European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Krisztina Binder,

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In 2017, the European Union–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) dialogue partnership celebrated its 40th anniversary. The same year saw the 50th anniversary of the founding of ASEAN. The ASEAN region is currently the world’s fifth largest economy, a dynamic economic area home to more than 660 million consumers.

To ensure better access to opportunities in the region’s market, the European Union (EU) started negotiations with ASEAN for a region-to-region free trade agreement (FTA) in 2007. After negotiations were suspended in 2009, the EU decided to pursue bilateral trade agreements with the individual ASEAN member states. To date, six have begun talks on bilateral FTAs with the EU: Singapore and Malaysia in 2010; Vietnam in 2012; Thailand in 2013; the Philippines in 2015; and Indonesia in 2016. Negotiations have already been concluded and FTAs entered into force with two of these countries, Singapore and Vietnam, in November 2019 and August 2020, respectively. Negotiations are under way with Indonesia, while talks are currently on hold with Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.

In the longer term, these bilateral FTAs would allow the establishment of a region-to-region FTA, which remains the EU’s ultimate ambition. By bringing together two of the world’s largest economic areas, the agreement would establish a free trade area with a combined market of more than 1 billion people.

It is in the EU’s interest to strengthen its economic cooperation with ASEAN, in order to maintain its competitive position in this dynamically developing region. Closer trade and investment relations could also pave the way towards the EU’s goal of a strategic partnership between the two regional blocs, encompassing political as well as economic cooperation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Trade negotiations between the EU and ASEAN member states‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Christiaan Van Lierop,

© darioracane / Adobe Stock

Established in 1990, the first European territorial cooperation initiative, Interreg I, focused on cross-border cooperation. Action in this area has expanded over the years to cover broader initiatives such as trans-national cooperation, involving countries from wider geographical areas, and inter-regional cooperation, which brings together regions from across the whole EU. These three strands together make up European territorial cooperation (ETC), which is one of the two main goals of cohesion policy today and which is celebrating its 30th anniversary this year.

With the removal of many of Europe’s frontier posts, travelling freely across borders has become second nature for millions of EU citizens. European territorial cooperation has brought Europeans closer together, strengthened connectivity and improved the natural environment, supported by EU mechanisms such as the European groupings of territorial cooperation, and macro-regional strategies. Yet despite these achievements, numerous obstacles to closer cooperation still remain, such as divergent national rules in the areas of employment, healthcare and social security. Recent years have witnessed increased calls to address these hurdles, with the 2015 Luxembourg EU Presidency launching discussions on a new instrument for cross-border projects, leading to the 2018 European Commission proposal for a cross-border mechanism, and the Commission rolling out initiatives such as the cross-border review and the b-solutions project, which aims to identify and find solutions to remaining bottlenecks, helping to boost growth and cohesion in EU border regions.

With negotiations under way on post-2020 cohesion policy, there is broad agreement among many stakeholders on the importance of strengthening Interreg beyond 2020. Yet the budget for ETC has been significantly reduced under the current Interreg proposals despite the many achievements of this policy, not least in recent months during which cross-border cooperation has provided a lifeline for many border regions. The coronavirus pandemic has revealed that territorial cooperation arguably needs protecting more than ever, with the sudden closure of EU internal borders a stark reminder that European territorial cooperation cannot be taken for granted.

This is a further updated edition of a briefing from March 2018.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Thirty years of European territorial cooperation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański,

© alotofpeople / Adobe Stock

Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for the possibility of approving state aid for ‘important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEIs). These provisions have been used very rarely until recently. A specific framework enabling the creation of IPCEIs, originally only in the areas of research, development and innovation, and environmental protection has been in place for 15 years, yet only four such projects have been notified to and assessed by the Commission so far. The first two – in the area of infrastructure – were partially annulled by the Court of Justice, and the Commission opened in-depth investigations to examine their compatibility with State aid. One of those concluded that the aid was legal, the other is ongoing.

The next two were launched successfully in the areas of strategic value chains for microelectronics and batteries. After this rather modest start, there seems to be strong momentum to create more IPCEIs, including in the context of the debate on how to foster the emergence of ‘European champions’. The marked political shift towards greater technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy within the EU has been given further impetus with the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, which disrupted global value chains and highlighted the case for a more self-sufficient EU model. IPCEIs may be useful tools for creating complex new value chains that have the potential to ensure the EU’s long-term competitiveness and economic growth.

A growing number of governments, experts and organisations have been calling for the simplification of current rules to make IPCEIs more frequently and widely used. The European Parliament would also like to see the requirements for the IPCEIs streamlined to allow smaller industrial research projects also to acquire IPCEI status. In its 2021 work programme, the European Commission announced the revision of the current IPCEI framework planned for the fourth quarter of the year.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Important projects of common European interest: Boosting EU strategic value chains‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Stefano Spinaci (1st edition),

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On 28 May 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation on a Technical Support Instrument that would provide Member States with technical support to strengthen their institutional and administrative capacity in designing and implementing reforms. In the context of the ‘Next Generation EU’ recovery plan, it would support them to prepare and implement recovery and resilience plans, and make reforms and investments related to the green and digital transitions.

Modelled on an instrument proposed by the Commission in 2018, the Technical Support Instrument would replace the Structural Reform Support Programme that has helped implement over 1 000 reform projects in the Member States since 2017. Under the current Commission proposal, a budget of €864.4 million has been set aside for the instrument over the 2021-2027 period (by contrast, the Structural Reform Support Programme has a budget of €222.8 million for 2017-2020).

The Council of the EU agreed its position on 22 July 2020. At the European Parliament, the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) are working jointly on this file under Rule 58 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. On 1 October 2020, the joint committee adopted its final report and decided to enter into interinstitutional negotiations. The Parliament confirmed the decision in its first October plenary session.

Versions

• November 2020:  ‘Technical Support Instrument‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Technical Support Instrument Committee responsible:

Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) (jointly under Rule 58)

COM(2020) 409
28.5.2020 2020/0103(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Othmar Karas (EPP, Austria)

Dragoș Pîslaru (RE, Romania)

Alexandra Geese (Greens/EFA, Germany) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Trilogue negotiations

Written by Martin Russell,

Economical and versatile, palm oil has become the world’s most widely used vegetable oil. Although palm oil can be produced sustainably, rising consumption increases the risk of tropical rainforests being cut down to make way for plantations. Deforestation threatens biodiversity and causes greenhouse gas emissions. In view of this, the EU has revised its biofuels policy to phase out palm oil-based biodiesel by 2030.

Palm oil: A vital commodity

© photomagically / Fotolia

Oil palm trees are native to West Africa, but were introduced to tropical regions of south-east Asia and Latin America in the late 19th century. Oil extracted from the fruit was traditionally used in Africa for cooking, but has now found a wider range of uses: as a substitute for animal fats such as butter in baked products, soaps and cosmetics, or as a feedstock for biodiesel. Around half of packaged products in supermarkets contain palm oil. Although not particularly healthy (it contains higher levels of saturated fats than most other vegetable oils), palm oil has many advantages. Compared to soybean, it requires only one-tenth as much land, one-seventh as much fertiliser, one-fourteenth as much pesticide and one-sixth of the energy to produce the same quantity of oil, and is therefore very cheap. In addition, palm oil is highly resistant to oxidation, making it suitable for frying and giving it a long shelf life. As a result, consumption of palm oil has doubled over the past 15 years to nearly 8 kg per inhabitant of the globe, and shows no signs of slowing down. Until the 1960s, oil palms were mainly grown in Africa, but since then production has shifted to south-east Asia: according to FAO statistics, Indonesia (42 % of global output) and Malaysia (36 %) are the leading producers, followed by Thailand (5.6 %), Nigeria (2.9 %), Colombia (2.2 %) and Ecuador (1 %).

The economic and social impact of palm oil

Palm oil is the main agricultural export of Indonesia and Malaysia, generating 8.8 % and 3.4 % respectively of their exports in 2019. It is claimed that the sector provides direct employment for nearly 1 million in Malaysia and 4 million in Indonesia, often in remote rural areas where alternative employment is scarce. However, not all have benefited; in Indonesia, indigenous communities often lack legal documents certifying their ownership of land, and there are many legal conflicts between oil palm companies granted government concessions in forested areas, and the people who have used the land for centuries. In some cases, this has led to local people losing access to land and resources. As a result of such problems, one survey found that many villages in Indonesian Borneo were strongly opposed to palm oil companies. There are also serious concerns about abusive labour conditions on some plantations.

The environmental impact of palm oil

Deforestation is the main reason why palm oil is controversial. Booming production means that more land is needed for new plantations. This does not necessarily result in forest-clearing, as oil palms can be planted on degraded land or land previously used for other crops. However, scientific studies cited by the European Commission in 2019 suggest that 45 % of the land area covered by new plantations is on formerly forested land, a much higher share than for other oilseed crops such as soybean (8 %), and that between 2008 and 2011 palm oil caused 4 300 km2 of deforestation worldwide. A second study from 2019 points to oil palm plantations as the single biggest cause of deforestation in Indonesia, accounting for nearly a quarter of permanent forest-clearing in the country between 2001 and 2016.

Deforestation is a major concern for several reasons. Compared to rainforests, oil palm plantations support only one quarter as many animal species. By eating into the habitats of the orang-utan and Sumatran tiger (both critically endangered species) as well as numerous smaller animals, they threaten biodiversity. At the same time, oil palms have less than 20 % as much above-ground biomass as rainforest trees, and a correspondingly lower capacity to absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.

This is an update of an ‘At a glance’ note of February 2018.

Greenhouse gas emissions go up when oil palms are planted on carbon-rich peaty soil – which is the case for around one-fifth of new plantations. Draining such soils, which is necessary for the oil palms to grow, exposes the peat to oxygen, causing it to decompose and release huge quantities of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere over many years. Peat drainage in south-east Asia is estimated to cause the equivalent of 2 % of global fossil fuel CO2 emissions. Fires on dried-out peat, which are very hard to put out, release thick clouds of choking smoke in the atmosphere. In Indonesia, around one-fifth of such fires are directly linked to palm oil.

Some of Indonesia’s worst fires to date were in 2015. For several weeks, Indonesia became the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter, as fires destroyed an area almost the size of Belgium. Choking haze spread as far as Singapore, costing the Indonesian economy at least US$16 billion and causing up to 100 000 premature deaths.

Efforts by producers to make palm oil more sustainable

As the world’s largest producer of palm oil and one of the countries worst affected by deforestation, Indonesia has taken several steps to make palm oil more sustainable. Since 2011, Jakarta has stopped issuing new concessions for clearing forests in primary (i.e. old-growth) forests and on peatland; moreover, since the peak fire year of 2015, concession-holders are required to protect and rehabilitate peatland areas. Despite this, the country lost over 10 000 km2 of forests a year between 2017 and 2019, partly due to oil palm cultivation. The good news is that this is still less than half the record deforestation rate of 24 000 km2 in 2016. Deforestation has also slowed down in neighbouring Malaysia, the other main producer, which has a long-standing commitment to keep at least half of its land area under natural forest cover.

Several certification schemes for sustainable palm oil exist, of which the most widely used is that of the international Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). To be RSPO-certified, palm oil must not come from land that has been cleared by fire or by destroying primary forest. Moreover, since November 2018, the scheme excludes new plantations on peat soil. Opinions on the RSPO are divided: the World Wildlife Fund sees the scheme as an ‘essential tool’ in the drive to ensure that palm oil does not cause deforestation; on the other hand, Greenpeace claims that RSPO standards are not strict enough and that in any case not all participants in the scheme meet their commitments. Besides, less than one-fifth (19 %) of global palm oil production is certified by the RSPO as sustainable.

The EU and palm oil

Several European countries (including France, Germany, Italy and Norway), as well as numerous multinational companies, have already committed to only buying sustainably produced palm oil. In 2016, 69 % of EU palm oil imports were RSPO-certified. At present, there is no EU-level requirement for sustainability, but this could change soon; as part of its ‘Green Deal’, the EU is planning an impact assessment of regulatory and non-regulatory options to promote deforestation-free imports of commodities such as palm oil.

In a bid to curb greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels, in 2009 the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive set a target of 10 % of transport fuels in Member States to come from renewable sources by 2020. To help meet this goal, nearly two-thirds of the EU palm oil imports are used as biodiesel feedstock. However, studies show that when forests are cleared for plantations, palm oil-based biodiesel actually causes more greenhouse gas emissions than fossil fuels. In response to such concerns, the EU amended its Renewable Energy Directive in 2018. As a result, though biofuels from crops such as palm oil that carry a high risk of deforestation will not be banned, they will no longer count towards the 10 % target from 2030 on.

Apart from these sustainability concerns, the EU also complains that subsidies and tax breaks give Indonesian producers of palm oil-based biodiesel an unfair advantage over their European competitors. To compensate for this, in 2019 the EU imposed countervailing duties on Indonesian biodiesel.

Indonesia and Malaysia have responded sharply to what they see as unfair EU restrictions. In December 2019, Indonesia filed a dispute with the World Trade Organization, arguing that the amended Renewable Energy Directive is discriminatory, and Malaysia plans to do likewise. Palm oil-related tensions stand in the way of an EU-Malaysia trade deal, perhaps also of closer EU relations with south-east Asia as a whole.

The European Parliament has expressed concerns about palm oil as a cause of deforestation, for example in its resolutions of April 2017 on palm oil and deforestation, and of September 2020 on the EU’s role in protecting the world’s forests. The latter calls for a binding ‘legal framework based on due diligence, in order to ensure sustainable and deforestation-free supply chains for products … on the EU market’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Palm oil: Economic and environmental impacts‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

The first item on Parliament’s agenda for the November I session, now that the outcome of the US presidential elections is clear, is to take stock of the results, which are likely to have considerable impact on political and trade relations worldwide.

However, before turning to external policy, and in anticipation of a final agreement on the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), Members will discuss next year’s spending plans in anticipation of the overall framework being formally adopted. On Wednesday afternoon, therefore, Members will debate amendments to the Commission’s proposed EU general budget for 2021, with particular focus on the effects of the coronavirus pandemic. While Council has proposed considerable reductions, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) has tabled a report which reverses many of the cuts and proposes increased spending on programmes linked to Next Generation EU (NGEU) funding, the European Green Deal, and education and employment, among other priorities for Europe’s recovery.

However, the coronavirus crisis has also had an effect on NGEU itself, with doubts raised that the funding available under the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan is sufficient to successfully execute the European Green Deal under current conditions. The need to improve climate-related aspects of the agreement on future EU spending is an important aspect of Parliament’s criticism of the European Council’s agreement on the next MFF. Specifically, Members will debate a report on Wednesday afternoon, adopted jointly by the BUDG and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committees that, although welcoming the plan and supporting the mix of public and private funding, questions whether the promised €1 trillion can indeed be mobilised by 2030, given the negative economic outlook. Parliament’s committees propose changes to the current plans to take account of the role of trade policy, to measure the impacts effectively, and to ensure that the ‘do no harm’ principle is respected.

The Covid‑19 pandemic has also highlighted that disease recognises no borders, and led to calls for greater coordination of health matters in the EU. On Thursday morning, Members will debate the establishment of an important programme of EU health policy actions, known as EU4Health. With funding proposed under NGEU, the new programme would strengthen EU coordination on health matters, in line with Parliament’s position to place stronger focus on preventing disease, promoting health measures and reducing health inequality throughout the EU. Parliament’s Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee has put forward a report that supports the proposed EU measures, particularly to fight cancer, as well as suggesting that an EU-wide steering group of public health experts is set up to oversee implementation.

A crucial part of the economic recovery will involve getting people back into work. On Wednesday evening, Members will vote on formal adoption of a decision on the way forward for the EU network of Public Employment Services (the organisations that support job-seekers) in the EU. The report by Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) highlights the benefits reaped by these organisations working together to improve support for those searching for employment. The report proposes a revised focus for the network – to work towards preventing unemployment and increasing employability, especially by encouraging the improvement of digital skills in the EU workforce.

Maintaining a level playing field in trade relations is important to securing employment levels in an economy. In a joint debate on Thursday afternoon, Members will discuss an International Trade (INTA) Committee report on the EU-China agreement on cooperation on and protection of geographical indications. These quality denominations are an important aspect of trade agreements, protecting producers against counterfeiting. The proposed agreement protects geographical indications for 100 products each from the EU and China. The INTA committee report calls for strong implementation of the measures agreed, including deeper customs cooperation.

Turning to a key EU environmental policy, Members consider several issues regarding prudent management of fishing stocks during this session. On Wednesday evening, Members will vote on formal adoption of a provisional agreement to provide financial support for the crew and communities affected by the poor health of cod stocks in the Baltic Sea, including over 300 fishing vessels in Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, Denmark and Germany. As the fisheries will have to close permanently, and there is no capacity for vessels to convert to target other under-pressure species, financial support under the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) will be necessary to cope with the major reduction in fishing opportunities. Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) has approved the proposal to close the eastern and western Baltic cod fisheries as well as western Baltic herring fisheries.

The first ever EU bilateral fisheries agreement, signed with Senegal in 1979, has allowed EU vessels to fish in Senegalese waters while also helping to support the development of a sustainable fisheries policy in the region. Following a joint debate on Thursday morning, Members will vote on consent to a new protocol to implement the agreement. Parliament’s PECH committee has recommended that consent be granted, and indicates some priorities for modernising fishing control, to help Senegal fight illegal fishing. In the case of the Seychelles, the EU’s most financially significant tuna agreement, Parliament will also consider on Thursday morning, whether to consent to a new agreement providing access to fishing grounds in the western Indian Ocean, and cementing cooperation on sustainable fishing in the region. Parliament’s PECH committee calls for better implementation of sustainability measures, particularly in view of the overfishing of yellowfin tuna in the region. More generally, the PECH committee criticises the provisional application of international agreements prior to Parliament giving its consent.

Parliament stands by its long-term commitment to a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East, including a negotiated and viable two-state solution to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU has recently welcomed the normalising of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan, known as the ‘Abraham Accords’. Brokered by the United States, the Palestinian Authority and all Palestinian factions have nevertheless denounced the agreements. On Wednesday afternoon, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will make a statement before Parliament on the geopolitical implications of the Abraham Accords in the region.

Finally, following Mairead McGuinness’s nomination as Commissioner for Financial Services, Financial Stability and Capital Markets Union, Members will take part in the election of her replacement as first Vice-President of the European Parliament on Thursday morning. The Vice-Presidents replace the President in the chamber and are responsible, as members of the Bureau, for financial, organisational and administrative decisions on Parliament’s functioning, as well as interinstitutional relations.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© ronniechua / Adobe Stock

As the United States has been choosing its President, an explosion of cases in a second wave of the coronavirus pandemic has forced many governments in Europe to reintroduce strict confinement measures, including new lockdowns, curfews, bans on meetings and the closure of many businesses, notably in the hospitality and tourism sectors. The moves are meant to act as a firebreak on the exponential growth in Covid-19 infections and prevent health sectors in many countries from becoming overloaded. Whatever happens next, economies will contract this year in the great majority of countries around the world, even if in varying degrees, with significant social and political implications.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on pandemic related issues. Earlier think tank studies on the issue can be found in the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ of 23 October.

Preserving development cooperation during Covid-19 times
Friends of Europe, October 2020

Pandemic is a wake-up call for mental healthcare reform in Europe
Friends of Europe, October 2020

The pandemic and the economic crisis: What lies ahead for the Western model?
Friends of Europe, November 2020

The challenge for Spain to use the EU’s pandemic recovery fund wisely
Centre international de formation européenne, November 2020

Crise du covid et lutte contre le changement climatique
Centre international de formation européenne, November 2020

Tracking the mounting challenges among those who have lost their jobs
Brookings Institution, November 2020

As the pandemic rages on, it’s time for NATO to step up
German Marshall Fund, November 2020

As Covid-19 cases surge, the country’s economic recovery is losing steam
Brookings Institution, October 2020

Will Americans trust a Covid-19 vaccine? Not if politicians tell them to
Brookings Institution, October 2020

What Covid-19 has cost the climate
Brookings Institution, October 2020

Can public education return to normal after the Covid-19 pandemic?
Brookings Institution, October 2020

NATO’s response to Covid-19: Lessons for resilience and readiness
Brookings Institution, October 2020

Fighting Covid misinformation
German Marshall Fund, October 2020

European Union recovery funds: Strings attached, but not tied up in knots
Bruegel, October 2020

The pandemic will structurally change the global economy more than we think
Bruegel, October 2020

What role for the European Semester in the recovery plan?
Bruegel, October 2020

Crise du Covid et lutte contre le changement climatique
Centre international de formation européenne, October 2020

Brexit and Covid-19 are a toxic mix
Centre for European Reform, October 2020

Will the Coronavirus pandemic deliver a coup de grâce to Schengen?
Centre for European Reform, October 2020

War and Covid-19 in Yemen
Istituto Affari Internazionali, October 2020

Schengen under pressure: Differentiation or disintegration?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, October 2020

Governments take steps to save tourism from Covid-19
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2020

Southern Europe will regret not taking EU loans now
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2020

Europa krisenfest machen: Europäische Mindeststandards für die nationale Grundsicherung
Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2020

The Corona crisis and the stability of the European banking sector: A repeat of the Great Financial Crisis?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2020

After the pandemic: Global overheating to take centre stage at T20 and G20
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2020

Crisis presidency: How Portuguese leadership can guide the EU into the post-Covid era
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

The world is woefully unprepared for climate-driven natural disasters
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Inconfinables ? Les sans-abri face au coronavirus
Fondation Jean Jaurès, October 2020

High hopes, low expectations: Brussels’ perspective on the future of Europe after Covid-19
European Policy Centre, October 2020

The European Parliament’s involvement in the EU response to the corona pandemic
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2020

Covid: Faute d’avoir mis à profit les six derniers mois, l’État sacrifie nos libertés
Institut Thomas More, October 2020

Coronavirus tracking apps: Normalizing surveillance during states of emergency
Carnegie Europe, October 2020

Covid-19: Une bataille stratégique entre la Chine et les États-Unis en Amérique latine
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2020

Upholding the World Health Organization
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2020

The re-shaping of the political discourse in times of crises
Fondation Européenne d’Etudes Progressistes, October 2020

The Covid crisis, an opportunity for a ‘new multilateralism’?
Confrontations Europe, October 2020

Covid-19 and the legal impact on the shipping industry and the case of Cyprus
Cyprus Centre for European and International Affairs, October 2020

L’Europe, le monde et la crise du Covid-19
Terra Nova, October 2020

Global trade today: Five basic facts about global trade
European Centre for International Political Economy, October 2020

Corona politics: The cost of mismanaging pandemics
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, September 2020

28 semaines plus tard: Y aura-t-il un monde d’après?
Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, September 2020

Covid-19 pandemic: Insights from RAND
Rand Corporation, September 2020

The Covid-19 gender gap: How women’s experience and expertise will drive economic recovery
Chatham House, September 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Europe confronts the second wave‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi,

© Aurielaki / Adobe Stock

Farm structure refers to the composition and organisation of an agricultural productive unit, typically for growing crops and rearing farm animals. Farm structure data allow analysis of the functioning of farms and their responses to events and agricultural policies. While basic statistics are key for capturing the essentials of the EU farming sector, understanding the various elements of farm structure implies more thorough analysis of the data.

Measuring farm structure

Farm structure defines an agricultural productive unit in terms of sizes of the land area and livestock herds, the labour force working on the farm and its main characteristics (such as age or working time), the means of production, and legal and organisational aspects of land tenure, farm management and market access. It is a key aspect of an agricultural system, along with agro-ecological (farming system, soil, altitude, climate, etc.) and economic factors (farm resources and inputs, product diversity, integration in the food chain, etc.).

In the past century, the development of agricultural policies prompted the need for information on farm structure, with the objective of understanding how agriculture was changing, what elements were triggering such change and what future direction it might take. On the basis of farm structure statistics, it is possible, for example, to build up typologies of farm types, analyse the drivers of farm structural change, and evaluate the interaction between agricultural policy and structural change in agriculture.

In the EU, the Farm Structure Survey (FSS) has delivered a continuous record of harmonised data on the structure of European farms since 1966, providing a picture of the situation every third year, on average. Although the topics covered have remained significantly stable, some changes have been introduced to reflect changing realities over the years. The legislation adopted in 2018 introduced a new approach to collecting data as from the Agricultural Census 2020, with the objectives of both preserving the continuity of the survey’s core elements and introducing flexibility in data collection to better address data needs.

EU farm structure in basic figures

The FSS includes information on land use, livestock numbers, labour input, etc. These can be aggregated by dimension such as geographic level, time and farm type. Therefore, there are countless ways to analyse and present the data on farm structure, depending on the information need to be addressed.

Farm and farm workforce size

Distribution of EU farms by land area (hectares)

A common indicator to describe farm structure is the farm size, though it can refer to various measures, such as land area, economic outcomes, or farm labour. The FSS data indicate that two thirds of the 10 million EU farms have less than five hectares of land and the majority of these farms do not exceed two hectares (see figure to the right). Also, more than two thirds of EU farms have a total standard output (i.e. an estimate of the average farm output based on standard values) of below €8 000 a year. EU farms count on average less than one annual work unit (i.e. the equivalent of a full-time job). Indeed, while about 20 million people work on EU farms, this figure includes full- and part-time farm managers and workers, seasonal labour, and farmer’s family members providing help (often free labour) when needed.

Land use and livestock

Crops and animals are vital elements of the farm structure. The average EU farm has 16 hectares of agricultural land, compared to averages of 180 hectares in the United States, 315 hectares in Canada, and 4 331 hectares in Australia. Altogether, EU farms utilise roughly 157 million hectares of land, of which about one third for growing cereals, slightly less than one third for permanent grassland, and the remaining area for other crops (with industrial crops, permanent crops, and temporary grass and grazing occupying the largest surfaces). Moreover, 5.6 million EU farms with livestock count millions of farm animals – with pigs being the largest group followed by bovines, sheep and goats – plus countless poultry birds as well as other types of animals (e.g. rabbits and horses). On average, they have 21 livestock units (i.e. a reference unit to calculate livestock as the equivalent of one dairy cow). The distribution of land and livestock varies a lot across EU farms, with the smallest farms showing the greatest diversity in terms of on-farm activities.

Beyond the main figures

Basic indicators such as farm distribution by size class or average size are invaluable tools to get a glimpse on the predominant characteristics of farm structure. These are very much revealing of an EU farming sector largely made up of small-sized farms. However, these figures do not embrace the extreme diversity in the EU farming sector (disclosed in Eurostat’s agriculture regional statistics). Therefore, more details are needed for planning adequate farm policies or drawing conclusions on farm economics, including on the methodology behind available data.

Need to dig into the data

Average livestock units per farm with pigs and/or poultry

Understanding how farm structure affects the functioning of the farm involves information on such issues as farming specialisations, agricultural practices, agronomic and environmental conditions, and the degree of local development. Therefore, going beyond the main indicators may reveal whether a given farm structure is just right or not adequate at all for a viable farming activity. For example, it may help to explain whether a significant farm workforce is an appropriate labour input or if it stems from a low level of mechanisation or a lack of alternative job opportunities. Also, farms may have large or small acreage, or no land at all, without this accounting, on its own, for strong or weak economic performance. Indeed, farms may have large surfaces because they keep land under cereal production or breed animals on extensive grazing areas. On the other hand, fruit groves or the use of common land (especially for sheep and goat farms) often relate to farms with small land area. The table to the right shows a relevant example of farms with no land area rearing pigs and/or poultry indoors. Although they are not counted as large farms based on hectares of land, these are certainly very large farms based on their high animal numbers compared to the average pig and poultry farm.

Methodological caveats

The European Union’s farm statistics legislation allows national authorities a certain degree of autonomy in defining the scope of the survey, while respecting minimum coverage requirements which ensure appropriate representation of the farming sector. Hence, each country defines the set of thresholds above which an agricultural activity is in the scope of the survey. This limits the survey’s cost and burden by focussing on the farms targeted by agricultural policies and excluding very small units. Therefore, a given farm would be below the survey’s thresholds in a country where agricultural production takes place mostly in medium-sized to large farms, but be included in the scope of the survey in a country where semi-subsistence or small farms are the backbone of agriculture. As a result, the high share of small farms at EU level overall originates from a small group of countries (largely from Romania). However, this should not result in over- or under-representation of any agricultural sectors or farming types. The national methodological reports detail the diverse approaches, where the scope of the survey varies from the absence of any thresholds (such as in Malta and Romania, where all entities in the administrative farm register are included) to relatively high thresholds (such as in Germany and Sweden, where farms are included only with a larger number of farm animals or cultivated hectares compared to other countries).

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Understanding farm structure‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Damiano Scordamaglia,

© clin0000 / Adobe Stock

Every year since 1983, the EU has chosen a special annual theme to celebrate and to bring to public attention. The idea is to raise awareness on the issue, encourage public debate on it across the EU and underline its political importance. The process can lead to new EU initiatives or legislation. 2021 has been designated European Year of Rail, to stir debate on railways’ contribution to the European Green Deal and the environment. A wide range of events are planned, reaching out to the general public, to demonstrate the challenges and opportunities offered by rail, and promote it as a sustainable, innovative and safe mode of transport.

Background

In December 2019, the European Commission adopted a new development strategy, the Green Deal, to address environmental challenges and climate change. To contribute to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, this new strategy centres on achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and a more resource-efficient economy. For this to happen, as transport accounts for a quarter of EU greenhouse gas emissions, a 90 % reduction in transport emissions is necessary by 2050 and an important share of the 75 % of inland freight currently carried by road will have to shift to rail or inland waterway transport. Rail’s green credentials speak for themselves: in 2016, rail represented 0.5 % of the CO2 emissions from all transport modes. Railways are also energy-efficient: while they account for roughly 2 % of energy consumption in EU transport, in 2018, they transported 12.6 % of freight and 6.9 % of passengers. Despite this, the share of freight transported by rail has been decreasing continuously since the mid-1990s and passenger traffic has stagnated. Rail has played an important role during the pandemic, ensuring the circulation of people and essential goods, and it will support the post Covid-19 economic recovery. If the EU wants railways to become more attractive to passengers and businesses and help to improve traffic congestion and air pollution, it needs to give this sector additional support.

European Commission proposal

On 4 March 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal to designate 2021 European Year of Rail (EYR) and promote the use of rail for passengers, companies and public authorities. This specific year was chosen in part because it will coincide with the first full year of the implementation of the new rules on governance and domestic passenger market opening, agreed under the fourth railway package. In addition, the international arts festival Europalia will devote its 2021 edition to the influence of railways on arts and their contribution to social, economic and industrial change. The overarching aim of the EYR is to raise awareness of the challenges and opportunities offered by rail, and support the efforts made by the EU, Member States, regional and local authorities to expand the market share of this transport mode.

EYR: organisation and objectives
With its initiatives, debates, dedicated events, exhibitions and promotional campaigns, the EYR will reach out to the wider public, in particular young people, to promote rail as a sustainable, innovative and safe mode of transport. The EYR is also designed to underline the cross-border dimension of rail and its contribution to relations with neighbouring countries and to EU cohesion, economy, industry and society at large. It will cover aspects relating to regional development, industrial competitiveness, sustainable tourism, employment, innovation, education, youth and culture, while focusing on improving accessibility for disabled people and people with reduced mobility (DPRMs).
In order to tailor the EYR to the needs of EU countries, each Member State will appoint a national coordinator and the EU will set up a steering group. The financial allocation for the EYR is estimated at €8 million; the final envelope will be decided in accordance with the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027. European Parliament position

In a resolution of 15 January 2020, the European Parliament welcomed the European Green Deal, underlining the need for all transport modes to contribute to the decarbonisation of transport and calling for enhanced investment in EU rail connectivity. Parliament expressed its first opinion on the EYR proposal in June 2020, when the rapporteur (Anna Deparnay-Grunenberg (Greens/EFA, DE)) presented her draft report to the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), responsible for this file. The rapporteur noted that the EYR would give visibility to rail as an attractive transport mode and highlighted the importance of digitalisation and, more specifically, further development of the European rail traffic management system (ERTMS). Shadow rapporteurs insisted on the need to focus on enhancing train accessibility for DPRMs and supporting rail in the urban context. On 12 October 2020, with very broad support (45 votes in favour, none against and two abstentions), the TRAN committee adopted its report along with 15 compromise amendments and the decision to start interinstitutional negotiations. In order to create a truly European rail network, the TRAN committee called for support for regional cross-border rail connections and action to promote completion of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T). The report invited the Commission to study setting up a rail connectivity index to identify areas where investment is especially necessary. It also advocated for EYR activities to inform citizens better of their rights as rail passengers. The Committee report also endorsed some recommendations from two other parliamentary committees. In particular, TRAN supported the call to improve train accessibility for the elderly, disabled and persons of reduced mobility, and other measures put forward by the Committee on Regional Development, such as efforts to promote the EU’s night train networks and develop rail networks and infrastructure in regional and border areas. Finally, the TRAN Committee supported the idea of the Committee on Culture and Education to promote better geographical coverage of rail services, considering their impact on the uptake of certain EU programmes, such as Erasmus + and DiscoverEU. On 24 June 2020, Council agreed a common position for a negotiating mandate on the proposal. It added some themes such as rail for end-to-end mobility and better distribution of information on passengers’ rights. It also proposed that the Commission launch a feasibility study during the EYR on the creation of an EU label to promote goods transported by rail. Interinstitutional negotiations began on 27 October 2020.

Advisory committee and stakeholder views

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) adopted its opinion on the legislative proposal on 15 July 2020. Supporting the EYR, the EESC considered that this initiative should be an opportunity to communicate on rail’s safety record, sustainability and on EU rail investment policies. It also underlined that the EYR should be promoted to regain consumers’ trust in rail, contribute to sustainable tourism and give new momentum to DiscoverEU. The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) adopted its opinion on the EYR on 14 October 2020. It called for the EYR to be used to highlight rail’s contribution to the EU economy and completion of the single market, and to offer solutions to urbanisation issues. The CoR was of the view that the EYR should also underline the attractiveness of employment in the rail sector and recommended increasing the EYR budget to €12 million. In March 2020, the Shift2Rail joint undertaking welcomed the EYR and declared that it was a very timely opportunity to raise awareness of rail’s potential to become the backbone of a future sustainable, climate-neutral transport system. In April 2020, the European associations representing infrastructure managers, railway operators, intermodal companies, wagon keepers and the rail supply industry welcomed the European Parliament resolution on Covid-19 and the recovery and reconstruction plan. In their statement they called for support for rail beyond the pandemic, to enable this sector to make a substantial contribution to cleaner mobility and the development of multimodality. UIC, the worldwide railway organisation, also welcomed the initiative and underlined the role rail has to play in decarbonising transport, due to its energy efficiency, long life cycles and frugality in public space occupation. In a letter sent to EU Commissioner for Transport Adina Vălean, and signed jointly by the European Passengers’ Federation (EPF), the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) and the network of non-profit organisation AGE Platform Europe, the European Disability Forum (EDF) insisted on the necessity for the EYR to focus on rail passengers’ rights and how to promote them to make rail a truly convenient choice for all citizens, including disabled people and people with reduced mobility. BEUC, meanwhile, published its proposal for the EYR in May 2020, observing that the ongoing reform of rail passengers’ rights should send a strong political signal to EU passengers and that the EYR should focus on making rail travel more convenient and affordable and on increasing the quality of services.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘2021: European Year of Rail‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Niestadt,

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The coronavirus pandemic has had an unprecedented impact on air transport in the European Union and the rest of the world. During the first wave, most Member States imposed entry or flight bans and other travel restrictions, bringing passenger flights almost to a standstill. However, many airports serving major cities stayed open for limited scheduled, humanitarian, repatriation, and cargo flights, and for aircraft parking. The drop in passenger flights has meant that the air freight sector has had to adjust to the situation by occasionally carrying cargo in passenger compartments. As the industry looks for ways to cut costs, it has announced job cuts and/or reduced work patterns, wage reductions and hiring freezes. A number of airlines have already declared bankruptcy.

With the public health situation improving in the EU by the summer of 2020, Member States started to lift some travel restrictions, allowing airlines to slowly resume operations while leaving in place numerous inconsistent and constantly changing travel rules and guidelines, limiting air travel significantly. In addition, airlines and airports apply strict health and sanitary measures that entail higher costs both for the industry and passengers. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) forecasts that airlines would lose about 66 % of their passengers and see total revenues drop by US$419 (€357) billion in 2020. The final impact of the crisis on air transport will depend on factors such as its duration and magnitude, the level of consumer confidence, and the stringency of the containment measures. In all likelihood, the sector will feel the effects well beyond 2020.

The EU has worked on several levels to help the sector meet the challenge, whether by publishing guidelines (e.g. on passenger rights) and recommendations, or by legislative work. One of the first measures it took was to change EU rules on the allocation of airport slots, so as to help airlines avoid flights with very low load factors. However, a lot of work still lies ahead, in particular regarding the coordination of travel restrictions. The European Commission has also authorised several national aid schemes for airlines and airports. However, this raises questions about fair competition and whether the aid should be linked to environmental considerations.

Read this complete briefing on ‘Air transport survival during the pandemic‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel,

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In the context of a major spike in coronavirus infections across all EU Member States, Heads of State or Government met by video-conference on 29 October 2020 in a bid to strengthen collective EU efforts to defeat the pandemic. Placing testing, tracing and vaccines at the centre of their strategy, EU leaders stressed the urgent need to ensure the mutual recognition of rapid testing − to support the free movement of people and keep the EU’s internal borders open − as key to preserving a functioning internal market. The informal format of the meeting was conducive to information exchange and coordination and did not require binding decisions. EU leaders also adopted a joint declaration condemning the recent terrorist attacks in France and expressing full solidarity with France and the French people at this difficult time. They also raised the issue of the relationship with Turkey and condemned the mounting tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Video-conference of the members of the European Council

At their video-conference meeting on 29 October 2020, focusing on the fight against the coronavirus pandemic, EU leaders considered short-term containment measures with a view to stemming the second wave of coronavirus infections (such as for example, common recognition of rapid testing). They also discussed longer-term measures, notably economic recovery and the preservation of the single market. In line with past meetings, they stressed the importance of maintaining unity and of acting in a coordinated manner.

This was the seventh meeting of the European Council to be held by video-conference since March 2020. Six of these meetings have focused on tackling the coronavirus but this was the first such meeting since the beginning of the second wave of the pandemic. The European Council President announced that this meeting was one of a series, signalling that the European Council was re-entering the active crisis monitoring mode that had shaped its agenda during the spring of 2020. In this respect, the fact that the new Leaders’ Agenda presented in early October did not mention the pandemic specifically among the topics to be addressed by the EU leaders in the coming months provides confirmation of its adaptability.

As the meeting was considered to be an informal one, European Council President Charles Michel sent no formal invitation to EU leaders, and no conclusions were issued. However, prior to the meeting, Michel used a recently introduced tool – a newsletter – to communicate on the pandemic. Although primarily addressed to EU citizens, when issued just days ahead of a meeting of the Heads of State or Government, the European Council President’s newsletters appear to provide him with a means to set the agenda and steer the process. In his 27 October newsletter, Michel outlined most of the points that were subsequently considered by the EU leaders; namely: testing and tracing, a common approach to quarantine, and vaccine distribution. The informal nature of the meeting also meant that the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, was not invited to present Parliament’s view.

Coronavirus pandemic second wave: state of play in the EU

In the weeks preceding the EU leaders’ meeting, a number of Member States’ intensive care capacities were approaching saturation, resulting in new national measures to counter the spread of the virus. Health policy is a national competence, however, in contrast with the situation this spring, containment measures are now being introduced in a relatively coordinated manner. As stressed by President Emmanuel Macron, EU leaders spoke to one another before the video-meeting and before setting measures at national level. However, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, pointed to the ‘failure of leaders to act quickly enough to stop the second wave of infections’.

National level containment measures range from the introduction of curfews to nationwide lockdowns. Notably, they include the closure of restaurants and/or non-essential shops in several countries, including Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, analysts point to distortions in competition resulting from the closure of small shops while major supermarket chains (which sell a mix of essential and non-essential goods) and on-line platforms are able to continue with their business. While education remains a national competence, the political will to preserve the economy and the single market is visible through decisions to maintain schools open in several Member States, including France, Germany and the Netherlands. Other Member States, given their specific epidemiological situations, have chosen to prolong the autumn holiday (Belgium), opted for a ‘hybrid’ system where full on-line learning can be triggered at any time if needed (Romania), or chosen to temporarily close schools (Czech Republic). It remains to be seen if these measures will be sufficient to tackle the second wave or if more robust measures, including school closures, might be needed to limit the spread of the virus.

Prior to the summit, Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen made an assessment of the medical situation, stressing its gravity and urging fellow EU citizens to wear masks, observe strict hand hygiene and avoid the ‘three Cs’: crowds, contacts and closed spaces with poor ventilation. She underlined the risk of fatigue and called for patience and determination.

European Council’s coronavirus crisis response

The European Council entered crisis mode in March 2020. A series of crisis meetings was held by video-conference in March 2020, allowing the European Council to formulate a short-term response to the crisis (see Figure 1). By 23 April 2020, EU leaders had articulated a long-term response based on two pillars: 1) the recovery roadmap and 2) the financial package linking the Next Generation EU (NGEU) to the upcoming multiannual financial framework (MFF). As for October 2020, the European Council has once again entered crisis management monitoring mode, focusing this time on both the short- and long-term responses to the crisis. Two main messages appear to be key, namely, the need to maintain unity and the need to coordinate responses at EU and national levels.

Figure 1 – Key topics in the European Council on the coronavirus pandemic

Maintaining unity

In contrast to the situation in March 2020, when the European Council first worked to achieve unity and overcome Member States’ individualism, this time around, EU leaders have shown a more united front in tackling both the health and the economic dimensions of the coronavirus crisis. At the press conference following the meeting, Charles Michel stressed that the EU was united in fighting the common challenge of the pandemic but also spoke of a ‘severe crisis’, pointing to the battle facing citizens and EU Member States currently confronted by a massive second wave of infections.

Coordinating responses

Faced with a shortage of protective medical equipment back in spring 2020, Member States were tempted to look for individual solutions, but rapidly realised that the challenges posed by the pandemic could only be tackled through solidarity and cooperation. This led to increased coordination and cooperation efforts at EU level, for instance with the creation of the European reserve of emergency medical equipment (rescEU stockpile). It is now expected that the role of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) will be expanded. While the lockdowns of spring 2020 were largely uncoordinated, there was greater coordination on lockdown-exiting strategies, although Ursula Von der Leyen has stressed that ‘measures were relaxed too soon’.

Health policy is a national prerogative, but Member States seem to have learned from the first wave that a coordinated response is key. The reflex to coordinate action has gradually gained traction since the spring, as expressed at the European Council meetings of 1-2 October, 15-16 October and 29 October, and as reflected at national level in the close bilateral and multilateral coordination of the new lockdowns. Following the recent meeting, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, stressed that, for as much as health policy is a national competence, ‘exchange of knowledge, distribution of medicines and vaccines’ are areas where coordination and cooperation are needed.

Main results of the EU leaders’ video-conference

The meeting featured an exchange of views on ways to limit the spread of the virus, vaccines and economic recovery, but given its informal nature, no binding decisions were taken.

Limiting the spread of the virus

As shown in Figure 1, limiting the spread of the virus was a central concern in the European Council discussions both on 29 October and during the first wave of the pandemic in the spring of 2020. This time, EU leaders discussed a series of measures, including data sharing and common recognition of testing and tracing, as part of their strategy to limit the spread of the virus.

Data and knowledge sharing

The Commission President stressed the crucial importance of sharing data on the epidemic ‘in real time’ with the ECDC platform, not only to secure accurate situation awareness, but also to provide indicators for anticipation and coordinated responses, including the planning of patient transfers between Member States. The Commission has unblocked €220 million for the specific purpose of cross-border medical assistance, while a network of national government health advisors and EU health advisors is to be established to facilitate knowledge sharing among Member States.

Test and trace policies

Limiting the spread of the virus relies in part on extensive testing. There was agreement on the need for common recognition of existing polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests and their results, and for validation of the new rapid antigen tests. These tests are complementary, both to ascertain the spread of the virus and to preserve the internal market. The tracing strategy, meanwhile, relies on two pillars: 1) interactive apps connected through the European Interoperability Gateway; and 2) a passenger locator form. Twenty-two Member States have developed tracing apps, downloaded by 50 million European citizens. The European Interoperability Gateway is designed to facilitate inter-operability between the different national apps. The Commission aims to have the passenger locator form in place by the end of 2020. Nine Member States have already developed their own passenger locator forms, collecting differing data, hence the need for harmonisation.

Vaccines

Ursula von der Leyen stressed the need for ‘accuracy and speed’ in the validation of vaccines. She underlined that, exceptionally, the European Medicines Agency would proceed on a ‘rolling basis’ to evaluate incoming data. Vaccines would be distributed fairly and simultaneously among the EU Member States, in proportion to their share of the EU’s population, as soon as one or more became available. Coordination would still be needed on three points: 1) defining priority target groups (who would receive the vaccine first, in particular the elderly, the chronically ill, medical staff); 2) the logistical preparation of the vaccination campaign, tackling all aspects linked to the transport, storage and conservation of vaccines at an early stage; and 3) communication campaigns aimed at raising EU citizens’ awareness of the vaccination process. In this respect, EU leaders agreed on the need to coordinate communication on future vaccination campaigns and to counter disinformation.

Economic recovery

EU leaders stressed the importance of preserving the internal market and of enabling economic recovery, including by keeping borders open and refraining from the national reflexes that had led to the closure of borders during the spring of 2020. Furthermore, Charles Michel stressed the urgency of reaching an agreement between Council and Parliament on the financial package – NGEU and the MFF – agreed by the EU leaders in July 2020.

Other items Terrorist attacks in France

EU leaders adopted a joint declaration condemning the terrorist attacks recently perpetrated in France and calling on other international leaders to promote dialogue, not division. Charles Michel expressed solidarity with France and condolences for the victims’ families. He emphasised that ‘we stand together: the European family united for our democratic values and freedoms’. Von der Leyen stressed that Europe stood ‘united and determined against fanaticism’.

Turkey

As confirmed by Charles Michel, EU leaders discussed the relationship with Turkey, asking ‘to be respected’ and condemning the multiplication of provocations in the Eastern Mediterranean. He recalled the European Council’s offer to Turkey proposing to work jointly on a positive agenda, and confirmed the intention of EU leaders’ to return to this topic in December 2020, when, depending on developments, both a positive agenda and a less bright scenario could be examined.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council video-conference of 29 October 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

© Adobe Stock

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages on the current situation of the rule of law in Spain. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in October 2020 calling on the Parliament to intervene in favour of the rule of law in Spain, which the Spanish government is allegedly not respecting. With regard to the rule of law in the European Union, the European Parliament has called for an EU mechanism to protect and strengthen democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. In October 2020, the European Parliament warned that the Union is facing an unprecedented and escalating crisis of its founding values.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English and in Spanish).

Main points made in the reply in English

With regard to the rule of law, we would like to inform you that on 7 October 2020, the European Parliament adopted, by 521 votes in favour, 152 against and 21 abstentions, a resolution proposing the creation of an EU mechanism to protect and strengthen democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.

The European Parliament ’emphasises the urgent need for the Union to develop a robust, comprehensive and positive agenda for effectively protecting and reinforcing democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights for all its citizens; insists that the Union must remain a champion of freedom and justice in Europe and the world; warns that the Union is facing an unprecedented and escalating crisis of its founding values, which threatens its long-term survival as a democratic peace project’.

The European Commission published the 2020 Rule of Law Report on 30 September 2020. The report includes a chapter on Spain.

Regarding the allocation of EU funds, the European Parliament ‘reiterates its call to ensure that systematic violations of the values referred to in

Finally, we take this opportunity to inform you that the European Commission is the institution responsible for ensuring the application of EU law in the Member States, managing European policies and allocating EU funds.

Main points made in the reply in Spanish

Con respecto al Estado de Derecho, le informamos de que el Parlamento Europeo ha aprobado el 7 de octubre de 2020, por 521 votos a favor, 152 en contra y 21 abstenciones, una resolución en la que plantea la creación de un mecanismo de la Unión que permita proteger y reforzar la democracia, el Estado de derecho y los derechos fundamentales.

El Parlamento europeo “hace hincapié en la necesidad urgente de que la Unión desarrolle una agenda sólida y positiva para proteger y reforzar la democracia, el Estado de Derecho y los derechos fundamentales de todos sus ciudadanos; insiste en que la Unión debe seguir siendo una defensora de la libertad y la justicia en Europa y en el mundo; advierte que la Unión se enfrenta a una crisis sin precedentes y creciente de sus valores fundacionales que amenaza su supervivencia a largo plazo como proyecto de paz democrático”.

La Comisión Europea ha publicado el 30 de septiembre de 2020 el Informe sobre el Estado de Derecho 2020. El informe incluye un capítulo sobre España.

Con respecto a la asignación de fundos, el Parlamento Europeo “reitera su petición de que se garantice la incompatibilidad de las violaciones sistemáticas de los valores a que se refiere el artículo 2 del TUE con la financiación de la Unión” blindando así el presupuesto de la Unión cuando un Estado miembro no respeta el Estado de derecho de forma sistemática.

Por último, permítanos hacerle saber que la Comisión Europea es la institución encargada de garantizar la aplicación del Derecho de la Unión Europea en los países de la UE, gestionar las políticas europeas y asignar los fondos de la Unión Europea.

 

Written by Anja Radjenovic (1st edition),

© Ajdin Kamber / Adobe Stock

In September 2020, the European Commission submitted a proposal on asylum and migration management, to replace the 2013 Dublin Regulation that determines the EU Member State responsible for examining asylum applications. While the proposal ‘essentially preserves’ the current criteria for determining this responsibility, it would also make changes and additions to the regulation, especially on solidarity and responsibility-sharing for asylum-seekers among Member States.

The proposal comes after a failed attempt to reform EU asylum policy following the 2015 migration crisis. While the migratory context has changed since, both in terms of arrivals and the composition of flows, the migration situation remains fragile, as evidenced by pressures on national asylum systems and continual disembarkations after search and rescue operations. According to the Commission, addressing this situation requires a relaunch of the reform of the common European asylum system to achieve a more efficient, fair and harmonised framework that is more resistant to future migratory pressures. The new system would ensure international protection to those who need it and be effective and humane towards those who have to be returned.

Versions

• Reforming asylum and migration management: A shift towards greater solidarity? (1st edition)

Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/109 and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund] Committee responsible: Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) COM(2020) 610
23.9.2020 Rapporteur: To be appointed 2020/0279 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial discussions in committee

Written by Nicole Scholz (1st edition),

© Idea.s / Adobe Stock

The European Commission has proposed to amend Directive 2004/37/EC, by expanding its scope and by including and/or revising occupational exposure limit values for a number of cancer- or mutation-causing chemical agents. The initiative is proceeding in steps and has now become a continuous process. Following on from three previous legislative amendments, which covered a total of 26 priority chemical agents, the present (fourth) proposal addresses an additional three.

The proposal was announced as one of the first measures of the Commission’s commitment to fight cancer under the forthcoming Europe’s Beating Cancer plan.

Broad discussions with scientists and social partners fed into all four proposals. The Commission’s feedback period on the proposal will run until 20 November 2020. While broadly welcoming the proposal, professional organisations, trade unions and patient groups would like carcinogenic and mutagenic hazardous medicines as well as substances toxic for reproduction to be brought within the scope of the current proposal.

The legislative process is in its early stages. In Parliament, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs is in charge of the file. The working party on social questions is dealing with it in the Council.

Versions

• Fourth revision of the Carcinogens and Mutagens Directive (CMD) (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2004/37/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work Committee responsible: Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) COM(2020) 571
22.9.2020 Rapporteur: To be appointed 2020/0262 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial discussions in committee

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

The European Union faces multifaceted foreign security and defence policy challenges. First and foremost, it awaits the outcome of the US Presidential election, which is set to determine in significant part global economic and political developments to in the short to mid term. The Union also faces a tough choice about how to treat China: more as a rival or as a partner, and in which areas? An increasingly assertive Russia represents yet another challenge. The EU’s stance on climate, migration, Africa, terrorism and developments in its near neighbourhood policy add to this complex scene.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on EU foreign, security and defence policies.

Europe’s pivot to Africa: Shaping the future of the strategic partnership
European Policy Centre, October 2020

An election of stark choices for Americans, but also for Europe
European Policy Centre, October 2020

Europe as a global standard-setter: The strategic importance of European standardisation
European Policy Centre, October 2020

What should Europe expect from American trade policy after the election?
Bruegel, October 2020

China’s carbon neutrality goal spells competition for the EU in the market for low-carbon technology
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2020

EU trade and investment policy since the Treaty of Lisbon
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2020`

Geopolitical ambitions in the Black Sea and Caspian region
Bertelsmann Stiftung, October 2020

L’éviction de l’Europe du Moyen-Orient
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2020

Battalions to brigades: The future of European defence
Egmont, October 2020

Talking to the Houthis: How Europeans can promote peace in Yemen
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

A balance of values and interests: Germany, realpolitik, and Russia policy
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Trump or Biden: Three ways to make Europe matter in the Middle East
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

The Caucasus burns while Europe struggles
Carnegie Europe, October 2020

Lessons from Belarus: How the EU can support clean elections in Moldova and Georgia
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

How the EU became marginalised in Nagorno-Karabakh
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Security realities
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Europe must grow up and stop moaning about Trump
Carnegie Europe, October 2020

How China could push Europe and India closer together
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Three dangers Trump’s Covid poses for the world
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Resilient Ukraine is solution to aggressive Russia
Chatham House, October 2020

Europe, the U.S.s and China: A love-hate triangle?
Centre for European Reform, September 2020

Non-summit shows EU-China ties at new low
Bruegel, September 2020

Diversification and the world trading system
Bruegel, September 2020

European foreign policy is drowning in the Mediterranean
Carnegie Europe, September 2020

The future of the Transatlantic Alliance: Not without the European Union
Egmont, September 2020

Use connectivity to strengthen multilateral cooperation in the EU’s neighbourhood
Egmont, September 2020

An alliance of democracies: With the US or for the US?
Egmont, September 2020

The Corona transformation: How the pandemic slows globalization and accelerates digitalization
Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2020

An appropriate European Union response to tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean
Bruegel, August 2020

Unboxing the future: Finding the futures hidden in plain sight
EU Institute for Security Studies, August 2020

Disorder from chaos: Why Europeans fail to promote stability in the Sahel
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2020

Differentiated cooperation in European foreign policy: The challenge of coherence
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, August 2020

What future for a ‘geopolitical’ Europe?
Centre for European Reform, July 2020

The challenges of the post-pandemic agenda
Bruegel, July 2020

A challenging agenda for the new Trade Commissioner
European Policy Centre, July 2020

Rethinking the EU’s approach towards its southern neighbours
Centre for European Reform, July 2020

Trump sounds the retreat: Can European defence advance?
Centre for European Reform, July 2020

The future of the E3: Post-Brexit cooperation between the UK, France and Germany
Chatham House, July 2020

The big engine that might: How France and Germany can build a geopolitical Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2020

Religion and forced displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World
Foreign Policy Centre, Aston University, July 2020

Uncharted territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a strategic compass for EU security and defence
EU Institute for Security Studies, July 2020

The EU’s strategic compass for security and defence: Just another paper?
Jacques Delors Centre, July 2020

Ensuring cyber resilience in NATO’s command, control and communication systems
Chatham House, July 2020

Europe in a multipolar world
LSE Ideas, June 2020

An initiative to end the standstill: Desirable security policy objectives of a united EU
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2020

The weaponisation of the US financial system: how can Europe respond?
Jacques Delors Centre, June 2020

European defence in the post-Covid world
Instituto Affari Internatzionali, June 2020

EU ‘sanctions’ and Russian manoeuvring: Why Brussels needs to stay its course while shifting gears
Instituto Affari Internatzionali, June 2020

Protracted conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood: Does resilience apply?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, June 2020

Rethinking EU crisis management: From battlegroups to a European legion?
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, June 2020

The EU’s external action on counter-terrorism development, structures and actions
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, June 2020

Has CovidD-19 dented the EU’s credibility in the Balkans?
Bruegel, June 2020

Sharpening EU sanctions policy: Challenges and responses in a geopolitical era
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, May 2020

European defence and PESCO: Don’t waste the chance
Instituto Affari Internationali, May 2020

EU foreign policy needs ’embedded’ differentiation
European Policy Centre, May 2020

Challenges and constraints facing a ‘Geopolitical Commission’ in the achievement of European sovereignty
Robert Schuman Foundation, May 2020

Who’s first wins: International crisis response to Covid-19
EU Institute for Security Studies, May 2020

The impact of sanctions imposed by the European Union against Iran on their bilateral trade: General versus targeted sanctions
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, May 2020

Read this briefing on ‘EU foreign, security and defence policies‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tania Lațici,

Strategic autonomy – what does it mean? what for? from whom? and how? – were some of the questions that were discussed during the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) online policy roundtable on strategic autonomy in security and defence and the EU’s role in promoting peace. This timely discussion took place in the backdrop of ongoing high-level strategic reflections, namely the Strategic Compass process in the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO2030 process.

As the European Parliament is currently debating the implementation and future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as well as more precise initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), EPRS gathered a virtual panel covering the institutional, academic and think tank spectrum. Etienne Bassot, Director of Members’ Research Service in the EPRS, set the scene for the debate, and Tania Lațici moderated what was a highly dynamic and interactive debate.

Kicking off the discussion was Sven Mikser (S&D, EE), who is currently drafting the Parliament’s annual report on the implementation of the CSDP. Affirming that EU strategic autonomy is very high on the Parliamentary agenda, he noted that strategic defence capability gaps need to be filled for the EU to be able to meet its political and military levels of ambition. Sven Mikser also emphasised that the EU’s ambition is much broader than the military, also encompassing conflict prevention, multilateralism, disarmament and non-proliferation. He concluded by advising against giving in to the temptation of cutting defence budgets due to the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, as that would impair capacity to properly address current threats.

Hannah Neumann (Greens, DE), the European Parliament’s rapporteur on arms exports, noted that there are more versions of what strategic autonomy means than there are Member States. She emphasised the need to clarify the purpose of strategic autonomy for the EU and highlighted the opportunity to make better use of the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty, for example, by making use of constructive abstention provisions or enacting majority voting when it comes to human rights violations. Hannah Neumann expressed hope that the Strategic Compass process would result in a better convergence of views among EU Member States as regards threats and addressing them.

While pointing out the importance of the current discussions of strategic autonomy at EU level, Dr Sven Biscop of the Egmont Institute argued that Member States should accept the reality that they can only be autonomous collectively. Referring to EU instruments such as PESCO, he noted that the EU is only currently using 10 % of the framework’s potential and argued in favour of integrating forces at the EU level. Reacting to the recent discussions on potentially making use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in foreign policy, Sven Biscop argued that there is no reason as to why the EU cannot vote with QMV on everything, except for obliging a Member State to commit troops to operations.

Representing the European External Action Service, Jean‑Pierre Van Aubel described the state of play of ongoing EU defence initiatives, with an emphasis on PESCO and its ongoing strategic review. On the latter, he noted that PESCO is much more than a capability development process and that discussions on how to better incentivise Member States to deliver on their commitments are ongoing. Regarding the Strategic Compass, he emphasised that its purpose is to translate the EU Global Strategy into concrete deliverables and political ambition to build a common European strategic culture.

Dr Jana Puglierin, the Director of the Berlin Office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, observed that the progress and enthusiasm seen in the defence realm after 2016 seems to have hit a plateau, in part also as a result of the coronavirus crisis. She noted that foreign and defence policy does not seem to figure highly on the EU agenda and feared that uncoordinated defence budgets would result as a consequence of the Covid‑19 crisis. As regards transatlantic relations, Jana Puglierin emphasised the need for the EU to reflect on how to engage the United States in achieving its ambition for EU sovereignty.

Focusing on the changing nature of peace and security due to new threats and challenges –illustrated in particular by the coronavirus crisis – Dr Elena Lazarou, Acting Head of the EPRS External Policies Unit noted that the Lisbon Treaty was not written bearing these challenges in mind. She explained the reason for the EU’s current strategic reflection processes and emphasised that the EU will have to reflect on how it can use its entire toolkit of peace and security to address these threats and promote peace and security in a holistic manner. She also noted the importance of foresight in these processes and of the EU’s engagements with strategic partners such as the United Nations, NATO and the African Union.

Finally, the event gathered some 114 virtual participants at its peak and the audience engaged with the panellists by posing questions related to the current crisis in the eastern Mediterranean, the future of the EU’s strategic partnerships, and the prospects for QMV in foreign policy.

Towards strategic autonomy in European security and defence: The EU role in promoting peace in today’s world

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2020 – Source : EP / Emilie GOMEZ

During the second October 2020 plenary session – the first at which Members were able to speak remotely, and not only vote, from the Member States – the European Commission presented its 2021 work programme, which Members largely welcomed. Members also discussed the conclusions of the 15‑16 October 2020 European Council meeting, EU measures to mitigate the social and economic impact of Covid‑19, police brutality within the EU, the sale of EU passports and visas to criminals, the State of the Energy Union and aligning the Energy Charter Treaty with the European Green Deal. Parliament announced that its 2020 Sakharov Prize will be awarded on 16 December to the Belarusian opposition, in particular the Coordinating Council, for ‘an initiative launched by courageous women’.

Joint debate on the common agricultural policy

Members conducted an important joint debate on the Commission’s package of three legislative proposals to overhaul the common agricultural policy (CAP) for 2021‑2027. While Parliament supports the modernisation of the CAP, it warns against moves to introduce budget cuts, particularly in view of the challenges of restructuring this vital sector to help farmers protect the environment, and distribute funds more fairly. The proposals seek to establish a new delivery model by combining interventions under the two pillars of the CAP in strategic plans drawn up by Member States; improving financial management, with Member States allocated greater responsibility for conformity and control of agricultural support spending; and introducing amendments to five regulations, including on the common market organisation (CMO) in agricultural products (including controversial issues concerning, for instance, authorised wine grape varieties and the labelling of plant and dairy-based meat substitutes). Parliament adopted its position for negotiations with the Council following votes on a series of amendments to all three Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) Committee reports. However, some Members and stakeholders felt that the final compromise does not go far enough towards protecting the European Green Deal’s ambitions and climate goals.

Joint debate on digital services

Following important debates on the need to regulate digital services and artificial intelligence to ensure that they maximise benefits to people in the EU while also minimising the risks, Members adopted three own-initiative resolutions, of which two are legislative. Parliament has long called for revision of the outdated EU online services framework, particularly in the light of large discrepancies in application of the rules between EU countries. In advance of the expected Commission proposal on a Digital Services Act package, Parliament adopted its initial position on the revision, set out in three committee reports. Members approved an Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committee legislative-initiative report calling on the Commission to amend its proposals to ensure that the rules apply to all goods and services providers, wherever they are located, and better protect EU consumers against fraud, targeted advertising, and automated decisions. Members also approved the parallel Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee legislative-initiative report recommending standards to which platforms should be held and the application of different approaches to ‘legal ‘and ‘illegal’ online content. The report seeks to balance protection of both users’ rights and their right to freedom of speech. Finally, Members approved, by a large majority, a Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee own-initiative report echoing the same concerns and calling for improved cooperation between service providers and national supervisory authorities, as well as the creation of an independent EU body with the power to place sanctions on online operators.

Joint debate on artificial intelligence

During the same debate, Members also considered the implications – both positive and negative – of harnessing the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) technology, for the lives of people in the EU. In advance of the Commission proposal expected in 2021, Parliament voted with large majorities on three reports from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee, on ethics, civil liability, and intellectual property in artificial intelligence, setting out Parliament’s positions. The first legislative-initiative report deals with the requirements for a framework of ethical principles for the development, deployment and use of AI, robotics and related technologies, which will be vital to ensuring innovation also protects people’s rights. The second legislative-initiative report sets out recommendations for a legal framework for civil liability that identifies a hierarchy of risks, and measures to compensate for harm caused by the technology. A third own-initiative report highlights the need to foster the free flow, access, use and sharing of data, while also protecting intellectual property rights and trade secrets.

Discharge decisions

Members voted by a large majority to refuse to discharge the 2018 EU general budget for the European Council and Council, and for the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), following Budgetary Control (CONT) Committee re-examination of the files. Parliament has refused to grant discharge to the European Council and Council since 2009, due to a lack of cooperation on accountability and transparency. Parliament’s decision also reflects a lack of accountability, budgetary control and good governance of human resources at the EESC in relation to serious misconduct by one of its senior members.

European Globalisation Adjustment Fund

Parliament approved, by an overwhelming majority, the decision to mobilise €2 054 400 from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund to support workers who have lost their jobs as a result of financial difficulties at two shipyards in Galicia (Spain).

Implementation and governance of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

In view of the strategic review of PESCO taking place this year, Members adopted, by a large majority, a Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) report on the implementation and governance of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the EU’s Treaty-based military and defence cooperation mechanism. Under PESCO’s binding commitments, participating Member States aim at achieving a competitive European defence industry through collaborative projects. While Parliament has long supported the creation of PESCO, it is critical of certain shortcomings, including project coherence and strategic justification. Parliament also calls for increased scrutiny powers, including for national parliaments.

Relations with Belarus

Parliament endorsed AFET committee recommendations on relations with Belarus, calling for an end to the violence and fresh elections. While endorsing the overall EU stance towards Belarus following the disputed August 2020 elections, Parliament calls for solidarity, support for the population and sanctions against the regime. Parliament declines to recognise Lukashenka as the legitimate president of Belarus, recognises the Coordination Council, and calls for a peaceful resolution to the standoff.

Global deforestation

Members voted by an overwhelming majority in favour of imposing mandatory EU rules to fight global deforestation. Parliament calls on the European Commission to take regulatory action, following the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) Committee legislative-initiative report proposing to prevent products associated with deforestation or forest degradation from entering the EU market. The ENVI committee proposes a new EU framework to protect forests worldwide, guaranteeing that commodities imported into the EU are legal and sustainable.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed two mandates for negotiations: from the Transport and Tourism (TRAN) Committee on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Rail (2021); and jointly from the Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committees on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the public-sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – October II 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© wladimir1804 / Adobe Stock

A resurgence in the number of coronavirus infections since the summer has evidently turned into a second wave of the pandemic, which has now hit many European Union countries. The pandemic is putting renewed pressure on European health systems, and authorities are introducing stringent but targeted preventive measures in a bid to cushion the negative economic impacts while preserving people’s health and ensuring hospitals are not once again overwhelmed. An increasing number of EU countries are clamping down on travel and imposing strict social distancing measures, such as night-time curfews in major cities and limits on social contacts, although most schools and businesses remain open throughout Europe.

The International Monetary Fund said in its October World Economic Outlook (WEO) that global growth in 2020 is projected at -4.4 per cent owing to the pandemic, a less severe contraction than forecast in the June 2020 WEO. The revision reflects better than anticipated second quarter GDP outturns – mostly in advanced economies, where activity bounced back sooner than expected following the scaling back of national lockdowns in May and June – as well as indications of a stronger recovery in the third quarter.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on pandemic related issues. Earlier think tank studies on the issue can be found in the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking‘ of 25 September.

The global compact for migration and public health in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2020

The European Parliament’s involvement in the EU response to the Corona pandemic
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2020

Europe and the Covid-19 crisis
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2020

Who will really benefit from the Next Generation EU funds?
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2020

Measuring price stability in Covid times
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2020

In the name of Covid-19
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2020

A proposal for a public infrastructure leasing entity for Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2020

Covid-19 has democratic lessons to teach. Has Angela Merkel helped Germany to learn them?
German Marshall Fund, October 2020

Trump infected with corona: What are the consequences for the United States?
German Marshall Fund, October 2020

The pandemic was supposed to be great for strongmen. What happened?
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2020

Europe’s double bind
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

Schengen will survive the pandemic: The single market may not
Centre for European Reform, October 2020

Taking pandemic preparedness seriously: Lessons from Covid-19
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

What is the world doing to create a Covid-19 vaccine?
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

EU law in the time of Covid-19
European Policy Centre, September 2020

Covid-19 et immigration: Le grand laisser-faire européen
Confrontations Europe, September 2020

The Covid crisis, an opportunity for a ‘new multilateralism’?
Confrontations Europe, October 2020

A sectarianised pandemic: Covid-19 in Lebanon
Istituto Affari Internazionali, October 2020

Covid lies go viral thanks to unchecked social media
Chatham House, October 2020

Ensuring a greener recovery from the pandemic
Chatham House, October 2020

Preparing for Covid-20
European Council for International Political Economy, October 2020

As election day nears, Covid-19 spreads further into red America
Brookings Institution, October 2020

Lessons learned from Taiwan and South Korea’s tech-enabled COVID-19 communications
Brookings Institution, October 2020

Corporate bond market dysfunction during Covid-19 and lessons from the Fed’s response
Brookings Institution, October 2020

What Covid-19 may—or may not—change about swing state politics
Brookings Institution, October 2020

New poll: More Europeans prioritise the environment than prioritise the Covid-19 economic recovery
Friends of Europe, October 2020

Pandemic is a wake-up call for mental healthcare reform in Europe
Friends of Europe, October 2020

Covid-19 and Africa’s recession: How bad can it get?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, October 2020

Changes in adult alcohol use and consequences during the Covid-19 pandemic in the US
Rand Corporation, September 2020

Managing the challenge of workforce presentism in the Covid-19 crisis
Rand Corporation, September 2020

How Russia targets U.S. Elections, black workers and Covid-19, TikTok: RAND weekly recap
Rand Corporation, October 2020

Understanding the Romanian diaspora: Diaspora mobilisation during Covid-19
Foreign Policy Centre, October 2020

Contre la pandémie et pour le climat: La science et l’innovation
Institut Jacques Delors, September 2020

Trade in pandemic time
Institut Jacques Delors, September 2020

The Corona transformation: How the pandemic slows globalization and accelerates digitalization
Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2020

Why has Covid-19 hit different European Union economies so differently?
Bruegel, September 2020

Common eurobonds should become Europe’s safe asset: But they don’t need to be green
Bruegel, September 2020

Will European Union countries be able to absorb and spend well the bloc’s recovery funding?
Bruegel, September 2020

Government-guaranteed bank lending six months on
Bruegel, September 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: The second wave‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

© Adobe Stock

The European Union (EU) first unified summer-time arrangements in 1980, to ensure a harmonised approach to time switching within the single market. Until then, national summer-time practices and schedules were different, with obvious consequences for time differences between neighbouring countries. A 2000 EU Directive on summer-time arrangements now governs seasonal clock changes. It defines the summer-time period as ‘the period of the year during which clocks are put forward by 60 minutes compared with the rest of the year’ and stipulates that it begins ‘on the last Sunday in March’ and ends ‘on the last Sunday in October’. The directive states that coordinated summer-time arrangements are ‘important for the functioning of the internal market’.

Against the background of a number of petitions, citizens’ initiatives and parliamentary questions, the European Parliament called on the European Commission, in a February 2018 resolution, to conduct a thorough assessment of the summer-time arrangements provided in the 2000 Directive and, if necessary, to come up with a proposal for its revision.

European Commission proposal to end seasonal clock changes

On that basis, the Commission conducted a public consultation on the summer-time arrangements. In September 2018, the Commission put forward a new legislative proposal, where it suggests ending the practice of seasonal clock changes.

This proposal for a directive is put forward for adoption under the ordinary legislative procedure, in which the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, which represents the EU Member States, take decisions on an equal footing. Once both institutions have adopted their respective positions on the proposal, they can enter into negotiation on the proposed legislation. Once these negotiations have been concluded, both the Parliament and the Council need to endorse the agreed deal for it to become law.

European Parliament position in favour of ending seasonal clock changes

In its position on the proposal adopted in March 2019, the European Parliament endorsed the Commission suggestion to discontinue seasonal changes of time, leaving EU countries free to decide whether they want to introduce summer-time or winter-time on a permanent basis. To ensure that the application of summer-time by some EU countries and winter-time by others does not disrupt the functioning of the internal market, however, Parliament called on EU countries and the Commission to coordinate decision-making.

The adopted text sets out Parliament’s position in the negotiations on the proposal with the Council.

Blockage in the Council of the European Union

EU countries discussed the Commission’s proposal at an informal meeting of transport ministers in October 2018, in which a majority of ministers expressed their support for ending seasonal clock changes. However, at the following meeting, in December 2018, ministers indicated that EU countries needed more time for further consultations. In December 2019, the Finnish Presidency of the Council of the EU updated ministers on the status of the European Commission’s proposal. The Council has still to agree its position and EU countries are carrying out consultations to finalise their positions.

Further information

• Discontinuing seasonal changes of time, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, March 2019
• Directive discontinuing seasonal change of time, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament
• EU summer-time arrangements under Directive 2000/84/EC, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, October 2017
• Seasonal changes of time, European Parliament
• State of the Union 2018: Q&A on the Commission’s proposal to put an end to seasonal clock changes, European Commission
• Seasonal clock change in the EU, Mobility and Transport – European Commission

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Eric Pichon (1st edition),

© octofocus / Adobe Stock

The EU is in the process of adapting its budgetary instruments to respond to the consequences of the coronavirus crisis, in particular in raising the established ceilings for some financial instruments. The proposed adjustments include, among other things, measures aimed at helping the most fragile third countries recover from the consequences of the pandemic. In particular, on 28 May 2020, the European Commission put forward a proposal concerning the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) in order to expand its coverage and raise the funds dedicated to leverage private investment for sustainable development and the guarantees to de-risk such investment. On 21 July 2020, the European Council rejected the draft amending budget that would have provided increased EFSD funding for the current year.

Versions

• Amending the European Fund for Sustainable Development (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending regulation (EU) 2017/1601 establishing the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), the EFSD Guarantee and the EFSD Guarantee Fund Committee responsible: Foreign Affairs (AFET), Development (DEVE) and Budgets (BUDG), jointly under Rule 58 COM(2020) 407
28.5.2020 Rapporteur: To be appointed 2020/0107 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: To be appointed Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report and discussion in committee