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KYIV, 5 AUGUST 2016 –OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Madina Jarbussynova, on Friday concluded an official visit to Ukraine aimed at raising awareness of human trafficking and the risks encountered by the most vulnerable groups as a consequence of the current crisis.

During her five-day visit, she met with representatives of the Donetsk Oblast state administration and female Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Kramatorsk. Ambassador Jarbussynova also travelled to Kharkiv to talk to relevant civil society representatives about the situation on the ground, how to prevent the expansion of the conflict-driven human trafficking phenomenon, and to evaluate existing mechanisms of identifying, referring and assisting victims of trafficking in human beings.

“More than one-and-a-half million citizens have been displaced – a vast number that demands a comprehensive response,” Jarbussynova said. “This vulnerable group can easily find itself in situations where human trafficking may occur.”

In Kyiv, the OSCE Special Representative met with Ukrainian authorities to discuss progress in anti-trafficking measures and review future plans.

“The Government of Ukraine has recently demonstrated a high level of commitment to addressing human trafficking, particularly in enhancing its victim identification efforts and in filing cases to relevant courts”, said Jarbussynova.

At the same time, she noted that there are still considerable gaps in the National Referral Mechanism for victims, and that long-term, sustainable measures should be sought.

The Special Representative travels regularly to Ukraine, engaging with high-level authorities and holding training sessions together with the Special Monitoring Mission and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator to strengthen the capacity of the Ukrainian institutions and OSCE monitors to spot human trafficking trends and to report on alleged cases.

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This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to the day before including more than 520 explosions. In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day. On the night of 4 August, the SMM heard single shots of small-arms fire in close proximity to  its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). The SMM analysed craters in Zaitseve, Luhanske and Novozvanivka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, and noted the absence of numerous weapons from permanent storage sites in government-controlled areas. The SMM followed up on reports of water and power supply cuts in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions – two in government-controlled areas and two in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted a higher number of ceasefire violations[1] recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period, including more than 520 explosions.

On the evening of 3 August, while in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions 8-15km north-west of its position.

On the same night, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 104 undetermined explosions 7-10km north, and 12 explosions assessed as outgoing armoured personnel carrier (BMP-1, 73mm) cannon fire 5-8km north of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:35 and 22:31 of 3 August, facing north-east, recorded 63 undetermined explosions and 30 bursts in the following sequence: five bursts of undetermined tracer fire and 25 bursts of direct tracer fire from east to west, north to south, south to north, north-west to northeast, north-east to north-west, east to north-west, north-east to west, south-east to north-west.

The following day, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of the city centre), the SMM heard 236 undetermined explosions all at locations 3-10km ranging from north-west to north-east of its position. The most intense violence was noted between 08:14 and 08:42, when the SMM recorded 100 undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-east of its position. 

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and 13 outgoing explosions assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher fire 1-7km west-south-west, west, west-north-west, north, north-north-east and north-east of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 3-5km east and south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 3 August. Whilst in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. While positioned 1.5km north-west of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard, within a half-hour period, more than 100 bursts of small-arms fire 1.5km east-south-east of its position – the location of a known shooting range – and assessed them as live-fire exercise – within the security zone – in violation of the ceasefire and of the Trilateral Contact Group decision on the prohibition of live-fire exercises within the security zone. Subsequently, while in the vicinity of a shooting range, the SMM saw five armed “LPR” members wearing ski masks with sniper rifles.

At 21:45 on 4 August, the SMM while at its base in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), heard 16 single shots of small-arms (pistol) fire at an undetermined location 100-150m away from the base. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling area.

The SMM conducted crater analysis. In “DPR”-controlled parts of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field 60m away from a house and assessed it as caused by a mortar (82 or 120mm) round fired from a north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that shelling had occurred during the night of 2-3 August. Across the street, the SMM also saw a completely burnt and destroyed house and two neighbouring houses with minor damage. No casualties were reported.

In government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw four relatively fresh craters  with fragments of 120mm mortar rounds and 122mm artillery rounds in a garden of an inhabited house. The SMM was unable to determine the direction of fire due to contaminated craters after the recent heavy storms.

In government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw four craters near an inhabited house and assessed two of them as caused by 82mm mortar and the other two as caused by 122m artillery rounds, all fired from an easterly direction. Two residents told the SMM that shelling had taken place during the night time two days prior.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: five self-propelled howitzers (2S1Gvozdika, 122mm) in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk); four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152 mm) in a military compound in Donske (57km south of Donetsk); one radio-guided anti-tank system (9K114 Shturm, 134mm) mounted on a stationary armoured tracked vehicle (MT- LB) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 12 tanks together with other hardware including 19 armoured vehicles and 44 military-type trucks in an industrial complex in “DPR”-controlled Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), while it noted as missing six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) as first observed on 8 July. The SMM also observed that two areas continued to be abandoned, as they have been since 3 July, with 12 towed howitzers (D-30, 12mm) and six Addendum-regulated mortars (2B11, 120mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At Ukrainian Armed Forces sites, the SMM noted that 22 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (five 2B9M, 82mm; and two BM-38, 82mm) remained missing. In addition, the SMM also observed missing for the first time 36 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (BM-37, 82mm). The SMM noted that one of those sites continues to be abandoned and another site has been newly abandoned.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol); one light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun heading north near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) at an “LPR” checkpoint south-east of Shchastia across the contact line; one infantry fighting vehicle (BTR) heading north near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 33 armoured vehicles and 169 military-type trucks in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, in addition to aforementioned present in the same compound as the tanks (see above).

The SMM followed up on reports about cuts to water and power supply in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. In Avdiivka, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that at around 23:00 on 3 August, water and power supply to the town had been interrupted as shelling had caused damage to power transmission lines and to the Donetsk water filtration station located between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. At Yasynuvata railway station, an employee (a woman in her thirties), stated that at approximately 04:00 of the day the water supply had been interrupted affecting large parts of the town. She added that most residents currently used water from private wells and bottled water.

The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from government-controlled Lopaskyne to Lobacheve (24 and 17km north-west of Luhansk, respectively) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that the perpetrators had been identified. The SMM also requested the meeting with a senior “DPR” member to follow up on the incident of 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 30 July 2016). He subsequently  refused  the request.*

The SMM observed the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM for the first time saw a tailfin of a multiple-launch rocket system (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) stuck in soil 30m away from an inhabited house and some 50 rusty shells of 82mm mortars (without fuses) scattered in a nearby field.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning and widening of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant, repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), repair works to gas pipelines in areas between “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk and Pryshyb (28 and 34km north-west of Luhansk, respectively).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning, at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 132 cars waiting in a queue to cross into government-controlled areas and six cars in the opposite direction. A man in his forties told the SMM that he had been waiting for four hours since 06:00. A man in his early thirties with his wife and 8-year-old son stated that they were travelling to receive medical treatment for his son in government-controlled areas, expressing his concern as his son should not stay in the sun for a long time.  

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In government-controlled Hranitne (25km north of Mariupol), armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to enter a military compound. The JCCC was informed.
• Armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a military compound in government-controlled Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from their superior. The JCCC was informed. 
• A senior “DPR” member refused to meet with SMM, when it attempted to follow up on the incident 29 July near Lukove.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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MOSCOW, 5 August 2016 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission (EOM) deployed by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 18 September State Duma elections in the Russian Federation, the mission will hold a press conference in Moscow on Monday, 8 August 2016.

Jan Petersen, the head of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the EOM and its upcoming activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Monday, 8 August, at Interfax, 1-ya Tverskaya-Yamskaya ul., 2 Moscow, 127006.

For further information, please contact Inta Lase OSCE/ODIHR EOM Media Analyst, at +79166214710 (mobile) or Inta.Lase@odihr.ru

or

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

 

 

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257951 Communication and Media Relations Section

Representatives of relevant ministries and other state agencies of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan responsible for implementing provisions of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction met at an OSCE-supported peer review meeting in Minsk from 2 and 5 August 2016, to discuss progress in their work.

Experts from the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee also attended the meeting, which was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, and is the second event of its kind to be held in the OSCE region and in the world, and the first to be held in trilateral format.

Opening the event, Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Valentin Rybakov said that the issues of non-proliferation are among his country’s priorities in the area of international security.

He noted that Belarus was the first state of the former Soviet Union to voluntarily refuse the opportunity to possess weapons of mass destruction, and that the withdrawal of such weapons from the country’s territory was completed in 1996. Rybakov added that his country also initiated the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution on prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Adriana Volenikova of the  OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre said regional co-operation on UNSCR 1540-related issues has become one of the most efficient means in bolstering national implementation and enhancing an open dialogue between countries that face similar challenges and benefit from close interaction in related areas.

The three States will work on a joint report on implementation and later submit it to the UNSC 1540 Committee and the UN Security Council.

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DUSHANBE, 5 August 2016 – Twenty officers  of the Tajik Border Troops, ranked between warrant officer and major, mainly coming from border detachments  on the Afghan and Tajik border, successfully completed a four-week course today on patrolling and leadership at the Gissar Training Centre in Dushanbe.

The course, organized by the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, focused on enhancing participants’ knowledge of conducting observation missions using topographical maps, satellite imagery and other tools. They also learned about reporting and analysis, repelling methods, communications and tactical movement.

Uniforms and common tactical equipment were given to each participant. Separate medical lessons were delivered by trainers from the United States Embassy in Tajikistan. The sessions on gender mainstreaming and demining awareness were delivered by experts of the OSCE Office. Two officers of the Tajik Border Troops, who previously passed the course, also supported the OSCE in delivering the lessons.

OSCE Office in Tajikistan Counter-terrorism and Police issues Adviser Wolfgang Nikolaus, congratulated the officers on completing the course and said: “The OSCE continues supporting efforts to enhance the capacity of Tajik Border Troops Staff by providing such high-quality training courses."

The course is the eighth to be held under the third phase of the Patrol Programming and Leadership Project. The Project aims to increase the capacities of Tajik border staff in detection and interdiction of illegal cross-border movements.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk region the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with many concentrated around government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska and Trokhizbenka. The SMM analysed craters in Stanytsia Luhanska, Pobeda and Hnutove. It observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. It monitored border areas not controlled by the Government and encountered one restriction. It faced another freedom-of-movement restriction, also in an area not controlled by the Government*.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.[1]

On the evening of 2 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its position.

Whilst in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard in the late evening of 2 August explosions assessed as 20 artillery impacts (122mm), eight mortar impacts (120mm) and  seven mortar impacts (82mm) 2km south- east its position; and 23 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (122mm) 3km south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as outgoing recoilless-gun fire (SPG-9, 73mm) 0.7-1.5km north of its position and ten explosions assessed as outgoing mortar fire (82mm), 1-10km north of its position.

On 3 August, positioned during the day in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions 3-5km west, north-west and west-south-west of its position.

Positioned during the day in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 49 undetermined explosions 4-5km south-east, south-south-east and south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) throughout the day, the SMM heard five single undetermined explosions 6-12km ranging from north-north-west to south-west of its position.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) and government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk). While in Stanytsia Luhanska in the late evening of 2 August, the SMM heard during a two hour period 48 undetermined explosions 3-5km south and south-south-west of its position; 14 explosions assessed as outgoing 73mm recoilless-gun (SPG-9) fire and 14 impacts of 73mm SPG-9 rounds, 17 rounds of outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher fire (AGS-17) and 17 AGS-17 impacts, and intensive small-arms  and heavy machine gun-fire 3.5-4km south of its position.

On 3 August in the morning while positioned in Trokhizbenka, the SMM heard 81 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. In Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) throughout the day, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions within a  40 minute period in the morning, 5km south of its position.

The SMM conducted crater analysis and followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. At the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, approximately four metres south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces position closest to the bridge, the SMM observed a crater containing pieces of shrapnel which it assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from an undetermined direction. Near the same location the SMM observed three fresh craters assessed as caused by grenade launcher (AGS-17) rounds fired from an undetermined direction. The SMM observed 25m south of the “LPR” forward position at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge the SMM saw grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground approximately 15-20 metres north of the checkpoint. No craters were observed in either location.

The SMM observed four fresh craters at a farm in government-controlled Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk). Due to security concerns the SMM could not conduct crater analysis. The SMM saw from a distance that the craters were in soft ground and contained fragments of 125mm shells. The SMM saw that one shell had hit a concrete fence facing a southerly direction, while another shell had hit a pigsty. The director of the farm told the SMM that shelling had occurred on 2 August.

In government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed damage to a fence surrounding a house and damage to the roof of the house. The SMM saw shattered windows and shrapnel damage on the house’s wall facing a southerly direction. The SMM did not observe any crater.

In Stanytsia Luhanska medical personnel of the emergency department at the hospital confirmed to the SMM that two wounded Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers had been hospitalized on 2 August. Both soldiers had surgery at the hospital and one of them had been transferred on 3 August to a military hospital.  

At the hospital in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on the condition of the two civilians (a woman and a man) injured during the shelling in the night of 1-2 August (see SMM Daily Report, 3 August 2016). The medical personnel told the SMM that both patients were in critical condition. According to medical personnel, the female patient was still in the recovery unit, while the other had been transferred to Luhansk hospital for further treatment.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one tank (T-72) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk), in violation of the respective withdrawal lines.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines, but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed: 15 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in government-controlled Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk); and ten stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 31 July of the 26 towed artillery pieces and 35 tanks together with other hardware including 96 armoured vehicles, 80 military-style trucks and 14 trailers near “LPR”-controlled Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a “DPR”-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 16 mortars (PM-38, 120mm), 15 towed howitzers (D30, 122mm), could not account for two towed howitzers (D30, 120mm) and noted five additional such heavy weapons .

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces site, the SMM noted that 40 tanks (T-64), seven anti-tank guns (five D-44, 85mm and two D-48, 85mm) and nine mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing  (first eight observed missing on 19 April, the last on 29 June 2016).

At a “DPR”-controlled site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs, BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers, one of which had six anti-tank missiles mounted on its roof near Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk); and at the northern outskirts of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2), travelling north and one IFV (BMP-2) travelling towards the bridge.

In addition, an SMM UAV spotted one IFV (BMP) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on the incident on 2 August when SMM monitors were stopped at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk (see SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that an investigation was currently on-going and that findings should be soon presented.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the H15 highway near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed in the morning about 500 pedestrians and 145 civilian vehicles waiting to exit government-controlled areas. The SMM observed that the queue moved approximately 30 meters every 10-20 minutes. The SMM saw that three drivers alighted from their cars and walked towards the checkpoint. At this stage there were about 10—15 vehicles in front of them. They returned after 15 minutes and then drove their cars directly to the checkpoint surpassing the cars in front of them. The SMM spoke separately to several passengers and bus drivers who said that they have heard about bribery taking place at the checkpoints, but could not give concrete examples. At the first Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed in the morning approximately 200 pedestrians (mostly elderly people) waiting to proceed towards areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM observed that the elderly people in the queue were suffering from the heat. In the afternoon within 40 minute period the SMM saw 104 pedestrians leaving government-controlled areas and 84 pedestrians entering government-controlled areas.

The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government and was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members in Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, 28km east of Luhansk).* At the Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 45 civilian cars (the majority with Ukrainian license plates and one with a “Novorossiya” sticker partially covering the plate) and two covered commercial trucks (also Ukrainian license plates) lined-up in a queue waiting to exit Ukraine.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

•  At the border crossing point near “LPR”-controlled Makariv Yar an armed “LPR” member told the SMM to leave the area and checked ID cards of the SMM monitors. The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors. 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations on the day before, with many concentrated around “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). A peaceful protest was held outside the SMM’s base in Kadiivka. Later, at the same location, the SMM heard bursts of small-arms fire in the vicinity of their base and saw an individual running from the area. An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position threatened the SMM at gunpoint in Lobacheve. The SMM analysed craters on both sides of the contact line. It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. “LPR” members prevented the SMM from monitoring in border areas.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before[1].

On the evening of 1 August, while in government-controlled Mariupol, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions at an unknown distance east and east-north-east of its position. On the same evening, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded fighting in the following sequence: five explosions (impacts) north-east, and fifty bursts of tracer fire from east in an unknown direction; four bursts of tracer fire from south-east to north-west; four undetermined explosions; 12 bursts of tracer fire from east to north and 34 air bursts from south-east to north-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre in the early morning hours of 2 August, the SMM heard 67 undetermined explosions 5-15km north and north-west of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 2-5km west and north-west of its position. Later, positioned at the Yasynuvata railway station the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 4-6km north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard

16 undetermined explosions and two explosions of automatic grenade launcher fire 3-4km ranging from south-east to south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard 22 mortar impacts (120mm), 30 mortar impacts (82mm) and 50 automatic grenade launcher impacts 5km south-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) on the evening of 2 August, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions, 14 airbursts from an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and multiple bursts of small-arms and heavy machine gun-fire 1-2km north.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). While in Kadiivka in the early morning of 2 August, the SMM heard 91 explosions, some of them assessed as impacts and some as outgoing rounds, 32 of which were in areas 5-10km north-north-west and 59 in areas 5-10km west and south-west. For an hour during this period of shelling, the electricity supply to the city was cut.

At 20:34 on 2 August, the SMM, positioned in one forward patrol base in Kadiivka, heard three bursts of small-arms fire 50-100m north of its location. At 20:45, while positioned at another patrol base, the SMM heard 4-5 bursts from an automatic rifle fired in the air 10-15m away, just beyond the perimeter fence. In the darkness the SMM observed a person running from the area. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling the area.

In government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works, the SMM heard a mortar impact (possibly 82mm) and saw smoke rising approximately 1.5km east of its position. A short time later the SMM heard a further two mortar impacts approximately 1km east. Approximately an hour later the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-4km north and north-east of its position.

The SMM followed up on recorded ceasefire violations and conducted crater analysis. In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed craters at two locations. In Oleha Koshevoho  Street in a residential area in the south of the town the SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed that it was caused by artillery (calibre unknown) fired from a westerly direction. A woman told the SMM that children had taken remnants of a shell from the crater. The SMM observed damage to adjacent houses, including shattered windows and shrapnel-damaged walls. Two residents (a 60 year-old man and a 70 year-old woman) said that the shelling, which had begun at about 01:30, had critically wounded a 50 year-old man who was taken to hospital.

At a second impact area in a residential area in the north of Kadiivka the SMM observed shell damage and analysed craters. The SMM observed a crater in the yard of a house, which it assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a north-westerly direction. The SMM observed damage to the exterior walls of the house, broken windows and saw that the interior ceiling was damaged by shelling. A second crater was analysed in this area, and was assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a westerly direction. A tree had sustained a direct hit from a shell. According to Russian Federation officers at the JCCC who were present, armed men had visited these impact sites and removed pieces of shrapnel. Nevertheless, the SMM observed pieces of shrapnel at these sites that indicated the use of artillery or rockets. Residents told the SMM that two women (70 and 79 years-old) were injured in the shelling and that both were hospitalized in Kadiivka, with one of them subsequently moved to Luhansk for further treatment.

On 1 August, near the government-controlled Maiorsk checkpoint (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw damage to checkpoint barriers and nearby trees. The SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed it to have been caused by multiple-launch rocket systems (122mm, Grad) fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the checkpoint nearby told the SMM that heavy shelling had taken place on the night of 31 July.

An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position stopped two SMM vehicles in government-controlled areas travelling east on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk). The armed man, wearing military-style clothing with no marking, threatened at gunpoint one of the SMM monitors and said in Russian, “Stop. You are not going anywhere”. Later, four armed men arrived, some in military-style clothing and appearing to be intoxicated, carrying assault rifles (AK-74).  After 15 minutes the SMM was allowed to leave the area and proceed to Lobacheve (See SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira 100mm) in “DPR”-controlled Zelene (28km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm). In another government-controlled area the SMM saw 17 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) but could not account for one. When the SMM asked a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier why one anti-tank gun had black soot on its muzzle break he said it was because it had recently been used in training exercises. One government-controlled area continued to be abandoned, as it has been since 19 December 2015, with all 12 mortars (2S12 Sani, 120mm) missing. The SMM observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it has been for since 12 July 2015, with all six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At one site in “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed that two tanks (T-64) were missing for the first time and other weapons had been added. Tank ammunition was seen stored next to tanks.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone: two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM) near government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed an armoured tracked vehicle (MT-LB) travelling west in the direction of the contact line in a convoy of 20 military-type vehicles, one of which the SMM observed to be carrying approximately 125 anti-tank mines.

The SMM observed new mine hazard signs. Between Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two new mine hazard signs on the sides of the road in the area of the proposed disengagement area.

The SMM requested that “DPR” members and officers at the JCCC follow-up the incident on 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (See SMM Spot Report, 30 July). In Lukove, the SMM met with “DPR” members, including from the “ministry of defence”. A “DPR” member who had threatened the SMM, apologised. “DPR” members told the SMM that an investigation is planned. The SMM await the response of “DPR” members to the violation.

During the afternoon of 2 August a group approximately 30 protestors (mainly young people) gathered in front of the SMM base in Kadiivka, some carrying signs with slogans such as, “OSCE is blind”. Local “police” was present. The protestors dispersed peacefully after an hour. At the same time in another part of Kadiivka, a stone was thrown at an SMM vehicle, causing no damage.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote. Following explosions in the area of Zolote the SMM left the area due to security concerns.

The SMM attempted to monitor border areas not controlled by the Government but was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members who stopped the SMM near Diakove (70km south-west of Luhansk).*

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from travelling through a checkpoint towards the west of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The JCCC was informed.
• A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC office in Yasynuvata denied the SMM access to the roof of the building to conduct ceasefire monitoring, citing security concerns. He refused to share his ceasefire violation log with the SMM.
• On 1 August, water company officials refused to meet the SMM in “LPR”-controlled Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, 43km south-east of Luhansk), claiming that the SMM needed permission from the “municipality” to hold such a meeting.
• On 1 August, in Sorokyne, the “director” of the cultural centre and the “deputy head” of the “culture department” in the town asked for the SMM’s patrol plan and to produce some sort of “registration” from “LPR” members in order to have a meeting. The SMM refused and left.
• Two armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM near Diakove and asked for a signed and stamped patrol plan in the Russian language. The SMM informed the JCCC. After 40 minutes of waiting the SMM left, and were unable to travel to their planned destination, “LPR”-controlled Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk). The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “DPR” members allowed the SMM to proceed through a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve after checking the trunk of SMM vehicles.
• An armed “LPR” member at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names of SMM monitors.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 29 July 2016

© nicanor-ngouan.net État de guerre, horreur absolue, urgence absolue, hyper ceci, hyper cela … Face aux terribles attentats ayant ensanglantés la France, la parole institutionnelle, dès Charlie Hebdo, a choisi de n’adresser que l’émotion, dans une sorte de surenchère performative. … Lire la suite →

L'ancien Premier ministre fut l'un des premiers hommes d'Etat francais, et l'un des rares, a s'interesser de pres aux services de renseignements.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© mrallen / Fotolia

Challenges to security in Europe will take centre stage at the NATO summit in Warsaw on 8-9 July when its heads of state and government will discuss issues ranging from Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and its growing military assertiveness to turmoil across the Middle East and North Africa, and the future of the military alliance.

This note highlights a selection of commentaries, studies and reports by some of the major international think tanks and research institutes on European security and defence published in the run-up to the NATO summit. More reports on the subject can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’ from in November 2015.

NATO summit

NATO Summit 2016: From reassurance to deterrence. What’s really at stake?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, June 2016

The Warsaw summit and the return of Western nationalism
Danish Institute for International Studies, June 2016

Warsaw summit
Atlantic Council, June 2016

NATO Summit 2016: NATO must reaffirm its “open door” policy
Heritage Foundation, June 2016

National priorities for the NATO Warsaw summit
German Marshall Fund, May 2016

NATO defence planning between Wales and Warsaw: Politico-military challenges of a credible assurance against Russia
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016

What NATO for what threats? Warsaw and beyond
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2015

Preparing for NATO’s Warsaw summit: The challenges of adapting to strategic change
Danish Institute of International Studies, December 2015

Other studies

Restoring the power and purpose of the NATO alliance
Atlantic Council, June 2016

Time to restore conventional deterrence-by-denial
Egmont, June 2016

A new strategy: Implications for CSDP
Clingendael, June 2016

All not quiet on NATO’s eastern front
Carnegie Europe, June 2016

A threat-based strategy for NATO’s southern flank
Carnegie Europe, June 2016

Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Activation of risk potential
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2016

The future of Transatlantic security
Rand, June 2016

Evaluating future U.S. Army force posture in Europe
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, June 2016

NATO must stop crowding Russia
Cato Institute, June 2016

European defence: From strategy to delivery
Clingendael, May 2016

Embedding NATO into the European Union Global Strategy: The missing link?
European, May 2016

Closing NATO’s Baltic gap
International Centre for Defence Studies, May 2016

Russia: A test for Transatlantic unity
Transatlantic Academy, German Marshall Fund, May 2016

A historic reminder, an ever-present dilemma? Assessing Brexit’s potential consequences for European security
European Policy Centre, May 2016

Russian “countermeasures” to NATO are coming
Brookings Institution, May 2016

EUISS yearbook of European security 2016
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

Envisioning European defence: Five futures
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

For a “new realism” in European defense: The five key challenges an EU defense strategy should address
German Marshall Fund, April 2016

A new Helsinki needed? What security model for Europe?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 2016

The parliamentary dimension of defence cooperation
Clingendael, April 2016

European defence spending 2015: The force awakens
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

Do we need an EU army? Which way for the European security and defence cooperation
Mendel European Centre, March 2016

NATO’s guns point the wrong way
Friends of Europe, March 2016

NATO, the US and Baltic Sea security
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, February 2016

The annexation of Crimea: Lessons for European security
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2016

Ensuring deterrence against Russia: The view from NATO’s front-line States
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, February 2016

Forces terrestres et réassurance: Quelles options pour l’Alliance?
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2016

The defence of Europe before European Defence: Returning to the Schuman method
Fondation Robert Schuman, January 2016

A stronger CSDP: Deepening defence cooperation
Clingendael, January 2016

Defence budgets and cooperation in Europe: Developments, trends and drivers
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Consortium of Think Tanks, January 2016

Reinforcing deterrence on NATO’s Eastern flank: Wargaming the defense of the Baltics
Rand, January 2016

NATO and European security: back to the roots?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2015

The EU, Russia and the quest for a new European security bargain
Clingendael, December 2015

European strategy, European defence and the CSDP
Egmont, November 2015

L’Europe à la croisée des chemins: La politique de défense et de sécurité a besoin d’initiatives franco-allemandes
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2015

Après avoir battu campagne pour la sortie du Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne, l’ancien maire de Londres – qui n’a jamais hésité pour sa cause à faire usage de mensonges grotesques et à se rouler dans la plus vile des xénophobies … Lire la suite →

En « Europe », les électeurs anglais, si l’on peut d’abord saluer chez eux le respect du précieux principe démocratique, n’ont aucune idée de ce qui les attend (une récession et la réalisation brutale leur place exacte sur l’échiquier mondial) : l’une … Lire la suite →

L’idée a surgit, comme celles que l’on préfère oublier, après une sortie de table excessive. Prêts à tout pour montrer que la gauche de gouvernement n’était pas « angélique », après les attentats ayant ensanglantés Paris, des esprits échauffés, se croyant richement … Lire la suite →

Sur le papier, c’est bien. C’est juste un autre truc low-cost, une possibilité de prendre un TGV moins cher, avec un modèle calqué sur ces compagnies aériennes qui font un Paris-Milan à moins de 100 euros, aller-retour. On se doute … Lire la suite →

Le general Lanata, chef d'etat-major de l'armee de l'air, s'inquiete : sur la duree, la surchauffe guette les aviateurs francais.

Un ressortissant étranger qui n’a pas été intercepte lors du franchissement irrégulier d’une frontière extérieur de ’espace Schengen, ne peut être mis en prison au seul motif de son entrée irrégulière sur le territoire d’un Etat membre. L’affaire est emblématique en raison des protagonistes. L’affaire au principal concerne une ressortissante ghanéenne qui a été interceptée par la police française au point d’entrée du tunnel sous la Manche en tentant de rejoindre le Royaume-Uni à partir de la Belgique.

A ce stade la Conclusion a été présentée par l’avocat généra Maciej Szpunar récemment, le 2 février, sur la base d’une analyse des dispositions du droit français qui prévoient que les ressortissants de pays tiers peuvent être punis d’un peine d’emprisonnement de un an s’ils sont entrés irrégulièrement sur le territoire français et ce à la lumière de la directive 2008/115/CE sur le retour des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier.

La ressortissante ghanéenne ne disposait pas de ses propres documents d’identité et a été placée en rétention dans l’attente de sa réadmission en Belgique.

La directive européenne qui vient d’être citée ne s’oppose pas en principe à l’emprisonnement d’un migrant et la jurisprudence de la Cour s’est étoffée récemment avec des arrêts précisant dans quelles circonstances cela pouvait être fait ou encore en déterminant les critères permettant l’expulsion immédiate d’un étranger en séjour irrégulier.

L’avocat général a rappelé qu’il existait deux situations qui ouvraient la voie à la possibilité d’emprisonner un migrant en séjour irrégulier. Un Etat membre peut le faire lorsque la procédure de retour établie parla directive a été appliquée et que le ressortissant d’un pays tiers continue à séjourner irrégulièrement sur le territoire de Etat membre sans motif justifié et, deuxième possibilité, lorsque la procédure de retour a té appliquée et que la personne concernée entre de nouveau sur le territoire de l’Etat membre en violation d’une interdiction d’entrée.

L’Avocat général a ainsi déterminé que la directive devait s’appliquer, puisque la ressortissante ghanéenne se trouvait déjà dans l’espace Schengen et qu’elle faisait l’objet d’une procédure de réadmission vers la Belgique et qu’elle était en séjour irrégulier. Toutefois les conditions n’étaient pas remplies pour pouvoir l’emprisonner, car elle ne faisait pas l’objet d’une procédure de retour

Et n’était pas à nouveau entrée sur le territoire français en violation d’une interdiction d’entrée. Le seul motif qu’elle était en séjour irrégulier n’est donc pas suffisant pour l’emprisonner. Même migrant en situation irrégulière on ne peut vous emprisonner d’un claquement de doigt !

Mais comment s’y retrouver dans ce maquis inextricable de lois, règlements de jurisprudences et de situations personnelles, d’histoires individuelles diverses et variées ?

Pour en savoir plus :

     -. Texte d la demande de décision préjudicielle (le français étant la langue de procédure) https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163052&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1159828

   -. Texte des conclusions https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=174070&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=817894

     -. Communiqué de presse de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-02/cp160009fr.pdf

 

 

 

Classé dans:Conditions d'accueil des migrants et réfugiés, Dignité humaine, Droit à l'intégrité de la personne, Droit à la liberté et à la sûreté, DROITS FONDAMENTAUX, Liberté de circulation des personnes, MIGRATIONS ET ASILE

The European Commission is dealing with challenges on another EU-U.S. data sharing deal: the Parliament legal service and MEPs argued that the so-called Umbrella Agreement, which will be brought into being with the signature of the Judicial Redress Act, does not comply with EU law.

On November 2015 the legal service of the European Parliament received a request from Mr. Claude Moraes, Chair of the committee of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), regarding the “Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of personal information relating to the prevention, investigation detection and prosecution of criminal offences” also known as the “ EU-U.S. umbrella Agreement”. This accord would put in place a data protection framework for personal data transferred for the purpose of prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of criminal offenses, including terrorism. The European Commission agreed on terms for the ‘Umbrella Agreement’ with the U.S. government on 8 September 2015.

The Commission made the Umbrella Agreement conditional on the U.S. Congress’ passing of the Judicial Redress Act, which will give EU citizens the right to challenge how their data is used in the U.S. courts. The Judicial Redress Act was passed by the U.S. Senate in February 2016.

At a meeting on 15 February, the MEPs of the committee of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the EP and the Legal Service of the European Parliament presented their opinion on the relationship between the Umbrella agreement and Union law, both as regards its compatibility with primary and secondary European law.

To give his advice the Legal Service was supposed to answer three questions regarding the umbrella agreement, first about the legal nature of the accord and its relation with secondary EU legislation, second whether it could be considered as an adequacy decision, and third regarding the legal status of person who are not EU citizens and whether they are entitled to protection.

Concerning the first question the Legal Service answered that the agreement once properly concluded will be an international accord within the meaning of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), so it will have primacy over secondary legislation such as on the future data protection package. As a consequence, it is important to specify, that international agreements cannot have primacy over secondary EU law if they are in any way incompatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Regarding the second matter, on whether the agreement will constitute an adequacy decision or not, Dominique Moore, the rapporteur of the Legal Service, stated that the agreement does not represent a classic form of adequacy decision, that it falls outside the scope of secondary legislation and that, being its effects already clear, they do not require further adequacy decision. He also explained, on a further comment, that the European Court of Justice has limited jurisdiction over international agreements, while enjoys full powers in the review and eventual annulment or declaration of invalidity of a Commission position.

On the third question Mr. Moore stated that under EU law and in particular under both article 8 of the charter and article 16 of the TFEU “everyone has the right to the protection of personal data”.

Thus, under EU primary law , the right to protection of personal data is granted to everyone and it is not restricted on the basis of residence or citizenship or any other criteria. The situation under the EU-U.S. umbrella agreement, would instead be different. Specifically, as for regards agreement itself, it is important to note that Article 19, labeled « Judicial Redress », provides that certain limited rights of judicial redress shall be made available, subject to certain conditions, only to « any of a Party »

Accordingly, the EU-U.S. Umbrella agreement does not provide that the U.S. will afford rights of judicial redress to natural persons, falling within the scope of EU law, other than EU citizens. This then opens a significant « gap » in the protection of the personal data of individuals covered by EU law which applies to « everyone », when compared with the limited obligations imposed on the U.S. by the EU-U.S. Umbrella agreement .That is why in the opinion of the Legal Service, the proposed agreement would not be compatible with the charter.

Then Mr. Francisco J. Morillo, Deputy Director- General in the DG JUST, took the floor during the LIBE meeting and explained that, in the opinion of the Commission, the agreement will constitute a major success for EU. The agreement establishes indeed a framework that will apply to every transfer in the law enforcement sector made on the basis of future or existing accords or national law.

In addition, it will improve the situation of all EU data subjects except for judicial address avenues, regardless of the nationality or place of residence of the data subject. Furthermore he explained that the Umbrella agreement is an improvement compared to the present situation. The judicial redress act will allow EU citizens to benefit from redress: refusal to grant access to personal data, change data and disclosure to data. The effectiveness will be the core issue. The judicial redress act extends avenues to EU citizens. Nevertheless, this is not the only route of judicial redress.

However Mr. Morillo also specified that the agreement does not grant adequacy to the U.S. and he added it was never the intention of the Commission to make an adequacy finding. Article 5.3 of the draft version of the Umbrella Agreement does not provide a blanket authorization but a presumption of compliance. Paragraph 2 of article 5 clarifies that. The presumption operates on a case by case basis. It is an instrument to complement our legal basis for transfer. It is very different from an adequacy decision, he concluded.

Afterwards Mr. Giovanni Buttarelli, European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) took the floor, and welcomed the efforts of the European Commission to reach, for the first time, a general agreement with the U.S. Nevertheless he emphasized that the crucial challenge was to ensure full compatibility of the agreement with the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in particular with Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter and Article 16 TFEU. Thus he suggested three essential improvements in order to guarantee the compliance of the accord with the Charter and with Article 16 of the Treaty.

First of all, he said that all the safeguards should apply to all individuals in the EU, not only to EU nationals, because there are specific provisions in the Agreement that regard all individuals – such as the rights to access, rectification and administrative redress. But there are two essential provisions that appear to be limited to citizens of the two parties to the Agreement: namely, the general non-discrimination obligation in Article 4 and the right to judicial redress in Article 19. Mr. Buttarelli added that on these points the EDPS could not afford any ambiguity.

Secondly, Mr. Buttarelli stated that the second EDPS recommendation was to ensure that judicial redress provisions were effective – again within the meaning of the Charter.

Finally, the third EDPS recommendation dealt with transfers of sensitive data. As Buttarelli underlined “I am afraid that Article 13(2) of the Agreement seems to open the possibility of bulk transfers of sensitive data: it refers to the possibility of transfers of personal information « other than in relation to specific cases ». Such transfers would not necessarily mean transfers in bulk, but this possibility cannot be excluded”.

Afterwards many MEP’s casted serious doubts on the transatlantic agreement. Indeed, several MEP’s denounced the agreement for not safeguarding the rights of all EU residents, and contested Mr. Morillo assertion that the text would not lead to an adequacy decision.

Thus, how to reach an agreement on the accord is still not clear.

However, in the meanwhile, on Wednesday 24 February, the American President, Barack Obama signed the Judicial Redress Act, which was adopted by the American Senate in early February and on the occasion of the signing, Justice Commissioner Věra Jourová said:

“I welcome the signature of the Judicial Redress Act by President Obama today. This new law is a historic achievement in our efforts to restore trust in transatlantic data flows. The Judicial Redress Act will ensure that all EU citizens have the right to enforce data protection rights in U.S. courts, as called for in President Juncker’s political guidelines. U.S. citizens already enjoy this right in Europe. The entry into force of the Judicial Redress Act will pave the way for the signature of the EU-U.S. Data Protection Umbrella Agreement. This agreement will guarantee a high level of protection of all personal data, regardless of nationality, when transferred across the Atlantic for law enforcement purposes. It will strengthen privacy, while ensuring legal certainty for transatlantic data exchanges between police and criminal justice authorities. This is crucial to keep Europeans safe through efficient and robust cooperation between the EU and the U.S. in the fight against crime and terrorism. The signature of the Judicial Redress Act by President Obama is a historic achievement in our efforts to restore trust in transatlantic data flows, paving the way to the signature of the EU-U.S. Data Protection Umbrella Agreement.”

Elena Dal Monte

For Further Information:

Image Source:

https://cdt.org/blog/the-eu-us-umbrella-agreement-and-the-judicial-redress-act-small-steps-forward-for-eu-citizens-privacy-rights/

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs – meeting 15/02/2016 (PM)

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160209IPR13553/Committee-on-Civil-Liberties-Justice-and-Home-Affairs

European Commission – Statement

https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-401_en.htm

Speech of Giovanni Buttarelli on the EU-U.S. Umbrella Agreement given at Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee (LIBE)

https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/2016/16-02-15_Umbrella_Agreement_LIBE_EN.pdf

Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences

https://statewatch.org/news/2015/sep/eu-us-umbrella-agreement-full-text.pdf

 

Classé dans:DROITS FONDAMENTAUX, Protection de la vie privée et des données personnelles

On the occasion of International Women’s day, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality organised, on 3 March 2016, an inter-parliamentary committee in collaboration with the Employment, Civil Liberties and Budget Committees and the Human Rights Subcommittee. This year the focus is on the issue of women refugees and asylum seekers in the EU. This meeting brought together MEPs, representatives of national parliaments of 24 member states, candidate countries and Norway, and some delegates of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) and the European Commission, amongst the others. The debates mainly focused on combating violence against women refugees and asylum seekers, their situation in healthcare, and measures for promoting their integration. The latter point will be better analysed in a further article, while here, the focus is on the topic in general terms, presenting violence experienced by women and the almost non-existent health care provided to them in their trip to and across Europe.

On February, UNICEF has raised the alarm about the fact that “for the first time since the beginning of the refugee and migrant crisis in Europe, there are more children and women on the move than adult males.” Children and women now make up nearly 60% of refugees and migrants, against 27% of the end of June last year. Refugee and migrant women and girls are among those particularly at risk and require additional protection measures, as highlighted by the report issued by UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the Women’s Refugee Commission (WRC).

In fact, women are among the most vulnerable refugees. They are often the victims of violence and discrimination in their own countries, including forced marriage, rape, domestic violence, female genital mutilation, and “honour crimes”. However, on their journeys to and through the EU, they can again become victims of trafficking, prostitution and sexual exploitation.

In his opening speech at the European Parliament (EP) International Women’s day, Martin Schulz, President of the EP, expressed his strong interest in this gender issue, underling that the EU and its Members have to commit themselves to this matter. He also underlined that “refugee crisis” has not an easy solutions nevertheless, rule of law and solidarity, principles that have been put in peril during the last months, are strong bases to build on a possible solution.

Afterwards, several activists and MEPs took the floor at the conference. The words of Nawal Soufi, a human rights activist, thundered in the room presenting the awful reality that migrants face every day. She started her speech showing two bottles of water and a pair of tights: the hand-made life jacket that people, with no money left, use to try to save their life at sea. She talked about a “red Mediterranean sea”, coloured by thousands of silent deaths; the world looks at it and stays silent: “we continue to pretend that it is all nothing”.

This activist, an Italian 27-year-old girl of Moroccan origins, talked about her own trip from a gender perspective: she travelled as a refugee under false identity from Syria to Europe. She experienced violence twice: hit with baton by the border police of two EU Member States. “The travel frequently becomes untenable; people are constantly under pressure and often treated in an inhumane and degrading manner first by smugglers, and then by police authorities.” Nawal Soufi continued saying that she is not worried about refugees in Europe, because one day they will come back home. However, she is really concerned about Europe and its conscience. Thus, she called on the EU to open humanitarian corridors making Europe “permeable” in a safe and legal way.

All refugees face great hardship but women and girls are among the most vulnerable of those travelling to the EU in search of protection from war, human rights abuses and deprivation. Because of their gender, they are often the victims of violence and discrimination. As recalled by Susana Amador, Portuguese representative of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms Guarantees: women refugees are victims twice, as refugees firstly and then for gender-based persecution.

Women and girls are confronted to violence that they have been fleeing from in their home country and violence on the journey, very often from smugglers and traffickers and unfortunately from other refugees. It is a violent situation in itself. Women are vulnerable, particularly if they are on their own. Statistics show that there are now more women coming. The reason could be that men are sent on ahead and then women and children do come later.

UNHCR underlined “single women travelling alone or with children, pregnant and lactating women, adolescent girls (…) elderly women and especially persons with disabilities are among those who are particularly at risk”. In fact, as reported by the COFACE-Disability organisation, there are hundreds of disabled women refugees left behind with no access to humanitarian aid. Moreover, there are dozens and dozens of reports telling how women, and especially women with disability, are often exposed to sexual violence and psychological assault.

Rachael Reilly, representative of the Women’s Refugee Commission, exposed one of this report at the conference. She presented different cases experienced by some women interviewed. A Sub-Saharan woman, for instance, told that in Greece she was asked to have sex for obtaining a passport. Rachael Reilly added that, in emergency camps along the Balkan route, women are afraid of being subject to violence: there are no separates toilets, showers and, sleeping and safe places for women. Some migrants’ women told that they stopped eating and drinking not to go to the toilet. Women are in danger because there are thousands of people mixed up with no organisation. However, violence is even experienced in reception centres. As underlined by Mina Jaf, a Belgian social worker, a pregnant Nigerian woman, living in Brussels, was sexually abused by an operator of her reception centre.

These points are reiterated in the joint report conducted by UNHCR, UNFPA and WRC which underlines that, “despite attempts by UNHCR and partners to ensure well-lit and gender segregated reception facilities and shelter, many lack private, safe water, sanitation and health facilities and sleeping areas for women and children, exposing them to potential or further sexual and gender-based violence risks.”

Thus, the study comes up with a set of recommendations for governments and EU agencies to fight against this sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV):

• establish a coordinated response system within and across borders that protects women and girls;
• acknowledge the protection risks and put personnel and procedures in place specifically to prevent, identify, and respond to SGBV;
• ensure response to SGBV that recognizes women will not stop to report SGBV or access services; and
• provide legal pathways to protection, especially for women, children and SGBV survivors, including effective family reunification and prioritization of these refugees with specific needs in relocation and resettlement opportunities.

As regard to gender healthcare, the debate at the Parliamentary International Women’s day underlined that woman’s category is the most exposed during the trip. Directives for asylum seekers at national level envisage that once recognised as refugees, women have the same rights to receive healthcare as national citizens. The problem is that sometimes legislation remains on paper. In emergency centres, there is a lack of health facilities and most of the time police officers, doctors and interpreters are males: this represents an obstacle for women.

Moreover, due to the high rate of pregnant women, there is the need of pre and post-natal services, women care centres and safe spaces to leave children while their mothers receive medical care and assistance. Furthermore, Daniela Aiuto, Italian MEP, highlighted that the language barrier is a great obstacle: there is a lack of linguistic support and limits in the administrative structure. Thus, women often struggle to adequately explain their symptoms during the medical interview. Fortunately, she concluded, this gap is often fill in by NGOs and volunteers, but this is not enough. “The EU is called directly into play, more than ever before.”

Mary Honeyball, a UK member of the S&D group, underlined that a concrete step towards could be taken rising awareness. “People need to know that this is going on. This kind of pressure can lead to improvements.” The English MEP has drafted an own-initiative report on women refugees, highlighting the need for gender-sensitive measures as part of broader reforms on EU migration and asylum policies.

According to this report, once women are accepted in an EU country, their special needs are often not fully addressed throughout the asylum process, including the fact that they are often travelling with young children. “We need to make sure that the centres where they arrive are run properly”. Thus, she called for new European measures that could grant women access to proper legal advice or the right to request female interviewers and interpreters. Reception centres should include separate sleeping and sanitation facilities for women as well as trauma counselling and appropriate health services. She even highlighted that having been the victim of violence due to being a woman should be considered a valid reason for seeking asylum in the European Union.

The women’s rights committee adopted the non-legislative report of Mary Honeyball on last 28th January. All MEPs will debate and vote on the report tomorrow, on 8th March, a symbolic date to underline another time the EU new commitment on this gender issue.

On 8th March 2016, the International Women’s Day allows us to give voice to the silence of women migrants. It is a renewed opportunity to express our indignation about their situation. Anyway, this day allows us to stand together with all those women who dare to speak up, sometimes at their life’s risk, against the violence suffered at our borders and at our doors.

Let us raise our voice hoping that this can turn into real actions and decisions…and in 365 “women’s days” per year.

Adele Cornaglia

For further information:

• International Women’s day, European Parliament: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/top-stories/20160226TST16212/International-Women’s-Day-2016
• More children and women seek safety in Europe, UNICEF: https://www.unicef.org/media/media_90000.html
• Nawal Soufi, the girl that save migrants at sea with her mobile phone, LINKIESTA: https://www.linkiesta.it/it/article/2015/12/04/nawal-la-ragazza-che-salva-i-profughi-in-mare-con-il-suo-cellulare/28459/
• Refugee women on the move in Europe are at risk, says UN, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/569fb22b6.html

 

Classé dans:Conditions d'accueil des migrants et réfugiés, Dignité humaine, Droit à la santé, Droits de l'enfant, DROITS FONDAMENTAUX, Egalité entre hommes et femmes, MIGRATIONS ET ASILE, Non-discrimination