Central Europe

On 29 May 2018 in Podgorica the OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized the first in a series of training courses on hate crime for around 30 judges and prosecutors from across Montenegro. The event was organized in co-operation with the the Centre for Training in Judiciary and State Prosecution.

The training introduced the participants to the definition of and international legal provisions relating to hate crime. The participants examined the practices and precedents of the European Court of Human Rights and the work of the United Nations Human Rights Committee in comparison with their experiences in prosecuting hate crime in Montenegro.

“Thanks to support of the OSCE Mission, important knowledge was gained by our prosecutors on the methodology of prosecuting hate crime and by our judges on assessing and weighing evidence in adjudicating hate crime,” said Masa Adzic, Head of the Department for In-service Training from the Centre for Training in Judiciary and State Prosecution. Adzic underlined the effectivity of the OSCE Mission’s support to prosecutors in reviewing evidence and prosecuting hate crimes. She welcomed the next series of training courses scheduled for the second half of the year.

The Mission’s Security Co-operation and Governance Programme Manager, Robert Kucharski, emphasized that this training course responds to operational needs identified by justice practitioners. He also noted that it serves to enhance their capacity to prosecute hate crimes in Montenegro and protect basic human rights.

The event is part of the Mission’s cross-programmatic project to raise public awareness and support the improvement of the ability of law enforcement and judicial institutions to properly respond to the phenomena of hate crime.

OSCE Representative strongly condemns murder of journalist Arkadiy Babchenko in Ukraine and calls for swift and complete investigation

VIENNA, 29 May 2018 – OSCE media freedom representative Harlem Désir today strongly condemned the murder of a well-known Russian journalist and writer Arkadiy Babchenko in Kyiv, Ukraine.

This evening, Babchenko, a journalist with ATR television channel and a founder of the project Journalism Without Intermediaries, was shot dead in front of his apartment.

“I am outraged by this horrific act," said Désir. "I call on the authorities to swiftly and thoroughly investigate the circumstances of this assassination and to bring the perpetrators and those who ordered it to justice.”

“My sincere condolences go out to Babchenko’s family, friends and colleagues,” concluded Désir.

Babchenko worked as a journalist and a war correspondent for various media outlets, including Moskovskiy Komsomolets and Novaya Gazeta newspapers, during his career. He has also published in The Guardian. After receiving threats he left Russia in 2017 for Prague and then Kyiv.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Myrnohrad, Pivdenne and Horlivka. The Mission observed damage as a result of shelling near Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Buhaivka. It continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station and repair works and demining activities in order to keep the station operational; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. The SMM continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to high-voltage power lines near Almazna, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Veselohorivka. In Kharkiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], however more explosions (about 115), compared with the previous reporting period (about 35 explosions).

During the evening of 27 May, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, a projectile in flight from west to east and 15 undetermined explosions, followed by totals of 21 undetermined explosions, six projectiles (five in vertical flight and one from east to west), two bursts assessed as heavy-machine-gun fire and an illumination flare, all 3-6km north-east.  

On the evening of 27 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions, seven bursts assessed as anti-aircraft gunfire and seven shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-9km north and west. Positioned the next day on the northern edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-3km north-north-west.

On the evening of 27 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact of a mortar (120mm) round 2-3km south-east, 16 explosions (ten undetermined, six assessed as outgoing rounds) and 20 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-east.

During the evening and night of 27-28 May, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, two projectiles from south-east to north-west and one undetermined explosion followed by totals of three undetermined explosions, 22 projectiles (ten from south-east to north-west, five from south-west to north-east, three from north-west to south-east, two from west to east, one from east to west, one from south to north), nine illumination flares and three bursts assessed as anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) rounds, all 1-5km east and east-north-east.

Positioned in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) during the day on 28 May, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and 12 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, 2-4km in directions ranging from north-east to south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however fewer explosions (about 25), compared with the previous reporting period (about 35 explosions).

Positioned in Nyrkove (government-controlled, 77km west of Luhansk) during the day, the SMM heard 17 explosions assessed as outgoing and 20 bursts of small-arms fire, all 4-6km north-north-west and assessed as part of live-fire training exercise outside the security zone.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. In Myrnohrad (formerly Dymytrov, government-controlled, 52km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man (55 years old) outside his apartment and saw two bandages and several small wounds on his upper body that he said were the result of an explosion on 22 May that had also killed his wife (55 years old) at their summer home at 10/16 Pivdennyi Street in Myrnohrad. He added that they were both working in the garden of their summer home when his wife found what he described as a small green-blueish package on the ground. The man said he advised his wife to throw it away and then heard a loud explosion and the blast forced him back three to four metres onto the ground. The man told the SMM that he then saw his wife moaning loudly and bleeding. He told the SMM that both himself and his wife were taken that day to the Myrnohrad Central hospital, where the wife died on 23 May. Medical staff at that hospital told the SMM that the abovementioned couple had been admitted on 22 May: the man with minor injuries to his limbs and the woman unconscious with shrapnel injuries in different parts of her body. The staff added that the woman had died in the hospital on 23 May. Local police told the SMM that a woman had died and a man was injured in line with the details shared by the injured man and the medical staff. 

At the Trauma hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk) on 28 May, the SMM saw a man (70 years old) with small bandages covering wounds to his torso, legs and head and a large bandage from his right arm to elbow. The man told the SMM that he lived at 28 Poltavska Street in the Chyhari area of Pivdenne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). According to the man, he was fixing electricity lines 10-15 m from his house when an explosion occurred as he was moving tree branches. Medical staff told the SMM that a man was admitted on 27 May with wounds to the torso, legs, arm and head from a “booby trap”, however ruled out that it could be from an unexploded ordnance or landmine. Staff at a non-governmental organization’s office in Toretsk told the SMM that on 27 May a man (about 70 years old) sustained injuries as a result of an explosion.

On 26 May, at Horlivka Children’s Hospital, medical staff told the SMM that two boys had been admitted on the evening of 25 May. Medical staff said one boy (11 years old) had sustained shrapnel injuries to his mid to lower back and left leg and the other boy (10 years old) had sustained shrapnel injuries to his jaw and had been discharged the same day. The SMM spoke on 28 May to two neighbours (male, about 50-60 years old, female 60-70 years old) of the boys who resided on Pavlika Morozova Street in the Mykytivskyi district of Horlivka. They told the SMM the boys were wounded on 25 May at an abandoned park at the end of the street where they were playing together and encountered a grenade. Both neighbours told the SMM they only saw the aftermath of the incident, and the woman said that she later saw the ten year old boy wearing bandages on his head and about six bandages across both his arms.

The SMM observed damage as a result of shelling. In Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) on 26 May, the SMM was led to 1 Druzhby Street by a member of the armed formations where it saw a fresh crater south of the gate to the house. The SMM assessed that it was caused by a mortar (82mm) round but could not determine the direction of fire. About 15m west of the gate, on the southern side of Druzhby Street, the SMM saw a second fresh crater. The Mission assessed that it was caused by a mortar (82mm) round fired from a westerly direction.

On 26 May, an SMM long-range unmanned-aerial-vehicle (UAV) spotted three fresh craters about 2km south of Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and 4.3km from the contact line, assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a west-south-westerly direction. The same UAV spotted three fresh craters, assessed as caused by mortar rounds, on the south-western edge of Dokuchaievsk and about 5km from the contact line, one of which was spotted in the garden of a residential house.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 26 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded seven airbursts and two projectiles in vertical flight, 3-8km south-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the evening and night of 27-28 May, the same camera recorded, in sequence, seven projectiles in flight from north to south, three projectiles in vertical flight, 18 projectiles north to south and ten projectiles north-west to south-east, all 3-9km in directions ranging from east to west-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).   

Positioned at the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed a civilian car with black and white military licence plates and two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel on board entering the disengagement area from the northern edge and moving in a westerly direction assessed as travelling to or from houses or positions inside the disengagement area. The same day, the SMM saw the same car inside the disengagement area, this time with three Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel on board, coming from the west moving towards the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the northern edge of the disengagement area.

On 28 May, positioned in Petrivske, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 1-3km south (unable to assess as inside or outside the disengagement area).

Further review of imagery revealed that an explosion recorded by the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska at 04:03 on 22 May 1-2km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) had been an explosion assessed as an impact of an automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) round. (See SMM Daily Report 23 May 2018.)

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 26 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted 14 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), an anti-aircraft gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas on 28 May, the SMM saw eight tanks (T64) being offloaded from trucks at the side of road M03 near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 26 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted: 18 tanks (eight T-72 and 10 T-64), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 18 towed howitzers (12 D-30 and six 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and nine mortars (2B-11 Sani, 120mm) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk); 32 tanks (21 T-64 and 11 T-72) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); and 21 tanks (type undetermined), eight mortars (2B-11), and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Buhaivka. (see above weapons in violation); the same UAV also spotted 30 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) in the area.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns[2]  in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 26 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) within 100m of the main hospital in Toretsk and an IFV (BMP-variant) within 100m of the psycho-neurological hospital in the south-east area of Toretsk. The same UAV also spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Toretsk; two IFVs (BMP-variant) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) near Pivnichne (formerly Kirove, 44km north-east of Donetsk); two APCs (type undetermined) and an IFV (BMP-2) near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk); three IFVs (BMP-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); as well as an APC (MT-LB) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Svitlodarsk. On 28 May, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) in Avdiivka.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 26 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted eight IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk); as well as two APC (type undetermined), four IFV (three BMP-1 and one undetermined type) and an anti-aircraft gun (type undetermined) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk). On 28 May, the SMM saw one IFV (BMP-2) moving in a southerly direction on road T0519 between Ukrainske (80km south of Donetsk) and Prymorske (76km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed mine hazard signs. On the road T-1303 at the junction towards Zhovte (non-government controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM again saw a large mine hazard sign with a white background with “Stop Mines! Danger” written on it in Russian language and in smaller font in English. On the same day, on road T-1303 at the junction towards Dovhe, the SMM again observed a mine hazard sign with same format and content as mentioned above. Both mine hazard signs were previously seen by SMM on 9 May 2018.

The SMM continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) as well as repair works to the DFS and demining activities around the station. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 19 cars (ten with Russian Federation, five with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates”) entering Ukraine, and 17 cars (six with Russian Federation, four with Ukrainian licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates), eight cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) and two buses (both with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

In Kharkiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation. The SMM observed 80 people (mixed ages and genders) holding a portrait of Oleh Sentsov and carrying two Ukrainian flags as well as posters with “Free Sentsov” and “Free Kolchenko”, written in English on them. The SMM saw about ten police and six National Guard personnel near the consulate. This was the third similar gathering in Kharkiv observed by the SMM in the month of May. Participants dispersed without incident. (See SMM Daily Report 25 May 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of Access:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM accessing a crossing point between mainland Ukraine and Crimea on the southern edge of Syvash (162km south-east of Kherson). Despite the SMM having routinely visited the position in the past three years and having obtained permission from the border guards to enter, a man identifying himself as a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander denied the SMM access.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia in a southerly direction due to the presence of mines. A member of the armed formations said there were mines on the road towards the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.5

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs. On 24 May, the seventy-fifth Russian convoy of 16 vehicles crossed into Ukraine and returned through the Donetsk Border Crossing Point.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;

2. Persons in military-style outfits;

3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 10,966 to 11,482 per day for both BCPs compared to last week. The average net flow for both BCPs went from plus 203 to plus 113 (i.e., more entries into the Russian Federation).

The Donetsk BCP continues to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for 36.4 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region[1].

Persons in military-style outfits                                                                                                                                         

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions was 58 at both BCPs compared to 53 last week; 29 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, 29 into Ukraine. Approximately 79 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continue to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, no families were observed, compared to the previous reporting period when three such families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and two into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continue to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed 417 buses crossing the border at both BCPs (compared to 407 observed during the previous week), 210 of them were bound for the Russian Federation and 207 for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Luhansk-Kharkiv; Luhansk-Kyiv; Luhansk-Kyiv-Moscow; Luhansk-Sevastopol and Rovenky-Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a decrease in the number of trucks crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 1,008 to 955 (302 at the Gukovo BCP and 653 at the Donetsk BCP); 550 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 405 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                           

Among them, the OTs continued also to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased from 90 to 64 (compared to the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks have hazard signs, indicating that they are transporting propane or a mix of propane with butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks. At the Donetsk BCP the OTs observed 120 X-ray checks: out of the total number of trucks scanned during the reporting period, 72 trucks (60 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 48 trucks (40 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation.

As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly increased from 189 to 190; 95 crossed into the Russian Federation and 95 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 30 occasions, compared to 46 last week; the OTs assessed that 18 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 12 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. In addition, the OTs also observed vehicles registered in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania and Poland. A number of vehicles with “LPR” and “DPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions.

Convoy

On 24 May at 06:31 (Moscow time), the seventy-fifth[3] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk BCP. A total of 16 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 16 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 14:33 on the same day (see the OM Spot Report of 24 May 2018: https://www.osce.org/observer-mission-at-russian-checkpoints-gukovo-and-...).

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 24 May to 29 May 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from Rostov-on-Don region Border Guard Service

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

[3]According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the seventy-seventh Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” border crossing points, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the seventy-fifth convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

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A workshop on the Central Voter Registry, organized by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), concluded on 29 May 2018 in Vlašić.

Some 40 participants from the BiH Central Election Commission, Municipal/City Election Commissions, centres for voter registries, the Agency for Identification of Documents, Registries and Data Exchange, local register offices and the Interior Ministries of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, analysed the current state of the Central Voter Registry in BiH and discussed obstacles and problems related to regularly updating the Registry, with the aim of adding transparency to the election process. 

Ahmed Rifatbegovic, Political Officer at the OSCE Mission to BiH, said: “Accuracy of the Central Voter Registry is important for strengthening public trust in the integrity of the election process. We hope that this event contributed to enhancing co-ordination between responsible actors for accuracy as well as its regular updating to improve the election process.”

The President of the BiH Central Election Commission, Irena Hadžiabdić, highlighted the significance of this workshop and said: “Events like this contribute to improvements and more effective data updating in voter registries.”

The workshop is a part of a three-year project, funded by the European Commission and the Austrian Development Agency, and implemented by ODIHR. The project supports the Western Balkans countries in their efforts to follow up on election observation recommendations in areas related to election management, voter registration and media coverage during election campaigns.

TIRANA, 29 May 2018 – OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger today concluded a two-day visit to Tirana during which he met with Albania’s highest level officials, emphasizing the importance of broad political commitment to the country’s essential reforms and offering OSCE’s continued partnership. 

“The fight against corruption remains of paramount importance for the country, and the OSCE Presence in Albania is ready to help establish a solid track record of proactive investigations, prosecutions and convictions,” said Greminger. The OSCE Presence continues to support the government in shaping and implementing the National Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020.

“Albania has made considerable progress on the reform agenda,” said Greminger. “Electoral reform has made a positive start thanks to cross-party political will, but this must be sustained. The recommendations of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights should be addressed before the next elections.” 

In his meetings with the country’s senior officials, Greminger welcomed Albania’s constructive role in sustaining good neighbourly relations and supporting regional co-operation. “Albania is a full partner in OSCE’s work against the common security challenges facing our community, including organized crime and extremism,” he said.

Greminger met with Albania’s President Ilir Meta, Assembly Speaker Gramoz Ruçi, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Ditmir Bushati and Interior Minister Fatmir Xhafaj. He also met the leader of the Democratic Party, Lulzim Basha, representatives of international community and civil society.

During the visit, the Secretary General signed a co-operation agreement between the Albanian Parliament, the OSCE and the Swiss Government on a new project, ‘Support to the Albanian Parliament and Civic Education’. The project aims to increase public awareness and to empower Albanian citizens to participate in their country’s decision-making processes.

During his visit, the Secretary General also met with the staff of the OSCE Presence in Albania. 

OSCE Head of Presence Bernd Borchardt said: “The OSCE Presence in Albania will remain a strong supporter and partner of Albania’s institutions and citizens as they tackle their highest priority challenges.”

On behalf of the 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship, the Italian Ambassador to Albania, Alberto Cutillo, accompanied the Secretary General during his visit.

The OSCE Presence in Albania was established in 1997.

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In its final report on the 25 March 2018 parliamentary elections in Turkmenistan, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) said that the elections lacked important features of a genuinely democratic electoral process.

The report, published on 30 May 2018, notes that the political environment is only nominally pluralist and the exercise of fundamental freedoms was severely curtailed. Despite measures to demonstrate transparency, the integrity of the elections was not ensured, leaving the veracity of results in doubt. To this end, ODIHR recommends that the authorities ensure the integrity of the electoral process by preventing proxy voting, multiple voting, ballot box stuffing and inflation of voter turnout figures.

The report underlines that the lack of media pluralism and independence in the country deprives voters of access to the variety of views necessary to make informed choices. To overcome this issue, the report recommends creating an environment that enables the establishment of independent media, encourages the exercise of free speech and ensures access to information.

By law, all candidates have equal rights to participate in campaign meetings and to deliver their message via mass media. In practice, the report says, any campaigning other than that organized by the authorities was effectively prohibited during the campaigning period. The report recommends that candidates be allowed to freely pursue their own methods of campaigning.

The administration of elections generally lacked transparency, in spite of efforts made by the Central Election Commission. The report encourages the election administration to comply with the principles of transparency, professionalism and impartiality. It also calls on the authorities to ensure that election commissions are independent from the government.

With respect to voter registration, the report calls for the accuracy of the voter lists to be improved, possibly through the introduction of a permanent, centralized voter register. It also recommends putting in place safeguards against multiple registration of voters.

The report highlights the lack of follow-up to previous ODIHR election-related assessments and recommends that electoral reform address key issues from previous reports. They concern the formation of election commissions, the compilation of voter lists, the system for complaints and appeals, and campaign and campaign finance regulations. Other recommendations to be considered include the elaboration of detailed procedures on counting and tabulation of results, the facilitation of women’s participation in elections and on campaign financing.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 25 and 26 May compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 26 and 27 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Zhovanka. The Mission observed fresh damage as a result of shelling in Toretsk and Bohdanivka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. It recorded ceasefire violations in the Petrivske disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three areas, as well as in Pikuzy, Sosnivske, at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and near Leonove, near the border with the Russian Federation. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station and of demining activity in order to keep the station operational; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. The SMM also continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and high-voltage power lines near Almazna, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Veselohorivka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] between the evenings of 25 and 26 May, including fewer explosions (about 170), compared with the previous reporting period (about 660 explosions). Between the evenings of 26 and 27 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, as compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 25-26 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 55 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-7km west, north-west, and north-north-west and eight explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of artillery fire and two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapon(s) 2-4km south-east.

On the evening and night of 25-26 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 80 undetermined explosions and 80 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-6km south-east and south-west. The following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions and about ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east and south-west.

On the evening and night of 25-26 May, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 15 projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west, two muzzle flashes, three projectiles from south-east to north-west and an undetermined explosion followed by totals of two undetermined explosions, 73 projectiles (16 from north-west to south-east and 57 from south-east to north-west), ten illumination flares, and eight muzzle flashes, all 2-4km east-north-east.

Continuing on the evening and night of 26-27 May, the same camera recorded, in sequence, one illumination flare, four projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, one projectile from south-east to north-west, and two undetermined explosions, followed by totals of nine undetermined explosions, 213 projectiles (115 from north-west to south-east, 59 from south-east to north-west, and 39 from west to east), four illumination flares, and three bursts, all 0.2km-2km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 25-26 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station[2] (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west, three projectiles from north-west to south-east, nine projectiles from south-east to north-west, three muzzle flashes, and 13 projectiles from south-east to north-west, all 0.15km-5km west.

On 26 May, positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 28 undetermined explosions, all 2-4km south-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 10), compared with the previous reporting period (60 explosions). Between the evenings of 26 and 27 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, as compared with the previous 24 hours. 

On the evening of 26 May, while in Kadiivka (non-government-controlled, formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 10-12km north-north-west.

On 27 May, positioned in Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and five bursts of small-arms fire, all 5-6km north-east.

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of a civilian casualty in Zhovanka. On 26 May, in the intensive care unit in a hospital in Bakhmut, the SMM spoke with a woman (60 years old) who said she had a piece of shrapnel removed from her abdomen. She said that around 19:30 on 21 May, she was leaving her house located at 32/2 Zhuravskoho Street in the government-controlled neighbourhood of Zhovanka in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) when she heard an explosion and saw blood on her abdomen. She said she was later taken by military ambulance to the hospital in Bakhmut. On 25 May, while at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, a woman (in her fifties) told the SMM that she was a resident of Zhovanka and knew the injured woman and that shelling had taken place near 32/2 Zhuravskoho Street around 19:30 on 21 May. (See SMM Daily Report 24 May 2018.)

The SMM observed fresh damage as a result of shelling. On 26 May in Toretsk (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM followed up on reports of damage to two hospitals.

At the Tuberculosis Hospital at 25 Haidara Street the SMM saw broken windows on the eastern side of the building on all three floors. Six patients (men, aged 40-50) told the SMM that they had been present when the shelling took place around 04:45 on the morning of 25 May.

Approximately 200m west of the Tuberculosis Hospital, the SMM observed broken windows, about 20 overall, on all three floors on the southern side of the building, damage to the southern side of the roof, and dents and holes in the outer southern wall of the Psychological Hospital. The SMM observed an impact, 2m wide, about 4m south of the building, near the entrance. The SMM observed that Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had been staying in part of the hospital building, including before the shelling.

On 26 May, imagery from an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) revealed an impact on the eastern end of the roof of the Psychological Hospital, which the SMM assessed was caused by a 122mm artillery round. Damage to the southern-facing wall of the building and windows was also visible, along with debris on the ground. Imagery also revealed an impact 100m east of the hospital, which was assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a south-easterly direction.

At 14 Rimskoho-Korsakova Street, the SMM saw a hole in the external upper eastern wall of an apartment building (about 650cm in diameter), on the third floor between two windows. At apartment no. 22 on the third floor, the SMM saw a hole about 30cm in diameter in the ceiling and a hole about 20cm in diameter in the floor. Three residents of the building (women, aged late thirties to sixties) told the SMM that the damage was caused by shelling around midnight on 25-26 May.

On 25 May, in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed three impact sites. At the first impact site on 1 Lenina Street, the SMM saw at least 25 fresh holes from 4cm to 20cm wide on the south-facing concrete, garden wall, on the east-facing wall of a barn and a shattered window, all assessed to be caused by shrapnel. The SMM saw a crater about 10m south-east of the barn’s southern wall and assessed it as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a north-easterly direction. A female resident (eighties) who showed signs of shock said that the shelling had happened on 24 May around 21:30 and that she had been at home at the time.

At 52 Lenina Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater about 2m east of a house. The SMM saw 15 holes, up to 7cm in diameter in the north- and south-facing sides of an ambulance parked about 4m east of the house. The driver’s side window had been destroyed. The SMM assessed the damage to be caused by an artillery round (122mm) fired from a north-easterly direction.

At 56 Lenina Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater located about 15m south of a house. The SMM assessed that the crater was caused by an artillery round (either 122mm or 152mm) fired from a north-easterly direction.

On 26 May, at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer showed the SMM a hole on one of the modules used for checking the passports of civilians crossing the contact line. The SMM could see both an entrance and an exit hole and assessed that it was caused by a round of small arms fired from a southerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 25-26 May, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded four undetermined explosions and 18 muzzle flashes, all 2-4km south-east (all unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).[3]

On the night of 25-26 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, ten projectiles in flight from west to east, one projectile in vertical flight, one undetermined explosion, two projectiles in vertical flight, and six undetermined explosions, all 3-8km at directions ranging from east to south (unable to assess four explosions as inside or outside the disengagement area, the rest assessed as outside).

During the day on 27 May, positioned in about 300m north of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 5-6km north-west. From another location within Zolote-4/Rodina, the SMM heard 14 shots of small-arms fire 1-2km north. Positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds and five shots of small-arms fire, all 4-5km south-south-east. All ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 16 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded five undetermined explosions 500-800m north-north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 17 May, the same camera recorded four undetermined explosions 1.5-3km west-north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 24 May, the same camera recorded 24 projectiles in flight from south to north 1-2km west and north-north-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area). On 25 May, the same camera recorded one undetermined explosion 500-800m west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and four projectiles from south-west to north-east and one airburst, 1-3km west and south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 25 May, while driving south from Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) toward Petrivske, the SMM observed a fresh crater 8m east of the road. Twenty metres south, the SMM observed another fresh crater 1m east of the road, which was about 2m wide and 1m in depth. The SMM could not make further assessments due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 25 May an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two probable self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) under camouflage netting north of Zoria (40km north of Donetsk) and again spotted one towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) under camouflage near Petrivka (43km north of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report 26 May 2018.) On 27 May, the SMM observed 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) on railway flatbed cars at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 25 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a tank (T-64) under camouflage netting in a residential area near Sosnivske (78km south of Donetsk) and seven tanks (T-72) and one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted four tanks (T-64) under camouflage near Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 21 April 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas on 27 May the SMM saw two tanks (T-72) being loaded onto flatbed trucks near Memryk (33km north-west of Donetsk), a tank (T-72) being transported on a flatbed truck north-west of Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk), and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Kostiantynivka.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) being transported on a flatbed truck near Heorhiivka (15km south of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At three such sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, on 26 May, the SMM saw two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and noted that two sites were abandoned and that 11 MLRS (BM-21) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area in Donetsk region on 26 May, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that 11 tanks (four T-64s and seven T-72s) were again missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region on 26 May, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[4] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 25 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk), one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) under camouflage netting near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-1 and two BMP-2) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1) under camouflage netting near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk),  an IFV (BMP-2) and probable command vehicle (BMP-1) near Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk), an APC (MT-LB variant) near Svitlodarsk, five IFVs (four BMP-1 and one BMP-2) and one anti-aircraft gun loaded on a truck under camouflage netting near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1) under camouflage netting near Troitske (69 km west of Luhansk), one IFV (BMP-1) under camouflage netting, and an APC about 5km south of Krymske. Also on 25 May, the SMM saw an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch), and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 26 May, the SMM saw four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM) near Halytsynivka (29km north-west of Donetsk) and one IFV (BMP-1) near Popasna.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 25 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Sosnivske and an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4A), and four IFVs (one BMP-1 missing its main gun, three undetermined variants under camouflage) in a training area near Sofiivka.

On both 26 and 27 May, the SMM continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as demining on roads leading to the station. On both 26 and 27 May, the SMM facilitated demining of the eastern side of road H20 up to the gate of the DFS by sappers from the Ukraine State Emergency Services and the demining of the intersection of roads M04 and H20 up to the gate of the DFS by sappers from the armed formations. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

On 26 and 27 May, the SMM continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). From both sides of the contact line, the SMM also monitored and facilitated demining activities near the Maiorsk entry-exit checkpoint and a checkpoint in Horlivka to support construction by an international organization of facilities for civilians crossing the contact line.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. On 27 May, while at a border crossing area near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw six cars (three with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.  

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 25 May, two armed men in military-style clothing prevented the SMM from accessing a location to assess a possible camera installation in Pikuzy (non-government-controlled, formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk).
• On 26 May, an armed man in military-style clothing prevented the SMM from entering Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 78km south of Donetsk).
• On 26 May, two armed men in military-style clothing in a border area near Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk) prevented the SMM from proceeding and said that “restrictions” were still in place “prohibiting” the SMM from monitoring the border area. They also said that demining was ongoing in the area.
• On 27 May, two armed men in military-style clothing prevented the SMM from entering a heavy weapons holding area, citing the need for “special approval” from their “superior”.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 26 and 27 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• On 26 and 27 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• On 26 and 27 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• On 26 May, from Bohdanivka, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Petrivske disengagement area because of the possible presence of mines and UXO.

Conditional access:

• On 26 May, at a checkpoint of the armed formations north of Horlivka, two armed men in military-style clothing allowed the SMM to go through the checkpoint only after checking the trunks of its vehicles.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka and Maiorsk were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Addendum: Further review of imagery revealed that on 21 May 2018 at 20:55 and 20:56, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station recorded three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) fire 20-50m west-south-west, rather than explosions assessed as impacts 20-50m west-south-west as reported in the SMM Daily Report 23 May 2018. At 20:55, it also recorded an explosion assessed as the impact of one of the outgoing rounds, about 250-500m west-north-west.

[3] Addendum: On 24 May, the SMM did not register a freedom of movement restriction in non-government-controlled areas of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area as originally reported in the SMM Daily Report 25 May 2018.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 28 May 2018 – Greater co-ordination among states in their work to combat trafficking in children, with a focus on those at particular risk, is needed to effectively combat this form of human trafficking, participants said today at the opening of a two-day OSCE meeting in Vienna.

The meeting, organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, with the support of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and in co-ordination with the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, brings together representatives of governments and of civil society organizations to address the prevention of child trafficking and the related protection of minors, including specific measures for unaccompanied minors.

“Combatting the trafficking of children remains a priority for the OSCE, but further efforts are required to eradicate this unacceptable human rights violation and heinous crime. Strong attention must be dedicated to children at risk and particularly to unaccompanied minors, especially exposed among the vulnerable,” said Ambassador Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council and Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE. “The discussions at this meeting will provide a solid foundation on which participating States can build to strengthen the OSCE commitments in addressing the special protection needs of unaccompanied minors and secure their right to be children.”

Madina Jarbussynova, OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, said: “The 2017 Alliance conference on ‘Trafficking in Children and Best Interests of the Child’ highlighted the need to better co-ordinate governmental efforts to protect children and confirmed that effective and functional child protection systems can significantly reduce the risks of trafficking and create favorable conditions for identifying and assisting child victims. I remain convinced that adopting a multi-disciplinary and inclusive approach to combating child trafficking, including in crisis-inflicted scenarios that directly or indirectly affect children’s security and welfare, is the only way for us to succeed in combating the scourge of child trafficking.”

Noting that more than two-thirds of child trafficking victims in the OSCE region are girls, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of ODIHR, stressed that combatting trafficking in children had to include efforts to directly target demand.

“The power of the recent and galvanizing #MeToo movement, and the impact it is having in ending impunity for sexual harassment and sexual violence against women and girls, is particularly important to integrate into combating the trafficking in girls,” the ODIHR Director said. “We would not be here today if there was no demand generated for children by paedophile ‘buyers’ or demand for cheap goods produced by trafficked children, who are often invisible in supply chains. Efforts to prevent child trafficking should prioritize impactful strategies to address demand.”

In a keynote video address, United States Member of Congress Christopher Smith, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative on Human Trafficking Issues, told participants that better sharing of information would make such efforts more effective.

“It is the duty of government to protect the weakest and most vulnerable, especially children who are at risk or who are victims of trafficking,” Smith said.  “Child predators thrive on secrecy – a secrecy that allows them to commit heinous crimes against the weakest and most vulnerable.  We can prevent child trafficking by keeping track of known child predators, and by notifying destination countries when they are traveling abroad.”

The Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting is aimed at providing guidance on how to design and implement sustainable mechanisms to ensure a victim-centred and child-friendly human rights-based approach in countering human trafficking, including through multi-agency approaches and partnerships. The event will also provide a forum for identifying and discussing promising practices and challenges in this respect in the OSCE region.

“May 2018 is a good opportunity to take stock of what has been achieved for children and what has not – and to note the urgent need to tackle obstacles that prevent essential action being taken to protect children from exploitation,” Mike Dottridge, independent human rights expert, said in his keynote address at the event.

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OSLO, 28 May 2018 – OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Lamberto Zannier, Representative of the Italian 2018 OSCE Ch­airmanship and Ambassador of Italy to Norway Alberto Colella, UN Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues Fernand de Varennes, Chair of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Vesna Crnić-Grotić, former HCNM and former Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek and other experts will address the conference Language Policy and Conflict Prevention in Oslo on Thursday, 31 May.

The event marks the 20th anniversary of the HCNM’s Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities. While reviewing best practices for a balanced language policy in OSCE participating States, the more than 100-participant event will also turn towards contemporary challenges, such as the accommodation of diversity in times of resurgent nationalism and divisive rhetoric.

At the event HCNM staff will launch the book Language Policy and Conflict Prevention published by Brill Publishers, which reviews the work of the HCNM in this field and includes a foreword by Zannier.

A livestream video of the event will be available from 9:30 to 10:15 and from 11:15 to 12:15 (CEST) at www.osce.org/live. Follow the discussion on Twitter using the hashtag #OsloRecommendations.

The event will be open to the media from 9:00 to 13:00. Journalists are invited to the Gamle Festsal, Domus Academica, Karl Johans gate 47, 0162 Oslo. 

Media representatives should register by Wednesday, 30 May, 18:00, by sending their name, contact details and the name of the media they represent to Anastasia Rybachenko, Communications Assistant at HCNM, anastasia.rybachenko@osce.org.

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ROME/CHISINAU, 28 May 2018 – A meeting of the Transdniestrian settlement talks in the 5+2 format will take place in Rome on 29 and 30 May 2018. The talks will be hosted by Franco Frattini, the Special Representative of the Italian Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process.

The meeting, officially known as the “Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transdniestrian Settlement in the 5+2 format”, will bring together representatives of the Sides, mediators and observers in the negotiations – Moldova, Transdniestria, the OSCE, the Russian Federation, Ukraine as well as the European Union and the United States.

The 5+2 meeting will review the status of the implementation of the six agreements signed by the Sides in November 2017 and April 2018, establish timelines for the implementation of the remaining priorities from the “package of eight” identified by the Sides, and outline new priorities to further advance the settlement process. 

The Transdniestrian settlement talks in the 5+2 format will be held at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Rome. The opening session of the 5+2 talks on Tuesday, 29 May 2018, at 9:30 a.m. (Rome time) and a press conference on the outcomes of the 5+2 talks on Wednesday, 30 May 2018, at 11 a.m. (Rome time) are open to media representatives.

Media representatives wishing to attend the opening session and the press conference at the premises of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Rome, must confirm their attendance by sending an e-mail with their name and the name of their media organization to accreditamentostampa@esteri.it.

The press conference will be broadcast live at the OSCE Mission to Moldova premises in Chisinau via a video link with Rome. Journalists are invited to the OSCE Mission to Moldova to watch the live broadcast and ask questions. The press conference will be held in English with simultaneous translation into Romanian and Russian.

Media representatives wishing to participate in the live press conference at the premises of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in Chisinau must confirm their attendance by sending an e-mail with their name and the name of their media organization to MtMpress@osce.org by 5 p.m., Tuesday, 29 May 2018.

Registered media representatives are kindly requested to arrive at the OSCE Mission to Moldova premises in Chisinau at least 30 minutes before the press conference and present a valid press card and/or ID.

For more information, please contact the Press Office of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, at +373 22 223 495 or e-mail: MtMpress@osce.org.

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Prishtinë/Priština, 28 May 2018 – The OSCE Mission and the UNFPA Office will launch tomorrow a report with results of the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES) conducted for the first time in Kosovo.

The goal of the survey was to gain a comprehensive understanding on men’s attitudes and practices on a variety of topics related to gender and the ways men can help address gender inequality. The results also include women’s opinions and reports of men’s attitudes.

The report contains information and statistics on a number of key issues pertaining to gender equality such as: gender norms and attitudes toward gender equality; childhood experiences; relationship dynamics and domestic duties. The survey also gathered information on violence and criminal practices, health practices and gender equality policies and laws.                                            

Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo Ambassador Jan Braathu, UNFPA Programme Specialist Visare Mujko-Nimani and Executive Director of the Agency for Gender Equality Edi Gusia, will deliver opening remarks, followed by a presentation of the report, discussion and a Q&A session.

Media are cordially invited to attend the event at the Swiss Diamond Hotel on Tuesday, 29 May 2018, starting at 10:00.

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An OSCE-supported five-day training seminar on countering cybercrime for representatives of Kazakhstan’s governmental institutions and law-enforcement agencies concluded on 25 May 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Eighteen officials from the Interior Ministry, the Prosecutor General’s Office and its Law Enforcement Agencies Academy, the Ministry of Justice’s Forensic Centre, Kazakhstan’s Agency for Civil Service Affairs and Anti-corruption, and the State Revenues Committee of the Ministry of Finance took part in the Computer and Network Intrusion Course, which was led by experts from the United States.

The course provided the participants with the skills to guide their colleagues in responding to most network intrusion investigations. Participants learnt about tools and techniques to collect and analyse Random Access Memory, live data, Microsoft Windows registries, log files and event logs as well as network packet information in investigating computers of both victims and suspects involved in cybercrimes. 

The participants, who completed an OSCE-supported Train-the-Trainers course on the Basic Investigation of Computers and Electronic Crimes Programme last year, will teach this course to their peers in the future.  

The event was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the Office of the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office of the United States Embassy in Astana and the Central Asian Regional Information Coordination Centre for Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and their Precursors (CARICC).

The training seminar is part of the OSCE Programme Office’s activities to combat transnational threats, money laundering, financing of terrorism and preventing the abuse of the Internet for criminal purposes.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports about an explosion in a bus in Debaltseve in which a boy died and three other teenagers were injured. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. It recorded explosions of mortar rounds inside the Zolote disengagement area as well as ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station to facilitate repair works and demining activity in order to keep the station operational; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. The SMM also continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and high-voltage power lines near Almazna, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Veselohorivka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including more explosions (about 660), compared with the previous reporting period (about 295 explosions).

On the evening of 24 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions, seven explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-7km south-west, west and north-west. While at the same location, on the morning of 25 May, the SMM heard about 85 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 2-8km north-east and north-west, as well as about 100 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds and about 110 undetermined explosions, all 5-9km at directions ranging from north to north-west. During the day on 25 May, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Horlivka for about three and a half hours, the SMM heard about 35 undetermined explosions, 2-8km north-east, south-east, north-west and north.

On the evening of 24 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and 80 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-6km south-east and south-west. The following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions and about ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east and south-west.

In the early hours of 25 May, while in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled), the SMM heard 55 undetermined explosions 5-8km south.

During the day on 25 May, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM heard 27 undetermined explosions 10-12km north.

Positioned on the south-western edge of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions, 5-12km south-east and north-west.

Positioned in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM heard 11 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds and six undetermined explosions, 2-8km north, north-east and east.

Positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 25 undetermined explosions and uncountable shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-6km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north. Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 15 undetermined explosions and four bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-7km at directions ranging from north-east to south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions).

On 25 May, positioned in Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 3-4km north-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Debaltseve: a boy who died and two boys and a girl who were wounded in an explosion that occurred in a bus on the afternoon of 22 May. At a house on Menzhynskoho Street, where the deceased boy (14 years old) had lived, the SMM saw a coffin with the boy’s body. On Kurchatova Street, the SMM spoke with the grandmother (in her fifties) of one of the injured boys. She told the SMM that her grandson (15 years old) had a serious wound in his elbow and additional wounds in his thigh and had been admitted to a hospital in Yenakiieve (non-government-controlled, 41km north-east of Donetsk). She added that her grandson had told her that someone on the bus was handling an object when the explosion occurred. On Piatydesiaty rokiv Zhovtnia Avenue, the SMM spoke to a man (in his sixties) who was in the bus. He told the SMM he had been sitting next to the bus driver while the boys and the girl had been sitting at the back. He said that the bus had been on its route along Kurchatova Street to the “Druhyi maidanchyk” quarter in the north-eastern part of Debaltseve when he had heard an explosion at the back and seen a lot of smoke, after which the driver had opened the door and had told everyone to get out. On Babushkina Street, the SMM spoke to the grandmother of the second injured boy. She told the SMM that her grandson was in a hospital in Yenakiieve and that his condition was stable.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 24-25 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight from east to west, seven projectiles from north-west to south-east and two bursts, all 3-8km east, south and south-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 25 May, positioned 1.5km west of Zolote-4 (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard and saw 20 explosions assessed as mortar rounds, and heard four explosions assessed as mortar rounds, three undetermined explosions and four bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-2km south-south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On the same day, in Katerynivka (government-controlled 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 5-6km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area), an undetermined explosions 1-2km south (assessed as inside the disengagement area), two explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 1-2km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and four shots of small-arms fire 1-2km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 21 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded about 85 tracer rounds in flight from north to south, 0.5-1km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).[2] On 25 May, positioned in Petrivske, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 8-10km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and about 20 shots of small-arms fire, 2-3km west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 24 May, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted again an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2), as well as recently built positions and trenches inside the Petrivske disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report of 21 May 2018).

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 23 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Petrivka (43km north of Donetsk). On 24 May, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 23 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in Panteleimonivka (26km north-east of Donetsk) and, on 24 May, a towed howitzer (probable D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) on the eastern outskirts of Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk). On 25 May, the SMM saw two tanks (possible T-72) near Novosvitlivka (16km south-east of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014, on 24 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three tanks (T-64) near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw four self-propelled howitzers (2A36) near Azovske (121km south of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area in Donetsk region, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that 16 tanks (six T-64s and ten T-72s) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 24 May, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Romanivka. On 25 May, the SMM saw three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk), an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), two IFVs (BTR-4) and one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Rozivka (32km north of Donetsk), and an APC (BTR-70) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk). On 23 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six infantry IFVs on the southern edge of Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk), an APC (BTR-80) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk), two APCs (BTR-70) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk) and three APCs (two BTR-70 and an MTLB-S) in a residential area of Verkhnotoretske, as well as an APC (BTR-70) in a residential area of Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk). On 24 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) and seven armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) (six of which were in a residential area) near Vodiane (15km north-west of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 24 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five IFVs (three BMP-2 and two BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-80) in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 86km south of Donetsk) as well as an excavator (EOV-4421) and a trench digger (PZM-2) near Vedenske (90km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the presence of mines. On 23 May, a mid-range UAV spotted again 15 anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 2km south-east of the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS). It also facilitated repair works to the DFS and demining around the station. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees. It saw that the demining team of the Ukrainian Armed Forces collected an 82mm mortar shell and that the demining team from non-government-controlled areas collected a 12.7mm bullet. When positioned at the junction of road H20 and the road leading to the main entrance to the DFS, the SMM saw two men in military-style clothing crossing road H20 from east to west outside the DFS territory and behind the DFS’s northern edge. The SMM lost sight of the men after they crossed the road.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw a truck with a trailer and a car exit Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km west of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV near Kozatske (non-government controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as due to jamming. The SMM was able to recall the UAV and land it safely.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 25 May 2018).

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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TIRANA, 26 May 2018 - OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger will visit visit Albania on 28 and 29 May 2018.

Greminger will meet with Albania’s President Ilir Meta, Assembly Speaker Gramoz Ruçi, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Ditmir Bushati and Minister of Interior Fatmir Xhafaj. He will also meet the Democratic Party Leader Lulzim Basha. 

During his visit, the Secretary General will sign a co-operation agreement between the Albanian Parliament, the OSCE and the Swiss Government on a new project “Support to Albanian Parliament and Civic Education”. The project aims to increase awareness and to empower Albanian citizens to participate in their country’s decision-making processes. 

The signing ceremony will take place on 29 May, at 10:20, at the Albanian Assembly’s Administration buildng. A press opportunity with Secretary General Greminger and Assembly Speaker Ruçi will be held immediately afterwards.

During his visit, the Secretary General will also meet with the staff of the OSCE Presence in Albania.

For additional information, media representatives can contact Joana Karapataqi, National Public Affairs Officer at the OSCE Presence in Albania, at joana.karapataqi@osce.org, or at +355 69 40 110, or the OSCE Media Relations e-mail address at press@osce.org. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Zaitseve. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Petrivske disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including near Izvaryne and Sievernyi at the border with the Russian Federation and in Luhansk city. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station to facilitate repair works and keep it operational; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. The SMM also continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema, high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and facilitated access for Vodafone employees to their office in Donetsk city. In Ternopil region, the SMM followed up on reports of an attack against members of the Roma community. In Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson, the SMM monitored public gatherings. In Kherson, the SMM attended a hearing related to a detained cargo ship.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including fewer explosions (about 295 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (about 640 explosions).

On the evening of 23 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an outgoing explosion which projected a round in flight from north-west to south-east, two projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, two undetermined explosions, a projectile from north-east to south-west, two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds, and a projectile in flight from south-east to north-west, followed by totals of one explosion assessed as an impact of 14.55mm ammunition 30-80m west and 20 projectiles (one from west to east, one from south-east to north-west, two from north to south, four from south to north, and 12 in vertical flight), all 300m-5km south-west, west-south-west and west.

On 24 May, positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions 2-6km south-east.

The same day, positioned 1.1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and 14 shots of small-arms fired 2-5km south-south-west, west-south-west and west.

Positioned in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and shots of small-arms fire 1-5km north-west and seven undetermined explosions 1-3km south-west.

On the evening and night of 23-24 May, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, 22 projectiles in flight from north to south, an undetermined explosion, 19 projectiles from south to north, an undetermined explosion, and 17 projectiles from south to north, all 3-7km east.

On the evening and night of 23-24 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions, about 90 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons, 27 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons, and about 140 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-west.

On the evening and night of 23-24 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 90 undetermined explosions and about 110 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-6km south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (240 explosions).

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Zaitseve.[2] On 23 May, a woman told the SMM that her husband (63 years old) had died on 22 April as a result of shrapnel wounds, which he sustained during shelling on Rybalko Street in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk).  On 23 April, a staff member at the Horlivka morgue told the SMM that a man’s body had still been in the morgue.

On 23 May, a woman told the SMM by telephone that her husband (76 years old) had been wounded by shrapnel on 20 May when their house was hit by a round that had exploded in the non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve  She said that he was currently receiving in-patient treatment at Horlivka hospital no. 2. On 20 May, hospital staff at Horlivka hospital no. 2 told the SMM that the man had been admitted the same day. The SMM was unable to speak to the man in person. It was also unable to visit the injured man’s house in Zaitseve due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the morning of 22 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded, in sequence, an airburst 1-1.5km west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and an undetermined explosion 1.5-2km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 24 May, positioned in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 2.5km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 23 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, 12 bursts in flight from south-west to north-east 5-10km south and two undetermined explosions 12-14km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 23 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable mortar (likely 82mm) east of Zaitseve.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 22 May, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 16 tanks (eight T-72 and eight T-64), including five tanks in firing positions, south-east of Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report 23 May 2018 for more information about associated ceasefire violations.) On 23 May an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35, Strela-10) 100-300m north-east of residential areas in Holmivskyi (49km north-east of Donetsk). On 24 May, the SMM saw a tank (T-72) being transported south of Vesela Tarasivka (17km west of Luhansk), moving west on road M-04.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw 11 tanks (T-64) on 23 May and four tanks (type undetermined) on 24 May near Mykolaivka (77km west of Luhansk). On 24 May, the SMM saw one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk), a self-propelled howitzer (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) being transported near Malynivka (82km north of Donetsk), and one tank (T-64) being transported about 3km south-east of Pryvilne (31km north of Mariupol).

In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw 18 tanks (11 T-72 and seven T-64) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, an SMM mid-range UAV on 24 May spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80A) south of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-2) in government-controlled areas between Zaitseve and Horlivka. The SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk), and three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, an SMM mid-range UAV on 22 May spotted four IFVs (probable BMP-1) near Novoselivka. On 23 May, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) in Horlivka. On 24 May, an SMM mini-UAV May spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed a convoy of cargo trucks from the Russian Federation. In Luhansk city, the SMM saw five white cargo trucks in a compound known to us as used by the armed formations at 2a Rudnieva Street and that they were being unloaded by men in blue work uniforms without visible insignia, but could not see the cargo. One of the trucks was labelled “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation,” the other trucks were not labelled. The SMM saw three armed men in military-type clothing standing around the perimeter of the compound. At the entrance of the compound, an armed man in military-type clothing told the SMM that it could not enter* and that none of the people traveling with the convoy could speak to the SMM without permission from the armed formations in Luhansk. Later the same day, the SMM observed a convoy of 11 white covered cargo trucks exiting Ukraine at the border crossing point in Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk).* (See OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk Spot Report 24 May 2018.)

The SMM observed demining activities. The SMM saw a team of five men with clothing marked with the insignia of an international demining organization on road P-22 north of Shyrokyi (government-controlled, 38km north-east of Luhansk) and they told the SMM that they had been demining in the area. Near Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a team of five men wearing clothing marked as “emergency services” working with metal detectors in a field on the northern edge of the settlement.

The SMM continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) to facilitate repair works. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees. In Avdiivka, the SMM observed that water supply had been restored. Four female residents of Avdiivka (sixties) told the SMM that city authorities had informed residents that water supply and water pressure would be fully restored within 24 hours (see SMM Daily Report 24 May 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). The SMM also facilitated the access of Vodafone employees to their office in Donetsk city from government-controlled areas and facilitated their return to government-controlled areas later the same day.

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control.* Upon arrival at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), a man in military-type clothing told the SMM to leave the area.* At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a man in military-type clothing told the SMM on two separate occasions to move its vehicles further away from the border crossing point (first from 200m away and later to 500m).* While present, the SMM observed 11 white covered cargo trucks (all with Russian Federation licence plates), seven of which were labelled “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” (in Russian), accompanied by two cars labelled “police” with “LPR” plates, two cars marked as Ministry of Emergency Services of the Russian Federation (with Russian Federation licence plates), an ambulance (with Russian Federation licence plates) and one passenger van (plates not visible) (see above).

The SMM followed up on reports of an attack against members of the Roma community on 22 May at a camp on the western edge of Velyki Hai (94km north-east of Ivano-Frankivsk) where the SMM saw an abandoned area that had been recently burned and was covered in ash. At another nearby Roma camp, two women (thirties) and five children (five-ten years old) told the SMM that they had been at the first camp on the evening of 21 May when a group of about 20 masked people arrived and physically assaulted a woman and a man from the Roma community. They said that one of them then fired serval rounds into the ground next to another woman from the Roma community as well as several small children and another poured gasoline over the tents and set them on fire, destroying all belongings. Police told the SMM that at 21:00 on 21 May, they had received a phone call detailing the above information and that when they arrived at the camp, they had held 12 people for questioning (five of whom were under the age of 18) and all identified as members of groups such as Right Sector and Tryzub (Trident). Police told the SMM that they saw three tents on fire and recovered several gun cartridge cases from the area. Police informed the SMM that an investigation for “hooliganism” was ongoing under Article 296(4) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

In Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson, the SMM monitored gatherings in support of a Ukrainian filmmaker’s hunger strike, who participants said had been detained in the Russian Federation since 2014. In Kyiv, the SMM saw about 100 people (men and women, aged 20-60) outside the Embassy of the Russian Federation at 27 Povitroflotskyi Avenue and 12 National Guard officers securing the area as well as two police cars nearby. In Kharkiv, the SMM observed 40 people (mixed gender, 25-60 years old) on the sidewalk across from the Consulate General of the Russian Federation; two people were holding Ukrainian national flags. The SMM saw 11 police officers securing the Consulate General of the Russian Federation. In Kherson, the SMM saw at least 150 young people (men and women, aged 16-22) holding Ukrainian national flags. All of the gatherings ended without incidents.

In Kherson, the SMM attended a court hearing regarding a detained cargo vessel, which had reportedly been detained on 21 February 2018, on three charges including violation of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine entry/exit order under Article 332 (Part 1, 2), financing of the actions aimed at forceful change or overthrow of constitutional order or taking over the state power, or change of the state borders of Ukraine under Article 1102, and high treason under Article 111.1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. No charges had been brought against the crew members or the Ukrainian chartering company. After hearing arguments from both the prosecutor and defence, the judge lifted the detention order, and released the ship as well as its navigational equipment and log.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a compound in Luhansk city, an armed man in military-type clothing told the SMM that it could not enter the compound where white cargo trucks were being unloaded, one of which was marked as “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation”.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne a man in military-style clothing told the SMM to leave the area on two separate occasions, requiring that the SMM move first 200m and then 500m away from the area.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. he SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] The SMM will follow-up on reports of damage to a hospital as a result of shelling in Toretsk (government-controlled, formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk).

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 25 May 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today reiterated that foreign media outlets and representatives should not be included on sanctions lists, following a recent decision by the Ukrainian authorities with regard to the information agencies RIA Novosti Ukraine and Rossiya Segodnya.

“Freedom of expression and freedom of the media are fundamental commitments of the OSCE participating States. Any limitations imposed on these rights should be limited in scope, proportional, and provide for adequate safeguards against abuse,” Désir said. “Foreign media, as such, should not be included on sanctions lists.”

On 14 May, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko signed a decree re-enforcing sanctions against a number of organizations and individuals that pose a threat to national interest and security, including several media outlets, media managers and journalists. The decree also expanded a list of targeted media organizations by including RIA Novosti Ukraine and Rossiya Segodnya. The sanctions provide for the blocking of assets, limiting or terminating provision of telecommunications services and the use of telecommunication networks, and the blocking of websites.

“I call on the authorities to respect and fulfil the OSCE commitments aimed at improving the conditions under which journalists from one participating State practice their profession in other participating States,” Désir said.  

The Representative has intervened on this issue in a number of occasions in the past, see https://www.osce.org/fom/122579 and https://www.osce.org/fom/182661. 

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com.

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A two-day training course on preventing violent extremism among youth was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe in close co-operation with UNESCO on 24 and 25 May 2018 on the premises of the OSCE Programme Office.

The train-the-trainer course brought together 17 teachers from the Khujand, Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab, Garm, Nurobod, Tursunzoda, Shahrinav and Rudaki districts of Tajikistan. The course aimed to strengthen the role of education in building community resilience against violent extremism and terrorist radicalization, as well as empowering local teachers in taking preventive measures against violent extremism.  

“It is very important to obtain new skills in preventing violent extremism among youth,” said Zukhro Murodova, one of the trainees from Bokhtar town in the Kurgan-Tyube district. She highlighted that training activities, which focus on the role of education, are in high demand among local communities.

Ibrohim Jabborov, a high-school teacher from Khujand, said: “Today’s course is extremely important given the local realities.” He added that the training sessions were very useful for them, since the participants were equipped with the necessary knowledge to address these sensitive issues.

Johan Dahl, Acting Head of the OSCE Programme Office’s Politico-Military Department emphasized the importance of education and a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to tackling the phenomenon of violent extremism. “It is a gradual and very complex process that needs to be addressed in a very meticulous way, otherwise we risk fixing a problem by creating another problem.”

Upon the completion of the train-the-trainer course, the Office plans to engage the trained educators in a series of training events across the Khatlon and Sughd regions, as well as in Rasht and in other districts. The training aims to reach up to 360 local teachers and educators.

This capacity-building activity is part of the OSCE Programme Office’s project on assisting the Government of Tajikistan in implementing their National Strategy and Action Plan on Preventing Violent Extremism and Terrorism by 2020.

VIENNA, 25 May 2018 – Representatives of the 57 OSCE participating States, civil society and international organizations will meet in Vienna on Monday for the two-day meeting Child Trafficking – From Prevention to Protection.

This meeting, organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, with the support of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and in co-ordination with the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, will seek to address the prevention of child trafficking and the related protection of minors, including specific measures for unaccompanied minors.

This Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting will also serve as a forum to identify and discuss promising practices, as well as challenges, in designing and implementing sustainable mechanisms to ensure a victim-centred and child-friendly human rights-based approach to countering human trafficking, including through multi-agency approaches and partnerships.

Christopher Smith, Member of the United States Congress and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative on Human Trafficking Issues, and Mike Dottridge, independent human rights expert, will deliver the keynote addresses at the event.

Journalists are invited to attend the opening of the conference from 15:00 to 16:00 on 28 May in the Neuer Saal of the Hofburg Conference Centre. To register, please send an e-mail confirming your attendance to thomas.rymer@odihr.pl by 11:00, 28 May.

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A team of election experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) met with electoral stakeholders in Malta from 22 to 25 May 2018 to present the final report of ODIHR’s election assessment mission for the June 2017 early parliamentary elections.

The report’s findings and recommendations were presented to representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Promotion, the Electoral Commission, the parliament’s Standing Committee on the Consideration of Bills, the Broadcasting Authority, parliamentary political parties, as well as civil society and media.                                                                  

The recommendations focused on further improving election-related laws and regulations by clarifying existing ambiguities, reviewing limitations on suffrage rights and introducing explicit provisions allowing for citizen and international election observation. Recommendations from ODIHR’s previous election assessment not yet fully addressed were also discussed, including those related to the promotion of women’s participation in politics and fostering greater transparency in campaign finance.

“We appreciate the opportunity to engage in meaningful follow-up in Malta to discuss ODIHR’s recommendations,” said Ambassador Jorge Fuentes, who led the ODIHR election assessment mission. “We regard this visit as a signal of the importance attached by the authorities to enhancing the country’s well-developed electoral process. The Maltese authorities can rely on ODIHR’s support and expertise as they move forward in following up on electoral recommendations.”

Recent legal changes have lowered the voting age to 16 years and decriminalized defamation and libel. Authorities indicated that a number of additional amendments to the election legislation are being finalized in the parliament, including introducing provisions for electronic counting.

ODIHR experts emphasized the importance of addressing recommendations made in the final report and broader reform initiatives in an inclusive and open manner, well ahead of the next elections. During the meetings, the authorities expressed interest in receiving ODIHR support through expert advice and comparative examples of good practice related to topical electoral issues and, in the longer term, in considering requests for legal reviews of draft legislation.

The follow-up visit, the first of its kind in Malta, followed an official invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Promotion.

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to following up on ODIHR's election assessments and recommendations.