Central Europe

VIENNA, 21 May 2018 – Today the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed the dropping of defamation claims against the now-defunct Kyrgyz media outlet Zanoza.kg, and its journalists Dina Maslova and Naryn Ayyp, by the former president Almazbek Atambaev.

“I am pleased that this positive move may herald a new, constructive relationship between the media and authorities in Kyrgyzstan. Disproportionate fees in civil defamation cases have a chilling effect on media freedom and may bring about the closure of outlets and thus, endanger media pluralism,” Desir said.

An online news and current affairs outlet, Zanoza.kg, along with its editors and the two journalists, faced up to 5 million Soms (500,000 EUR) in damages, following a defamation suit launched by the general prosecutor on behalf of the president in March 2017. Although Kyrgyzstan decriminalised defamation, failure to pay damages may lead to a criminal prosecution. Following an unrelated legal claim by the former owner related to a trademark dispute, Zanoza.kg ceased to exist in August 2017 and was relaunched as Kaktus Media.

“I appreciate the role civil society played in settling the dispute, in particular, those of the legal clinic, Adilet, the Media Policy Institute and Internews Kyrgyzstan,” added Desir.

The Representative raised the case of damages payable by Zanoza.kg in a public statement in April 2018 (https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/379015).

 

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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381982 OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan

The first in a series of training courses on anti-trafficking for investigators and operative agents of Uzbekistan police forces was held in Urgench from the 14 to 18 of May 2018.

The course, organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, brought together 25 participants from Khorezm, Bukhara and Navoiy regions, and the autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan.

The training’s objective was to increase knowledge and develop police skills and attitudes to identify victims of human trafficking and labour exploitation and refer them to the appropriate assistance.  

“Since trafficking is a common challenge transcending national boundaries, I hope that this course will help to promote effective government and civil society partnership,” said Juergen Becker, Senior OSCE Project Officer. “Uzbekistan can only benefit from the sharing of expertise from international law enforcement practitioners. The United Kingdom experts delivering the course have a vast amount of expertise in investigating human trafficking, international organized crime and terrorism.  It is a valuable resource to have the participation of police professionals who have the common goal of adequately protecting and strengthening respect for the human rights of trafficked persons and sharing good practices in combating human trafficking.”  

The course participants were familiarized with the PEACE (Preparation and Planning) interview model, designed to stem the proliferation of false confessions that can result from an accusatory style of interviewing. The model promotes a more psychological approach towards conversation management, based on reciprocity between the interviewer and the witness. It is equally applicable to interviewing a suspect and designed to give structure to get to the facts.

Particular attention was given to the new forms and methods of recruitment of potential victims of human trafficking through new technologies. This year`s training took an innovative approach by exploring the link between human trafficking and terrorism.

The course, developed by the Specialist Policing Consultancy was unique in comparing elements of human trafficking to the methods of modern terrorist groups. The training clearly showed that some terrorist groups use the same strategies of recruiting, transporting, coercing and exploiting men, women, boys and girls into committing terrorist acts. It was also explored if investigators could use human trafficking laws to combat or disrupt terrorist activities.

Bernie Gravett, the Director of the Specialist Policing Consultancy, said: “I cannot stress the importance of sharing knowledge and experience between law enforcement officers in the UK and in Uzbekistan. During my time as a police officer investigating international organized crime, the biggest challenge was working together across international borders and legal systems. The growth of human trafficking and the challenges in combatting modern terrorist groups requires us to share experiences, build partnerships and gain an understanding of individual working methods, with the aim of combatting crime and protecting all our citizens.”                                                                                                               

Ulugbek Gaynazarov, Head of Department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, stated that trafficking in human beings, along with crimes such as drug trafficking or terrorism, has become a global phenomenon and requires urgent action. “The organization of such a training course will not only facilitate the exchange of practical experience, but will also allow police investigators to gain new knowledge and skills. He also stressed that the acquired experience will be very valuable for the further development of international co-operation.”

The training is part of a longstanding commitment of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan to assist the country in combating trafficking in human beings. 

This report is for the media and the general public.

At 11:04 on 20 May, two SMM patrols consisting of ten members and four armoured vehicles positioned themselves about 20m south of a checkpoint of the armed formations inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) on its southern edge. All patrol members were outside the vehicles, five of whom were speaking with two unarmed members of the armed formations, and saw an additional five to eight members of the armed formations (one armed with an assault rifle (AK-type), the remainder unarmed) walking around the checkpoint inside the disengagement area. At 11:06, the patrol members heard an undetermined explosion 300-500m north (assessed as inside the disengagement area). (The SMM had previously observed an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) about 10m north-west of the abovementioned checkpoint inside the disengagement area. See SMM Daily Report 3 May 2018.)

Both patrols immediately left the area and returned safely to their bases in Sievierodonetsk (government-controlled, 74km north-west of Luhansk) and Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), respectively. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas in Luhansk city, Sakhanka and Svitlodarsk. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near all three disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including in Shevchenko.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Vidrodzhennia and Klynove. The Mission facilitated access to assess damage to the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Almazna and to a water pipeline in Obozne. In Kyiv and Kharkiv, the Mission monitored gatherings marking the 1944 deportation of the Crimean Tatars. 

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 250 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period(about 900 explosions). Most of the ceasefire violations were recorded in the area west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

On the evening and night of 17-18 May, while in Horlivka, the SMM heard about 140 undetermined explosions (including about 40 assessed as artillery fire and about 60 assessed as tank fire) as well as bursts and shots of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-7km at westerly directions. The following afternoon, while in the same location, the SMM heard about 30 explosions (including one assessed as artillery fire and three assessed as tank fire), all 3-5km south-west.

On the evening and night of 17-18 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east and about 20 undetermined explosions 5-10km south-west and south-south-west, as well as about 80 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km south-east. The following day, the SMM recorded two undetermined explosions 8-10km south-west and four undetermined explosions 4-7km south-east and east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period(15 explosions).

The SMM saw fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas of Luhansk city, Svitlodarsk and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM saw a 10-15cm wide-hole in the ceiling of a two-storey shed 10m west of a house at 26 Vyshneva Street in Luhansk city, and another 40-50cm hole in the shed’s west-facing wall at ground level. The SMM assessed that the shed had been struck by a projectile fired from an easterly direction.                                                                                      

On the grounds of School No. 11 at66a Molodizhnyi Boulevard in Svitlodarsk, the SMM observed a 55cm-deep crater 15m west of the school building and fresh shrapnel scarring to a tree 9m north-west of the crater. 

In Sakhanka, the SMM assessed seven fresh impact sites. At 14 Konstytutsii Street, the SMM observed two fresh craters: one in a garden 15m south of a single-family house and the other 15m south-east of the house. About 10m north of the second crater, the SMM observed shrapnel fragments embedded in the wooden wall of a nearby shed. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by an 82mm mortar round. About 10m west of a house at 18 Konstytutsii Street, the SMM saw a bent metal fence post and several holes through the fence’s chain-links. The SMM assessed the holes to have been caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-westerly direction. About 5m west of the house, in a garden, the SMM saw another fresh crater and two shattered west-facing windows. The SMM assessed the crater to have been caused by an 82mm mortar round. North of the house, the SMM saw two more fresh impact sites – one on a road and the other on a piece of farming equipment – the first of which it assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from an undetermined direction, the second from a 122mm artillery round fired from a south-westerly direction. Lastly, the SMM saw that the lower half of the north-west-facing corner of a house at 20 Konstytutsii Street had been destroyed, with fragments of brick and masonry scattered about; the lower half of a nearby doorframe was also destroyed. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-westerly direction. Seven residents of the village told the SMM that shelling had occurred between 09:30 and 11:00 on 17 May and had caused only property damage. 

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* 

In the early morning of 9 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded three projectiles in flight from east to west, 5-10km south and assessed as outside the disengagement area.

In the early morning of 18 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a burst of heavy machine-gun fire fired in a southerly direction 4.5-8km south-south-west and 14 explosions assessed as impacts (including 12 assessed as impacts of artillery rounds) 4-7km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 18 May, positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions of mortar rounds and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2km south-south-east, as well as one undetermined mortar round explosion 7-10km south, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. The same day, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted eight self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm, and five 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk) on 17 May. On 18 May, the SMM saw an anti-tank guided missile system (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites on 18 May, the SMM observed nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, government-controlled, 65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk) and a possible armoured personnel carrier near Vidrodzhennia on 17 May. The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Prychepylivka as well as an IFV (BMP-1) and two probable IFVs near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On 18 May, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) in Novobakhmutivka (28km north-west of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1) being transported on a flatbed near Svitlodarsk and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 18 May, the SMM saw an 82mm mortar round protruding from the pavement approximately 300m south-east of an armed formation checkpoint on road T-0513 at the northern edge of Horlivka.                                                                                                                                      

The SMM facilitated the access of Voda Donbassa water company representatives and others to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) to assess damage. On 18 May, representatives of Voda Donbassa told the SMM that the DFS had been shut down due to damage to its electrical infrastructure from shelling during the night of 17 April (see SMM Daily Report 18 May 2018); the SMM facilitated access for workers of the local electrical company to assess the damage to the DFS’ power station. According to the representatives, there were no Voda Donbassa workers at the station besides a security guard. The representatives also told the SMM that shutting down the station has left Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) without water and led to cuts in available drinking water in Donetsk and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation table below), despite explicit security guarantees. 

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to high-voltage power lines near Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and the water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). 

At Sofiivska Square in Kyiv, the SMM saw around 500 people – some of whom were holding Crimean Tatar flags with black ribbons and Ukrainian national flags – commemorating the 1944 deportation of the Crimean Tatars. The SMM saw around 100 National Guard members around the square; those entering the event were required to pass through a metal detector. The SMM saw the Ukrainian President address the crowd, saying that there is a need to amend the Ukrainian Constitution to ensure the rights of Crimean Tatars. The event ended without incident. SMM observed 30 people gathered in front of the Regional State Administration building at 64 Sumska Street in Kharkiv listening to speeches about the 1944 deportation of Crimean Tatars and the current situation in Crimea in commemoration of the same event. The SMM did not observe police present.

On 18 May in Odessa, SMM observed that red paint had been applied over the inscription on a monument at Kulykove Pole (“To the fighters who died for the power of the Soviets in Odessa. From the labourers of Odessa. 1960.”) and the words “Occupiers” and “Invaders” in Ukrainian had been written on the monument. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 18 May 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a compound near Shevchenko (government-controlled, 19km north-west of Mariupol), a soldier of the Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM it could not enter without special permission from his unit commander.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO: 

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC. [3]

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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KYIV, 18 May 2018 – The deteriorating security situation in the wider area around the Donetsk Filtration Station poses a threat to the facility, its workers and monitoring officers of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), said the SMM’s Chief Monitor Ertugrul Apakan today.

In a letter he addressed to the signatories of the Minsk agreements on 15 May, he had noted how he was following the developments with great concern. He said that despite the sides having provided explicit security guarantees – essentially promises not to fire in the wider area around the Donetsk Filtration Station – there has been continuous violence. He warned that the use of multiple launch rocket systems, recorded by the SMM on Tuesday evening, marked a sharp escalation.

The Chief Monitor said that without full adherence to the ceasefire, the SMM will need to reconfigure its operations at the Donetsk Filtration Station. 

The Mission has been facilitating access to the Donetsk Filtration Station for Voda Donbassa water company employees for several weeks to keep the station operational. More than 300,000 people on both sides of the contact line depend on the Donetsk Filtration Station for drinking water. 

“These ceasefire violations must stop immediately,” said Apakan. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period; it recorded explosions assessed as impacts of multiple launch rocket system rounds near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS). The Mission heard an explosion less than 300m from its forward patrol base in Svitlodarsk. The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas of Mykolaivka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and it was also restricted at a checkpoint near Debaltseve, as well as near Izvaryne and Sievernyi at the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Luhansk city. The Mission continued to facilitate access to the Donetsk Filtration Station for Voda Donbassa water company employees to keep the station operational and heard ceasefire violations in the area despite security guarantees. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Almazna and to a water pipeline in Obozne. In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a gathering near the venue of a pre-announced public discussion organized by a non-governmental organization. In Kherson, the SMM monitored a court hearing for the editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine. In Lviv, the Mission observed three gatherings in front of the Regional Council building.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including more explosions (about 900), compared with the previous reporting period (about 460 explosions). Most of the ceasefire violations were recorded in the area between Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

On the evening and night of 16-17 May, while in Svitlodarsk the SMM heard about 50 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 3-6km east, south-east and west; 370 undetermined explosions (mostly assessed as artillery rounds) and about 860 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-10km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-west; and about 60 undetermined explosions 3-6km at directions ranging from north-north-west to north-east.

On the morning of 17 May, while at the same location, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an airburst of a probable artillery or mortar round about 200-300m from its forward patrol base on the south-eastern edge of the town. SMM staff members immediately took cover in the base’s shelter. The SMM informed representatives of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as well as members of the armed formations of the incident and urged cessation of further fire.

On the evening of 16 May, while in Debaltseve, the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 5-8km north-north-west and about 240 undetermined explosions 5-10km north-north-west.

On the evening of 16 May, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded, over a two-minute period, 21 muzzle flashes assessed as a salvo of outgoing multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) rounds as well as their subsequent projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west 5-10km north-west. During the same period of time, the SMM in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) recorded 26 projectiles in flight from south to north assessed as rounds of MLRS (BM-21), all 3-3.5km south-east. Immediately thereafter, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 25 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of MLRS (BM-21), followed by two projectiles in flight from south-east and north-west, all 2-4km west-south-west. (The SMM assessed that the three cameras above recorded the same instance.)

During the day on 17 May, positioned on the western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and about 260 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km south-west, west-south-west and west. 

On the evening and night of 16-17 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions and about 60 shots and bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-10km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west. During the day on 17 May, while at the same location, the SMM heard about ten undetermined explosions and about 20 shots and bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-4km at directions ranging from south to west.

On the evening of 16 May, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 18 projectiles in flight from west to east, followed by eight projectiles from east to west, all 1-3km south.

The following morning, while in Mariupol city centre (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions at undetermined distances and directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (15), compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions).

During the day on 17 May, positioned in Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 5-7km south.

Positioned in Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 200 shots of small-arms fire 1-1.5km east-south-east, assessed as probable live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

Positioned in Malomykolaivka (non-government controlled, 36km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 10-20km north-north-west.

The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas of Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk). On 17 May, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the yard of a one-storey house at 17 Shyiana Street, assessed as caused by a round of an anti-tank guided missile fired from a northerly direction. The Mission also saw that four windows on the south- and west-facing sides of the house were broken (assessed as caused by the wave of an explosion), that the east-facing part of the concrete base of a wooden fence, 50m west of the house, was cracked, and that one of the slats of the fence of an adjacent house was cleaved in half. The owner of the house told the SMM that she had heard an explosion at around 12:30 on 16 May.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 16-17 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded six projectiles in vertical flight, followed by an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-4km south-east and south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). The same camera subsequently recorded, in sequence, 11 undetermined explosions, five projectiles in flight and a burst from north to south, three projectiles from north-west to south-east, a projectile in flight from north to south and 15 tracer rounds in flight, a projectile and a burst from north-north-west to south-south-east, as well as two undetermined explosions, all 1-7km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

In the early morning of 17 May, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 2-5km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day, positioned on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard a shot fired 1-1.2km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 17 May, positioned near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 16 May, the SMM saw two tanks (T-64) loaded on transporter trailers heading south-west on road T1301 in Luhansk city.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 16 May, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 21 tanks (T-64), seven mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk); 11 tanks (T-72) near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and 24 tanks (T-64) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk). Aerial imagery revealed the presence on 15 May of 33 tanks (type undetermined), 12 towed howitzers (or mortars) and two surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report of 15 March 2018).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government‑controlled areas, the SMM observed five towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12) for the first time and noted that 46 towed howitzers (38 2A65 and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and 45 anti-tank guns (42 MT-12 and three D-48, 85mm) were again missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that two MLRS (BM-21) were again missing. At the same site, it also observed an additional weapon.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 16 May, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80), an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) and four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1 and two BMP variant) near Popasna, and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Serednoteple (28km north of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) and three IFVs (BMP-2) near Artema (26km north of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 17 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four IFVs (three BMP-1 and one BMP-2) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe anti-tank mines. On 16 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted at least 25 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in a field on the southern edge of Avdiivka (see SMM Daily Report of 17 May 2018). 

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS to keep the station operational. On 17 May, positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to high-voltage power lines near Almazna and the water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). Positioned near Almazna, the SMM heard small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM visited two border areas outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for 15 minutes, the SMM saw 52 cars (21 with Ukrainian, 17 with Russian Federation and two with Georgian licence plates, and 12 with “LPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and five covered cargo trucks (two with Russian Federation and two with Belarussian licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine.  A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for 15 minutes, the SMM saw 11 cars (seven with Ukrainian licence plates and four with “LPR” plates) stationary in a nearby parking lot. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering near the venue of a pre-announced public discussion organized by a non-governmental organization (NGO), following an incident on 10 May when the same discussion was prevented from taking place by a group of people. (See SMM Daily Report 12 May 2018.) On the evening of 16 May, the SMM saw a group of at least 65 people (all men, aged 18-30), including at least three wearing C14 (Sich) insignia, in front of the Peremoha Space meeting centre at 62 Tarasa Shevchenka Boulevard, where the public discussion was taking place. It noted that some of them were also present at the incident site on 10 May. The SMM heard the group of people expressing their opposition to homosexuality and chanting “Glory to Ukraine, Glory to the nation”. About 85 police officers, including 40 in riot gear, were present both inside and outside the centre. After the public discussion, some of the participants and a representative of the NGO told the SMM that most of the participants had left through the back door of the centre under police escort. The SMM did not observe any incidents.

In Kherson, the SMM monitored a court hearing for Kyrylo Vyshynskyi, the recently arrested editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine. (See SMM Daily Report 16 May 2018.) At Kherson City Court (6/29 Maiakovskoho Street), the public prosecutor accused Vyshynskyi of assisting a foreign state in its activities against Ukraine, as per Article 111 of the Criminal Code (high treason) in relation to materials published online by RIA Novosti Ukraine. After hearing the arguments of prosecution and defence, the judge remanded Vyshynskyi to custody for 60 days without bail. (In Kyiv, the SMM saw that the office of the RIA Novosti Ukraine (16 Shota Rustaveli Street) was closed; it also attempted to contact its employees without success.)

In Lviv, the SMM monitored three public gatherings in front of the Regional Council building at 16 Vynnychenka Street. The first gathering comprised around 30 people (mostly women, aged 45-60) whom the SMM heard expressing discontent with what they said were plans of closing a hospital in Lviv. The second one comprised around 50 members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (mostly men, aged 40-60) whom the SMM heard expressing support for coalminers from the Lviv region. The third gathering comprised around 200 people who said they were veterans (all men, aged 50-70), some of whom were carrying the Ukrainian national flags. The SMM saw about 35 law enforcement officers present nearby. Throughout the gatherings, it observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Debaltseve, armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint.
• At the border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying that it could not be present in the “service zone”.
• At the border crossing point near Sievernyi, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying that it could not be present in the “service zone”.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Karen Gainer

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro and the Police Academy of Montenegro held a three-day seminar on the management of contemporary security systems, police leadership qualities, from 14 to 16 May 2018 in Podgorica.

The Contemporary Security Management course is designed to provide relevant training on modern-day practices to run a security department efficiently and effectively. It addresses vital themes such as leadership in management, employee relations, risk management, terrorism, information security, access control, investigations, substance abuse, workplace violence, and emergency management.

The seminar was delivered by experts from the Centre for Strategic Prognosis (CSP) in Belgrade. The curriculum was developed co-operatively with experts from the Police Academy and tailored to address the results of a training needs assessment of the Montenegrin Security Sector Agencies.

Eleven senior officials of the Internal Affairs Ministry and the Police Directorate, Foreign Affairs Ministry, Defence Ministry, the Institute for Execution of Criminal Sanctions, the Maritime Safety Administration, Customs Administration and National Security Agency were introduced to the management of the systems in light of the changing geopolitics and balance of global powers in the world today.

Professor Violeta Rašković Talović, Dean of the Faculty for Diplomacy and Security and Director of the CSP, talked about globalization and challenges posed by the emerging “Fourth world”. Contemporary security problems of small countries, changing alliances and rivalries of great powers within the Balkan and EU discussed were also discussed.

Security topics such as High-Tech crime and private intelligence were elaborated by Ivan Petrović, professor at the Faculty for Diplomacy and Security Migrations.   

The fundamental session of the seminar was the discussion on psychological aspects of leadership as elaborated by the psychologist Slobodan Spasić. His presentation encompassed communication techniques, social engineering, and the psychology of manipulation and principles of sanctioning.

Participants emphasized the significance of security system management and the importance of maintaining it on the agenda of the Montenegrin Police Academy and security sector institutions in the forthcoming period.  

Sharing experiences in the field of in-service training and the training of legal professionals was the focus of an international conference organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan in co-operation with the Lawyer’s Training Centre of the Ministry of Justice on 17 and 18 May in Tashkent and Samarkand.

Around 50 national and international experts from the judicial, law-enforcement and educational sectors participated in the first day of the event in Tashkent. The second day of the conference, held in Samarkand, brought together over 150 legal professionals from the Samarkand region for further presentations by international experts.                  

Over the course of two days, participants were familiarized with the experiences of different countries across the OSCE region in improving the skills of legal professionals. They engaged in in-depth discussions on how to achieve the highest level of professionalism in the legal sector. Specific topics in this regard were the use of modern technologies and other innovations when training legal professionals and the development of feedback mechanisms, models for which were presented by experts from Belgium, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Germany.

In his opening speech in Samarkand, Juergen Becker, Senior Project Officer at the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, stated: “The importance of training legal professionals cannot be overstated. An effective judiciary system benefits a society in all its aspects. It establishes trust of a society in the state and is a very important factor in the social, economic and political stability of a country.”

The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan has been supporting the Lawyer’s Training Centre in Uzbekistan since 2009. This partnership intensified after the introduction of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s reform agenda and the signing of the decree “On the Strategy of Actions to Further Develop Uzbekistan in Five Priority Areas in 2017-2021”. The strategy specifically highlights the need to further strengthen legality in the judicial and legal system.“The on-going reforms require the establishment of a quality-based new system to train legal professionals, in particular in the most required and specialized fields, the introduction of innovative forms of training in the field of jurisprudence as well as providing opportunities for internships at leading foreign institutions,” noted the Director of the Lawyer’s Training Centre, Mirzatillo Tillabaev.

The conference was conducted within the framework of the Project Co-ordinator’s project Support to the Lawyer’s Training Centre under the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan – Phase IV.

Karen Gainer

Conflict management for the parliamentary services of Montenegro in focus of a training workshop organized by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro was held on 17 and 18 May in Podgorica.

Twelve participants from the parliamentary services who already underwent a series of specially designed workshops attended the training course. Last year, they completed the first segment of the programme, which focused on business culture, communication and presentation skills.

Within this module, special attention was paid to new practices and approaches in conflict management, hierarchy in public administration, and analysis of typical sources of conflict in public administration, new directions and approaches, conflict management styles, as well as strategies for solving conflicts.

The goal of the programme is to support the development of the parliamentary services in their role as embodiment of the institutional memory of the parliament, leading to the steady advancement of its professionalism and efficiency.

The next training, on change management, will be held on 31 May and 1 June in Podgorica.

 

381964 Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day workshop on anti-corruption draft legislation review for 30 representatives of government institutions, law enforcement agencies, civil society and the business community of Kyrgyzstan concluded on 18 May 2018 in Bishkek.

Aimed at strengthening the capacities of relevant anti-corruption stakeholders in identifying potential corruption risks in the legislative drafting process, the workshop was organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.

The workshop provided participants with theories and practical tools on sound legal drafting and transparent analysis of draft legislation. Participants also learned how to identify corruption risk factors and to produce final review reports. 

“This workshop is a joint practical anti-corruption activity, which gives representatives of the public sector, business community and civil society of Kyrgyzstan an opportunity to co-operate more closely in anti-corruption matters,” said Kurban Babayev, Associate Anti-Corruption Officer at OCEEA.

Eni Gjergji, Acting Regional Development Officer at the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek said that corruption remains one of the most pressing challenges of our time. “Promotion of good governance and the fight against corruption are high on the agenda of the OSCE and our Programme Office in Bishkek.”

The workshop is part of an OSCE-led regional extra-budgetary project on fostering a participatory approach to preventing corruption in Central Asia. The project is designed to assist governments, as well as civil society and business sector, in developing and implementing national corruption prevention policies. It is funded by Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Serbia and Liechtenstein.

TASHKENT, 18 May 2018 – Practical measures to combat illicit cross-border trafficking in cultural property in the Central Asian Region was the focus of a five-day regional workshop, which concluded today in Tashkent.

Organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, with the support of Italy, which is chairing the OSCE in 2018, and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, the workshop was attended by 18 participants from relevant law enforcement services and ministries of culture of all five Central Asian participating States.

“In recent years we have experienced a dramatic upsurge in the destruction and degradation of archaeological sites and in trafficking of cultural property in the OSCE area and beyond,” said Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE, Luca Fratini. “It has become evident that this kind of trafficking is deeply linked to transnational organized crime and corruption networks and the financing of terrorism. Combating the destruction of cultural heritage and trafficking in cultural property is a priority of Italy which is currently chairing the OSCE”

The participants were familiarized with actual cases of trafficking in cultural property and discussed the best ways to respond to this serious transnational threat with the support of international and regional organizations.

Over the course of the workshop, experts from the Carabinieri Command for Protection of Cultural Heritage, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Guardia Civil, INTERPOL, the Spanish National Police as well as the Spanish Ministry of Culture and the World Customs Organization highlighted the international legal framework and best practices in criminal justice responses to trafficking in cultural property. They also spoke about how to implement best practices by respective services in the Central Asia region.

They focused on combating the trafficking of counterfeited works of arts, the role of customs agencies, techniques and best practices in trafficking in cultural property cases, available IT systems and databases in addressing illicit trafficking, international co-operation, and the return of forfeited cultural property.  

Participants provided insight into their respective national legal frameworks and discussed ways forward to better address trafficking of cultural property and smuggling of antiquities.

The highlight of the workshop was a study visit to Samarkand, where participants had the opportunity to visit different archeological and cultural sights and to discuss practical measures related to their protection and co-operation between different agencies.

The project under which the workshop took place will continue in 2018 and 2019, with additional regional events in South-Eastern Europe and the Asian Partners for Co-operation.

 

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381967 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The latest trends in using the Internet to illegally buy and sell drugs and how to counter this phenomenon were the focus of an OSCE-supported training course for law enforcement officials from Kazakhstan’s Regional Hub to Counter Global Threats which concluded on 18 May 2018 in Astana.

The four-day event brought together some 15 law enforcement officers and instructors from law enforcement educational institutions representing the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Central Asian Regional Information and Co-ordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC) and the Interior Ministry’s Anti-Drug Units.

The participants learned about monitoring web-based platforms used for conducting illegal activities, the criminal use of messenger services, payment instruments as well as software for using the Darknet and the Deep Web. Experts referenced case studies to illustrate ways to effectively conduct online investigations.

The course was organized by the Programme Office in Astana in co-operation with the United States Embassy in Astana Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. It is part of the OSCE Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to build the host country’s capacity to effectively address the illicit trafficking of drugs.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed fresh damage caused by gunfire and shelling in residential areas of Hranitne, Kozatske and Sakhanka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and it was restricted also at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk.* Two SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) were jammed while flying near Horlivka.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Verkhnoshyrokivske, Pikuzy, Bezimenne, Miusynsk and Fashchivka. The SMM observed new mine hazard signs and anti-tank mines in Avdiivka. The Mission continued to facilitate access to the Donetsk Filtration Station for Voda Donbassa water company employees to keep the station operational and heard ceasefire violations in the area despite security guarantees. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Almazna and to a water pipeline in Obozne.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (460), compared with the previous reporting period (about 500 explosions).

On the evening of 15 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 explosions (one assessed as an artillery round and the remainder undetermined) and two bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-7km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north-north-west.

On the evening of 15 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and about 40 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 3-7km at directions ranging from east to west. During the day on 16 May, while at the same location, the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire 3-5km south-east.

On the evening of 15 May, while in Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and six minutes of uncountable and overlapping explosions, assessed as outgoing artillery rounds, as well as bursts and shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) cannon fire, all at undetermined distances north-east and east.

On the evening and night of 15-16 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 30 undetermined explosions and three projectiles in flight from north to south, all 1-5km west.

During the day on 16 May, positioned in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard 45 undetermined explosions, about 70 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, as well as 15 minutes of uncountable bursts and undetermined explosions, all 1-4km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north-north-west.

Positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km south-east.

Positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, 2-6km west-south-west. (The SMM assessed that it heard the same explosions when positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka (see above)).

Positioned 2.5km south-east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) for about 15 minutes, the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and about ten shots of small-arms fire, all at undetermined distances east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

During the day on 16 May, positioned in Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 90 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2km west and north-west.

The SMM observed fresh damage caused by gunfire and shelling in residential areas of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 86km south of Donetsk) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 97km south of Donetsk).

In Hranitne, at 33 Bohdana Khmelnytskoho, the SMM saw a hole in the glass of an east-facing window of a school building and assessed it as caused by a bullet fired from an easterly direction. A woman (aged 50-60), who introduced herself to the SMM as the school director, told the SMM that the school had been hit by small-arms fire on 13 May around 14:00, but no pupils had been in the building at that time.

In Kozatske, at 61 Myru Street, the SMM saw that south-west-facing parts of the roof and metal supporting beams of a church had been destroyed. It also saw fresh shrapnel damage to the south-west-facing outer walls of the building, to a gas pipeline about 10m north-west of the building, to several trees within a 25m radius, as well as to a brick fence about 15m north of the church. Inside the building, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the south-western end of the ceiling. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by an artillery round (at least 122mm), but could not assess the direction of fire. A man (aged 40-50) told the SMM that he had heard two explosions near the church at around 04:00 on 15 May while he had been at his house in the same neighbourhood.

In Sakhanka, at 1 Vartazarovoi Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to the west-facing outer wall of the dining hall of a school, located about 30m south-west of the school’s main building, and to the west-facing part of its roof. The SMM also saw a fresh hole in the west-facing outer wall, as well as five shattered west- and south-facing windows. It assessed the damage as caused by a round from anti-tank guided missile system fired from a westerly direction. Four residents of Sakhanka (a man and three women, all aged 30-40) told the SMM that the incident had occurred at about 11:45 on 16 May and added that pupils had been in the main school building.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 15-16 May, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard 13 explosions assessed as mortar rounds and 22 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-6km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and 18 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds and six bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 2-6km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 16 May, positioned in Petrivske, the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire 2-4km south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) heading south near Fashchivka (60km south-west of Luhansk). An SMM long-range UAV spotted on 15 May a tank (T-64) in a residential area of Verkhnoshyrokivske (85km south of Donetsk), a tank (T-72) in a residential area of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk), as well as two tanks (T-72) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in Bezimenne (100km south of Donetsk). Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 15 May of eight multiple launch rocket systems (type undetermined) near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2018).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted on 15 May seven tanks (T-64) near Zoria (40km north-west of Donetsk). In non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 15 May of ten tanks (type undetermined) and seven towed howitzers (type undetermined) near Miusynsk (see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2018).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-60) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk), an armoured personnel carrier in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk). An SMM long-range UAV spotted on 15 May an IFV (BMP-1) near Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1) near Vodiane (15km north-west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted on 15 May an IFV (BMP-2) in a residential area of Verkhnoshyrokivske and an IFV (BMP-1) near Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the presence of mines and mine hazard signs. In a field on the south-western edge of Avdiivka, the SMM observed again a red-and-white mine hazard sign with “Mines” written in English and Ukrainian (see SMM Daily Report of 11 April 2018). In a field about 0.2km south of the aforementioned mine hazard sign, the SMM saw for the first time about three parallel rows of red-and-white mine hazard signs with “Mines” written in Ukrainian, as well as a row of about 15 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid nearby. On a concrete wall surrounding a compound on the south-western edge of Avdiivka, the SMM saw again a sign with “Danger Mines” spray-painted in Ukrainian on it.

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS to keep the station operational. On 15 May, positioned at the DFS, as well as in nearby areas, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to high-voltage power lines near Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and the water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). The SMM also facilitated the access of a team of Vodafone employees travelling from government- to non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 24 cars (seven with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation, one with Lithuanian licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates), a van with Ukrainian licence plates, three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and six pedestrians (five men aged 20-30 and a woman aged 30-40) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw 14 cars (ten with Russian Federation, three with Ukrainian and one with “DPR” plates), two mini-buses with “DPR” plates and 16 passengers on board, a van with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as nine pedestrians (two men and seven women, all aged 50-60) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint on road E58 north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and, citing orders from their superiors, denied it passage.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with two long-range UAVs that were flying over an area near Horlivka. The SMM assessed the loss of communication as due to jamming. The SMM managed to land the UAVs safely.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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381757 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

ALMATY, Kazakhstan, 17 May 2018 – The OSCE-supported Ninth Annual Central Asian Forum on Internet Development began today in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The event’s focus is “Media, State, Society: Digital Security and Media Literacy". Some 120 government officials, representatives from civil society, media-related NGOs, professional associations, experts, lawyers and journalists from Germany, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan as well as Aidar Botagarov, an Adviser from the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media are convening for the two-day event.

Participants will discuss the influence of the Internet on digital safety, protection of personal data; freedom of expression in Central Asia; promotion of media literacy as the most effective instrument for counteracting fake news; xenophobia and hate speech as well as the role of the state in the regulation of the media sphere.

The OSCE Programme Office in Astana organized the event in co-operation with the International Centre for Journalism MediaNet and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Kazakhstan.

“Contemporary security challenges and problems in cyberspace require increased accountability from not only journalists for providing accurate and unbiased information but every single person,” said the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, György Szabó. “Media literacy becomes an inalienable part of a thoughtful and active role in society.”

Bekzat Rakhimov, Deputy Head of the State Media Policy Committee of the Communication and Information Ministry, added that the state has to take a proactive role in regulating the media sphere. However, the role of the state in the media sphere will decrease proportionally to enhanced self-regulation processes.  

The forum is part of the Office’s work to promote freedom of expression and freedom of the media in Kazakhstan and the Central Asia region.

Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Alexander Hug, is travelling to Donbas this evening, 17 May 2018, following a serious deterioration in the security situation in the last 24 hours.

He will assess the security situation along the contact line and its impact on civilians, and discuss with interlocutors measures to reduce tension.

Journalists wishing to cover the visit should contact Tetiana Tesliuchenko: Phone +380 50 334 14 54; +380 67 828 15 78; E-mail tetiana.tesliuchenko@osce.org; smm-media@osce.org

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381664 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The Central Asian Youth Talks and Model OSCE for 34 young people from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe from 10 to 15 May 2018 in Dushanbe and in the town of Romit north east of Dushanbe. During these events, participants discussed modern security challenges and the role of youth in addressing them.

Speaking at the panel session entitled “Promoting the power of dialogue for the shared responsibility in Central Asia”, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, Tuula Yrjölä, emphasized the increasing attention of the OSCE participating States to the role of young people in addressing modern security threats. “The OSCE recognizes the importance of the young generation and is focused on mainstreaming the youth agenda in its work and activities.” 

His Excellency Mohammad Gul Zalmai Yonusi, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Tajikistan, said: “Youth becoming a strong actor in modern politics is an important agent of positive change in the resolution of crisis in Afghanistan. I am really glad to see that young people are ready to talk to each other and issues of security and peace are widely discussed in the context of regional dialogue and confidence building.”

The seminar established a platform of Youth Talks, in which young people throughout the region had a chance to raise important question affecting youth and present their experience and  ideas in addressing them.

Presenting their own projects, young people from Central Asia and Afghanistan discussed inclusive education and digital schooling, social entrepreneurship, student self-governance, gender, as well as youth initiatives in rural and remote areas. Thematic workshops on political participation, information management, negotiations and networking enabled the flow of knowledge and skills for responsive citizenship and an inclusive decision-making process.

The event concluded with a Model OSCE simulation, providing young participants with the chance to play the roles of delegates of OSCE participating States dealing with a crisis situation and using the instruments of dialogue and the consensus-based approach.

The event was organized in the framework of the OSCE efforts in supporting democratic political processes in Tajikistan and in Central Asia. The OSCE has facilitated a number of interactive panel discussions exploring the OSCE’s three-dimensional approach to comprehensive security through the high level dialogue, as well as the modus operandi of the Secretariat, its institutions and field operations.

381700 Communication and Media Relations Section

The role of armed and security forces in democratic societies was the focus of a seminar organized by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre from 14 to 18 May 2018 in Bucharest. The discussion brought together more than 50 participants, including senior officers from the armed forces, senior government officials, representatives of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and representatives of academia and civil society, from Romania and other OSCE participating States.

Democratic control of the armed and security forces, parliamentary oversight and respect for international humanitarian and human rights law for armed forces personnel, as well as migration challenges in relation to the work of the armed forces were the main topics of discussion.

Participants also gathered in working groups to share experiences and best practices in applying the inter- and intra-state level commitments and principles enshrined in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, a landmark document adopted in 1994 detailing the governance of the security sector and the role of armed and security forces in democratic societies.

“The Code of Conduct has provided continued guidance for Romania and serves as a toolbox for the region,” said George Ciamba, State Secretary at Romania’s Foreign Ministry, as he opened the event. “Importantly, the Code is something to speak about more and not less, and this seminar is an excellent opportunity to exchange good practices in the region.”

Andrej Benedejčič, Chairperson of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the OSCE, said: “One of the fascinating aspects of the Code is that even though it has never been revised since its adoption, it has not lost its relevance as a unique norm-setting framework document.”

Marcel Peško, Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, emphasized that “the Code of Conduct is a visionary document. Besides raising awareness, this seminar creates an opportunity to engage in forward looking dialogue and to build trust.”

The Code of Conduct contains key principles and commitments for the 57 OSCE participating States related to security relations between States and to the control of all armed and security forces within a state.

The seminar was held in line with an FSC decision according to which the OSCE Secretariat is requested to organize at least one specialized seminar or workshop annually in order to facilitate better implementation and promote awareness of the Code of Conduct and support outreach in its regard. 

The seminar was co-hosted by the OSCE and Romania, with donor support provided by Germany and Switzerland.

381424 Kunduz Rysbek

On 11 May 2018, a public dialogue was organized by the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda of the Kyrgyz Republic (CEC) and the public foundation Civic Platform, with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, to discuss ways to improve the electoral legislation and to identify the main strategic directions of electoral reform.  

The event brought together election administration officials, Members of Parliament, representatives of the government and civil society, as well as international organizations.

Nurjan Shaildabekova, Chair of the CEC, stressed that “On the way to building democracy, it is important to capitalize on what has already been achieved within the electoral reform framework and to take it even further”.

The discussion focused on the improvement of mechanisms of legal relations between the electorate and candidates, political parties and law enforcement agencies. The effectiveness of tools to prevent violations of the electoral legislation was also debated.

The Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, Pierre von Arx, said that electoral reform is a continuous process: “We enjoy a fruitful partnership with the CEC and will continue to support electoral reform in the future. After all, elections are not just about voting on the election day, they are about a sense of citizenship and a sense of responsibility for the vote that one casts.”

The participants of the public dialogue also discussed the achievements of the Electoral Reform Working Group, which is currently developing a draft strategy on improving the electoral system for the consideration of the National Council for Sustainable Development led by the President. The Working Group, set up in 2013 by presidential decree, was instrumental in initiating and pushing forward the ongoing electoral reform.

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek will build upon its multi-year efforts to strengthen transparent, fair and free elections in Kyrgyzstan. Within the framework of ODIHR Election Observation Missions’ recommendations, the Programme Office will continue its assistance in improving the country’s electoral system.

MINSK, 16 May 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 16 May 2018:

“At the previous TCG meeting, the situation around Donetsk Filtering Station (DFS) was subject to particular attention. Unfortunately, despite the sides’ security guarantees and the reinforced patrolling by OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, further ceasefire violations near the DFS occurred. 

Let me remind you that the DFS, as a part of the enterprise “Voda Donbassa”, provides water for several hundred thousand people on both sides of the contact line. 

These issues, among others, were duly considered in the Working Group on Security. At the TCG meeting, it was decided to hold a videoconference of the Working Group on Security concerning the situation in the DFS area next week. In this regard, I call on the sides to provide all the required security guarantees to allow for the uninterrupted operation of the station and to ensure security for DFS employees and SMM monitors.

Besides, the increase in civilian casualties in April raises a major concern. In this respect, I once again call on the sides to do their utmost to avoid civilian casualties. I am determined to repeat these calls to ensure that the interests of the conflict zone residents are properly voiced.

The Working Group on Economic Issues continued its discussion of further steps to restore and improve Vodafone-Ukraine mobile communication in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR). Moreover, the Group considered the topic of water deliveries in Karbonyt system as well as the crucial environmental issues. 

The Working Group on Humanitarian Issues continued its discussion on the topics of detainees exchange and the conditions of their detention, missing persons, as well as improving conditions for the contact line crossing via the entry-exit checkpoints.  

The Working Group on Political Issues further considered the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and modalities of local elections in CADR and CARL.”

 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued to facilitate access to the Donetsk Filtration Station for Voda Donbassa water company employees in order to keep the station operational. It heard ceasefire violations close by, despite security guarantees, and immediately left the location and suspended operations in the area of the station. In Betmanove, the Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties. The SMM followed up on reports of fresh damage to civilian properties caused by small-arms and automatic-grenade-launcher fire in Zolote-4. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including in Novolaspa and Kreminets.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Vidrodzhennia. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Almazna and to the water pipeline in Obozne. The SMM continued to follow up on media reports of arson at a Roma community camp near Lviv. In Ostroh in Rivne region, the SMM followed up on reports of a break-in at a chapel at a Jewish cemetery. The SMM also followed up on media reports of a raid by the Security Service of Ukraine on the offices of RIA Novosti in Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 500 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 210 explosions).

On the evening and night of 14-15 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an explosion, a projectile in flight from north to south, and two explosions, all 0.2-5km west.

On the evening and night of 14-15 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 explosions assessed as artillery rounds 3-6km west-north-west, four explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 4-6km north-west and about 50 undetermined explosions 3-6km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west.

On 15 May, positioned 1km north of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard about 110 undetermined explosions at undetermined distances south, an undetermined explosion at an undetermined distance north-east and an undetermined explosion 5-7km south. Positioned 1km north-north-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 5-7km south-east, about 70 undetermined explosions south and south-east and small-arms fire south-west and north at undetermined distances. 

Positioned 1km west of Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 13 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) at undetermined distances south-east and 13 explosions assessed as impacts of MLRS at undetermined distances south, as well as about 70 undetermined explosions at undetermined distances south and south-east.

Positioned in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 34 undetermined explosions 4-20km at directions ranging from south-east to west-south-west and about 170 bursts and shots of small-arms fire 3-7km at directions ranging from east to south.

Positioned in Novohnativka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 36 outgoing explosions 2km south-south-east and six outgoing explosions at an unknown distance south-south-east.

Positioned in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 explosions 0.5-3km at directions ranging from north-west to north and about 70 bursts of small-arms fire 0.5-2km north-west.

In Luhanskregion, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (13 explosions). Positioned 1km south of Stepanivka (non-government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an outgoing artillery round, an explosion assessed as the impact of a mortar round and 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-5km west-north-west.

Positioned 1km south-west of Bile (non-government-controlled, 22km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 60 explosions of tank rounds, assessed as outgoing and impacts, 5-10km south-south-east.

The SMM was in close proximity to small-arms fire while monitoring the security situation and facilitating access for employees of the Voda Donbassa water company to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS). Positioned on road H20, about 1.6km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard the whistling sound of a bullet flying at a distance of 20cm to 1m above their heads, assessed as small-arms fire from an unknown distance south-south-east in an area covered by explicit security guarantees. The SMM patrol immediately left the location and suspended operations in the area of the DFS. (See SMM Spot Report 15 May 2018.)

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Betmanove (non-government-controlled, formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, 23km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM spoke by phone with a woman (aged 57) who said that on 1 May she and her husband (aged 58) were home at 68A Chervona Street in Betmanove when shelling had started at 13:15. The woman said that as they ran towards their shelter, their garage had sustained an impact, but a car in the yard had shielded them from much of the blast. According to her, she sustained a deep shrapnel wound above her right thigh, and her husband sustained injuries from metal fragments to the right rear of his neck. The woman also said that they were treated for two days in Horlivka Hospital No. 2. Earlier in the day in Horlivka, hospital staff told the SMM by phone that the couple had been admitted to the hospital on 1 May, provided a similar description of their injuries, and said that after two days of care the two were released. The SMM could not visit the abovementioned address due to security reasons.

The SMM followed up on reports of fresh damage to civilian properties caused by small-arms and automatic-grenade-launcher fire in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk). At 6 Ostrovskoho Street, at a two-storey brick house, the SMM observed three fresh divots (2-3cm deep, 10-15cm in diameter) on a wall and door as well as a hole in the glass of a first floor window, all facing east, assessed as caused by small-arms fire. The SMM also observed a number of minor surface scratches on the north-facing wall. Three residents (two women aged 50 and 65, and one man aged 45) told the SMM that the damage had occurred in the late evening of 4 May and that one of the women had been home at the time. 

At 7/2 Ostrovskoho Street, at a two-storey brick house, the SMM observed three fresh bullet holes (10mm in diameter) on the south-facing wall and door as well as a hole in the glass of a south-facing second floor window, all assessed as caused by 5.45mm rounds fired from a south-easterly direction. The SMM observed a 5.45mm bullet inside the frame of a double-pane insulated window and another 5.45mm bullet inside the door frame. The SMM spoke with two owners of the house (women aged 25 and 50), one of whom said that the damage had occurred in the late evening of 3 May and that they had been inside the house, together with a two–year-old child, at the time of shooting. 

At 7/1 Ostrovskoho Street, at a two-storey brick house, the SMM observed a fresh bullet hole (20mm in diameter) in the east-facing first-floor window, assessed as caused by small-arms fire from a south-easterly direction. The owner (woman aged 30) told the SMM that she had been inside the house when the damage had occurred in the late evening of 3 May.

At 5/2 Ostrovskoho Street, the SMM observed two fresh bullet holes (10mm in diameter) in the south-facing concrete wall of a shed (located 20m west of the house) assessed as caused by small-arms or heavy-machine-gun fire coming from a west-south-westerly direction (likely ricochet), and a minor surface scratch (5-7cm in length) assessed as caused by an automatic-grenade-launcher. About 20m east of the shed,the SMM observed many holes (more than 2mm in diameter, around half of them fresh, assessed as caused by various weapons) in the north-facing metal gate to another property at 4/1 Ostrovskoho Street. The owner (man, aged 40) told the SMM that he had been at home when the damage occurred on the late evening of 3 and 4 May.Otsrovskoho Street is located around 300m north of the contact line and the SMM is aware of Ukrainian Armed Forces positions between 300-400m south-east and south-west of the street.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* 

On 15 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an illumination flare in vertical flight and two undetermined explosions, all 4-12km east-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in Petrivske, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 5-8km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM noted a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a stationary self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Vidrodzhennia (66kmnorth-east of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw five self-propelled howitzers (2S1Gvozdika, 122mm) being transported on trucks travelling near Sloviansk (95km north of Donetsk), two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk) and three stationary tanks (T-64) in Bakhmut (67km north of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region and noted that six tanks (four T-64 and two T-72) were again missing. 

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2], a pontoon bridge and unmanned aerial vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 14 May, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-variant) in Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a pontoon bridge (PMP-3), two motorboats (BMK-130, BMK-460) and an amphibious transporter (PTS-2) across the Siverskyi Donetsk River, as well as a trench digger (PZM-2) north-west of Krymske. On 15 May, the SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 14 May an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1), an APC (MT-LB) and a probable APC (MT-LB) in Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk) and, on 15 May, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk). 

On both sides of the contact line in the security zone, the SMM heard UAVs. Positioned 2.5km south-east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 93km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard an unidentified UAV flying east of its position, near the line of contact, from south to north. In a non-government-controlled area, positioned1.5km west of Khreshchatytske, the SMM heard an unidentified UAV flying from east to north-west then north-west to south.

The SMM observed demining activities. In Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed two trucks, one fitted with blue emergency lights and “demining” written in Russian on the front of the truck, and five men (aged 30-40) in military-style clothing in an uncultivated agricultural field that had been fenced off with wooden stakes and white tape 1km north of the town.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to high-voltage power lines near Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk)and the water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk).

In Lviv city, the SMM continued to follow up on media reports of arson at a Roma camp on 9 May. On 14 May, the head of the Department of Culture and Religions of the Lviv Regional State Administration told the SMM that prior to the alleged attack approximately 30 people had been living in the settlement in Rudne (11km west of Lviv City). On 15 May, the head of the Rudne village council told the SMM that the affected individuals had been living in the area for the past three years and that there had been no conflict between them and other local residents. The SMM was told the same by members of the local Roma community staying at a different camp in Rudne. (See also SMM Daily Report 14 May 2018.) 

The SMM followed up on news reports of unknown persons breaking into a chapel at a Jwish cemetery on Kozatska Street in Ostroh (247 km north-east of Lviv) in Rivne region. At the chapel, the SMM saw three broken windows on the west side of the chapel and a door showing signs of forced entry. According to a cemetery attendant, the damage had occurred on the night of 27-28 April 2018 and the attackers took a small sum of money from the chapel.

In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on media reports of a raid on the offices of the RIA Novosti news agency at 16 Shota Rustaveli Street. At the RIA offices, a security guard told the SMM that at around 09:00 on 15 May he had seen agents of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) enter the building. The SBU published a statement on its website that it had conducted searches in offices of RIA Novosti. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 15 May 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• While on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), an armed formation member prevented the SMM from travelling west into Novolaspa citing security concerns and alleging that there was ongoing IFV (BMP-2) cannon fire in the area.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO: 

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMMwas prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• On 9 May and again on 14 May, the SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that there had been no demining in the area in the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• While 2.7km east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), an armed formation member allowed the SMM to proceed east on road H15 only after inspecting an SMM trailer.

[1]For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka and Pyshchevyk were not operational during the reporting period.

[2]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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