Africa

Nigeria's Blessing Oraekwe says it is "heartbreaking" to be barred from the World Championships in Liverpool after missing the deadline for a new genetic sex test.

Plastic waste washed up on a beach in India. Credit: Ocean Image Bank/Srikanth Man
 
The international push for consensus on a legally binding deal to end plastic pollution proved beyond the grasp of weary UN Member States meeting in Geneva in mid-August, as they agreed to resume discussions at a future date, according to UN News.
 
“This has been a hard-fought 10 days against the backdrop of geopolitical complexities, economic challenges and multilateral strains,” said Inger Andersen, Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). “However, one thing remains clear: despite these complexities, all countries clearly want to remain at the table.”

By Craig Boljkovac
GENEVA, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

The debacle that was the latest round of negotiations for a global treaty on plastics (including in the marine environment); known as “INC 5.2” has already been written about at length by many colleagues on all sides of the issues. Despite all the very informative posts, articles, and other analyses, I believe I have several key observations to make, particularly about the process to-date.

After being absent from the previous two INCs (INC-4 and INC-5), I may have a slightly different perspective from those who have been completely immersed in the process all the way along. I managed to observe virtually every (painful) minute of INC 5.2, and, below, I list some things that participants may want to consider as the process continues.

Backing up a bit, for those who may be less familiar with the issue, we clearly have a problem with plastics globally. Mounting evidence of the presence of plastics and a clear lack of recycling capacities: from blatantly visible plastics in the marine environment (massive floating gyres of overwhelmingly plastic garbage in our oceans – particularly in but not limited to the Pacific) to the presence of microplastics in our bodies (and those of wildlife as well), including in the placenta and mother’s milk, and the use of clearly harmful chemicals (such as endocrine disrupters released when certain plastics are used) in the manufacture of at least some plastics – has led to decisions on the international level that merely complement significant action at other levels of governance that are already in place.

This situation resulted in the decision, from March, 2022, by the UN Environment Programme’s UN Environment Assembly, to pass a resolution authorizing a negotiating process (the “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, or INC) to realize a global plastics treaty by 2024 (a highly ambitious timeline that, to many, was likely unachievable).

And, here we are, late in 2025, after six unsuccessful negotiation sessions and some preparatory work, without an agreed treaty text, and with, it seems, a wide gulf of differences between UN member states that seems, frankly, virtually unbridgeable.

Much has been written about the various positions of UN Members States, who have informally organized themselves (for the negotiations) into the “Like-Minded Group” of countries that want the treaty to focus mainly on waste management and not impinge on their plans to not only maintain, but greatly expand plastics production; and the “High Ambition Coalition” countries who, in part, want a strong global treaty that addresses plastics at all stages of their life cycle, severely limit “single-use plastics” and include human health concerns, particularly with regard to the harmful effects of chemical inputs to plastics production (which the “Like-Mindeds” reject, particularly for what some delegations say is a clear lack of evidence of harm to human health and the environment).

In my long experience with international environmental negotiations under the UN rubric, such differences in positions are not unprecedented, and have been solved by having a team of negotiators that are solutions-oriented, and a secretariat (the UN staff assigned to coordinate and facilitate the negotiations) and chair (usually a diplomat or high-level civil servant from an environment or similar ministry) that work together to bridge differences in a transparent, inclusive, and participatory manner, where trust is built over time and solutions are eventually found.

Something is clearly blocking the process. The secretariat and bureau (including the chair, in particular) have shown commitment, but the goal of an agreed treaty, despite the presentation of many textual proposals by negotiators, several chairs’ drafts, and some movement on at least some of the issues, has not been realized over six energy- and resource-intensive negotiation sessions.

Why is this the case? A few thoughts/observations from my side (the list is not comprehensive):

1) Apart from some closed events earlier on in the negotiations, there now seems to be an almost total lack of intersessional activities (both formal and informal) essential for the further building of trust and understanding of each other’s positions (although some may be planned but are not yet announced). Regional efforts, in particular, might help to bridge some of the wide differences that are apparent, even within regions (where there is clearly a lack of consensus as well).

2) There has been a clear lack of transparency and communication in/from both subsidiary groups (such as contact groups, where various issues are “unpacked” and grouped for more detailed negotiations) and, more significantly and consistently, at the broader level (directly led by the chair/bureau and supported by the secretariat) such as plenary sessions (which were few and far between and even resoundingly brief – one was 43 seconds at the latest INC). Relatively untransparent processes have worked in the past (such as with the climate change negotiations); but from what I understand there was more trust and confidence in the chair/bureau and secretariat than exists in our present negotiations.

3) The chair, bureau and secretariat were always present, but rarely available. The absence of regular plenary sessions was keenly felt. There was also a clear lack of consistency in the way contact groups operated – some put textual proposals on a screen for all to see and negotiate with; while others simply heard interventions and then came out with proposals for text at the very end (not the most transparent of ways to operate!). In addition, there was a heavy reliance on informal negotiations throughout (this became apparent with news, in the final plenary, of a long, closed negotiation on the final day chaired by Chile and Japan). A lot seemed to be going on, but only a limited number of participants (including a fair number of government delegations that I conversed with) seemed only vaguely aware of them, if at all.

4) During the course of this, the sixth negotiating session, positions taken by both the Like-Minded Group and the High Ambition Coalition more closely resembled opening salvos that one might expect would be typical of the early stages of negotiations – not positions that would still be raised at such a late stage, when one would expect at least some compromises to have been made along the way. To me, this is symptomatic of a lack of trust in the process to-date.

This apparent situation (lack of clear negotiating milestones/organization, lack of visibility of the chair and lack of transparency) seems to have, in my opinion, possibly been used by delegations to hold back on reaching any sort of even basic compromises.

How to solve this as we try to move forward?

1) Make every possible attempt to put into place a proper, formal, and transparent intersessional process (along with informal and regional activities as needed), even if it results in a significant delay until the next INC (5.3). A rumour is going round that INC 5.3 may be scheduled for February, 2026. In my opinion this is far too soon if a properly designed intersessional process, focused on bridging the key gaps and reaching some sort of consensus, at least informally, is to be realized. An adequate “break” is needed to clearly think through all the options. If needed, even keep bringing in the UN Secretary-General to “knock heads together” to find some compromises in advance of the next negotiations. And report back to all INC participants regarding the process of intersessional work on a regular basis.

2) Hold in-depth “debriefs” and “lessons learned” sessions for the secretariat and bureau, with additional participants from the INCs who have valuable observations to contribute (both from government and observer delegations). A suggested focus could be on how to expand the obvious organizational strengths of the secretariat into other areas, such as a finer level of facilitation aimed at bridging differences among delegations through improved intersessional activities (see 1), above).

3) Without formally reopening the original (2022) resolution, seek backing from UNEA-7 for the original mandate (since delegations have clearly not followed the original resolution, particularly regarding the scope of the convention, during the INCs. A complementary resolution which could guide member states towards a possible framework convention would also allow negotiation of the difficult and time-consuming issues in a more extended, party-based process.

4) Once experiences and lessons learned are gathered, consider holding a special, more internally-focused intersessional process between secretariat and the chair and bureau, in order to have a detailed set of lessons learned so far, and to try to readjust the relationship as we move forward. Perhaps such a process could have a trusted and even renowned external facilitator that could help find some new and more effective way of working together. Such trust-building exercises were essential in other forums that I have participated in (although they were done more up-front, towards the beginnings of such processes, it’s never too late!).

5) At the next, eventual INC (presumably 5.3 will take place), put into place more plenary time (at least brief plenaries) where regular updates can be given. This would display more transparency, potentially build more confidence in the process, and benefit small delegations in particular, who cannot cover the breadth of different negotiations we saw in previous INCs.

In conclusion, there is no doubt in my mind that we have a huge task still at hand, but not an insurmountable one. Recently, Forbes published what I think is a fantastic, forward-looking piece that basically says the “train has left the station” for the plastics industry. Even if the global process fails (which I firmly believe will not happen), at other levels of governance from California to the EU and beyond, clear commitments have been made that are even above and beyond the current UNEA mandate.

This will drive the investments and planning of the industry for decades to come. The writing is on the wall. Now is the time to find compromises at the global level (even a framework treaty like the Paris Agreement on climate change would be a good start!) to ensure a sustainable future for all in this field. Otherwise, we may be facing a failure that results in a long-term stalemate where no treaty (or alternative) is agreed for the foreseeable future.

1 https://www.forbes.com/sites/trondarneundheim/2025/08/16/plastics-manufacturing-at-crossroads-pivot-to-lead-or-lose/

Craig Boljkovac is a Geneva-based Senior Advisor with a Regional Centre for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, and an independent international environmental consultant with over 35 years of experience in relevant fields. His opinions are his own. He has participated in several INCs and related meetings for the global plastics agreement.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Google's first data center in Chile lies in the industrial sector of the municipality of Quilicura, on the northern outskirts of Santiago. It has no symbols or logos to identify it, but covers an extensive area. Water vapor is visibly emitted as part of the process to cool the servers. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS

By Orlando Milesi
SANTIAGO, Sep 4 2025 (IPS)

Chile wants to be a hub in Latin America in data storage and transmission by developing data centers, leveraging its wealth of renewable energy, and its optimal digital interconnection.

In contrast, the massive water required for cooling servers and resistance from social and local organizations who were not consulted are the main obstacles in this strategy.

The authorities are promoting a tech hub, as the concentrator or logistical connection point for centralizing numerous nodes of a computer network is called, where companies, investments, and talent converge.“Chile's technological development is at a turning point that will define our position as a relevant player in the region. In the future, this could mean having the capacity to host infrastructure for training large artificial intelligence models”–Andrés Díaz.

A key step in this direction is the National Data Center Plan (PData), launched by the government of leftist president Gabriel Boric in December 2024.

PData complemented the Cybersecurity Framework Law, enacted in April 2024, which established minimum requirements for the prevention, containment, resolution, and response to cybersecurity incidents, applicable to state agencies and private companies.

PData aims to position this elongated South American country as a Latin American hub for data centers.

It was launched 10 months after an environmental court in Santiago, the capital of this country of 18.4 million people, halted a multi-million dollar Google project in the municipality of Cerrillos, on the outskirts of Santiago, preventing it from using water to cool its servers.

The stoppage was a victory for residents organized in the Socio-Environmental Community Movement for Water and Territory (Mosacat), an environmental coalition that emerged in Cerrillos.

Google had announced it would modify the cooling system to use less than the planned 169 liters of water per second. But, following the court decision, it suspended the project and a US$40 million investment in what would have been its second data center in the country, after the one operating since 2015 in Quilicura, also on the outskirts of Santiago.

Tania Rodriguez, a spokesperson for Mosacat, praised the strength of the residents to “convince a multinational that its project was not possible with such scarce water resources. Companies are the ones that must become aware of the excessive use of our resources,” she stated in an interview with a union media outlet.

New reality

To promote data centers, the Boric government brought all interested parties together and managed to finalize PData, with the goal of providing certainty to all sectors and enabling their massive installation in the country.

Chile has abundant low-cost renewable energy, 62,000 kilometers of optical fiber, a network of 69,000 kilometers of submarine cables, as well as 3.8 million devices connected to the 5G network.

Alejandro Barros, a professor of engineering and researcher at the Public Systems Center  of Industrial Engineering at the public University of Chile, told IPS that the main lesson after the crisis with Google was the need to equip Chile with a public policy for the establishment and management of data centers.

According to Barros, PData “advances very significantly by establishing the governance model for these projects because multiple state institutions will be involved. How synergy and coordination is achieved across all sectors linked to these projects is relevant.”

“My concern is that the plan was presented at the end of an administration,” he said, recalling that Boric’s term concludes in March 2026.

“The question is what will the next administration do. Data centers will have to be built, but how do we agree so that Chile meets standards, has good dialogue with communities, and we don’t start from scratch again?” he asks.

Google’s fenced and patrolled data center in Quilicura, on the outskirts of Santiago, where huge water tanks are visible. The tech company was unable to establish another data center in the Chilean capital due to a court ruling against the massive use of water. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS

Microsoft installs its regional cloud

In 2017, there were six data center projects in Chile. Today, 38 are in operation.

It seems more likely that companies of various sizes will export data and processed information from Chile to meet external demand.

According to Fitzgerald Cantero, Director of Studies and Projects at the  Latin American Energy Organization  (Olade), the growth in the use of artificial intelligence will exceed an annual rate of 31% by 2029.

In the Latin American region, 78% of data centers are currently concentrated in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.

During the Data Centers and Energy forum, organized by the Institute of the Americas  and held in Santiago on August 21, Cantero said that investment in artificial intelligence in 2025 will be 7 billion dollars and will jump to 10 billion in 2029.

Juan Carlos Olmedo, Chile’s electrical coordinator, stated at the forum that the electrical energy required by data centers in this country will quadruple by 2032, rising from the current 325 megawatts (MW) to 1,360.

On June 18, Microsoft opened its first Data Center Region in Santiago to support economic growth, technological innovation, and social development, indicated the transnational tech company.

According to Microsoft, this state-of-the-art infrastructure will provide digital services to businesses and public organizations, improving their speed, privacy, security, and data storage in compliance with local regulations and high availability

The new network of data centers, called the Microsoft Cloud Region, is also located in Santiago, consisting of three independent physical locations, each with one or more data centers, and will provide services to several South American countries.

According to the U.S.-based software developer, the opening of this regional Data Center will generate US$35.3 billion in net income over the next four years, both for Microsoft and for partners and customers using its cloud.

“Of that total, approximately US$3.3 billion will be invested directly in Chile, contributing to this country’s development and creating about 81,041 jobs between 2025 and 2029,” detailed the tech company.

At the time, Boric expressed his joy for this new project, calling it a show of confidence for Chile to continue integrating and transforming into a major tech hub in Latin America.

Chile is now connected to a global network that spans the planet, he said, which reinforces the country as “an excellent destination for investment, placing us at the regional forefront of innovation and technology.”

“Data centers and the digital economy are transforming society, and this is not just for some sectors—it is for everyone,” emphasized the president.

Representatives from companies, Latin American energy institutions, Chilean electrical sector authorities, and academics gathered in Santiago for a forum on Data Centers and Energy, which debated the challenges and conditions for Chile to become a regional hub. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS

The pros and cons of data centers

Andrés Díaz, director of the School of Industrial Engineering at the private Diego Portales University, believes that Chile has managed to position itself as a tech hub by attracting investments in digital infrastructure.

Regarding the projections for this strategic industry, he maintains that the important thing is to send clear signals of stability and security.

“The country has favorable conditions, from natural resources to technical capabilities; however, confidence to ensure the attraction of investment remains key,” he told IPS.

According to this academic, “Chile’s technological development is at a turning point that will define our position as a relevant player in the region. In the future, this could mean having the capacity to host infrastructure for training large artificial intelligence models.”

Data centers enable the operation of applications such as instant messaging or viewing content on platforms. And they are essential for sending, storing, and interconnecting information for companies, public administration, hospitals, and banking entities.

If a data center stops functioning, it would affect everything from traffic lights to email and ATMs. Teleworking, video calls, food delivery, and home cinema are also activities derived from their operation.

So-called data centers have thus become critical infrastructure, like other basic services.

“Both in Europe and the United States, the demand for massive data processing is exponential, especially because of what is happening with artificial intelligence,” professor Barros told IPS.

“This is what we see in the technological infrastructure plans driven by the United States and China, with all their positive and negative variables,” he added.

He warned of risks and challenges as a result, especially for the environment, including the type of energy that will be used: renewable or fossil-based.

“In Europe, they are starting to reuse nuclear energy again, and in the United States, they are beginning to use fossil-based energy. Chile has the advantage of its very significant renewable energy production,” he explained.

In 2024, renewable energies contributed nearly 68% of Chile’s electricity generation, with 35% coming from variable sources such as solar and wind.

But the main challenge is water due to the large volumes consumed to cool the servers, given that air cooling is less efficient.

“That means having clarity about how much water will be consumed, what impact it will have on the area where the data centers will be installed, and knowing if it is an area with water problems or drought for long periods,” emphasized Barros.

He also highlighted the importance of providing greater transparency and access to information when discussing the issue of water with local communities, specifying how much will be required and what impact it will have on basins or human consumption.

Droughts have affected various regions of Chile over a 40-year period, from 1979 to 2019. Furthermore, northern Chile is one of the driest regions in the world, and the central region, which is home to 70% of the national population, has had a permanent water deficit since 2010.

Leaders of the involved localities insist that data centers be required to undergo the Environmental Impact Assessment System, which includes a government evaluation and a citizen consultation.

Currently, to install a data center, only an Environmental Impact Declaration must be made, where the company itself reports on potential risks.

England's poor form in white-ball cricket continues as they are beaten by South Africa to lose the second one-day international and the series with a game to spare.

Health officials urge people to take preventive measures following a new outbreak of the deadly virus.

Joseph Malanji was convicted of acquiring properties and helicopters that were suspected to be the proceeds of crime.

Spyros Blavoukos, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business

& Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

The content of the Commission President’s speech is inevitably connected to the current year’s action programme, but it must also respond to international developments.

This year, the Commission is focusing on two main pillars: the competitiveness of the European economy, and the strengthening of European security and defence. With regard to the first, the EU is aiming to speed up the simplification of procedures, and the development of strategies, aimed at improving European competitiveness. Preparing the productive base for the challenges (and opportunities) presented by globalization, digitization and the green transition was a key point of last year’s State of the Union address, in which the President presented her vision for her second term of office to the plenary of the European Parliament. In relation to the second pillar, the White Paper on the future of European defence and the plan to rearm Europe, of which the SAFE Regulation is an integral part, have dominated the effort to consolidate European security. The main priority and common denominator remains the creation of a coherent framework for the development of European defence capabilities that will help the bloc achieve the strategic autonomy it seeks.

International developments—with the return of President Trump and the (neo)-protectionism he advocates, the continuing need to support Ukrainian resistance, but also the volatility of the global geo-economic and geopolitical environment—require similar objectives for the EU and the Commission. The two aforementioned pillars are thus expected to dominate von der Leyen’s speech this year. However, security is not limited to its military dimension. It is also linked to European society’s preparedness in the face of various forms of crises, the diversification of supply chains, energy autonomy, economic growth, and the resilience of democratic institutions and values—all of which are expected to emerge as priorities for the next programming period. The Union’s new (existential?) narrative is therefore taking shape around a “comprehensive defence” in which security and defence cut across every aspect of its internal policies, from energy to social cohesion, and the implementation of the proposals in the Letta and Draghi reports is a key priority to prevent the EU becoming the “grass that’s trampled when elephants fight”.

Alekos Kritikos, Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP; Former senior official, European Commission; former Secretary General, Ministry of the Interior

This year’s State of the Union address by the Commission President will be delivered at a juncture when Europe is seemingly being reduced ever more to the role of an observer of global developments rather than a protagonist in them. The Trump system’s dismissive treatment of the EU and the Shanghai summit are just two examples that point to this being the case.

The EU’s room for manoeuvre has narrowed dishearteningly—if it has not already been eradicated entirely—and it is of existential importance that the Union take immediate and comprehensive action. Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech should respond to this need by adopting the proposals made in the Letta and Draghi reports, and summarized afresh in Mario Draghi’s recent speech at the Rimini meeting, without further delay, hesitation or pettiness.

The completion of the internal market, the boosting of EU competitiveness, the development of a wide-ranging industrial policy, the unification of Europe’s capital markets, the pursuit of strategic and defence autonomy, the coordinated Research and Technology development, and the ongoing promotion of economic and social cohesion are the most fundamental, and there are certainly others of crucial importance. The implementation of these proposals will need to be accompanied by the defence of democratic values and the European social model, and by an immigration policy which, while respecting European values, preserves social cohesion while also helping the EU secure the human resources it needs for its economic and demographic growth. All of this will be very hard to achieve, however, unless it is accompanied by a bold political and institutional reorganization of the EU, leading to new forms of European integration.

On 10 September, we will know whether the European Commission has got the message.

Stella Ladi, Panteion University and Queen Mary University of London; Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

In the annual State of the Union address by the Commission President, we should focus not only on what is said, but also on what is left unsaid. The tense international situation, with its multiple conflicts but especially those in Gaza and Ukraine, and the new transatlantic (im)balance make it near certain that the common defence and security of Europe will be the main theme. And we would expect our partnerships and trade relations to figure centrally—those with Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, for instance, now that it is clear the EU needs to diversify and expand its trading networks. However, the most interesting question will be how much emphasis is placed on the two former flagships of European policy: the green economy and the regulation of new technologies and artificial intelligence. Because this year more than any other, the audience will not only be European citizens; it will also be the President of the United States, who would like to see backpeddling on both. It is critical for Europe’s dignity and global credibility that these priorities remain centre-stage, even if only at the symbolic level of this annual address.

Elena Lazarou, Director General, ELIAMEP

2025 finds the European Union facing external challenges and the threat of internal rifts. The annual State of the Union address by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, is an opportunity to chart a strategic course, but also to reinforce the conviction that the Union can respond to the political, economic, social and geopolitical challenges of our times.

At the heart of the speech is the long-term budget (2028-2034), which is causing political tensions between member states, agricultural and industrial interests, and political groups. Von der Leyen will be seeking to balance liberal and green priorities and issues such as re-industrialisation, social cohesion and immigration, and will also voice support for the proposed (enhanced) budget, with its added flexibility.

The key points of the speech, however, will relate to foreign policy: support for Ukraine and the need to strengthen European defence. Presenting a targeted plan for transatlantic relations will pose a major challenge to the Commission President, as the recent EU-US trade agreement has already come in for harsh criticism from many parts of the EU.

The President will reaffirm the importance of democracy and the international legal order, as well as the need for the EU to support both in an era in which anti-democratic forces are on the rise and international and humanitarian law is breaking down.

The European Union is presented with a choice: advance towards strategic autonomy and unity, or be immobilized by internal contradictions and external coercion.

Manos Matsaganis, Professor, Polytechnic University of Milan; Head of ELIAMEP’s Greek and European Economy Programme

The threats Europe is currently facing have no precedent in its 80-year history.

Some may have arrived suddenly, but their roots run deep: Russian aggression, American antipathy, Chinese expansionism, conflict in the Middle East.

Others are the product of internal weaknesses that were not addressed in time, and have now festered: economic sluggishness, an innovation deficit, ageing populations, institutional inertia, political fragmentation.

Their combined impact means that our children and our children’s children are at risk of growing up in a continent that is vulnerable and insecure, unable to defend itself, with an obsolete economy, stagnant living standards, and angry societies.

The train of events that would make this a grim reality can be easily described. A Le Pen (or Bardella) victory in the 2027 presidential elections puts France on a collision course with the EU, while simultaneously paralyzing any attempt at a coherent European response. In the confusion that follows, each country tries to salvage what it can. I leave it to the reader’s imagination to work out what this might mean for Estonia, or for Denmark (and — why not? — for Cyprus or Greece).

The alternative scenario begins with the acknowledgement that no country can go it alone. This implies the need for close cooperation in defence, the economy, and immigration. It isn’t the likeliest scenario. It will be politically demanding. But it is the only thing that can save us from worse trouble ahead.

 

 

Ursula von der Leyen’s second term at the helm of the European Commission is structured around seven thematic priorities that reflect the executive branch’s effort to integrate diverse policy areas in pursuit of the prosperity of the European citizenry. The Commission’s 2025 Work Programme introduces 51 new initiatives and places particular emphasis on simplification and the reduction of administrative burden, highlighting the shift towards “a faster and simpler Union”. At the same time, there is a clear tendency for the EU to assume a more active role in policy domains where supranational involvement has traditionally been limited. For Greece, both the Union’s achievements to date and its forthcoming actions have a direct impact on key national sectors. Meanwhile, the Greek government is preparing for the decisive role it will play in the negotiations on the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034.

• The forthcoming State of the European Union address, though generally framed in broad terms, provides a clear indication of the EU’s trajectory for member states, citizens, businesses, and external partners, enabling them to adapt and align with upcoming initiatives.
• It is not merely a stock-taking exercise; rather, it represents a critical test of credibility, as it will raise the question of whether and to what extent the Commission can translate its announcements and ambitions into tangible measures. The shift from theory to action will determine both the Commission’s institutional credibility and citizens’ trust in the European project.
• At the same time, the new structure of the Commission will also come under scrutiny. Nine months after the creation of new portfolios within the College of Commissioners, it remains to be assessed whether these have delivered on their intended functions.
• Greece, holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2027, will be at the forefront of negotiations that will determine the scope of financial instruments across all policy areas. For Athens, the challenge will be not only to forge common ground among member states but also to advance its own national priorities.

The article is authored by Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Ursula von der Leyen’s second term at the helm of the European Commission is structured around seven thematic priorities, based on the political guidelines she presented before the European Parliament in July 2024. The priorities for the 2024–2029 period are as follows: sustainable prosperity and competitiveness, European defense and security, supporting people, strengthening societies and the social model, preserving quality of life, protecting democracy and safeguarding values, Europe in the world, and preparing the Union for the future.

The 2025 Work Programme was published in February 2025 and is organized around these political priorities, while also taking into account the guidelines and mission letters assigned to members of the College of Commissioners. In total, it introduces 51 new initiatives, at least 18 of which are legislative. Particular emphasis is placed on simplification, with more than 60% of the legislative proposals falling within this scope. The Commission President has repeatedly stressed the urgent need to reduce administrative burden and simplify legislation. In her political guidelines, she explicitly referred to her vision of “a faster and simpler Union.”

In view of this year’s State of the Union address, during which Ursula von der Leyen is expected to present the achievements of the College of Commissioners since taking office (1 December 2024), attention now turns to the analysis of the policies to be advanced in the near future. The address, though generally framed in broad terms, provides a clear indication of the EU’s trajectory for member states, citizens, businesses, and external partners, enabling them to adapt and align with forthcoming actions.

While awaiting the address, it is useful to examine what has been achieved so far. This analysis is structured around the Commission’s political priorities and presents illustrative examples of its most significant actions from December 2024 to the present. These actions have taken different forms (e.g. legislative proposal, strategy, action plan, roadmap, etc.), depending on the political maturity and objectives of each initiative.[1]

The analysis then turns to the Greek perspective on both the Commission’s achievements and its planned actions. The final section looks ahead to what can be expected in this year’s State of the Union address. 

Sustainable Prosperity and Competitiveness

Mario Draghi’s September 2024 report served as the foundation for the Competitiveness Compass, published at the end of January 2025. In short, the Compass sets out how the Union can: (a) strengthen innovation, (b) shift towards cleaner and more affordable energy, and (c) diversify its supply chains. In this direction, the Commission has released a series of strategies and other documents (e.g. the Clean Industrial Deal in February, the Startup and Scaleup Strategy and the Single Market Strategy in May, and the Quantum Europe Strategy in July). As expected, however, a considerable share of the Commission’s output consists of (proposals for) legislative initiatives aimed at simplification. In particular, six “Omnibus” packages covering a wide range of policy areas have been tabled. Moreover, the political agreement in principle reached in the trade negotiations with four MERCOSUR states (December 2024) underscores the Union’s continued commitment to promoting free and mutually beneficial trade. As shown in Table I, proposals for six legislative initiatives, one strategy, and one plan are expected to be submitted later this year.

Table I: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (sustainable prosperity and competitiveness)

Type Title Legislative proposal Revision of the Sustainable Finance Disclosures Regulation Legislative proposal Digital Package Legislative proposal European Business Wallet Legislative proposal Accelerating industrial decarbonisation Legislative proposal Revision of the REACH Regulation (on chemicals) Legislative proposal Digital Networks Strategy/Legislative proposal Bioeconomy Strategy Plan Sustainable Transport Investment Plan

 

European Defense and Security

European defense and security have become a top priority for the Commission due, among other factors, to the war in Ukraine, broader Russian assertiveness, and U.S. disengagement from Europe. In this adverse geopolitical environment, Ursula von der Leyen created the portfolio of the Commissioner for Defense and Space, signaling the importance of this new dimension. The Commission subsequently announced the White Paper on the Future of European Defense and the “ReArm Europe” plan, which could channel up to €800 billion into strengthening Europe’s defense readiness.

Beyond strictly military initiatives, the Union appears to be embracing the ideas of the Niinistö’s Report of October 2024 and promoting strategies linked to the concept of “total defense.” Within this framework, the Preparedness Union Strategy, the proposal for a Critical Medicines Act, the Medical Countermeasures Strategy, the Stockpiling Strategy, combined with the Internal Security Strategy, the proposal for a Common European System for Returns, and the Action Plan on Cybersecurity for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers, all aim to provide a holistic safety net against multiple threats. Preparedness has thus become a central concern within the European family. In several national capitals, discussions are underway on reviving military conscription, moving towards a Scandinavian-style “total defense” model combining military and civilian dimensions. While the implementation of the SAFE Regulation appears to be the Commission’s main priority, Table II presents the three initiatives expected to be announced in the near term.

Table II: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (European defense and security)

Type Title Legislative proposal New rules on drug precursors Legislative proposal Firearms Trafficking Directive Strategy Migration and Asylum Strategy Supporting People, Strengthening Societies and the Social Model

The cost of living, social inequalities, and the center–periphery divide have undermined the European way of life, while the modern era demands new skills for businesses and workers to adapt to evolving circumstances. With the aim of reinforcing the European social model, the Commission launched the Union of Skills in March, designed to upgrade citizens’ skills and enable the Union to attract and retain talent in critical sectors within its borders. Although the 2025 Work Programme does not include new initiatives on the housing crisis, the Commission President has pledged to: (a) present a plan for affordable housing, and (b) cooperate with the European Investment Bank to establish an investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing.[2] By the end of the year, three initiatives are expected to be published to strengthen the social dimension, as indicated in Table III.

Table III: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (supporting people, strengthening societies and the social model)

Type Title Action Plan European Pillar of Social Rights Roadmap Quality Jobs Agenda Consumer Agenda 2030 Preserving Quality of Life

Agriculture is considered an integral part of the European way of life. Its support is a prerequisite for the Union’s sustainable growth and competitiveness. With the goals of food self-sufficiency and support for the food value chain, the Commission has placed particular emphasis on simplifying the procedures of the Common Agricultural Policy, while announcing the Vision for Agriculture and Food (February) to make farming and food sectors more attractive to young people. At the same time, the Commission has tabled a proposal to amend the European Climate Law (July), seeking to establish a 2040 climate target. Finally, the Ocean Pact and the Water Resilience Strategy, both announced in June 2025, aim to boost the blue economy and protect water resources, whose resilience “is regarded by the EU as a matter of security and crisis preparedness”. According to the current Work Programme, no new initiatives are expected in this policy area.

Protecting Democracy and Safeguarding Values

At a time when liberal democracy is under challenge, strengthening democratic resilience and societal preparedness are key objectives for the Commission. Furthermore, the defense and reinforcement of the rule of law remain a central duty of the EU’s executive branch as the “guardian of the Treaties.” In this context, the Roadmap for Women’s Rights (March) seeks to eliminate gender-based violence and ensure equal treatment of women. By year’s end, three initiatives are expected to be presented, as shown in Table IV.

Table IV: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (protecting democracy and safeguarding values)

Type Title Communication European Democracy Shield[3] Strategy Strategy to Support, Protect and Empower Civil Society Strategy Equality Strategies for LGBTIQ and Anti-Racism Europe in the World

As the international environment grows increasingly dangerous and hostile to EU interests, the European family must be able to leverage its strength and build meaningful partnerships with like-minded actors. Accordingly, the Union unveiled its Black Sea Strategy (March), built on three pillars: (a) security, (b) sustainable development and connectivity, and (c) environment and preparedness. Beyond the eastern flank, however, the Union is also placing emphasis on its southern neighborhood, as evidenced by the creation of a dedicated Mediterranean portfolio within the College of Commissioners and the establishment of a new Directorate-General for the Middle East (DG MENA). At the same time, preparations for the announcement of a Mediterranean Pact and the development of a coherent Middle East strategy reflect the Union’s clear interest in its southern dimension. Additionally, the EU is seeking to deepen ties with other regions across the globe, illustrated by the growing number of security and defense partnerships.[4] In the field of transatlantic relations, the Union reached an agreement with President Trump in July 2025 on tariff levels, while also striving to secure U.S. support for any future peace-monitoring mission in Ukraine. Table V presents the two initiatives expected to be announced shortly.

Table V: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (Europe in the world)

Type Title Pact Pact for the Mediterranean Joint Communication EU–India Preparing the Union for the Future

One of the Commission’s most significant priorities is the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034. Early preparation of the proposal ensures stability and predictability in the Union’s resources. According to the Commission’s proposal, the new budget will approach €2 billion, representing on average 1.26% of the EU’s Gross National Income per year. The innovation lies in structuring the funds around four pillars: (a) national and regional partnership plans, including cohesion and agricultural policy; (b) cross-cutting programmes and instruments, such as EU funds; (c) external dimension and Common Foreign and Security Policy; and (d) European public administration. At the same time, the Commission is expected to table proposals to prepare the Union for potential enlargement.

The Greek Perspective: Priorities and Challenges

For Greece, the Union’s actions have a direct impact on key national sectors. In the field of security and defense, Athens supports the new European initiatives and, in July 2025, formally submitted a request for loans worth at least €1.2 billion under the SAFE Regulation, seeking to bolster its defense capabilities through low-interest borrowing. Nonetheless, certain contentious issues remain, the most sensitive being the partial involvement of the Turkish defense industry in European schemes. Regarding the Union’s interaction with third actors, Greece seeks closer cooperation with like-minded partners while promoting stability in relations with the United States for both strategic and trade reasons. The Black Sea Strategy holds particular significance for Greece, as it explicitly states that “it proposes multiple avenues to forge closer cooperation with… Turkey,” highlighting that coordinated engagement with the neighboring country is “important” and that Turkey is “an EU partner of strategic importance.” At the same time, Greece aims to draw the attention of other member states to regions that have been partly sidelined due to the war in Ukraine, such as the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which directly affect the Union’s overall policy agenda (e.g. the war in Gaza and the crisis in the Red Sea).

With regard to preserving quality of life, as a coastal state with a strong shipping and fisheries sector, Greece is particularly interested in the sustainability of oceans and the management of marine resources, in cooperation with Cyprus and the Cypriot Commissioner responsible. The agricultural sector also remains crucial, especially amid growing pressures. As a predominantly agricultural country, Greece advocates for policies that will support farmers’ incomes during this difficult period. Transport is likewise a Greek priority, with an emphasis on safe and sustainable networks, reflected in the country’s strong interest in key positions both in the College of Commissioners and in the European Parliament. In the field of tourism, Greece, as a major tourist destination, looks forward to the European strategy for sustainable tourism, which is expected to include proposals to enhance the sector’s resilience and competitiveness. Finally, the housing crisis is becoming one of the most pressing social challenges in Europe. In Greece, it creates a suffocating environment for young people and the middle class, both struggling to cope with housing costs. As a key factor of social cohesion and demographic stability, Athens is keen to see whether the Commission will advance more targeted housing policies, drawing also on EU financial instruments.

All of these political priorities are closely linked to the issue of the new MFF 2028–2034. Greece, holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2027, will be at the forefront of negotiations that will determine the scope of funding across all the aforementioned policy areas. For Athens, the challenge will be not only to find common ground among member states but also to advance its own priorities.

What Lies Ahead?

The multitude of initiatives launched by the Commission may be welcomed as a sign of dynamism and an eagerness to act across key policy domains. However, the central question is not the announcement of new strategies, but their timely and effective implementation. The shift from theory to practice will ultimately determine the credibility of the institutions and citizens’ trust in the Union. In this context, the role of member states becomes pivotal.

Against this backdrop, this year’s State of the Union address will not merely be a stock-taking exercise, but rather a “credibility test.” The key question will be whether, and to what extent, the Commission can turn its ambitions into concrete action for the Union’s collective good. At the same time, the new structure of the Commission will also come under scrutiny. The creation of the two new portfolios for Defense and Space, and for the Mediterranean signals the Union’s evolving priorities in critical sectors and regions where its previous contribution and involvement were comparatively limited. Nine months after their establishment, it will be assessed whether these portfolios have delivered on their intended r

[1] As provided by the Treaties (Article 17 TEU), the European Commission holds the “right of initiative” and is responsible for proposing new EU legislation in policy areas where it has competence. For such proposals to acquire the force of secondary law, they must be adopted either through the ordinary legislative procedure or a special legislative procedure. In parallel, there are non-legally binding acts that serve as documents outlining political direction in specific areas. These carry less weight than legislative acts (which are adopted by the European Parliament and/or the Council of the EU), as they primarily express the Commission’s views. Although they emerge following consultations with stakeholders and member states, these may not fully endorse the same positions (or their exact implementation). Strategies, usually framed as “communications” to other institutions, set out the Commission’s stance and priorities on specific issues. Action Plans, Pacts, and Roadmaps generally fall into this same category.

[2] In December 2024, the European Parliament established a temporary Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU, tasked with examining the causes of the current crisis and submitting specific proposals to address it.

[3] In December 2024, the European Parliament decided to create a Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield to assess existing and planned legislation and policies. According to an EPRS briefing, the communication is “widely expected to be postponed”.

[4] The EU currently has security and defense partnerships with eight partners (Albania, North Macedonia, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Moldova, Norway, and South Korea).

The overloaded boat was carrying passengers including children when it hit a submerged tree stump.

Despite living longer lives, the aged are opposed to raising official retirement ages, reducing retirement benefits, or raising taxes on the elderly. They are increasingly protesting, resisting, and demanding that retirement ages stay the same and benefits remain intact. Credit: Shutterstock

By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Sep 4 2025 (IPS)

It is becoming increasingly apparent that planet Earth is evolving into the planet of the aged. In nearly every country around the world, the numbers and percentages of the aged, commonly defined as individuals aged 65 years or older, have increased rapidly.

Consequently, the aged have infiltrated offices and institutions and advanced their demands and aspirations. As a result of these developments, they have formed gerontocracies that dictate policies, programs and expenditures, often without truly representing their populations.

In 1950, the aged accounted for only 5% of the world’s population, totaling 128 million. Today, the proportion of the elderly has doubled. The aged now account for 10% of the world’s population, totaling 854 million people. Since 1950, the aged population has nearly septupled!

In 2000, only three countries – Italy, Japan, and Monaco – had more aged individuals than children under 18. However, by 2025, this historic reversal had spread to approximately 45 countries and territories. For instance, in Italy, the percentage of aged individuals compared to children under 18 was 25% versus 15%. Japan shows an even larger demographic reversal, with 30% being aged and 14% being children under 18.

It is projected that by 2050, the aged will make up 17% of the world’s population. By 2080, individuals aged 65 and older are expected to outnumber children under 18, reflecting the evolving rise of the planet of the aged.

Furthermore, by the end of the 21st century, nearly one out of every four human beings living on the planet, close to 2.5 billion people, is expected to be a member of the aged population.

In many countries, including the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the aged proportions are even higher by the close of the century. For example, the proportion of the elderly in 2100 is expected to be about 34% in France and Great Britain, and 41% in China (Figure 1).

 

Source: United Nations.

 

In 2025, countries like Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, and Portugal are expected to have approximately one-quarter of their populations made up of aged individuals. This proportion is projected to grow to about one-third by 2050.

With the rise of the aged, many countries across the planet are being transformed into gerontocracies.

Gerontocracies often have policies that are out of touch with the needs of younger generations. Such societies can lead to legislative stagnation and entrenchment of a political system disconnected from the changing needs of its population.

The aged have infiltrated offices and institutions and advanced their demands and aspirations. As a result of these developments, they have formed gerontocracies that dictate policies, programs and expenditures, often without truly representing their populations

Aged leaders tend to focus on issues primarily affecting their age group, resulting in a political system that overlooks the needs of the majority. For instance, aged leaders spend less on welfare for children and more on benefits for seniors, marginalizing the interests of young people.

These political systems are less likely to address long-term issues, like climate change, food insecurity, environmental degradation, biodiversity loss, and pollution. Gerontocracies can also stifle innovation, reduce scientific research, and create barriers for young researchers to advance in their careers.

In addition to their increasing numbers and proportions of populations, the aged are now living longer than at any time in human history. In 1950, global life expectancies at age 65 for men and women were 11 and 12 years, respectively.

By 2025, these figures had increased to 16 years for men and 19 years for women. Moreover, the global life expectancies of the aged are projected to continue increasing, reaching 21 years for men and 23 years by the end of the 21st century.

Despite the rising aged population, the vast majority of the world’s population, around 90% or 7.4 billion people, are not members of the aged. The median age of the global population in 2025 is 31 years, with about four billion men, women, and children.

In contrast to the majority of the world’s population, the leaders of many countries are aged. Many of these leaders are more than twice the age of their population’s median age and decades older than majority of their citizens (Table 1).

In addition, there is a growing number of government leaders who are aged men, many of whom are well over the age of 70.

As of 2025, women held the position of Heads of State and/or Government in 27 countries, accounting for approximately 14% of the world’s countries. Men also dominated parliament and cabinet minister positions, making up 73% and 77%, respectively.

Potential problems with having aged state leaders include the risks of cognitive decline, reduced mental flexibility, ineffective strategic planning, resistance to new ideas, increased health problems (often concealed), lower energy and stamina levels, and a focus on policies that primarily benefit the aged members of their population.

A particularly worrisome consideration among the aged, especially for the world’s state leaders, is dementia.

The risk of developing dementia among the elderly is significant, believed to double approximately every five years after the age of 65. In some countries, such as the United States, researchers estimate that 42% of the population over the age of 55 years will eventually develop dementia.

Aged state leaders likely have an elevated risk of dementia compared to others in their populations because of their advanced ages, highly stressful roles, and intense and sustained pressures. Studies on aging and political leadership suggest that a significant proportion of leaders over 65 may have impaired executive function. These impairments affect complex decision-making, flexible thinking, and impulse control.

In addition, aged country leaders often strive to leave a lasting legacy. As they near the end of their tenure and lives, these leaders aim to establish systems, capabilities, and strategies that will have a lasting impact reflecting their tenure long after they are gone.

One powerful tool at the disposal of the aged is voting. While the elderly, regardless of age, are eligible to vote in elections, young people, usually below the age of 18, are not eligible to vote.

The elderly are also consistently more likely to vote in elections than younger voters who are busy working and have other time-consuming activities. Aged voters tend to be more conservative, favor the status quo, and have a greater stake in economic issues related to retirement and old-age healthcare.

As a result of the growth of the aged populations, many countries are facing financial challenges when it comes to funding national retirement programs. Several solutions have been suggested to address these issues, such as increasing taxes, raising the retirement age, and limiting retirement benefits.

Despite living longer lives, the aged are opposed to raising official retirement ages, reducing retirement benefits, or raising taxes on the elderly. They are increasingly protesting, resisting, and demanding that retirement ages stay the same and benefits remain intact.

The elderly are concerned about the declining number of workers in the labor force who support retirement and health benefits for them. In response to this issue, the aged have embraced pro-natalist policies, promoted traditional family values, and emphasized patriotism to boost fertility rates that have fallen below replacement levels in more than half of all countries and areas globally. However, these efforts have not yet succeeded in raising fertility rates back to replacement levels.

In conclusion, with their increasing numbers, growing proportions, and a rise in aged world leaders, as well as the establishment of gerontocracies that influence government policies, programs, and spending, Earth is witnessing the rise of the planet of the aged.

Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population issues, including his recent book, “Population Levels, Trends, and Differentials”.

 

The Kishtwar cloudburst on August 26 buried Chesoti village beneath a torrent of mud and boulders, killing at least 65 people, with several still missing. Credit: Umar Manzoor Shah/IPS

By Umar Manzoor Shah
SRINAGAR & KISTIWAR, India, Sep 4 2025 (IPS)

The relentless rain that battered the mountains and valleys of Jammu and Kashmir this August shattered lives and records.

In the span of just 31 days, more than 100 lives were lost, scores of families were displaced, and entire communities devastated, not just by the sheer force of nature but by the uncertainty and chaos that followed.

August 2025 will be remembered for the sheer scale and frequency of the natural disasters it experienced. According to the India Meteorological Department (IMD), Jammu and Kashmir saw its sixth wettest August in 125 years, with 319.3 mm of rainfall; this was 73 percent above the norm.

“We recorded over 30 extreme weather events this month, including flash floods, cloudbursts, landslides, gusty winds, and thunderstorms. At least 14 of these led to fatalities,” confirmed Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad, Director of the Meteorological Department, to Inter Press Service.

The destruction was widespread. Among the most devastating incidents was the Kishtwar cloudburst on August 26, which buried Chesoti village beneath a torrent of mud and boulders, killing at least 65 people, with several still missing. Just days later, a landslide along the Vaishno Devi route in the Jammu division claimed 35 more lives, many of them Hindu pilgrims.

Inside a makeshift shelter near Chesoti, 45-year-old Ghulam Nabi recounted the horror of that night.

“We heard a roar like a thousand waterfalls. There wasn’t even time to scream. The earth shook, and then everything was dark and wet.”

He lost his wife and two children—their bodies found days later by rescue teams sifting through the debris.

“I never thought the mountain would come for us. We always feared the river, but it was the hillside that swallowed my family,” Nabi told IPS News.

In Reasi, 13-year-old Manisha Devi stands at the edge of her ruined home, clutching a photograph of her elder brother, who had traveled to the Vaishno Devi shrine to work as a porter.

“He sent me money so I could buy books. Now, he is gone, and so is our house,” she said.

Experts say the frequency and intensity of these disasters cannot be dismissed as mere chance.

“There is clear evidence that climate change is making rainfall events more erratic and intense, especially in mountainous terrain,” explained Faizan Arif Keng, an independent weather forecaster. “Doda received 290 percent more rainfall than normal. Udhampur, Ramban, and Samba were also hit with more than double their usual rain.”

“The weather patterns are changing. We’re seeing more cloudbursts, intense rainfall in a very short time, triggering flash floods and landslides. These are not isolated events but symptoms of a larger problem,” said Ahmed.

In Ladakh, the story was even more dramatic. “Kargil recorded a 1,530 percent surplus, and Leh almost 900 percent above average. These numbers are unprecedented and should be a wake-up call,” said Keng.

If the rain brought tragedy for some, it spelled economic ruin for others. The closure of the Srinagar–Jammu National Highway, the only road link connecting the landlocked Kashmir valley with the outer world, left thousands of trucks loaded with apples, pears, and plums stranded for days. The result: rotting fruit and plummeting prices.

At north Kashmir’s Sopore Fruit market [Mandi], Asia’s second-largest trading hub, the atmosphere was grim.

“We are staring at losses of around Rs 200 crore (about USD 22 million). If the trucks can’t reach the markets on time, growers lose everything. Last year, we survived a similar crisis, but how many more can we take?” Fayaz Ahmed Malik, president of the Mandi, told IPS.

Grower Abdul Rashid, standing beside his damaged Gala apple boxes, shared his frustration. “I spent all year in the orchard. Now, the apples are ruined. The buyers pay half the rate, sometimes less. How do I feed my family or pay my debts?”

The Kashmir region has endured its deadliest month in living memory. In 31 days, more than 100 lives were lost, scores of families were displaced, and entire communities were left shattered due to rain and landslides. Credit: Umar Manzoor Shah/IPS

The mandi chairman, Bashir Ahmad Basheer, called for urgent government intervention: “Partial traffic movement is not enough. We need priority passage for all fruit trucks. The growers’ livelihoods depend on timely delivery. Every day’s delay is a disaster.”

With the crisis mounting, India’s Ministry of Home Affairs announced the formation of Inter-Ministerial Central Teams (IMCTs) to assess the damage not just in Jammu and Kashmir but across the northern states battered by extreme weather. Teams, comprising senior officials from various ministries, are expected to tour affected districts, evaluate relief efforts, and recommend further aid.

An official from the administration, who asked not to be named, told IPS that the process is now faster than before. The center releases funds quickly after the assessment, without waiting for lengthy paperwork from the states. But the ground reality is that search and rescue operations are still ongoing in several districts.

Official figures show that, in the current financial year alone, Rs 2,090 million (about USD 11.9 million) was released to Jammu and Kashmir under the State Disaster Response Fund, with more sanctioned under the National Disaster Relief Fund.

Despite these efforts, experts warn that more must be done. “We have to move beyond just relief and compensation. There needs to be investment in community-level disaster preparedness, early warning systems, and stricter regulation of construction in vulnerable zones. The people living in these mountains are tough, but they need help adapting to new realities,” says Mudasir Ahmad Mir, a researcher from the University of Kashmir who is working on his thesis on Kashmir’s natural disasters and their impact on livelihoods in the region.

In Chesoti, Ghulam Nabi’s voice carries a plea: “We are simple people. We don’t ask for much. But we want to live without fear every time it rains. Can someone tell us when the next storm will come?”

Not all is lost. Community solidarity has served as a source of hope. Volunteers from neighboring villages, religious organizations, and NGOs have distributed food, clothes, and medicines.

“It’s the people who save each other when the government is stretched thin,” said Manzoor Ahmad, a teacher from Ramban who has been helping coordinate aid efforts.

But the scars run deep. For children like Manisha, every thunderstorm brings back memories of loss. For farmers like Abdul Rashid, the fear of financial collapse shadows the joy of harvest.

“August will end,” said Fayaz Malik at Sopore mandi, “but its wounds will take much longer to heal. We need help, yes, but also understanding and empathy from those in power.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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One man whose family were affected tells the BBC that he can only account for two relatives, who both died.

A family prepares a banner to protest the effects of climate change on children outside their house in the village of Patzité, Quiché, Guatemala. Credit: UNICEF/Patricia Willocq

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 4 2025 (IPS)

2025 has been marked by a significant escalation of the climate crisis and its effects on vulnerable populations, as the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) warn that average global temperatures could exceed the 1.5°C threshold within the next five years. In Latin America and the Caribbean, rising temperatures and emissions continue to strain access to essential services and deepen poverty, particularly among children.

“Children and adolescents bear the greatest burden of climate change,” said Roberto Benes, the Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean for the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). “Not only because their developing bodies are more vulnerable to extreme phenomena such as cyclones or heatwaves, but also because these events disrupt their families’ livelihoods and their education. If children and young people don’t have the resources to meet their basic needs and develop their potential, and if adequate social protection systems are not in place, the region’s inequalities will only be perpetuated.”

On August 28, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and UNICEF published a joint report: The Impact of Climate Change on Child and Youth Poverty in Latin America, which details the impact of climate change on youth poverty in the region as well as current government and humanitarian initiatives aimed at climate adaptation and loss mitigation.

According to the report, poverty rates in Latin America have risen sharply since the COVID-19 pandemic, pushing an additional 22 million people into poverty. It is estimated that roughly 94 million children and adolescents are living in poverty, making up 52 percent of the region’s poor population. Despite youth making up only 39 percent of the total population, roughly 40 percent of all children under the age of 15 live in poverty.

The frequency of extreme weather events in Latin America has skyrocketed in recent years, reaching nearly 30 per year in the early 2020s. In the Caribbean, some countries are already experiencing monthly temperature increases that exceed the 1.5°C threshold. Meanwhile, Latin American countries such as Argentina and Chile do not exceed 1°C and face volatile precipitation patterns that increase flooding, particularly for low-lying coastal communities.

According to UNICEF’s Child Climate Risk Index, as a result of climate change, roughly 55 million children in Latin America and the Caribbean face water shortages, 60 million experience cyclones, and 45 million are exposed to extreme heat. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the frequency of floods and landslides from heavy torrential rains, which have damaged numerous critical infrastructures that children depend on, such as schools, healthcare centers, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) facilities. Floods and rising temperatures have also given way to a rise in waterborne and vector-borne diseases, such as diarrhea, malaria, zika, and dengue.

Additionally, agriculture and food production has been hindered by persistent droughts, particularly in northeastern Brazil, areas in the Southern Cone, and the Central American dry corridor. Poor children and adolescents in these regions face extended periods of nutritional deprivation, which heightens the risk of malnutrition. It is estimated that anywhere between 570,000 and over 1 million children under 5 could suffer from stunted growth by 2030 due to climate change.

Estimated economic losses from natural disasters have increased nearly tenfold since the 1960s.“These increasing impacts divert resources towards damage repair and adaptation instead of investing in infrastructure, education, or innovation. This creates an opportunity cost by limiting potential growth and perpetuates development gaps, hindering the reduction of inequalities in Latin America,” the report said.

Current climate adaptation policies and funding fail to adequately prioritize the needs of children, with critical services such as health, nutrition, education, water, and sanitation being limited, jeopardizing cognitive and physical development. It is projected that by 2030, at least 5.9 million additional children, adolescents, and youth could be pushed into poverty—a figure that could triple to nearly 17.9 million if funding and humanitarian action remain insufficient.

Although children and adolescents are the most climate-vulnerable populations in Latin America and the Caribbean, climate financing directed toward youth accounts for just 3.4 percent of the region’s multilateral climate funding, totaling at roughly USD 743 million. However, these funds are primarily reserved for education projects and do not cover investment needs for other basic sectors such as healthcare, which is urgent in the face of rising child morbidity in the region. Additionally, child-sensitive climate funds only reach children in six countries in Latin America and the Caribbean: Brazil, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.

The report also highlights that climate change risks worsening existing wealth disparities and gender inequality in the region. Latin America and the Caribbean — described as the “most unequal region in the world” — are projected to see poorer families experience higher rates of poverty, hindered recovery, and greater challenges adapting to natural disasters. Women and girls are disproportionately affected, facing higher levels of unemployment, difficulty reentering the workforce, relative asset losses, and increased school dropout rates.

“Without investment in resilient services for children, and without sustained political will from countries and other sectors to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the children and youth of 2030 will continue to be deprived of their rights,” said UNICEF climate advisor Reis López. “This will only perpetuate inequality in one of the most unequal regions of the world.”

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Families in northeastern Afghanistan have been devastated by last Sunday's earthquake. Credit: IOM

By Monica Hirst
RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil, Sep 4 2025 (IPS)

Since January 2025, Donald Trump’s second presidency has been focused on securing the global supremacy of the United States. It justifies a package of international coercive and intimidatory measures, accompanied by an aggressive, arrogant rhetoric. Right at the outset, the new administration announced a veritable tsunami of tariffs and immediately implemented them as a sign of its new independence.

This demonstrated Washington’s willingness to turn access to the US market into a challenge fraught with uncertainty and protracted bilateral negotiations. This massive blow to the global trading system affects all of the United States’ economic relations – including those with Brazil.

In addition to a general 10 per cent increase in all tariffs on US imports, a differential treatment policy for countries and regions was introduced based on varying and sometimes opaque criteria. The US President interprets the need to combat the American trade deficit as a national emergency that justifies the imposition of counter-tariffs.

By August, 94 countries were already affected by this contentious policy. Some, including Vietnam, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the European Union, managed to reach tariff agreements, but only at the cost of various concessions and often significant losses.

An ideology-driven policy

In the first few months of Trump’s term in office, Brazil kept a safe distance from Washington’s coercive measures. The Lula government managed to continue its active and self-confident foreign policy.

Brasília’s claim to influence, whose voice is heard on issues of global governance, was bolstered by its role as host of high-level multilateral meetings held this year, including the G20 summit, the meeting of BRICS heads of state and government, and, before long, the COP30 world climate conference.

Relations with China, Brazil’s most important trading partner, accounting for 28 per cent of Brazilian foreign trade, also gained new significance; both sides signed 36 agreements on a wide range of economic, technological and cultural issues.

While the Lula administration sought dialogue with the White House to address the consequences and potential damage of the new US tariff policy – as Brazil’s second-largest trading partner, the United States accounts for 12 per cent of the country’s exports – it was only a matter of time before the US administration’s aggressive stance on trade and tariffs would have an impact on Brazil’s economy.

On 18 July, the American government informed President Lula da Silva in a letter that tariffs of 50 per cent would henceforth be levied on imports from Brazil, marking the start of a heated exchange with the Planalto, the seat of the president’s government.

By executive order, Trump imposed an additional 40 per cent tariff on Brazilian imports, supplemented by a list of 700 exceptions.

The justification for increasing tariffs to offset the bilateral trade deficit proved unfounded, as the trade balance has consistently shown a surplus in favour of the United States for more than 15 years.

Additionally, the American president’s letter went beyond trade policy arguments and addressed political issues related to the court proceedings against former President Bolsonaro and the rulings of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF), which affect the interests of US digital platform companies.

Lula’s government perceived the letter as ‘unacceptable blackmail,’ leading to growing tensions that were exacerbated by repeated public statements by the US president and his staff. Value judgements were made about Brazilian democracy and its institutions, and the priorities of Brazilian foreign policy were called into question, including the organisation of the BRICS, which Brazil currently chairs.

This was followed by an investigation by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) based on Section 301, which allows unilateral retaliatory measures to protect national interests. By executive order, Trump finally imposed an additional 40 per cent tariff on Brazilian imports, supplemented by a list of 700 exceptions.

The Trump administration also began to question the competitive conditions for North American companies in Brazil, attacking the PIX instant payment system and criticising environmental policy, anti-corruption policy, the handling of digital platforms and the effects of preferential trade agreements with third countries.

Right-wing circles seized the opportunity to blame Lula for the escalation with Washington.

A further boost to this ideologically motivated campaign came from the close ties between individual actors and political organisations on the American and Brazilian far right, particularly between Trumpism and Bolsonarism.

The influence of the United States in Latin America, especially in Brazil, is not a new phenomenon, but in this case it took on a new form: Digital media channels were mobilised in coordination with the ideological crusades of the local right against the institutions of the Brazilian republic — especially the judicial system.

Creating fault lines between Brazil’s political forces, exacerbated by the real economic costs that the tariff shock entailed for Brazilian industries. Right-wing circles seized the opportunity to blame Lula for the escalation with Washington.

The timing of Trump’s tariff shock, coinciding with the court ruling against former President Jair Bolsonaro – for his responsibility in the attempted coup in 2023 – further fuelled the fire. The Magnitsky Act was instrumentalised to sanction STF judges and stylise Bolsonaro as a victim of human rights violations in the eyes of Trumpists.

At the same time, Washington rejected the dispute settlement mechanisms of the World Trade Organisation, justifying this with security policy arguments that increasingly dominate Trump’s narrative.

Trump’s criticism of Brazil’s international policy is also becoming increasingly vocal in this context. The political steadfastness and keen sense of economic opportunity that have characterised Lula’s foreign policy to date will be powerless against the thorny and delicate prospects in the short to medium term.

The country’s right to determine its position in the world autonomously is being called into question. The Planalto’s response to the repeated political coercion of Trump’s tariffs is based on the inseparability of sovereignty, autonomy and the defence of democracy.

Alternative partnerships

The Brazilian government does not see this as a lonely crusade, but is increasingly seeking partners and allies in all directions. Opening the doors to Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam is intended to add further counterweights to the connection with China and better link the Brazilian economy with the dynamic Asian value chains.

At the same time, Brasília is focusing on dialogue with India – a key partner in the BRICS – on issues of global governance, investment, agribusiness and digital technologies. Within the region itself, the aim is to overcome the inertia that has long prevented greater progress in relations between Brazil and Mexico.

The Trump nightmare is a strong incentive to overcome the mutual indifference that has stood in the way of sustainable cooperation between Latin America’s two largest economies. As far as European countries are concerned, Brazil is keen to expand the agenda of common interests at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

The European Union is currently one of Brazil’s most important trading partners, with a trade volume of over nine billion dollars. Of particular note is the Brazilian government’s commitment to concluding the long-delayed EU-Mercosur agreement, driven by the need to expand common interests and opportunities in areas such as energy transition, technology and strengthening multilateralism.

Closer cooperation with the world’s democracies is taking on new significance – as a safeguard for the rule of law in Brazil itself.

So far, the European Union has treated the BRICS and the Global South with palpable scepticism and has avoided acknowledging their contributions to negotiations on international policy issues. Instead of taking note of the neutral and pragmatic positions and initiatives of many states, the EU is dominated by the interpretation – shared by Trump – that these are anti-Western groups.

It would be a mistake not to develop a dialogue with the emerging powers of the South to address issues such as the genocide in Gaza, an understanding with Iran or a just peace between Russia and Ukraine.

Even if this does not reduce the costly strategic dependence on the US in the short term, these steps would enable European governments to engage in inclusive and constructive projects on the changing world stage.

Undoubtedly, the Lula government would be the first to support moving the political game in this direction. Closer cooperation with the world’s democracies thus takes on new significance – as a safeguard for the rule of law in Brazil itself.

Monica Hirst is a research fellow at the National Institute for Science and Technology Studies in Brazil.

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS), Brussels

IPS UN Bureau

 

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During the first years of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, brave Afghan women in Kabul and several other provinces rose up in protest. Credit: Learning Together.

By External Source
KABUL, Sep 3 2025 (IPS)

This year marks the fourth anniversary of the Taliban retaking power in Afghanistan. All these years have been one long nightmare for  the women of Afghanistan, the ones who have borne the brunt of oppression – arguably the worst of its kind anywhere in the world.

To mark the occasion we find it appropriate to take a short trip in history back into the last four years to recollect how it all unfolded and how Afghan women have endured it this far.

On August 15, 2021, Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan fell to the Taliban. The event marked the end of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, led by Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, and the return of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” under Taliban rule. This political change started a new chapter of suffering, systemic bans, and harsh restrictions reserved mainly for women and girls.

Within a very short time, the Taliban introduced strict rules affecting education, work, public life, and even travel. Girls were banned from school; women were ejected from government work and the public sector; they were compelled to wear full covering and not allowed to travel without a male guardian.

The year 2021 was painful, suffocating, and deeply traumatizing for Afghan women and girls. In late August 2021, schools remained open up to grade 12 only in a few provinces of Balkh, Kunduz, Jawzjan, Sar-e Pol, Faryab, and Daikund – where local officials ignored the Taliban leadership’s orders. In most other provinces, girls were stopped from going to school.

 

A “Temporary” Suspension That Still Stands

The Taliban’s Ministry of Education officially announced that only primary schools – up to grade 6 – would stay open for girls. Secondary and high schools were, however, suspended “until further notice”. They would only reopen if “Islamic rules were followed, such as wearing the proper religious clothing.” Four years on, the so-called temporary suspension in still place.

In September 2021, the Taliban shut down the Ministry of women’s Affairs and handed over its building to the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Thus, a ministry notorious for its harsh and oppressive treatment of women and girls, was preferred to the one meant to raise awareness, promote gender equality and support women’s participation in national development.

By December 2021, the Taliban moved to make a black full-body covering that shows only the eyes or a burqa, mandatory for women. At universities, female and male classes were completely separated.

 

Women Protest—Despite Crackdowns

But Afghan women did not take these oppressive rules on the chin. On the contrary, they took to the streets of Kabul and protested vigorously, with slogans such as, “Work, education, freedom, and political participation are our rights.”

The Taliban predictably responded with brutal force, including even firing live rounds into crowds to break up the protests, but the women remained undeterred. The protests inspired similar actions in other provinces such as Herat, Balkh, Badakhshan, Daikundi, Bamyan, and Nangarhar.

Amidst the protests and brutalities, the women still held onto hope. “Brighter days will come”, they used to say, but in 2022, the Taliban escalated the bans on women’s social life, once again, beginning with education. That year, Afghan girls were officially banned from entering universities and barred from registering for the national university entrance exams.

Media restrictions and mandatory dress codes, which started in November 2021, intensified in 2022. The sight of women was banished from television and cinema screens, and female journalists were compelled to cover their entire faces. In May 2022, wearing the full-body abaya with a niqab became mandatory. Failure to comply was punished by fines, job loss, and even imprisonment.

In April 2022, restrictions began with new rules assigning specific days for women to visit public parks. By November of the same year, women were entirely forbidden to visit public parks, gyms, and bathhouses. Severe travel restrictions were also placed on women. They were forbidden to travel more than 72 kilometres without a male guardian. This rule was enforced regardless of whether the woman had a husband at home or not, or whether the guardian was able to accompany her. Transportation companies and airlines were ordered to enforce this rule, violators would have their vehicles seized or imprisoned.

Eventually, women were pushed out of government jobs altogether. The largest wave of dismissals happened in September 2022. By December, women’s participation in NGOs, international organizations, and UN offices was completely banned. This also affected thousands of women, many of them nurses and midwives working in the health sector, severely jeopardizing an already creaky health services of people in a war-torn country.

As the years progressed, the banning decrees kept flying out like snowflakes, with increasing violence. In Logar, Kabul, Herat, Faryab, Jawzjan, and Ghor provinces, public floggings, stoning and executions were carried out against women accused of moral crimes.

In spite of that, brave Afghan women in Kabul and several other provinces rose up in protest. They chanted slogans like “Bread, Work, Education It’s Our Right,” “We Will Not Back Down”.

Undeterred by serious threats and dangers, these courageous women raised their voices louder than ever before. They showed unprecedented resilience against oppression, hoping their protests would become a symbol of civil resistance for Afghan women everywhere.

We spent the last three years like the living dead, silent, breathless, merely surviving hoping each day that the next decree would not bring more loss. As we stepped into 2025, we carried with us a fragile hope that the injustice, oppression, and inequality would end. But this year, too, has mirrored the years before.

The voices of young girls have been replaced by locked doors, forced silence, and tired, defeated gazes.

The very women who are meant to save lives in the future are now imprisoned behind the walls of their own homes. Beauty salons have been shut down as if femininity itself were a crime. Learning centers are silent, universities are forgotten and even dreams once bold and vibrant have been exorcised from the mind.

The year 2025 continues to mark a series of systematic and oppressive steps by the Taliban aimed at gradually erasing women from public life. Afghan women remain trapped under oppression, yet with an unbreakable spirit, we hold onto hope for a day when freedom, education, and justice will return to our land.

 

A Call to the International Community

This hope, however, would only become reality when the international community and the European Union listen to the demands of Afghan women and respond with tangible and effective actions.

We are not just asking for sympathy or words of condemnation, we are calling for real action. We are standing firm and we will not surrender. Now it is the turn of the international community to stand with us.

Excerpt:

The author is an Afghanistan-based female journalist, trained with Finnish support before the Taliban take-over. Her identity is withheld for security reasons

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Produce trucks arrive at Lo Valledor, Chile’s largest wholesale market, where edible surplus is recovered for vulnerable communities; Latin America and the Caribbean lead hunger reduction, yet inequalities and malnutrition persist. Credit: Max Valencia / FAO

By Máximo Torero
SANTIAGO, Sep 3 2025 (IPS)

In perspective, good news: world hunger is beginning to decline. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025 (SOFI 2025) reported a drop in the proportion of people suffering from hunger, from 8.5% in 2023 to 8.2% in 2024. Latin America and the Caribbean has played a pivotal role in this progress.

In 2024, undernourishment in the region affected 5.1% of the population, down from 6.1% in 2020–2021. Moderate or severe food insecurity fell significantly, from 33.7% in 2020 to 25.2% in 2024, the largest reduction recorded worldwide.

Even after crises such as the pandemic, rising inflation, and extreme climate events, progress is possible through sustained public policies, cooperation, investment, and strengthening the resilience of agrifood systems

Five countries in the region—Chile, Costa Rica, Guyana, Uruguay and now Brazil— no longer appear on the hunger map, thanks to coordinated policies in the areas of economy, health, education, agriculture, and social protection, a viable formula to tackle the structural determinants of hunger.

These figures demonstrate that, even after crises such as the pandemic, rising inflation, and extreme climate events, progress is possible through sustained public policies, cooperation, investment, and strengthening the resilience of agrifood systems.

This positive development should not hide an uncomfortable truth: these advances are not reaching everyone equally. SOFI 2025 points out that while some countries are reducing hunger, others face challenges such as increasing child stunting, overweight, and obesity. In the region, 141 million adults are obese, and 4 million children under the age of five are overweight.

The analysis of specific cases highlights contrasts: Colombia reduced hunger to 3.9% with territorial policies and support for family farming, while the Dominican Republic cut the indicator by more than 17 percentage points in two decades with a multisectoral approach.

However, progress is not always uniform. Panama and Guatemala, although reducing hunger, continue to struggle with the challenge of malnutrition. Ecuador and El Salvador face a similar paradox: while hunger is decreasing, moderate and severe food insecurity is on the rise.

In Venezuela, hunger fell to 5.9%, but the pressure of food inflation persists. Mexico has reduced its figures to 2.7%, although adult overweight reached 36% in 2022, above the regional average. In Argentina, while hunger remains at low levels (3.4%), there has been an increase in child overweight and adult obesity.

Unfortunately, the Caribbean remains the greatest challenge. Some 17.5% of the population is undernourished, and the cost of a healthy diet reaches 5.48 PPP dollars per person per day. Haiti is facing one of the world’s most severe crises: 54.2% of its population suffers from hunger. This is not only an alarming statistic; it is an urgent call to strengthen greater cooperation and investment in the region’s most fragile context.

SOFI 2025 concludes that the countries that have reduced hunger under adverse circumstances in Latin America and the Caribbean share common approaches. These include strong and well-targeted social protection systems capable of cushioning crises; and integrated policies that strengthen local production, inclusive value chains, and market access, support family farming, and promote environmental sustainability.

Added to this are productive diversification, climate resilience measures to withstand extreme events, and open and stable trade to ensure supply and moderate price volatility; as well as coordination among institutions and levels of government to align investments, and data and monitoring systems that anticipate and respond quickly to crises.

These experiences show that a combination of political will, strategic investment, and evidence-based management can reverse hunger—even in an uncertain global environment.

Excerpt:

Máximo Torero Cullen is FAO Chief Economist and Regional Representative ad interim for Latin America and the Caribbean