment than in modern combat. That certainly included the T-62, a platform that was first introduced more than six decades ago.

Developed from the T-54/55 series Soviet tanks, the T-62 was actually considered a very good tank in its day—and it did introduce many design features that became standard in future Soviet and Russian mass-produced tanks, including the T-72, T-84, and T-90. It has been touted as being easier to operate and easier to maintain, but those are hardly selling points given how outclassed the T-62 is compared to modern platforms—not to mention drones.

To put it in historical perspective, the medium tank was introduced before the United States military even adopted the AR-15/M16 as its standard rifle!

Numbers Matter More Than Capabilities For Russia

Production of the T-62 ended in 1975, with more than 22,000 units being produced. Instead of selling off its old stocks of tanks as newer and more capable models were introduced during the Cold War, the Soviet Union often kept older platforms in reserve.

Yet, those tanks sat for years, and then decades, in storage. Instead of ever cleaning out the arsenals, the stockpile built up, and that's how Russia ended up with a massive number of tanks.

Of the 22,000 produced, Moscow inherited around 2,000, and most remained in open-air storage depots. While the Kremlin did refurbish some in the past decade for service with the Syrian military, as many as 1,200 were still held in reserve.

Quantity Doesn't Mean Quality

Those "vintage" tanks have been steadily making their way to Ukraine to bolster Russia's forces and replace the losses of more modern and capable vehicles.

"They're not great tanks­—and they're definitely inferior to Ukraine's most numerous T-64s and vulnerable to its mines, drones, artillery and missiles. Analyst Andrew Perpetua described the T-62s as 'vaguely useful.' But only by '1980s standards,'" David Axe wrote for Forbes last summer, adding, "But vaguely useful old tanks are the best Russia can get as long as its losses in Ukraine greatly outpace the manufacture of new tanks."

What is surprising, too, is which units have been supplied with the T-62s. It was reported early last year that the 1st Guards Tank Army (1 GTA), ­purported to be Russia's premier tank force, was even equipped with the T-62s to make up for previous losses. The unit had previously been due to receive the next-generation T-14 Armata MBT but instead received the T-62.

This speaks to the desperate situation Russia finds itself in.

However, given that at least four T-62 tanks were lost in recent days should give Russia pause about whether the T-62 is even worse than "vaguely useless." Getting trained crews killed in the latest offensive seems to be an ineffective strategy.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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