Diplomacy & Crisis News

There is no holiday season in Ukraine, where the fighting continues with no respite. While people celebrated Christmas and the holidays around the world, the Russian military was capturing an important settlement in the Donbas.  

Russian Progress in Kurakhove

“Russian forces have likely seized Kurakhove following two months of intensified offensive operations aimed at seizing the settlement and eliminating the Ukrainian salient north and south of the settlement,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest estimate of the war.

Nestled in the Donetsk Oblast, in southeastern Ukraine, Kurakhove was an important part of the Ukrainian defensive line. The Russian military had been trying to capture it for several months now, dedicating large numbers of troops and resources to the operation.

To take the settlement and clear the Ukrainian positions to the north and south of Kurakhove, the Russian military concentrated up to 36,000 troops in the area. Although exact numbers are available, the Russian forces very likely suffered heavy casualties in their efforts to capture Kurakhove. This is mainly due to the fact that the Russian military’s preferred method of offensive is mass infantry attacks.

However, taking Kurakhove doesn’t mean that the Russian military is close to an operational breakthrough. On the contrary, the Russian forces are making slow, and costly, gains, but they struggle to achieve more than tactical progress. On the other end, the Ukrainian military usually defends a position for as long as it can before falling back to a better-defended position to continue the fight.

“Russian forces may struggle to advance rapidly further west of Kurakhove along the H-15 Kurakhove-Pokrovske highway should Ukrainian forces choose to defend in the Kurakhivska TPP and Russian forces fail to outflank Ukrainian positions in the TPP near Dachne or Ulakly,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed.

The Russian forces lost a lot of men in their attempt to capture Kurakhove, and that can stem immediate further advances in the region.

Russian Casualties

Meanwhile, the Russian forces continue to take heavy casualties on the ground. Over the past twenty-four hours, the Russian military, paramilitary units, and pro-Russian separatist forces lost approximately 1,650 troops killed or wounded. In addition, the Russian invaders lost around eighty-two tactical vehicles and fuel trucks, twenty-eight unmanned aerial systems, twenty-two artillery guns and multiple launch rocket systems, eighteen infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, fourteen main battle tanks, one air defense weapon system, and one piece of special equipment.

Overall, the Russian forces have lost approximately 785,000 troops in the fighting, with over 200,000 killed and more than 580,000 wounded.

Despite these heavy casualties, Russian president Vladimir Putin and his military leadership have chosen a strategy of attrition. They are content with losing thousands of troops a day and tens of thousands of troops every month as long as that translates into tactical gains on the battlefield. Since the Russian military is incapable of achieving an operational breakthrough via maneuver warfare, attritional tactics, such as human wave attacks, are the Kremlin’s only reasonable option.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Dmytro Larin / Shutterstock.com

Earlier in December, an A-10 Thunderbolt II close air support aircraft made a rare appearance in southeast Asia in what could be a picture from the future.

The American aircraft worked with the Philippine Air Force, sending a clear message to China.

A-10s in the Indo-Pacific

Between December 9 and 13, U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II close support aircraft from the 25th Fighter Squadron completed a Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) as part of a bilateral exercise with the Philippine Air Force. The American aircraft operated alongside Philippine’s A-29B Super Tucanos, another close air support aircraft, and other conventional and special operations aircraft.

“DFE’s are important because it allows us to project airpower at the time and place of our choosing with as small footprint as possible at the location we conduct these DFE’s at,” Maj. Gregory St. Clair, Pacific Air Forces chief of future operations, said in a press release. “In addition to that it allows us to train closely with our allies and partners which is our greatest strength.”

The Philippines is a key U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific. Too close to China for comfort, the Philippines looks to the United States to ensure its sovereignty in the region. In exchange, the United States has a willing ally and a great expeditionary base for its aircraft, warships, and other assets.

“Flying with the Philippine Air Force has been incredible; I was blown away by how willing they were to work and engage with us to continue to strengthen this alliance we have in the Indo-Pacific. We continue to promote stability and freedom to all our partners in the region,” Capt. Ben Burmester, 25th Fighter Squadron project officer, stated.

The 25th Fighter Squadron participated in the training event with eight A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft.

“The main goal of this DFE was to show we are super close with our allies and partners so that we can train and be effective together,” added Major St. Clair. “DFE’s are not a new concept and we will continue to do them in the future and we’re only going to get stronger by continuing to do them.”

The A-10 Thunderbolt II is beloved by ground forces. It is, after all, a dedicated close air support aircraft that can bring impressive firepower and save the day for a beleaguered ground unit. A-10 Thunderbolt IIs saved many an infantry and special operations unit in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the A-10 Thunderbolt II was almost retired by the Air Force and was only saved after Congress prohibited the service from pushing out the venerable aircraft.

The aircraft’s biggest shortcoming is probably its inability to effectively operate in a permissive or semi-permissive operational environment. Designed to take out enemy tanks and infantry, the A-10 Thunderbolt II is slow and cumbersome. As such, its survival rate in a near-peer environment with potent enemy air defenses is low. But in an environment of air superiority, the A-10 Thunderbolt II can really shine.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: StockPhotosLV / Shutterstock.com

The Kremlin claimed on Thursday that it shot down an American-made F-16 Fighting Falcon. The multirole combat aircraft was allegedly struck by a Russian air defense system over southeastern Ukraine. Kyiv has not confirmed the loss of the F-16, which if true would be the first Western-made and Western-supplied fixed-wing aircraft to be lost in the conflict, which has been raging since February 2022.

"An F-16 aircraft was shot down in the Zaporizhzhia region at its launch site," Russian state news agency RIA Novosti announced via the Telegram social messaging app on Thursday.

Tass also reported, "Chairman of Russia's Civic Chamber Commission on Sovereignty, Patriotic Projects and Support of Veterans Vladimir Rogov [said] that the F-16 aircraft was downed in the Zaporozhye Region when preparing for a missile strike on the region."

Russia had previously claimed in September that it had shot down a Fighting Falcon, but that was later proven to be false. However, Kyiv did confirm in August that an F-16 was lost while attempting to shoot down a Russian cruise missile, and there have been reports since then that it may have been a friendly fire incident involving one of Ukraine's U.S.-supplied MIM-104 Patriot air defense systems.

Bounty Paid!

According to Bulgarian Military (not to be confused with the Bulgarian Armed Forces), Sergey Shmotyev, CEO of the Russian energy firm Fores, had said he would pay a 15 million ruble ($145,000) reward for the first Fighting Falcon that was downed. It is unclear if it would apply to the aircraft that was reported to have been shot down on Thursday or a future F-16.

This isn't the first such bounty that Russian oligarchs have offered to the country's military—while the Kremlin has also put bounties on Western-made hardware including the German Leopard 2 and American M1 Abrams main battle tanks (MBTs). The firm had put a bounty on the fighter in July.

The F-16 in Ukraine

In August 2023, U.S. president Joe Biden approved the transfer of the F-16 from multiple NATO members. One year later, in early August 2024, Ukraine received the first ten Fighting Falcons.

NATO members Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway pledged to provide around ninety of the fourth-generation aircraft.

However, Ukrainian aviators have largely received a "crash course" of sorts, with the training on the F-16s reduced to several months instead of the years that Western pilots have received. That fact may have led to the loss of one of the F-16s just weeks after it arrived in the country. Efforts have been made to increase the training the Ukrainian aviators are receiving on the F-16.

The American-made multirole fighter has been employed to successfully down Russian missiles and drones fired at Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. In addition, in October, a Ukrainian Air Force F-16 was also credited with shooting down a Russian Sukhoi Su-34 (NATO reporting name Fullback).

Airliner and Santa Sleigh Down!

The news of the downing of the F-16 came just a day after an Azerbaijan Airlines' Embraer jet crashed in Kazakhstan on Christmas Day, killing at least thirty-eight of the sixty-seven people on board. It has been alleged that the airliner was shot down by a Russian air defense system.

And on Friday, a Russian blogger released a propaganda video that showed Santa Claus being shot down over Moscow with assistance from De Moroz—a Slavic version of Saint Nicholas or Father Christmas. The video ends with Ded Morz telling a Russian serviceman, "We don't need anything foreign in our skies. Happy New Year!"

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Shutterstock.

From the Vault

Could China Sink a U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier in a War?

USS Parche: The Navy Submarine That Could Self-Destruct

The Apple+ miniseries The Masters of the Air, which debuted in January 2024, tells the story of World War II aviators who served in the U.S. Army Air Force’s 100th Bomb Group of the 8th Air Force. The follow-up to Band of Brothers and The Pacific by producers Steven Spielberg and Tom Hanks has already been noted for its gritty realism. It features the vast armadas of the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress during its missions over occupied Europe.

Those bombers were able to strike deep into German-held territory, hitting individual factories and other precision targets. Still, they whittled away at the fighter strength of the Luftwaffe in some of the largest and bloodiest air battles in history. The B-17 flew more than 290,000 sorties in the European theater of operations and dropped in excess of half a million tons of bombs.

Daytime Attacks

While the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) conducted night-time bombing raids over Germany, the U.S. 8th Air Force bombed during the day, and the B-17 proved especially well-suited for the task—yet it came at a steep price. As noted in the Apple+ series, the Flying Fortress was easy to fly and absorbed a lot of returning fire. The aircraft could be shot up and remain in the sky, and its Norden bombsight gave American forces bombing accuracy unmatched by any other nation during the war.

Newspapers hype crowed that the bomber could “drop a bomb into a pickle barrel” from thousands of meters in the air. That was a bit of hyperbole, and the truth was that only one of every ten bombs landed within close range of their target. On the second bombing raid against the ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt in October 1943, the 8th Air Force sent more than 250 B-17 bombers at the target, yet the attackers failed to destroy the factory completely.

As further depicted in The Masters of the Air, the tactics to bomb German targets around the clock were costly. Tragically, more than 47,000 U.S. 8th Air Force crewmen were killed in those daylight raids over Germany.

Truly, A Flying Fortress

Development of what was to become the B-17 began in the mid-1930s, and it first took to the skies in July 1935. While it was already a well-armed warbird for the era, Boeing soon began to plan the development of the next-generation bomber. That led to the development of the B-29, but Boeing also continued to refine and improve the B-17. The aircraft increased in size and weight while it also received increased armor, self-sealing fuel tanks, and notably greater armament.

It also earned its now infamous nickname from a supportive journalist’s report.

The often-repeated story is that after Richard Williams, a reporter from The Seattle Times, observed the Model 299 prototype on the ground, he described it as a “15-ton flying fortress” in a photo caption. Boeing quickly responded by trademarking the name, and the rest is history.

The aircraft went on to be even more heavily armed to deal with the threats from enemy fighter aircraft after it entered service.

A Lucky Thirteen

The B-17G variation that saw service in the tail end of World War II was armed like no other aircraft before it, with up to a “lucky thirteen” M2 .50 caliber (12.7 mm) machine guns placed in nine positions located throughout the airframe, each able to fire upwards of 700 rounds per minute. This aircraft variant of the famous “Ma Deuce” was dubbed the AN/M2 (officially the “Browning Machine Gun, Aircraft, Cal. .50, AN/M2”)—and it was fitted with a substantially lighter thirty-six-inch length barrel.

Ten crew members —the pilot, co-pilot, bombardier, navigator, radio operator, and five gunners—were crammed into the small cabin for six to eight hours per mission. The main cabin was barely tall enough for the crew to stand up straight, and flying at altitudes above 27,000 feet meant the aircraft got very cold, often below freezing.

Crews had to be careful when touching the guns, which could be dangerously cold until fired. When enemy fighters approached, everyone but the pilot and co-pilot was expected to operate a machine gun.

Each B-17 initially carried around 5,000 rounds of ammunition—with the tail gunners and turret gunners having around 1,000 rounds available. According to some sources, the ammunition supply was doubled by the end of the war.

The B-17G’s thirteen machine guns were positioned throughout the aircraft to allow it to take on enemy fighters from nearly any direction, while the bombers also flew in tight formations.

There were two machine guns in the main cabin operated by the waist gunner(s) to defend from side attacks. Two more machine guns were positioned in the nose for the bombardier and navigator to operate when they weren’t conducting other duties. At the same time, twin .50 caliber machine guns were also positioned in the “chin turret” to the front of the aircraft and operated remotely.

It should be noted, too, that the bombardier was located at the extreme front end, protected only by a Plexiglas window. Just behind him, the navigator sat on a mounted table with access to maps and charts to best plot the bomber’s course during each mission. However, the B-17 was most vulnerable to a head-on attack—with many bombardiers and navigators killed in the early stages of the daytime bombing missions. The added .50 caliber machine guns provided them a chance to fire back at approaching German fighters.

Directly behind the flight deck, where the pilot and co-pilot were seated, were twin .50 caliber machine guns in a top or dorsal turret. It was the turret gunner’s job to scan the horizon for any incoming enemy fighters. A radio operator, located behind the turret, also operated one machine gun that fired upwards.

The underside of the B-17 was equipped with a Sperry ball turret, a spherical space about four feet in diameter and capable of rotating 360 degrees. After takeoff, the ball turret gunner—who was typically one of the smallest crew members—would crouch into a fetal position while entering the turret to operate a pair of machine guns. It may have provided a stunning view of the ground, but the ball turret gunner was still only protected by his flak jacket and the Plexiglas.

At the extreme end of the fuselage were two more twin .50-caliber machine guns, which the tail gunner operated. His job was to protect the rear of the aircraft from attack.

Initially, the bomber crews wore only heavy flight jackets and sheepskin flight trousers, which were about protecting the wearer from the cold at extreme altitudes. However, the effects of Triple-A (anti-aircraft artillery)—also known as flak—resulted in the development of flak jackets and even specialty helmets.

Though the B-17 was not literally a fortress in the sky, it should be remembered that sometimes fortresses need some outside support. This turned out to be the case with the B-17. The huge losses seen in raids like the one over Schweinfurt convinced the Allied leadership that the B-17 could not go to war over German-held territory unescorted. In the latter stages of the war, the P-51 Mustang fighter plane proved to be the bomber’s little friend all the way to Berlin and back.

The B-17 Flying Fortress went on to make its mark on history and became among the most famous aircraft of the Second World War. Yet, it wasn’t actually the bomber that was produced in the largest number. A total of 12,731 B-17s were produced, while 18,482 Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers were also built by the end of World War II. However, both heavy bombers had a well-earned reputation for being the workhorses of the USAAF.

Today, there are reported to be only forty-five surviving B-17s, of which thirty-eight are in the United States. Just ten are airworthy. Among the most famous of the surviving aircraft is the “Memphis Belle,” which is currently on display at the National Museum of the United States Air Force.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites, with over 3,200 published pieces and over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: VanderWolf Images / Shutterstock.com.

On November 30, 2024, President-elect Donald Trump made a resounding statement on X, declaring that BRICS countries are moving away from the dollar “while we stand by and watch is OVER.” This statement’s timing not only came a month after dignitaries from thirty-six countries and six international organizations attended the sixteenth BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, but also doubled down that countries would “face 100 percent tariffs” whether they intended to replace the dollar with the BRICS currency or any other currency. 

Trump’s bold threat comes at a critical point in international economic relations, as many world leaders like Russian president Vladimir Putin have openly criticized the dollar’s role as a “weapon.” Additionally, Trump’s call for 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico and a 10 percent tariff on China calls into question whether this new raft of tariffs can safeguard the dollar’s primacy and the underlying financial hegemony of G7 institutions.

Once a moniker from a Goldman Sachs banker Jim O’Neill’s report from 2001 raising concerns of a coalition of countries that could challenge, if not supplant, the G7 nations, the group has now expanded and rolled out an array of parallel institutions to offer small and middle power countries an alternative to the liberal international order. As of 2024, BRICS countries’ share of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) is 34.9 percent as opposed to the G7’s 30.05 percent, whereas, in 2000, the G7 stood at 43.28 percent, and the BRICS constituted only 21.37 percent.

Trump’s return to the White House has also raised concerns about whether the G7 nations, with an avowedly isolationist leader in Washington, can weather the BRICS bloc. In one of his campaign rallies in battleground Wisconsin as early as September 8, 2024, Trump adamantly condemned the de-dollarization of global trade, stating clearly, “You leave the dollar and you’re not doing business with the United States because we are going to put a 100 percent tariff on your goods.” This threat explains why BRICS-aligned nations have been seeking to build alternatives to the dollar for the last sixteen years. In fact, during Trump’s first administration, Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi observed in November 2017 how it has become “increasingly difficult for Western governance concepts, systems, and models to keep up with the new international situation,” arguing further that Western-led global governance has “malfunctioned” and reached a point “beyond redemption.” 

It is no surprise, then, that BRICS was established in 2009, immediately after the 2008 global financial crisis. According to a report from the Boston Consulting Group, trade among BRICS economies has outpaced trade between BRICS and G7 nations. Representing half of the world’s population and between a quarter and a third of the global economy, the group of nine countries has a fourfold purpose: (1) create an alternative financial system to the Western one, (2) better coordinate economic policy, (3) seek greater representation in global governance, and (4) reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar. 

While the strategic discourse laid out by analysts attempts to provide threat assessments from Western capitals, Western academics in the field of international relations have better constructed a framework to explain this unique phenomenon through power transition theory. Coined in 1958 by University of Michigan political scientist A.F.K. Organski, power transition theory explains how the prevailing hegemon in the international system finds itself in danger of systemic war as a rising challenger catches up with or overtakes a declining hegemon. Organski explains how the aggressor originates from a small group of dissatisfied, strong countries, where the weaker, rather than the stronger power, is most likely to be the aggressor. Applied to the BRICS countries, this explains how Russia and China can alternate in leading the charge of leveraging geography, population, and economic heft to propose a new set of international organizations bent on replacing G7-led Western institutions. 

In pursuit of the alternative financial system goal, the BRICS countries, through the economic heft of China, have created the New Development Bank (NDB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) in order to challenge the prominence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Professors Saori Katada, Cynthia Roberts, and Leslie Elliott Armijo argue in their book, BRICS and Collective Financial Statecraft, how this unique club of rising powers has united over their shared interest in “global revisionism” through military and financial power resources to impact international outcomes through club theory. 

Professors Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, in their book The Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy, explain how social psychology explains the need for these two rising powers to seek preeminence in a new area to enhance their realization of great power status. With these new multilateral institutions, spearheading the creation of these alternative institutions reflects their increased power and status, motivated by their frustration of not receiving recognition commensurate with China’s power and rise.

However, skeptics of the BRICS and the China-Russia axis’s stewardship of an alternative global financial system are quick to point out the vast disparities in economic capacities between the BRICS countries and the prevailing G7 institutions. Professor of Economics and Political Science at UC Berkeley, Barry Eichengreen, lays out these limitations by listing how the Chinese renminbi accounts for less than 6 percent of trade settlements, Chinese banks manage only 3 percent of daily transactions by value of U.S.-based clearinghouses, and Beijing’s ability to provide liquidity, privacy and data-protection laws remain murky. 

Within the BRICS, security and geopolitical faultlines between member states also raise doubt over whether this forum can be conducive to any sort of cooperation. For instance, China and India have treaded carefully since the 2020 Galwan border clash, which led to the death of twenty Indian and four Chinese soldiers. The aftermath of this episode of border conflict along the Sino-Indian border has led to New Delhi deepening ties with the United States, as evident in Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 state visit to Washington, resulting in the largest U.S.-Indian defense cooperation deals. The DoD confirmed that twenty years ago, there was no defense cooperation at all, whereas, as of 2023, the two countries are “co-producing and co-developing major systems together.” 

Additionally, the recent inclusion of Middle Eastern states like Iran, Egypt, and the UAE after the 2023 BRICS Summit raises questions about BRICS cohesion, given the regional rivalry such a big tent would now inherit. Saudi Arabia’s recent inclusion also draws doubt, given its ongoing endemic security rivalry with Iran. Riyadh made this point clear during the 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan, where the Saudi foreign minister only attended the last day, making clear that it is hedging its commitment to a club it perceives as a hedging club for middle powers.

While the BRICS members have clear attributes, such as their status as non-Western states, the security rivalries they carry may and have proven to stand as impediments to becoming a fully-fledged treaty-bound organization with any semblance of a security commitment. Commentators are quick to couple the relative lack in economic heft to U.S.-led organizations in addition to this big tent of geopolitical rivals, which has shown serious flaws, particularly with the India-China and Iran-Saudi rivalries as well as its framing as an anti-Western coalition.

There is no clear formula for what makes an ideal BRICS member, just as no clear path exists for these member states to chart any form of coordination. Negative assessments of the BRICS as a paper tiger or house of cards are still as common in 2024 as they were in the early 2000s and 2010s when the group did not have its China-led multilateral institutions in place or carry as much economic clout. While some players like New Delhi, Brasilia, and Ankara are hedging against uncertainties to garner more negotiating power with Washington, others argue that new members like Egypt and Ethiopia are simply deepening ties with non-Western members, unlike Russia or Iran. Bringing Trump into the equation at the helm of the G7 bloc doesn’t immediately signal any tightening of alignment within BRICS. Still, it can potentially accelerate common causes over concerns like climate cooperation and financial statecraft in the interests of member states already under heavy sanctions. 

Rimon Tanvir Hossain is a Research Assistant with the Middle East Institute’s Program on Strategic Technologies and Cybersecurity. He received his M.P.P. from the UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs and his B.A. from UC Berkeley. He is an MPhil/PhD Candidate at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and an Assistant Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation. Previously, Rimon served as a congressional staffer for the Office of U.S. Senator Alex Padilla, where he led the State Department portfolio as a Constituent Services Representative.

Image: Irzhanova Asel / Shutterstock.com. 

World War II saw a de facto rematch between the Mauser and the Mosin-Nagant, but it was with new versions of each respective rifle. Following a trend that had begun with the British Army's Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE), which proved better suited to the trench warfare of World War I than the longer rifles of the era, and without compromising range or accuracy—the length of both the Soviet (Russian) and German rifles decreased.

The Mosin-Nagant Model 91/30

Production of the Mosin-Nagant continued in the Soviet Union, but in 1930, the rifle underwent some notable changes. The basic M1891/30 saw the barrel shortened by about 3.5 inches to the length of the "Dragoon variant" produced for the Imperial Russian Army's cavalry before World War I.

The M91/30 was the standard issue weapon of Soviet troops when the nation was invaded by the Germans in 1941, and it remained in production throughout the war. As the manufacture of the semi-automatic Tokarev SVT-40 was disrupted following Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, emphasis was placed again on the Mosin-Nagant—which was easier to produce. It also proved to be more reliable and rugged, both necessities as the Motherland was fighting for her very survival.

Millions of Soviet rifles were made during the war, and it remained the main small arm of the largest mobilized army in history with some 17.4 million being manufactured from 1941 to 1945. Numerous variations were produced notably a sniper version and a carbine version that was introduced in 1944. Arguably one of the most widely produced firearms ever (with the possible exception of the AK-47 assault rifle), some 37,000,000 were made between 1891 and 1965.

The Karabiner 98 Kurz

Officially designated the Karabiner 98 Kurz or Kar98K, it wasn't technically a "carbine" in the traditional sense, although there had been a carbine version of the Gewehr 98. Rather, it was a short rifle and became the standard service rifle of the German military when it was adopted in 1935.

As for why it wasn't the Kar35K comes down to restrictions placed on Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. The development of a new rifle was concealed, but it was a direct descendant of the Model 98 rifle. The new model resembled its preceding version in its basic shape, except for being almost six inches shorter, while also incorporating a few design improvements. The Kar98K used the same controlled-feed bolt-action system of its predecessor, while the most immediate difference is the straight bolt handle of the Gewehr 98 that was replaced by a turned-down bolt handle that made it easier to rapidly operate, and reduced the amount the handle projected beyond the receiver. That enabled the mounting of options directly above the receiver. The Langevisier—rollercoaster—rear sights were also replaced with a more conventional tangent leaf sight.

Though it was the standard infantry weapon of the Wehrmacht at the start of World War II and continued to serve in that role until Germany's defeat in May 1945, it was gradually supplemented by the semi-automatic Gewehr 43/Karabiner 43 (G43/K43), which almost ironically incorporated an improved short-stroke pistol gas system employed in the aforementioned SVT-40. Yet, while more than 9 million Kar98Ks were manufactured by the war's end, only around 402,000 K43s were produced.

As the war drew to a close, Germany was in the beginning stages of slowly replacing its bolt action rifle with the Sturmgewehr 44 (StG44) assault rifle designed by Hugo Schmeisser—and that weapon would go on to influence the AK-47 and other post-war assault rifles.

The Rifles Compared (Again)

Neither the Model 90/31 nor the Kar98K could be seen as a revolutionary step forward, and they were really simple evolutionary changes. The same level of German precision design and engineering is present with its rifle, while the Soviet weapon retained the same rugged reliability.

Both rifles could hold five rounds and could be loaded with a stripper clip or individually by hand. As with the previous models, the range and accuracy are about the same. The Soviet weapon was produced in massively larger numbers, which is fitting as Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was quoted as saying "Quantity is a quality of its own." Truer words were never spoken in wartime. The Mosin-Nagant M91/31 was certainly among the weapons that helped save the motherland during her darkest days.

So is one better than the other?

Now with nearly eighty years of hindsight, it may come down to collectability. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Kar98Ks were so common that tens of thousands (perhaps more) were "sporterized" and converted into a poor man's hunting or target rifle. Throughout much of the Cold War, Mosin-Nagants weren't exactly rare, but certainly not as widely available as they are now.

Then in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Mosin Nagant flooded the market. As noted, those are still collectible, but not quite in the same way as the Mauser that the Doughboys brought home after the Great War or the Greatest Generation came back with following World War II. It should be noted that Mauser collectors can look to countless variations made for countries around the world, while Mosin-Nagants were made in far fewer flavors.

As the better rifle, it may be a matter of personal preference, but both will have a legacy that lasts for eons to come!

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Twice in the twentieth century, the German Army marched eastward, where it engaged in brutal combat against a determined foe. It could be argued that the record for the German military was one-to-one—as it essentially defeated the Imperial Russian Army during World War I, but was utterly destroyed by the Soviet Red Army a generation later.

Notable is the fact that the primary weapons employed by each side in the two conflicts were bolt-action rifles that had evolved only slightly. A case could also be made that it was German engineering and design going against Russian ruggedness and reliability.

The First Showdown: The Mauser Gew98 vs. the Mosin Nagant Model 1891

"Mauser" and "Mosin Nagant" are practically synonymous among collectors and firearms enthusiasts for Germany's and Russia's respective rifles of the two world wars. But the devil is truly in the details.

Both stories can rightfully be described as "complicated."

From the Gewehr 88 to the Gewehr 98

The Mauser-made Gewehr wasn't actually the first German-made military bolt action rifle, as that distinction goes to the Gewehr 88—also known as the Model 1888 commission rifle. Of course, a case could be made that the Dreyse needle gun was a German rifle, but it was designed in the Kingdom of Prussia before the unification of Germany.

By the early 1880s, the Dreyse was outdated, and that led to the development of the Gewehr 88, which was adopted in 1888 as the result of an arms race between Germany and France. It was not developed by Mauser; instead, it was the result of the German Rifle Commission. Notably, Mauser was also one of the few major German arms makers that didn't produce any Gewehr 88s.

However, Paul Mauser continued to refine his design and patented a bolt-action design as the Mauser Model 1895. It was soon adopted by several nations in South America—and was later purchased by Spain, which used the rifle during the Spanish-American War, where it helped influence the design of the American military's Springfield Model 1903.

Berlin saw that it was quickly becoming outclassed by a German-made rifle employed by other nations, and that led to the development of the Gewehr 98.

As stated by Robert W.D. Ball in his epic tome Mauser: Military Rifles of the World, the Gewehr 98 was adopted on April 5, 1898, and it was truly the finest in German engineering at the time. Ball noted that the first troops to receive the rifle were those of the East Asian Expeditionary Force, followed by the Imperial German Navy and three premier units of the Prussian Army Corp. The Gewehr 98 had its baptism of fire during the Boxer Rebellion (1898-1901), and then in the colonial conflict/genocide in German Southwest Africa against the native Hereros.

In 1904, contracts were placed with Waffenfabrik Mauser for 290,000 rifles and with Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabriken (DWM) for 210,000 rifles. Total production of the Gewehr 98 by the end of the First World War exceeded five million.

Enter the Mosin Nagant Model 91

While not as common as even a decade ago, it is hard not to find a Mosin Nagant at the local gun show. As one of the most produced rifles of all time, vintage rifles from old Soviet stocks were commonly sold for little over $100, and oftentimes with Cold War-era ammo pouches or other accessories.

However, those were the later models, and the story of the Mosin-Nagant dates back almost half a century. While it was a firearm that was almost ideally suited to the Russian peasant, it wasn't a wholly Russian design. It incorporated designs and features from two different designers: Sergei Ivanovich Mosin, a captain in the Imperial Russian Army, and Belgian gun designer Leon Nagant. Each submitted their rifles for testing, and while Mosin's rifle was selected, the modified version featured key details of the Nagant design including the fixed box magazine and the magazine spring.

The first fight involving the rifle wasn't even on a battlefield but in the courts—both legal and in the Russian Imperial Court of the tsar. To sum up a complicated situation, Nagant claimed patent protection despite borrowing the idea from Mosin, who couldn't file a patent as he was an officer in the Russian Army, making the design property of the government and a military secret. In the end, Nagant was paid off and continued to design weapons for the Russian military, notably the Nagant M1895 revolver.

Moreover, in addition to incorporating design aspects from the Belgian maker, the first 500,000 rifles were produced by the French arms factory, Manufacture Nationale d'Armes de Châtellerault. It wasn't the only time the most famous of Russian rifles was produced in a foreign land.

The Mosin-Nagant entered service officially as the Russian 3-line rifle M1891, and domestic production began in 1892. The gun fired the 7.62x54mmR cartridge, a round that remained in service for more than 130 years!

Russia's new battle rifle first saw combat during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), and by that time some 3.8 million rifles were already in service. Its combat results were mixed, but gun historians say a larger part of this is that the infantrymen were not properly trained with this new weapon.

Millions more were made during World War I, and in another unique twist, the Russian demand far outpaced the supply, so much so that 1.5 million rifles were ordered by the Russian government and produced by Remington Arms in the United States. An additional 1.8 were further produced by New England Westinghouse. Many of these rifles didn’t make it to Russia before the Revolution and Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and thus were never delivered to the Russian government. Some were supplied to American and British expeditionary forces sent to Russia in 1918 and 1919, but many were later used by U.S. National Guard and ROTC units.

The Rifles Compared

As Terence W. Lapin described in his book The Mosin-Nagant Rifle, the Russian-made weapon "is not an attractive firearm. It has none of the elegance of, say, the 1903 Springfield, nor is it particularly arresting in appearance. The venerable rifle is, however, robust, dependable, and reasonably accurate." That could also sum up the differences between Russia's peasant army, and the more refined German military.

Yet, from a cursory glance, the rifles are quite similar. Each weighs around nine pounds empty, holds five rounds, and is chambered for similar cartridges—the 7.62x54mmR for the Mosin-Nagant and the 7.92x57mm round for the Gewehr 98 (in post 1903 versions). With similar effective ranges of about 500 meters (550 years), it is hard to suggest one is better than the other.

Mauser fans will certainly disagree, and fair competition is challenging as many of the Russian rifles sold as surplus have been reworked and certainly used and abused. Those who favor the Mosin-Nagant will argue it can take a bit more punishment and keep working.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Sebastian_Photography / Shutterstock.com

Military and financial assistance from the United States and the West is the main reason why Ukraine has been able to defend itself for so long against Russian aggression.

A U.S.-led international coalition comprised of over forty countries has provided over $100 billion worth of military aid to Ukraine.

In exchange, the Ukrainian military has been able to hold, and in many instances defeat, the Russian forces for over 1,000 days, while seriously diminishing the conventional capabilities of the Russian military in the process.

Military Aid to Ukraine

In terms of military aid, the United States is by far the single most important supporter of Ukraine. With over $62 billion worth of security aid packages, the United States has provided the Ukrainian military with key weapon systems and support capabilities.

Just to name a few important transfers, the United States has provided Ukraine with M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), MGM-140 Army Tactical Ballistic Systems (ATACMS), MIM-104 Patriot air defense batteries, M1 Abrams main battle tanks, M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, M-777 155mm towed howitzers, M109 Paladin 155mm self-propelled howitzers, T-72B main battle tanks, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), FIM-192 Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, over 4 million artillery munitions, and more than 500 million small arms bullets and grenades. These are just some of the weapon systems and capabilities provided to Ukraine.

As the manufacturing country, the United States has also authorized other countries to provide Ukraine with F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets.

In terms of transferring these weapon systems to Ukraine, the United States has been doing it in two different ways: Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) packages and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) packages.

PDA packages draw from the Pentagon’s existing stocks to provide immediate relief and capabilities to the Ukrainian forces. Of course, the U.S. military has been providing weapon systems from its reserves in order not to jeopardize its global deterrence posture. But even these older weapon systems are effective against the Russian military.

USAI packages provide the Pentagon with money to buy brand-new capabilities for the Ukrainian military. Although these weapon systems are new, it can take years before they are delivered to the Ukrainian military.

The United States and its allies have also been looking for alternative methods of funding Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression.

Alternatives Methods of Funding

On Tuesday, the United States sent Kyiv the first tranche of loans generated solely from profits from seized frozen Russian assets. According to Kyiv, the first loan was worth $1 billion and it will go toward ensuring Ukraine can survive Russian aggression. Japan will also be sending $3 billion generated from seized frozen Russian assets. Earlier in December, the United States announced that it would be allocating approximately $20 billion from seized frozen Russian assets to Ukraine.

Since the war began on February 24, 2022, there has been international pressure to seize Russian assets from all over the world and give them to Ukraine to defend itself. Although it took more than 1,000 days, the United States and its partners are now moving in the right direction. For example, the Group of Seven, under the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans initiative, will provide approximately $50 billion to Ukraine in 2025 from the profits generated from seized frozen Russian assets; the funds will go toward helping the Ukrainian military, as well as providing important financial relief to the Ukrainian government.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Shutterstock.

As Western powers continue to provide and approve Ukraine’s use of advanced weaponry against Russia, the veracity of Vladimir Putin’s deterrent threats against such provocations is increasingly called into question. 

Throughout the war, each step up the escalation ladder taken by the West—whether supplying Ukraine with fighter jets, long-range missiles, and, most recently, $20 billion in aid funded by seized Russian assets—was preceded by warnings of dire consequences from Moscow. However, no retaliation against the United States or its NATO partners has resulted. Now, this anticlimactic pattern has led many, including President-elect Donald Trump’s designated envoy to Ukraine-Russia, to believe that Putin’s nuclear threats are more bluff than bluster, arguing that the United States should “lean in” to challenge Russia rather than back down. Now, many contend that the unexpected fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria dealt a blow to Russia’s geopolitical standing, fueling more calls to capitalize on Moscow’s weakened position.

Yet, assuming limited risk or expected advantage in continuing escalation against Russia is dangerously flawed. This hardline approach misreads and oversimplifies the dynamics of escalation and overlooks Russia's increasing conventional military capabilities.

Contrary to the bravado on display, crisis escalation is non-linear and inherently unpredictable. Despite the analytic investment by scholars to study its dynamics, our grasp of escalation games remains limited, at best, while our understanding of nuclear escalation is virtually non-existent. Not only are there no standard units of measurement to gauge and evaluate the mechanics that underpin escalation, but also, the rules are not governed by simple cause-and-effect frameworks, fixed interests, or stable perceptions. In continuously adaptive feedback, the context, stakes, and calculations evolve with each new development and maneuver.

Likewise, the difficulties inherent in interpreting signals add another layer of complexity to understanding escalation. For instance, the assertion that Putin is bluffing wrongly conflates rhetoric with policy and behavior. Most likely, Moscow’s deterrent threats directed toward the West serve as tools of coercive diplomacy—signals meant to manage escalation from spiraling out of control—rather than represent triggers of an imminent military response. Still, to cross a so-called “red line” doesn’t necessarily nullify the threat or confirm the bluff. Indeed, repeated provocations could aggravate and intensify Russia’s threat perceptions, gradually building deferred pressure among decision-makers in Moscow. Eventually, this could lead to a tipping point, where Russia might act decisively to reaffirm its credibility.

Needless to say, Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was itself a dramatic act of escalation. It was marked by many instances of its warnings going unheeded by the United States and NATO until it provoked a response. In effect, what held true in the past may not hold true in the future—and assuming otherwise invites miscalculation.

Certainly, escalation doesn’t necessarily mean recklessness. Sometimes, it’s a rational choice in militarized crises. In such cases, meeting specific criteria can justify advancing the escalation ladder. First, the stakes must be vital enough to warrant the risks. Second, escalation must be controllable or manageable to ensure strategic advantage, a position referred to as “escalation dominance.” Finally, diplomacy must be exhausted or unviable at that juncture of the crisis to render escalation a last resort.

However, last month’s approval by Western powers for Ukraine to launch long-range strikes inside Russia—through American-supplied ATACMS, British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles, and French-supplied SCALPs—disregarded these principles. Such provocations prompted Russia to rattle its nuclear saber, revising its nuclear doctrine to expand the conditions for deployment.

No doubt, the odds of Russia resorting to nuclear weapons are slim—but slim odds are still far from an impossibility. With the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, Russia’s modern warheads include “dial-to-yield” technology, enabling adjustable explosive power to be reduced down to a fraction of its potential. This makes tactical nukes more suitable for limited battlefield engagements or demonstrating resolve. Hence, even a trivial probability warrants caution.

Paradoxically, overconfidence in the stability of the “nuclear taboo” has emboldened the provocative actions that prompted Russia’s nuclear threats—behavior the taboo is meant to prevent. Indeed, many Western policymakers and pundits alike dismiss any risk of nuclear use by Russia, categorizing it as suicidal. However, this argument fails to connect the premise to its conclusion logically.

For starters, Ukraine doesn’t possess nuclear weapons. Moreover, while unlikely, Russia’s use of a tactical nuke in Ukraine is still more plausible than a U.S. retaliation through direct war, especially in response to nuclear use against a third country. Such a scenario would compel any American president to confront the stark reality of nuclear escalation and the grave risks of direct conflict with Russia. Thus, assumptions about the existential risk to Putin’s survival in response to nuclear use overestimate NATO’s ability to credibly deter Russia on behalf of a non-treaty partner. In fact, NATO has no extended deterrence over Ukraine and has ruled out direct defense of the country, having refrained from deploying its own ground forces.

Of course, Russia isn’t likely to go nuclear so long as it’s not losing the war. But even if nuclear fears are overstated, to rely on its improbability to justify further escalation precariously overlooks Russia’s formidable conventional power. Indeed, Western hardliners fail to grasp that Moscow still has ample room to turn up the dial and escalate below the nuclear threshold. Moreover, this stratum of high-tech conventional capability only grows more dynamic and potent, with no clear countermeasures on the horizon.

Undoubtedly, Russia's November 21 debut of its “Oreshnik” missile, which targeted a weapons factory in the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro, was a powerful display of its developing conventional forces. An intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile with multiple reentry targeting capabilities is reported to exceed speeds of Mach 10, bypassing any air defense system. Putin regards this weapon system as a versatile tool, enabling flexible and calibrated responses against Western escalation and allowing Russia to avoid the troubles of going nuclear.

“Oreshnik is not a weapon of mass destruction,” Putin declared on November 28, adding that if deployed “several missiles at once, in a cluster, their single strike will be comparable to the use of nuclear weapons.” On December 10, he emphasized that “what we need now is not to improve the nuclear doctrine, but to advance the Oreshnik,” claiming that with enough of these advanced systems, Russia would be “on the brink of virtually no need to use nuclear weapons.” Now entering mass production, with plans to potentially forward-deploy the weapon to Belarus in 2025, Russia has signaled its intent to rely on this system more extensively.

Contrary to its intended purpose, escalation by Western powers hasn’t degraded Russia’s military. Instead, the war of attrition intensified and prolonged by Western aid, has worked to transform Russia’s massive latent power into tangible military strength. Today, Moscow has a range of tools to intensify and expand the war within Ukraine and beyond, if necessary. This toolkit includes advanced development in hypersonic missile technology, precision-guided munitions, anti-missile defense, armored vehicles and tanks, and drone, cyber, and electronic warfare.

Apart from its advanced technological expertise, Russia’s vast reserves of critical minerals, energy resources, and industrial metals provide the raw materials necessary to sustain large-scale weapons production, which hasn’t yet reached its potential output. In a war where artillery remains “King of the Battlefield,” Russia produces artillery shells three times faster—and at a quarter of the cost—compared to American and European NATO members combined. To boot, Russia’s strategic partnerships with states like China, Iran, and North Korea have bolstered its access to key military ingredients, such as machine tools and microelectronics, in addition to combat-ready weapons like drones and artillery. This ensures its ability to sustain a high-intensity war even longer.

By all metrics, Russia’s war-making capacity has grown stronger, whereas Ukraine’s has progressively weakened. This vulnerability stems from the cascading risks inherent in a protracted war of attrition. It’s no surprise that Russia’s strategy centers on grinding down Ukraine’s military at a favorable casualty-exchange ratio while hindering it from replenishing and reproducing the quality of its forces. Since the war’s onset, Ukraine’s military has been forced to rev its engines and run on all cylinders. This relentless pressure and tempo have left its military with no auxiliary capacity to regulate its intensity or manage escalation within what it’s able to sustain organizationally. Over time, institutional breakdown or capitulation becomes a more plausible scenario for Ukraine than for Russia. 

Today, Washington is urging Kyiv to address its critical shortages in manpower and lower the conscription age to eighteen as Russian military advances accelerate on the ground.

Equally important, Moscow’s capacity for conventional escalation is matched by its willingness to act. Despite talk in Western capitals about Moscow’s reluctance to enforce its threats, Russia has instead managed its escalation with calibration, minimizing overexposure and mitigating risks of overreach and overheating. Against evolving and emerging threats, Russia has expanded its political aims, intensified its firepower, and further mobilized troops to correspond with changes in goals and strategy. But its will to fight stems from the balance of resolve in Ukraine, where Russia’s stakes outweigh those of NATO. Again, it’s not a coincidence that Western commitment to Ukraine remains distant, limited to support from afar rather than direct defense.

Yet, despite clear evidence of Russia’s resolve, the United States and Europe remain entrenched in outdated assumptions that still underestimate it. To the detriment of their own coercive strategies, Western policymakers consistently fail to recognize, let alone accept, that Russia’s willpower is not driven by imperial ambition but by the conviction that NATO’s deepening relationship with Ukraine—and the endeavor to incorporate it into the alliance—constitutes a threat to its national security. History has repeatedly shown that when a state perceives its security threatened, its resolve hardens.

Today, Russia’s conventional escalation in Ukraine could still intensify in two major ways. First, the range of military targets could expand further. While this has already included Ukraine’s critical infrastructure—such as energy, electricity, and communications—the intensity of attacks could still be ramped up significantly. Likewise, its crosshairs could shift toward Ukraine’s command-and-control and government institutions. Second, Moscow could expand its war aims further. Beyond the four regions annexed in 2022 and Crimea in 2014, Russia could seek to grab more territory, such as Odesa and Kharkiv.

For NATO, the premise of escalation began with the aim to overburden Russia’s invasion, pressuring it to abandon its military objectives and withdraw from Ukraine. Today, escalation aims to coerce Moscow into accepting Western-favored terms for a negotiated settlement.

This strategy—coercive bargaining—is destined to fail on the merits of an inconvenient truth: the West doesn’t hold escalation dominance against Russia. To coerce without advantage is a recipe for diminished coercive power in return.

As such, Donald Trump’s return to the White House provides an opportunity for a course correction in Ukraine. Further escalation, however, must be avoided. To seek to gain or apply leverage is a perilous gamble in this case and will unlikely extract a better deal in the future. Prone to backfire, it’ll force upward pressure on the Kremlin to respond in kind and grant Russia the pretext to flex its conventional muscle even further. As a result, Ukraine’s eroding position on the battlefield—and thus, at the negotiating table—will be accelerated.

For the sake of Ukraine’s people, the practical and moral course is to shift toward a policy of accommodation with Russia, abandoning unproductive attempts to negotiate from an unattainable position of strength. Neither escalation nor time is on Ukraine’s side. The new administration must understand the intransigence of this reality, recognize Russia’s security concerns, and seriously engage with its terms for ending its war on Ukraine.

The pill will surely be a bitter one to swallow now, but its bitterness will only grow with time.

Ramzy Mardini is an associate at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago. He is also a research affiliate at the Center for International Security & Cooperation at Stanford University.

Image: Seneline / Shutterstock.com. 

What America, China, and middle powers stand to gain and lose.

Economists have drawn the wrong lessons from the failures of the 1930s.

Christmas came early for the Polish Air Force, as its first two Lockheed Martin F-35A “Husarz” fighters arrived at Ebbing Air National Guard Base (ANGB), Arkansas, on Monday. The pair of fighters will be used to train Polish pilots on the fifth-generation stealth fighters as part of the Foreign Military Sales Program.

Poland is one of several NATO members that announced plans to adopt the F-35 Lightning II, which is produced in three variants. Warsaw’s aircraft will be the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) F-35A model. Following a longstanding tradition with the Polish Air Force, the warplanes will receive a domestic moniker—in this case, Husarz (Polish for “Hussar”).

The Winged Cavalry

Selected by a public competition, the designation honors the historic Polish Winged Hussars, a famed sixteenth and seventeenth-century cavalry unit. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s elite unit was originally formed in 1503, with many of its members coming from the Polish nobility. The Winged Hussars received their name from the colorful and elaborate uniforms that incorporated military influences from the Byzantine Empire and the Mongol cavalry initially, and later from the Balkans, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire.

The cavalry troopers wore a metal zischägge, or “lobster-tail” helmet, and highly adorned armor that consisted of a cuirass (breastplate), spaulders over the shoulders, a bevor around the neck, and arm braces. Most notably, and unique to the hussars, the troopers wore a pair of wings that arched from the end of the saddles to over their heads and fluttered in the wind.

The cavalry unit participated in numerous engagements and helped Poland and her allies win more than sixteen major battles during the commonwealth’s “Golden Age,” which saw conflicts with Ottoman and Russian forces. The Winged Hussars, led by King Jan Sobieski, have been credited with helping break the Ottoman siege of Vienna in September 1693, ending Turkish expansion into Europe.

Protecting Europe’s Flank

The Polish Air Force officially received its first F-35 at a ceremony at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Fort Worth, Texas, in August. Warsaw’s program of record is for thirty-two of the fifth-generation fighters, part of a $4.6 billion deal signed in 2020. It also included training and simulators, as well as a logistic support package for the aircraft.

The fleet of F-35 Husarz fighters will begin to arrive in Poland in 2026, but the first two fighters are instead heading to Ebbing ANGB for the aforementioned training.

“The arrival of Poland’s first F-35s is a significant milestone for our state, the nation and our allies who will train on this fifth-generation fighter at Ebbing Air National Guard Base,” said Brigadier General Chad Bridges, Arkansas adjutant general.

“I’m extremely proud of the whole team in the 188th Wing and the staffs at Razorback Range and Fort Chaffee Joint Maneuver Training Center for the planning and work that has resulted in the sound of freedom returning to the River Valley,” Bridges added. “They’ve partnered with the active-duty Air Force to go from concept to jets being parked on the ramp in a compressed timeframe. We are thankful for the dedicated teamwork of those in Fort Smith, Sebastian County, our entire congressional delegation and state elected officials who have moved mountains to make this mission possible in Arkansas.”

According to the Arkansas National Guard Public Affairs Office, “Ebbing ANGB will also host F-35 pilots from Finland, Germany, Switzerland and Singapore in the coming years.”

Replacing Legacy Soviet Aircraft

Deliveries of Poland’s nearly three dozen F-35s will continue through 2030, allowing Warsaw to phase out its Cold War-era Mikoyan MiG-29 (NATO reporting name “Fulcrum”) fighters. In July, it was reported that Warsaw would likely send the remaining MiG-29s to Ukraine as it receives the F-35s.

The F-35 isn’t the first Western-made fighter to be adopted by the NATO member state. The Polish Air Force also operates the F-16 Fighting Falcon, which is locally designated the “Jastrzab” (Polish for “Hawk”).

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites, with over 3,200 published pieces and over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Mike Mareen / Shutterstock.com. 

Air power is probably the most important aspect of a modern conflict. Whoever controls the skies can control the ground and seas.

In the Ukrainian conflict, neither side has been able to wrestle control of the skies and establish air superiority. And although it is not surprising that the Ukrainian Air Force is having trouble with this—since it lacks the advanced aircraft and numbers of its adversary—it is quite a surprise for the Russian Aerospace Forces.

In an attempt to replenish its significant losses and bolster its air power, the Russian Aerospace Forces are receiving a new batch of Su-57 Felon and Su-34 Fullback fighter jets.

More Fighter Jets

The Russian Aerospace Forces will be getting more Su-57 Felon and Su-34 Fullback fighter jets. Moscow touts the Su-57 Felon as a fifth-generation stealth fighter jet, though Western analysts doubt its stealth capabilities. The Su-34 Fullback is a fighter-bomber aircraft designed to take out strategic targets on land and sea.

“Aerospace enterprises within Rostec are steadily supplying aviation equipment to the troops. The Su-57 and Su-34 aircraft delivered today will soon take their place in active service,” Rostec CEO Sergey Chemezov said.

“The Su-34 is valued by pilots for its high technical and combat characteristics. The Su-57, often referred to as the ‘king of the skies,’ has demonstrated its status as a fifth-generation fighter in prolonged combat conditions. It can effectively engage a wide range of targets using precision-guided weapons while maintaining low visibility against advanced air defense systems,” the Rostec CEO added.

Actually, the Su-57 Felon hasn’t “demonstrated its status as a fifth-generation fighter in prolonged combat conditions.” Yes, the Russian Aerospace Forces have used Su-57 Felons to conduct long-range strikes against Ukrainian urban centers and critical infrastructure. However, Moscow has been very careful not to allow its most advanced fighter jet too close into the fighting out of fear that it will be shot down by Ukraine’s Western air defense batteries. In other words, the Su-57 Felon has participated in combat but not to the extent necessary to determine its actual combat capabilities against comparable Western aircraft.

“The Su-57 and Su-34 are among the best in their class,” said Vadim Badekha, the head of UAC which is itself part of Rostec.

“They address critical tasks while showcasing superior maneuverability and combat performance. Our production teams continue to work diligently to fulfill the state defense order, and we are committed to enhancing wages and expanding corporate social programs,” the Russian aerospace official added.

The Russian Aerospace Forces have taken serious losses in the Ukrainian conflict. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense puts the number of Russian fixed-wing aircraft losses at approximately 369. The Oryx open-source intelligence analysis website comes up with a lower number, 134. (Oryx relies on visual evidence that is published on social media.) The actual number is probably somewhere in between the two estimates. In terms of the Su-57 and Su-34, the Russian Aerospace Forces have lost thirty-seven Su-34s and one Su-57, which was destroyed on the ground after a Ukrainian long-range drone attack.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: vaalaa / Shutterstock.com

The historical significance of the M1 Garand can't be overstated. It was the first semi-automatic military rifle to be employed as a standard shoulder weapon, a point that was quite notable at the time. While movies and video games may suggest that the average German or Soviet soldier carried a submachine gun—respectively the MP40 or PPSh-41—the truth is that throughout World War II, most infantrymen were armed with a bolt action rifle that featured a magazine of just five rounds.

Those rifles were slightly shorter in length than the rifles that had been carried in the trenches of World War I, but the technology was otherwise not improved.

The U.S. infantryman by comparison was equipped with the M1 Garand, which in addition to being semi-automatic—offering a higher rate of fire—held eight rounds. As it was fed by en bloc clips, it was also quicker to reload than the bolt-action rifles. And for the record, while video games suggest it wasn't possible to "top off" the M1 Garand, operators could eject a partially expended clip and put in a full one.

An Innovative Firearm

A common misconception is that the M1 Garand was the first successful semi-automatic rifle, if not the first actual auto-loading rifle. Both are incorrect. The latter distinction of the first auto-loader goes to the Mannlicher Model 85, which was the first rifle to employ the recoil to load the next cartridge into the chamber. However, it was far from "successful," as it often jammed and fouled quickly—the latter due to the black powder ammunition of the era.

John Browning's Remington Model 8 earns the distinction of being the first proven semi-automatic rifle and was noted for being reliable and accurate. Yet, the Model 8 was also complex in design and not ideally suited to military use.

Following World War I, various militaries continued to work on the auto-loading concept including the United States, which in the 1930s sought to develop a simple, accurate, and rugged semi-automatic rifle. Several rifles were tested, but Canadian-born John C. Garand's design won out.

Noted firearms expert Ian Hogg described the operation of the M1 Garand in his book Guns and How They Work, writing:

"Originally developed in .276in caliber, it was changed to .30in due to ammunition availability. Operation of the Garand was by a gas piston below the barrel which drove an operating rod. This, by means of a cam, rotated the bolt to unlock it, and thrust it back to open the breach and eject the spent case. A return spring around the piston rod then pulled the rod and bolt back, stripping a round from the magazine and chambering it before rotating to lock it. A hammer, cocked by the returning bolt, was then released by the trigger to strike a firing pin inside the bolt."

Though Hogg's explanation is complex, the operation was fairly straightforward: The M1 Garand proved to be well-suited to coming conflict.

Yes, Patton Loved It

No reporting on the M1 Garand's historical significance would be complete without looking into the praise offered to the firearm by General George S. Patton. "Old Blood and Guts" is often quoted as saying "In my opinion, the M-1 Rifle is the greatest battle implement ever devised."

Now to set the record straight, Patton actually wrote those words in a letter to Major General Levin H. Campbell, Jr., the U.S. War Department's chief of ordnance.

The letter also went on to state, "However, my admiration for Ordnance products does not stop with the M-1 rifle. Our machine guns, mortars, artillery, and tanks are without equal on the battlefields of the world. In the hands of the unconquerable veterans now composing our armies, the utter destruction of the armed forces of our enemies is certain."

Patton's reason for writing the letter to Campbell is unclear, but there is a simple explanation.

Despite the myth that Patton was some kind of military leader who played by his own rules (like too many movie police detectives); the truth is that he was a career military officer who rose through the ranks not only for his leadership skills but also understanding how to "play the game." You don't become a four-star general by being a troublemaker and certainly not by making enemies among the other generals.

Had Patton been discussing military hardware with General Henry "Hap" Arnold, chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Old Blood and Guts might have praised the B-17 Flying Fortress instead.

So was Patton just kissing butt or did he really see the M1 Garand as a super weapon? Well, it was probably somewhere in the middle.

The M1 Garand Was Also Quickly Outdated

The timing of Patton's letter to Campbell is also notable as he wrote it in January 1945, by which time his soldiers would have certainly encountered the German StG44—the world's first assault rifle. History doesn't note whether Patton personally handled the German-made firearm, but it is fair to suggest that the StG44 was the future, not the M1 Garand.

Therefore we should accept that Patton's praise of the M1 Garand was piled on a bit thick, yet, there is no denying that the rifle certainly arrived at just the right time. It was developed in the 1930s, even as the United States was hell-bent on staying out of another European conflict (let alone a world war that would see its troops sent to the Pacific).

Much like a lot of the military hardware of World War II—everything from the M1 Garand to the M4 Sherman tank to the B-17 Flying Fortress bomber to the U.S. Navy's Iowa-class battleships—what was cutting-edge at the start of the war was a bit antiquated by the time the dust settled. The M1 Garand provided greater firepower to the infantryman than the bolt action rifles, but the German military responded with its own semi-automatic rifle, the K43/G43, as well as the aforementioned StG44. That latter firearm was studied by the Soviet Red Army and even if not copied directly, it certainly was reviewed during the development of the AK-47.

The United States missed the memo on assault rifles, however, and continued to employ the M1 Garand in the Korean War. Production of the M1 Garand was restarted to meet the demand, and in total more than five million were produced. The United States military then began the development of the M14, which was essentially an evolutionary step forward in battle rifle design, before changing course and adopting the AR15/M16.

The M1: Respected, Loved, and Collected

Today, the M1 Garand remains an especially sought-after rifle—in part because those movies, TV shows, and video games have reminded contemporary shooters that this was the firearm that the Greatest Generation carried to win World War II and save democracy.

Yet, there was a time when it wasn't all that popular.

In the years after World War II, the vast majority of GIs, Marines, and other servicemembers who returned to civilian life probably saw little need for a semi-automatic rifle. Hunters preferred bolt-action rifles that could be fitted with a scope, and that fact at least partially explains the move to "sporterize" military surplus rifles in the decades after the war.

It was only as time passed that there was renewed interest in all things World War II. The latest wave certainly began with the release of films like Saving Private Ryan in 1997, followed by HBO's Band of Brothers in 2001. Video games then introduced a new generation to the World War II firearm, while also offering some now commonly-believed myths—notably that you'd hear that infamous "ping" sound when the en bloc clip was ejected from the receiver!

Likewise, though some communities, notably New York City, have a ban on the M1 Garand, it is legal in many states where AR15s and other modern sporting rifles are now illegal to own. Interestingly, the rationale for the Big Apple's ban is based on the fact that the M-5 Bayonet attaches to the gas cylinder lock screw. Any semi-auto rifle with a "bayonet mount" is defined as an "assault weapon" in New York City and subsequently banned.

Today, shooters continue to praise the M1 Garand because it is fairly easy to maintain—as long as you're careful, otherwise, you could end up with "Garand thumb"—while it remains an accurate range gun that can handle all types of weather. It shoots as well in the sweltering summer as it does in the freezing winter.

The interest in the M1 Garand has driven up the prices considerably, however.

It has also presented a few issues along the way—notably, vintage M1 Garands, which are now upwards of eighty years old, shouldn't be used with some modern ammunition. The issue is that modern hunting .30/06 loads, those with 180-grain or heavier bullets and slower-burning propellants, will produce pressures that exceed what the M1 Garand was designed to handle. Shooters are therefore advised to be cautious in what rounds they use with their old rifles.

Yet, with proper ammunition, a well-maintained M1 Garand should operate as well today as it did when it was carried by those of the Greatest Generation during World War II.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

On Friday, December 20, Lockheed Martin announced that it had signed a deal with the United States Department of Defense (DoD) for full-rate production of Lot 18 of the Air Force’s F-35A, the Marine Corps’ F-35B, and the Navy’s F-35C variants of the F-35 Lightning II fifth-generation warplane. 

Beyond the American order, thirty-nine F-35As and seven F-35Bs will be sent to U.S. allies, courtesy of concomitant foreign military sales deals. Interestingly, The Defense Post reports that “Undisclosed program partners will receive 15 F-35As and one F-35B aircraft.” The production of Lot 18 is anticipated to be completed by June 2027.

This is an interesting development, considering how much Lockheed’s F-35 program has fallen into controversy since it was first unveiled in 2006 (the program had been in development since at least 1995).

Three Key Points About the F-35 Program

First, the F-35 has struggled to meet its agreed-upon timelines and Lockheed has, throughout the twenty-year-long course of the program, rarely delivered the quantity of F-35s without going beyond its allotted budget.

Second, the rapid development and deployment of cheaper unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has called into question the efficacy of paying for the vaunted F-35. And this second point is key, as the incoming president, Donald J. Trump, is a month from taking office. Trump is taking advice from tech leaders such as Elon Musk and the biotech billionaire Vivek Ramaswamy, both of whom have expressed deep skepticism as to the utility of this manned, fifth-generation warplane.

These individuals surrounding Trump believe that unmanned systems are superior and will only become more essential to the modern battlefield, especially in light of the advances in things like artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and quantum computing. When all is said and done, the F-35 program is projected to cost U.S. taxpayers more than $2 trillion over the course of its lifetime. Could that money have been better spent on unmanned autonomous or semi-autonomous systems?

Oh, and Trump himself has long been a critic of the F-35 program.

On December 12, 2016, as he was transitioning to become president for the first time, Trump famously tweeted that, “The F-35 program and cost is out of control. Billions of dollars can and will be saved on military (and other) purchases after January 20th.”

So, the Pentagon is clearly pushing through what might end up being its last tranche of purchases for the F-35 (at least until Trump and his team of advisors get a good look under the hood of the program that many believe has been spinning out of control).

Third, there remains a bit of argument within America’s defense aerospace community as to whether the F-35 or the F-22A Raptor was the right plane for the U.S. government to favor. Sure, the F-35 is a multirole warplane (meaning it does both air-to-air combat as well as air-to-ground attack and surveillance missions) whereas the F-22 is just an air superiority fighter.

Yet, in the age of renewed great power competition, the F-22 might be more important than the F-35 (at least for the Air Force). Further, the F-22 is clearly more advanced than the F-35. 

Is the F-35 Even the Best Fifth-Generation Bird?

Key allies, like Britain and Israel, are prevented from purchasing the F-22 not only because the production line was prematurely canceled, but because the F-22 contains such supposedly advanced technologies that if they were shared even with U.S. allies it would weaken U.S. national security.

If there were no real differences technologically then why do the Pentagon and Congress still refuse to make the F-22 an exportable program whereas the F-35 is an exportable system? 

Nevertheless, the Pentagon will be getting forty-eight F-35As for the Air Force, sixteen F-35Bs and five F-35Cs for the Marines, and the Navy will be getting fourteen F-35Cs. Most of the work for Lockheed will occur in California and Texas. After this tranche, though, Trump and his team might push to cancel the program. 

Losing the F-35 But Gaining a Sixth-Generation Plane? 

What’s more, the Air Force appears dead set on getting its sixth-generation Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program to replace the fifth-generation birds they have. The Navy is also keen on getting its sixth-generation F/A-XX plane.

Both services are understandably hitting stiff resistance from a Congress that is increasingly skeptical of investing gobs of tax dollars on sixth-generation warplanes that will only marginally enhance the capabilities of the current fleet of fifth-generation warplanes in service to both the Navy and Air Force.

But, should the incoming forty-seventh president follow through on his threats to cancel or seriously curb future production of the F-35, it might free up the Air Force and/or Navy to reinvest in their respective sixth-generation planes. One thing is clear, though, this might be the last tranche of F-35s until the incoming Trump administration can figure out what, precisely, it seeks to do.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, The American Spectator, to the National Interest. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

Of all the government boondoggles, the United States Navy’s Zumwalt-class destroyer might be the silliest waste of money ever. After years of avoiding having to make the hard call on the failed Zumwalt-class (e.g., mothballing these boats), the Navy has kicked the can down the road again. 

This time, the Pentagon has concocted a scheme that might prove to be utterly useless: arming the Zumwalts with hypersonic cruise missiles that the Navy has been developing to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. 

Now, there are some people lamenting the fact that the Zumwalt never went into full production and more units were never bought. And their reason is, frankly, ridiculous. 

According to these sources, now that the Navy has figured out what to do with these boats after twenty years of being totally unable to use them, the Pentagon is retrofitting them by removing their primary guns and replacing them with hypersonic cruise missile launchers. 

They want to turn the Zumwalt class into a hypersonic missile carrier.

Some of you are salivating at that. I know. It’s what we’ve always wanted. Indeed, it’s what America needs, right? 

The Russians—yes, the Russians—are beating us in hypersonic weapons technology. They have long-range and shorter-range hypersonic ballistic missiles in their arsenal that they have used already in combat. China, too, is working on increasingly complicated hypersonic weapons platforms. 

In fact, some of the technological advances China enjoyed over the last few years with its hypersonic weapons development are downright scary. For instance, China successfully experimented with beaming sixth-generation (6G) communications into one of their hypersonic glide vehicles as it was reentering the atmosphere using a laser to enhance Chinese control over the vehicle. 

So, yeah, America needs to up its game in the hypersonic domain.

Lipstick on a Pig

But the idea that the Zumwalt-class destroyers, given all their chronic problems and failures, can live up to the hype that surrounded them when they were first sold to the American people is ridiculous. One can only put so much lipstick on a pig, after all. And why is the Navy even entertaining notions of placing hypersonic cruise missile launchers on the Zumwalts?

It's because the much-ballyhooed main guns for the Zumwalt-class destroyers that were originally planned to be installed didn’t work. Originally, the Navy had planned for the Zumwalts to feature the Advanced Gun System (AGS) that would fire specialized “Long Range Land Attack Projectile” (LRLAP) ammunition.

Designed to be highly precise but useable only on the Zumwalts, the Navy realized that at a cost of $800,000 per round made the LRLAP munitions impractical. It’s just too bad that the Pentagon figured this out after it had committed to the AGS. Without the LRLAP munitions, the AGS was rendered useless. 

So, the Navy had to go back to the drawing board for what the Zumwalts would fire.

A Monumental Waste

Hence, the introduction of hypersonic missile launchers. And while some of you reading this might be inclined to congratulate the Navy for taking one of its greatest failures, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and trying to make it a success story, remember that the ship itself is an expensive claptrap. Not only are the main guns for the Zumwalt a failure, but the destroyers are notorious for their relatively weak armor and their chronic engine woes. 

Let’s get this straight. The Navy spent $8 billion per unit on the Zumwalt-class destroyer (which has been billed as the world’s largest destroyer), equaling about $24 billion in all. This new destroyer was to be revolutionary. Instead, it is an evolutionary dead-end (an expensive one at that). Its guns don’t work. Its armor is dangerously weak. And its engines are subpar. That doesn’t sound like a warship. Placing hypersonic weapons onboard will not overcome the inherent flaws of this expensive, useless warship. 

The Navy should be taken to task for wasting the kind of money it has on this failed warship and the boats themselves should be mothballed before they wind out getting their crews killed in combat. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, The American Spectator, to the National Interest. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image:  Lukas Prosch / Shutterstock.com

Earlier this month, the Lithuanian Defence Materiel Agency under the Ministry of National Defence (DMA) announced it signed a contract with KNDS Deutschland for forty-four Leopard 2A8 main battle tanks (MBTs) to equip a Lithuanian Army armored unit. Valued at €950 million ($988 million), this is the largest defense deal ever made by this Baltic nation and NATO member.

“The agreement on Leopard acquisition is the largest contract Lithuania has ever signed. It is a pivotal stage of modernizing our armed forces and strengthening the regional security,” Minister of National Defence Dovil Šakalien said in a statement. “The new tanks will facilitate integration and interoperability of [the] Lithuanian and German militaries.”

Lithuania, which shares a border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad as well as a border with Russian ally Belarus, will become the first nation to acquire the German-made MBT as part of Germany’s Common Procurement Agreement, which has aimed to improve Europe’s common defense capabilities. 

Lithuania will receive the most advanced version of the Leopard 2. The MBT is equipped with the Rafael-designed Trophy APS (active protection system) and a better all-around (360-degree) awareness system. The upgraded variant also features the newest generation of passive multi-layer composite modular armor, which is made up of steel, tungsten, composite filler, and even ceramics.

The Leopard In The Crosshairs

The 28A model is equipped with a three-man turret containing the main 120mm L55 smoothbore gun manufactured by Rheinmetall AG. This is an improved iteration of the L44 gun that previous models of the Leopard 2 hosted. The L55 is over a meter longer than its predecessor, giving it higher muzzle velocities. It has greater accuracy, range, and penetration and can fire a wide array of ordnance, including APFSDS (Armor-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot), HEAT (High-Explosive Anti-Tank), and multipurpose ammunition.

The overall layout of the modernized tanks is similar to other models. They are powered by an upgraded 1,600 hp engine that allows the Leopard 2A8 to reach speeds of over seventy kilometers per hour (forty-four miles per hour).

Well Above 2 Percent

During a recent visit to Germany, Šakalien had further pledged that Vilnius would remain committed to hosting a Bundeswehr military brigade near the border of Belarus, Breaking Defense reported.

Last week, Lithuania also passed its 2025 state budget, which will allocate 4 percent of its GDP (gross domestic product) to defense—double NATO’s 2 percent defense expenditure guidelines.

“We’ve essentially budgeted 4 percent of GDP for defence, but some of that money has to be borrowed,” said Lithuanian president Gitanas Nauseda.

NATO Ammo Plant to be Built in Lithuania

Earlier this month, the German-based Rheinmetall also announced it had begun construction of an artillery ammunition plant in the Lithuanian city of Baisogala, in the center of the country. The plant is on track to begin producing 155mm rounds—the NATO standard ordnance for weapons, including the M777 towed howitzer and numerous self-propelled artillery platforms—by the middle of 2026. Tens of thousands of artillery shells will be manufactured annually.

The facility will not only bring around 150 jobs to the Lithuanian city but also help NATO replenish its stockpiles of the much-needed 155mm ordnance.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites, with over 3,200 published pieces and over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Arnoldas Vitkus / Shutterstock.com. 

Est-il raisonnable d'espérer des « sages de la rue de Montpensier » qu'ils retoquent tout ou partie de la loi réformant les retraites ? Le Conseil constitutionnel demeure une instance essentiellement politique, qui n'a que très peu souvent la volonté de se confronter aux pouvoirs. / Droit, France, (...) / Droit, France, Politique, Retraites - 2023/04

Les coups de menton de l'exécutif et les brutalités policières témoignent de la fébrilité du pouvoir français. Et pour cause : la contestation de la réforme des retraites porte en germe celle de l'ordre social soutenu par le gouvernement. / Politique, Démocratie, France, Mouvement de contestation, (...) / Politique, Démocratie, France, Mouvement de contestation, Retraites, Syndicalisme - 2023/04

En janvier, la publication de l'édition allemande d'une bande dessinée française de Dominique Grange et Jacques Tardi, « Élise et les nouveaux partisans » (Delcourt, Paris, 2021), était annulée en raison de l'expression « apartheid israélien » utilisée dans la postface de l'œuvre. Loin d'être isolé, ce (...) / Allemagne, Extrême droite, Racisme, Israël, Art, Société - 2023/04