European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Velina Lilyanova,

© European Union, 2021

In the face of the changing nature of the geopolitical environment in the past decade and its own internal challenges, the EU has reflected upon and adjusted its vision for its global role. In 2016, the EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy declared the EU’s ambition to play a stronger role in the world. At the start of its mandate, the current European Commission described itself as a ‘geopolitical’ one. The global pandemic raises further questions about the EU’s role globally.

To assert itself at global level and pursue its priorities, the EU needs adequate means. Its external role and impact are defined to a great extent by the scope of its resources, but also by their efficient and coordinated use. With the adoption of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-2027, the EU has ensured the means and tools for achieving its external action objectives over this period. This paper aims to examine how the EU financed its external action in the 2014-2020 MFF and how it has adapted its approach in this domain. Far from being exhaustive, it seeks to map the main financing instruments, mechanisms and actors involved, an exercise revealing the complexity of the architecture involved, as well as to outline the novelties with their underlying reasons and the main trends for the future financing of EU external action.

Read the complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Understanding EU financing for external action‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Miroslava Karaboytcheva (1st edition),

© metamorworks / Adobe Stock

The digitalisation of the economy opens the door to new cross-border economic activities that make it possible to under-report income and under-pay tax. It also presents new challenges for tax administrations, already faced by limited access to information at the national level. Hence, in July 2020 the Commission proposed to amend the provisions on information exchange and administrative cooperation and to include the automatic exchange of data on information declared by digital platform operators in their scope. The goal is to ensure that sellers on digital platforms pay their fair share of taxes, align EU countries to the digital economy, and close the gaps for tax evasion and avoidance. Right now, having secure tax revenues is vital for the provision of support to the people and businesses most in need.

The Parliament’s ECON committee adopted its report on the proposal for an amended Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC7) on 4 February 2021. The report is expected to be voted in plenary in March 2021. On 1 December 2020, the Council reached agreement on the proposal, and will thus be in a position to adopt it once Parliament’s opinion is delivered.

Complete version

• Advances in administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2020) 314 final
15.7.2020 Rapporteur: Sven Giegold (Greens/EFA, Germany) 2020/0148(CNS) Shadow rapporteurs: Lídia Pereira (EPP, Portugal)
Aurore Lalucq (S&D, France)
Monica Semedo (Renew, Luxembourg)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)
Roberts Zīle (ECR, Latvia)
Dimitrios Papadimoulis (The Left, Greece) Consultation procedure (CNS) – Parliament adopts a non-binding opinion only Next steps expected: Parliament’s opinion voted in plenary

Written by Gianluca Quaglio,

European Union (EU) policy promotes innovation with the aim of triggering an economic dynamism that will increase the competitiveness of the EU as a whole. This entails improving research and innovation (R&I) capacities, addressing territorial inequalities, and improving coordination at all levels. Achieving this requires closer coordination of research, cohesion and education policies at EU level and among Member States.

Besides the Recovery Plan, Horizon Europe and structural funds are the two most important EU funding sources for R&I. Horizon Europe focuses on European R&I excellence, the generation and utilisation of new knowledge, and disruptive, market-creating innovations. Structural funds investments are built around regional innovation eco-systems. They focus on R&I with regional relevance and the diffusion of existing knowledge and technology to places that need it, and then proceed to embed R&I locally via smart specialisation strategies. Supporting synergies in the implementation of Horizon Europe and structural funds may maximise scientific, economic and societal impact, leveraging R&I investments in Europe from all sources.

However, the process of identifying potential synergies and exploiting them is sluggish, due to complex interactions between different innovation actors, as well as rules and time frames that vary between EU-funded programmes. The EU needs to overcome this issue, since combining different funding instruments (and policy frameworks) substantially boosts competitiveness, welfare, and growth in EU regions. To achieve this objective, it is crucial to align strategies and implementation modalities, and to adapt and complement existing and future roadmaps.

All these issues were discussed during the workshop on ‘Exploring synergies between the Horizon Europe and regional policy’, organised in a virtual form on 2 February 2021, by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA). Over 450 people participated in the event, chaired by Christian Ehler (EPP, Germany), Member of the European Parliament and STOA First Vice-Chair.

In his opening remarks, Christian Ehler highlighted that the latest EU legislation created additional opportunities for synergies between Horizon Europe and the structural funds. These synergies are needed even more urgently to face the economic challenges due to the coronavirus pandemic. At the same time, the EU is transitioning towards a greener and increasingly digital future. All European regions need to benefit from Europe’s excellent research and innovation. Effective synergies between Horizon Europe and the structural funds should be able to support this process. Christian Ehler thanked former Member of the European Parliament, Lambert Van Nistelrooij, for his unceasing and extensive work over many years on closing the gap between research and structural funding.

A comprehensive approach to synergies is required

Too often, synergies are seen in terms of funding mechanisms and procedures, observed Paul Webb, Head of Unit for Horizon Budget and Multiannual Financial Framework Synergies, at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD). These aspects are certainly important, however, the overall objective of synergies must acknowledge that R&I in itself is not sufficient to achieve the transformations we are seeking. Instead, synergies must ensure that R&I priorities and activities are aligned with, and support, EU policies and programmes.

Paul Webb noted that such synergies must also provide the best opportunities for exploiting and deploying R&I results, to facilitate the desired transformations. To do this, a comprehensive approach is necessary, starting with the assessment of what we want to achieve. The Horizon Europe strategic planning process aims to ensure this comprehensive approach and alignment of priorities for the different Union policies and funding programmes. A number of initiatives are underway to enable the best possible opportunity for the deployment of research results and innovative solutions developed under Horizon Europe by other EU funding programmes.

A comprehensive approach to synergies was also advocated by Anna Panagopoulou, Director of the Common Implementation Centre, (DG RTD). This broad approach should be adopted at a political level, with a shared vision and common priorities; at a programming level, with an alignment of strategic priorities and co-creation of funding actions; and at an operational/implementation level, through specific and consistent legal provisions in the different regulatory frameworks. Concerning the rules for implementing synergies, she argued that there is very good progress in the legislative process on facilitating and simplifying the rules at operational level in all relevant regulations (Horizon Europe, Cohesion Policy, and the State Aid General Block Exemption).

Pursuing synergies at several levels

Synergies can be pursued at several levels, e.g. design and strategic planning, project selection, management and exploitation of results, monitoring, and governance. Synergies can be implemented by alternative, integrated or cumulative funding and by the transfer of resources. For example, Horizon Europe proposals with a Seal of Excellence (a quality label awarded to outstanding project proposals submitted to Horizon 2020, to help these proposals find alternative funding), may get support from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund+ (ESF+), or European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). Employment of integrated funding is also possible: under certain conditions, financial contributions from programmes co-financed by structural funds may be seen as a contribution from a Member State towards participation in Horizon Europe partnerships. Many synergies are already apparent in Horizon 2020. The challenge today is to ensure that these are built-in systematically at all stages of the R&I cycle.

Concerning the transfer of resources, a possibility exists for structural fund management authorities to transfer up to 5 % of their structural fund allocation to Horizon Europe to support researchers. Transferred resources must be implemented in accordance with the rules of the fund or the instrument to which the resources are transferred. The new rules also facilitate a cumulative funding process: a single enterprise may receive two separate contributions from two Union funds or programmes, with due regard to the principle of co-financing laid down in the Financial Regulation (cumulative funding cannot exceed 100 % of the eligible costs).

Finally, synergies can also be achieved by the propagation of research results and innovative solutions developed under Horizon Europe, in particular through dissemination and exploitation strategies, transfer of knowledge, complementary and cumulative funding sources, and accompanying policy measures.

The European Institute of Innovation & Technology (EIT), which is integral to Horizon Europe, also represents an opportunity to strengthen the connections between R&I and regional policy. EIT Director, Martin Kern, described how the institute has been catalysing regional innovation through its targeted outreach scheme, the EIT Regional Innovation Scheme (EIT RIS), since 2014. The RIS widens access to EIT activities, creates linkages among regional innovation actors, and offers tailor-made programmes to support countries with moderate innovation performance. The EIT Strategic Innovation Agenda for 2021‑2027 will incorporate more regional support activities in EIT strategic planning and implementation.

A collective effort is needed

So far, operational and project-level synergies have proven useful, but the critical mass that is needed to mobilise large amounts of funding is still lacking. Bringing structural funds and Horizon Europe investments closer together has accelerated with the preparation of the post-2020 period. Peter Berkowitz, Head of Unit for Smart and Sustainable Growth, at the European Commission Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO), argued that this effort will hopefully strengthen the impact of both policies, in particular in less developed and peripheral regions.

Member States and regions are now engaged in developing the next round of structural fund programmes. ERDF/ESF+ managing authorities should be aware of the Horizon Europe priorities and actions when drafting smart specialisation strategies and the related structural funds programmes. In particular, the thematic priorities under Horizon Europe, as well as the missions and partnerships, could be a reference point for synergies. Horizon Europe, in turn, provides many opportunities for regional actors to participate in line with their regional policy priorities.

Franc Bogovič (PPE, Slovakia), Member of Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development (REGI), highlighted the complexity involved in organically connecting the different funds for R&I. The complications increase at the regional level, where demonstrating the possible synergies of the different tools can be more challenging. However, the tasks that the EU faces in the near future require everyone to make a collective effort. Implementing a real transition, he said, requires the development of broad coalitions at all levels, i.e. Member States, regions, cities, European R&I networks, private players, and civil society, to build strategic synergies and increase the impact of local investments.

Given the complexity of these instruments, Christian Ehler concluded by noting that it would be appropriate to organise a new STOA meeting in the near future to debate these challenging issues with the Member States, fully involving them in the discussion.

If you missed out this time, you can watch the webstream.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2021 – Source : EP/DAINA LE LARDIC

The main debates held during the February 2021 plenary session concerned the state of play of the EU’s Covid‑19 vaccination strategy and the de facto abortion ban in Poland. Members also debated democratic scrutiny of social media platforms and the protection of fundamental rights, including the challenges ahead for women’s rights more than 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action The impact of coronavirus on young people and sport, relief measures for the transport sector, homologation and distribution of transparent masks and the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia were also discussed. Members debated statements by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borell, on his visit to Russia in the light of the recent crackdown on protestors and the opposition, on the humanitarian and political situation in Yemen, and on the situation in Myanmar.

Recovery and Resilience Facility

Members debated a joint report by the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), and voted to adopt the text agreed with the Council in trilogue, thereby giving the green light for the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) to go ahead. The RRF is designed to raise funding to revive the post-coronavirus economy with a major focus on climate action. It is also the main element of the Next Generation EU package. Under the agreement, Member States will be able to submit recovery and resilience plans that earmark at least 37 % of their budget to climate and 20 % to digital measures, with up to 13 % pre-financing available upon approval. Parliament will follow progress closely, through a recovery and resilience scoreboard.

Capital markets recovery package

Following a joint debate, Parliament adopted by a narrow majority, provisional agreements on two proposals, resulting from interinstitutional negotiations on the capital markets recovery package (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and EU recovery prospectus). The proposals revise the legal framework on investment services, in a package of targeted amendments to the Prospectus Regulation, MiFID II and securitisation rules. The amendments aim at reducing the administrative burden for experienced investors, while preserving protection for retail investors and maintaining requirements for transparency.

European Central Bank – Annual report

ECB President Christine Lagarde was present for the debate on the ECON committee own-initiative report on the European Central Bank’s 2019 annual report, following which Parliament adopted its resolution by a large majority. The ECON report considers ECB monetary policy in the context of the coronavirus crisis, financial stability measures, and actions against climate change. In response to a projected decrease of 7.3 % in real GDP for the euro area, and increased unemployment to 8.0 % in 2020, the ECB has implemented monetary stimulus, non-standard monetary policy measures, and temporary capital and operational relief to increase banks’ lending capacity. The ECON committee report considers that the ECB has acted decisively to mitigate the impact of the crisis. However, it also calls for accompanying reforms to strengthen competitiveness and social cohesion, and underlines the need to tackle climate change-related risks.

New circular economy action plan

It is clear that current use of the earth’s resources is unsustainable, leading to biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions that threaten the natural world and accelerate climate change. Parliament has already called for an ambitious circular economy action plan to tackle the lack of re-use in the EU (the share of recycled materials in the economy was only 12 % in 2019). Members debated an own-initiative report and adopted a resolution on the European Commission’s proposed new circular economy action plan, by a large majority. The Environment, Public Health & Food Safety (ENVI) Committee report proposes more robust and binding targets for reducing the use of primary raw materials, and highlights the opportunities inherent in optimising the use of products over a longer lifecycle.

Visit of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) to Russia

Members debated several statements made in plenary by the HR/VP, Josep Borrell. Members’ reactions were mixed regarding the HR/VP’s controversial visit to Russia and his meeting with Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, on Friday 5 February 2021. The meeting took place against the backdrop of the Russian authorities’ crackdown on large-scale demonstrations in response to the arrest and jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny.

EU Association Agreement with Ukraine

Members debated and approved by a large majority an own-initiative resolution on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine, which commends the country’s efforts in implementing its commitments under the Agreement. The wide-ranging Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) report recommends that Ukrainian authorities focus on a limited number of priorities and suggests completion of reforms now, to secure the advances made on the rule of law, governance and combating corruption.

Implementation of the Anti-Trafficking Directive

A grave violation of fundamental rights with a strongly gendered impact, which not only causes long-term harm to its victims (largely women), but also significant economic, social and human costs to society, Parliament debated and voted on an own-initiative resolution on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings. The joint report prepared by the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) committees, recommends several measures to identify victims and improve prevention and prosecution of those who profit from trafficking in human beings.

Democratic scrutiny of social media and the protection of fundamental rights

Members also debated Council and European Commission statements on democratic scrutiny of social media platforms and protection of fundamental rights, in particular on freedom of expression. Social media platforms have become a major source of information for many people, but also amplify mis- and disinformation. Their role and power in moderating online content has attracted increasing criticism, particularly in light of recent events around the elections in the United States. While the EU has favoured self-regulation to date, in 2020, Parliament stressed that the responsibility for law enforcement in digital services must remain with public authorities in the EU, not with private commercial entities, and called for adequate oversight and judicial redress mechanisms.

25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action

Members adopted a resolution, by a large majority, to mark 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, following a debate with the Council and Commission on their statements on the challenges ahead for women’s rights in the current difficult climate. While the coronavirus pandemic has delayed review of this initiative by a year, it also has a heavy impact on gender equality in a number of areas. Furthermore, the European Institute for Gender Equality reports that substantial gender inequalities persist across all twelve areas of concern identified for action. Parliament has already called for EU Member States to do more to ensure gender equality, and recently adopted three resolutions on the subject.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – February 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Miroslava Karaboytcheva (1st edition),

© gustavofrazao / Adobe Stock

In response to the coronavirus pandemic, on 28 May 2020 the Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Recovery and Resilience Facility (the Facility). The Facility will provide €672.5 billion in loans and grants over the coming years to help mitigate the consequences of the pandemic across the EU and to make EU economies more sustainable. The Facility will disburse funds based on the achievement of a set of milestones and targets.

The Parliament’s Committees on Budgets and on Economic and Monetary Affairs have been working jointly on the file, and adopted their report in November 2020. In December 2020, the Parliament and the Council reached an agreement on the Facility in trilogue. The Parliament is expected to vote at first reading on the agreed text during its February 2021 plenary session.

Complete version

• Recovery and Resilience Facility (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on amending Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies Committee responsible: Budgets (BUDG) and Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), jointly under Rule 58 COM(2020) 408 final
28.5.2020 Rapporteur: Siegfried Mureşan (EPP, Romania);
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial (S&D, Spain); 2020/0289(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: José Manuel Fernández (EPP, Portugal)
Costas Mavrides (S&D, Cyprus)
Luis Garicano (Renew, Spain)
Joachim Kuhs (ID, Germany)
Antonio Maria Rinaldi (ID, Italy)
Damian Boeselager (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Ernest Urtasun (Greens/EFA, Spain)
Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium)
Roberts Zīle (ECR, Latvia)
José Gusmão (The Left, Portugal)
Dimitrios Papadimoulis (The Left, Greece) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: First-reading vote in plenary

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Adobe Stock

Technological change, far from being deterministic in its nature and effects, is open to reform. There is no guarantee that digital technologies will destroy jobs, nor any certainty that these technologies will lead to more and better jobs.

This was one of the main conclusions of the study ‘Digital automation and the future of work: Securing a digital future that works for all’, which was carried out by Professor David Spencer of the University of Leeds at the request of the STOA Panel, following a proposal from STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece).

Although new technologies can lead to economic growth, job creation and demand for new specialist skills, they can also displace entire tasks and professions, modify the nature and structure of jobs and create a polarised economy. This is fuelled by the dominant perception that today’s technological change is faster-paced and broader-based than in the past, automating many more jobs than previously thought. As technological breakthroughs rapidly shift the frontier between the work tasks performed by humans and those performed by algorithms, labour markets are undergoing major transformations. The changing nature of work may undermine the protection of labour rights, lead certain types of workers to long-term unemployment, and create job polarisation and societal discontent. If not managed carefully, these transformations, exacerbated by the ongoing Covid‑19 crisis that has impacted millions of low-skilled workers, pose the risk of further widening skills gaps and existing inequalities.

Will artificial intelligence (AI) technologies benefit the labour market and job creation over the next decade and beyond, or will they aggravate it by replacing humans? Is the ongoing technological disruption going to lead to extensive technological unemployment or have labour-augmenting effects? Are all stakeholders adequately prepared to tackle the challenges of the ongoing increase of automation in the workplace and strengthen existing safety nets in view of the coronavirus pandemic and its unprecedented social and economic consequences?

This new STOA study provides a timely, in-depth overview of the nature, scope and possible effects of digital automation. It reviews relevant literature and recognises that the impacts of technological change on work and employment are multifaceted. The report addresses the nature, scope and possible effects of digital automation and situates modern debates on technological change in historical context. The report recognises that technological change can affect not just the volume of work but also its quality.

According to the study findings, the effects of digital technologies will depend on the relative strength of any job displacement effect and digital automation will have a more complex and gradual effect on occupations than simply wholesale job destruction. By looking at the history of technological change, the author argues that, despite the effects upon the type and often the content of work on offer, no technological revolution has led to any lessening in the work we are required to do.

On the one hand, it is argued that technology may help to improve skills and raise the quality of work, leading to upskilling and improvement in the quality of jobs. At the same time, digital technologies, and AI in particular, can lead to skill gaps, greater inequality and a more polarised society by de‑skilling and creating and embedding low-paid, low-autonomy work. They can also erode job quality by eliminating valuable skills, intensifying monitoring at work, and extending atypical work.

The study puts forward the issue of the broader economic and social context within which technology is developed, applied and controlled as an important parameter in the analysis of the effects of digital technologies upon the future of work. The author stresses the need for wider reforms that go beyond the existing skills-focused agenda and are inclusive of work time reduction, so that the benefits of digital automation can be more widely shared. The study’s recognition of the need for better active labour market policies as well as for better involvement of and working together between employment services, skills providers, social services and business is of significant policy relevance.

The report adds to the current debates by suggesting policy options that are forward-looking in that they not only complement existing policies, but also propose elements of a digital social contract that could promote an inclusive future of work. These refer to the need for digital upskilling for working in AI-enhanced environments, and a reduction of the EU Working-Time Directive to 38 hours per week and removal of the opt-out clause. The study argues for greater worker representation and more democratic workplace governance and the adoption at the EU level of a strategic, mission-oriented approach to digital automation to ensure decent work objectives are achieved. The proposed policy options go beyond the commonly framed suggestions for enhancing skills and training and seek a human-centred approach to digital transformations of work based on industrial democracy and social partnership.

The study is expected to steer the debate around the labour market impact of AI and through its analytical lenses to offer considerable evidence to respond to the ongoing challenges related to the precariousness of today’s jobs. Given that the Covid‑19 crisis has further increased the gap between the most privileged and the most vulnerable and has accelerated digital disruption, the study’s balanced approach may prove vital in helping to prepare a more inclusive digital future, in adapting EU policies to the changing reality in the world of work, and in exploring how to best harness such changes for the benefit of our societies. The ongoing technological change needs to be managed in a proactive and worker-centric manner: the study’s findings can support EU policy-makers in visualising labour reforms that are inclusive and would enable the net benefits of digital automation to be realised and more widely shared.

Read the full report and accompanying STOA Options Brief to find out more.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu

Written by Freya Windle-Wehrle,

The first fully online ESPAS Annual Conference was held on 18 and 19 November 2020. Under the title ‘Thinking about the Future: Europe’s Road to 2030’, the conference focused on the impact of the pandemic on global trends, and on the practical application of foresight in policy-making. With around 600 people connecting on each day, it set an all-time attendance record (of the eight conferences so far).

The conference secured a wide array of senior political, academic and think tank figures from Europe and beyond. They tackled issues such as how the pandemic could impact global trends, what will be Europe’s place in the changed world that awaits us, and the future of transatlantic relations with a Biden administration.

European Parliament President David Sassoli opened the conference with a thoughtful speech on Europe’s future.

‘Our goal [is] to look ahead and make Europe future-proof for new challenges. The pandemic won’t be the only challenge, there will be many other challenges, and […] we have to be ready to take initiatives and to take up responsibilities’ David Sassoli

 

Especially during crises, democracies cannot grind to a halt. President Sassoli remarked that we find ourselves at a point that leads us to reimagine the basics of the European Union and its future direction. The coronavirus pandemic may be a transformative moment, enabling us to see a more sustainable model of development, with environmental and social justice at its core.

Following President Sassoli’s introduction, European Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič presented the Commission’s first strategic foresight report. He emphasised that foresight is about anticipating, exploring and ultimately acting in a collaborative manner. With this in mind, Vice-President Šefčovič launched an EU-wide strategic foresight network, which will see EU institutions, Member States, think tanks, academia, civil society and international organisations joining forces to

‘ … put strategic foresight at the heart of EU policy making’
Maroš Šefčovič

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and senior ministers from across the EU expressed their commitment to the newly created network, agreeing that Europe needs a plan for the future. Strengthening our capacity for evidence-based anticipatory governance is necessary to get ahead of events, instead of being overtaken by them – for which more resilience is needed. As well as joint efforts to design, develop and deliver better policies for better lives.

If the last months have taught us anything, it is that Member States can no longer rely on traditional methods of policy-making and crisis management. We need to become more resilient. Klaus Welle, the European Parliament’s Secretary-General, linked to this point, presenting the Parliament’s recent risks and capability gaps mapping.

‘… it becomes interesting to immediately have a look at the crisis waiting after the crisis’
Klaus Welle

After having been confronted with three major crises in the past years (financial, immigration and Covid‑19), the question of preparedness arises. Mapping risks is the first step towards a methodology to screen the landscape and better prepare the European Union. We need to do this in a systematic, not ad hoc way.

Madeleine Albright, special guest and former United States Secretary of State shared her thoughts about America and transatlantic relations with David McAllister, Chair of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the European Parliament. While looking into the current state of democracy in the west and international relations, she pointed out that democracies are resilient, even during a pandemic. In the case of the USA, the high numbers of votes during the last election provides proof of this resilience. However, Madeleine Albright also suggested that the Trump era has been hard on democracies, as it has fuelled populism and created tensions, for example in trade.

Where Madeleine Albright sees scope for transatlantic cooperation is on climate change. Here, she believes that a common vision and honesty amongst a family of democracies will help – possibly also when encouraging reforms for organisations such as the United Nations.

Whereas Madeleine Albright is worried about Russia, who is playing a ‘weak hand’ whilst trying to separate the USA and the EU, she closed in looking at Turkey, a country towards which the EU should have been more welcoming when they wanted to become a part of the west, instead of ‘changing the goalposts’ of what they had to accomplish.

The second day of the ESPAS Conference was, like the first, a cornucopia of thought-provoking discussions. The panel offering a foretaste of the future featured, as social media put it, the ‘Queens of foresight’, including: Eva Kaili (Chair of the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology); Jeanette Kwek (Head, Centre for Strategic Futures, Singapore); Alexander Schieferdecker (Head of Strategic Foresight and Policy Planning, Federal Chancellery, Germany); Jaana Tapanainen‑Thiess (Prime Minister’s Office, Finland); as well as Simonetta Cook (Cabinet, President of the European Council), who moderated the session.

Their conclusion was that foresight is the most important leadership skill in the 21st century. Eva Kaili summed this up in saying that it is key to have long-term strategies, understand trends to prepare legislation and future jobs, and be more resilient.

‘We need to look beyond the immediate crisis and see farther into the future’
Simonetta Cook

Whilst there was general agreement on this point, Jeanette Kwek pointed out that foresight is a step-by-step process, a cultural shift that cannot be rushed. The Singaporean example has been working on implementing foresight for more than 20 years, yet is only now fully functional. Jeanette Kwek added that foresight processes could become even more successful, if futures literacy became a subject in schools to train citizens for their future lives.

‘The future is a moving target’
Jaana Tapanainen‑Thiess

Finland was represented by Jaana Tapanainen‑Thiess. Their futures work is based on collaboration, co-creation and participation, an approach Vice-President Šefčovič is pursuing with the new EU-wide foresight network. According to Jaana Tapanainen‑Thiess, scenarios can help a lot in this field. Being ‘powerful planning tools’, they require decision-makers to question assumptions about how the world works. This helps ‘rehearse’ the future and engage in a strategic conversation about it. Most importantly, however, one must use the ‘power of the crowd’, by engaging with others. Examples include the Futures Dialogue and the Ministry of the Future Reviews.

Alexander Schieferdecker underlined that those who have to deal with complicated negotiations on current problems on a daily basis do not always find it easy to look 5-10 years ahead, a detail also relevant for Members of the European Parliament.

‘The future is fairly good but it needs constant vigilance, constant, tender, loving care and good politicians and policies’
Shada Islam

The panel discussion ‘What future for democracy and government post-coronavirus?’ delved deep into a wide range of topics, including social investments, data sovereignty and targeted information, social divides, tribal media and media literacy. What stood out most, however, was Professor Brigid Laffan’s (Director Robert Schuman Centre, EUI) remark about democracy being fragile. Brigid Laffan further stated that it ‘requires constant vigilance and effort, [and] that it makes an enormous difference to one’s life’.

Professor Stephan Lewandowsky (University of Bristol), an expert in cognitive psychology, claimed that we live in a regulated environment, but that regulations are not made by democratic institutions. He suggests the European Union has reclaimed the regulatory space, by taking it back from corporations, to endow democratically accountable bodies. He highlighted that targeted information seriously undermines democracy. We must combat inequality, as it provides opportunities for populists to gain a greater share of votes, something also alluded to by Madeleine Albright.

‘Crises are a terrible thing to waste! We need an equitable and inclusive recovery instead of what happened in 2008’
Mathew Burrows

Mathew Burrows (Director, Atlantic Council) closed the session, adding that sociocultural issues can undermine democracy. He reflected upon the US situation by saying that a lot needs to be done domestically to combat the problems that have grown over decades, where political segregation had led to areas that are uniform in their political views. Digital life has further increased this phenomenon.

Want to know more? Further details about the programme and speakers can be found on the conference website. You will find a full list of recordings in the EPRS-ESPAS YouTube Playlist.

Written by Giulio Sabbati,

© European Union, 2021

The European Commission is the executive body of the European Union. Under the Treaties, its tasks are to ‘promote the general interest of the Union’, without prejudice to individual Member States, to ‘ensure the application of the Treaties’ and adopted measures, and to ‘execute the budget’. It also holds a virtual monopoly on the right of legislative initiative, alone proposing nearly all EU legislation to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU.

The College of Commissioners is currently composed of 27 individuals: the President, Ursula von der Leyen, three Executive Vice-Presidents, five Vice-Presidents and eighteen Commissioners. The Executive Vice-Presidents both manage a specific portfolio and coordinate one of the core parts of the Commission’s political agenda. The five Vice-Presidents each coordinate a single specific policy priority. The other Commissioners manage the specific portfolios, under the coordination of the Vice-Presidents.

This Briefing sets out the responsibilities, composition and work of the Commission and its leadership, both in the current Commission and in the past. It also gives details of the staff of the Commission’s departments, their main places of employment, gender distribution and national background, as well as providing a breakdown of the EU’s administrative budget and budgetary management responsibilities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Commission: Facts and Figures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Diaz Crego,

© Daniel Jędzura / Adobe Stock

The creation of a pan-European constituency, comprising the whole territory of the European Union (EU), in which a number of Members of the European Parliament would be elected from transnational electoral lists is frequently depicted by its proponents as a way to enhance the European dimension of European elections. The availability of transnational lists could help to focus the electoral campaign on European affairs and strengthen European political parties, which would acquire a central role in European elections by proposing truly European candidates. In addition, transnational list advocates argue that they would improve the quality of democratic representation in the EU and help to create a European ‘demos’. Conversely, detractors of transnational electoral lists criticise their potential for creating different levels of legitimation among Members of the European Parliament, with those elected in the European constituency/ies claiming ‘European’ endorsement and those elected in the national constituencies claiming a national one. In addition, transnational lists are criticised for potentially increasing the distance between voters and their representatives, as Members elected through transnational lists would not have a bond with a constituency, and for favouring candidates from large Member States and for the difficulties surrounding organisation of a European electoral campaign in different languages and a large territory.

Praised by some and criticised by others, concrete proposals to operationalise transnational electoral lists have been discussed in the European Parliament, other institutional settings and academia since the 1990s. Proposals to create transnational electoral lists discussed in the European Parliament have always shared common features: a single pan-European constituency, comprising the territory of all Member States, would be created to elect a relatively small number of Members of the European Parliament (25‑46) compared to the total number of Members (currently 705). In addition, a proportional electoral formula would be applied (usually the D’Hondt formula), together with closed electoral lists. In some cases, proposals have suggested using a system that aims at ensuring gender and geographically balanced representation by imposing certain requirements on lists of candidates presented in the European constituency. In the most recently discussed proposal (Hübner‑Leinen Report), the European Parliament also linked the Spitzenkandidaten process to the possible creation of transnational electoral lists, by suggesting that those lists should be headed by the lead candidates of each European political family.

However, other proposals to create transnational electoral lists have been put forward in other institutional settings, academia and think tanks. Aiming to offer voters a wider range of electoral choices than those offered by a closed list system, some actors have proposed to use a system of open lists, or the single transferable vote system, in some cases coupled with the creation of several joint constituencies, comprising the territory of different Member States. Aiming to favour geographically balanced representation, some authors have proposed each list should contain candidates from at least one third or one quarter of the Member States. Others have proposed to reserve seats for candidates from each Member State, or to group Member States according to certain features (e.g. their population), and require each candidate list to include a specific number of candidates coming from each of those groups. Similarly, gender-balanced representation could be achieved through various systems.

Apart from questions relating to the design of the electoral system applicable to the elections in the European constituency/ies, this paper analyses the legal reforms that would be needed at European and national levels in order to create transnational electoral lists. Although the creation of transnational electoral lists does not seem to require modification of the EU Treaties, except if it were decided to extend the maximum number of European Parliament seats currently provided for under Article 14(2) TEU (750 plus the President), it would require the modification of several EU secondary acts. In this vein, the 1976 European Electoral Act (Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976), which currently provides for a common set of rules to be applied by all Member States in European elections, would need to be amended to create a European constituency/ies and provide for a uniform electoral system and procedure to be applied in the elections in that constituency/ies. The amendment of the 1976 European Electoral Act requires a unanimous decision of the Council, based on a proposal by the European Parliament and with its consent (by a majority of its component Members), as well as the later approval of all Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements (Article 223 (1) TFEU). As the procedure to modify the 1976 European Electoral Act is quite demanding, the possibility to leave determination of the secondary aspects of the electoral procedure to be applied in the elections in the European constituency/ies through the procedure provided for under Article 14 of the European Electoral Act could be explored.

Similarly, Decision (EU) 2018/937 of 28 June 2018, establishing the current composition of the European Parliament, would also require modification, to provide for the allocation of a certain number of European Parliament seats to a European constituency/ies. In this case, the amendment would need to be adopted by a unanimous decision of the European Council, on the initiative of the European Parliament and with its consent (Article 14 (2) TEU). Apart from that, some other EU secondary acts may also need amendment, depending on the electoral system and procedure to be applied in the elections in the European constituency/ies.

In addition to the modifications that would be required at the European level, the procedures to be followed in the Member States to approve the amendments to the 1976 European Electoral Act should also be taken into account. In this vein, such approval would require a constitutional amendment in Austria, and depending on the exact scope of the modifications introduced in the European Electoral Act, in some other Member States (e.g. Spain, Portugal or Italy). In 15 Member States, the procedure for the ratification of international treaties would need to be applied to approve the changes introduced in the 1976 European Electoral Act (Belgium, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden). In 11 Member States, approval would only require the adoption of a law or amendments to the existing laws regulating European elections (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia). Amendments to the laws applicable to European elections would generally be needed in the Member States, with some national legal orders requiring special qualified majorities or procedures for their adoption (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Spain, Estonia, Slovenia or Portugal).

The adoption of these legal modifications would be likely to take some time. Given that the Venice Commission recommends that – and some Member States (e.g. Belgium and France) require – amendments to electoral laws are made at least one year in advance of elections, to ensure the credibility of the electoral process, European institutions would need to start the procedure to modify EU legislation sufficiently early, if they wished to introduce transnational electoral lists before the 2024 European elections.

Read the complete study on ‘Transnational electoral lists: Ways to Europeanise elections to the European Parliament‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves,

© frikota / Fotolia

The European Union (EU) is committed to working collectively to eradicate female genital mutilation (FGM) as part of broader efforts to combat all forms of violence against women and girls, and to support EU countries’ efforts in this field. The European Commission has undertaken to assess EU efforts to combat FGM every year, on or around the United Nations International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation on 6 February.

Here too, as in so many other areas of our lives, the coronavirus pandemic is having a significant impact, threatening to undermine global progress towards eliminating FGM. Before the pandemic, FGM was declining in some, but not all, of the regions where the practice is most widespread. It was already clear that efforts needed to be scaled up to keep pace with population growth, the fact that girls were undergoing FGM at a younger age and the spread of the practice caused by population movement. In July 2020, the Secretary-General of the United Nations reported on the emerging evidence that the coronavirus pandemic is a further obstacle to progress. There are multiple reasons why the pandemic is putting more girls at risk of FGM and disrupting prevention efforts. On the one hand, girls are more likely to be out of education due to school closures and lockdowns, at a time when many families are under financial pressure. This contributes to girls being married off at a younger age and to FGM as a prelude to these marriages. There are also reports that traditional cutters are approaching families directly in search of work as a result of the economic downturn caused by the pandemic. On the other hand, services involved in outreach, support, awareness-raising, and pursuit of perpetrators are also facing pressures as a result of social distancing, lockdowns and the diversion of resources to frontline health services. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) estimates that the pandemic could result in two million cases of female genital mutilation that would otherwise have been averted, or a 33 % reduction in progress towards the target under the Sustainable Development Goal of eliminating FGM by 2030.

The pandemic is not only having an impact in the countries outside the EU where FGM is most prevalent. The civil society organisation, End FGM EU, warns that risks to girls and pressures on services are also being experienced in Europe. Although travel restrictions make it more difficult to take girls abroad in order for FGM to be performed, this may be counterbalanced by the disruption of protection measures and pressures on the frontline organisations that provide support. End FGM EU has made a number of recommendations for action to ensure that the needs of girls at risk of FGM and survivors of FGM are not forgotten in immediate crisis responses and long-term recovery planning. It is calling specifically for services and funding to be boosted or, at the least, maintained.

At EU level, combating gender-based violence, including FGM, is one of the priorities in the new EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020‑2025. The European Commission is envisaging new EU legislation on gender-based violence and a specific recommendation on measures to prevent FGM. Funding for combating FGM will be available under the joint EU‑UN Spotlight initiative, for external action, and under the new Rights and Values programme for action within the EU.

For its part, the European Parliament has set out its own recommendations for an EU strategy to put an end to FGM around the world. It has also called for action to address the increased risks of FGM resulting from the coronavirus pandemic.

Related EPRS publications:

• At a glance briefing, Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation, February 2021
• At a glance briefing The Istanbul Convention: A tool to tackle violence against women and girls, November 2020
• Briefing, Violence against Women in the EU: State of Play, November 2020

What do people write about when contacting the European Parliament and its President?

People from across the EU and elsewhere in the world turn to the European Parliament and its President, David Maria Sassoli, to request information, call for action to be taken, express their opinions or suggest ideas on a wide range of topics. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) at the European Parliament answers in any of the official EU languages – from Swedish to Slovak and Polish to Portuguese!

In 2020, Ask EP received no less than 9 373 individual messages and 82 680 campaign enquiries. Citizens wrote to us on the topics that defined 2020, such as the coronavirus pandemic and the implementation of the rule of law mechanism, as well as on a wide range of other topics.

Which topics were most addressed in individual enquiries in 2020?

The most frequently addressed topic in 2020 was matters concerning the European Parliament itself. We received over 2 100 enquiries, in which citizens expressed interest in Members of European Parliament and their activities, enquired about visits to the European Parliament, and requested information on topics such as committee meetings and the right to petition. Any EU citizen or resident has the right to address a petition to the European Parliament on a matter related to EU powers and which affects the citizen directly. People turn to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit asking questions about submitting petitions or requesting an update on their ongoing petition, information, which is also available on the Petitions Portal webpage.

The second most frequent topic on which citizens contacted Ask EP last year related to civil liberties, justice and home affairs, with came close to 1 600 enquiries. People voiced their concerns about, for instance, fundamental rights matters or respect for the rule of law in EU countries – and requested action from the Parliament on these topics. The judicial system in Bulgaria, the rule of law in Poland and Hungary as well as women’s right to abortion in Poland were some of the focal points of these controversial topics. The European Parliament adopted a new resolution on 7 October 2020, emphasising once more the urgent need for creation of an EU mechanism to protect and strengthen democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.

Issues concerning foreign affairs were another key focus for citizens in the past year, counting over 800 enquiries. People expressed their opinion on the situation in third countries, for example on the death of George Floyd in the USA, the political situation in Russia or EU‑Turkey relations. One prominent topic was the presidential elections in Belarus, for which EU and Belarussian citizens reached out to the Parliament, requesting support for Belarussian democracy. In a resolution adopted in September 2020, the European Parliament expressed its unequivocal support for the people of Belarus in their legitimate demands and aspirations for free and fair elections, fundamental freedoms and human rights.

Finally, the European Parliament received over 800 different suggestions, questions and requests from citizens in 2020 regarding the coronavirus pandemic, including about the EU’s approach to tackling the coronavirus, travel restrictions, the closing of borders, confinement measures, or management of the crisis by individual EU countries. Many citizens requested coordinated EU action with respect to the coronavirus and commented on how the EU was handling the situation. In a resolution adopted in April 2020, the European Parliament called for a united response, solidarity in the health sector and European solutions to overcoming the pandemic’s economic and social consequences.

Campaign messages sent to the European Parliament in 2020

As a response to political, humanitarian and economic events, citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament, expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. These messages may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

In October 2020, for instance, the European Parliament received over 15 500 messages calling on the President of the European Parliament to intervene against the possible introduction of a digital euro by the European Central Bank. After the European Central Bank announced in a 2 October 2020 press release that it would launch a public consultation on the potential implementation of a digital euro, citizens voiced concerns that a purely digital euro could increase the ability of authorities to control and monitor them, thereby potentially restricting their civil liberties and financial independence. However, as the European Central Bank indicated, a digital euro would be intended to complement, but not replace, cash. The full answer given by the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit is available on this EPRS blog.

Due to the situation at the EU’s external borders with Turkey in March 2020, over 17 000 citizens wrote to Parliament’s President to press the EU to urgently adopt a clear and humane migration and external borders policy. They also called on the EU to assist Greece and Bulgaria in managing the situation on their borders with Turkey, after the Turkish government had stated that it would allow thousands of migrants to cross into the EU. Ask EP’s answer to this campaign can be found here.

Finally, the biggest campaign in 2020, with over 36 000 enquiries, addressed the termination of the mandate of Oriol Junqueras i Vies. The President of the European Parliament received a large number of messages in January 2020 following the judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C-502/19, Junqueras Vies, of 19 December 2019. The President of the European Parliament, announced in plenary on 13 January 2020 that, following the judgement of the EU Court, Oriol Junqueras i Vies’ mandate began on 2 July 2019, on the basis of the official declaration of the results of the European elections by the competent Spanish authorities. However, taking into account the decision of the Junta Electoral Central of 3 January 2020, and pursuant to the decision of the Tribunal Supremo of 9 January 2020, his mandate was terminated, with effect from 3 January 2020. More information on this campaign is available on this website.

All replies to campaigns totalling over 50 enquiries are published on the EPRS blog. Are you curious about our answers to other campaign messages in 2020? Find out more here.

Continue to put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP), using our contact form, the Citizens’ app, or post! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us and are looking forward to your enquiries in 2021!

Your Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)

Written by Martin Russell,

Alexey Navalny is one of Vladimir Putin’s most outspoken critics. After surviving an assassination attempt and recovering in Germany, he returned to Russia in January 2021 to face arrest and imprisonment. Mass protests over his detention and revelations of high-level corruption show that an increasingly repressive Kremlin has not succeeded in crushing opposition to Putin’s rule.

Who is Alexey Navalny?

© Jonathan Stutz / Adobe Stock

Alexey Navalny is one of Vladimir Putin’s most outspoken opponents, a thorn in the Kremlin’s side for over a decade. In Russia, he is best known as a campaigner against deep-rooted corruption in the ruling elite; investigations by his Anti-Corruption Foundation have focused on figures such as former Prosecutor-General, Yury Chaika, and Putin ally, Yevgeny Prigozhin, a millionaire businessman linked to Kremlin disinformation operations such as the infamous St Petersburg ‘troll factory’. In 2017, the Foundation’s video on then Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s private assets was watched nearly 40 million times. In July 2020, the foundation closed after a Moscow court ordered it to pay €1 million in damages to one of Prigozhin’s companies for libel over a food-poisoning scandal in Moscow schools; it has since resumed its activities.

Navalny stood in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election, and did unexpectedly well, capturing 27 % of the vote, almost enough to force Putin ally and incumbent Sergey Sobyanin into a second round. In 2014, he was convicted of embezzlement, and received a three-and-a-half year suspended sentence in a judgment later described by the European Court of Human Rights as ‘arbitrary’. Electoral authorities refused to register Navalny as a candidate in the 2018 presidential election. Since 2011, Navalny has spent hundreds of days in detention for a variety of offences; in 2016 he was assaulted by Cossacks, and in 2017 temporarily lost part of his eyesight after being doused by unknown assailants with a caustic green dye.

Latest developments: Poisoning, arrest, and protests

On 20 August 2020, Navalny collapsed on a flight from the Siberian city of Tomsk. After an emergency landing, he was taken to a hospital in Omsk, and from there for treatment in Berlin. Tests from independent laboratories showed that he had been poisoned by a Novichok-type nerve agent similar to the substance used against former Russian spy Sergey Skripal in 2018. Given that private actors would find it difficult to access Novichok, and that Federal Security Service (FSB) agents were shadowing Navalny at the time, it is probable that the attack was carried out by Russian security forces on orders from Putin or his entourage. In December 2020, Navalny released a recording of a phone call to an FSB agent who he tricked into revealing that the poison (which was spread onto his underpants) was intended to kill.

In an apparent attempt to discourage Navalny from returning to Russia after his recovery, in December 2020 the Prisons Service threatened him with jail for violating the conditions of his suspended sentence. Nevertheless, in January 2021 he arrived back in Moscow and was immediately arrested. On 2 February, a Moscow court ordered him to serve the rest of his sentence (2 years and 8 months) in prison.

Two days after Navalny’s arrest, his foundation released a video exposing an opulent Black Sea palace allegedly built for Putin. Like the 2017 video on Medvedev, the documentary has attracted enormous interest, with over 100 million views. Putin denies flatly that the palace has anything to do with him. On 30 January, Putin friend and oligarch Arkady Rotenberg came forward, claiming to be the real owner.

To discourage protests, the Russian authorities banned public gatherings and ordered social media to take down organisers’ posts. Angered by Navalny’s detention and the revelations of high-level corruption, protestors were undeterred; an estimated 20 000 took to the streets of Moscow on 24 January, with further large rallies in over 100 cities across the country bringing the nationwide total to over 100 000 – possibly the largest turnout since the post-election protests of 2011-2012. A second round of protests on 31 January drew even bigger crowds in some cities, although in Moscow they were smaller. The police response to the latter protests was unusually forceful, with over 5 000 arrests (a ten-year record), batons and tasers.

Political implications

Navalny receives only minimal coverage in state media, and Putin famously refuses to mention his name in public. However, the popularity of the ‘Putin palace’ video shows that corruption is an issue that resonates far beyond the relatively limited circle of Navalny supporters; in 2020, 77 % of Russians saw government corruption as a serious problem. The scale of the rallies shows that a decade of increasing repression has not lessened the capacity of Putin’s opponents to mobilise large-scale protests.

Protests also reflect rising dissatisfaction with problems such as persistent poverty, declining incomes, and profound inequality, which the pandemic has only exacerbated. In 2019, 59 % wanted ‘decisive, large-scale’ changes, up from 42 % two years earlier, according to independent pollsters Levada Centre. Charismatic, bold, media-savvy, and backed by a network of loyal supporters, Navalny has become perhaps the most prominent figure in Russia’s ‘non-system’ opposition (so-called to distinguish it from officially tolerated tame ‘system’ parties such as the Communists). The Kremlin might prefer to ignore Navalny, but its apparent attempt to eliminate a difficult opponent has only put him in the spotlight.

Previous waves of discontent came in 2011-2012 (after allegedly rigged parliamentary elections), 2017 (triggered by the Medvedev video) and 2019 (over the exclusion of ‘non-system’ candidates from regional elections). Recurrent mass protests show that the Kremlin is failing to silence dissent. The latest protests come at an awkward time, with Russia struggling to recover from the pandemic and preparing for crucial parliamentary elections in September 2021. There are signs that support for Navalny is growing; in September 2020, 20 % approved of his actions, compared to just 6 % in 2013, while the 24 January demonstrations were some of the largest ever, despite forceful police action and harsh winter weather.

Nevertheless, these protests seem unlikely to be more of a game-changer than the previous ones. Non‑system opposition politicians have scored a few electoral victories in recent years (in 2019 and 2020, partly due to a ‘smart’ tactical voting strategy promoted by Navalny), but such successes are isolated. The non‑system opposition remains weak and fragmented, and it lacks a positive agenda other than getting rid of Putin. Few in Russia see it as a credible alternative to the established political parties. Public opinion remains mostly favourable to Putin, whose approval rating is stable at around 60-65 %, according to Levada Centre. Surveys suggest that most Russians do not see any alternative to him; in October 2020, he was still by far the nation’s most trusted politician (34 % of respondents), compared to just 4 % for Navalny. Although most have heard of Navalny, in December 2020 just 17 % claimed to have followed his poisoning with any interest, and a similarly low percentage believed that the authorities were to blame. Few doubt that United Russia, the ruling party, will win another sweeping victory in the September 2021 elections.

Russian and international reactions

The Russian authorities are sticking to denials of state involvement in Navalny’s poisoning, and have not launched an investigation, as they claim to have seen no evidence of criminal activity. Official statements blame the current unrest on Western efforts to destabilise Russia; Presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has denounced Navalny as a CIA collaborator, while the Foreign Ministry suggests that the US Embassy may have actively helped to organise Moscow rallies. Pro-Kremlin media describe protest organisers as ‘political paedophiles’ playing on young people’s naivety. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mariya Zakharova warns Western critics not to ‘meddle in the internal affairs of a sovereign state’.

On 3 February, EU High Representative Josep Borrell condemned the ‘politically motivated’ sentencing of Navalny, and called on Russia to immediately release him and those who demonstrated in support of him. Borrell will also raise the issue at his meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on 5 February.

In October 2020, the EU adopted chemical weapons sanctions against Russian officials linked to Navalny’s poisoning. EU foreign ministers are expected to discuss possible further measures (possibly under the new human rights sanctions mechanism) at the next Foreign Affairs Council meeting, scheduled for 22 February.

European Parliament position
In its resolutions on Navalny’s arrest (21 January 2021) and on his poisoning (17 September 2020), the European Parliament denounced the shrinking space in Russia for human rights, and called for tougher EU sanctions against Putin’s inner circle, oligarchs and media propagandists, a new and more critical approach to cooperation with Russia, and an immediate end to construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Navalny vs Kremlin: Latest developments‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

With the coronavirus continuing to rage throughout Europe, Parliament’s plenary agenda focuses firmly on getting beyond the crisis. However, Parliament sees a balance to strike between measures to recover socially and economically, with opportunities to seize to do more to mitigate climate change and to ensure that the recovery benefits everyone.

It is clear that current use of the earth’s resources is unsustainable, leading to biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions that threaten the natural world and accelerate climate change. Parliament has already called for an ambitious circular economy action plan to tackle the lack of re-use in the EU (the share of recycled materials in the economy was only 12 % in 2019). On Monday evening, Members are due to debate an own-initiative report on the European Commission’s proposed new circular economy action plan. The Environment, Public Health & Food Safety (ENVI) Committee report proposes more robust and binding targets for reducing the use of primary raw materials, and highlights the opportunities inherent in optimising the use of products over a longer lifecycle.

Climate action is a major focus of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, designed to raise the necessary funding to revive the economy post-coronavirus, and the main element of the Next Generation EU package. On Tuesday, Members will debate a joint report adopted by the Committees on Budgets (BUDG) and on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), scrutinising the text agreed with the Council, which, if plenary confirms, would come into effect this month. Under the agreement, Member States would be able to submit recovery and resilience plans that earmark at least 37 % of their budget to climate and 20 % to digital measures, with up to 13 % pre-financing available upon approval. Parliament will scrutinise progress via a recovery and resilience scoreboard.

Rebooting the economy after the ravages of the coronavirus epidemic will also demand robust measures to encourage investment in EU businesses. Parliament is expected to vote following a joint debate on Wednesday afternoon, on provisional agreements on two proposals, resulting from interinstitutional negotiations, on the capital markets recovery package (MiFID and EU recovery prospectus). The proposals revise the legal framework on investment services set out in MiFID governing their provision in financial instruments, in a package of targeted amendments to the Prospectus Regulation, MiFID II and securitisation rules. The amendments aim at reducing the administrative burden for experienced investors, while preserving protection for retail investors and maintaining requirements for transparency.

ECB President, Christine Lagarde will be present in the plenary on Monday afternoon, for a debate on the own-initiative report on the European Central Bank’s annual report, which considers ECB monetary policy in the context of the coronavirus crisis, on financial stability measures, and on actions against climate change. In response to a projected decrease of 7.3 % in real GDP for the euro area, and increased unemployment to 8.0 % in 2020, the ECB has implemented monetary stimulus, non-standard monetary policy measures, and temporary capital and operational relief to increase banks’ lending capacity. The ECON committee report considers that the ECB has acted decisively to mitigate the impact of the crisis. However, it also calls for accompanying reforms to strengthen competitiveness and social cohesion, and underlines the need to tackle climate change-related risks. A secret vote will also take place on Monday on the appointment of the Vice-Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board – where Parliament would like to see greater effort made to respect gender equality.

Equality between women and men is a core EU value and objective. On Wednesday afternoon, the Council and Commission are expected to make statements on the challenges ahead for women’s rights, 25 years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and in the current difficult climate. The coronavirus pandemic has delayed review of the initiative by a year, and has a heavy impact on gender equality in a number of areas. Furthermore, the European Institute for Gender Equality reports that substantial gender inequalities persist across all twelve areas of concern identified for action. Parliament has already called for EU Member States to do more to ensure gender equality, and recently adopted three resolutions on the subject.

A grave violation of fundamental rights with a strongly gendered impact, which not only causes long-term harm to its victims (largely women), but also significant economic, social and human costs to society, Parliament is due to debate an own-initiative report on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings on Monday evening. The joint report, adopted by the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) committees recommends several measures to identify victims and improve prevention and prosecution of those who profit from trafficking in human beings.

Social media platforms have become a major source of information for many people, but also amplify mis- and disinformation. Their role and power in moderating online content has attracted increasing criticism, particularly in light of recent events around the United States elections. The Council and the European Commission are expected to make statements in plenary on Wednesday afternoon on democratic scrutiny of social media platforms and protection of fundamental rights, in particular on freedom of expression. While the EU has favoured self-regulation to date, in 2020, Parliament stressed that the responsibility for law enforcement in digital services must remain with public authorities in the EU, not with private commercial entities, and called for adequate oversight and judicial redress mechanisms.

The High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission will make statements on several current issues on Tuesday afternoon, including on his visit to Russia to meet Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, on Friday 5 February 2021. This meeting comes in the context of the crackdown by Russian authorities on large-scale demonstrations in response to the arrest and jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny.

Finally, on Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to vote on an own-initiative report on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine, which commends the country’s efforts in implementing its commitments under the Agreement. The wide-ranging Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) report recommends that Ukraine authorities focus on a limited number of priorities and suggests completion of reforms now, to secure the advances on the rule of law, governance and combating corruption.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© New Africa / Adobe Stock

As the latest wave of the coronavirus pandemic intensifies and some highly infectious new mutations of the virus spread, a growing number of countries have increased restrictions on travel and some lockdowns have been intensified. Whilst a series of vaccines are progressively gaining official approval, and their roll-out has started, pharmaceutical companies struggle with production capacity issues, the effectiveness of the vaccines on mutations is still uncertain, and a broader debate is opening up on the global fairness of vaccine distribution beyond the ‘first’ world.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the coronavirus and related issues. More studies on the topics can be found in a previous edition in this series, published in December 2020.

How to increase vaccination and mask-wearing to defeat Covid-19
Brookings Institution, January 2021

The secret sauce behind Israel’s successful Covid-19 vaccination program
Brookings Institution, January 2021

The human costs of the pandemic: Is it time to prioritize well-being?
Brookings Institution, November 2020

Covid-19: How can we get it under control in 2021?
Friends of Europe, January 2021

Same storm: Different boats – The impact of Covid-19 on Europe’s shadow economy
Friends of Europe, December 2020

Dossier d’actualité sur la Covid-19
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, January 2021

Corporate insolvencies during Covid-19: Keeping calm before the storm
Bruegel, January 2021

When the future changes the past: Fiscal indicator revisions
Bruegel, January 2021

Happy New Year?
Bruegel, December 2020

Monetary policy in the times of corona: Many unknown unknowns
Bruegel, December 2020

Covid-19 has widened the income gap in Europe
Bruegel, December 2020

With European unity and empathy against Covid-19
Bertelsmann Stiftung, December 2020

Deadly coronavirus, domineering China and divided America: What the new geopolitics means for Europe
Centre for European Reform, December 2020

Europe needs a strong Africa, but will it work to achieve one?
Centre for European Reform, December 2020

The recovery triangle must include social investment if it is to succeed
European Policy Centre, December 2020

The European Semester must acknowledge that the EU recovery fund is not a stimulus package
European Policy Centre, December 2020

Russia’s relative resilience: Why Putin feels vindicated by the pandemic
European Centre on Foreign Relations, December 2020

Coronavirus as a catalyst for global civil society
Carnegie Europe, December 2020

The Coronavirus crisis as an opportunity in Ukraine
Carnegie Europe, December 2020

Bubble trouble: Estonia and the coronavirus crisis
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2020

Loyal at once? The EU’s global health awakening in the pandemic
Clingendael, January 2021

Europeanising health policy in times of coronationalism
Clingendael, November 2020

Covid-19 vaccine: Reaching people in areas controlled by armed groups
Chatham House, November 2020

Six aspects of daily life rapidly changed by Covid-19
Chatham House, November 2020

The skill challenges posed by Covid-19
Centre for European Political Studies, November 2020

The effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on us and European commitment to the multilateral economic order
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, November 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Uncertainty and discontent‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vitalba Crivello,

© Adobe Stock

The debate about sound and evidence-based science communication, effective in engaging the public and countering mis- and disinformation, was already quite lively long before the Covid‑19 pandemic hit. The coronavirus outbreak has caused a high level of uncertainty in the public health sphere and enabled a flow of inaccurate news and rumours about different aspects of the crisis: the ‘infodemic’. The European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) sees this as both a challenge and an opportunity for resolute and effective action.

The ESMH was created three years ago by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA), as a platform to promote networking, training and knowledge sharing between the Parliament, the scientific community and the media.

The ESMH project ‘Tackling the infodemic’

Aware of the need to help the public navigate the massive information flow and find answers to their questions in knowledge-based science news, the ESMH responded to the coronavirus crisis by turning to the ‘guardians of the expertise’ – the scientists – with the ‘

‘Listening to the experts, interviews with scientists on coronavirus’ project. The ESMH also publishes articles on aspects of the health crisis, including treatments for Covid‑19 and vaccines.

However, providing sound communication on Covid‑19 to tackle the infodemic is only one of the pieces of a bigger puzzle that need to be put together. Eager to better understand the inner dynamics of the infodemic, the ESMH developed a specific project to tackle mis- and disinformation. Drawing up a list of initiatives tackling the enormous spread of false information on various aspects of the health crisis, the ESMH began publishing a series of interviews with experts on dis- and misinformation, together with thematic news articles. The experts share their opinions on aspects of the infodemic, offering take-away messages for reflection.

Trust is crucial – Cary Funk: ‘We need to address lower levels of trust among some segments of the public’

Indeed, the findings of a global report conducted by the PEW Research Centre (‘Science and Scientists Held in High Esteem Across Global Publics’), show that ‘people’s ideology and education do have an impact on their trust in scientists’, explains Cary Funk, PEW Director of Science and Society Research.

‘What drives public trust?‘ is also the question that the new EU-funded TRESCA project tries to answer. It does make a difference if the relation between political actors, health authorities and the experts is based on trust, or not. In the words of Stephan Lewandowsky, cognitive scientist at the University of Bristol, ‘the more the culture of a country is condoning the dismissal of expertise and evidence, the easier it is for conspiracy theories to find a foothold, there is no question about that’.

Along similar lines, Renée di Resta, Technical Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory, notes that ‘the media sources that people choose to follow are so integral to this particular problem, because, depending on who they trust, they’re either going to get good information or bad information’ and ‘a high degree of trust in the media is usually accompanied by a high degree of trust in the government’.

Trust in the media – Rasmus Kleis Nielsen: ‘Journalistic standards work successfully in the crisis’

Moving on to the role of the media, the crisis shows the importance of independent fact-checkers and science journalists, who collect and critically evaluate a huge amount of information and make sure that the public receive trustworthy news.

In one of the first interviews conducted by the ESMH, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Director of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, pointed out that ‘a classic finding from media and communications research is that essentially a rumour is a form of improvised news. When there is an information vacuum it tends to be filled by improvisation’.

Nielsen also spoke at the first ESMH webinar ‘Corona: is misinformation more contagious than the virus?‘. The event offered some interesting take-away messages. Traditional media play an important role in providing people with reliable health information during the pandemic. At the same time, vulnerable sections of society may be more likely to turn to media platforms to look for news than to traditional media – when social media are actually seen as the main source of misinformation.

Research carried out by the Oxford Internet Institute on social media platforms shows that ‘people who seek junk content, because they find it entertaining or are simply curious, will always find it, as long as they know how to look for it’. (Nahema Marchal).

It is indeed true that ‘in a setting of uncertainty and high stakes, people tend to trust the ‘old’ media’ – as Michael Hameleers of the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) argues – and that ‘the distinction between mis- and disinformation perceptions is mainly a matter of trust in the honesty and transparency of the press’. Media literacy interventions could play a key role in empowering citizens to develop those critical skills they need to recognise mis- and disinformation themselves.

In his interview with the ESMH, Philipp Schmid of the University of Erfurt, pointed out that weight-of-evidence reporting is a good example of how psychologists and journalists can work together to tackle critical challenges such as climate change and health issues. Journalists can effectively reduce the negative impact of messages of science denialism by simply warning the public about the impact of the ‘balancing of viewpoints’, which are highly important for democratic discussions of different opinions, but potentially misleading in discussions about scientific facts.

The ‘Age of misinformation’ conference

In the attempt to tackle the infodemic, various initiatives have been launched, especially workshops and conferences – gathering experts from different scientific fields, media representatives and policy-makers – to look at the phenomenon, offering a ‘trans-disciplinary’ perspective, and possibly some ‘recommendations’.

One of these was the online conference on the ‘Age of misinformation: an interdisciplinary look at fake news‘ This event took place on Thursday, 17 December 2020, and was organised by the Centro per l’Eccellenza e gli Studi Transdisciplinary (CEST) – a network of researchers from Italian universities, created in 2013 to strengthen the relationship between academia and civil society. The webinar obtained the patronage of the European Parliament and STOA/ESMH were actively involved.

Lina Gálvez Muñoz (S&D, Spain), Vice-Chair of the European Parliament Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, and member of the STOA Panel, opened the conference with a heartfelt intervention on the key role played by public trust in the current political context, strictly interconnected with the health crisis. She highlighted the European institutions’ increasing engagement in countering disinformation via targeted initiatives and specific action. She also introduced the ESMH as an emerging institutional actor in countering scientific disinformation.

Vitalba Crivello presented the ESMH ‘infodemic’ project during the session ‘Countering online disinformation: roots and causes’, organised by the Horizon 2020 Provenance project, and chaired by Eileen Culloty from Dublin City University’s Institute for Future Media and Journalism. The panel’s speakers represented experts active in countering mis- and disinformation. Stephan Lewandowsky, Thomas Zerback, Rachel Hermitage and Stella Giuffreda brought in the scholars’ point of view, while Thomas Grandjouan spoke about the experience of the EU Disinfo Lab just before the ESMH closing intervention.

Further developments

As part of the ‘Tackling the infodemic’ project, the ESMH is also producing – with the help with external provider Athens Technology Center (ATC) – monthly reports, collecting the main deceptive narratives on Covid‑19 trending on selected social media.

The ESMH is further developing complementary activities in this direction, confident that trust and an open dialogue between scientists, media producers and policy-makers is the key to success in effectively countering disinformation, especially in times of emergency.

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition),

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The European Union is party to the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. The Aarhus Regulation applies the Convention’s provisions to EU institutions and bodies. In 2017, the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, reviewing implementation by the parties, found that the EU fails to comply with its obligations under Article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the convention concerning access to justice by members of the public. To address this non-compliance issue, on 14 October 2020 the European Commission put forward a legislative proposal to amend the Aarhus Regulation, triggering mixed reactions from stakeholders. The legislative process is ongoing. In Parliament, the file is being examined by the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The Council reached a general approach on the file on 17 December 2020.

Complete version

• Access to justice in environmental matters: Amending the Aarhus Regulation (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on amending Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies Committee responsible: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) COM(2020) 642 final
14.10.2020 Rapporteur: Christian Doleschal (EPP, Germany) 2020/0289(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Milan Brglez (S&D, Slovenia)
Martin Hojsík (Renew Europe, Slovakia)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Mick Wallace (The Left, Ireland) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of the draft report

Written by Naja Bentzen,

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The deadly insurrection at the US Capitol on 6 January 2021 was a significant cautionary example of the offline effects of online disinformation and conspiracy theories. The historic democratic crisis this has sparked − adding to a number of other historic crises the US is currently battling − provides valuable lessons not only for the United States, but also for Europe and the democratic world.

The US presidential election and its aftermath saw domestic disinformation emerging as a more visible immediate threat than disinformation by third countries. While political violence has been the most tangible physical effect of manipulative information, corrosive conspiracy theories have moved from the fringes to the heart of political debate, normalising extremist rhetoric.

At the same time, recent developments have confirmed that the lines between domestic and foreign attempts to undermine democracy are increasingly blurred. While the perceived weaknesses in democratic systems are − unsurprisingly − celebrated as a victory for authoritarian state actors, links between foreign interference and domestic terrorism are under growing scrutiny.

The question of how to depolarise US society − one of a long list of challenges facing the Biden Administration − is tied to the polarised media environment. The crackdown by major social media platforms on Donald Trump and his supporters has prompted far-right groups to abandon the established information ecosystem to join right-wing social media. This could further accelerate the ongoing fragmentation of the US infosphere, cementing the trend towards separate realities.

Ahead of the proposed Democracy Summit − a key objective of the Biden Administration − tempering the ‘sword of democracy’ has risen to the top of the agenda on both sides of the Atlantic. Against this backdrop, and in line with the EU-US Agenda for Global Change, EU initiatives to counter disinformation − including the recent democracy action plan and the Digital Services Act − may provide a basis for EU-US cooperation on boosting democracy at home and abroad.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Trump’s disinformation ‘magaphone’: Consequences, first lessons and outlook‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anja Radjenovic,

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International law imposes an obligation to render assistance to persons and ships in distress at sea, which must be provided regardless of the persons’ nationality or status or the circumstances in which they are found. These rules have to be applied without prejudice to the obligations deriving from international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including in particular the prohibition of refoulement.

Search and rescue (SAR) and disembarkation activities of EU Member States are currently not covered by a common EU legal framework, except for those activities carried out in the context of Frontex-led joint operations at sea.

In recent years, a significant proportion of migrants and asylum-seekers in distress at sea have been rescued by EU naval operations, EU agencies and non-governmental organisations in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, over the last couple of years, the Mediterranean Sea has also been the backdrop for the largest number of casualties and missing people.

Lack of coordination in search and rescue activities, solitary action by individual countries and criminalisation of non-governmental organisations active in SAR in the Mediterranean lead to migrants being forced to stay for several days and sometimes weeks on boats. EU Member States and EU agencies (Frontex) have also been accused of pushbacks of asylum-seekers and other migrants to the high seas and towards Libya and Turkey.

Individual actors dealing with boats of migrants have been a subject of strong criticism and legal action. Their accountability is, however, not always clear, the reason being varied application and interpretation of different bodies of international law. One solution, proposed by academics, could be the harmonisation of the fragmented legal regime for maritime interceptions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Search and rescue in the Mediterranean‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Search and rescue in the Mediterranean’ on YouTube.

Written by Marcin Szczepański,

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The pandemic has highlighted the risk involved, including for the EU, in relying heavily on external suppliers. The EU’s 30 critical raw materials (CRMs) combine two characteristics: they are strategically important for its industry and economy, and there are high risks associated with securing their supply. The notion of strategic autonomy, which has been gaining track recently, calls for a more autonomous and independent EU policy, also in the area of CRMs. Importantly, the core of the EU’s response to the pandemic has been to use it to transform its economy and society. The twin transition to a green and digital future relies particularly on the safe and diverse supply of CRMs. In its journey to a low-carbon economy, the EU should however make sure it does not replace its reliance on fossil fuels with a reliance on CRMs.

While secure access to CRMs has been on the EU agenda for many years, the European Commission has eagerly stepped up its policy in this area since the beginning of its current term, and in September 2020 delivered a new package of measures. These included a new action plan for CRMs that supports initiatives in four main areas: i) developing resilient value chains for EU industrial ecosystems; ii) supporting sustainable and environmentally friendly domestic mining and processing of raw materials in the EU extraction (with priority given to former coal-mining regions); iii) weakening dependency on primary CRMs through better circular use of resources, environmentally friendly products and innovation; and iv) diversifying supply with sustainable and responsible sourcing from third countries. The EU has also launched the European Raw Materials Alliance, joining together the industry, researchers, Member States and civil society to close the main gaps in the value chains.

The European Parliament has been a long-standing supporter of boosting all the elements of CRMs value chains to ensure the security of supply and weaken unwanted dependencies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Critical raw materials for the EU: Enablers of the green and digital recovery‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Critical raw materials for the EU: Enablers of the green and digital recovery’ on YouTube.

Written by Issam Hallak, Carmen-Cristina Cìrlig , Alessandro D’Alfonso , Hendrik Mildebrath, Jana Titievskaia, Frederik Scholaert, Jaan Soone, Carla Stamegna and Alex Wilson,

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On 30 December 2020, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) signed a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), concluding nearly ten months of negotiations. Since 1 January 2021, the TCA has been provisionally applied. Should the European Parliament agree to consent to the Council decision concluding the agreement, the TCA will constitute the cornerstone for a new future relationship between the EU and the UK, as it creates a single framework covering a wide range of areas of economic activity and cooperation, and allows for the broadening of those areas.

A large part of the TCA is made up of chapters touching upon economic activity. First and foremost, these envisage that trade in goods will take place under conditions of zero tariffs and quotas, although trade will now be subject to non-tariff barriers such as rules of origin. On digital trade, the TCA safeguards the primacy of data protection and privacy rules, and provides for a ban on customs duties on electronic transmission, as well as on data localisation requirements. The energy chapters grant access to wholesale markets and provide a framework for developing rules on the management of electricity and gas interconnectors; key principles of EU law will continue to apply. In air and road transport, the TCA allows operators to provide services from points in the EU to points in the UK and vice versa, with a limited number of road haulage operations allowed in each other’s territories. Regarding the movement of people, the TCA grants visa-free short-term tourism, and facilitates temporary migration for business purposes; it also provides for social security coordination for pensions, among other things. On fisheries, the TCA provides for a gradual shift of quota shares from the EU to the UK, worth a quarter of the EU’s catch value in UK waters, beyond which they can only be changed by mutual consent. The TCA also provides for compensatory measures in case of a reduction in access to waters, for example through tariffs. Finally, the negotiations dealt only marginally with financial services.

The level playing field provisions constrain the parties to maintain at least the same level of standards as prevailed on 1 January 2021, in the social, labour, and environmental areas (non-regression), and establish rebalancing mechanisms whenever significant divergences in these areas lead to ‘material impacts’ on trade or investment. These non-regression and rebalancing principles were a major source of divergence during the negotiations, and were strongly supported by the EU.

In a separate part, the TCA provides for continued cooperation in law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Among other things, it provides for the exchange of data between the parties – but without granting the UK direct access to the EU’s databases and information systems – and introduces a new surrender mechanism for those accused or convicted of crimes. The UK will also continue to cooperate with the EU agencies in this field (Europol and Eurojust), under the third-country model. The TCA also sets the general framework for UK participation in EU programmes. Based on draft protocols, still to be adopted, the UK is expected to participate in a number of programmes in the areas of research, innovation and space, including Horizon Europe. The UK will participate as a third country, subject to making a financial contribution.

The core governance component of the TCA is the Partnership Council, co-chaired by a member of the European Commission and of the UK government, and assisted by 19 specialised committees; it will oversee the attainment of the TCA objectives, and supervise its implementation and application. The TCA also provides a horizontal, as well as field-specific, dispute-settlement mechanisms, which involve decisions by arbitration tribunals or panels of experts. The format of a single agreement, coupled with a horizontal dispute-settlement mechanism linking various fields within the TCA, was another major source of divergence during the negotiations, with the EU strongly supporting this single agreement approach.

Read this complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement: An analytical overview‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.