Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Current global crises are complex. Tackling issues separately or in sequence will be futile. Transformation can happen only when multiple issues are tackled at the same time. To help do so, a new study by UNDP’s Oslo Governance Centre (OGC) and the German Development Institute (DIE/GDI) investigates how aspects of SDG 16 that are considered critical features of governance institutions – transparency, accountability and inclusion – help or hinder progress on key dimensions of SDG 1 on poverty and SDG 10 on inequality. The study is the first attempt to consolidate evidence on this link and fills a gap in the existing literature on how different SDGs can reinforce each other.
Based on a scoping literature review of 400+ academic papers, the study finds empirical evidence from across the globe that investing in accountable, transparent and inclusive governance can boost the reduction of poverty and inequality. For example, in election years, social benefits are better targeted to those with low incomes; reducing corruption is positively correlated with access to education and improved literacy rates; and civil society engagement enables the provision of health care access. It offers initial policy insights on why, how and with whom national actors can use the employed methodology to identify, prioritize and sequence governance policies with ‘booster effects’ in their own country.

While cities are important emitters of greenhouse gases (GHG), they are also vulnerable to the impacts of climate change; at the same time they constitute innovation hubs for climate action. For cities to fulfil their potential for global climate action, a thorough understanding of the governance of transformative change towards the decarbonisation of cities is necessary.
This study asks: Which governance approaches facilitate successful transformative change towards zero carbon in cities? It specifically addresses the three key aspects stakeholder involvement, financing, and impact assessment, and looks at how they contribute to transformative change – particularly to the dimensions CO2 reduction, the dynamics of transformation, and acceptance by citizens.
The empirical analysis is based on a mixed methods approach. An international survey involving city government officials of cities that are proactive in the fight against climate change was conducted in order to obtain an overview of socio-ecological transformation paths. In addition to this macro-level approach, in-depth case studies of three cities that are widely regarded as proactive on climate action in their respective world regions – Bonn, Quito and Cape Town – provide complementary insights.
The survey data show a generally positive tendency in the way local governments approach GHG emission reduction activities. Most of the participating cities engage in the mainstreaming of policies to address climate change in local decision-making and have established climate action plans and emission reduction targets; however, on actual climate action and the reduction of emissions, the picture is more mixed.
While stakeholder involvement is generally considered a key success factor in the survey responses and in the three case-study cities, stakeholders were seldom involved in a truly inclusive and cooperative way. While Bonn has gradually expanded citizen engagement, in Quito relations between the local government and stakeholder groups have often been short-term and project-bound, while a close connection between city government and academic institutions has been established in Cape Town.
In terms of finance, cities mostly rely on traditional financing sources such as intergovernmental transfers, local taxes and fees, as well as international grants to cities of the Global South. Additional funding through the generation of local revenues or market-based finance mechanisms is less widespread. Both Quito and Cape Town depend heavily on external funding from international organisations and donors, along with central government transfers, which are less relevant in Bonn. While building the metro is absorbing finances for additional climate action in Quito, perverse incentives exist in South Africa where cities receive revenues from re-selling fossil fuel-based energy to consumers. Bonn has recently started to experiment with a sustainability budget to align budgeting with sustainability and climate goals.
As far as impact assessment is concerned, most cities in the survey including the three case-study cities collect relevant data. However, systematic impact assessment or the incorporation of lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation into policy occur less frequently.
Despite its limitations, this study contributes to the theoretical and empirical discussions in the field of transformative urban governance by suggesting a conceptual framework for dimensions of success for transformative change, by combining survey and case study-based data, and by looking at finances and impact assessment which are two important governance dimensions that are not frequently investigated.

While cities are important emitters of greenhouse gases (GHG), they are also vulnerable to the impacts of climate change; at the same time they constitute innovation hubs for climate action. For cities to fulfil their potential for global climate action, a thorough understanding of the governance of transformative change towards the decarbonisation of cities is necessary.
This study asks: Which governance approaches facilitate successful transformative change towards zero carbon in cities? It specifically addresses the three key aspects stakeholder involvement, financing, and impact assessment, and looks at how they contribute to transformative change – particularly to the dimensions CO2 reduction, the dynamics of transformation, and acceptance by citizens.
The empirical analysis is based on a mixed methods approach. An international survey involving city government officials of cities that are proactive in the fight against climate change was conducted in order to obtain an overview of socio-ecological transformation paths. In addition to this macro-level approach, in-depth case studies of three cities that are widely regarded as proactive on climate action in their respective world regions – Bonn, Quito and Cape Town – provide complementary insights.
The survey data show a generally positive tendency in the way local governments approach GHG emission reduction activities. Most of the participating cities engage in the mainstreaming of policies to address climate change in local decision-making and have established climate action plans and emission reduction targets; however, on actual climate action and the reduction of emissions, the picture is more mixed.
While stakeholder involvement is generally considered a key success factor in the survey responses and in the three case-study cities, stakeholders were seldom involved in a truly inclusive and cooperative way. While Bonn has gradually expanded citizen engagement, in Quito relations between the local government and stakeholder groups have often been short-term and project-bound, while a close connection between city government and academic institutions has been established in Cape Town.
In terms of finance, cities mostly rely on traditional financing sources such as intergovernmental transfers, local taxes and fees, as well as international grants to cities of the Global South. Additional funding through the generation of local revenues or market-based finance mechanisms is less widespread. Both Quito and Cape Town depend heavily on external funding from international organisations and donors, along with central government transfers, which are less relevant in Bonn. While building the metro is absorbing finances for additional climate action in Quito, perverse incentives exist in South Africa where cities receive revenues from re-selling fossil fuel-based energy to consumers. Bonn has recently started to experiment with a sustainability budget to align budgeting with sustainability and climate goals.
As far as impact assessment is concerned, most cities in the survey including the three case-study cities collect relevant data. However, systematic impact assessment or the incorporation of lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation into policy occur less frequently.
Despite its limitations, this study contributes to the theoretical and empirical discussions in the field of transformative urban governance by suggesting a conceptual framework for dimensions of success for transformative change, by combining survey and case study-based data, and by looking at finances and impact assessment which are two important governance dimensions that are not frequently investigated.

While cities are important emitters of greenhouse gases (GHG), they are also vulnerable to the impacts of climate change; at the same time they constitute innovation hubs for climate action. For cities to fulfil their potential for global climate action, a thorough understanding of the governance of transformative change towards the decarbonisation of cities is necessary.
This study asks: Which governance approaches facilitate successful transformative change towards zero carbon in cities? It specifically addresses the three key aspects stakeholder involvement, financing, and impact assessment, and looks at how they contribute to transformative change – particularly to the dimensions CO2 reduction, the dynamics of transformation, and acceptance by citizens.
The empirical analysis is based on a mixed methods approach. An international survey involving city government officials of cities that are proactive in the fight against climate change was conducted in order to obtain an overview of socio-ecological transformation paths. In addition to this macro-level approach, in-depth case studies of three cities that are widely regarded as proactive on climate action in their respective world regions – Bonn, Quito and Cape Town – provide complementary insights.
The survey data show a generally positive tendency in the way local governments approach GHG emission reduction activities. Most of the participating cities engage in the mainstreaming of policies to address climate change in local decision-making and have established climate action plans and emission reduction targets; however, on actual climate action and the reduction of emissions, the picture is more mixed.
While stakeholder involvement is generally considered a key success factor in the survey responses and in the three case-study cities, stakeholders were seldom involved in a truly inclusive and cooperative way. While Bonn has gradually expanded citizen engagement, in Quito relations between the local government and stakeholder groups have often been short-term and project-bound, while a close connection between city government and academic institutions has been established in Cape Town.
In terms of finance, cities mostly rely on traditional financing sources such as intergovernmental transfers, local taxes and fees, as well as international grants to cities of the Global South. Additional funding through the generation of local revenues or market-based finance mechanisms is less widespread. Both Quito and Cape Town depend heavily on external funding from international organisations and donors, along with central government transfers, which are less relevant in Bonn. While building the metro is absorbing finances for additional climate action in Quito, perverse incentives exist in South Africa where cities receive revenues from re-selling fossil fuel-based energy to consumers. Bonn has recently started to experiment with a sustainability budget to align budgeting with sustainability and climate goals.
As far as impact assessment is concerned, most cities in the survey including the three case-study cities collect relevant data. However, systematic impact assessment or the incorporation of lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation into policy occur less frequently.
Despite its limitations, this study contributes to the theoretical and empirical discussions in the field of transformative urban governance by suggesting a conceptual framework for dimensions of success for transformative change, by combining survey and case study-based data, and by looking at finances and impact assessment which are two important governance dimensions that are not frequently investigated.

Kenya had awaited the presidential elections held on August 9, 2022 with bated breath. The elections were won by William Ruto, who defeated opponent Raila Odinga by just a few percentage points. Ruto succeeds Uhuru Kenyatta, who leaves office having served his two permitted terms. This Spotlight analyzes the reasons for Ruto’s success, and, reflecting on his political career, discusses what can be expected from his presidency. We argue that both his success and his career have been strongly influenced by Kenya’s political history and the power structures of political alliances—especially in the context of previous elections.

Kenya had awaited the presidential elections held on August 9, 2022 with bated breath. The elections were won by William Ruto, who defeated opponent Raila Odinga by just a few percentage points. Ruto succeeds Uhuru Kenyatta, who leaves office having served his two permitted terms. This Spotlight analyzes the reasons for Ruto’s success, and, reflecting on his political career, discusses what can be expected from his presidency. We argue that both his success and his career have been strongly influenced by Kenya’s political history and the power structures of political alliances—especially in the context of previous elections.

Kenya had awaited the presidential elections held on August 9, 2022 with bated breath. The elections were won by William Ruto, who defeated opponent Raila Odinga by just a few percentage points. Ruto succeeds Uhuru Kenyatta, who leaves office having served his two permitted terms. This Spotlight analyzes the reasons for Ruto’s success, and, reflecting on his political career, discusses what can be expected from his presidency. We argue that both his success and his career have been strongly influenced by Kenya’s political history and the power structures of political alliances—especially in the context of previous elections.

Bonn, 07.11.2022. Ägypten bezeichnet das hochrangige Segment der UN-Klimakonferenz 2022 (COP27) in Sharm El Sheikh als „Klima-Umsetzungsgipfel“ und betont damit, dass die nationalen Klimapläne (NDCs) rasch umgesetzt werden müssen. Die derzeitigen Zusagen der Regierungen bleiben jedoch weit hinter dem zurück, was sie ursprünglich versprochen haben. Eine Umsetzung allein dieser Zusagen wäre gleichbedeutend mit der Aufgabe des erklärten Anspruchs, die globale Erwärmung auf 1,5°C zu begrenzen. Sich ausschließlich auf die Umsetzung von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zu konzentrieren, könnte zudem zu Zielkonflikten mit anderen Aspekten der nachhaltigen Entwicklung führen, einschließlich des Schutzes und der Wiederherstellung der Natur.

Die Regierungen und andere Akteure müssen über die bloße Umsetzung der bisherigen Zusagen hinausgehen und ihre Ambitionen erhöhen. Auf der letztjährigen Klimakonferenz in Glasgow (COP26) wurde eine noch nie dagewesene Zahl von Unternehmen, Städten und anderen nichtstaatlichen und subnationalen Akteuren mobilisiert. Sie verpflichteten sich freiwillig zur Klimaneutralität (Race to Zero), zur Mobilisierung von Finanzmitteln (Glasgow Financial Action for Net Zero, GFANZ) und zum Aufbau von Widerstandsfähigkeit in gefährdeten Gemeinschaften (Race to Resilience). Für die Regierungen bietet sich eine enorme Chance, den Ehrgeiz dieser Akteure zur Senkung der Emissionen, zur Mobilisierung von Finanzmitteln und zum Aufbau von Anpassungsfähigkeiten zu nutzen. Und doch haben nur eine Handvoll Regierungen (fünf Prozent) in ihren NDCs auf freiwillige nichtstaatliche und subnationale Maßnahmen verwiesen (UNFCCC 2022).

Es ist verständlich, dass die Regierungen das Potenzial der nichtstaatlichen und subnationalen Akteure nur zögerlich erkannt haben. Große Versprechungen zu machen ist einfach, glaubwürdige Maßnahmen umzusetzen ist eine andere Sache. Und selbst wenn nichtstaatliche und subnationale Akteure ihre Versprechen einhalten würden, bräuchten Regierungen verlässliche Daten und Analysen, um ihren Beitrag einschätzen zu können.

Ein wichtiger Schritt zur Bereitstellung solcher Daten und Analysen ist die Veröffentlichung des Berichts "Global Climate Action 2022: how have international initiatives delivered, and what more is possible" des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), der Radboud University, dem NewClimate Institute, der University of Oxford, der Utrecht University und dem DataDriven Envirolab at UNC Chapel Hill. In dem Bericht wird der Beitrag von mehr als 600 Initiativen zur Dekarbonisierung und Klimaresilienz bewertet. Eine wichtige Erkenntnis ist die Tatsache, dass mehr als die Hälfte der großen Klimainitiativen, die seit 2014 auf UN-Klimakonferenzen und -Gipfeln ins Leben gerufen wurden, nicht die notwendigen Verhaltensänderungen oder Verbesserungen bei Umweltindikatoren (einschließlich der Reduzierung von Treibhausgasemissionen) bewirken. Darüber hinaus schneiden Initiativen, die in erster Linie auf den Aufbau von Resilienz und Anpassungsfähigkeit abzielen, schlechter ab als Initiativen zur Eindämmung des Klimawandels. Dies ist ein Problem für nachhaltige Entwicklung im weiteren Sinne. Am Race to Zero haben sich beispielsweise mehr als 8000 Unternehmen, 500 Investoren, 1000 Städte und 1000 Bildungseinrichtungen beteiligt, die sich verpflichtet haben, bis spätestens 2050 “Netto Null- Kohlenstoffemissionen zu erreichen. Die Verwendung von Kohlenstoffkompensationen, z. B. durch groß angelegte Baumpflanzungen, könnte jedoch andere Aspekte der nachhaltigen Entwicklung beeinträchtigen. Eine ausschließliche Konzentration auf die Emissionsreduzierung ist daher keine Option: Netto-Null-Verpflichtungen müssen mit dem Schutz und der Wiederherstellung natürlicher Ökosysteme in Einklang gebracht werden.

Da in diesem Jahr sowohl die UN-Klimakonferenz als auch die UN-Biodiversitätskonferenz stattfinden, bietet die COP27 eine wichtige Gelegenheit, Natur- und Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zu integrieren. So wird IDOS zusammen mit dem Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research an der York University, der Zoological Society of London, der Sociedade de Pesquisa em Vida Selvagem e Educação Ambiental (SPVS) und der Boticário Group Foundation ein offizielles Side-Event auf der COP27 ausrichten, um zu diskutieren, wie naturbasierte Klimamaßnahmen in Städten gleichzeitig die Natur und die Gesundheit des Planeten schützen und wiederherstellen und gleichzeitig zur Erreichung der Klimaziele beitragen können. Solche Überlegungen zwischen Forscher*innen, politischen Entscheidungstragenden und Praktiker*innen sind der Schlüssel, um einseitige Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zu verhindern und Kompromisse mit der Natur und der Gesundheit des Planeten zu vermeiden.

Sander Chan ist assoziierter Wissenschaftler am German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), Assistenzprofessor am Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, Nijmegen School of Management an der Radboud University und Principal Researcher in der Synergies of Planetary Health Research Initiative & Lab, Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research.

Idil Boran ist assoziierte Wissenschaftlerin am German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) und Professorin für Applied Environmental Governance and Public Policy an der Faculty of Liberal and Professional Studies, York University.  An der York University leitet Boran die Synergies of Planetary Health Research Initiative & Lab am Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research und fungiert als stellvertretende Direktorin von CIFAL York.

Andrew Denault ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

Bonn, 07.11.2022. Ägypten bezeichnet das hochrangige Segment der UN-Klimakonferenz 2022 (COP27) in Sharm El Sheikh als „Klima-Umsetzungsgipfel“ und betont damit, dass die nationalen Klimapläne (NDCs) rasch umgesetzt werden müssen. Die derzeitigen Zusagen der Regierungen bleiben jedoch weit hinter dem zurück, was sie ursprünglich versprochen haben. Eine Umsetzung allein dieser Zusagen wäre gleichbedeutend mit der Aufgabe des erklärten Anspruchs, die globale Erwärmung auf 1,5°C zu begrenzen. Sich ausschließlich auf die Umsetzung von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zu konzentrieren, könnte zudem zu Zielkonflikten mit anderen Aspekten der nachhaltigen Entwicklung führen, einschließlich des Schutzes und der Wiederherstellung der Natur.

Die Regierungen und andere Akteure müssen über die bloße Umsetzung der bisherigen Zusagen hinausgehen und ihre Ambitionen erhöhen. Auf der letztjährigen Klimakonferenz in Glasgow (COP26) wurde eine noch nie dagewesene Zahl von Unternehmen, Städten und anderen nichtstaatlichen und subnationalen Akteuren mobilisiert. Sie verpflichteten sich freiwillig zur Klimaneutralität (Race to Zero), zur Mobilisierung von Finanzmitteln (Glasgow Financial Action for Net Zero, GFANZ) und zum Aufbau von Widerstandsfähigkeit in gefährdeten Gemeinschaften (Race to Resilience). Für die Regierungen bietet sich eine enorme Chance, den Ehrgeiz dieser Akteure zur Senkung der Emissionen, zur Mobilisierung von Finanzmitteln und zum Aufbau von Anpassungsfähigkeiten zu nutzen. Und doch haben nur eine Handvoll Regierungen (fünf Prozent) in ihren NDCs auf freiwillige nichtstaatliche und subnationale Maßnahmen verwiesen (UNFCCC 2022).

Es ist verständlich, dass die Regierungen das Potenzial der nichtstaatlichen und subnationalen Akteure nur zögerlich erkannt haben. Große Versprechungen zu machen ist einfach, glaubwürdige Maßnahmen umzusetzen ist eine andere Sache. Und selbst wenn nichtstaatliche und subnationale Akteure ihre Versprechen einhalten würden, bräuchten Regierungen verlässliche Daten und Analysen, um ihren Beitrag einschätzen zu können.

Ein wichtiger Schritt zur Bereitstellung solcher Daten und Analysen ist die Veröffentlichung des Berichts "Global Climate Action 2022: how have international initiatives delivered, and what more is possible" des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), der Radboud University, dem NewClimate Institute, der University of Oxford, der Utrecht University und dem DataDriven Envirolab at UNC Chapel Hill. In dem Bericht wird der Beitrag von mehr als 600 Initiativen zur Dekarbonisierung und Klimaresilienz bewertet. Eine wichtige Erkenntnis ist die Tatsache, dass mehr als die Hälfte der großen Klimainitiativen, die seit 2014 auf UN-Klimakonferenzen und -Gipfeln ins Leben gerufen wurden, nicht die notwendigen Verhaltensänderungen oder Verbesserungen bei Umweltindikatoren (einschließlich der Reduzierung von Treibhausgasemissionen) bewirken. Darüber hinaus schneiden Initiativen, die in erster Linie auf den Aufbau von Resilienz und Anpassungsfähigkeit abzielen, schlechter ab als Initiativen zur Eindämmung des Klimawandels. Dies ist ein Problem für nachhaltige Entwicklung im weiteren Sinne. Am Race to Zero haben sich beispielsweise mehr als 8000 Unternehmen, 500 Investoren, 1000 Städte und 1000 Bildungseinrichtungen beteiligt, die sich verpflichtet haben, bis spätestens 2050 “Netto Null- Kohlenstoffemissionen zu erreichen. Die Verwendung von Kohlenstoffkompensationen, z. B. durch groß angelegte Baumpflanzungen, könnte jedoch andere Aspekte der nachhaltigen Entwicklung beeinträchtigen. Eine ausschließliche Konzentration auf die Emissionsreduzierung ist daher keine Option: Netto-Null-Verpflichtungen müssen mit dem Schutz und der Wiederherstellung natürlicher Ökosysteme in Einklang gebracht werden.

Da in diesem Jahr sowohl die UN-Klimakonferenz als auch die UN-Biodiversitätskonferenz stattfinden, bietet die COP27 eine wichtige Gelegenheit, Natur- und Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zu integrieren. So wird IDOS zusammen mit dem Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research an der York University, der Zoological Society of London, der Sociedade de Pesquisa em Vida Selvagem e Educação Ambiental (SPVS) und der Boticário Group Foundation ein offizielles Side-Event auf der COP27 ausrichten, um zu diskutieren, wie naturbasierte Klimamaßnahmen in Städten gleichzeitig die Natur und die Gesundheit des Planeten schützen und wiederherstellen und gleichzeitig zur Erreichung der Klimaziele beitragen können. Solche Überlegungen zwischen Forscher*innen, politischen Entscheidungstragenden und Praktiker*innen sind der Schlüssel, um einseitige Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zu verhindern und Kompromisse mit der Natur und der Gesundheit des Planeten zu vermeiden.

Sander Chan ist assoziierter Wissenschaftler am German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), Assistenzprofessor am Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, Nijmegen School of Management an der Radboud University und Principal Researcher in der Synergies of Planetary Health Research Initiative & Lab, Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research.

Idil Boran ist assoziierte Wissenschaftlerin am German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) und Professorin für Applied Environmental Governance and Public Policy an der Faculty of Liberal and Professional Studies, York University.  An der York University leitet Boran die Synergies of Planetary Health Research Initiative & Lab am Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research und fungiert als stellvertretende Direktorin von CIFAL York.

Andrew Denault ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

Bonn, 07.11.2022. Ägypten bezeichnet das hochrangige Segment der UN-Klimakonferenz 2022 (COP27) in Sharm El Sheikh als „Klima-Umsetzungsgipfel“ und betont damit, dass die nationalen Klimapläne (NDCs) rasch umgesetzt werden müssen. Die derzeitigen Zusagen der Regierungen bleiben jedoch weit hinter dem zurück, was sie ursprünglich versprochen haben. Eine Umsetzung allein dieser Zusagen wäre gleichbedeutend mit der Aufgabe des erklärten Anspruchs, die globale Erwärmung auf 1,5°C zu begrenzen. Sich ausschließlich auf die Umsetzung von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zu konzentrieren, könnte zudem zu Zielkonflikten mit anderen Aspekten der nachhaltigen Entwicklung führen, einschließlich des Schutzes und der Wiederherstellung der Natur.

Die Regierungen und andere Akteure müssen über die bloße Umsetzung der bisherigen Zusagen hinausgehen und ihre Ambitionen erhöhen. Auf der letztjährigen Klimakonferenz in Glasgow (COP26) wurde eine noch nie dagewesene Zahl von Unternehmen, Städten und anderen nichtstaatlichen und subnationalen Akteuren mobilisiert. Sie verpflichteten sich freiwillig zur Klimaneutralität (Race to Zero), zur Mobilisierung von Finanzmitteln (Glasgow Financial Action for Net Zero, GFANZ) und zum Aufbau von Widerstandsfähigkeit in gefährdeten Gemeinschaften (Race to Resilience). Für die Regierungen bietet sich eine enorme Chance, den Ehrgeiz dieser Akteure zur Senkung der Emissionen, zur Mobilisierung von Finanzmitteln und zum Aufbau von Anpassungsfähigkeiten zu nutzen. Und doch haben nur eine Handvoll Regierungen (fünf Prozent) in ihren NDCs auf freiwillige nichtstaatliche und subnationale Maßnahmen verwiesen (UNFCCC 2022).

Es ist verständlich, dass die Regierungen das Potenzial der nichtstaatlichen und subnationalen Akteure nur zögerlich erkannt haben. Große Versprechungen zu machen ist einfach, glaubwürdige Maßnahmen umzusetzen ist eine andere Sache. Und selbst wenn nichtstaatliche und subnationale Akteure ihre Versprechen einhalten würden, bräuchten Regierungen verlässliche Daten und Analysen, um ihren Beitrag einschätzen zu können.

Ein wichtiger Schritt zur Bereitstellung solcher Daten und Analysen ist die Veröffentlichung des Berichts "Global Climate Action 2022: how have international initiatives delivered, and what more is possible" des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), der Radboud University, dem NewClimate Institute, der University of Oxford, der Utrecht University und dem DataDriven Envirolab at UNC Chapel Hill. In dem Bericht wird der Beitrag von mehr als 600 Initiativen zur Dekarbonisierung und Klimaresilienz bewertet. Eine wichtige Erkenntnis ist die Tatsache, dass mehr als die Hälfte der großen Klimainitiativen, die seit 2014 auf UN-Klimakonferenzen und -Gipfeln ins Leben gerufen wurden, nicht die notwendigen Verhaltensänderungen oder Verbesserungen bei Umweltindikatoren (einschließlich der Reduzierung von Treibhausgasemissionen) bewirken. Darüber hinaus schneiden Initiativen, die in erster Linie auf den Aufbau von Resilienz und Anpassungsfähigkeit abzielen, schlechter ab als Initiativen zur Eindämmung des Klimawandels. Dies ist ein Problem für nachhaltige Entwicklung im weiteren Sinne. Am Race to Zero haben sich beispielsweise mehr als 8000 Unternehmen, 500 Investoren, 1000 Städte und 1000 Bildungseinrichtungen beteiligt, die sich verpflichtet haben, bis spätestens 2050 “Netto Null- Kohlenstoffemissionen zu erreichen. Die Verwendung von Kohlenstoffkompensationen, z. B. durch groß angelegte Baumpflanzungen, könnte jedoch andere Aspekte der nachhaltigen Entwicklung beeinträchtigen. Eine ausschließliche Konzentration auf die Emissionsreduzierung ist daher keine Option: Netto-Null-Verpflichtungen müssen mit dem Schutz und der Wiederherstellung natürlicher Ökosysteme in Einklang gebracht werden.

Da in diesem Jahr sowohl die UN-Klimakonferenz als auch die UN-Biodiversitätskonferenz stattfinden, bietet die COP27 eine wichtige Gelegenheit, Natur- und Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zu integrieren. So wird IDOS zusammen mit dem Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research an der York University, der Zoological Society of London, der Sociedade de Pesquisa em Vida Selvagem e Educação Ambiental (SPVS) und der Boticário Group Foundation ein offizielles Side-Event auf der COP27 ausrichten, um zu diskutieren, wie naturbasierte Klimamaßnahmen in Städten gleichzeitig die Natur und die Gesundheit des Planeten schützen und wiederherstellen und gleichzeitig zur Erreichung der Klimaziele beitragen können. Solche Überlegungen zwischen Forscher*innen, politischen Entscheidungstragenden und Praktiker*innen sind der Schlüssel, um einseitige Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zu verhindern und Kompromisse mit der Natur und der Gesundheit des Planeten zu vermeiden.

Sander Chan ist assoziierter Wissenschaftler am German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), Assistenzprofessor am Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, Nijmegen School of Management an der Radboud University und Principal Researcher in der Synergies of Planetary Health Research Initiative & Lab, Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research.

Idil Boran ist assoziierte Wissenschaftlerin am German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) und Professorin für Applied Environmental Governance and Public Policy an der Faculty of Liberal and Professional Studies, York University.  An der York University leitet Boran die Synergies of Planetary Health Research Initiative & Lab am Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research und fungiert als stellvertretende Direktorin von CIFAL York.

Andrew Denault ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

The People’s Republic of China’s expanding influence in the United Nations (UN) has become a defining feature of today’s world politics. This study provides insights into China’s expanding role in the UN development pillar. We find that China has become an increasingly visible player over the last two decades as its funding for, staff representation in and diplomatic engagement with UN development work have expanded. Relative to the financial and political resources at its disposal, however, China’s engagement has largely remained moderate and selective. The thematic priorities and selected arenas China has focused on include rural development, big data and South-South and triangular cooperation. Overall, China appears to be taking an increasingly assertive and long-term approach towards changing some of the traditional contours of UN development work. Attempts to enshrine Chinese concepts in UN resolutions and the Global Development Initiative, for instance, seem to be directed at building the foundation for development multilateralism with Chinese characteristics. By doing so, China can make use of an asset that Western member states do not have at their disposal: the combination of its roles as a superpower and a UN programme country. China has capitalised on this duality to expand ties with the UN, notably through South-South cooperation support schemes. While many Western powers approach UN development organisations as project implementers, China has UN entities act as brokers or facilitators for processes and initiatives that are more immediately relevant to Chinese interests. The study provides reflections on the implications of these findings and concludes with recommendations for addressing (contestations around) China’s expanding engagement with the UN development pillar.

The People’s Republic of China’s expanding influence in the United Nations (UN) has become a defining feature of today’s world politics. This study provides insights into China’s expanding role in the UN development pillar. We find that China has become an increasingly visible player over the last two decades as its funding for, staff representation in and diplomatic engagement with UN development work have expanded. Relative to the financial and political resources at its disposal, however, China’s engagement has largely remained moderate and selective. The thematic priorities and selected arenas China has focused on include rural development, big data and South-South and triangular cooperation. Overall, China appears to be taking an increasingly assertive and long-term approach towards changing some of the traditional contours of UN development work. Attempts to enshrine Chinese concepts in UN resolutions and the Global Development Initiative, for instance, seem to be directed at building the foundation for development multilateralism with Chinese characteristics. By doing so, China can make use of an asset that Western member states do not have at their disposal: the combination of its roles as a superpower and a UN programme country. China has capitalised on this duality to expand ties with the UN, notably through South-South cooperation support schemes. While many Western powers approach UN development organisations as project implementers, China has UN entities act as brokers or facilitators for processes and initiatives that are more immediately relevant to Chinese interests. The study provides reflections on the implications of these findings and concludes with recommendations for addressing (contestations around) China’s expanding engagement with the UN development pillar.

The People’s Republic of China’s expanding influence in the United Nations (UN) has become a defining feature of today’s world politics. This study provides insights into China’s expanding role in the UN development pillar. We find that China has become an increasingly visible player over the last two decades as its funding for, staff representation in and diplomatic engagement with UN development work have expanded. Relative to the financial and political resources at its disposal, however, China’s engagement has largely remained moderate and selective. The thematic priorities and selected arenas China has focused on include rural development, big data and South-South and triangular cooperation. Overall, China appears to be taking an increasingly assertive and long-term approach towards changing some of the traditional contours of UN development work. Attempts to enshrine Chinese concepts in UN resolutions and the Global Development Initiative, for instance, seem to be directed at building the foundation for development multilateralism with Chinese characteristics. By doing so, China can make use of an asset that Western member states do not have at their disposal: the combination of its roles as a superpower and a UN programme country. China has capitalised on this duality to expand ties with the UN, notably through South-South cooperation support schemes. While many Western powers approach UN development organisations as project implementers, China has UN entities act as brokers or facilitators for processes and initiatives that are more immediately relevant to Chinese interests. The study provides reflections on the implications of these findings and concludes with recommendations for addressing (contestations around) China’s expanding engagement with the UN development pillar.

Over the past few years, a growing barrage of disinformation has targeted UN peacekeeping operations, particularly the missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Mali (MINUSMA), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). This includes false allegations that UN peacekeepers are trafficking weapons to armed groups, supporting terrorists, and exploiting natural resources. This disinformation makes it harder for peacekeeping operations to implement their mandates and has put the safety of peacekeepers at risk.

This paper provides an overview of the recent rise in disinformation against MINUSCA, MINUSMA, and MONUSCO. It also examines how these three peacekeeping operations have been addressing disinformation and the challenges they have faced. While these initial efforts have tended to focus on strategic communications, disinformation is not only a strategic communications issue; it affects all mission components, and effectively tackling it requires situating it in the broader political context and understanding its drivers.

This paper offers the following questions the UN Department of Peace Operations and individual missions could consider as they develop policies, guidelines, structures, and activities to address disinformation:

• How can missions develop a cross-cutting, strategic approach to disinformation? Disinformation is more than a technical or tactical issue; it is a political and strategic issue that requires the proactive attention of mission leaders.
• How can missions better monitor and analyze disinformation both online and offline? Monitoring disinformation is critical not only so missions can address it; tracking rumors also has intrinsic value by helping missions better listen to and understand the sentiments of local populations.
• How can missions respond to disinformation more quickly? For many UN personnel, the slowness of the UN response is one of the biggest challenges inhibiting their efforts to address disinformation.
• How can missions reshape anti-UN narratives? Anti-UN disinformation is woven into a broader anti-UN (and anticolonial) narrative that is grounded in both great-power politics and legitimate public grievances. In countering individual falsehoods, missions should consider whether and how they could also respond to this broader narrative.
• How can missions contribute to a healthier information environment? From the perspective of civil society, the most important shift the UN can make would be to focus more on supporting local journalists.
• Does the scale of the problem call for a more decisive shift in approach? Any shift in approach should be premised on the principle that under no circumstances should missions respond to disinformation with disinformation of their own.

Download

This article investigates the demand side of social contracts. It asks what people expect from their governments. Drawing on original, nationally representative surveys in Egypt, Tunisia and Lebanon, it explores popular preferences for the three possible government deliverables in social contracts: provision of social and economic services, protection from physical harm and political participation. Findings reveal that citizens expect governments to deliver all three ‘Ps’ (even if this costs a price), yet preferring provision over protection and participation if they have to prioritize. Findings do not show robust preferences among social groups identified by economic, gender, educational and communal differences.

This article investigates the demand side of social contracts. It asks what people expect from their governments. Drawing on original, nationally representative surveys in Egypt, Tunisia and Lebanon, it explores popular preferences for the three possible government deliverables in social contracts: provision of social and economic services, protection from physical harm and political participation. Findings reveal that citizens expect governments to deliver all three ‘Ps’ (even if this costs a price), yet preferring provision over protection and participation if they have to prioritize. Findings do not show robust preferences among social groups identified by economic, gender, educational and communal differences.

This article investigates the demand side of social contracts. It asks what people expect from their governments. Drawing on original, nationally representative surveys in Egypt, Tunisia and Lebanon, it explores popular preferences for the three possible government deliverables in social contracts: provision of social and economic services, protection from physical harm and political participation. Findings reveal that citizens expect governments to deliver all three ‘Ps’ (even if this costs a price), yet preferring provision over protection and participation if they have to prioritize. Findings do not show robust preferences among social groups identified by economic, gender, educational and communal differences.

Synthesis paper prepared by Ukȧmȧ: the Africa-Europe platform for sustainable

development thinkers

This paper presents the platform members’ analysis and discussion of three papers analysing JETP

discussions in South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal that were written by independent researchers

based in the countries concerned. For any feedback on or queries about this synthesis paper,

please contact Elisabeth.Hege@iddri.org

For more information about the Ukȧmȧ platform, see:

https://www.iddri.org/en/project/ukama-africa-europe-platform-sustainable-development-thinkers

Synthesis paper prepared by Ukȧmȧ: the Africa-Europe platform for sustainable

development thinkers

This paper presents the platform members’ analysis and discussion of three papers analysing JETP

discussions in South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal that were written by independent researchers

based in the countries concerned. For any feedback on or queries about this synthesis paper,

please contact Elisabeth.Hege@iddri.org

For more information about the Ukȧmȧ platform, see:

https://www.iddri.org/en/project/ukama-africa-europe-platform-sustainable-development-thinkers

Synthesis paper prepared by Ukȧmȧ: the Africa-Europe platform for sustainable

development thinkers

This paper presents the platform members’ analysis and discussion of three papers analysing JETP

discussions in South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal that were written by independent researchers

based in the countries concerned. For any feedback on or queries about this synthesis paper,

please contact Elisabeth.Hege@iddri.org

For more information about the Ukȧmȧ platform, see:

https://www.iddri.org/en/project/ukama-africa-europe-platform-sustainable-development-thinkers