European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig,

© bluraz / Adobe Stock

National parliaments organise their security in a variety of ways. Whereas in some cases the principles of separation of powers or of parliamentary autonomy prevent police forces from entering parliamentary premises − meaning that these legislative chambers rely on in-house security services – in others the security of parliaments is ensured exclusively by the police or other state forces with responsibilities in the area of security, defence or civil protection. Other national parliaments exhibit a mixed model, whereby parliamentary security departments are supplemented by national police or military units.

This briefing provides an overview of the structures responsible for maintaining security and order in and around the parliaments of 11 EU Member States, namely Belgium, Germany, Spain, Estonia, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Finland, and also 3 non-EU countries − Canada, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). It focuses on the competences and tasks assigned to the services responsible for the security of each national parliament and highlights modes of cooperation with other external state forces. Furthermore, the briefing indicates, for each parliament, the ultimate authority in charge of the services responsible for maintaining order and security on and off the premises.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Policing in national parliaments: How parliaments organise their security‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nicole Scholz,

© jessicagirvan / Adobe Stock

The arrival of the Covid-19 vaccines marks a turning point in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic. For European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, vaccination is about self‑protection and solidarity. For many people, it is also about trust. Some are hesitant to get vaccinated, while others are against vaccination on principle. According to estimates, coverage of at least 60 % to 75 % is needed to establish population immunity through vaccination.

Polls show that sizeable numbers of people in the EU are hesitant − or even opposed − to vaccination in general. As regards Covid-19 vaccination, surveys suggest that Europeans are among the most sceptical in the world. According to the World Health Organization, vaccine hesitancy is complex and context-specific, varying across time, place and vaccine. Science has identified several behavioural factors underpinning vaccine uptake. Vaccine scepticism can also be linked to trust in government and is associated with certain political mindsets.

Many commentators agree that Covid-19 vaccine communication is a collective endeavour that should ideally involve institutional actors, healthcare professionals, scientists, journalists and people with standing in communities. There is a need to engage with the wider public, in particular with groups that have a low level of trust in scientists and are less favourable to vaccines. It is considered key to move towards an open dialogue that respects people’s emotions, and to understand the individual values behind doubters’ fears. Reaching diverse populations is deemed instrumental, as is involving political and community leaders in communication strategies.

The December 2020 European Council conclusions stressed the importance of providing clear factual information on Covid-19 vaccines and countering disinformation. The European Commission is set to roll out a two-phase vaccine communication campaign complementing the Member States’ efforts. The European Parliament has insisted on the need to counter the spread of unreliable, misleading and unscientific information on vaccination, and Members have repeatedly called for more transparency on the EU advance purchase agreements with vaccine developers.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Covid-19 vaccination campaigns: The public dimension‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Figure 1 Tips for professional reporting on Covid-19 (World Health Organization)

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Angelos Delivorias, Nora Milotay and Magdalena Sapała,

© European Union, 2021

Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in Europe collapsed in 2020 as a result of the economic crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Moreover, in contrast with previous recessions, the uncertainty caused by the pandemic also caused a shift in consumption and investment patterns. In great part thanks to the discovery of effective vaccines against the virus, GDP growth is expected to rebound in the coming two years. This forecast depends on several variables, however, including the length and size of the support programmes put in place by governments and central banks, geopolitical tensions, and the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom.

When it comes to employment, the positive trends observed in previous years were reversed in 2020 as a result of the economic crisis. The picture would have been bleaker had it not been for various support schemes and policy measures at national level, supported by a number of measures at EU level, and the EU’s new SURE instrument for temporary support to unemployment schemes. Nevertheless, interpretation of the numbers must be nuanced, given that many unemployed people were pushed out of the labour force in 2020, hiding the full effect of the economic crisis. Moreover, future unemployment figures will depend on the timing and pace of the withdrawal of policy support schemes and on whether the economic recovery has materialised by then. Taking these factors into consideration, unemployment is expected to increase in 2021, and then decrease slightly in 2022.

General government deficits are expected to have increased significantly, as a result of the various fiscal measures put in place to counter the economic crisis. Deficits are expected to decrease from those highs in the next two years, but still remain over the 3 % limit set by the Maastricht Treaty. Similarly, the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to increase significantly in 2020, both for the euro area and for the EU as a whole, and to continue increasing slightly in 2021 and 2022.

Lastly, in 2020, inflation for the euro area was slightly above zero and, despite picking up in the next two years, is still expected to remain below the target of 2 % set by the European Central Bank. In this context, but also to support the Member States, the ECB maintained its asset purchase programme (APP), launched a new one for the duration of the pandemic, and extended its accommodative measures.

The coronavirus pandemic influenced the negotiations on the medium-term architecture of EU finances, which resulted in the adoption of an unprecedented budgetary package in December 2020. This combines the €1 074.3 billion multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the years 2021 to 2027 with the €750 billion Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument. The agreement brought new momentum to the EU budget, assigning it a major role in the Union’s strategy to relaunch the economy. The launch of NGEU, a temporary recovery instrument (2021-2023), to be financed through resources borrowed on the markets by the European Commission on behalf of the Union, is a major innovation.

The 2021 budget is of a transitional nature. As the first under the new MFF, it shows the amounts needed to launch the new generation of EU actions and programmes, but also provides the payment appropriations needed for the closure of the programmes relating to the 2014-2020 MFF. Furthermore, NGEU will significantly increase the resources channelled through the 2021 EU budget, adding an estimated €285.15 billion in commitments and €75.93 billion in payments to selected programmes. As a result, in 2021, total commitments will almost triple the usual annual expenditure of the EU budget. While investment in recovery and resilience measures is the overarching priority of EU spending in 2021, the EU budget will continue contributing to the achievement of other objectives, in such areas as the green and digital transition, cohesion and agriculture, security and defence, migration and border management, and the EU’s role in the world.

Social and employment policies are strongly interlinked with other major policy fields, most importantly the economy, the public health system and education. Social considerations are also part and parcel of all policy fields – also set out in Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – and are woven into the fabric of society, directly affecting people’s everyday lives. The coronavirus outbreak and lockdown measures have caused major disruption, and exacerbated existing social risks and challenges, such as: an ageing population; rising inequalities between socio-economic groups, generations, genders and regions; new forms of work; and greater polarisation of wages between higher and lower paid workers. This situation is threatening to increase the divergence between Member States, and regions, making achievement of one of the main EU objectives, (upward) social and economic convergence, more difficult. Moreover, it again raises issues around the sustainability of public finances. Therefore, there is an even greater need than before to update the EU’s welfare states and labour markets, which implies structural changes in many instances.

Given the complexity of the issues that social and employment policies have to tackle, the EU has a broad range of tools available to design and support the implementation of policies in the Member States. These range from setting minimum standards and targets, and providing policy guidance and funding, to the EU’s economic governance mechanism. Beyond the immediate response to the crisis, the EU intends to contribute to nurturing more systemic resilience across the board, to enable Member States to bounce back, or even forward, from shocks in a sustainable way, to preserve the well-being of all of the EU’s population.

Close to three quarters of the funding programmes within the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-2027 and most of the investments through the new instrument, NGEU, can be used to support the implementation of policies that could contribute to the update of welfare states and labour markets. However, due to the relatively small size of the MFF compared to national budgets, its main function is to incentivise transformation and innovation on the ground that – in the longer term – can lead to systemic change. For that reason, the way the MFF, combined with other EU policy tools, shapes both the quantity and quality of spending (i.e. governance mechanisms and institutions on the ground) matters equally. This time, NGEU is designed to give an additional boost to the resources channelled through EU budgetary instruments and strengthen their pull for investment into relevant fields. Both new and old instruments seek to open avenues for increased solidarity among Member States based on common borrowing, and to promote a social investment approach to financing. In addition, through its other policy tools, including setting objectives and targets, the EU can help Member States to develop the necessary structures and institutions that in turn can help them absorb the increased funds more efficiently.

Read the complete study on ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass,

© paveu / Adobe Stock

This year, 27 January, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, marks the 76th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration and extermination camp. One focus of this annual day of commemoration is the responsibility borne by those who remain indifferent in the face of intolerance and discrimination. This places the Holocaust in the context of human rights, broadening Holocaust education to issues of tolerance, respect for human dignity, and democracy.

Holocaust education, which traditionally centres on the human and historical dimension, is also a vehicle for reflection on ethical and legal issues, and promotes critical thinking and open-mindedness. In contrast with ethical aspects and critical thinking, the legal dimension adds a new perspective to school education that can put additional pressure on the teachers responsible for Holocaust education, extending beyond their usual subject areas. Moreover, many European countries host immigrant populations whose collective history does not include this particular experience. Pupils and students meanwhile use social media, a potential source of conspiracy theories, Holocaust denial, antisemitism and xenophobia. In this context, teachers need to be ready to deal with this subject in a difficult social environment. They also need adequate resources and tools to address inconvenient truths of the period.

International institutions, and the European Union and its bodies, encourage dialogue and research on these issues, recognising the importance of Holocaust education and its human rights aspects for democracy and tolerant societies. The European Union provides funds, expert bodies and agencies to address the history, education, pedagogy and rights aspects of Holocaust education in all its dimensions of discrimination, persecution and extermination of Jewish, Roma and Sinti populations, as well as other minorities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Holocaust education: ‘Never, never be a bystander‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Izabela Bacian and Suzana Anghel,

© Adobe Stock

Discussions at the 21 January video-conference meeting of EU leaders largely focused on a coordinated response to the coronavirus pandemic, including the evolving public health situation with the spread of new virus variants coming from the UK and South Africa, vaccination strategies and international solidarity. While agreeing to further restrictive measures to limit non-essential travel, keeping borders open to ensure the functioning of the EU’s single market was emphasised as essential. At the meeting, EU leaders also raised the issue of the detention of Alexei Navalny, condemning it and calling on the Russian authorities to release him.

Video-conference of the members of the European Council

For the ninth time since the outbreak of the pandemic, the European Council’s members met by video-conference to coordinate the coronavirus-crisis response. Unlike previous video-meetings of the Heads of State or Government, the conclusions presented by President of the European Council, Charles Michel, were labelled as ‘oral conclusions,’ and not as conclusions by the President of the European Council.

Response to coronavirus pandemic

In light of the new variants of the virus already present in a majority of Member States, EU leaders’ discussions largely focused on vaccination, testing and possible restrictions to non-essential travel. Regarding vaccination, President Charles Michel recalled that two vaccines had been approved, with more expected to follow. The EU has secured up to 2.3 billion doses of vaccines to date. Charles Michel stressed that vaccination needed to be accelerated, and therefore urged the delivery of the vaccines in the timeframe agreed with the pharmaceutical companies. He stressed that all means should be used to avoid delays in distribution, including early supply of doses. Following a Commission communication issued ahead of the video-conference meeting, EU leaders agreed that Member States should aim at vaccinating at least 80 % of people over 80 years old and 80 % of health and social service professionals by March 2021, and at least 70 % of the adult population by summer 2021. President Michel underlined that the EU needed to act on two fronts at the same time: accelerating vaccination capacity but also limiting the spread of the new variants, notably by restricting non-essential travel.

The issue of ‘vaccination certification’, with certificates showing the vaccination status of an individual, was an important element in the discussions. No concrete decisions were taken at this stage. Leaders agreed that the Commission should work with the Member States on common elements for such a certificate, which would solely have a medical purpose. At a later stage, it should be determined, if, and under what conditions, such certification could be used for other purposes. A number of Member States have recently called for the development of such a vaccination ‘passport’ or ‘certificate’. The European Commission agreed in principle that a vaccination certification could be useful from a medical point of view, as it would allow for better surveillance of vaccination uptake as well as of any reported secondary effects across the population. While a global standard exists, the yellow World Health Organization international certification, the use of any future certificate must be carefully considered given the many unanswered questions surrounding immunity levels. It is still unknown whether vaccination inhibits transmission of the virus and for how long it provides effective protection. Moreover, any vaccine certification would need to ensure the respect of the rights of those without access to the vaccine, as well as of those who may have legitimate reasons not to be vaccinated. Moreover, data privacy experts have already warned against the risk of improper storage and sharing of data. Consensus will thus be needed among the Member States on the future uses of vaccination certification.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasised that more predictability and stability was necessary in the delivery process of the vaccines; she said the Commission would work together with the companies and the European Medicines Agency to this effect. Moreover, testing and specifically sequencing of the new variants needed to be increased. Given the low rate of sequencing across the Member States (<1%), the European Centre for Disease Control would be able to support the Member States in enhancing their sequencing capacity to reach at least 5 % of all positive tests.

While maintaining borders open remains crucial for the functioning of the single market, including for cross-border workers, the spread of the new variants requires Member States to refine their testing and quarantine criteria for both EU and non-EU travellers. Within the EU, the areas with a high circulation of the virus would in future be classified as ‘dark red’, and travellers from these areas would be required to undertake a test prior to departure. Travellers from third countries, on essential travel to Europe, would have to comply with the same requirement. The Council was therefore invited to review its previous recommendations on intra-EU travel and non-essential travel into the EU, in light of the risks posed by the new virus variants.

International cooperation on vaccines: Delivering on ‘a public global good’

International solidarity on vaccine distribution has been a key element of the EU’s crisis response from the early moments of the coronavirus outbreak. The European Council has on several occasions (most recently at its November 2020 and December 2020 meetings) stated that vaccines should be treated as ‘a public global good’, to which countries around the world should have timely and equitable access. To deliver on this commitment the European Commission has played, along with the World Health Organization and France, a central role in establishing COVAX, a global vaccine procurement facility. To date, the European Commission has pledged €500 million to COVAX in support to low- and medium-income countries. President Michel stressed that EU leaders remained committed to COVAX, and that the fight against Covid‑19 would only be successful if the pandemic was fought simultaneously in Europe and worldwide.

President von der Leyen confirmed that COVAX remained the main instrument for international solidarity on vaccines. She stressed that, in the current context, in which there is a ‘rush’ to vaccines, and partner countries face problems in securing supply, the EU is considering the establishment of a mechanism allowing the sharing of access to some of the vaccines procured by the Union; until COVAX is able to deliver large quantities of vaccines. The Team Europe mechanism will be used for that purpose, whilst vaccines will be channelled to partners through COVAX. The EU has set up Team Europe, a mechanism benefiting from a financial envelope of over €20 billion. This mechanism enables support to partner countries, including countries in the EU’s neighbourhood, to respond to the immediate needs of the health crisis.

External affairs Alexey Navalny

President Michel stressed that the EU leaders condemned the detention of Alexei Navalny, underlined that ‘Mr Navalny’s rights must be fully and unconditionally respected’, and called on the Russian authorities to release him and ensure his safety. EU leaders also called on Russia ‘to urgently proceed with an independent and transparent investigation’ on the poisoning attempt on Mr Navalny, and to fully cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to facilitate a fair international investigation.

EU-US relations

Speaking prior to the European Council meeting at the European Parliament, President Michel invited the new US President, Joe Biden, to work together to ‘build a new founding pact. For a stronger Europe. For a stronger America. For a better world.’ He has also extended an invitation to President Biden to attend an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in Brussels in parallel to the NATO summit. On both sides of the Atlantic there is political will to support multilateral action. In his inaugural speech, President Biden committed to ‘repair [US] alliances, and engage with the world once again’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the European Council video conference of 21 January 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Isabelle Gaudeul-Ehrhart,

© Daniel Schludi on Unsplash; JFL Photography, 1STunningART, gustavofrazao, stasnds, Inna, Björn Wylezich, Olena, muratart, Premium Collection, and max dallocco on ©Adobe Stock; Wikimedia Commons | US Embassy Tel Aviv Creative Commons license

This year again, for the fifth consecutive time, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) held its first event of the year on ten key issues to watch in the year ahead. The goal of the event, which took place on 12 January 2021, was to set the scene and present major issues that are in every mind, such as the race to vaccinate against coronavirus, the EU recovery plan, or the new United States administration. It also aimed at highlighting longer-term developments, such as the fight against inequality, the twin (green and digital) transition and digital boost for the circular economy, migration and asylum including a new procedure to manage Europe’s borders, or EU neighbourhood policy, including relations with Turkey and stormy waters in the eastern Mediterranean. Finally, the event shone a spotlight on research issues that may lack the momentum to make the front pages, yet are nonetheless important, such as access to food for all, culture in crisis, or critical raw materials.

Opening the event, EPRS Director-General Anthony Teasdale, highlighted the continuity between past events, and particularly the last one, which focused on the significance of 2020 – ‘a year we are all going to remember’ – and future EPRS events.

The European Parliament Vice-President responsible for EPRS, Othmar Karas (EPP, Austria)

The European Parliament Vice-President responsible for EPRS, Othmar Karas (EPP, Austria) then invited us to see the current situation not as a crisis but as an opportunity. His positive take is based on the lessons we have learnt (cooperation, investment, comprehensive solutions), the progress we have achieved (the deal on the recovery plan, the ambitious green objectives, the agreement on the rule of law) and the opportunities ahead of us. He found this attitude best captured by the words of the German poet Friederich Hölderlin: ‘But where the danger is, grows the saving power also’.

Event moderator, EPRS Members’ Research Service Director Etienne Bassot, highlighted the importance of this event. First as a researcher-driven exercise; second for its collective dimension and the many interactions between the authors, their managers and editors; and third as a way to connect with the public and to launch a year of events – the audience hailed from Brussels to Athens.

After ten quickfire presentations given by EPRS researchers and analysts, Etienne Bassot opened the floor to questions. These covered all ten issues, illustrating the audience’s interest in EPRS policy analysts’ expertise. Towards the end of the discussion, the chair announced the results of a quick audience poll. Participants were asked to choose which of the ten issues they considered the most important. While the vaccine race and EU recovery plan – unsurprisingly – tied for first place, access to food for all ranked next, confirming the relevance of the selection of issues.

Readers can read the publication here and watch the recording of the event here.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2021 – Source : EP / Eric VIDAL

The main debates of the January 2021 plenary session were on the inauguration of the new President of the United States, and the presentation of the Portuguese EU Council Presidency. Members also debated the humanitarian situation of refugees and migrants at the EU’s external borders, as well as the EU global strategy on Covid‑19 vaccinations, and the social and employment crisis caused by the pandemic and the EU’s response. Lack of transparency in Council appointments to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the consequences of earthquakes in Croatia were also discussed. Members discussed the Court of Auditors’ annual report, and Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borell made statements on the arrest of Aleksei Navalny, on enhancing EU external action in Latin America and the Caribbean, and on the latest developments in the National Assembly of Venezuela.

Enforcement of international trade rules

As the EU seeks to modify the Enforcement Regulation that protects its commercial interests in trade agreements, Members approved the text agreed between the EU institutions that extends EU counter-measures to cover trade in services and intellectual property rights, shortens the deadline for the review of the current EU regulation, and allows for provisional measures.

Right to disconnect

Members voted to approve a legislative initiative dealing with an issue exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic – the blurring of the work/home boundary and the need for a right to disconnect. While the digital transformation has meant that working schedules have become more flexible, workers’ rights to be able to disengage from work are under considerable strain. Although workers are protected in some EU countries, there is no legislation at EU level. The European Commission should now make a legislative proposal for a directive on the right to disconnect, to reaffirm the right to no professional solicitation outside working time.

European arrest warrant

Members debated an own-initiative report on the implementation of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant (EAW). Parliament has regularly called for a revision of this instrument (the first to allow judicial mutual recognition), due to issues regarding proportionality, judicial independence, prison conditions, and other problems. To date, the European Commission has declined to take up this invitation. While Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee recognises that the EAW is an effective instrument in combating serious cross-border crime and bringing perpetrators to justice, it nevertheless reiterates Parliament’s calls for a number of improvements

Common foreign, security and defence policy and human rights

Following a joint debate on Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee annual reports on the implementation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP), the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and democracy and human rights in the world, Members adopted resolutions on all three, with a large majority in the case of the third. While common EU positions on foreign policy are increasingly the rule rather than the exception, the coronavirus pandemic and a new, sometimes confrontational, geopolitical situation led to a more challenging global environment in 2020. The report on the implementation of EU CFSP reiterates that basic EU principles must be respected, and calls for greater ambition in CFSP. The committee notes that the EU’s credibility is in play and calls for debate on the question of qualified majority voting in some areas of foreign policy. An integral part of EU CFSP and the main instrument for intergovernmental defence cooperation between Member States, the second report debated looks at implementation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP). The report considers the EU’s global presence favourably in general, but also calls for further development of capabilities, greater cooperation with strategic partners, and underlines the need for democratic oversight, notably through consultation with Parliament. Members also adopted a resolution on the annual report on human rights and democracy in the world, which notes that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms has been considerably strained by the pandemic – exacerbating anti-democratic measures, discrimination, violence and hate speech. Climate change and environmental destruction have also increased threats to human rights, particularly for refugees and human rights defenders. The report urges the EU to streamline and monitor human rights and democratic standards in all its policies, including in international agreements. Parliament also seeks greater powers of scrutiny, notably of measures proposed under the 2020-2024 EU action plan on human rights and democracy.

Gender equality

Following a joint debate on the effects of the coronavirus pandemic and other challenges (such as the digital gender gap) on gender equality., Members adopted resolutions based on three Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) Committee reports, each by an overwhelming majority. The reports welcome the new EU strategy for gender equality for 2020‑2025, but underscore the need to tackle a recent backlash on equality with clear timescales, monitoring, and indicators of success, and set out specific recommendations for responding to the effects of the coronavirus crisis and for promoting women’s and girl’s participation in the digital economy.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed the mandate for negotiations from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee on the proposal for a directive on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – January 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape,

© metamorworks / Adobe Stock

Transport is the backbone of the EU economy, connecting people and businesses across various EU regions and countries. The coronavirus pandemic has shown the impact of mobility restrictions on the free movement of people, goods and services and, at the same time, confirmed the essential role of transport in safeguarding the functioning of vital supply chains. However, transport also generates significant costs to society, in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, environmental pollution, accidents, congestion and loss of biodiversity.

EU ambitions to address these negative impacts have increased over the years. In December 2019, the European Commission put forward the European Green Deal that aims to make the EU carbon neutral by 2050. This goal was subsequently endorsed by the European Parliament and EU Member States. To achieve climate neutrality, the EU transport sector has to cut its CO2 emissions by 90 %. This requirement is in stark contrast with the past trend: despite previously adopted measures, transport is the only sector in which greenhouse gas emissions have kept growing.

The Commission has therefore proposed a strategy outlining how it wants to transform the EU transport sector and align it with the European Green Deal, by making it green, digital and resilient.

While transport stakeholders have welcomed parts of the strategy as steps in the right direction, concerns about the text’s high ambitions and lack of concrete elements have been voiced.

The Commission is to start proposing the measures envisaged in 2021. It remains to be seen to what extent, with what modifications and how fast they will be adopted and then implemented by EU Member States, shaping transport transformation for the years to come.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Sustainable and smart mobility strategy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tania Latici,

© assetseller / Adobe Stock

In her first State of the Union speech, and in the section of the speech most applauded by the European Parliament, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called for the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in areas such as sanctions and human rights. The crises and security challenges accumulating in and around the European Union have added to the urgency of having a more effective and rapid decision-making process in areas pertaining to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The core encumbrance against unanimous EU agreement on foreign policy is argued to be the absence of a common strategic culture among EU Member States.

The Lisbon Treaty’s architects have equipped the EU Treaties with ‘passerelle clauses’ – provisions usually aimed at modifying the decision-making of the Council of the EU. The passerelle clause for CFSP is Article 31(3) of the Treaty on European Union, which empowers the European Council to, by unanimous agreement, allow the Council of the EU to take decisions by QMV in some areas of the CFSP. Another option is an emergency brake – cancelling a vote for vital reasons of national policy – while constructive abstention is an option which allows a Member State to abstain from a unanimous vote without blocking it.

Since 2016, the EU has witnessed growing momentum to shape its identity as a security provider and peace promoter. From 2020 and until 2022, it is undertaking a strategic reflection process taking the form of a ‘strategic compass’, whereby the threats, challenges and objectives for the Union in security and defence will be better defined. It is in this context that the debate about QMV in foreign and security policy has resurfaced and continues to be the subject of policy discussions. Nevertheless, recent efforts to innovate in the EU’s methods for adopting sanctions in the field of human rights abuses (the European Magnitsky Act) have been unsuccessful in their attempt to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Qualified majority voting in foreign and security policy: Pros and Cons‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Figure 1 – The pros and cons of QMV in foreign and security policy

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© brainwashed 4 you / Adobe Stock

The European Union and the United Kingdom reached a last-minute deal on trade and other issues on 24 December 2020, thereby avoiding major disruption from 1 January 2021, the date on which the transition period ended. However, many politicians and experts have noted that the agreement does not cover all areas of potential partnership, as well as leaving some issues ambiguous, so there is much potential for complex further negotiations in the future. In practice, the EU-UK trading relationship has been further complicated, at least in the short term, by the effects of the coronavirus crisis and a recent upsurge in infections in the United Kingdom.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on Brexit and related issues. More studies on the topic can be found in a previous item from this series, published in September 2020.

Brexit brief
Institute of International and European Affairs, January 2021

The great Brexit heist
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2021

The UK-EU Trade and Co-operation Agreement 2020
Senior European Experts Group, January 2021

How Britain and the EU could cooperate on defence after Brexit
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2020

How UK-EU trade cooperation can survive Brexit
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2020

Warming relations: UK-EU climate cooperation after Brexit
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2020

What’s in the EU-UK Brexit deal?
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2020

Ten reflections on a sovereignty-first Brexit
Centre for European Reform, December 2020

Brexit trade deal means ‘freedom’, but at a cost: The arguments will be far from over
Centre for European Reform, December 2020

Navigating accidental illegality
Centre for European Reform, November 2020

Post-Brexit foreign, security and defence co-operation: We don’t want to talk about it
Centre for European Reform, November 2020

The Brexit trade deal is no frictionless uncoupling
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2020

Brexit, le malheur de rompre
Institut français des relations internationales, December 2020

Breaking up is hard to do: Royaume-Uni et Union européenne après le Brexit
Institut français des relations internationales, December 2020

A deal is done: What happens now?
UK in a Changing Europe, December 2020

Is Brexit war finally over?
UK in a Changing Europe, December 2020

Brexit is not done: This deal is no ‘game, set and match’
UK in a Changing Europe, December 2020

What the Brexit deal means for Northern Ireland
UK in a Changing Europe, December 2020

UK manufacturing welcomes the deal in as far as it goes
UK in a Changing Europe, December 2020

Boris Johnson’s brinkmanship: To the cliff edge or beyond?
European Policy Studies, December 2020

China and Brexit drive the UK’s ‘tilt’ to Indo-Pacific
Chatham House, November 2020

Brexit and coronavirus: Economic impacts and policy response
Institute for Government, December 2020

The Brexit deal is the latest case of the government’s disregard for parliamentary scrutiny
Institute for Government, December 2020

The New Year does not mean that Brexit is old news
Institute for Government, December 2020

The Brexit deal is about taking back control rather than ‘exact same benefits’
Institute for Government, December 2020

Partnerships for the future of UK foreign policy
Foreign Policy Centre, December 2020

Le Brexit pourrait-il mener à la fin du Royaume-Uni?
Egmont, December 2020

Parliament should have a meaningful vote on the EU trade deal. But it doesn’t
Foreign Policy Centre, December 2020

Partnerships for the future of UK foreign policy
Foreign Policy Centre, December 2020

Brexit: Adieu or Au revoir?
Friends of Europe, December 2020

European security after Brexit
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, December 2020

Brexit, the area of freedom, security, and justice and migration
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2020

Devolution in the UK and the combined challenges of pandemic and Brexit
Polish Institute of International Affairs, December 2020

The UK’s European question is far from over
Scottish Centre for European Relations, December 2020

Where next for Scotland and Brexit: Four challenges
Scottish Centre for European Relations, November 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Brexit: The EU-UK trade deal‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Matthew Parry,

© Daniel Thornberg / Adobe Stock

At 13.00 EST on 6 January 2021, the 117th United States Congress and US Vice-President Mike Pence assembled in the Capitol Building, seat of the US Congress in Washington, DC, to tally the electoral votes certified by the 50 states and the District of Columbia, thereby declaring Joe Biden and Kamala Harris, respectively, US President-elect and Vice-President-elect. The ceremony was interrupted when an angry mob, seemingly encouraged by President Donald Trump in a speech earlier that day, broke into the Capitol and forced the Vice-President and Members of Congress to shelter in fear for their lives, while the intruders clashed with Capitol security and vandalised and stole property. Later that day, the combined forces of the police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Guard were able to evict the protesters and secure the building, allowing the Vice-President and Congress to re‑assemble and complete the ceremony.

The invasion of the Capitol, a symbol of US democracy, has had dramatic political consequences. Trump has now been impeached by the House of Representatives for the second time − the only US President in history to be so. Democratic Party leaders had already appealed, the day after the intrusion, to Vice‑President Pence to use the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the US Constitution to replace Trump against his will before the end of his term on 20 January. The US Senate appears set to conduct an impeachment trial after Trump leaves office, but it is not certain that it has the authority to do so, or what the trial’s legal or political outcome will be.

This Briefing considers some of the options that Congress had to deprive President Trump of power immediately after 6 January, and the options that remain after Joe Biden becomes President on 20 January 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘After the storming of the US Capitol: A second impeachment trial of President Trump?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katrien Luyten,

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Around 90 % of those who cross the external European Union (EU) borders illegally do so with the assistance of migrant smugglers. Furthermore, the facilitation of irregular migration is a highly profitable criminal activity, in particular when compared with the relatively low risks incurred. Even though detections of illegal border crossings are currently at their lowest level since 2013, the migrant smuggling business shows sustained high levels of demand.

This demand is not only due to the fact that people in severe distress – whether for economic reasons or because of a genuine fear for their lives – keep trying to reach the EU, by irregular means if necessary. Demand is also high because illegally crossing borders has become harder, due to increased external border controls and other measures put in place to prevent irregular migration. This is where migrant smuggling networks step in.

Migrant smugglers are among some of the most agile criminals. They go to great lengths in order not to get caught, quickly adapting the routes they use to smuggle migrants into the EU and their means of travel. They avoid direct contact with their victims, instead using the latest digital communication technologies and involving different intermediaries along a migrant’s journey. The facilitation of irregular migration is a complex crime, interconnected with many other criminal activities, such as document fraud, trafficking in human beings or other types of illicit smuggling.

Although people willingly pay smugglers to help them cross borders, they do so at great personal risk. Too many lose their lives, or are at risk of serious harm or exploitation. Therefore, preventing and combatting migrant smuggling and related crimes is one of the key priorities of the EU’s action against irregular migration and organised crime. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for more and better operational cooperation, data sharing and legal migration channels, and insisted on better implementation of relevant EU legislation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU action against migrant smuggling‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Figure 1 – Migration routes and illegal crossings to the EU

Written by Ivana Katsarova,

© Preeyanuch / Adobe Stock

Nearly a year after its initial outbreak, the deadly strain of the coronavirus, Covid-19, is still raging across the world and the sports ecosystem has not been spared. Whilst countries’ responses have varied widely, the global response prompted the almost total shutdown of competitions at all levels, including multiple postponements of mega sports events such as the Olympic Games and the European Football Championship. Estimates show that nearly a million sports-related jobs have been impacted in the EU, not only for sports professionals but also for those in related retail and sporting services such as travel, tourism, infrastructure, transportation, catering and media broadcasting, to name but a few. Additionally, Covid-related measures are estimated to have caused the loss of some €50 million in GDP across the EU-27.

The results of a 2020 survey among European national Olympic committees show that over 93 % have had to significantly review their work-related practices, and over two thirds (67 %) reported their elite athletes were unable to use training facilities. While larger clubs in major sports are likely to have the financial resources to cope with a temporary loss of income, the same is not true for grassroots sports facilities that rely on self-employed coaches and volunteers and face a greater risk of shutting down.

Even though its role in the area of sport is limited to ‘soft’ policy instruments, the EU has responded promptly to limit the spread of the virus and help EU countries to withstand its social and economic impact. In addition to the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative (CRII) and the CRII+, both approved by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU in record time, the European Commission has set up a temporary framework allowing EU countries to derogate from State aid rules, and proposed a European instrument for temporary support (SURE) to help protect jobs and workers affected by the coronavirus pandemic.

To keep their players and fans engaged, traditional sports have had to adapt their models by blurring the lines between traditional sports and Esports. However, research reveals that Covid-19-related restrictions have only increased the appeal of outdoor activities and made initiatives such as the European Week of Sport more necessary than ever.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How coronavirus infected sport‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nikolai Atanassov (1st edition),

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In September 2020, the European Commission proposed a new pact on asylum and migration. The legislative package related to the pact includes a proposal for a regulation dealing with crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum, aimed at establishing a mechanism for dealing with mass influxes and irregular arrivals of third-country nationals in a Member State.

The regulation would set out the solidarity mechanism procedure in the event of returns of irregular migrants applying the possibility for return sponsorship on behalf of another Member State, as established in the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMR). It would also provide for shorter deadlines in comparison to usual procedures under the AMR, when applicable in a crisis situation and for some derogations in crisis situations concerning the asylum crisis management procedure, the return crisis management procedure, and the registration of international protection applications in crisis situations.

Complete version

• Crisis and force majeure regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum Committee responsible: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) COM(2020) 613
22.9.2020 Rapporteur: Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D, Spain) 2020/0277(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Damian Boeselager (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Konstantinos Arvanitis (The Left, Greece) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Union, EP

The New Year begins with Members of the European Parliament continuing to speak in debates from the Parliament’s external offices in European Union (EU) countries (and following the debates and voting from home). The agenda once again reflects the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on all aspects of Europeans’ lives. Driving the EU’s recovery efforts will be a key priority for the Portuguese Presidency of the Council, which took office on 1 January. Prime Minister Antonio Costa is due to present the presidency programme in plenary on Wednesday morning. As that is also the day of the inauguration of President-elect Joe Biden, Members will hear statements on recent developments in the United States.

Two joint debates are scheduled for this session. During the first, on Tuesday afternoon, Members will discuss, and later vote on, annual reports on the implementation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP), the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and democracy and human rights in the world. While common EU positions on foreign policy are increasingly the rule rather than the exception, the coronavirus pandemic and a new, sometimes confrontational, geopolitical situation led to a more challenging global environment in 2020. The AFET committee annual report on the implementation of EU CFSP reiterates the need for respect of basic EU principles and calls for greater ambition in CFSP. The committee notes that the EU’s credibility is in play and calls for debate on the question of qualified majority voting in some areas of foreign policy. An integral part of EU CFSP and the main instrument for intergovernmental defence cooperation between Member States, a second AFET annual report looks at implementation of EU CSDP. While the report is positive regarding the EU’s global presence, it calls for further development of capabilities, greater cooperation with strategic partners, and underlines the need for democratic oversight, notably through consultation with Parliament. In addition, Members will discuss the AFET annual report on human rights and democracy in the world and EU policy on the matter for 2019 (which also discusses the 2020 situation, particularly in light of the coronavirus pandemic). Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms have been considerably strained by the effects of Covid‑19, which have exacerbated anti-democratic measures, discrimination, violence and hate speech. Climate change and environmental destruction have also increased threats to human rights, particularly for refugees and human rights defenders. The report urges the EU to streamline and monitor human rights and democratic standards in all its policies, including in international agreements. Here too, Parliament seeks greater scrutiny, notably of measures proposed under the 2020-2024 EU action plan on human rights and democracy.

The second joint debate, scheduled for Thursday morning, considers gender equality, and is likely to touch on both the effects of the coronavirus crisis and issues such as the digital gender gap. Progress to date on closing the gender equality gap has generally been slow in the EU. Women are also hit harder by the impacts of both climate change and digitalisation, where an opportunity to improve gender equality in the labour market has been missed. In addition, the health, social and economic crisis caused by Covid‑19 has led to consequences for women, including reduced income, domestic violence and shouldering much of the burden of care for others. A Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) Committee report welcomes the new EU strategy for gender equality for 2020‑2025, but underscores the need to tackle a recent backlash on equality with clear timescales, monitoring, and indicators of success. Two further FEMM own-initiative reports set out specific recommendations for responding to the effects of the coronavirus crisis and for promoting women’s and girl’s participation in the digital economy.

On Wednesday afternoon, Members are expected to debate and vote on a legislative-initiative report dealing with another issue exacerbated by the Covid‑19 pandemic – the blurring of the work/home boundary and the right to disconnect. While the digital transformation has meant that work schedules have become more flexible, workers’ rights to be able to disengage from work are under considerable strain. Although workers are protected in some EU countries, there is no legislation at EU level. Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs is calling for the European Commission to make a legislative proposal for a directive on the right to disconnect, and to reaffirm the right to no professional solicitation outside working time. The committee proposes minimum requirements on the use of digital tools for professional purposes outside working hours, emphasises the role of social partners, and the need for tailor-made solutions that meet specific sectors’ needs and constraints.

Members are scheduled to debate an own-initiative report on the implementation of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant (EAW) on Monday evening. Parliament has regularly called for a revision of this instrument (the first to allow judicial mutual recognition), due to issues regarding proportionality, judicial independence, prison conditions, and other problems. To date, the European Commission has declined to take up this invitation. While Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee recognises that the EAW is an effective instrument in combating serious cross-border crime and bringing perpetrators to justice, it nevertheless reiterates Parliament’s calls for a number of improvements.

For more than a year now, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement system has been unable to sit, owing to the refusal of the outgoing US administration to allow new judges to be nominated. The EU’s Enforcement Regulation enables the Union to take action to protect its trade interests following a ruling of the Appellate Body. In the absence of such a ruling, on the other hand, the regulation does not allow the EU to take action. The European Commission’s proposal to amend the Enforcement Regulation would allow for trade protection measures to be taken in cases where the WTO Appellate Body is blocked, and also in similar cases where dispute-resolution procedures under other trade agreements are unable to progress. With agreement on the proposal reached in trilogue in November, Parliament is due to debate on Monday and then vote on the agreed text at first reading.

Written by Sofija Voronova,

© makaule / Adobe Stock

Faced with a persistent international terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) is playing an ever more ambitious role in counter-terrorism. Even though primary responsibility for combating crime and ensuring security lies with the Member States, the EU provides cooperation, coordination and (to some extent) harmonisation tools, as well as financial support, to address this borderless phenomenon. Moreover, the assumption that there is a connection between development and stability, as well as between internal and external security, has come to shape EU action beyond its own borders. EU spending in the area of counter-terrorism has increased over the years, to allow for better cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and enhanced support by the EU bodies in charge of security and justice, such as Europol, eu-LISA and Eurojust.

The many new rules and instruments that have been adopted in recent years range from harmonising definitions of terrorist offences and sanctions, and sharing information and data, to protecting borders, countering terrorist financing, and regulating firearms. However, implementing and evaluating the various measures is a challenging task. The European Parliament has played an active role not only in shaping legislation, but also in evaluating existing tools and gaps through the work accomplished by its Special Committee on Terrorism (TERR) in 2018.

In line with the Parliament’s recommendations, as well as the priorities set by the new European Commission and its counter-terrorism agenda presented in December 2020, future EU counter-terrorism action will focus on better anticipating threats, countering radicalisation and reducing vulnerabilities, by making critical infrastructures more resilient and better protecting public spaces. Upcoming developments also include increased information-sharing, by means of better implementation and modernisation of existing tools, a reinforced mandate for Europol, as well as possible investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes at EU level, through the proposed extension of the mandate of the recently established European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

This briefing builds on an earlier one, entitled ‘The fight against terrorism‘, published in 2019.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU counter-terrorism policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tambiama Madiega,

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The EU has unveiled an ambitious plan to regulate online platforms, and the European Commission is proposing to introduce ex ante regulation to ensure that markets characterised by large platforms acting as digital gatekeepers remain fair and competitive for innovators, businesses, and new market entrants. The introduction of an ex ante regulatory framework that could limit online platforms’ commercial freedom and give wide-ranging enforcement powers to regulators would be a far-reaching step. Against this background, this briefing explains the rationale for regulating digital gatekeepers in the EU and provides an overview of the key policy questions currently under discussion.

Recent reports and studies have shown how a few large platforms have the ability to apply a range of practices that raise significant competition issues. The limitation of competition law – essentially applied ex-post after the anti-competitive practices have been implemented – has sparked a debate on whether EU competition rules are still fit for purpose and whether such platforms should not instead be regulated ex ante so as to provide upfront clarity about what behaviour towards users and competitors is acceptable. In this respect, the policy discussion focuses on a number of issues, in particular, how to identify online gatekeepers that should be subject to ex ante regulation, what conduct should be outlawed for those gatekeepers, what obligations should be placed on them (such as data portability and interoperability), and how such innovative regulations should be enforced. Finally, the briefing highlights the initial views of a number of stakeholders.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Regulating digital gatekeepers: Background on the future digital markets act‘.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Regulating digital gatekeepers: Background on the future digital markets act’ on YouTube.

Written by Andrés García Higuera,

While public discussion concentrates on the idea of autonomous driving as an added feature in a vehicle, could it turn out that the real advantage lies in interoperability?

Artificial intelligence (AI) is empowering what has arguably become one of the most important trends in the automotive industry: autonomous driving. Manufacturers are already equipping their entry-level vehicles with emergency braking, collision warning and blind spot monitoring, and offering other advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) as options, such as autopilot, auto lane change, autopark and summon. Even when these ADAS still require a human in the loop, they are clearly pushing towards level 5 vehicle automation.

© THI-Carissma

A fully automated vehicle has to operate safely in all circumstances. It needs to adapt to a changing environment, in which other elements are also moving. Typically, the AI in the vehicle allocates ‘uncertainty areas‘ to other objects in the road depending on their possible movements. However, as the number of moving elements in that environment increases, the system begins to require a reduction in these ‘uncertainty areas’ to accommodate its own trajectory. In the absence of additional data, this can only be achieved on the basis of suppositions collected and encoded in rules used by algorithms, with the assumption of risks.

Who sets these rules and programs the algorithms? How can anybody decide what risks are acceptable? There may be grounds here to decide on liability in cases of damage due to the system taking the wrong decision while following its program, rather than malfunctions where insurance companies could step in (in March 2017, the German Road Traffic Act was adapted to open the way for autonomous driving, and some manufacturers already contemplate facing this responsibility).

As traffic increases and the vehicle enters the uncertainty area of other moving elements, some level of interaction becomes necessary. In the same way as human drivers need to communicate and exchange signals by means of indicator lights or acoustic devices, such as the horn, autonomous vehicles need to gather information on the trajectories to be followed by other vehicles in order to reduce uncertainty. If no risks are acceptable at all, autonomous vehicles will not be able to operate in heavy traffic on their own. To reduce the uncertainty areas of other vehicles, the system needs to increase the amount of information it has on them. Thus, vehicles need to be connected and closely cooperate with each other, so that all of them can accommodate their own trajectories according to those of others.

Potential impacts and developments

As with all AI applications, autonomous vehicles require abundant data. Information external to the vehicle is crucial, as it needs to know the structure of the road and the presence of obstacles or other vehicles in its path. Internal information is also essential, as the vehicle needs to know its own status and the reliability of critical elements, such as brakes. Even if autonomous vehicles need to detect traditional signals and allocate uncertainty areas while sharing the public thoroughfare with non-autonomous vehicles, pedestrians and even animals, an efficient exchange of information with as many other vehicles as possible will greatly increase their safety, as well as their performance.

It follows that the more information the system can gather from other vehicles, the better (V2V). And this information can refer to the path other vehicles intend to take, as well as to their reliability. A path will be less reliable if a human driver is likely to be operating the controls to change the predefined trajectory, and it would also be useful to know the status of the steering system and brakes of that other vehicle. Road infrastructure such as signals can also be involved and coordinate with the flow of vehicles, knowing their intended trajectories (V2I). The autonomous vehicle thus becomes connected and operates as a part of its environment and traffic (V2X). Mostly sharing of operational information is contemplated for this, however privacy concerns still apply to specific questions, e.g. vehicle tracking and driver monitoring systems (DMS).

Intelligent transport systems (ITS) are a technological revolution in the transportation and automotive sector. The main goal of ITS is interconnecting all vehicles in a network so that safety and efficiency measures can be deployed in coordination. Besides, ITS can offer additional services. In fact, these technologies are evolving into an adaptation of the internet of things (IoT) to the automotive field, which is emerging as one of the most important technological trends for coming years.

Recent advances on smart vehicles and ITS give rise to the idea of the connected car as a central paradigm of new propositions aimed at introduction of collaborative systems and interoperability. In this context, many solutions for fleet control are already commercially available, whereas traffic optimisation is considered a realistic option for the near future. However, all these systems rely on information that is often internal to the vehicle and controlled by its manufacturer. For collaborative traffic to be really effective, AI systems in all vehicles need to be open to free exchange of internal data and connected to a global network.

Manufacturers tend to use proprietary systems to ensure their revenue from maintenance operations in their vehicles. However, while manufacturers may arguably have a claim to this maintenance revenue, the way in which some of them are limiting remote connection and the access to the information gathered by the vehicle and necessary for diagnosis and repair operations, constitutes a serious drawback to the development of new solutions for traffic control that aim for safer and more efficient vehicle circulation.

Anticipatory policy-making

For these new solutions on collaborative systems to work, it is necessary that all of the information concerning every vehicle is made available, e.g. through the on-board diagnostic (OBD) port. Most industrial vehicles already incorporate telematics systems such as smart tachographs (now compulsory) and others, to report on their status for fleet management and maintenance. Today, only limited specific legislation regarding automated mobility exists. However, seven big vehicle manufacturers have agreed on a standard protocol regarding basic parameters for fleet management systems. This protocol, identified as the fleet management system (FMS), is not backed by any European regulation and only allows for basic interoperability between management systems operating with vehicles from different manufacturers.

There is a growing new market for telematics solutions, some of which are already being developed by companies emerging in this sector. However, these solutions require access to diagnostic data through the OBD port without the restrictions set in place by some vehicle manufacturers. On the other hand, these may arguably have a legitimate right to include restrictions and they are also concerned about possible safety issues related to open access to vehicle data.

The maintenance sector (represented by associations such as EGEA) makes a claim for specific regulation on these issues. EGEA argues that manufacturers frequently set security gateways (SGW) restricting access to OBD vehicle information. This practice is contrary to Regulation (EC) No 595/2009 on type-approval of motor vehicles and engines and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance information, which specifies that ‘unrestricted access to vehicle repair information’ must be allowed at all times, and to related regulation (EU) No 2018/858, which makes specific reference to OBD systems, and even rules on how this must be done. According to the regulation, the OBD data has to be available for reading while the vehicle is in motion. This prevents tampering under these conditions, thus eliminating possible concerns related to vehicle safety. Restricting access to vehicle information results in a dominant position for manufacturers that is contrary to free competition and EU market rules. Facilitating remote access to this information would allow the transport industry to become more proficient by improving fleet management through predictive maintenance. It would also create the required conditions for the development of new solutions based on Big Data and AI that will make transport safer and more efficient. Enforcing the sector’s compliance with existing regulations and extending its scope (e.g. to increase references to remote data access), will help create the proper conditions for this sector to develop and grow with new solutions and service companies.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if AI took care of traffic as well as driving?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if AI took care of traffic as well as driving?’ on YouTube.

Written by Tatjana Evas and Aleksandra Heflich,

© Adobe Stock

Transport is one of the sectors in which artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are seeing rapid uptake. AI systems can detect patterns in a large volume of data and model complex solutions that enable increased efficiency in decision making and better resource allocation. The biggest transformation in the sector, yet to come, would be the deployment and uptake of highly autonomous vehicles and enhanced traffic management systems.

Many estimations show that the application of AI systems in the transport sector can bring some important benefits to the economy and create jobs, which could help balance out the negative effects that automation brings, such as loss of low-skilled jobs (Chapter 1).

For several years now, the European Parliament has been indicating that the transport sector is key for AI and has been advocating the harmonisation of rules to enhance the cross-border development of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs). This could fully exploit their economic potential and enable the EU to benefit from the positive effects of technological trends. In 2021, the European Commission is planning to address the current legal vacuum and will make a number of horizontal legislative proposals addressing AI (Chapter 1.2).

Against this backdrop this report analyses enablers for the development and deployment of AI in road transport. These are: (i) infrastructure, (ii) technology, (iii) investment, (iv) ethics, (v) the legal and policy framework and (vi) social acceptance. Next it identifies the gaps and barriers that still persist and hamper the potentially beneficial development of AI (Chapter 2).

Finally, the report estimates the cost of non-Europe (CoNE) – the cost of not acting at EU level – for AI in road transport (Chapter 3). This calculation is based on the study that underpins this report (see Annex 1). For this purpose, the report analyses in detail only selected AI enablers (EU policies and legislation, and how they could increase social acceptance of AI with regulatory rules). The report presents three sets of EU policy actions ranging from least ambitious – no additional intervention at EU level – to most ambitious, which addresses current weaknesses in the liability regime and strengthens the trust and safety of AI users in road transport.

Figure 1 – Proposed policy actions at EU level that could address some of the identified gaps that hinder the development and deployment of AI in road transport in the EU

Calculations made as part of the study underpinning this CoNE report (Annex 1) point to a potential cost of non-Europe relating to AI in road transport. In 2030, the benefits lost if no further action is taken at EU level on liability in AI and on enhancing the trust of users of AI in road transport could amount to between €231 097 and €275 287 million, were none of the gaps and barriers analysed addressed. This EU action would be also beneficial for employment and could create between 5.181 and 6.147 million jobs.

Table 1 – Estimated direct cost of non-Europe, in 2030, EU-27

Read this complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Artificial Intelligence in road transport: Cost of Non-Europe report‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

Artificial intelligence (AI) is affecting the architecture and implementation of law in several ways. AI systems are being introduced in regulatory and standards-setting bodies and courts in several jurisdictions, to advance the functions of the la w and facilitate access to justice. Sound standards and certifications for AI systems need to be created so that judges, lawyers and citizens alike know when to trust and when to mistrust AI. Within this frame, several questions arise: Do we need ‘legal protection by design’? What are the legal and ethical boundaries to AI systems? Are existing legal frameworks adequate to cope with the challenges associated with the deployment of AI?

To respond to these questions and in view of the recent launch of its new Centre for Artificial Intelligence (C4AI), STOA co-hosted the 2020 edition of the Athens Roundtable on Artificial Intelligence and the Rule of Law, on 16‑17 November 2020 with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other prominent institutions. Co-founded in 2019 by IEEE SA, the Future Society, and ELONtech, the Roundtable was held virtually, from New York, under the patronage of H.E. the President of the Hellenic Republic Katerina Sakellaropoulou. The mission of the Athens Roundtable is to advance the global dialogue on policy, practice, international cooperation, capacity-building and evidence-based instruments for the trustworthy adoption of AI in government, industry and society, under the prism of legal systems, the practice of law and regulatory compliance. The two-day event, which attracted more than 700 attendees, reviewed progress on the AI governance initiatives of key participating legislative, regulatory and non-regulatory bodies, exchanged views on emerging best practices, discussed the world’s most mature AI standards and certification initiatives, and examined those initiatives in the context of specific real-world AI applications.

The event featured prominent speakers from international regulatory and legislative bodies, industry, academia and civil society. There was consensus that, to protect our democracies, it is imperative to ensure the deployment of AI in ways that do not undermine the rule of law. The speakers agreed that the trustworthy adoption of artificial intelligence is predicated on a thorough examination of the effectiveness of AI systems and on constant review of their legal soundness, especially in high-risk domains. This is critical to ensure that societies capture the upsides of AI while minimising its downsides and risks. During the discussion, the use of algorithmic systems to support or even to fully assume the function of the decision-making process in legal questions directly affecting humans emerged as a key issue: ‘black box’ algorithms, possibly developed on the basis of potentially biased data, and with no clear chain of accountability should be considered as unacceptable. The representatives of all major international organisations agreed on the need for a strengthened working relationship between the EU, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UNESCO and the Council of Europe – as a critical success factor in establishing impactful governance frameworks and protocols leveraging the entire policy toolbox smartly from ‘self’ to ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ regulation.

In both her opening and closing remarks, STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) highlighted that Europe should lead these efforts and pave the way for the establishment of a legal framework on human-centric AI that is similar to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and for the development of some commonly agreed metrics for ethical AI. In her view, the rule of law will have to be synonymous with governments and big corporations being prevented from using AI technologies to gain access to citizens’ sensitive personal data or from using perception manipulation techniques to that end. The panellists also agreed that enhanced algorithmic scrutiny is necessary, combined with a thorough assessment of the quality of such computer-based decision-supporting systems, with regard to their level of transparency, to the provision of a meaningful scheme of accountability and to assurance of minimisation of bias.

The discussion also focused on the various ways AI can be regulated, as well as on how algorithmic decision-making systems can be controlled and audited, including the methodologies needed to analyse automated systems for possible flaws and to identify common ways of risk calibration. Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden, recommended that the EU should closely cooperate with organisations like UNESCO to specify its ethical principles and should create, along with its transatlantic partners, equivalent systems of trust for all parts of society. Algorithmic bias in legal and judicial environments became a topic of discussion across almost all panels and most recommendations agreed on the necessity to build AI systems that are as diverse as our societies, given that technology can become a magnifier of social inequalities.

The speakers also emphasised the need to intensify efforts to regulate weaponised AI and reach an international agreement on definitional issues and the red lines that should be drawn when developing and deploying AI applications in critical domains. In several sessions, the issue of training and education to enhance algorithmic literacy was advanced as a key requirement for safeguarding citizens’ trust as well as for allowing users to exercise, in an meaningful way, their right to be forgotten, their right to an explanation when their data are being used for AI algorithms, and the right to redress against decisions made by AI systems. Several regulators also highlighted the mismatch between the traditional regulatory approach and the fast pace of technology developments in the domain of AI that point to the urgent need to introduce smart regulatory instruments, including ethical impact assessments.

In her concluding remarks, STOA Chair Eva Kaili underlined that a privacy-by-design and ethics-by-design approach should be followed throughout the entire lifecycle of AI systems, from their initial development to actual implementation especially in the legal domain. In a period of intense digital interdependence, where AI strategies and ethical principles are increasingly adopted at an organisational level worldwide, multi-stakeholder engagement, such as the Athens Roundtable, is critical to identifying and disseminating widely adopted practices for operationalising trustworthy AI.

The full recording of the meeting is available here.