Central Europe

On 6 June 2018, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) published the final report on the 18 March 2018 presidential election in the Russian Federation.  The report recommends that, in order to improve the electoral process, national legislation on fundamental freedoms and political, including candidates’ rights, be brought in line with OSCE commitments and other obligations, and that these rights and freedoms be fully respected by the authorities.

The report states that in order to increase public confidence in the electoral process efforts should be made to ensure election administration bodies are transparent, impartial and independent. 

It also recommends ensuring that all contestants in elections have equal opportunities and that restrictions on the right to be a candidate, which conflict with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards, should be removed. In addition, the report recommends that the authorities take decisive action to prevent voters from being pressured and investigate cases of alleged coercion, with a view to prosecuting those responsible.

The report recommends that media outlets should be free to establish their own editorial policies, and that the independence of public media should be strengthened. To that end, it recommends the creation of an independent body for media oversight.

The report notes that the legal framework for the presidential election is comprehensive, and recent amendments addressed some previous ODIHR recommendations. However, further efforts are needed to follow up on outstanding recommendations. For example, the report reiterates a previous recommendation that legislation should guarantee non-partisan citizen observers the opportunity to independently scrutinize the electoral process. 

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission joined efforts with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly delegation to observe voting on election day.

 

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has released translations of five publications on different aspects of elections into six Western Balkan languages.

Three handbooks, entitled Follow-up of Electoral Recommendations, Observation of Voter Registration and Media Monitoring for Election Observation Missions, respectively, as well as two sets of guidelines, Reviewing a Legal Framework for Elections and Population Registration, have been translated into Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, Macedonian and Serbian.

"The translation of these publications not only makes them available to a broader audience, but also helps increase familiarity with ODIHR’s election observation methodology, and in doing so, enhances its transparency,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of ODIHR. "This will help to facilitate the transfer of ODIHR expertise, tools and methodologies in order to support electoral reform efforts across the Western Balkans."

The translations were produced as part of the project Support to Elections in the Western Balkans, which is funded by the European Union and the Austrian Development Agency.

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to following up promptly on ODIHR election assessments and recommendations. The translated publications build upon ODIHR’s existing support to participating States in following up on such recommendations.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM observed fresh impact sites in Shyrokyne. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted near Izvaryne, an area in Luhansk region near the border with the Russian Federation. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line near Vodiane, Bohoiavlenka, Sentianivka and in Luhansk city. The SMM’s monitoring and facilitation of the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as demining activities near the DFS, was interrupted after the SMM heard ceasefire violations in nearby areas. The Mission continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station in Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 180 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 170 explosions).

On the evening and night of 3-4 June, the SMM camera at the DFS (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from west to east, eight projectiles from east to west and 15 projectiles from west to east, followed by totals of four explosions (one assessed as impact and the remainder undetermined), 73 projectiles (27 from east to west and 46 from west to east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 0.2-2km south. The camera also recorded four projectiles from west to east, assessed as rounds of automatic grenade launcher, and their subsequent impacts 100-140m south (assessed as inside the DFS territory, on its south-western edge).

On the evening and night of 3-4 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east, an explosion assessed as outgoing and two projectiles from south-west to north-east, followed by totals of 246 projectiles (32 from north to south, 37 from north-west to south-east, 102 from south to north and 75 from south-east to north-west), 16 undetermined explosions and five illumination flares in vertical flight, all 1-4km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 3-4 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 explosions (15 assessed as impacts, out of which three were assessed as impacts of mortar rounds; 12 assessed as outgoing, out of which four were assessed as outgoing mortar rounds; and the remainder undetermined), all 4-10km at directions ranging from east to south-west. The SMM also heard about 780 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-8km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south. During the day on 4 June, while at the same location, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-5km south.

During the day on 4 June, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about two and a half hours, the SMM heard about nine undetermined explosions 2-5km south-east and south. Positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka for about three hours, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 4-6km south-east and south.

Positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2-5km west-south-west and west. Positioned on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata for about three hours, the SMM heard about 15 undetermined explosions 1-3km at directions ranging from south-west to west. Positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata for about three hours, the SMM heard about 15 undetermined explosions and about 15 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-3km at directions ranging from south-west to north.

Positioned on road M04, about 400m west of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), for about three and a half hours, the SMM heard about ten undetermined explosions 3km south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[2], including, however, fewer explosions (one), compared with the previous 24 hours (about five explosions).

During the day on 4 June, positioned 2km south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 200 shots of small-arms fire, all 1-10km south and south-west.

The SMM observed fresh impact sites in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol). On 30 May, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted fresh impact sites, including three destroyed buildings and six damaged buildings, as well as four craters in Shyrokyne. The SMM assessed them as caused by rounds of self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) fired from a north-easterly direction. Most of the impacts were located about 300m south of the centre of the town.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 3-4 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from south-west to north-east and a projectile from west to east, followed by two projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east and a projectile from north-east to south-west, all 0.2-10km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 2 June, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (an MT-LBS and a BTR-70) about 100-200m north of the disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report of 23 May 2018).   

During the day on 4 June, positioned 3km north of Petrivske for about half an hour, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 4-9km north-west as well as 14 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 2km north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned about 1km north of Petrivske for about ten minutes, the SMM heard two minutes of uncountable and overlapping explosions 2km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 4 June, positioned in and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw nine towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Vodiane (42km south-west of Donetsk), as well as nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bohoiavlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk). In non-government-controlled areas, on 2 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk). On 3 June, an SMM-mini UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a compound in Luhansk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 2 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (S-300) near Nikolske (formerly Volodarske, 97km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw nine towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and noted that 28 mortars (12 M120 Molot, 120mm, 15 2B11 and one BM-37 82mm), 119 towed howitzers (45 D-20, 152mm, 47 2A36, 18 2A65 and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 18 self-propelled howitzers (18 2S3) and 21 anti-tank guns (12 D-48, 85mm and nine MT-12) were again missing. It noted that six self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 and three 2A65) were missing for the first time.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and found the site abandoned and that 14 mortars (2B11) continued to be missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area in Luhansk region, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 3 June, the SMM saw a military truck towing an IFV (BMP-2) near Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk), and an APC (BTR-3) parked near a house in Kyrylivka (26km north-east of Mariupol). On 2 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) and an APC (MT-LB) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk), five reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk), five IFVs (two BMP-2 and three BMP-1) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). On 3 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk), three APCs (two BTR-80 and one BTR-70) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk), six IFVs (three BMP-1, one BMP-2 and two BMP variant) and an APC (MT-LB) near Troitske and an IFV (BMP-1) near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 2 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP-1) near Sentianivka as well as two IFVs (BMP-1) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk). On 3 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two APCs (BTR-80) in a compound in Luhansk city. On 3 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk) and an APC (MT-LB) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk). On 4 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the presence of anti-tank mines. On 2 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time ten anti-tank mines laid across a road 6km south-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk. On 3 June, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted nine anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in a row across the western carriageway of road H21 approximately 700m north-west of the junction between road H21 and a road leading to Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). The same UAV again spotted 30 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in seven rows on road H21, about 1.7km north-west of the aforementioned junction, and 42 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across road H21 about 200m south-east of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed mine hazard signs and demining activities. The SMM saw about ten people wearing demining suits (including helmets and face shields) and vehicles of an international demining organization in a field marked with mine hazard signs (red square with “Mines!” written in Cyrillic) beside a road north-west of Sartana (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Report of 26 March 2018). On the northern outskirts of Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a Kamaz truck and three people carrying a metal detector in a field (marked with white tape) 20m west of the road running north from Nikishyne to the junction with roads M03 and E50 (see SMM Daily Report of 2 June 2018).

The SMM’s monitoring and facilitation of the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS was interrupted due to ceasefire violations and presence of mines. On 4 June, on two occasions, the SMM continued to facilitate mine clearance conducted by demining teams of the armed formations of road H20 up to the access road to the DFS. On both occasions, positioned within a radius of 5km from the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees, and left the area.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw 45 cars (26 with Ukrainian, 14 with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as four with “LPR” plates) and 60 pedestrians (men and women, aged 40-60) in a queue to exit Ukraine. A member of the armed formations then told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (60km south-east of Luhansk) for about half an hour, the SMM saw five pedestrians (three women and two men, aged 30-50) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about half an hour, the SMM saw 31 cars (18 with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as seven with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel north on a road leading towards Shchastia due to the possible presence of mines. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that only limited demining activities had taken place in the area during the previous week. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• In Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM interlocutor told the SMM that she could not provide the SMM with information about civilian casualties without written permission from a senior “DPR” member.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

read more

ISTANBUL, 5 June 2018 – Ignacio Sanchez Amor (MP, Spain), the Special Co-ordinator of the short-term OSCE observer mission to the early parliamentary and presidential elections taking place in Turkey later this month, today wrapped up a visit to Istanbul where he has met with representatives of political parties, NGOs, analysts, and journalists.

The two-day visit also included a meeting with HDP’s presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtaş in Edirne’s high security prison and a visit to Edirnekapi Cemetery, where Sanchez Amor paid respects to those who lost lives during the attempted coup of July 2016.

“Over the past two days, I have met many dedicated men and women who share a desire for a democratic and prosperous Turkey. Candidates, journalists, election officials, activists and Turkish citizens from all walks of life all want to see Turkey succeed, and it is with them in mind that we will conduct a professional and fair-minded election observation mission of these early presidential and parliamentary elections,” Sanchez Amor stated.

He noted that the issue of security and media were of concern among several of his interlocutors, and issues to which election observers should pay close attention.

Meetings were held with representatives of the Justice and Development Party, Republican People’s Party, Nationalist Movement Party, People’s Democratic Party, Good Party and the Patriotic Party. Topics of discussion included the state of emergency that has been in force in Turkey since 2016.

Sanchez Amor also discussed with his interlocutors the general election environment including any challenges that exist to campaigning, campaign activities both inside and outside of Turkey, and the climate for journalists and election observers. He urged all stakeholders to refrain from any forms of violence or intimidation ahead of the elections.

As Special Co-ordinator, Sanchez Amor leads the OSCE’s short-term observation mission to the elections. He will deliver the international observers’ preliminary post-election statement on 25 June in Ankara. Peter Osusky (MP, Slovakia) will serve as the Head of Mission for the 60 OSCE PA observers.

The OSCE parliamentarians will participate in comprehensive briefings before deploying to polling stations in several regions for election day. They will work closely with observers from the OSCE/ODIHR and in co-ordination with colleagues from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

The mission will assess the elections against democratic commitments contained in the OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document.

For more information about the OSCE PA’s election monitoring work, please click here.

For photos of Sanchez Amor's pre-electoral visit, please visit our Flickr page.

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;

2. Persons in military-style outfits;

3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased slightly from 11,482 to 11,452 per day for both BCPs compared to last week. The average net flow for both BCPs went from plus 213 (i.e., more entries into the Russian Federation) to minus 68 (i.e., more exits from the Russian Federation).

The Donetsk BCP continues to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for 35.6 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region[1].

Persons in military-style outfits                                                                                                                                        

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions was 55 at both BCPs compared to 58 last week; 25 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, 30 into Ukraine. Approximately 93 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continue to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, two families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and another four were observed crossing to Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when no such families were observed crossing the border.

Bus connections                                      

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continue to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed 414 buses crossing the border at both BCPs (compared to 417 observed during the previous week), 214 of them were bound for the Russian Federation and 200 for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Stakhanov-Kyiv; Sevastopol and Rovenky-Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a decrease in the number of trucks crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 955 to 948 (306 at the Gukovo BCP and 642 at the Donetsk BCP); 555 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 393 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                          

Among them, the OTs continued also to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks slightly decreased from 64 to 63(compared to the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks have hazard signs, indicating that they are transporting propane or a mix of propane with butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks. At the Donetsk BCP the OTs observed 132 X-ray checks: out of the total number of trucks scanned during the reporting period, 90 trucks (68 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 42 trucks (32 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation.

As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 190 to 169; 82 crossed into the Russian Federation and 87 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 31 occasions, compared to 30 last week; the OTs assessed that 16 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 15 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. In addition, the OTs also observed vehicles registered in Georgia and Lithuania. A number of vehicles with “LPR” and “DPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions.

On 30 May at 14:00 the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed an ambulance with “LPR” licence plates crossing the border from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. Later the same day at 16:50 the same ambulance was observed crossing back to Ukraine. Only the driver was observed inside.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 24 May to 29 May 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from Rostov-on-Don region Border Guard Service

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

read more

383526 Communication and Media Relations Section

Some 20 representatives of law enforcement agencies from Belarus and the Russian Federation began an OSCE Secretariat-organized five-day training course, from 4 to 9 June 2018 in Minsk, on developing co-operation among law enforcement agencies in digital forensics and network investigations in combating drug-related and other crimes.

The course aims at introducing police investigators to the basics of digital forensics and to train them in using open source digital forensics software to identify, analyse, obtain and preserve relevant digital evidence and use it for prosecuting drug-related and other crimes.

 “Digital forensics and open sources investigations are gaining importance as the Internet and its resources are more and more used for criminal activities, including for trafficking in illicit drugs and psychotropic substances,” said Andrey Saladovnikov, Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for Drug Control and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings of the Criminal Police of Belarus. “Law enforcement agencies should focus their activities on tackling these modern challenges and continue gaining experience, building up capacities and exchange best practices with other countries in this domain.”

The course is organized by the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) and the Co-ordination Cell of the OSCE Transnational Threat Department with the support of Belarus’ Interior Ministry.

Rasa Ostrauskaite, the OSCE Secretariat’s Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats, said that in order to more effectively investigate cybercrimes, including those related to Internet use, law enforcement agents need to apply more sophisticated techniques and methods, such as digital forensics and open sources investigations.

“OSCE experts, in co-operation with other relevant organizations, are ready to assist national experts in tackling new challenges and threats by promoting best practices and applicable international standards, as well as by facilitating training of personnel and strengthening the capacities of OSCE participating States,” said Ostrauskaite.

383538 Ioanna Lachana, OSCE Mission to Skopje Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje

More than 100 students, teachers, and representatives of civil society and the international community gathered on 5 June 2018 in Skopje for an event of a project sponsored by the OSCE-supported grants programme, the Building Bridges Fund, aimed at increasing interaction among students of different communities.

Children and youth from different communities who attend the Institute for Rehabilitation of Children and Youth, the Rajko Zhinzifov primary school and the M Educational Center participated in different research activities, learning about the ecology and nature preservation, the importance of diversity and strong relationships.

“It was great to see such a diverse and enthusiastic group of young people, including children with disabilities, making friends across the lines that divide them,” said the Acting Head of OSCE Mission to Skopje, Jeffrey Goldstein. ”Without dedicated teachers and school administrators, this project couldn’t have happened. This is why the Building Bridges Fund will continue to award grants to schools and kindergartens with different languages of instructions throughout 2018 and 2019,” he said.

Netherlands Ambassador Wouter Plomp said that appreciation and acceptance of differences is a prerequisite for a strong and prosperous society. “We are happy that the Netherlands has supported this project that brings together children of different ethnic and religious backgrounds. The bridges they have built can be a learning example for all of us.”

Biljana Sterjadovska Stojcevska, Project Manager, said: “The students learned to take care of themselves, as well as of the others, to take chances and risks, to co-operate and to lend a supporting hand to their fellow students regardless of the language they speak.”

“I am glad that the Building Bridges Fund made it possible for us to meet new friends,” said a student Angel Angelov. “We had a great time together and I hope that similar activities will be organized in the future.”

The open call for the 2018 and 2019 grants, funded by contributions from the Netherlands and the governments of Austria, the United States, and Italy, can be downloaded from the website of the Ministry of Education and Science at http://www.mon.gov.mk/index.php/2014-07-23-14-03-24/vesti-i-nastani/2250-grantovi-za-zaednichki-aktivnosti-gradime-mostovi

 

 

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

While finding that the 4 March 2018 parliamentary elections in Italy were conducted in a professional manner and characterized by a high level of public confidence in the election administration, the final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) recommends that existing regulations be codified in electoral legislation to ensure legal certainty and coherence, and that shortcomings noted in this and previous reports be addressed well in advance of the next elections.

The report, published on 6 June 2018, praises special arrangements to facilitate voting for persons with physical disabilities. However, it also notes that such arrangements were not made for persons with intellectual disabilities. It recommends that the election legislation be harmonized with the objectives of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

The report assesses campaign finance regulations as generally satisfactory, but notes that the oversight system is not effective in ensuring transparency, integrity and accountability. It recommends enhancing oversight, including by assigning a body with the mandate, adequate powers and resources to lead pro-active and efficient supervision, investigation and enforcement of regulations.

Highlighting that the parliament’s jurisdiction over the validity of the election of its own members raises concerns about potential conflicts of interest, the report calls on the authorities to explicitly provide for the legal right to appeal election results to a court as the final authority, as well as to define adequate time limits for all election-related complaints.

Noting a discrepancy in the number of votes needed to be elected, particularly to the Senate and for the out-of-country constituency, the report recommends adhering more closely to the electoral quota for all constituencies, in line with international good practice concerning the equality of the vote, without prejudice to the protection of minorities.

The report notes that some previous ODIHR recommendations have been addressed. It also affirms the ODIHR’s readiness to support Italy in its continued efforts to bring electoral legislation and practice in greater compliance with OSCE commitments.

VIENNA, 4 June 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today expressed his concern that the Spokesperson of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine published a list, which includes journalist Miroslava Gongadze and Chair of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine Sergiy Tomilenko, accusing them of being traitors.

“The publishing of a list including names of journalists, accusing them of being traitors, is unacceptable and dangerous. This can have serious repercussions for the safety of journalists,” Désir wrote in a letter to the authorities. “I strongly encourage the authorities to intervene and suspend such practices, especially those undertaken by government officials, given the sensitive and difficult environment in Ukraine at the moment.” 

On 30 May, following an announcement by law enforcement that the death of journalist Arkady Babchenko was staged as part of a special operation, the Spokesperson of the General Prosecutor of Ukraine posted on her Facebook page a list of people, including Gongadze and Tomilenko, whom she named as traitors for their criticism of the state regarding journalists’ safety and impunity for crimes against media in the country. 

“Journalists and media must be able to express their opinions openly and freely. Labelling those with critical voices as traitors put them at great risk, and it must not be tolerated,” Désir added.

 

read more

COPENHAGEN, 5 June 2018 – Chair of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on Migration Nahima Lanjri raised concerns today over reports in the United States that young migrant children are being separated from parents trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border, as well as recent news that nearly 1,500 migrant children are unaccounted for in the U.S. due to lax monitoring by the federal government.

Noting that the U.S. government has been separating children from their families and placing them in foster care or in shelters while their parents are held at detention centers awaiting court dates, Lanjri, a member of the Belgian parliament, recalled relevant obligations under international law.

“The controversial practices by the U.S. government of separating children from relatives threaten to undermine international norms that enshrine the right to family unity and call for the best interests of the child to be the primary consideration in all actions concerning children,” she said. “This practice furthermore inflicts additional trauma on children who are already in an extremely vulnerable situation and who depend on their family members for emotional, psychological and material support.”

Lanjri called upon the U.S. and other governments to not only refrain from such practices but to take steps to prevent the separation of children and their relatives at border controls and during any other procedures.

She also raised concerns over recent reports that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services had lost track of 1,475 unaccompanied migrant children who had crossed the U.S.-Mexico border. The children had been placed with adult sponsors in the United States but are now unaccounted for.

“Safeguards, including detailed background checks on potential sponsors and regular follow-up calls, must be put into place to ensure that unaccompanied migrant children are not trafficked or abused, remain with their sponsors, attend school and show up at their court dates,” Lanjri said.

Ad Hoc Committee member Sheila Jackson Lee, a member of the U.S. Congress from Texas, reiterated concerns over the monitoring of migrant children in the United States, noting that it is unacceptable that the department responsible for them cannot account for their whereabouts. “This crisis is not just an immigration matter nor is it just a foreign policy matter; it is a humanitarian crisis,” she said.

The topic of migration and unaccompanied migrant children will feature high on the agenda of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s upcoming Annual Session in Berlin. Last year in Minsk the OSCE PA adopted a resolution on “Ensuring a coherent, shared and responsible governance of migration and refugee flows,” which included a number of recommendations with respect to unaccompanied and separated minors.

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 1 and 2 June, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 2 and 3 June, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. Small arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near non-government-controlled Teplychne in Luhansk region. The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty near Panteleimonivka. The Mission saw fresh damage as a result of shelling to a house in Chermalyk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The SMM continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) as well as demining near the DFS. The SMM heard ceasefire violations near the DFS, despite security guarantees. It continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka, Almazna and Veselohorivka. In Kyiv, the SMM observed two peaceful public gatherings.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] between the evenings of 1 and 2 June, including, however, more explosions (about 140), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120). Between the evenings of 2 and 3 June, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 170), as compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 1-2 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from east to west, two projectiles from west to east and two projectiles from east to west, followed by totals of eight undetermined explosions, 75 projectiles in flight (50 from west to east, 22 from east to west, one from east south-east to west-north-west and two from south-east to north-west) and three illumination flares (two from south to north and one in vertical flight), all 0.5-2km south.

On the evening and night of 2-3 June, the same SMM camera at the DFS recorded, in sequence, four projectiles in flight from east to west, an undetermined explosion, three projectiles from east to west, a projectile from west to east and two undetermined explosions, followed by totals of an undetermined explosion and 32 projectiles in flight (23 from east to west and nine from west to east), all 0.5-3km south.

On the evening and night of 1-2 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 42 projectiles in flight from north to south, six projectiles from south to north, 15 projectiles from north to south, followed by totals of two undetermined explosions, 135 projectiles (51 from north to south and 84 from south to north) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 2-4km east.

On the evening and night of 2-3 June, the same SMM camera recorded, in sequence, 11 projectiles in flight from north to south, three projectiles from south to north and an undetermined explosion, followed by totals of two undetermined explosions, 160 projectiles in flight (15 from east-south-east to west-north-west, 7 from north to south, 21 from north-north-west to south-south-east, 13 from north-west to south-east, 27 from south to north, 30 from south-east to north-west, 41 from south-south-east to north-north-west and 6 from south-west to north-east) ), and four illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-4km east.

On the evening and night of 1-2 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions, five explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of automatic-grenade-launcher and their subsequent impacts,  seven explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (calibre unknown) and four shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire, all 2-6km south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening and night of 2-3 June, while in the same location, the SMM heard, 21 undetermined explosions, six explosions assessed as impacts of mortar (120mm) rounds, five explosions assessed as outgoing IFV (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) rounds, an explosion assessed as an impact of a rocket-propelled-launcher round and about 140 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-4 east-south-east and south-east.

On the evening and night of 2-3 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw 60 undetermined explosions and heard 11 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapon(s) as well as about 20 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 2-6km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north-north-west.

On 2 June, positioned about 2km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-6km east, south-east, south-west, and west.

On 2 June, positioned on the eastern edge of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-west. On 3 June, positioned in the same location, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions, 3-5km north-east and south-west.

On June 2, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 2-3km south-west and west. On 3 June, positioned in the same location, the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-west and west.

On 2 June, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions 2-3km at directions ranging from south-east to south. On 3 June, from the same location, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 2-5km east-south-east, south-east and south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[2] between the evenings of 1 and 2 June, including the same number of explosions (one), compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 2 and 3 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about five), compared with the previous 24 hours.

On 3 June, about 1.5km east of Teplychne (non-government-controlled, 8km west of Luhansk), while flying an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the SMM heard seven shots of small-arms fire 0.4km east of its position, which it assessed were directed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV and left the area.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. On 1 June, medical staff at a fist aid station in Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that a man (in his thirties) had been taken from the first aid station to Hospital no. 2 in Horlivka after he had crossed a tripwire in a field south of the village that had caused an explosion. On 2 June, the man’s mother and aunt told the SMM that he had crossed a tripwire while walking with his bicycle in a field near a pond about 5km south-west of Panteleimonivka that had triggered an explosion that had left him unconscious. They said he had been found by a passer-by and that when the man regained consciousness he had called his friend, who had called an ambulance. The man’s relatives told the SMM that an ambulance agreed to meet the man at a nearby cemetery, but could not come out into the field to pick him up, so he walked to the cemetery and met the ambulance. The man’s mother told the SMM that he had a concussion and shrapnel wounds to his upper left leg and had been discharged from the hospital in Horlivka the same day.

The SMM observed fresh damage as a result of shelling to a civilian property in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). At 39 Khmelnytskoho Street, the SMM saw a crater about 10m east of a single-storey house and about 5m east of the outhouse. The house had about ten shrapnel holes on its east-facing wall, and two east-facing windows had been broken and covered with plywood. The residents (89-year-old woman and her 63-year-old son) said they had been home on 31 May at around 09:00 when they had heard an explosion at the back of the house. The SMM assessed that the crater and damage were caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a north-easterly direction. The SMM saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier in front of a neighbouring house about 70m south and camouflage netting over the side of that house.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 1 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 13 projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west 4-15km south-south-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 2 June, positioned on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge in the disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-5km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 3 June, positioned near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation near the Petrivske disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, on 1 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Oleksandro-Kalynove (government-controlled, 47km north of Donetsk). On 2 June the SMM saw two military trucks each towing what the SMM assessed were anti-tank guns (MT-12) (two in total) near Berkhivka (government-controlled, 73km north of Donetsk).  

In a non-government-controlled area, on 2 June, the SMM saw four stationary multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 1 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12) near Yablunivka (49km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At two such sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in an area outside of government control in Donetsk region and was unable to access the site as the site was locked and without a guard.* The last time the SMM visited the site, it had been abandoned. (See SMM Daily Report 2 March 2018.)

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns.[3] In non-government-controlled areas, on 3 June, the SMM saw 30 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB), ten of which were mounted with anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

In a government-controlled area, on 3 June, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a pick-up truck near Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM observed demining activities in Krasna Talivka (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Luhansk). On 3 June, the SMM saw two demining teams, each composed of ten workers wearing clothes bearing insignia of an international demining organization and demining an area near a cemetery. The SMM saw several mine hazard signs that read “Caution, demining work in progress” written in Ukrainian and Russian languages and bore the insignia of an international organization.

The SMM’s monitoring and facilitation of the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS was interrupted due to ceasefire violations and the presence of anti-tank mines across road H-20. On both 2 and 3 June, the SMM facilitated demining of the eastern side of road H-20 (the side used for vehicle traffic) up to the access road to the DFS by sappers from the Ukraine State Emergency Services as well as the demining of the intersection of roads M04 and H20 up to the gate of the DFS by sappers from non-government-controlled areas. On 2 June, the SMM observed at least 18 anti-tank mines across road H-20 about 3.5km south of Kamianka, which prevented the SMM from proceeding toward the DFS on this road. On 3 June, the SMM saw 13 anti-tank mines laid across the western lane of road H-20, 12 anti-tank mines laid parallel to the western lane, and ten anti-tank mines laid parallel on the eastern side of the road. On both days, positioned in five different areas 1.5-5km from the DFS as well as onsite at the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk), and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for thirty minutes, the SMM saw a man and a woman (both about 60 years old) entering Ukraine and did not see anyone exit Ukraine.

In Kyiv, on 2 June, the SMM monitored a “March for Protection of Children and Family”. The SMM saw about 7,000 people (mixed gender, aged 18-65), including representatives of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, as well of the Muslim community, gathered on Sofiivska Square. From there, the SMM saw that participants began a march which ended at the Parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street. The SMM saw about 20 police officers securing the gathering, which dispersed peacefully.

On 2 June, the SMM monitored a pre-announced gathering on Independence Square in support of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleh Sentsov, who has been in detention in the Russian Federation and has entered a hunger strike. On arrival the SMM observed some 300 people taking part in the protest (all ages and 60 per cent women). The SMM saw that many participants held photographs of Mr. Sentsov and placards with messages including “Free Oleg Sentsov”. The SMM did not observe any police presence at the event, which dispersed peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 2 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 2 June, at a permanent storage site in an area outside of government control in Donetsk city, the SMM was unable to access storage site as the gate had been locked, and there was no one present.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 2 and 3 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[4]
• On 2 and 3 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.4
• On 2 and 3 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• On 2 June, at a checkpoint near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer prevented the SMM from continuing on, saying that he needed permission from his superior. After 20 minutes, the SMM was allowed to proceed.  

Other impediments:

• On 3 June, positioned east of Teplychne, the SMM heard seven shots of small-arms fire in an area where it was flying a mini-UAV, assessed as directed at the UAV. The SMM landed the mini-UAV and left the area (see above).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

read more

VIENNA, 4 June 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today deplored the sentencing of Ukrainian journalist Roman Sushchenko to 12 years in prison in the Russian Federation, and reiterated his call to release the journalist.

“Journalism is not a crime and media workers should carry out their work under safe conditions, without fear of being harassed, attacked or imprisoned,” Désir said. “I hope the decision to convict Sushchenko will be overturned in appeal and I reiterate my call on the Russian authorities to release the journalist from prison.”

The Moscow City Court today sentenced Sushchenko, a correspondent of the Ukrainian National News Agency, Ukrinform, to 12 years in prison in a high security prison on espionage charges. He has been under arrest in Moscow since 30 September 2016.

The Representative raised the case on several occasions in the past, including during his official visits to Kyiv and Moscow in 2017 (see: https://www.osce.org/fom/351561 and https://www.osce.org/fom/358456).

read more

PARIS, 4 June 2018 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) today released a joint publication aimed at assisting policymakers in addressing anti-Semitism through education, at a launch event at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris.

The publication, Addressing Anti-Semitism through Education – Guidelines for Policymakers, was produced within the framework of ODIHR’s project Turning Words into Action to Address Anti-Semitism. Created in consultation with experts from throughout the OSCE region, the Guidelines examine the complexities of anti-Semitic prejudices and reflect good policy and practices in education that can address the various manifestations of anti-Semitic prejudice and discrimination.

ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir stressed the vital role of education in countering anti-Semitism and all forms of intolerance.

“Educators have access to a uniquely large audience of young people and have the opportunity to help them foster mutual respect and understanding, and thereby become responsible citizens,” the ODIHR Director said. “Resilience to language and ideas that incite discrimination can only be ensured by educating young people so that they are mindful of their own and others’ prejudices and capable of critical thinking, and that they feel responsible for making the societies in which they live cohesive ones.”

Audrey Azoulay, Director General of UNESCO, highlighted that the publication comes at a time when both teachers and students are struggling to recognize anti-Semitism in its contemporary and older forms, and to deal with it alongside other forms of prejudice in a way that promotes human rights for all.

“Anti-Semitism is not the problem of Jewish communities alone, nor does it require the presence of a Jewish community to proliferate. It exists in religious, social and political forms and guises, on all sides of the political spectrum. Various violent extremist ideologies and conspiracy theories that proliferate online often feed on anti-Semitism,” the UNESCO Director General said. “As with all forms of discrimination and intolerance, anti-Semitism must be countered through education, within the framework of human rights and global citizenship. This is both an immediate security imperative and a long-term educational obligation.”

The Guidelines lay out practical and technical steps that can be taken at all levels of the system to prepare the education sector for the difficult but crucial role it has to play in rejecting prejudice and discrimination in our societies. The publication builds on earlier collaboration between UNESCO, ODIHR and the Council of Europe, which resulted in the Guidelines for Educators on Countering Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims, published in 2013.

ODIHR’s mandate in this area is based on longstanding OSCE commitments to address all forms of intolerance and discrimination, including the 2014 OSCE Basel Ministerial Council Declaration on Enhancing Efforts to Combat Anti-Semitism, which called on participating States to promote educational programmes for combating anti-Semitism and provide young people with opportunities for human rights education, including on the subject of anti-Semitism. Furthermore, it called on ODIHR to facilitate the exchange of best practices among participating States on educational initiatives and other measures to raise awareness of anti-Semitism and overcome challenges to Holocaust education.

read more

383580

OSCE participating States should step up their efforts to ensure the effective and meaningful participation of Roma and Sinti in public and political life, said participants at the consultation workshop organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw on 5 and 6 June 2018.

The workshop brought together 22 Roma experts from civil society organizations across the OSCE region to assess the progress participating States have made in the last five years in the implementation of the Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area (OSCE Action Plan). Participants focused, in particular, on OSCE commitments related to enhancing the participation of Roma in public and political life.

During the meeting, participants discussed various developments regarding the participation of Roma and Sinti, including women and youth, over the last five years. Participants also discussed good practices, challenges and lessons learned over the last five years.

“The workshop provided an important platform for reviewing the extent of the progress made by OSCE participating States, but more vigorous action and measures must be undertaken to overcome the significant gap in participation of Roma and Sinti in all aspects of public life,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of ODIHR.

Miranda Vuolasranta, president of the European Roma and Travellers Forum, said that “often, public authorities initiate consultation processes where Roma and Sinti’s contribution and recommendations are simply ignored or considered to a minimum extent only. This results in a situation where the policies, initiatives and projects stemming out of these processes lack Roma ownership and participation, and fail to produce the needed changes.”

In 2018, on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the adoption of the OSCE’s Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area, ODIHR will prepare its third status report on the implementation of the action plan, focusing, in particular, on Chapter VI: “Enhancing participation in public and political life”.

KYIV, 4 June 2018 – The Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Alexander Hug, will travel to eastern Ukraine from 5 to 9 June to assess the security situation along the contact line and its impact on civilians.

He will also encourage all concerned to work towards normalization of the situation, in particular through meetings with senior government officials, senior members of the armed formations and other relevant interlocutors.

Hug will hold press briefings, the exact time and locations of which will be communicated via social media (@OSCE_SMM, www.facebook.com/oscesmm).

He will also join OSCE monitors as they patrol locations along the contact line. Journalists interested in covering these patrols should contact: Liudmyla Palamar: +38 050 387 93 98; liudmyla.palamar@osce.org; smm-press@osce.org.

read more

VIENNA, 4 June 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his concern about the continued detention of Oleg Sentsov, a writer and film director from Crimea, Ukraine, after sending a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation last week, urging to review the case.

“I call on the Russian authorities to review Sentsov’s case and to release him immediately,” Désir wrote in a letter to Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “His continued detention is unjustified and creates a strong chilling effect for those in Crimea who have the right to express their views and opinions freely. His voice should not be silenced, no matter how critical.”

Sentsov was arrested in Simferopol by Russian security services in May 2014 and convicted in Rostov-on-Don in August 2015. He is currently serving a 20-year prison term on terrorism charges at a high-security penal colony in the Russian Federation. His sentence was upheld on appeal in November 2015. He has been on a hunger strike since 14 May 2018.

“I am particularly worried about the deterioration of his health condition and morale after he has started a hunger strike,” Désir added.

In his letter to Foreign Minister Lavrov, Representative Désir also noted reports indicating a number of irregularities in the judicial proceedings of the case as well as disturbing allegations of torture against Sentsov, including beatings, suffocation and threats of sexual assault.

The Representative raised Sentsov’s case in a public statement in May 2014 (see: https://www.osce.org/fom/119329).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

read more

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed fresh damage in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including near Izvaryne and Sievernyi at the border with the Russian Federation. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Oleksandropil and Tarasivka. The SMM’s monitoring and facilitation of the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) as well as of repair works to the DFS were interrupted due to the presence of anti-tank mines near the station. The SMM heard ceasefire violations near the DFS, despite security guarantees. It continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Almazna. In Kyiv, the SMM observed a gathering on the occasion of International Children’s Day.

In Donetskregion, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). 

On the evening and night of 31 May-1 June, the SMM camera at the DFS (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from north-north-east to south-south-west, two projectiles from south to north, five projectiles from north to south, followed by 13 projectiles (eight from west-north-west to east-north-east, two from south to north, one from north-north-east to south-south-west, one from north to south and one from south-west to north-east) and an undetermined explosion, all 0.15-3km west.

On the evening and night of 31 May-1 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two illumination flares from south-east to north-west, an undetermined explosion, 13 projectiles in flight from north to south, followed by totals of 14 undetermined explosions, 161 projectiles (100 from south to north, 59 from north to south, one from east to west and one from west to east), eight illumination flares from east to west and three bursts, all 1-4km east and east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 31 May-1 June, the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles from west to east, an undetermined explosion and ten projectiles from south-west to north-east, followed by totals of two illumination flares in vertical flight and 15 projectiles (ten from west-south-west to east-north-east, one from west to east and four from south-west to north-east), all 1-6km north-east.

On the evening and night of 31 May-1 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 39 explosions (12 assessed as mortar rounds, four as infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon fire, four as artillery rounds and the remainder as undetermined) and about 590 bursts and shots of IFV (BMP-2) cannon fire, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-9km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west. During the day on 1 June, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and 11 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening of 31 May, positioned in Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and about 35 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 0.4-8km south-south-east and north-north-west. 

Positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-2km at directions ranging from west-south-west to north. 

In Luhanskregion, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions).

The SMM observed fresh damage to a civilian property in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). At 84 Lenina Street, the SMM saw fresh damage (a hole, approximately 15cm in diameter) with cracks radiating from it to the edges of the outer glass pane of a plastic frame of a north-facing double-glazed window on the ground floor of a five-storey apartment building, assessed as probably caused by shrapnel or a ricocheting bullet. The SMM also saw shards of broken glass on the ground below the window. The owner (woman, 30-40 years old) told the SMM that on the evening of 30 May, while she was inside her apartment, she had heard firing and an explosion.

On 24 May, aerial imagery revealed ten buildings damaged by probable shelling (including six without roofs) near Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 23km north-west of Luhansk) (not seen in imagery from 13 November 2017).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardwareof 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* 

On the evening and night of 31 May-1 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, four projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east and a projectile from south-east to north-west, all 0.5-8km south, south-west and north-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). 

Positioned near the Petrivske and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.  

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. 

In violation of withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) on 31 May spotted an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV on 31 May spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) south-east of Lozuvatske (35km north-west of Donetsk) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) east of Valerianivka (51km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2]and new trenches in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 27 May aerial imagery revealed the presence of four armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) in the northern outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk). On 31 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) north-west of Petrivske, an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Styla (34km south of Donetsk),an IFV near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and four IFVs (BMP-1) south-east of Bohdanivka (about 700m south of the disengagement area near Petrivske)and three IFVs (two BMP-1 and one probable BMP-2) near Dokuchaievsk. On 1 June, an SMM patrol saw an IFV (BTR-80) in Donetsk city centre.

In government-controlled areas, on 30 May, aerial imagery revealed the presence of new trenches in areas north and south of Pivdenne (40km north-east of Donetsk) (not present in imagery from 28 April 2018). On 31 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two probable APCs (MT-LB) near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk). On 1 June, the SMM saw an IFV (unknown type) in Zolote.

The SMM observed possible demining activities. On the northern outskirts of Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a Kamaz truck and eight people wearing dark blue-green clothing, one of whom was carrying a metal detector, in a field (marked with white tape) 20m west of the road running north from Nikishyne to the junction with the M-03/E-50 highway. About 2km further north, 700m east of Ridkodub (non-government-controlled, 61km north-east of Donetsk), the same SMM patrol observed an Ural truck and a minibus carrying a group of people wearing the same type of clothing.

The SMM observed a mine hazard sign in the northern outskirts of Krasna Talivka (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Luhansk), reading “Caution, demining is in progress” in Ukrainian and Russian language and bearing the logo of an international organization.

The SMM’s monitoring and facilitation of the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS as well as of repair works to the DFS were interrupted due to the observation of 18 anti-tank mines 1.2km north of the DFSacross road H-20. The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) about the presence of these mines. A demining team from the Ukrainian State Emergency Services then cleared a 6-8m wide corridor on the highway asphalt but did not remove the anti-tank mines from the road. The patrol decided not to proceed further due to security concerns and the operation was subsequently suspended. Positioned in the same location, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk)for about five minutes, the SMM saw eight cars (licence plates not visible), and two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates, the other not visible) exiting Ukraine, and a bus (with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine. An armed member of the armed formations then approached the SMM and told it to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM observed no traffic across the border. An armed member of the armed formations then approached the SMM and told it to leave the area.*

On 1 June, in Kyiv, the SMM observed a pre-announced gatheringon the occasion of International Children’s Day titled “Children Internally Displaced Persons into Nowhere: Let’s Protect Their Future”, held by a non-governmental organization. The SMM saw about 30 people (about half of them children, aged 3 to 12) gathered at Independence Square, many of whom held blue or yellow balloons. Some of the children were painting cardboard houses or writing on a banner about how they wished to be able to live in homes of their own. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access: 

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying that the restrictions on the SMM’s presence were still in place.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO: 

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMMwas prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing the DFS due to the presence of 18 anti-tank mines 1.2km north of the DFS on road H-20.

Other impediments:

• At a hospital in Horlivka, medical staff refused to speak with the SMM without permission from a member of the armed formations.
• A mini-UAV was temporarily jammed while flying over an area near Berdianske (government-controlled, 18km east of Mariupol).
• An SMM long-range UAV was temporarily jammed while flying over an area near Yablunivka (government-controlled, 49km north of Donetsk).[4] 
• An SMM long-range UAV was temporarily jammed while flying over areas near Stepanivka (government controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). 

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4]The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

read more

383319 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

A draft law and regulations establishing a national preventive mechanism (NPM) to monitor all places of detention in Uzbekistan were the focus of a roundtable discussion in Tashkent on 31 May and 1 June 2018. The event was organized by the country’s ombuds institution – the Authorized Person of the Oliy Mazhlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Human Rights, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the United Nations Development Programme.

Uzbekistan is taking steps towards the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) and the establishment of an NPM. National authorities, representatives of civil society organizations and international experts were invited to discuss the draft legislation prepared by the ombuds institution.

“We welcome the active discussions about strengthening efforts to prevent torture and other ill-treatment in Uzbekistan and the importance of independent external monitoring of all places of deprivation of liberty,” said Stephanie Selg, ODIHR Adviser on Torture Prevention. “The establishment of an NPM in compliance with the OPCAT requirements, the inclusion of independent civil society organizations in the work of the NPM, and the willingness of the authorities to fully support the independent functioning of the NPM will be a major contribution to the prevention of torture and ill-treatment.”

Representatives of the National Human Rights Centre, the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Health and Public Education, the NGO Development Strategy Centre and the national Chamber of Advocates also took part in the discussions, as did participants from Penal Reform International and Amnesty International.

“It is a very positive practice that we can discuss the future model and regulations of an NPM at such an early stage,” said Arman Danielyan, member of the UN Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture. “The Subcommittee stands ready to support states in the establishment of NPMs and in their efforts to ensure the NPMs’ functioning and effectiveness.”

International experts, including representatives of the NPMs in Georgia and Kazakhstan, shared their expertise, good practices and lessons learned with regard to the establishment of an NPM. Key recommendations and concerns will be considered by the ombuds institution and incorporated into the draft regulations discussed during the event.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties from Zalizne, Shyroka Balka and Horlivka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as repair works and demining activities in the area, in order to keep the station operational. The SMM heard ceasefire violations near the DFS despite security guarantees. It continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Almazna, as well as to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions).

On the evening and night of 30-31 May, the SMM camera at the DFS (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from north to south 3-6km west, six projectiles from north to south 200-300m west, an explosion assessed as an impact 100-200m west-south-west and an explosion assessed as an outgoing round 4-6km west.

On the evening and night of 30-31 May, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two illumination flares in vertical flight and an undetermined explosion, followed by totals of three undetermined explosions, 15 illumination flares in vertical flight, two muzzle flashes and 17 projectiles (one from north-east to south-west, six from south-west to north-east and ten from south-south-east to north-north-west), all 0.5-8km at directions ranging from north-east to east.

On the evening of 30 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km north-west. It also heard and saw two illumination flares 3-5km north-west.

During the day on 31 May, positioned about 2km north-west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and about 100 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km north-west and north-north-west.

Positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and 55 shots of small-arms fire, all 1-5km at directions ranging from west to north-north-west. Positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata for about one and a half hours, the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and two shots of small-arms fire, all 1-5km north-north-east, west-south-west and west-north-west.

Positioned in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard about 30 explosions (including 20 assessed as rounds of automatic grenade launcher) and 30 shots of small-arms fire, all 1-4km west-south-west and west-north-west.

Positioned on the western edge of Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM heard six explosions assessed as outgoing rounds from automatic grenade launchers and their subsequent impacts, as well as 20 shots of small-arms fire, all 3-5km north-north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (21 explosions).

Positioned on the eastern edge of Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 15 shots and a burst of small-arms fire 0.3-1km east, assessed as live-fire training in the security zone, in violation also of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. On 30 May, at a hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), medical staff told the SMM that the body of a 15-year-old girl from Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) had been brought to the hospital on 28 May. Medical staff added that, based on the body’s examination, the girl had died instantly on 28 May due to shrapnel wounds. In Toretsk, a representative of the military-civil administration and the deputy head of police told the SMM separately the 15 year-old girl had been killed on 28 May from the explosion of a mortar round that had detonated in front of her house at 11 Michurina Street in Zalizne.

The SMM followed up on information provided by medical staff at hospital no. 2 in Horlivka on 14 May about a 53-year-old man that had been admitted with shrapnel wounds to his right arm. On 30 May, the sister of the man told the SMM by phone that her brother had sustained shrapnel wounds while outside his house at 142 Plotinna Street in Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk) on 13 May. A community representative from Ozerianivka (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk) also told the SMM by phone that a 53-year-old man had been injured by shrapnel to his right shoulder while outside his house at the abovementioned address.

The SMM followed up on reports from a healthcare representative in Horlivka on 17 May that a 61-year-man had sustained shrapnel wounds to his right side and lower lumbar region from shelling in the morning of the same day while in the garden of his house at 54 Mezhlauska Street in the Kallinvoskyi district of Horlivka. The man’s wife and a neighbour separately told the SMM that the man had been injured by shrapnel from shelling while in the garden of his house on the morning of 17 May.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the evening and night of 30-31 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from east-north-east to west-south-west 0.5-1km east-north-east, assessed as fired from a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area), a projectile in flight from south to north 5-10km east and a burst from north to south, followed by 11 projectiles (five from north-west to south-east, one from south-west to north-east, one from east-north-east to west-south-west, one from south-south-west to north-north-east, one from east to west, one from west to east and one in vertical flight), including four assessed as fired from a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, a burst and four explosions (two undetermined and two assessed as outgoing rounds of a rocket-propelled grenade launcher), all 0.5-10km at directions ranging from east to south-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). The camera also recorded two projectiles in flight from north to south 1-4km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 29 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded an undetermined explosion 0.2-1km north-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 31 May, positioned in and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 31 May, the SMM saw two towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk) heading north-west, three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Bakhmutske (77km north of Donetsk) heading north-east, as well as four stationary towed howitzers (D-30) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk). On 30 May, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk). In a non-government-controlled area, on 30 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 31 May, the SMM saw four anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near Bakhmutske heading north-east and four stationary anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148) near Novoaidar.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 30 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1 or BMP-2) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-2) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-2) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-1) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk) and an APC (BTR variant) near Myrne (63km south of Donetsk). On 30 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 30 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) in Bezimenne and an IFV (BMP-1) near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the presence of mines. On 30 May, a mid-range UAV spotted 29 anti-tank mines (AT-62) laid in four rows across a road south of Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk), which leads to Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report of 1 December 2017). On the same road, about 350m south of the aforementioned mines and north-east of Holmivskyi, the same UAV again spotted 17 anti-tank mines (AT-62) laid in three rows across the road (see SMM Daily Report of 31 March 2018).

On 31 May, in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the gate of school no. 27 on Tsiolkovskoho Street told the SMM that the engineering unit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces had been temporarily using the school building since August 2017. The principal of the school told the SMM that the pupils of the school had been relocated to other schools in Popasna (see SMM Daily Report of 5 August 2017).

The SMM continued to monitor the security situation and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to and from the DFS, as well as of repair works to the DFS and demining activities around the station. Positioned near the DFS, the SMM heard explosions and small-arms fire, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table for ceasefire violations heard from the SMM’s positions in Yasynuvata, Kruta Balka, Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk)).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk), as well as to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw three trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates), three buses (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), 37 cars (16 with Russian Federation and nine with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as 12 with “DPR” plates) and 16 pedestrians (seven men and nine women) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw a bus with Russian Federation licence plates, seven cars (three with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw seven pedestrians (five men and two women) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 31 May 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• Footage from an SMM mini-UAV, which was flying on 30 May over an area near Krynychanske (Chervonohvardiiske, non-government-controlled, 42km west of Luhansk), revealed the presence of three men wearing military-style clothing, including one aiming a weapon and shooting at the SMM UAV. (On 30 May, positioned west of Krynychanske, the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire in the area where it was flying its UAV and assessed them as directed at the UAV (see SMM Daily Report of 31 May 2018).)

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

read more

383307 Karen Gainer

A change management training course, the last in a series of workshops for the parliamentary services of Montenegro organized by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro in co-operation with the parliament, was held on 31 May and 1 June 2018 in Podgorica.

During the workshop, 12 parliamentary staff had the opportunity to learn about the process and procedures of change in the business culture. The tools for managing and initiating change for the benefit of the institution were also presented.

The trainers provided a broad theoretical overview and discussed practical examples of organizational change phases, motivation strategies to support employees to accept change and how to utilize project management as an instrument for managing change. Defining key performance indicators and their application in managing business processes were also tackled during the course.

The aim of this programme is to support the development of the human resources of the parliamentary services through strengthening their staff capacities to develop a sustainable and modern structure and increase professionalism by fostering good governance standards.