Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die Technologie ist im Gespräch, um die Erderwärmung zu bekämpfen. In globalem Maßstab angewandt, sind ihre Risiken allerdings nicht absehbar.

With the establishment of the sustainable development goals (SDGs), countries worldwide agreed to a prosperous, socially inclusive, and environmentally sustainable future for all. This ambition, however, exposes a critical gap in science-based insights, namely on how to achieve the 17 SDGs simultaneously. Quantitative goal-seeking scenario studies could help explore the needed systems' transformations. This requires a clear definition of the "target space." The 169 targets and 232 indicators used for monitoring SDG implementation cannot be used for this; they are too many, too broad, unstructured, and sometimes not formulated quantitatively. Here, we propose a streamlined set of science-based indicators and associated target values that are quantifiable and actionable to make scenario analysis meaningful, relevant, and simple enough to be transparent and communicable. The 36 targets are based on the SDGs, existing multilateral agreements, literature, and expert assessment. They include 2050 as a longer-term reference point. This target space can guide researchers in developing new sustainable development pathways.

With the establishment of the sustainable development goals (SDGs), countries worldwide agreed to a prosperous, socially inclusive, and environmentally sustainable future for all. This ambition, however, exposes a critical gap in science-based insights, namely on how to achieve the 17 SDGs simultaneously. Quantitative goal-seeking scenario studies could help explore the needed systems' transformations. This requires a clear definition of the "target space." The 169 targets and 232 indicators used for monitoring SDG implementation cannot be used for this; they are too many, too broad, unstructured, and sometimes not formulated quantitatively. Here, we propose a streamlined set of science-based indicators and associated target values that are quantifiable and actionable to make scenario analysis meaningful, relevant, and simple enough to be transparent and communicable. The 36 targets are based on the SDGs, existing multilateral agreements, literature, and expert assessment. They include 2050 as a longer-term reference point. This target space can guide researchers in developing new sustainable development pathways.

With the establishment of the sustainable development goals (SDGs), countries worldwide agreed to a prosperous, socially inclusive, and environmentally sustainable future for all. This ambition, however, exposes a critical gap in science-based insights, namely on how to achieve the 17 SDGs simultaneously. Quantitative goal-seeking scenario studies could help explore the needed systems' transformations. This requires a clear definition of the "target space." The 169 targets and 232 indicators used for monitoring SDG implementation cannot be used for this; they are too many, too broad, unstructured, and sometimes not formulated quantitatively. Here, we propose a streamlined set of science-based indicators and associated target values that are quantifiable and actionable to make scenario analysis meaningful, relevant, and simple enough to be transparent and communicable. The 36 targets are based on the SDGs, existing multilateral agreements, literature, and expert assessment. They include 2050 as a longer-term reference point. This target space can guide researchers in developing new sustainable development pathways.

With its unique multilateral assets, the United Nations Development System (UNDS) should be playing a key role in assisting governments and other stakeholders with their implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. But this requires change. Despite improvements in recent decades, too often the UNDS has continued to act as a loose assemblage of competing entities, undermining its effective support for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) implementation. It is against that backdrop that the UNDS has been undergoing an extensive reform – that was decided on in 2018 and has been implemented since 2019 – to provide more coherent, integrated support in line with requirements of the 2030 Agenda to United Nations (UN) programme countries. What effects have the reforms yielded at the country level? This paper presents the main findings, conclusions and recommendations from our research on UNDS reform implementation. It does so with a focus on reform-induced changes towards what we call a strengthened, collective offer at the country level. Overall, our research shows that reform implementation is moving the needle on the quality of the collective offer. In particular, with regard to its institutional element, we observed that the reform has fostered change in how UN country teams work together that is in line with what the 2030 Agenda demands. Institutional changes allow for increased cross-organisational and cross-sectoral coordination, which could potentially lead to increased policy coherence. But while we see substantial progress, it remains incomplete, fragile and subject to structural limitations. A more critical picture emerges with regard to change in the substantive component of the collective offer in the areas of SDG integration, cross-border work and normative approaches. While there were positive examples, we found little evidence of a systematic repositioning in these areas. The adjustment of the UNDS to the 2030 Agenda does not (yet) meet the expectations derived from the UN’s own reform ambition.

With its unique multilateral assets, the United Nations Development System (UNDS) should be playing a key role in assisting governments and other stakeholders with their implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. But this requires change. Despite improvements in recent decades, too often the UNDS has continued to act as a loose assemblage of competing entities, undermining its effective support for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) implementation. It is against that backdrop that the UNDS has been undergoing an extensive reform – that was decided on in 2018 and has been implemented since 2019 – to provide more coherent, integrated support in line with requirements of the 2030 Agenda to United Nations (UN) programme countries. What effects have the reforms yielded at the country level? This paper presents the main findings, conclusions and recommendations from our research on UNDS reform implementation. It does so with a focus on reform-induced changes towards what we call a strengthened, collective offer at the country level. Overall, our research shows that reform implementation is moving the needle on the quality of the collective offer. In particular, with regard to its institutional element, we observed that the reform has fostered change in how UN country teams work together that is in line with what the 2030 Agenda demands. Institutional changes allow for increased cross-organisational and cross-sectoral coordination, which could potentially lead to increased policy coherence. But while we see substantial progress, it remains incomplete, fragile and subject to structural limitations. A more critical picture emerges with regard to change in the substantive component of the collective offer in the areas of SDG integration, cross-border work and normative approaches. While there were positive examples, we found little evidence of a systematic repositioning in these areas. The adjustment of the UNDS to the 2030 Agenda does not (yet) meet the expectations derived from the UN’s own reform ambition.

With its unique multilateral assets, the United Nations Development System (UNDS) should be playing a key role in assisting governments and other stakeholders with their implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. But this requires change. Despite improvements in recent decades, too often the UNDS has continued to act as a loose assemblage of competing entities, undermining its effective support for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) implementation. It is against that backdrop that the UNDS has been undergoing an extensive reform – that was decided on in 2018 and has been implemented since 2019 – to provide more coherent, integrated support in line with requirements of the 2030 Agenda to United Nations (UN) programme countries. What effects have the reforms yielded at the country level? This paper presents the main findings, conclusions and recommendations from our research on UNDS reform implementation. It does so with a focus on reform-induced changes towards what we call a strengthened, collective offer at the country level. Overall, our research shows that reform implementation is moving the needle on the quality of the collective offer. In particular, with regard to its institutional element, we observed that the reform has fostered change in how UN country teams work together that is in line with what the 2030 Agenda demands. Institutional changes allow for increased cross-organisational and cross-sectoral coordination, which could potentially lead to increased policy coherence. But while we see substantial progress, it remains incomplete, fragile and subject to structural limitations. A more critical picture emerges with regard to change in the substantive component of the collective offer in the areas of SDG integration, cross-border work and normative approaches. While there were positive examples, we found little evidence of a systematic repositioning in these areas. The adjustment of the UNDS to the 2030 Agenda does not (yet) meet the expectations derived from the UN’s own reform ambition.

Climate change and development are strongly interconnected. An efficient use of financial resources therefore requires alignment between climate finance and development priorities, as set out in the context of both the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In this paper, we investigate to what extent climate-related official development assistance (ODA) before and after the Paris Agreement adoption supports the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, we assess to what extent donors align this finance with recipient countries’ climate-related priorities as spelled out in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). First, we find that climate-relevant ODA contributes to multiple SDGs, above all SDG7 (energy) and SDG11 (cities). Second, we find that there is substantial alignment between donors’ and recipients’ SDG priorities, but that this alignment has not improved in recent years, since the conclusion of the Paris Agreement. Third, we find that although climate finance continues to be allocated more to climate-change mitigation than to adaptation, the difference has become smaller in recent years. This has reduced the misalignment with recipient countries’ NDC climate activities, which focus more on adaptation than on mitigation. Overall, we identify coherence, gaps and opportunities for further alignment of climate and development actions and related finance. Such an alignment is essential to increase the likelihood of implementation of the two international agreements and to ensure that action is guided by recipient countries’ needs.

Climate change and development are strongly interconnected. An efficient use of financial resources therefore requires alignment between climate finance and development priorities, as set out in the context of both the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In this paper, we investigate to what extent climate-related official development assistance (ODA) before and after the Paris Agreement adoption supports the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, we assess to what extent donors align this finance with recipient countries’ climate-related priorities as spelled out in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). First, we find that climate-relevant ODA contributes to multiple SDGs, above all SDG7 (energy) and SDG11 (cities). Second, we find that there is substantial alignment between donors’ and recipients’ SDG priorities, but that this alignment has not improved in recent years, since the conclusion of the Paris Agreement. Third, we find that although climate finance continues to be allocated more to climate-change mitigation than to adaptation, the difference has become smaller in recent years. This has reduced the misalignment with recipient countries’ NDC climate activities, which focus more on adaptation than on mitigation. Overall, we identify coherence, gaps and opportunities for further alignment of climate and development actions and related finance. Such an alignment is essential to increase the likelihood of implementation of the two international agreements and to ensure that action is guided by recipient countries’ needs.

Climate change and development are strongly interconnected. An efficient use of financial resources therefore requires alignment between climate finance and development priorities, as set out in the context of both the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In this paper, we investigate to what extent climate-related official development assistance (ODA) before and after the Paris Agreement adoption supports the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, we assess to what extent donors align this finance with recipient countries’ climate-related priorities as spelled out in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). First, we find that climate-relevant ODA contributes to multiple SDGs, above all SDG7 (energy) and SDG11 (cities). Second, we find that there is substantial alignment between donors’ and recipients’ SDG priorities, but that this alignment has not improved in recent years, since the conclusion of the Paris Agreement. Third, we find that although climate finance continues to be allocated more to climate-change mitigation than to adaptation, the difference has become smaller in recent years. This has reduced the misalignment with recipient countries’ NDC climate activities, which focus more on adaptation than on mitigation. Overall, we identify coherence, gaps and opportunities for further alignment of climate and development actions and related finance. Such an alignment is essential to increase the likelihood of implementation of the two international agreements and to ensure that action is guided by recipient countries’ needs.

Digitalization is a disruptive megatrend which cannot be stopped but needs to be steered and used. Just how regulators should respond to it is less clear. For instance, Jordanian authorities faced the boom of the ride-hailing platform Careem, now an Uber subsidiary, in Jordan’s capital Amman. They were forced to choose between licensing Careem, and thus allowing flexible yet informal job creation, or protecting the entrenched taxi businesses. Against the backdrop of Jordan’s dire economic situation and rampant unemployment figures, regulators decided for a middle way, licensing ride-hailing platforms, yet limiting their growth and confining them to an upmarket line of business. As this paper demonstrates, this approach created new fractions and insider-outsider dynamics on the labour market.
The paper draws on interviews with Careem and taxi drivers, as well as expert interviews with staff and customers in 2019 to show (i) how Careem drivers’ employment situation allowed for comparatively high income opportunities but exposed them to considerable financial risks also due to obligatory car ownership, and (ii) how regulators’ differentiated approach created fairer competition but also led to labour market segmentation by distorting wage levels and incentives for the highly-skilled, who also experience de-skilling while working outside their professional field. Vulnerabilities and precarious working conditions were further exposed during the Covid-19 lockdowns.

Digitalization is a disruptive megatrend which cannot be stopped but needs to be steered and used. Just how regulators should respond to it is less clear. For instance, Jordanian authorities faced the boom of the ride-hailing platform Careem, now an Uber subsidiary, in Jordan’s capital Amman. They were forced to choose between licensing Careem, and thus allowing flexible yet informal job creation, or protecting the entrenched taxi businesses. Against the backdrop of Jordan’s dire economic situation and rampant unemployment figures, regulators decided for a middle way, licensing ride-hailing platforms, yet limiting their growth and confining them to an upmarket line of business. As this paper demonstrates, this approach created new fractions and insider-outsider dynamics on the labour market.
The paper draws on interviews with Careem and taxi drivers, as well as expert interviews with staff and customers in 2019 to show (i) how Careem drivers’ employment situation allowed for comparatively high income opportunities but exposed them to considerable financial risks also due to obligatory car ownership, and (ii) how regulators’ differentiated approach created fairer competition but also led to labour market segmentation by distorting wage levels and incentives for the highly-skilled, who also experience de-skilling while working outside their professional field. Vulnerabilities and precarious working conditions were further exposed during the Covid-19 lockdowns.

Digitalization is a disruptive megatrend which cannot be stopped but needs to be steered and used. Just how regulators should respond to it is less clear. For instance, Jordanian authorities faced the boom of the ride-hailing platform Careem, now an Uber subsidiary, in Jordan’s capital Amman. They were forced to choose between licensing Careem, and thus allowing flexible yet informal job creation, or protecting the entrenched taxi businesses. Against the backdrop of Jordan’s dire economic situation and rampant unemployment figures, regulators decided for a middle way, licensing ride-hailing platforms, yet limiting their growth and confining them to an upmarket line of business. As this paper demonstrates, this approach created new fractions and insider-outsider dynamics on the labour market.
The paper draws on interviews with Careem and taxi drivers, as well as expert interviews with staff and customers in 2019 to show (i) how Careem drivers’ employment situation allowed for comparatively high income opportunities but exposed them to considerable financial risks also due to obligatory car ownership, and (ii) how regulators’ differentiated approach created fairer competition but also led to labour market segmentation by distorting wage levels and incentives for the highly-skilled, who also experience de-skilling while working outside their professional field. Vulnerabilities and precarious working conditions were further exposed during the Covid-19 lockdowns.

The development and application of advanced manufacturing technologies (known as Industry 4.0) have been enabled by the fast-paced process of digital transformation. These transformations are expected to have major implications on the reorganisation of global value chains as well as on labour markets. For late-industrialising countries, Industry 4.0 brings both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it opens opportunities in terms of improving competitiveness, learning and export markets. On the other hand, however, it may devalue the traditional competitive advantage based on low labour costs, creating difficult-to-tackle challenges on labour markets related to unemployment and new demands for reskilling and upskilling. This paper explores these aspects through the lens of one country, Morocco, and two very different sectors: automotive and apparel. Morocco is a lower-middle-income country that has capitalised on its proximity to Europe and succeeded in developing a dynamic export-oriented automotive industry. The garment sector, which is critical for employment, has been generally neglected by the industrial development strategies. However, Industry 4.0 and its implications on global value chains are likely to affect both sectors, although in different ways. Our analysis clearly shows that interventions must be tailored to the different degrees of technological readiness. The automotive sector is driven more by the needs of major original equipment manufacturers. Therefore, industrial policy should focus on setting the framework conditions, enabling upgrading by investing in research and development, and shifting incentives towards facilitating local suppliers to better integrate with higher-tier suppliers. In the garment sector, policy interventions need to be more comprehensive, from developing a long-term vision to building awareness on technological upgrading and new business models enabled by digitalisation and automation. Moreover, there is extensive scope for industrial policy to contribute to building basic technological and knowledge capabilities all along the garment supply chain and to attracting investment.

The development and application of advanced manufacturing technologies (known as Industry 4.0) have been enabled by the fast-paced process of digital transformation. These transformations are expected to have major implications on the reorganisation of global value chains as well as on labour markets. For late-industrialising countries, Industry 4.0 brings both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it opens opportunities in terms of improving competitiveness, learning and export markets. On the other hand, however, it may devalue the traditional competitive advantage based on low labour costs, creating difficult-to-tackle challenges on labour markets related to unemployment and new demands for reskilling and upskilling. This paper explores these aspects through the lens of one country, Morocco, and two very different sectors: automotive and apparel. Morocco is a lower-middle-income country that has capitalised on its proximity to Europe and succeeded in developing a dynamic export-oriented automotive industry. The garment sector, which is critical for employment, has been generally neglected by the industrial development strategies. However, Industry 4.0 and its implications on global value chains are likely to affect both sectors, although in different ways. Our analysis clearly shows that interventions must be tailored to the different degrees of technological readiness. The automotive sector is driven more by the needs of major original equipment manufacturers. Therefore, industrial policy should focus on setting the framework conditions, enabling upgrading by investing in research and development, and shifting incentives towards facilitating local suppliers to better integrate with higher-tier suppliers. In the garment sector, policy interventions need to be more comprehensive, from developing a long-term vision to building awareness on technological upgrading and new business models enabled by digitalisation and automation. Moreover, there is extensive scope for industrial policy to contribute to building basic technological and knowledge capabilities all along the garment supply chain and to attracting investment.

The development and application of advanced manufacturing technologies (known as Industry 4.0) have been enabled by the fast-paced process of digital transformation. These transformations are expected to have major implications on the reorganisation of global value chains as well as on labour markets. For late-industrialising countries, Industry 4.0 brings both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it opens opportunities in terms of improving competitiveness, learning and export markets. On the other hand, however, it may devalue the traditional competitive advantage based on low labour costs, creating difficult-to-tackle challenges on labour markets related to unemployment and new demands for reskilling and upskilling. This paper explores these aspects through the lens of one country, Morocco, and two very different sectors: automotive and apparel. Morocco is a lower-middle-income country that has capitalised on its proximity to Europe and succeeded in developing a dynamic export-oriented automotive industry. The garment sector, which is critical for employment, has been generally neglected by the industrial development strategies. However, Industry 4.0 and its implications on global value chains are likely to affect both sectors, although in different ways. Our analysis clearly shows that interventions must be tailored to the different degrees of technological readiness. The automotive sector is driven more by the needs of major original equipment manufacturers. Therefore, industrial policy should focus on setting the framework conditions, enabling upgrading by investing in research and development, and shifting incentives towards facilitating local suppliers to better integrate with higher-tier suppliers. In the garment sector, policy interventions need to be more comprehensive, from developing a long-term vision to building awareness on technological upgrading and new business models enabled by digitalisation and automation. Moreover, there is extensive scope for industrial policy to contribute to building basic technological and knowledge capabilities all along the garment supply chain and to attracting investment.

Am 1. Januar 2022 hat Frankreich die EU-Ratspräsidentschaft übernommen. Unter dem Motto relance, puissance, appartenance (Aufschwung, Stärke, Zugehörigkeitsgefühl) setzt sich die französische Regierung für ein neues Modell des Wirtschaftswachstums und für ein souveräneres, menschlicheres und bürgernahes Europa ein. Frankreich ist bekannt für seine übergreifenden Visionen und das Setzen von Impulsen für den Integrationsprozess, was manchmal auch zu Reibereien mit anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten führt.

In der auswärtigen Politik plant die französische Ratspräsidentschaft, die Partnerschaft zwischen Afrika und der EU zu stärken. Die erste mögliche Gelegenheit zur Verwirklichung dieses Ziels ist der bevorstehende EU-AU-Gipfel am 17. und 18. Februar. Zudem ist das Zusammentreffen der französischen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft und des deutschen G7-Vorsitzes ein günstiger Zeitpunkt, um die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit in Afrika zu stärken. Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den beiden größten EU-Mitgliedsstaaten ist wichtig, da die bevorstehenden Präsidentschafts- und Parlamentswahlen in Frankreich im April und Juni 2022 es der französischen Regierung erschweren könnten, ihre ehrgeizigen Pläne vollständig umzusetzen.

Frankreich und Deutschland haben in ihrer Außenpolitik oft unterschiedliche Strategien verfolgt, insbesondere in Bezug auf Afrika. Dieses Mal bieten die französischen Prioritäten jedoch mehrere Ansatzpunkte, um die außenpolitische Agenda der Ampelkoalition zu erfüllen und die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit in der EU-Entwicklungspolitik voranzutreiben. Die neuen „Team-Europe“-Initiativen geben den EU-Mitgliedstaaten mehr Spielraum für gemeinsames Handeln. Die beiden Partner können vier wichtige Themen vorantreiben: Frieden und Entwicklung im Sahel, die EU-Afrika-Handelsbeziehungen, die externe Dimension des Green Deal und die entwicklungspolitische Digitalisierungsagenda.

Erstens engagieren sich Frankreich und Deutschland im Sahel sowohl militärisch, wie im Rahmen von Operation Barkhane oder durch ihre Beiträge zu UN- und EU-Missionen, als auch durch bi- und multilaterale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Während Frankreich sich für eine verstärkte Terrorismusbekämpfung einsetzt, befürwortet Deutschland die Stärkung ziviler Konfliktbearbeitung. Die Verschlechterung der Sicherheitslage in der Region, die Ankündigung der malischen Militärjunta, die Wahlen bis 2025 zu verschieben, zunehmende Spannungen mit Frankreich und anderen internationalen Partnern und die Ankunft russischer Söldner in Mali haben in vielen europäischen Hauptstädten Zweifel aufkommen lassen, ob und wie sie ihr Engagement im Sahel fortsetzen sollen. Frankreich und Deutschland sollten eine gemeinsame Initiative für eine koordinierte Reaktion der EU starten, um ihr Engagement in der Region neu zu definieren.

Zweitens ist die Unterstützung der Afrikanischen Kontinentalen Freihandelszone (AfCFTA) eine gemeinsame Priorität beider Regierungen. Die AfCFTA ist ein ehrgeiziges Integrationsprojekt, das den Handel auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent erleichtert und zu grundlegenden Reformen afrikanischer Volkswirtschaften beiträgt. Die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit kann eine Schlüsselrolle bei der Koordinierung der EU-Unterstützung für die AfCFTA spielen und die Kohärenz auf allen Ebenen und bei allen thematischen Prioritäten fördern. Um eine „zukunftsorientierte Allianz mit Afrika“ zu verwirklichen, sollten beide Partner einen Reflexionsprozess über die Konsolidierung des Flickenteppichs von bilateralen und regionalen Handelsabkommen der EU vorantreiben.

Drittens unterstützen Frankreich und Deutschland das Ziel, Europa bis 2050 kohlenstoffneutral zu machen. Allerdings haben sie auch unterschiedliche Ansichten darüber, wie dieses Ziel erreicht werden kann. Dies hat der Streit über den Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission, Atomkraft und Gas als grüne Investitionen zu bezeichnen, gezeigt. Viele afrikanische Staaten befürchten die Schaffung neuer Abhängigkeiten durch den europäischen Green Deal und das CO2-Grenzausgleichssytem. Daher muss die EU in einen umfassenden Dialog mit ihren afrikanischen Partnern eintreten. Als Vorreiter in der Klimapolitik können Frankreich und Deutschland ihr Know-how und ihre Innovationen bündeln, um eine globale grüne Agenda zu unterstützen. Gleichzeitig sollten sie den strategischen Interessen afrikanischer Staaten und deren eigener Klima-Agenda mehr Aufmerksamkeit schenken.

Viertens möchten beide Partner die digitale Souveränität der EU stärken. Dazu gehört nicht nur die Verbesserung der Regulierung und Innovationsförderung in Europa. Neue globale digitale Partnerschaften sind notwendig; ein Fakt, der durch Deutschlands Engagement für eine „aktive digitale Außenpolitik“ anerkannt wird. Die Stärkung digitaler Partnerschaften mit Afrika kann dazu beitragen, eine europäische Vision einer digitalen Zukunft zu fördern und eine Partnerschaft auf Augenhöhe zu unterstützen.

Deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit in diesen vier Dossiers kann nicht nur zu einer erfolgreichen französischen Ratspräsidentschaft beitragen, sondern auch zu einer engeren Partnerschaft zwischen Afrika und Europa. „Allez les deux”.