European Union

by Dr Moritz Rehm, Prof. Dr. Martin Schröder, and Prof. Dr. Georg Wenzelburger (Saarland University)

The enduring romanticized notion that border regions serve as the quintessential embodiment of European identity has long captured our collective imagination. However, recent scholarly inquiry challenges this assumption, suggesting that the emotional attachment to Europe among individuals residing in border regions is not significantly different from those living inland.

Led by Professor Georg Wenzelburger, Martin Schröder, and post-doctoral researcher Moritz Rehm, our study recently published in JCMS delves into the prevalent belief that proximity to borders inherently fosters a stronger sense of European belonging. Contrary to popular belief and political claims, our findings, drawn from comprehensive data collected from over 25,000 individuals via Germany’s Socio-Economic Panel, reveal a surprising lack of disparity in attachment to Europe between residents of border and inland regions.

In scrutinizing potential explanations for this unexpected revelation, we explored various factors including education, income, duration of residency in border regions, and actual cross-border experiences such as commuting. While our study confirms the commonly held view that individuals with higher education, income levels, and international experience tend to exhibit greater attachment to Europe, it also shows that neither the educated nor the affluent, nor those with cross-border experiences, display heightened European attachment simply by residing in border regions compared to their counterparts in inland areas.

Rather than perpetuating an overly optimistic portrayal of border regions as natural hubs of European identity, our study urges a reevaluation of prevailing assumptions. While we do not outright dismiss the potential influence of border regions on European attachment, we propose a nuanced understanding. Border regions may indeed serve as focal points for European integration, intensifying the “experience of Europe” compared to inland regions. However, they may also be arenas of heightened conflict where national differences manifest more acutely, potentially leading to detachment from Europe among residents who directly witness the challenges of cross-national connections. Thus, border regions may simultaneously foster cooperation and conflict across borders, resulting in a net neutral effect on European attachment overall.

As policymakers continue to invest substantial resources in promoting cross-border cooperation, our study underscores the importance of adopting evidence-based approaches. Our data unequivocally indicates that border regions are not inherently foster greater European attachment. This insight is crucial for shaping informed policies that accurately reflect the dynamics of European identity formation.

Dr. Moritz Rehm is a postdoc at the Department of European Social Research at Saarland University. His research is focused on the political economy of European integration as well as on financial assistance in the European Union. He studied at the College of Europe in Bruges and holds a doctorate in political science from the University of Luxembourg.

 

Prof. Dr. Martin Schröder is professor of sociology at Saarland University, Germany. He did his doctorate at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne and studied at Sciences Po Paris. He was a postdoc at Harvard University and a Visiting Professor at Sciences Po Paris. He is currently in what explains a European identity.

 

Stt

Georg Wenzelburger is a political scientist and holds the Chair of Comparative European Politics at Saarland University. His research is centred on the comparative study of public policies with a focus on Western Europe. Recent work has focussed on the politics of law and order, welfare state reforms, digital politics and insecurity and has been published in academic journals such as the British Journal of Political Science, the European Journal of Political Research, the Journal of European Public Policy or West European Politics.

The post Debunking the Myth: Exploring the Role of Border Regions in European Identity Formation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This media advisory outlines the briefings and practical assistance available to journalists covering the 6-9 June European elections.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This media advisory outlines the briefings and practical assistance available to journalists covering the 6-9 June European elections.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Find here information on electoral rules, poll opening and closing times and candidates for the 2024 European election in EU member states, as well as useful figures.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Find here information on electoral rules, poll opening and closing times and candidates for the 2024 European election in EU member states, as well as useful figures.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Many people, including politicians and journalists, don’t understand the difference between ‘free trade’ and ‘frictionless trade’. This has caused a huge misunderstanding across the country, leading to the mess we are now in.

In summary, ‘free trade’ means that goods (sometimes only some goods) can be exported and imported between countries without tariffs – hence the phrase, ‘free trade’ or ‘tariff free’.

But those goods, even though tariff free, must still go through customs and are subject to checks, often causing many delays.

And even though it’s called ‘free trade’ there are other barriers as well as customs – such as regulations, restrictions, strict compliances and complicated documentation, which hold things up. (See the graphic for some examples).

‘Frictionless trade’ means that goods, as well as being tariff free, go through customs without any checks. In fact, it means that for trade between those countries, there aren’t any customs or borders.

Furthermore, with ‘frictionless trade’ there is a ‘level playing field’ between countries for the movement of goods – removing many of the barriers that exist with ‘free trade’ only.

That makes exports and imports between those countries super-efficient, leading to streamlined delivery of products, and of course, increased profits and more successful national economies.

But frictionless trade, although making international trade simpler and easier, is more difficult to establish than just free trade.

Frictionless trade can’t just be based on trust. If countries agree to flatten their borders, then those countries need to agree rules, terms and conditions. And they need to agree on a mutually acceptable court to intervene if those rules are breached.

That’s so the process of sending goods between each other is not abused, for example, to export substandard or dangerous goods, or exporting goods that are banned, to another country within the customs union.

Agreeing those rules is fiendishly complicated. But there’s more.

For frictionless trade to function most fully and most successfully, it needs what are called the ‘four freedoms’ – free movement of goods, services, capital and people.

These ‘four freedoms’ represent the cornerstones of the EU’s Single Market, helping the EU to become the world’s largest and most successful frictionless trading bloc.

Studies show that the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown by several percentage points thanks to the Single Market and its four freedoms. This is hardly surprising, when one considers that two-thirds of all goods produced in the EU are exported to another EU country.

To try and understand how the EU couldn’t fully function without all four freedoms, imagine how our own union of the United Kingdom also couldn’t fully function without these four freedoms.

Free movement of people, goods, services and capital between the three nations of England, Scotland, Wales and the province of Northern Ireland form the basis of our union of the United Kingdom.

It’s our single market. Just like the EU’s Single Market, it’s the glue that keeps us together.

Free movement of people, goods, services and capital work together. They cannot be separated without causing discord and disorder across our nation.

It’s the same with the EU. The EU functions as a cohesive single market of 27 countries – 31 if you include non-EU members Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein that are also in the Single Market – just as the UK functions as a cohesive single market of four ‘nations’.

The EU Single Market is the glue that keeps European nations together. It has helped to maintain Europe as one of the world’s richest and most successful continents, with common standards, values and history.

The UK’s Single Market, and the EU’s Single Market, both represent significant achievements. They work.

But here’s one vital difference.

Frictionless trade between the four members of the UK is vital to our smooth functioning as a nation. But doing business with each other doesn’t make the UK significantly richer.

To do that, we need the UK to export our goods and services (and we export far more services than goods).

Doing frictionless trade with other EU countries made Britain richer. Easy exports and imports with the EU brought us prosperity.

Losing borderless, lowest-cost trade with our most important customers and suppliers right on our doorstop, makes Britain – and Britons – poorer.

Our frictionless exports to the rest of Europe brought us wealth. Yes, exports to countries outside the EU also bring us wealth. But we need BOTH. And ONLY in the EU did we have both.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Watch this 1-minute video – What the UK has lost:

• Watch 1-minute video: Rishi Sunak supports the Single Market – but only for Northern Ireland

• Watch this 3-minute video: 1988 When Britain LOVED the Single Market

______________________________________________________

Follow my journalism on:

• Facebook
• LinkedIn
• YouTube 
• Jon Danzig’s World

_______________________________________________________

The post Frictionless trade is different to free trade appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

31 May 2024

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

31 May 2024

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The European elections will take place on 6 - 9 June. The first country to vote on 6 June is The Netherlands, and the final country to close its polls is Italy, at 23.00 CET on 9 June.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Oleksandra Matviichuk and Lorent Saleh are among the Sakharov laureates calling on citizens to vote in the European elections.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Oleksandra Matviichuk and Lorent Saleh are among the Sakharov laureates calling on citizens to vote in the European elections.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Inga Ulnicane

Behind the Artificial Intelligence (AI) hype about its numerous benefits, uncomfortable questions concerning the problematic social impacts of AI on issues such as justice, fairness and equality are intensifying. While it has been argued that AI has a potential to eliminate human bias, growing evidence suggests quite the opposite – that AI is amplifying and exacerbating gender, racial, ethnic and other stereotypes. Some widely discussed biased AI applications include hiring algorithms that discriminate against female candidates, facial recognition that performs poorly on black and female faces as well as obedient and subservient digital female voice assistants. At the same time, it is very difficult to find examples where AI has helped to detect, reduce or eliminate human bias.

In two recent articles (Ulnicane 2024; Ulnicane and Aden 2023), I analyse how AI documents frame concerns about bias and inequality in AI and recommendations for tackling it. For this analysis, I use an intersectional lens to highlight the interaction between multiple identities – gender, race, class and others – leading to the marginalization, exclusion and discrimination of certain social groups.

 

Social vs technical framing of bias in AI

Bias is one of the key concerns in policy, media and public discussions about AI. While bias in AI can be presented as a technical issue, it is a multifaceted phenomenon that includes social, technical, political, cultural and historical dimensions. To make sense of discussions about bias in AI, in our recent article (Ulnicane & Aden 2023) we distinguish two competing frames: technical framing and social (socio-technical) one.

According to a technical frame, AI is objective and neutral and can help to detect and eliminate bias. If bias in AI occurs, then it is just a glitch that can be addressed with technical measures. AI is offered as a technical fix to solve human bias. While this technical frame has been quite popular, it has been challenged by an alternative social framing. According to the social frame, AI amplifies and exacerbates human biases and reflects deep rooted historical and systemic inequalities and power asymmetries. It cannot be just fixed with AI but requires a systemic and holistic approach. We suggest approaching bias in AI as a complex and uncertain ‘wicked problem’. To tackle such a problem, a broader strategy is needed that combines technical and social actions based on wide-ranging collaborations including affected communities.

 

Intersectionality and AI: concerns and agenda for tackling them

In my recent article on intersectionality and AI (Ulnicane 2024), I examine four high profile reports on AI and gender focusing on how they frame concerns and recommendations for action. The reports highlight the systemic nature of equality issues in AI, where the diversity crisis among AI developers and founders leads to the building of biased AI systems creating a negative feedback loop and vicious cycle. Concerns that AI might offset progress made towards equality during previous decades are growing.

Lack of women and minorities in computing is not a new problem. There have been a lot of diversity initiatives in computing during the past decades, but they have not led to positive changes. Sometimes these initiatives have even resulted in decline of diversity because they have not sufficiently addressed underlining culture and structural issues in the tech sector that includes harassment, discrimination, stereotypes, unfair pay and lack of promotion opportunities. Despite the acceptance of diversity rhetoric by tech companies, it is often poorly understood and has even experienced pushback.

The reports highlight the urgency of diversity problem in AI. They argue for a broad approach that goes beyond just increasing numbers of women and minorities. Instead, focus should be on shaping culture, power and opportunities to exert influence. Furthermore, it is necessary to involve perspectives from multiple disciplines, sectors and groups. At the same time, it is important to avoid ‘participation washing’ when the participation of a minority representative is supposed to legitimize the project.

While intersectionality provides an illuminating perspective on some of the key concerns in AI, in the existing AI landscape dominated by economic issues it can be perceived as a niche perspective mainly concerning women and minorities. It could be enriching to use intersectionality to reimagine AI in more inclusive and participatory ways.

 

References:

Ulnicane, I. (2024) Intersectionality in Artificial Intelligence: Framing Concerns and Recommendations for Action. Social Inclusion, 12: 7543 https://doi.org/10.17645/si.7543

Ulnicane, I. & Aden, A. (2023) Power and politics in framing bias in artificial intelligence policy. Review of Policy Research, 40(5): 665–687 https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12567

The post Artificial Intelligence and Intersectionality appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

What does the Parliament do, what are the European Commission's responsibilities? What is the Council of the EU? Find out from our infographic.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Read about 10 laws that the new European Parliament is set to work on after the European elections on 6-9 June.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Parliament is supporting media across Europe on their coverage in the run-up to the elections on 6-9 June, when it will also host journalists reporting from Brussels.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Parliament is supporting media across Europe on their coverage in the run-up to the elections on 6-9 June, when it will also host journalists reporting from Brussels.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

After the European elections, the new European Parliament will get constituted, MEPs will approve the new European Commission and resume work on EU legislation.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

by Christian Achrainer & Michelle Pace, Roskilde University (RUC)

The EU has aimed to support democratization in Arab countries for decades, yet the region is still one of the most authoritarian in the world. What is most striking is that the EU has apparently not learnt from its past ineffective democracy support (DS) attempts but continuously reproduces DS malpractices. To help us understand non-learning in that context, and in policy-making more generally, in our recent JCMS article, we conceptualize EU DS as practices performed by a community of insiders who act within a complex constellation on communities of practice (CoPs). The article provides an explanation for why the EU is not able to improve its DS practices, and it allows us to critically reflect on the way how the industry works and constantly (re)produces malpractices. This can help us rethink EU DS and identify ways to overcome this gridlock, and it brings practice-theoretical debates on (non)learning forward.

Learning and the CoP Approach

The article primarily draws from the CoP approach and is thus situated within the practice turn in International Relations (IR). The CoP approach offers a practice-theoretical perspective on learning and non-learning in groups, assuming that learning is rather a communal social endeavour instead of an individual mental process. CoPs are learning communities, which, as Adler defines them, consist of “like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice.”

We argue that only a very restricted form of learning takes place within CoPs: members learn the CoP’s (non-reflexive) background knowledge and learn how to perform practices accordingly. They do not, however, critically reflect on background knowledge, and once this knowledge becomes internalized, CoP members perform practices as a matter of routine and largely unconsciously. Thus, they do not learn reflexivity nor introspection: that is, how to be open to reconsider and revise background knowledge and how to improve the practices they perform. Instead, they constantly reproduce the same practices, no matter whether these are suitable to reach a desired goal or not.

EU DS and the Constellation of CoPs

In our article, we build on this theoretical approach and conceptualize EU DS as practices performed by a community of insiders within a complex and multi-layered constellation of CoPs.

As shown in Figure 1 above, the insiders (CoP 1) stand at the centre of this constellation, and they comprise three sub-CoPs: deciders (CoP 1.1), supporters in the EU (CoP 1.2), and local supporters (CoP 1.3). All individuals who have ultimate decision-making power regarding EU DS within EU institutions are members of CoP 1.1, deciding on the overall strategy, budgetary issues, instruments and measures, and so on. The deciders closely work together with supporters in Europe (CoP 1.2) and in Arab states (CoP 1.3), such as large and well-connected implementation agencies and NGOs, or influential Think Tanks and other experts. These supporters provide the deciders with information, and they implement DS projects financed by the deciders. Members of CoP 1 constantly engage with each other, and the background knowledge on which they base their practices largely converges. They are entangled and co-dependent, because they can only jointly run the industry of DS, from which they all benefit.

Yet, the insiders do not perform their practices in a vacuum but within a complex environment. At least three groupings of outsiders perform practices which also impact democratization in the Arab World as well as (non-)learning amongst the insiders and the subsequent reproduction of their malpractices. Outsiders contesting DS malpractices (grouping 2) are all those actors in Europe (CoP 2.1) or in Arab states (CoP 2.2) who call for an alternative, more inclusive, bottom-up EU DS approach which empowers local democratization practitioners. They could help to turn malpractices into good practices by bringing in fresh ideas and insights, and by contesting the dominant background knowledge and established practices of CoP 1. Yet, they lack influence and are kept out of CoP 1 by powerful gatekeepers.

Outsiders contesting EU DS as such (grouping 3) are all those actors who are, in general, against democratization in the Arab World and contest EU DS practices on this basis. The grouping comprises actors in Europe, such as right-wing populists or anti-feminist movements (CoP 3.1), at the local level, such as the military, the monarchy, fundamentalist religious actors, or a corrupt business elite (CoP 3.2), and international actors, such as leaders of other autocratic states (CoP 3.3). These CoPs can, for example, produce counter-narratives or support non-democratic forces, contest the legitimacy of EU DS practices, and they complicate good practices and learning.

Finally, grouping (4) comprises actors involved in cooperation between the EU and Arab countries in fields such as energy (CoP 4.1), migration (CoP 4.2), security (CoP 4.3), and trade (CoP 4.4). While EU practices in these fields often significantly influence DS, the EU largely treats them as disentangled policy areas. CoPs of grouping 4 and CoP 1 hardly coordinate their practices, which they each perform based on different background knowledge. In consequence, CoPs of grouping 4 frequently perform practices contradicting EU DS efforts, and the EU’s cooperation with Arab countries often rather entrenches authoritarian structures by propping up repressive regimes.

Application of the Constellation Model and the Way Forward

In our JCMS article, we illustrate this – admittedly complex – constellation model by explaining non-learning in the context of EU DS in Egypt in the period 2011 until 2017. This is an interesting case, because EU deciders had enthusiastically declared to critically reflect on their cooperation practices with Egypt after the 2011 Revolution, but have then, after the military coup in 2013, gradually returned to the pre-2011 practices, indicating the incapability to truly reflect on the insiders’ background knowledge to improve practices.

The case study provided in the article also exemplifies that the constellation model can serve as a general conceptual framework for empirical research, including categories of actors conceptualized as CoPs and groupings of CoPs, and, importantly, that it must be regarded as a flexible framework. Which CoPs exist in the EU’s DS in a specific country is an empirical question, and the framework can be adjusted to study particular aspects of EU DS. When studying EU DS and EU practices performed in other policy areas, especially CoP 1 and the CoPs of grouping 4 will be relevant. To investigate the impact of actors who prefer maintaining authoritarian structures, a focus on CoP 1 and grouping 3 seems more appropriate. And so on. Empirical studies will not necessarily have to apply the entire constellation, but it can and should be adjusted.

Therefore, we hope that our article inspires others to apply the model in in-depth empirical case studies (which do not need to be restricted to the Arab world!), developing it further. Moreover, we hope to kick-start increased conceptual thinking on how to use practice approaches and especially the CoP approach when studying EU DS and (non-)learning in policy-making groups, because this in essence is our main objective: to provide a sound conceptual framework to better understand (non-)learning in EU DS.

Christian Achrainer is a PostDoc researcher at Roskilde University, where he is involved in the Horizon Europe project SHAPEDEM-EU. His research focuses on democracy, authoritarianism and human rights in the Arab world (esp. in Egypt) as well as on German and EU foreign affairs.

 

 

Michelle Pace is Professor in Global Studies at Roskilde University, Denmark. A political scientist by training, her research focuses on the intersection between European/Middle East/Critical Migration/Democratization and Conflict Studies.

The post Why does the EU not learn how to improve its democracy support practices? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

24 May 2024

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

24 May 2024

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP