European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© New Africa / Adobe Stock

As the second wave of the coronavirus passes, new infections and the death rate are currently both in decline globally. At the same time, countries across the world have begun vaccination programmes. In parallel, fears that the impact of the disease will continue, as some new, highly contagious mutations of the virus have spread, have lead governments to adopt additional preventive border restrictions and lockdowns. Among many debates on the subject, two stand out – the slower vaccination rate in the EU compared to the UK and US, and the imbalance between rich and poor countries in the availability of vaccines, with a third debate, on vaccination passports, emerging rapidly.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the pandemic and related issues. A previous item from this series on the coronavirus was published in earlier in February 2021.

Vaccines: How to use market-based incentives to ramp up production
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2021

Why the EU’s vaccine strategy will pay off in the end
Carnegie Europe, February 2021

Will Covid accelerate productivity growth?
Bruegel, February 2021

Why has the EU been so slow to roll out a Covid vaccination programme?
Bruegel, January 2021

A global pandemic alarm bell
Bruegel, January 2021

What do vaccination passports mean for Europe?
Bruegel, January 2021

Résilience: La nouvelle boussole
Bruegel, January 2021

Corporate insolvencies during Covid-19: Keeping calm before the storm
Bruegel, January 2021

Lessons from the battleground: EU strategic autonomy after the ‘vaccine wars’
European Policy Centre, February 2021

Why the Covid-19 crisis calls for a revamped Better Regulation agenda
European Policy Centre, February 2021

Will corporate debt choke the post-Covid-19 recovery?
European Policy Centre, January 2021

Europe’s post-pandemic strategy for the WHO
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2021

The EU’s misguided export regulation on vaccines
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2021

All the rage: The pandemic’s emotional politics
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2021

The geopolitics of Covid vaccines in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2021

Corona pandemic shows that many states are poorly prepared
Bertelsmann Stiftung, January 2021

With European unity and empathy against Covid-19
Bertelsmann Stiftung, December 2020

L’impact de la Covid-19 sur le monde du travail
Confrontations Europe, January 2021

How Greece can recover from Covid
Centre for European Reform, February 2021

Ditchley conference report: Covid-19, the global economy and the return of power politics
Centre for European Reform, January 2021

Prioritizing equity after Covid-19
Chatham House, February 2021

The dysfunctional vaccine rollout is creating even more opportunities for cybercriminals
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2021

A guide to global Covid-19 vaccine efforts
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2021

Covid-19 death rate rising in Africa
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2021

What does the World Health Organization do?
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2021

How the Chinese state mobilized civil society to fight Covid-19
Brookings Institution, February 2021

How Covid-era innovation can build more equitable education systems
Brookings Institution, February 2021

Covid-19: Quels impacts sur le climat?
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, February 2021

Les relations Europe-Afrique à l’aune de la pandémie de Covid-19: État des lieux et perspectives
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2021

What the vaccine row tells us about the Commission’s worth
Friends of Europe, February 2021

Adapt or perish: Lessons from the pandemic
Friends of Europe, February 2021

Covid-19: How can we get it under control in 2021?
Friends of Europe, February 2021

La crise Covid, le transport stratégique et ses perspectives européennes
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, February 2021

Covid-19: Comment faire face à la peur vaccinale?
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, December 2020

Saving the red-eye to Ibiza: How vaccine corridors can open up travel again
Foreign Policy Centre, February 2021

Pandemie, Regierungskrise und Wahlkampfauftakt in den Niederlanden
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, February 2021

Political risk: Germany pledges to speed up vaccinations
Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 2021

An abrupt awakening to the realities of a pandemic: Learning lessons from the onset of Covid-19 in the EU and Finland
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, January 2021

Reforming multilateralism in post-COVID times: For a more regionalised, binding and legitimate United Nations
Instituto Affari Internationali, January 2021

The Post-Covid-19 trajectory for Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara
Instituto Affari Internationali, January 2021

Learning from Covid-19: Implications for the EU response to human smuggling
Instituto Affari Internationali, December 2020

How Covid-19 changed the future
European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2020

Les européens devant l’hésitation vaccinale
Institut Jacques Delors, December 2020

Covid-19 pandemic: Insights from Rand
Rand Corporation, February 2021

An evaluation of the Turkish economy during Covid-19
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2021

Impact and potential consequences of Covid-19: Global and European considerations
Economic Policy Institute, January 2021.

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Vaccination debates‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2018 – Source : EP

Continuing to mark International Women’s Day 2021, the agenda for the first plenary session of March 2021 kicks off with a ceremony celebrating women’s day, not least their role in fighting on the frontline of the coronavirus pandemic. Meanwhile, it is no secret that the pandemic has also had a highly gendered impact on women, with women more likely to suffer a negative impact in their professional and personal lives. Women continue to be under-represented in business and political leadership – even in the European Parliament. Nevertheless, the Parliament has already made recommendations on the need for a gendered response to Covid‑19, such as the adoption of effective gender mainstreaming tools that could mitigate the negative consequences and contribute to halting the reversal of gender equality.

A joint debate on the European Semester scheduled for Wednesday morning will look at the economic outlook for Europe’s recovery from the pandemic, with an emphasis expected on social and employment policy. The Council and European Commission are also expected to make statements on the action plan for the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. This will be followed by the formal signature, by the presidents of the EU institutions, of the recently endorsed Joint Declaration on the Conference of the Future of Europe, an initiative long supported by Parliament, which now begins its work to engage with citizens’ concerns. As direct representatives elected by people in EU countries, Parliamentarians are keen to contribute along with citizens themselves, to building a truly Citizen’s Union.

Even before the current pandemic, investment in the EU had yet to recover to pre-financial crisis levels. On Tuesday morning, Members will debate a joint Budgetary Committee and Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee legislative report on the proposed InvestEU programme, designed to streamline investment support and now adjusted to tackle the post-coronavirus investment landscape. Parliament has been fierce in its advocacy for adequate resources to finance the recovery, securing a €1 billion top-up for the EU guarantee and measures that could mobilise an extra €35-40 billion in investment through incorporating European Investment Bank legacy portfolios. Thanks to the Parliament’s efforts, the proposals now include the possibility for Member States to use InvestEU funding to provide capital support for otherwise viable small and medium-sized businesses that have been hard-hit by the pandemic.

Also under consideration before the current pandemic, Parliament has long supported moves to establish a coherent EU health programme – following through by negotiating an additional €3.4 billion for the EU4Health programme during the 2021‑2027 multiannual financial framework negotiations. Parliament will proceed with its first reading of the proposed legislation to establish the programme on Tuesday morning. While the programme will focus on combating cross-border health threats, ensuring affordable medicine and promoting stronger health systems, it is expected that Parliament will steer the programme towards support for measures with clear EU added value.

Parliament elects the European Ombudsman at the beginning of each parliamentary term, and is due to discuss an own-initiative report on the Ombudsman’s annual activity report for 2019 on Tuesday afternoon, in the presence of the Ombudsman herself, Emily O’Reilly. The annual report covers a wide range of issues where the Ombudsman has investigated complaints and initiated enquiries into possible maladministration by EU institutions or agencies. In 2019, these included senior EU staff appointments, ongoing transparency issues in the Council and Eurogroup, and the treatment of disabled people and asylum-seekers. While the institutions complied with the Ombudsman’s recommendations in the interests of good administration in most cases, the annual report makes some key recommendations for further action on: decision-making accountability in the Council; public access to documents; interviews with asylum-seekers; appointment procedures; and on citizens’ participation in EU policy-making. Parliament’s Petitions Committee (PETI) is largely in agreement with the Ombudsman’s assessment, particularly with regard to remarks concerning the Council and the transparency register.

Finally, while fisheries control is an exclusive EU competence under the common fisheries policy, EU countries are responsible for controlling their fishing activities, with the European Commission checking that they fulfill their responsibilities correctly. Advances in technology allow more effective controls to protect fish stocks, and the rules are therefore being revised. On Tuesday afternoon, Members will debate a legislative report on this revision from the Fisheries Committee that supports the new rules in general, while seeking to protect small fishing vessels, and reserving the imposition of CCTV onboard for those who commit infringements.

Written by Suzana Anghel,

© Adobe Stock

On 26 February 2021, EU leaders met for a second video-conference session to discuss security and defence and the southern neighbourhood. They reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda, by increasing the EU’s ability to act autonomously and strengthening its resilience through taking ‘more responsibility for its security’. They also expressed their wish to deepen the transatlantic bond with the US and through NATO. In line with past meetings dedicated to security and defence, the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, joined the EU leaders to discuss EU-NATO cooperation.

Video-conference of the members of the European Council

The October 2020 Leaders’ Agenda had listed security and defence as well as health as items for discussion in February 2021. A discussion on the southern neighbourhood was only subsequently added to the agenda. While health was discussed on 25 February, with European Parliament President David Sassoli addressing the European Council on the same day, discussions at the 26 February 2021 video-conference of the Heads of State or Government focused on security and defence and the southern neighbourhood. The title ‘special’ European Council specified on the Leaders’ Agenda indicates that the original intention was to organise a physical meeting in Brussels, but this had to be abandoned owing to the difficult EU-wide epidemiological situation. Accordingly, the EU leaders did not adopt conclusions, but released a statement, outlining medium to longer-term commitments (see Table 1).

Table 1 – New European Council commitments and requests with a specific time schedule

Policy area Action Actor Schedule Security and defence Keep under regular review European Council 2021-2022 Security and defence Report on the implementation of the cybersecurity strategy High Representative June 2021 Security and defence Present a technology roadmap European Commission October 2021 Security and defence Continue work on the Strategic Compass High Representative / Member States March 2022 Security and defence

The European Council returned to discussing security and defence policy, a rolling item on its agenda between 2012 and 2018, and committed to reviewing this regularly. European Council President Charles Michel stressed that the EU wanted ‘to act more strategically’ and to increase its ‘ability to act autonomously’ while continuing to deepen partnerships, including though a renewed transatlantic dialogue on security and defence with the Biden Administration.

The EU’s efforts to take more responsibility for its security go hand in hand with the deepening and strengthening of existing partnerships, especially with NATO. Charles Michel stressed that the EU and NATO shared ‘common strategic interests’ but also common threats, such as ‘cyber, hybrid and disinformation’ threats, for which both organisations needed to strengthen their resilience as well as their cooperation. He spoke of a ‘strong partnership which requires strong partners’, while NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg affirmed that EU-NATO cooperation had reached unprecedented levels in recent years, in particular on issues such as resilience and cybersecurity. However, a durable solution to maritime boundary delimitation in the eastern Mediterranean and to the Cyprus problem would allow further normalisation of the EU-NATO relationship. This is key, as the two organisations are developing a new strategic concept (NATO) on the one hand, and a Strategic Compass (the EU) on the other, making information-sharing vital.

The High Representative, Josep Borrell, presented the results of the first ever EU threat analysis, conducted with input from the Member States’ intelligence agencies between June and November 2020. This analysis represents the first step and the foundation for the forthcoming strategic compass. The exercise is entering its second and most sensitive phase, that of developing policy orientations and setting objectives in four areas, namely: i) crisis management; ii) preparedness and resilience; iii) capability development; and iv) partnerships. This second phase, which will last until mid-2021, requires a vision and guidelines from the European Council, which has tasked the High Representative with continuing the work on developing a strategic compass ‘making use of the entire EU toolbox’. In this way, EU leaders would have ownership of the process, something that was missing in 2016 when the European Council ‘welcomed‘, but did not endorse, the EU’s Global Strategy. The third phase of this exercise will be dedicated to developing the strategic compass document, expected by March 2022.

The European Council also recognised that ‘significant steps’ had already been undertaken to boost European defence cooperation, and called for it to be further deepened, not least in the area of crisis management where ‘improved force generation’ is needed. A set of new instruments – the coordinated annual review on defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF), permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Peace Facility (EPF) – have become a reality and are about to be implemented. The European Council called for ‘swift operationalisation’ of the EPF and ‘full use’ of PESCO. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasised the importance of these tools in tackling existing fragmentation and the duplication of capabilities, fostering interoperability and building synergies between civilian, defence and space industries. The EU leaders also underlined the importance of countering cyber-threats and building cyber-resilience, and invited the co-legislators to act ‘swiftly’ and ‘take work forward’ on the revised directive on security of network and information systems. Addressing EU leaders, the Parliament’s President, David Sassoli, welcomed ‘the shift from a common defence policy to a fully fledged defence system’ and the initiative to develop a strategic compass by 2022. He reiterated Parliament’s view that the EU must ‘improve [its] understanding of the new threats and build up our common resilience, in order to become strategically autonomous’.

Southern neighbourhood

EU leaders discussed the ‘political and strategic nature’ of the partnership with the southern neighbourhood and reaffirmed their attachment to their previous conclusions from December 2020. They called on the Council to implement the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative on a renewed and reinforced partnership with the southern neighbourhood, while taking into consideration the ‘common challenges’ and the ‘shared opportunities’. Josep Borrell emphasised that the EU is ‘closely intertwined’ with its southern neighbourhood but that the ‘gap between the two shores of the Mediterranean has been increasing’, heightening the urgent need to deepen cooperation. Charles Michel stressed that the EU and NATO want ‘more stability and more predictability’ in their neighbourhood.

In his address to the European Council, EP President David Sassoli underlined that Parliament welcomed the new agenda, which confirmed ‘the importance the EU attaches to its southern neighbours’. He stated that the Parliament, which holds the presidency of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean, was determined to help strengthen inter-parliamentary dialogue on challenging issues such as fighting climate change and overcoming socio-economic disparities.

Other items

Charles Michel reiterated the European Council’s condemnation of the imprisonment of Alexei Navalny and demanded his release. He stressed that, earlier in the week, the Foreign Affairs Council had agreed to impose restrictive measures against those responsible for the ‘arrest and sentencing’ of Mr Navalny under the newly introduced EU global human rights sanctions regime.

The European Council also condemned the attack on the World Food Programme convoy in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and expressed sympathy for the families of the victims and solidarity with Italy.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the European Council video-conference of 26 February 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Marcos Fernández Álvarez,

©phonlamaiphoto AdobeStock

Efforts to curb carbon emissions are falling short. As climate change impacts become all too clear, geoengineering is again in the spotlight. Some see it as a last-resort option to fight climate change. Detractors highlight the risks and uncertainties. Will governments end up ‘tinkering with Earth’s thermostat’?

In the summer of 2018, a succession of heatwaves struck the EU. Record-breaking temperatures were reported, and wildfires ravaged the continent. Sweden suffered the worst forest fires in modern history. In Greece, blazes swept through Attica and left 102 dead. For many citizens, wildfires threw the reality of climate change into sharp relief.

Under the Paris Agreement, nearly 200 countries pledged to keep global warming well below 2°C. But progress in curbing carbon emissions is not on track. If the current trend is not reversed, extreme weather events like the 2018 heatwave will become more and more frequent.

Large-scale tree planting and direct air capture (DAC) are being considered to boost these efforts. While these are steps in the right direction – and could end up playing a significant role in tackling climate change – DAC is currently very costly and energy intensive, and planting trees can only help so much.

Geoengineering refers to large-scale interventions in the global climate system, intended to counteract climate change. In 2008, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity called for a moratorium on geoengineering ‘until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities’. Only a decade later, scientists and policy-makers are again looking for last-ditch solutions to buy some extra time. Geoengineering is again in the spotlight.

Potential impacts and developments

Geoengineering includes a number of techniques of varying complexity, risk, and cost. In policy-making, the debate revolves almost entirely around ‘solar geoengineering‘. This describes a set of methods aimed at cooling the planet by reflecting a portion of solar energy back into space, or increasing the amount of solar radiation that escapes the Earth.

Cirrus clouds are known to have a warming effect on Earth. Seeding the atmosphere with innocuous Sahara dust would prevent the formation of cirrus clouds, and reduce global temperatures. Stratospheric aerosol injection entails creating an artificial sunshade by injecting reflective particles in the stratosphere. Its working principle is based in nature. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991 pumped around 15 million tons of sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere; in the two years that followed, global temperatures decreased by about 1°C.

Solar geoengineering would be inexpensive, and scientists agree on its potential. Without actions to reduce emissions, the concentration of CO2 is likely to be double pre-industrial levels by 2060. In theory, getting rid of all cirrus clouds would balance the doubling of CO2; so would using stratospheric particle injection to reflect 2 % of the incoming solar radiation.

But there is no simple solution. For a start, solar geoengineering does not target the root of the problem; it only mitigates its effects. Solar geoengineering has never been tried before. If done incorrectly, it could cause even more global warming; and there could be other unintended consequences. The real challenge, however, may not be technological but rather one of governance. Climate politics is slow and complex; agreeing on using untested technology on a planetary scale could prove impossible. Who decides to use solar geoengineering? Who benefits from it? Who is affected?

Solar geoengineering is a geopolitical issue. The atmosphere has no borders, and the actions of some countries could affect the climate of others. To make matters worse, the science is not always conclusive. Some climate models suggest that almost every region in the world would benefit from solar geoengineering. Other scientists claim that since heat-trapping gases would still operate, temperatures would be more evenly distributed. This would reduce precipitation. Such a geoengineered world would be cooler, but also drier.

Many stakeholders see a moral hazard in solar geoengineering. All efforts are now focused on reducing emissions. With new tools in their climatic toolbox, governments could become complacent. Scientists insist that geoengineering is a supplement and not a substitute for mitigation. For example, solar geoengineering will not solve ocean acidification, and its impact on the water cycle is uncertain. Eventually, part or all the carbon released into the atmosphere will need to be recaptured, regardless of whether geoengineering is used or not.

To some citizens, meddling with the climate may sound like playing god. But across the world, about 40 % of the population live within 100 kilometres of the coast. Rising sea levels will threaten these coastal communities. Many regions will see more intense and frequent summer droughts, extreme weather events, and heavy rainfall. This could strain the fragile agricultural systems in the global South, sparking an exodus of climate refugees. As the consequences of climate change accumulate, the public’s opinion on solar geoengineering could shift rapidly.

Perceptions could be as important as the science. In 1962, the US started a programme to weaken hurricanes through seeding. In 1963, Hurricane Flora caused thousands of deaths in Cuba. The Cuban government accused the US of waging weather warfare. Similarly, any country suffering from extreme weather could blame geoengineers. In addition, geoengineering would be deployed progressively. Its effects would be initially difficult to decouple from natural fluctuations and climate change. Detractors would be quick to discard it as a failed idea.

There is a bigger problem, however. Once started, solar geoengineering cannot be stopped. Assuming that carbon emissions continued, the artificial sunshade would mask increasing amounts of extra warming. If geoengineering ceased abruptly – due to sabotage, technical, or political reasons – temperatures would shoot up rapidly. This termination shock would be catastrophic for humans and ecosystems.

Anticipatory policy-making

Solar geoengineering should only be considered as a last-resort solution. There is ample consensus that cutting emissions is the safest, most economical route to tackling climate change. The world needs a climate champion to accelerate these efforts, and the EU could lead the way.

Ultimately, the debate surrounding solar geoengineering could come down to balancing the risks and benefits. Solar geoengineering is not without risks. However, failing to mitigate climate change will also bring major new risks, disrupt ecosystems across the world, and hit the most vulnerable regions particularly hard.

Ironically, one reason that solar geoengineering may become necessary is the slow pace of international climate negotiations. Yet discussions on geoengineering are following the same path. Should solar geoengineering become necessary, governments need to be ready. The EU could help advance preparedness in this area; for example, by throwing its diplomatic weight behind multilateral initiatives moving in this direction.

The EU and its partners could promote an international governance framework for solar geoengineering. However, all parties must be on board. There are real risks that some of the countries worst affected by climate change could act unilaterally. Even if well-intentioned, this could create geopolitical tension. An international regulation system would ensure that no country ‘goes rogue’, and that geoengineering is not done for some at the expense of others.

The EU could also support research on solar geoengineering. Studies and trials may have been hampered by fears of promoting a quick ‘technofix’. But if geoengineering became necessary to avert disaster, its full effects must be known. Current techniques are criticised for posing a risk to biodiversity, precipitation patterns, and the ozone layer. A better understanding of these problems is the first step towards tackling them. Research could also help governance. For example, counter-geoengineering tools could serve as a deterrent against unilateral action.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we could engineer the planet to help fight climate change?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to Science and Technology podcast ‘What if we could engineer the planet to help fight climate change?’ on YouTube.

Written by Stefano Spinaci,

© areeya_ann / Adobe Stock

The dramatic consequences of climate change and environmental degradation have brought the need for a more sustainable economy to the top of the agenda. Transforming the EU economy to make it more sustainable requires large investments, especially for enabling a green and low-carbon transition. Given that the public sector alone cannot cover this financial need, solutions have been sought to bring the private sector on board. Green finance involves collecting funds for addressing climate and environmental issues (green financing), on the one hand, and improving the management of financial risk related to climate and the environment (greening finance), on the other. Sustainable finance is an evolution of green finance, as it takes into consideration environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues and risks, with the aim of increasing long-term investments in sustainable economic activities and projects.

The European Union is a global leader in the above domain. In its 2018 action plan on financing sustainable growth, the European Commission set out the EU strategy to connect finance with sustainability. The first deliverables have been three key regulations seeking to create a classification system to determine whether an economic activity is environmentally sustainable (the ‘taxonomy’); to make disclosures relating to sustainable investments and sustainability risks clearer; and to establish low-carbon benchmarks. The Taxonomy Regulation is particularly important for driving the consistent development of future legislation, as advocated, in particular, by the European Parliament. The Commission will release a renewed sustainable finance strategy in 2021, and a legislative proposal on the green bond standard.

The interest in green and sustainable finance is rising very fast among investors worldwide, and several voluntary private initiatives have tried to create some market standards. Policymakers have also been very active in launching numerous regulatory and non-regulatory initiatives at global or local level. To avoid market fragmentation, there is a demand for greater harmonisation among the different measures. There is also a need to increase the standardisation and disclosure of non-financial information published by companies and used to evaluate the risks. Doing so will help to increase data availability, to make data more comparable, and to bring more transparency and clarity to investors. Given that climate change and environmental degradation are global challenges, international cooperation is in the common interest; the European Union is actively promoting this through the International Platform on Sustainable Finance.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Green and sustainable finance‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Green and sustainable finance’ on YouTube.

Written by Denise Chircop,

The European Union is beginning to deploy significant amounts of coronavirus recovery funding and has introduced visionary initiatives such as the New European Bauhaus, a European Green Deal, and a Europe fit for the digital age. In this way, the EU seeks to turn the huge disruptions resulting from the Covid‑19 pandemic into an opportunity to start afresh, with some initiatives to shape the future.

In the field of education, the European Commission proposes to establish a European education area by 2025, and implement a new digital education action plan. The Portuguese Presidency of the European Council has launched discussions on the renewal of the strategic framework for European cooperation on education and training up to 2030. In the latest round of negotiations over the long-term budget of the European Union, the European Parliament fought hard to boost the funding programme dedicated to lifelong learning Erasmus for 2021‑2017, securing additional funds and wider participation to include significantly more people with fewer opportunities.

At a time of new beginnings, our animated infographic on lifelong learning in the EU has been revamped with recent data and greater interactivity. A new section on vocational education and training looks at the distribution of enrolments, the situation of vocational education teachers and instructors, the financing of our vocational systems, and the opportunities vocational education and training opens up, including for mobility. Education is integral to our lives and the sections of the animated infographic span from early childhood to adulthood. Since learning implies an act of curiosity, there are many interesting nuggets waiting to be discovered – just click.

Lifelong learning in the EU is intended to help explain what the EU means when it uses the term lifelong learning and to draw attention to some of the issues by displaying EU financed studies and data. How is learning structured in the EU? Who pays for it? And how much? What are the profiles of the professionals? Who are the beneficiaries? Who is left by the wayside? What is the impact?

Prepared for Members of the European Parliament, we have added a series of infographic briefings that use some elements of the animated infographic as a launch pad to dig deeper into a theme. There are four to date:

• The infographic on the inclusion of migrants in formal education draws on statistics that show that students with a migrant background experience a degree of exclusion from formal education compared to other students. Nevertheless, many different individuals fall under this category. This infographic looks at the complex picture behind the statistics, and at how authorities in Member States address the inclusion of migrant students through their policies.
• Adult learners in a digital world looks at how adults in the EU currently use the internet, and their level of skills. While policy-makers see the potential of the digital environment to broaden access to education, lack of skills and infrastructure may be barriers in their own right.
• Non-formal learning: Access and validation looks at the different situations in which we learn over the course of a lifetime. It looks at examples of learning opportunities in adulthood and the types of recognition adults receive for the knowledge and skills that they develop.
• Our latest infographic is on early leavers from education and training. It looks at young adults whose highest level of education is at or below lower secondary or primary school level. Those who fall in this category suffer considerable disadvantage, so how do policies supported by the EU bring down their numbers?

See also our video that provides answers to questions such as what is lifelong learning, whether it is equally accessible to everyone and how the European Union contributes towards the promotion of lifelong learning.

 

 

Written by Rosamund Shreeves with Nessa Boland,

© pressmaster / Adobe Stock

One hundred years after women won the vote or were first elected to parliament in some EU countries, the data show that women continue to be under-represented in politics and public life, in the European Parliament, national parliaments and governments, and local assemblies.

The arguments for gender balance in politics are numerous, and benefit not only women and female politicians, but also parties themselves and the rest of society. After all, women form half the population and need to be better represented in power structures. However, there is now solid evidence both of obstacles and of the strategies that are effective when it comes to increasing women’s participation and representation. Here, political parties and the media can be both barriers and important enablers. The EU has committed to achieving a gender balance in political representation and participation as a matter of justice, equality and democracy. Concrete recommendations have been made for achieving this goal, including specific action that could be taken by the EU institutions, national governments, political parties, civil society and the media.

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has shone a spotlight on the issue of women’s leadership and its implications for gender equality.

This is an update of a Briefing from March 2019, drafted by Rosamund Shreeves and Martina Prpic.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in politics in the EU: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves,

© VAKSMANV / Adobe Stock

In the midst of the current pandemic, adopting a gender perspective may seem a secondary concern. However, pandemics are known to affect women and men differently, making it essential to recognise these differences in order to understand the impacts on individuals and communities and to respond effectively and equitably.

There is already clear evidence that the ongoing health, social and economic crisis is having gendered impacts. Disaggregated data show that sex and gender are playing a role in exposure to the virus and risks of severe outcomes, and that some groups of women and men are particularly vulnerable. Lockdown measures have led to an increase in violence against women and disrupted access to support services. Access to sexual and reproductive healthcare has also been affected. Successive lockdowns have widened the existing gender divide in unpaid care work that was already keeping more women than men out of the labour market. Greater work-life conflict is one of the factors leading to women’s employment being worse hit than men’s, with potential long-term impacts on women’s employment, pay and career advancement. The pandemic has also brought the issue of women’s participation in decision-making to the fore.

Without a gender-sensitive approach, the pandemic could have far-reaching implications, including a real risk of exacerbating gender inequalities and sending progress into reverse. At the same time, gender mainstreaming tools such as gender impact assessments and gender budgeting exist that could, if used effectively, mitigate the negative consequences and contribute to achieving gender equality.

Internationally and within the European Union (EU), there have been calls for gender-sensitive emergency and long-term responses. In January 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution setting out recommendations on both aspects.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Covid-19: The need for a gendered response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Sex-disaggregated data on confirmed cases and mortality in the EU

Written by Ralf Drachenberg,

© Adobe Stock

For the tenth time since the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis, the European Council met by video-conference, however this time in two separate sessions. The first, on 25 February, dealing with the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and ways of increasing the EU’s health resilience, is covered in this paper, while the second, the following morning, addressed security and defence as well as the southern neighbourhood, and is covered by a separate paper. Regarding the pandemic, EU leaders called for acceleration in the authorisation, production and distribution of vaccines, reiterated their solidarity with third countries, and acknowledged that non-essential travel still needed to be restricted while ensuring the unhindered flow of goods and services within the single market. To strengthen the EU’s resilience to future health emergencies, EU leaders will seek to improve coordination to ensure better prevention, preparedness and response. However, further EU integration in health policy was excluded, with the conclusions stressing that these actions should be carried out ‘in line with the Union competences under the Treaties’. EU leaders also called on the Commission to draw up a report on the lessons learned from this crisis, to take forward the work on the European health union, and underlined the need for a global approach, including an international treaty on pandemics.

Meeting format and video-conference conclusions

The Leaders’ Agenda for 2020-21 envisaged a physical European Council meeting in February 2021. However, due to the still serious health situation, it was replaced by video-conferences. Despite the informal nature of the meeting, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, was invited to present Parliament’s view, which is not the case for most video-conferences of the European Council. This was the 14th time the European Council has addressed the coronavirus crisis in a period of just under 12 months, underlining its role as Covid-19 crisis manager. Nine of these exchanges took place by video-conference, but their results have taken different formats, notably, three ‘President’s conclusions‘, three ’President’s remarks’, one ‘oral President’s conclusions’ and, for this meeting, two statements. While the meaning of these different labels is neither obvious nor explained, it suggests a distinction in nature to that of formal conclusions of a physical European Council meeting, which have been qualified as ‘political orientations’.

EU coordination efforts in response to the coronavirus pandemic EU coordination efforts

Over the past year, the European Council has met regularly to take stock of the epidemiological situation and to coordinate efforts in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Recent challenges regarding the production and roll-out of vaccines across the EU, have led to criticism of the European Commission. On 10 February, in the European Parliament, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen acknowledged some mistakes in the handing of the vaccine acquisition process, but remained firm that ordering vaccines jointly and sharing them in a spirit of solidarity was the right decision. MEPs addressed some of the mistakes made, but also stressed that the overall strategy – to purchase vaccines jointly – was the right one. EU leaders emphasised their determination to continue working together and coordinate their actions to tackle the pandemic and its consequences, keeping the overall situation under close review.

Vaccine delivery

The European Council agreed on the need to accelerate the authorisation, production and distribution of vaccines, as well as the vaccination process. Ahead of the meeting, Charles Michel stressed that the ‘main challenge is to speed up #COVID19 vaccine delivery to Member States so they can implement their vaccination campaigns’. EU leaders expressed their support for the Commission’s ‘on-going efforts to accelerate the availability of raw materials, facilitate agreements between manufacturers across supply chains, scope existing facilities so as to help production scale-up in the EU and further the research and development of vaccines to protect against variants’. Prior to the meeting, Belgium, Denmark, Lithuania, Poland and Spain called for the strengthening of vaccine production in the EU. In order to boost production capacity in Europe, the Commission has set-up a task force for industrial scale-up of Covid-19 vaccines, to facilitate a more integrated and strategic public-private partnership with industry. It will also provide operational support for addressing potential bottlenecks in production and supply of raw materials and other essential input required for vaccines manufacturing. Addressing the European Council, President Sassoli stressed ‘it was forward-looking of our governments to give the Commission the mandate to procure vaccines to distribute among all 27 Member States’.

Coronavirus variants

Considering the possible resistance of future coronavirus variants to existing vaccines, EU leaders called for enhancement of the EU’s surveillance and detection capacity to identify variants as early as possible. To anticipate such developments, the Commission launched a new bio-defence preparedness plan named HERA Incubator. The objective is ‘to access and mobilise all means and resources necessary to prevent, mitigate and respond to the potential impact of [coronavirus] variants’. EU leaders stressed that ‘companies must ensure predictability of their vaccine production and respect contractual delivery deadlines’. On 17 February, the Commission approved a second contract with the pharmaceutical company Moderna, providing an additional 300 million doses. This adds to the contracts already signed with BioNTech/Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Sanofi-GSK, Janssen Pharmaceutica NV, Curevac and Moderna.

The movement of persons

Currently eight Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Portugal and Spain) have set temporary internal border controls due to Covid-19. Seven of them introduced them despite the EU leaders’ statement at their last video-conference meeting, on 21 January 2021, that ‘borders need to stay open to ensure the functioning of the single market, including the flow of essential goods and services. No indiscriminate travel bans should be imposed.’ The latest European Council meeting took a more nuanced approach, acknowledging that ‘for the time being, non-essential travel needs to be restricted’, while stressing that ‘the unhindered flow of goods and services in the single market must continue to be ensured’. It welcomed two new Council recommendations on travel within, and into, the EU, as well as the progress made on a common approach to vaccination certificates, calling for this work to continue.

Covid-19 and third countries

EU leaders reaffirmed their solidarity with third countries, and the aim of improving access to vaccines for priority groups in the neighbourhood and beyond, through COVAX, a global vaccine procurement facility.

Strengthening the EU’s resilience to health threats

EU leaders had a first exchange of views on ways of strengthening the EU’s health resilience in the long term. The Commission was invited to present a report on the lessons learned from the Covid-19 pandemic ahead of the June European Council meeting, which would be followed up in the second half of 2021. Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, health was a policy issue which received very limited attention from the European Council; and had not previously featured as a separate agenda point at a European Council meeting. Due to the coronavirus pandemic, health has become one of the main concerns for Europeans, as shown by recent Eurobarometer surveys. When asked what the EU should now prioritise in its response to the coronavirus outbreak, citizens prioritised ‘developing financial means to find a treatment or vaccine’; ‘establishing a strategy for facing a similar crisis in the future’; and ‘developing a European health policy’. EP President Sassoli thus underlined that modifying the Treaties to incorporate clearly defined competences for the EU institutions ‘can no longer be a taboo’.

European health union

EU leaders agreed to ‘improve EU coordination, in line with the Union competences under the Treaties, to ensure better prevention, preparedness for and response to future health emergencies’. Priority will be given to the development of safe and effective vaccines and medicines, early investment in production capacity and making best use of big data and digital technologies for medical research and healthcare. EU Heads of State or Government called for the work on the European health union to be taken forward.

Global multilateral cooperation on future health threats

EU leaders committed to advancing global health security, including by strengthening the World Health Organization, and supported President Michel’s idea for an international treaty on pandemics, which could be addressed during the 21 May 2021 G20 Global Health Summit in Rome.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the European Council video-conference of 25 February 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Adobe Stock

The current EU liability framework is incredibly complex and often inadapted to modern entities. It is therefore difficult for the subjects involved to understand exactly when a given obligation applies to them, and what kind of behaviour is required. This was one of the main conclusions of the study on ‘Liability of online platforms‘, carried out by Professor Andrea Bertolini of the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (Pisa) at the request of the STOA Panel, following a proposal from Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany), First Vice-Chair of the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA).

Online platforms (OPs) have gained significant economic and societal importance in the last decade and the public debate on their responsibilities and liability has reached an unprecedented level. They have penetrated all product and service markets and have changed the way in which goods are sold and purchased, and in which information is exchanged and obtained, allowing a shift from the off-line world to the online environment, where they provide numerous digital services including the mass diffusion of any type of content, both legal and illegal.

As a result of their growing importance, users and policy-makers raise questions about the platforms’ responsibility in the digital domain. The contractual responsibility of online platform operators has been subject to an intensive debate in the recent past, in the frame of the debate on the effective detection and removal of illegal material. While the operators of transaction platforms usually seek a role of mere intermediary, without considerable liability for the proper performance of the main contracts, there is increasing support for extending their responsibility. Moreover, the lack of international legal mechanisms to enforce the removal of abusive material complicates the tracing and prosecution of abusive behaviours online. Self-regulation efforts appear suboptimal, due to the presence of externalities and asymmetric information problems, warranting some form of liability rules.

What are the main legal/regulatory challenges associated with the operation of OPs and the efforts to detect and remove illegal/harmful material, content and/or products? Can we map the whole range of liabilities associated with the operation of online platforms and provide the conceptual clarifications necessary to address them systematically? Is the existing EU legal framework adequate to ensure protection for users and their fundamental rights and freedoms? Does the current liability regime reflect the position of users and platforms alone? Does it adequately address the interests of third parties that are potentially violated by user-generated content?

Against this background, the study identifies and assesses the relevant legal framework at the EU level, discussing the policy issues that deserve consideration, and identifies the possible policy issues and concerns, with respect to the application of the existing legal framework – comprised of both hard- and soft-law initiatives – deserving discussion and, in some cases at least, even regulatory intervention. The review of the main legal/regulatory challenges associated with the operation of OPs involves an analysis of the incentives for OPs, their users and third parties, to detect and remove illegal/harmful material, content and/or products.

One of the most important aspects of the study is the detailed discussion of the notion of OPs and the comprehensive classification it provides on the basis of multiple criteria. In fact, it maps and critically assesses the whole range of OP liabilities, taking hard and soft law, self-regulation, as well as national legislation, into consideration.

In doing so, the study sets out a much-needed conceptual framework by analysing the difference between responsibility and liability, and the different types of liability, distinguishing, on the one hand, between civil, criminal and administrative liability and between strict, semi-strict or fault-based liability on the other hand. It also makes an important distinction between liabilities connected with the activities performed or the content uploaded by OP users and alternative sources of liability, such as OPs’ contractual liability towards users, both businesses and consumers, as well as that deriving from infringements of privacy and data protection law. The proposed classifications demonstrate their plurality, as platforms differ pursuant to the activities and functions they serve, the multiplicity of actors they involve and the various ways in which they interact with them in their operation, their different sources of revenue and associated business models, the way in which they use and exploit data, and the level of control they exercise on users’ activities.

Against the analysis of OPs’ rights, duties and liabilities under the existing EU regulatory framework, the study suggests a set of policy options which could be used to shape this framework regarding the liability of OPs, and especially that relating to the illegal/harmful content or products distributed and/or made available through their infrastructures, such as content that infringes intellectual property rights (IPR), hate speech, terrorist content, content that harms children, counterfeit and unsafe products.

One of the most innovative aspects of the study is that the policy options are assessed against a variety of criteria including cost and benefits, feasibility and effectiveness, sustainability, their coherence with EU objectives, ethical, social and regulatory impacts and the effects on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms, and presented along a scale of increasing interventionism.

This new STOA study provides a timely, in-depth overview of the discussion on the liabilities of OPs that will inform the discussions on the recent European Commission proposal on a Digital Services Acts, which aims to establish a new, comprehensive transparency and accountability regime for OPs. While proposing the maintenance of the liability exemptions for tech companies by not subjecting them to a general monitoring obligation regarding user content, this legislative proposal proposes that, in certain circumstances, platforms could be held liable for third-party content, for instance, when failing to act after being alerted of illegal content. The study is expected to provide EU legislators with a wide range of pragmatic and well-balanced policy options during the discussion of this proposal.

Read the full report and accompanying STOA Options Brief to find out more.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Ionel Zamfir,

© Christian / Adobe Stock

The crisis of democracy and the rise of authoritarianism across the globe, compounded by the coronavirus pandemic, highlight the importance of taking a more strategic and autonomous approach to supporting democracy worldwide – an objective often balanced against other external policy aims until now.

Since the start of the current parliamentary term, the EU has reviewed its political guidance on democracy and human rights. It has adopted or is about to adopt important measures to strengthen support for democracy (including better monitoring and enforcement of relevant provisions in trade arrangements). The adoption of the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) and of a new development aid instrument bringing together all former external aid instruments provides new opportunities for better implementing EU funding and better exploiting the EU’s leverage as a major provider of development aid. Digital challenges and the narrowing space for civil societies are among the priorities to be addressed. The challenge of engaging more difficult partners, such as China and Russia, has inspired calls to broaden the scope of a values-based agenda to other economic relations, such as investments.

These new measures complement an already broad and complex toolbox integrating various external policies. Using the enhanced powers in external affairs provided by the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has set up extensive political and diplomatic dialogues to enhance partnerships beyond the more asymmetric, specific development assistance and trade leverage going back to the 1990s. While the EU has responded to violations of democratic norms by reducing aid and withdrawing trade preferences, it has consistently sought to build equal partnerships based on constructive and open dialogues, rather than use its economic and commercial traction in a coercive manner.

This is an update of a Briefing from February 2018.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Support for democracy through EU external policy: New tools for growing challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alex Benjamin Wilson (1st edition),

© metamorworks / Adobe Stock

On 15 December 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal to revise the 2013 regulation on trans-European networks in energy (TEN-E). The revised TEN-E Regulation is currently under discussion in the European Parliament and the Council, which will prepare their negotiating positions. The 2013 TEN-E Regulation sets out EU guidelines for cross-border energy infrastructure and outlines the process for selecting projects of common interest (PCI). PCIs are infrastructure projects considered essential for delivering on EU objectives in the energy field, including improved interconnection between national markets, greater competitiveness, security of supply, and promotion of renewable energy sources. The list of PCIs is updated every two years. Some PCI projects are eligible for EU financing from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). The revised TEN-E Regulation would align closely with the ambitious climate neutrality objectives of the European Green Deal, primarily by supporting energy infrastructure that consolidates new and existing clean energy technologies, and by ending policy and financial support for fossil fuel projects, which would no longer be included on PCI lists and thus unable to receive CEF funding.

Complete version

• Revision of the TEN-E Regulation: EU guidelines for new energy infrastructure (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 Committee responsible: Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) COM(2020) 824
15.12.2020 Rapporteur: Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR, Poland) 2020/0360(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Tom Berendsen (EPP, the Netherlands)
Łukasz Kohut (S&D, Poland)
Claudia Gamon (Renew, Austria)
Paolo Borchia (ID, Italy)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Sandra Pereira (The Left, Portugal) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition),

© frank peters / Adobe Stock

Given the important role they play in the rollout of zero-emission mobility and the storage of intermittent renewable energy, batteries are a crucial element in the EU’s transition to a climate neutral economy. Global battery demand is expected to increase 14-fold by 2030, making this market an increasingly strategic one. The proposal presented by the European Commission is designed to modernise the EU’s regulatory framework for batteries in order to secure the sustainability and competitiveness of battery value chains. It would introduce mandatory requirements on sustainability (such as carbon footprint rules, minimum recycled content, performance and durability criteria), safety and labelling for the marketing and putting into service of batteries, and requirements for end-of-life management. The proposal also includes due diligence obligations for economic operators as regards the sourcing of raw materials.

The legislative process is in its early stages. In the Council, the proposal is being examined by the Working Party on the Environment. In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, which appointed Antonius Manders as rapporteur.

Complete version

• New EU regulatory framework for batteries: Setting sustainability requirements (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council concerning batteries and waste batteries, repealing Directive 2006/66/EC and amending Regulation (EU) No 2019/1020 Committee responsible: Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) COM(2020) 798
10.12.2020 Rapporteur: Antonius Manders (EPP, the Netherlands) 2020/0353(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Adriana Maldonado López (S&D, Spain)

Claudia Gamon (Renew Europe, Austria) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

© Adobe Stock

Citizens recurrently turn to the European Parliament to comment on various cases of alleged corruption. Furthermore, they request information on how to lodge a complaint and to ask the EU to act in the fight against corruption.

Corruption remains a challenge for society as a whole and is a serious crime that can have a cross-border dimension. Fighting crime is primarily a competence of authorities in EU countries, which remain ultimately responsible for key aspects linked to the fight against corruption: law enforcement, judicial measures taken on the ground, and budgetary resources allocated to policing and the administration of justice.

According to Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the European Union may establish minimum rules to define criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension, such as money laundering, corruption and organised crime.

In February 2014, the European Commission presented an EU Anti-corruption Report. Although intended as the first of a series, in 2017, the Commission decided not to produce any updates. Since its publication, the report has served as the basis for dialogue with national authorities while also informing broader debates across Europe.

European Parliament action

In a 2016 resolution on the fight against corruption, the European Parliament called inter alia for the adoption of a European action plan to eradicate organised crime, corruption and money laundering, for a stronger legal framework and for better cross-border judicial cooperation. It also recommended that EU countries strive to ensure efficient transparency, monitoring and accountability mechanisms in their use of EU funds.

In September 2020, the European Parliament set up a Subcommittee on tax matters (FISC) to assist the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on tax-related matters and particularly the fight against tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance. According to a 2016 Eurobarometer survey, 75 % of EU citizens would like the EU to intervene more to tackle tax fraud, making it one of the areas with the strongest support for greater EU involvement.

EU rules against corruption

Among the legislative initiatives introduced in recent years to combat corruption at EU level, examples include the Directive on the Freezing and confiscation of proceeds of crime, the 5th Anti-money laundering Directive, the Public Procurement Directives and the Directive on the Use of financial information to fight certain criminal offences.

In May 2018, the Commission published a legislative proposal aiming to establish an EU anti-fraud programme. The programme is based on Article 325 of the TFEU, which provides for an obligation shared between EU countries and the EU to protect the Union’s financial interests and to counter fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities affecting them.

Fraud against the EU budget

The European Commission publishes an annual report on the fight against fraud affecting EU financial interests. As the EU prepares to mobilise unprecedented sums to tackle the coronavirus crisis and its consequences, the positive results achieved in recent years provide a solid basis to meet future challenges for European and national authorities in their fight against fraud.

EU mechanisms to fight corruption

In the framework of the cooperation and verification mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania, the European Commission regularly reports on advancement with judicial reform and the fight against corruption in these countries, inviting them to take action in different areas, in order to develop the effective administrative and judicial systems.

The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is an EU body mandated to investigate fraud against the EU budget, corruption and serious misconduct within the European institutions, and to develop anti-fraud policy for the European Commission. Anyone can contact the office anonymously to report cases of fraud. Once it concludes an investigation, the European Anti-Fraud Office recommends action to the EU institutions and national governments concerned: this usually includes launching criminal investigations, financial recoveries or other disciplinary measures. It then monitors how these recommendations are implemented.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is a new body responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment crimes against the financial interests of the European Union. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office has a decentralised but hierarchical structure composed of European prosecutors at EU level and European delegated prosecutors in each EU country. Currently, 22 EU countries participate in the enhanced cooperation (so far, Hungary, Poland and Sweden have decided not to join the EPPO, while Denmark and Ireland have an opt-out from the area of freedom, security and justice). As an autonomous body, the EPPO could overcome potential unwillingness on the part of national authorities to investigate certain sensitive corruption cases. Once the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has finalised its administrative set-up, it will be possible to report a criminal offence affecting the EU’s financial interests directly to the EPPO.

Further information

• Corruption in the European Union: Prevalence of corruption, and anti-corruption efforts in selected EU Member States, European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2017
• Fight against fraud: Pericles 2020, Hercule III and AFIS, European Parliamentary Research Service, April 2019
• Tax committee chair: ‘Citizens demand action and this committee will be their voice’, European Parliament website, News, October 2020
• Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International
• Annual Reports on the protection of the EU’s financial interests, OLAF, September 2020

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Mar Negreiro (1st edition),

© tanaonte / Adobe Stock

The Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive is the first piece of EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity, and its specific aim was to achieve a high common level of cybersecurity across the Member States. While it increased the Member States’ cybersecurity capabilities, its implementation proved difficult, resulting in fragmentation at different levels across the internal market.

To respond to the growing threats posed with digitalisation and the surge in cyber-attacks, the Commission has submitted a proposal to replace the NIS Directive and thereby strengthen the security requirements, address the security of supply chains, streamline reporting obligations, and introduce more stringent supervisory measures and stricter enforcement requirements, including harmonised sanctions across the EU. The proposed expansion of the scope covered by the NIS2, by effectively obliging more entities and sectors to take measures, would assist in increasing the level of cybersecurity in Europe in the longer term.

Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy.

Complete version

• The NIS2 Directive: A high common level of cybersecurity in the EU (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union Committee responsible: Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) COM(2020) 823
16.12.2021 Rapporteur: Bart Groothuis (Renew, the Netherlands) 2020/0359(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Eva Maydell (EPP, Bulgaria)
Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece)
Thierry Mariani (ID, France)
Rasmus Andresen (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, Czechia) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Gregor Erbach and Liselotte Jensen,

© malp / Adobe Stock

Hydrogen is expected to play a key role in a future climate-neutral economy, enabling emission-free transport, heating and industrial processes as well as inter-seasonal energy storage. Clean hydrogen produced with renewable electricity is a zero-emission energy carrier, but is not yet as cost-competitive as hydrogen produced from natural gas. A number of studies show that an EU energy system having a significant proportion of hydrogen and renewable gases would be more cost-effective than one relying on extensive electrification.

Research and industrial innovation in hydrogen applications is an EU priority and receives substantial EU funding through the research framework programmes. Hydrogen projects are managed by the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH JU), a public-private partnership supported by the European Commission.

The EU hydrogen strategy, adopted in July 2020, aims to accelerate the development of clean hydrogen. The European Clean Hydrogen Alliance, established at the same time, is a forum bringing together industry, public authorities and civil society, to coordinate investment.

Almost all EU Member States recognise the important role of hydrogen in their national energy and climate plans for the 2021-2030 period. About half have explicit hydrogen-related objectives, focussed primarily on transport and industry.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) is preparing an own-initiative report on the EU Hydrogen strategy. The Council adopted conclusions on the EU hydrogen market in December 2020, with a focus on renewable hydrogen for decarbonisation, recovery and competitiveness.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Hydrogen as an energy carrier for a climate-neutral economy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Agnieszka Widuto,

© Stockfotos-MG / Adobe Stock

The New European Bauhaus is a European Commission initiative, which links the sustainability, aesthetics and inclusion dimensions of building design. Announced in September 2020 by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the project has now entered the design phase, which involves exploring ideas, launching the New European Bauhaus prize and opening calls for proposals to bring the new ideas to life through the use of EU funds at national and regional level. EU cohesion policy, through its support for environmental, socio-economic and cultural projects, can make a significant contribution to the New European Bauhaus.

New European Bauhaus initiative

The New European Bauhaus project was announced by Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union address on 16 September 2020. The name makes reference to the early 20th century Bauhaus architectural movement, which sought to combine art and practicality. In the words of the Commission President, the initiative ‘is about matching sustainability with style, to bring the European Green Deal closer to people’s minds and homes’. The project aims to involve designers, artists, scientists, architects and citizens to co-create these ideas and put them into practice. It will take place in three phases – design, delivery and dissemination (see box below). On the occasion of launching the ‘design phase’ on 18 January 2021, the Commissioner for Cohesion and Reforms, Elisa Ferreira described the project as ‘relevant for all regions and territories’, and confirmed that the Commission is exploring how EU funding tools could be mobilised to support concrete New European Bauhaus actions. The 2020 Commission communication on ‘A Renovation Wave for Europe – greening our buildings, creating jobs, improving lives’ also highlights the role of cohesion policy funding for renovation of buildings, while respecting cultural heritage, sustainability and social inclusion aspects.

Cohesion policy

Cohesion policy accounts for about one third of the EU budget. It supports a wide range of investments in all EU regions, in areas such as innovation, economic transformation, energy transition, transport and digital networks, social inclusion and sustainable urban development across the EU. In the 2021-2027 budgetary period, cohesion policy will be governed by the Common Provisions Regulation to be adopted in the coming months. The provisional agreement on the proposed regulation establishes five policy objectives for regional funding. These include the financing of environmental, cultural and socio-economic inclusion projects, which could support New European Bauhaus actions.

Support for the environment

The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and Cohesion Fund (CF) will offer support in a variety of areas relevant to the New European Bauhaus project, with particular relevance to its ‘sustainability’ strand. The policy objective on ‘a greener Europe’ includes promoting energy efficiency measures, renewable energy, smart energy systems and grids, climate change adaptation, risk prevention and disaster resilience, sustainable water management, circular economy, and reducing pollution. In the 2021-2027 period, Member States will be required to allocate at least 8 % of their ERDF resources to sustainable urban development, while over 30 % of ERDF resources and CF resources must be set aside for climate objectives.

Moreover, the new Just Transition Fund (JTF) aims to address the social, economic and environmental impacts of the transition towards a climate-neutral economy in high-emission regions. The Fund is governed by cohesion policy rules and included in the Common Provisions Regulation. Some activities supported by JTF could be relevant in the context of the New European Bauhaus. These include investments in the deployment of technology and infrastructure for affordable clean energy, in greenhouse gas emission reduction, energy efficiency and renewable energy.

Support for culture

The Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 also supports interventions in the area of ‘arts, entertainment, creative industries and recreation’, which are important themes in the context of the New European Bauhaus thanks to its focus on aesthetics and culture. One of the five policy objectives (‘a Europe closer to citizens’) also covers cultural heritage. The cultural dimension of the New European Bauhaus may also be supported under the European Social Fund Plus, which is an instrument supporting employment, skills development and social inclusion. The European Regional Development Fund with its support for enterprises, research activities and skills development may also support New European Bauhaus actions encompassing collaborative projects in these areas. The REACT-EU programme (funded from Next Generation EU but delivered under cohesion policy rules) also offers support for those sectors most hit by the coronavirus pandemic, including the cultural sector.

Support for socio-economic projects

The socio-economic aspects of the New European Bauhaus and its focus on inclusion may be addressed under the policy objective of ‘a smarter Europe’. Aimed at promoting innovative and smart economic transformation, specific supported actions include enhancing research and innovation capacities and the uptake of advanced technologies, boosting digitalisation, supporting enterprises and developing skills for smart specialisation, industrial transition and entrepreneurship. Support relevant to the New European Bauhaus could also be drawn from investments under the policy objective on ‘a more social Europe’. These include, for instance, social innovation and the socioeconomic integration of marginalised communities, migrants and disadvantaged groups, through integrated measures including housing and social services. Moreover, the policy objective on ‘a Europe closer to citizens’ offers support for integrated social, economic and environmental development, including through community-led local development. This again presents opportunities for the New European Bauhaus project in the context of its ‘inclusiveness’ strand.

Outlook

Cohesion policy in the 2021-2027 period will offer several opportunities to support the New European Bauhaus project. These include energy efficiency measures, renovation of buildings, urban renewal, preserving cultural heritage and ensuring social inclusion. Depending on the final shape the New European Bauhaus project takes, activities such as enhancing research and innovation capacities and the uptake of advanced technologies as well as skills development may also help support it. Cohesion policy is thus likely to complement other possible sources of funding for the New European Bauhaus project under the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and Next Generation EU, relating to the European Green Deal, Renovation Wave Strategy, InvestEU and other programmes. The final shape of cohesion policy will be known in the coming months, once the Common Provisions Regulation and the sectoral regulations on the individual funds have been adopted by the EU co-legislators.

Next steps for the New European Bauhaus
In its first ‘design phase’ of the project in 2021, the European Commission aims to enable the co-creation of ideas, launch the New European Bauhaus prize and open calls for proposals to select five pilot projects in EU Member States. The ‘design’ phase will then be followed by the ‘delivery’ (2021-2024) and ‘dissemination’ phases (in parallel from 2023 onwards).

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Cohesion policy contribution to New European Bauhaus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass,

© Fundació Mies van der Rohe, 2021

The EU Prize for Contemporary Architecture (also known as the EU Mies Award) was launched in recognition of the importance and quality of European architecture. Named after German architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, a figure emblematic of the Bauhaus movement, it aims to promote functionality, simplicity, sustainability and social vision in urban construction.

Background

Mies van der Rohe was the last director of the Bauhaus school. The official lifespan of the Bauhaus movement in Germany was only fourteen years. It was founded in 1919 as an educational project devoted to all art forms. By 1933, when the Nazi authorities closed the school, it had changed location and director three times. Artists who left continued the work begun in Germany wherever they settled.

Recognition by Unesco

The Bauhaus movement has influenced architecture all over the world. Unesco has recognised the value of its ideas of sober design, functionalism and social reform as embodied in the original buildings, putting some of the movement’s achievements on the World Heritage List. The original buildings located in Weimar (the Former Art School, the Applied Art School and the Haus Am Horn) and Dessau (the Bauhaus Building and the group of seven Masters’ Houses) have featured on the list since 1996. Other buildings were added in 2017.

The list also comprises the White City of Tel-Aviv. German-Jewish architects fleeing Nazism designed many of its buildings, applying the principles of modernist urban design initiated by Bauhaus.

Barcelona Pavilion – Mies van der Rohe Foundation

Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, the last director of this educational, artistic and experimental school, personified the vitality of Bauhaus. Forced to leave Germany in 1938, he moved to Chicago where, as head of the Illinois Institute of Technology, he helped to develop the ‘second’ Chicago School of Architecture, pushing back the limits of the original Chicago School’s approach to simplified form and ornamentation and the technological achievement of the day – 10-storey skyscrapers.

Not limiting himself to the design of simplified, rectilinear skyscraper buildings, van der Rohe pursued his work on the aesthetics of pavilions, already begun in Europe. Together with Lilly Reich, who was responsible for the interior design, he had created the German Pavilion for the 1929 International Exposition in Barcelona. The building, now known as the Barcelona Pavilion, represented the new aesthetics of simplicity, clarity and open spaces, embodying its architect’s guiding principle – ‘less is more’. The pavilion was dismantled once the exposition ended in 1930, but in 1983, work began to rebuild it on the basis of photographs and original drawings and plans. Barcelona City Hall set up the Fundació Mies van der Rohe to accompany the process. Three years later the pavilion became the foundation’s headquarters.

Mies van der Rohe award and EU prize

In 1988, two years after reconstruction of the Barcelona Pavilion was completed, the first edition of the biennial Mies van der Rohe Award for European Architecture was launched as a joint initiative of the European Commission and the Mayor of Barcelona. In 2001, the European Commission launched a call for proposals for a ‘European Union Prize for Contemporary Architecture’. It was won by the Fundació Mies van der Rohe, whose vision for the award included the idea to recognise the work of young architects at the beginning of their professional careers.

Since then, the foundation has been co-organiser of the EU Prize for Contemporary Architecture, which is awarded every other year for outstanding architectural works built across Europe (with a main prize of €60 000), and includes an ‘Emerging Architect Special Mention’ (€20 000). The prize is co-funded by the Creative Europe programme, the EU programme supporting culture. Nevertheless, despite recent efforts to popularise it through a dedicated app, and its logo featuring on the websites of winners, finalists, architectural studios and national architectural associations, the prize has a relatively low profile in the EU.

Selection criteria and jury

The award ceremony is held in May in the Barcelona Pavilion, headquarters of the Mies van der Rohe Foundation. A group of independent experts, the member associations of the Architects’ Council of Europe (ACE), other European national architects’ associations and an advisory committee nominate architectural works. The jury then evaluate all the nominations and present a selection of shortlisted and then finalists’ works. The opinions of the users of the architectural works are also taken into consideration.

The selection includes not only private homes and public housing, museums and cultural installations, but also educational, health and sports facilities, as well as large-scale infrastructure projects and transport systems contributing to the construction of European cities. The idea behind the prize is to promote sustainable architectural practice. It reflects the original inspiration of the Bauhaus movement of combining the social, cultural and economic aspects of architecture and the arts.

Recent developments

Recently the prize has reflected the guiding principle of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe to do more with less. The approach corresponds to sustainability criteria, with a preference for building more with less material, at a lower cost. The overall objective is to improve people’s lives and the way people live together.

Nominated projects and winners – A variety of works

Conferences, events and exhibitions are held to promote the ‘technological, constructional, social, economic, cultural and aesthetic achievements’ present in nominated and winning projects.

The examples below bear witness to the recent sustainability requirements and the diverse nature of the projects submitted.

Selected winners of the EU Prize for Contemporary Architecture:

• 2019 – Transformation of three housing blocks with 530 homes, Grand Parc Bordeaux, France
• 2017 – DeFlat Kleiburg, Amsterdam, Netherlands, transformation of the original building designed by Siegfried Nassuth in 1971, proposing new forms of ‘affordable housing’
• 2015 – Philharmonic Hall, Szczecin, Poland
• 2003 – Car Park and Terminus, Hoenheim North, Strasbourg, France.

Some of the winners of the Emerging Architect Special Mention:

• 2015 – Luz House, Cilleros, Spain, an extremely low-budget project built inside the stone party walls of an existing structure in a small village to create a contemporary dwelling environment using existing resources
• 2009 – Gymnasium 46°09’N/16°50’E, Koprivnica, Croatia, a mixed-use building combining sports hall and school, transforming the suburban periphery by creating an emblematic place for young people
• 2007 – Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Physics and Mathematics, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

The selection process for the 2021 edition had to be rescheduled because of Covid-19 restrictions. The 449 nominees were however announced in January 2021. The nominations reflect a huge variety of works and approaches and include: a metro line; a natural enclave with watchtowers in the area of a former gravel pit; a kindergarten; the revitalisation of former dragoon barracks; houses and a riding centre; a church; a hospital; a ballet school, a city cemetery, the transformation of a classical religious room into a new space for other activities, a daycare centre, a transport hub, an airport, timber dwellings, a home for the homeless, a graphic arts centre, an Olympic centre, a housing cooperative, a public pool, a waste-to-energy plant with an urban recreation centre; and, coming full circle, the expansion of the Moholy-Nagy University of Art and Design, named after a famous Hungarian photographer and designer from the Bauhaus movement.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘EU Prize for Contemporary Architecture / Mies van der Rohe Award: A tribute to Bauhaus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Marcos Fernández Álvarez,

‘The ambitious reduction targets for plant protection products in the European Green Deal and, hence, the Farm to Fork Strategy must be underpinned by in-depth scientific studies, carefully evaluating the impact not only on sustainability, but also on efficiency and potential offsets. I am convinced that the future of Europe’s sustainable food production lies in the deployment of new scientific and mechanical practices, as outlined in this study. Sound scientific research and innovation must be the basis for our decision-making, to enable a truly successful transformation towards an even more sustainable European food sector.’

Herbert Dorfmann, (EPP, Italy) Member of the European Parliament and STOA Panel member

©WUR-STOA

The European Parliament, together with the European Commission and the Council of the European Union (EU), is shaping the future of agriculture in the EU. In this context, the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) organised a workshop on farming without plant protection products in March 2019. This followed the publication of STOA’s studies on precision agriculture, (2016) and on plant breeding and innovative agriculture (2013).

STOA’s latest foresight study, ‘The future of crop protection in the EU‘, examines the environmental, societal, health and economic impact of deploying new crop protection practices in the EU. The study was presented to the STOA Panel on 4 December 2020, with Herbert Dorfmann as Lead Panel Member.

Plant protection products (PPPs): balancing efficiency and sustainability

The world’s population is expected to reach 11 billion by the end of the century. To feed ever growing numbers of people, agricultural production needs to change. Reducing food waste and shifting to more environmentally sustainable diets can make a big difference, but there is still pressure to increase agricultural production.

While PPPs could help increase agricultural production, conventional PPPs are mostly synthetic chemicals, and concerns are often raised about their impact on human health and biodiversity. In 2020, the European Parliament welcomed the EU’s commitment to achieving sustainability in agriculture. There is thus a clear demand for new practices to supplement chemical PPPs.

The dual environmental impact of PPPs is highlighted in a previous STOA publication, linked to the above-mentioned workshop. PPPs damage biodiversity, but to a lesser extent than converting natural ecosystems into farmland. This study argues that new crop protection practices need to be as effective as chemical PPPs. If not, the demand for more farmland could offset any direct environmental benefit.

Crop protection policy: systemic challenges

STOA’s new study on crop protection underlines that effective crop protection policy requires a systems perspective. Crop protection is part of a production process that spans from farms to international supply chains. To avoid undesired side effects, impacts must be weighed up against all common agricultural policy (CAP) and European Green Deal objectives. For example, passing very restrictive policies could decrease the use of chemical PPPs, but also reduce yields and trigger land conversion into farmland.

The potential extra cost of less harmful practices will not be limited to farmers. Farmers choose the most cost-effective methods, and will pass on extra costs to retailers and customers. Besides, policies must ensure a fair income for farmers – one of the objectives of the CAP.

International trade also poses challenges. Phytosanitary policy demands that no living organisms be present in plants or plant-product exports, limiting crop protection options. Environmental and trade regulations must also be balanced, so that EU producers are not disadvantaged. This would violate the CAP objectives, and the EU would merely export this environmental damage.

Anticipatory policy-making

According to STOA’s study, retaining the current legislative framework will likely result in little progress. Crop protection will largely rely on current PPPs, and damage to the environment and biodiversity will continue. The competitiveness of EU farmers will decline, as external producers innovate and improve their processes.

However, the EU can act to prevent this scenario. The authors present an overview of novel crop protection practices and their impacts. Precision agriculture, new plant breeding techniques, biocontrol methods, induced resistance, diversified crops, and enhanced mechanical practices are discussed. Ultimately, reducing the use of PPPs may require combining many of these techniques.

Precision agriculture is likely to be a key element of future farming. To make the most of its potential, the EU could invest in training its workforce. Promoting automated data collection on pests, diseases and weeds would allow optimal crop protection strategies – and adequate standards would facilitate data exchanges throughout the food chain.

The EU could remove legislative barriers to new breeding techniques. Lead Panel Member Herbert Dorfmann raised the need to update the GMO Directive. This follows the same direction as the opinion expressed by the EU Commission’s Group of Chief Scientific Advisors in November 2018. The authors agree that adjusting regulations from a process-based to a product-based approach would unleash the potential of innovative breeding techniques in the EU.

At the end of the presentation, Members took the view that further information is required on the costs of the crop protection options. STOA Chair, Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece), emphasised that the cost quantification analysis should account for regional differences in the EU. Look out for the follow-up study and other updates on the STOA blog.

The STOA Options Brief linked to the study contains an overview of various policy options. Read the full report to find out more, and let us know what you think via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Martin Russell,

On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar armed forces seized power and imprisoned Aung San Suu Kyi, de facto leader of the country since 2016. The coup threatens to derail Myanmar’s progress towards democracy, which began in 2008 after five decades of brutal military rule. Huge protests have broken out in Myanmar, calling for the restoration of the elected civilian government. The EU is considering additional sanctions against the country.

Myanmar’s 2020 elections lead to a military coup

© sezerozger / Adobe Stock

Myanmar’s parliament has a total of 664 seats, of which three-quarters (498) are elected and one quarter (166) allocated to representatives appointed by the armed forces. In the November 2020 elections, the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) won 396 seats, equivalent to 80 % of elected seats and 60 % of all parliamentary seats – an even bigger majority than in the previous (2015) vote. Observers raised several concerns about the conditions under which elections were held – a biased media environment, and the exclusion of several large groups such as the stateless Rohingya – but did not find major irregularities in the conduct of the vote itself. Nevertheless, the military alleged widespread electoral fraud, though without producing convincing evidence to back its claims.

Early in the morning of 1 February, a few hours before the new parliament was due to be sworn in, the armed forces arrested NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, as well as hundreds of NLD parliamentarians and supporters. Based on its unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, the military declared the elections invalid, and vested legislative and executive powers in a State Administrative Council comprising equal numbers of military officers and civilian politicians, chaired by General Min Aung Hlaing, head of the armed forces. Aung San Suu Kyi was charged with illegally importing radio equipment; both she and Win Myint now face criminal charges and are under house arrest. The military declared a one-year state of emergency, after which it says new elections will take place.

1962-2016: 54 years of military rule, then a democratic transition

Ever since seizing power in 1962, the Tatmadaw (military) has played a toxic role in a country which is racked by ethnic conflict and has become one of the poorest in Asia, despite its natural resource wealth. After a brutally suppressed uprising in 1988, elections were finally held in 1990, and won overwhelmingly by the NLD, but the army refused to recognise the results, and NLD leader Suu Kyi spent 15 years under house arrest. Both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) adopted economic sanctions and arms embargoes. A return to civilian rule began with the adoption of a new constitution in 2008, leading to elections in 2010. The new government, formed by the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was nominally civilian, but in fact mainly comprised former generals. Nevertheless, political reforms persuaded the EU to lift its economic sanctions in 2013, although the arms embargo remained in place; the US followed suit in 2016. The NLD, which had boycotted the previous vote in 2010, won an overwhelming electoral victory in 2015. Although Suu Kyi was constitutionally barred from the presidency, in 2016 she became the country’s de facto leader, with the title of State Counsellor.

2016-2021: Rights abuses continue under Suu Kyi, but her popularity remains intact

For decades, the Muslim Rohingya minority have endured persecution. Resented by most Burmese as illegal ‘Bengali’ migrants (although many are from families that have lived in the country for hundreds of years), most are denied citizenship, and live in apartheid-like conditions. Attacks on the community culminated in military ‘clearance operations’, killing thousands in 2016 and 2017. Over 700 000 fled to neighbouring Bangladesh, where they live in refugee camps with little prospect of ever returning home. In response, the EU adopted visa bans and asset freezes against 14 military officers, but did not bring back economic sanctions.

The 2008 military-drafted constitution makes it impossible for civilian authorities to hold the armed forces to account for such abuses: the commander-in-chief appoints the defence, home affairs, and border affairs ministers, and soldiers are tried in military courts, guaranteeing them lenient treatment. The constitution can only be changed if over three-quarters of parliamentarians are in favour, giving military representatives a veto on amendments. While Suu Kyi may have been powerless to stop the atrocities, many argue that she could at least have spoken out against them; in fact, she remained silent. Noting her complicity in the violence, the European Parliament, which had awarded Suu Kyi the Sakharov Prize for human rights defenders in 1990, decided to remove her from the list of Sakharov laureates in 2020. Concerns about the plight of the Rohingya are not widely shared in Myanmar itself. Suu Kyi’s defence of military atrocities in December 2019 at the International Court of Justice earned her international condemnation, but the resounding NLD electoral victory in 2020 suggests that, if anything, it consolidated her reputation at home.

Implications of the military coup, and the ensuing protests

Given that the constitution gives the armed forces enormous political power and shields them from civilian oversight, the motives for the coup are unclear. With the world’s attention distracted by coronavirus and the Biden administration still finding its feet, military leaders may have felt it was a propitious moment to act. General Min Aung Hlaing’s personal ambitions were probably also a factor; he is due to retire from the armed forces in July 2021, and the poor electoral showing of the pro-military USDP party, which lost 8 of its 41 seats in the 2020 elections, made it unlikely that he could secure parliamentary backing to become president.

Protests against the coup initially took the form of people banging pots and pans, followed by doctors and teachers going on strike. The rallies which started on 6 February are the largest since the Saffron Revolution, which was put down by the military in 2007. This time, the military has responded by banning large public gatherings, restricting internet access and declaring martial law in several cities. The police are using increasingly forceful methods to break up protests: water cannon, rubber bullets, and live ammunition fired into the air. So far, 400 have been detained. The outcome is still in the balance; in 1988 and 2007, the armed forces showed that they will stop at nothing to quell discontent, and an equally bloody crackdown cannot be ruled out now. On the other hand, after several years of relative freedom, protestors are more determined than ever. Unlike previous uprisings (mobile phones were practically non-existent in Myanmar before 2011), social media are playing a key part in mobilising the current wave of protests, which show no sign of losing momentum.

International reactions

The EU, G7 and US were united in immediately condemning the coup, while calling on military leaders to hand back power to civilian authorities, and to release Suu Kyi and other detainees. US sanctions announced on 11 February will block Myanmar government access to US$1 billion of funds held in the US. China, which is a key ally of Myanmar and by far its main trade and investment partner, merely called on all sides to ‘appropriately handle their differences … and safeguard political and social stability’. Japan, India and most other Asian countries have also avoided strong statements. For its part, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which Myanmar belongs to, urged ‘dialogue, reconciliation and the return to normalcy’. A UN Security Council statement issued on 4 February, after China had blocked a more strongly worded text, emphasises the need to ‘uphold democratic institutions and processes’ and release all detainees.

EU foreign ministers are to consider their response at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on 22 February. According to EU High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell in a speech to the European Parliament on 9 February, the three main options on the table are sanctions (in addition to the targeted sanctions adopted in 2018 against military officers for their role in atrocities against the Rohingya), a review of EU development aid to Myanmar (€688 million for 2014-2020), and cancelling the country’s privileged access to European markets under the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) scheme. Benefiting from zero tariffs, Myanmar’s textiles industry is booming, and its exports to Europe have grown 19-fold since 2013. However, Borrell warned that EBA suspension would hurt the general population, in particular the 500 000 employees of garment factories, while having little effect on the military, whose economic interests are mostly in other sectors. He emphasised the importance of continuing dialogue with Myanmar’s leaders.

In its resolution of 11 February 2021 on Myanmar, the European Parliament urges the armed forces to hand power back to the civilian authorities led by Suu Kyi, and to release all detainees. It also calls for constitutional reforms and additional targeted EU sanctions against military leaders.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Myanmar: The return of the junta‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.