Central Europe

VIENNA, 20 June 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today called on Moldova to ensure legal certainty and to uphold its commitments on media freedom, following a  legal review his Office shared with the Chairperson of Moldova’s parliament on the country’s draft Code of Audio-visual Media Services.

The analysis aims to help Moldova meet its OSCE commitments on freedom of the media and media pluralism. The legal review was commissioned by the OSCE and conducted by Dr. Joan Barata Mir, an independent media freedom expert.

“It is recommended that the aim of the law be broadened, specifically by establishing a complete and comprehensive regulation applicable to the provision of audio-visual media services in Moldova,” stated Désir in a letter to Andrian Candu, Chairperson of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on 11 June 2018.

“It is further recommended that the Code provide greater legal certainty vis-à-vis the services that are actually included or excluded, and that the definitions of the Code be improved in order for them to be fully in line with international standards,” noted the Representative.

The legal review also highlights the issue of so-called hate and extremist speech, noting that the Code needs to fully incorporate the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, allowing limitations only regarding expressions that incite or justify violence, discrimination, xenophobia or any other form of intolerance.

“My Office stands ready to assist Moldova by providing further advice and expert policy recommendations to improve freedom of the media in the country. I welcome and encourage the close working relationship between Moldova and the OSCE media experts, and hope that the proposed recommendations will be thoroughly considered by the authorities,” Désir concluded.

The full text of the review can be accessed here: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/385206.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Communication and Media Relations Section

The second in a series of OSCE workshops on the development of guidelines and a training module for better co-ordinated, harmonized and victim-centred identification of human trafficking cases among mixed migration flows concluded in Athens on 20 June 2018. The one-day event was organized jointly by the OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR/CTHB) and the Office of the National Rapporteur on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece.

The workshop gathered national practitioners whose professional duties require daily interaction with people on the move in the context of the current migration and refugee crisis. They included representatives of law enforcement bodies, migration agencies, public social services and civil society.   

The participants discussed how recommendations from a recent OSCE report “From Reception to Recognition: Identifying and Protecting Human Trafficking Victims in Mixed Migration Flows - A Focus on First Identification and Reception Facilities for Refugees and Migrants in the OSCE Region” can be translated into practice. The discussion also focused on contextualizing the findings of a similar workshop held in Skopje in March this year. A particular emphasis was placed on the available referral scenarios for victims of human trafficking identified among new arrivals and the pre-requisites for these scenarios to be fully operational and effective.

“The current migrant reception frameworks in the OSCE region require a stronger focus on the identification of victims of trafficking in human beings from every single stakeholder involved,” said the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Madina Jarbussynova. “I believe that the uniform guidelines that my Office is developing together with the national governmental and non-governmental partners will be highly instrumental in ensuring that such focus is unreservedly maintained throughout all the migrant reception procedures.”

“Greece acquired a solid, hands-on experience on addressing a variety of issues related to the management of mixed migration flows in reception and identification centres (hotspots).  Victim identification amid large numbers of vulnerable population groups, at risk of being trafficked, remains a challenge and referrals of potential victims are limited and not commensurate with the perceived magnitude of the problem,” said Heracles Moskoff, National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings in the Foreign Ministry of Greece. “Yet, well-co-ordinated and harmonized procedures of reception, specialized training on human trafficking issues addressing all front-line professionals, and a genuine will for synergy among all actors working in the hotspots will positively contribute to identifying more victims during the reception and asylum procedures,” he added.

The first draft of the guidelines will be presented for fine-tuning and finalization at a concluding workshop in Italy later this year.

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A two-day high-level international conference on the International Decade for Action, “Water for Sustainable Development, 2018-2028” started in Dushanbe on 20 June 2018. The Conference is organized by the government of the Republic of Tajikistan in co-operation with the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Water and in partnership with the OSCE and other international organizations.

The OSCE has been a long-term partner to Tajikistan’s government in promoting   sustainable management of water resources with the aim of enhancing security, prosperity and the protection of the environment.

Ambassador Vuk Žugić, Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, noted that water connects countries sharing water resources and jointly managing water can lead to improved relations among countries, and enhance security, prosperity and the protection of the environment. “Water can also be a source of co-operation. And this requires the OSCE investing its efforts in promoting effective water diplomacy,” Žugić said.  

On the second day of the conference the OSCE together with the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe will be leading discussions relating to the Action Panel on Transboundary Co-operation and Water Diplomacy.

The conference is expected to bring together representatives of United Nations agencies, international and regional organizations, international financial institutions, business community, non-governmental organizations, civil society, as well as scientists and experts.

WARSAW, 20 June 2018 – While the countries in the OSCE region have committed themselves to protecting the human rights of all refugees, they also have the responsibility to ensure the security and dignified treatment of all individuals wanting to cross borders, especially the most vulnerable and those at the greatest risk, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), said on today’s World Refugee Day.

“In recent weeks alone we have all seen too many disturbing reports underscoring the desperate situations in which many refugees, asylum seekers and migrants find themselves. These are people out at sea and denied entry to port, or men and women, boys and girls fleeing various forms of violence in their countries of origin, or even children in such situations being forcibly and traumatically separated from their parents,” the ODIHR Director said. “No legal aim – genuine or otherwise – can justify the danger and harm created for refugees in these situations.”

She noted that all OSCE participating States have made the commitment to “promote the dignified treatment of all individuals” in line with national and international laws and, “in particular human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law, and relevant OSCE commitments.”

“I am particularly concerned that decisions on the treatment of refugees – and migrants in general – in some states are being made based on populist pressures, rather than the relevant international and domestic laws and commitments,” Gísladóttir said. “Political leaders must act responsibly to ensure the human rights and safety of all individuals on their territory, regardless of the circumstances of entry.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission observed fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas of Pikuzy and Novotoshkivske. Small arms were fired in the direction of an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Petrivske, assessed as targeting the UAV. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and the Petrivske disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, and was also restricted near Izvaryne and Sievernyi at the border with the Russian Federation as well as near Holmivskyi and Zachativka. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Oleksandropil and Khlibodarivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs of the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska, the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and the Zolote-Popasna water pipeline.In Odessa, the Mission monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1],including about 105 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 120 explosions). 

On the evening and night of 17-18 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions, an illumination flare in vertical flight, seven muzzle flashes and 15 projectiles (six from south-east to north-west, four from north-west to south-east, four from west to east and a projectile from east to west), all 0.5-5km south.

On 18 June, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions and 35 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-3km east and south-east. 

On the evening and night of 17-18 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 70 undetermined explosions and about 240 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-east and south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including ten explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion). 

On 18 June, while flying an SMM mid-range UAV north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard six to eight shots of small-arms fire 1km south of its position, which it assessed were directed at the UAV.* The SMM landed the UAV safely and left the area.

The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk).

On 17 June, on Akhmatovoi Street in Pikuzy, the SMM saw two holes in the corrugated asbestos boards covering the north-facing side of a shop’s roof and multiple small holes in the metal plates covering the roof’s peak. The SMM saw fragments of the metal plates on the stairs in front of the shop. It assessed that the damage had been caused by 73mm rounds, however, it could not assess the direction of fire. The SMM also saw a hole in the corrugated metal boards on the south-facing side of the shop’s roof as well as fragments of those metal boards on the ground below. It could not assess the weapon used or the direction of fire. A local resident (woman, in her fifties) told the SMM that shelling had occurred on the evening of 16 June.

At 17 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw that parts of the corrugated asbestos boards covering the west-facing side of the roof of a residential one-storey building had been blown away. About 6m west of the building it saw a tree with one larger branch and several smaller branches broken. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by a 73mm round coming from a westerly direction. 

At 19 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a crater on a paved driveway leading to a one-storey residential building, 16m north of the building and 1m north of a passenger car parked in front of the entrance gate. It saw that the car’s boot and boot lid were twisted and pierced with multiple holes. Inside the crater, the SMM saw pieces of shrapnel which it assessed as parts of an 82mm mortar shell. It assessed that the fire had come from a westerly direction. 

At 21 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a hole in the north-facing gable of a one-storey residential building as well as broken and damaged branches of a tree 6m north-east of the building. The SMM was unable to assess the weapon used or the direction of fire. 

On 17 June, at 2 Oleha Vatazhka Street in Novotoshkivske, the SMM saw three craters: the first one in a paved road, 20m east of the south-eastern corner of afour-storey apartment building; the second one in grass 9m east of the building’s south-eastern corner; and the third one in grass 18m west of the building’s south-western corner. The SMM saw multiple shrapnel marks on the south-east corner of the building and six broken windows on the ground floor and the first floor. It also saw shrapnel marks and broken windows on the east side of a second building situated 26m west of the first one. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by 120mm mortar rounds coming from a south-easterly direction.Three residents of the first building (women, in their sixties) told the SMM that shelling had occurred at around 21:30 on 14 June.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* 

On the evening of 16 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an explosion assessed as an impact of a round of an undetermined weapon, followed by 15 bursts of anti-aircraft-gun (ZU-23, 23mm) fire, all 5-10km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening and night of 17-18 June, the same camera recorded, in sequence, four projectiles in flight from west to east, nine projectiles in vertical flight and eight projectiles in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by totals of one undetermined explosion and 74 projectiles (42 in vertical flight, 31 from west to east and one from south to north), all 5-10km east, east-south-east and south (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 18 June, positioned 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and about 30 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 1-2km south and south-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed a calm situation. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. 

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 16 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk). On 18 June, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 16 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 15 tanks (type undetermined) near Oleksandropil. On 18 June, the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (one 2S3 and five 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at a railway station in Khlibodarivka and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) west of Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw four tanks (T-64) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles [2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 17 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) north-east of Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP variant) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (type undetermined) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk). On 18 June, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Stepove (30km north-east of Luhansk) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BRDM-2) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 17 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB variant) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk) and an APC (type undetermined) south-east of Styla (34km south of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for ceasefire violations). 

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs of the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska. It also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and the Zolote-Popasna water pipeline near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 28 cars (13 with Ukrainian, 11 with Russian Federation, one with Georgian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and two with “LPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and 21 pedestrians (mixed gender and ages) waiting to exit Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*  

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 18 cars (12 with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates) waiting to exit Ukraine. After about a minute, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 16 June, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation at 14 Haharinske Plateau in Odessa. The SMM saw 20 people (men and women of different age groups), including some known to the SMM as members of the Auto-Maidan group. Speeches were held in support of releasing Ukrainians detained in the Russian Federation and boycotting the FIFA World Cup. Some of those gathered poured red liquid on four footballs and threw them over a wall onto the consulate premises. The SMM saw about 30 law enforcement officers present. It observed the gathering dispersing without further incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access: 

• On 17 June, in Zachativka (government-controlled, 74km south-west of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the SMM to leave the area. 
• On 18 June, near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to move at least 500m away from its position.  
• On 18 June, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 18 June, at a border crossing point near Sievernyi, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO: 

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. At a checkpoint south of the bridge, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 17 June, at a checkpoint on road H15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM it could not park its vehicles inside the checkpoint area.
• On 18 June, whileconducting a mini-UAV flight near Petrivske, the SMM heard six to eight shots of small-arms fire 1km south of its position, which it assessed as directed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV safely.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka and Pyshchevyk were not operational during the reporting period.

[2]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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385101 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Promoting dialogue to reflect on opportunities and challenges related to democratic representation in the age of rising populism was the focus of a conference co-organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Brussels from 18 to 20 June 2018.

The conference, entitled “Representation in the Age of Populism? – Ideas for Global Action”, was hosted by the Belgian Senate. It brought together leaders from both traditional and recently established political parties and social movements from across the spectrum, representatives of civil society, democracy assistance organizations, academia and the media from across the world.

The discussion centred around pressing questions about the state of liberal democracy, political party systems and legislatures, and their ability to adequately represent people in democratic societies, at times when appeals for new forms of political action and agendas are growing.

The discussion will shape the Global Agenda for the Renewal of Representation, a guide aimed at reinvigorating the linkages between people and the diverse forms of representation that exist. The Global Agenda, to be prepared with input from ODIHR, will seek to inspire social and political leaders from all regions of the globe and the communities supporting their work.

“The growing dissatisfaction and the emergence of populist narratives is a result of a series of shortcomings in our democracies that have not been properly addressed over the past decades,” said ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir. “We need to listen carefully and understand what triggers the distress, but we also need to be clear: human rights are fundamental rights, society free of intolerance is our birthright, and there can be no sustainable security without democratic values.”

Sir John Holmes, Chair of the Electoral Commission of the United Kingdom, highlighted that the conference takes place at a time when voters are increasingly holding their elected representatives to account and demanding transparency in how elections and referendums are conducted.

“We are relatively fortunate in the United Kingdom, as the law provides a high degree of regulation for all those undertaking political activity – whether long-established parties or new parties and campaigners that some might describe as populist,” he said. “However, the challenges are increasing. Much of our electoral law dates back to the 19th century and we, like other countries across the world, need to deal effectively with the rise in digital campaigning. Our overriding concern in all this is to make sure voters have transparency when it comes to who is targeting them for their votes.”

The event was held in partnership with International IDEA, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy and the research centre REPRESENT.

MINSK, 19 June 2018 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today launched the two-year, European Union-funded project “Promoting Democratization and Human Rights in Belarus”, with two days of seminars in Minsk focusing on fair-trial rights.

The project will assist Belarus in meeting its OSCE commitments in the areas of the rule of law, human rights and the equal participation of women in democratic processes. The seminars today and tomorrow were co-organized by ODIHR with the Institute for Re-training and Continuing Education of Judges and Personnel of Prosecutor’s Offices, Courts and Justice Institutions (IRCE) at Belarus State University, as the first element of the rule of law component of the project.

“The training and assistance this project will provide to judges, prosecutors and lawyers; to educational officials; and to women parliamentarians, young women and gender equality advocates, is aimed at making a real difference,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ODIHR Director.

Jim Couzens, Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the EU to Belarus, said: "These seminars for judges about the right to a fair trial are an important part of the EU's co-operation with Belarus."

The project’s rule of law activities will include the training of some 200 legal professionals, as well as thematic seminars and exchange visits on rule of law and other justice issues.

“Educational seminars help participants gain a greater legal awareness in line with universally recognized international standards, which contributes to the strengthening of the rule of law and justice in the country,” said Ludmila Zaitseva, Head of the Prosecution Activity Department at IRCE.

Activities related to the other components of the project will include the provision of expert assistance in setting priorities for human rights education, a training-of-trainers session to give the Ministry of Education a pool of trainers on human rights education, and a workshop to build the capacity of local education policy specialists.

The project will also organize training workshops to strengthen the leadership abilities of young women and gender equality advocates, support the establishment of a network of women parliamentarians in Belarus, and help organize international forums for women leaders in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

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COPENHAGEN, 19 June 2018 – Ignacio Sanchez Amor (MP, Spain), Chair of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s human rights committee, today criticized the U.S. government’s violation of human rights and humanitarian standards in its treatment of migrants – and especially migrant children – attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border.

“It should go without saying that attempts to enforce border security should not result in children being torn away from their parents, being confined to overcrowded cages, sleeping on the floor – terrified – with no mother or father to comfort them. The trauma being inflicted on these children, some of whom are reportedly as young as two years old, is difficult to comprehend,” Sanchez Amor said.

Sanchez Amor, who also serves as the OSCE PA’s Special Representative on Border Issues, noted that the U.S. Border Patrol is separating families because the current U.S. government has decided to implement a “zero tolerance” policy that seeks to charge every adult who illegally crosses the border with a crime. However, Sanchez Amor noted, this policy potentially contravenes a number of important international norms: the right of all people to seek asylum, the right to due process, the right to family unity, and the requirement under international humanitarian law to prioritize the best interests of the child.

“The United States has legal obligations to consider asylum applications and provide protection to those who qualify as refugees. The 1951 Refugee Convention recognizes that the seeking of asylum might sometimes require refugees to breach immigration rules, which the U.S. government as a party to this treaty should respect,” Sanchez Amor stated.

“In any case, children should not be punished for the actions of their parents and should never be traumatized in order to set an example to other potential asylum seekers or to send a political message. I call on the United States to immediately end the practice of forcibly separating children from their parents, to make every effort to reunite families that have been separated, and to adhere to all of its obligations under international humanitarian law,” he added.

Earlier this month, Chair of the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Migration Nahima Lanjri raised concerns that young migrant children were being separated from parents trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border, as well as reports that nearly 1,500 migrant children are unaccounted for in the U.S. due to lax monitoring by the federal government.

The topic of migration and unaccompanied migrant children will feature high on the agenda of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s upcoming Annual Session in Berlin.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly decreased at both BCPs.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                       

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly decreased from 11,682 to 11,647 per day for both BCPs compared to last week. The average net flow for both BCPs went from minus 382 (i.e., more exits from the Russian Federation) to plus 272 (i.e., more entries into the Russian Federation).

The Donetsk BCP continues to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for 36.7 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region[1].

Persons in military-style outfits                                                                                                                                      

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions was 38 at both BCPs compared to 31 last week; 20 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, 18 into Ukraine. All these crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continue to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, seven families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and another eleven were observed crossing to Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when eight families were observed crossing the border into Russian Federation and eleven into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continue to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed 450 buses crossing the border at both BCPs (compared to 382 observed during the previous week), 223 of them were bound for the Russian Federation and 227 for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Luhansk-Kyiv; Pervomaisk-Kyiv and Stakhanov-Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed an increase in the number of trucks crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 800 to 835 (305 at the Gukovo BCP and 530 at the Donetsk BCP); 519 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 316 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                    

Among them, the OTs continued also to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks significantly increased from 47 to 95 (compared to the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks have hazard signs, indicating that they are transporting propane or a mix of propane with butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks. At the Donetsk BCP the OTs observed 88 X-ray checks: out of the total number of trucks scanned during the reporting period, 58 trucks (66 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 30 trucks (34 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation.

As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 163 to 150; 78 crossed into the Russian Federation and 72 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 38 occasions, compared to 47 last week; the OTs assessed that 18 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 20 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions.

On 16 June at 12:35, an ambulance car with Russian Federation licence plates entered the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation and returned at 12:44. The OT team observed two drivers inside the vehicle.  

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 15 May to 19 June 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Rostov-on-Don Regional Administration.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

                        

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Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

The OSCE Mission to Moldova organized a workshop in Tiraspol on 15 June 2018 for 35 legal professionals from both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River on international standards regulating the right to the freedom of movement.

During the workshop, the participants reviewed in detail existing international standards, practices and protection mechanisms related to the right to the freedom of movement. They worked jointly in small groups on case studies and deliberated upon better strategies to promote human rights for all. The new, extended format of the workshop also included thematic presentations by legal professionals with an aim to facilitate the exchange of information among lawyers from both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River.

“Today’s event has been effective and relevant. I learned about the international norms that regulate the right to the freedom of movement and its application in the local context. Joint discussions and solutions regarding cases of human rights violations were very insightful,” said Alexei Balan, a lawyer from Tiraspol. 

These workshops build upon Human Rights Club meetings, which have been organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova since 2013 to serve as a communication platform and a confidence building measure between legal and civil society professionals on both banks of the Dniestr/Nistru River. In 2018, these meetings evolved into professional workshops with a greater focus on international law. At least two more workshops are planned for 2018.

COPENHAGEN, 18 June 2018 – Welcoming the signing on Sunday of an agreement between Athens and Skopje over a long-running name dispute between the two OSCE countries, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) today congratulated the governments for taking a major step forward in resolving the disagreement. He thanked the mediators for their work, congratulated Prime Ministers Alexis Tsipras and Zoran Zaev for their leadership, and expressed hope for next steps to be taken to speedily put this agreement in practice.

“The deal reached between Athens and Skopje demonstrates that even seemingly intractable disputes can be resolved through compromise. In the steps that will characterize the aftermath of this historic agreement, I call on all stakeholders to appreciate its significance and to keep in close sight the strategic and best interests of both countries, as well as the region of the Western Balkans and all of Europe,” said President Tsereteli.

He added: “A special word of gratitude is owed to all the mediators who have facilitated this process since 1994. The recent breakthrough goes to show that although diplomacy is sometimes slow-moving, through steady engagement, we can see positive results.”

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384957 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The importance of full participation of women in public and political life, and of co-operation between women’s parliamentary bodies and civil society, particularly organizations promoting women’s rights, was highlighted during the 10th National Congress of Women, which took place in Lodz, Poland, on 16 and 17 June 2018.

The Congress, organized with support from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), gathered more than 3,500 participants.

Speaking about ways for women in politics to break through the glass ceiling, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, the ODIHR Director, emphasized the need to transform democratic institutions from a gender perspective.

“Political parties and parliaments are failing to meet the interest of half of the population if they do not take into account the views and needs of women,” Gísladóttir said. “To address this gap, we need to support women’s networks and their efforts to have a seat at the table together with men.”

“It is paradoxical that we are still calling for a halt to the marginalization of women 100 years after our grandmothers gained voting rights,” said Dorota Warakomska, President of the Association of the Congress of Women. “Our strength is in the unity and diversity of women in the Congress beyond party lines, positions, levels of income or the place they live. We will be active in the forthcoming elections to ensure that women in Poland enjoy full rights and opportunities.”

The discussions also drew attention to issues of women’s health, parenthood and violence against women.

ODIHR hosted a number of panel discussions during the Congress, featuring academics, politicians and civil society activists from Poland, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The topics discussed included challenges to women’s participation in politics, the importance of networking and the fight for women’s electoral rights from the historical perspective. A panel on women in uniform highlighted challenges facing women who work in a male-dominated environment, such as the security sector. ODIHR also hosted a workshop on approaches to creating successful and sustainable civil society coalitions to address discrimination and strengthen tolerance.

Support to the Congress of Women in Poland is part of ODIHR’s efforts to promote the implementation of the 2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality and other related OSCE commitments.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 15 and 16 June compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 16 and 17 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on civilian casualties in Pivdenne and Druzhkivka. It observed fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas of Pikuzy and Zolote. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Pankivka. The Mission continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. In Kyiv, it monitored the “March of Equality” organized by activists of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 145 explosions, between the evenings of 15 and 16 June, compared with the previous reporting period (about 185 explosions). Between the evenings of 16 and 17 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 15-16 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from west to east, two projectiles from north-west to south-east, an undetermined explosion, four projectiles from north-west to south-east, seven projectiles from west to east, a projectile from east to west, an undetermined explosion, three projectiles from west to east, three undetermined explosions, five projectiles from east to west, two projectiles from west to east, a projectile from east to west, five projectiles from west to east and a projectile from east to west, all 1-3km south.

On the evening and night of 15-16 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from south to north, an undetermined explosion, 14 projectiles from south to north and four undetermined explosions, followed by, in aggregate, 15 undetermined explosions, an explosion assessed as an impact, 66 projectiles (37 from north to south and 29 from south to north), nine undetermined bursts, and an illumination flare in flight from south-east to north-west, all 4-6km east.

The following evening and night, the same camera recorded, in sequence, four projectiles in flight from south to north, a projectile from south-east to north-west and an illumination flare in vertical flight followed by, in aggregate, about 60 undetermined explosions, about 50 projectiles (including 24 from north to south and 26 from south to north) and two undetermined bursts, all 4-6km east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations between the evenings of 15 and 16 June, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). Between the evenings of 16 and 17 June, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM followed up on reports of two civilian casualties. On 17 June, at a hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government‑controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) a woman (in her forties) with a large blood-stained bandage on her chest told the SMM that on 16 June she had been at home on Poltavska Street in the Chyhari area of Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk) when she heard shelling and saw that a fire had broken out near her home. She said that she had attempted to extinguish the flames when an explosion occurred nearby and she saw that her chest was covered in blood. She said she immediately went to a nearby checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, from where she was taken to the hospital. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that more than 20 pieces of shrapnel had been removed from the woman’s body on 16 June.

At a hospital in Druzhkivka (government-controlled, 72km north of Donetsk), a man (in his thirties) whose left arm was bandaged up to his elbow told the SMM that on 15 June in a field near Raiske (government-controlled, 69km north of Donetsk) he had found what he assessed to be a heavy-machine-gun bullet (12.7mm) missing its casing, which exploded in his hand when he picked it up. Medical staff at the hospital showed the SMM what they said were pictures of the man’s injuries, revealing tissue damage to his fingers and forearm.

On 15 June, the SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). At 98 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw that most of the corrugated asbestos roof of an inhabited house had been blown off and saw multiple 3-15cm holes in the blown-off roof panel. The SMM assessed the roof damage to have been caused by a blast wave and the holes to have been caused by shrapnel. In the floor of the house’s attic, the SMM also saw a fresh 2m-by-2m hole and scratches assessed as caused by shrapnel. In the house’s kitchen, the SMM found fresh pieces of shrapnel. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a westerly direction. The home’s owner told the SMM that there had been shelling in the village around 07:00 on 15 June and that she and her son had taken refuge in their shelter as soon as the shelling had begun.

At 100 Akhmatovoi Street (about 40m east of the abovementioned impact site), the SMM observed rubble, bricks and wooden planks lying in a fresh heap, which it assessed as having been caused by an artillery or large-calibre-mortar round striking the structure that had previously stood there. A resident of Akhmatovoi Street told the SMM that there had been an uninhabited house there, which was destroyed on the morning of 15 June.

At 96 Akhmatovoi Street (about 30m west of the house at 98 Akhmatovoi Street), the SMM saw a single-storey house with an entry hall whose roof and door were torn off. The Mission saw a fresh hole in the house’s western wall and that all four of the house’s west-facing windows were shattered. About 4m west of the house, the SMM saw remnants of a recently destroyed barn. The SMM assessed that the roof and the door of the house had been blown off by a blast wave and the hole had been caused by shrapnel, all caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a westerly direction. According to a woman living on the same street, the house was uninhabited and was damaged on the morning of 15 June.  

In a field near 65 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM observed two fresh craters, assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a south-westerly direction. A resident on the same street told the SMM that the impacts had occurred at around 19:00 on 14 June.

On the exterior west-facing wall of an abandoned multi-storey building at 27/2 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM observed black scorch marks around a fresh crater. Nearby, at 27 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM observed a fresh 30mm-wide hole in the wooden ceiling of the building’s entryway and plaster damage, assessed as caused by shrapnel. The SMM assessed the damage to both buildings to have been caused by 73mm rounds fired from a westerly direction. In the tarmac in front of the building at 27 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a crater and pieces of shrapnel. The SMM assessed the crater to have been caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a westerly direction.

At 19 Vyrobnycha Street in Zolote-5 (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a large fresh hole (70cm in diameter) and seven smaller holes in the corrugated asbestos roof panels of a single-storey house. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) round fired from a northerly direction. The owners of the house told the SMM that they had been awakened by a strong explosion at around 04:10 on 16 June and subsequently left their house at which point they observed the damage to its roof.

At 24 Korchahina Street (about 300m north-west of 19 Vyrobnycha Street), the SMM observed the remnants of a house whose attic and chimney had been incinerated and a hole in the upper part of its north-facing wall. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by the impact of an undetermined weapon round fired from a northerly direction. A neighbour told the SMM that the house has been uninhabited for the last decade and that he had heard a large explosion at around 05:00 on 16 June and saw that the house was ablaze.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 14-15 June, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded 23 explosions 0.5-2km south-south-west and west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) and one explosion 200-500m north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 16 June, approximately 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM observed four men in military-type uniform, one carrying an anti-tank guided missile (9M133 Kornet, 152mm) which he dropped into tall grass after becoming aware of the SMM’s presence.

On the evening of 17 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, 12 projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east, 33 projectiles from south-east to north-west, and one projectile from north-north-west to south-south-east, all 6-10km south, as well as three projectiles 10-15km east and three projectiles in vertical flight 6-10km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 16 and 17 June, while in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area on 16 June, the SMM saw 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Pankivka (60km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas,[2] the SMM saw three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) on 15 June. On 16 June, the SMM saw three anti-tank guns (MT-12), three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk) as well as a tank (T‑64) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12) near Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw ten tanks (type undetermined) near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk), six tanks (type undetermined) near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM observed two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and noted as missing 12 MLRS (BM-21) (including four for the first time), 19 self-propelled howitzers (eight 2S1 (all for the first time) and 11 2S3) and six towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns[3] and new trenches in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) in Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol) on 15 June and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a pick-up truck near Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol) on 16 June. Also on 16 June, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four IFVs (BMP variants) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP variants) near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP variants) and 25m of trenches north-west of Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) that were not present in imagery recorded on 30 September 2017.

In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) in Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk) and nine IFVs (BMP variants) in Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk) on 15 June. On 16 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) in a compound on the south-eastern edge of Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-2) near Lohvynove (59km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 15 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted again 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) on road T0519 on the western edge of Pikuzy. (See SMM Daily Report 17 October 2017.)

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to and from the DFS, as well as demining activities around the station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire on 16 and 17 June. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for ceasefire violations). On 17 June, the SMM observed a bulldozer driven by a man in military-style clothing altering positions of the armed formations approximately 1.5km east-south-east of the DFS.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes on 16 June, the SMM saw three pedestrians exiting Ukraine and two pedestrians entering Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored the pre-announced “March of Equality” organized by activists of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) community as well as two protests in opposition to it (for observations of the same event in 2017, see SMM Daily Report 19 June 2017). At 57 Volodymyrska Street on the evening of 16 June, the Mission saw a protest of 40 people (mostly men in their twenties) gathered to, they said, “disrupt” the “March of Equality”. On 17 June, local police announced that at around 06:00 that day they had detained about 60 of the 150 protesters who had attempted to occupy a part of Volodymyrska Street. Police also said that those detained were associated with C14 (Sich’) and that five police officers had been injured during the operation. Between 08:00 and 10:00 on the same day, the SMM observed another protest of about 300 people (men and women, aged 20-70), near the intersection of Bohdana Khmelnytskoho and Volodmyrska Streets. The Mission heard them chanting messages critical of the march and saw some holding banners to the same effect. It noted that the protest ended without incident. At the same location at around 10:00, the SMM saw that about 3,500 people (mostly women, aged 20-30) were gathered for the “March of Equality” and started marching towards Lva Tolstoho Square. During the march, the Mission observed some of them holding banners with messages such as “Country of the Free People: Be Yourself” and heard them chanting slogans such as “All different - all equal!” The SMM saw about 5,000 police and National Guard officers, some of them wearing riot gear, who were conducting security checks of every person entering the cordoned-off march zone. The march ended without incident.

The SMM also monitored a gathering in Mariinskyi Park which had been announced by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The SMM observed some 400 people gathered for what the organizers described as a prayer service dedicated to family values. The church had previously publically appealed to the Kyiv City Administration to prevent the march from taking place. The event took place without incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 15 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 16 and 17 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[4]

• On 16 and 17 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.4

• On 16 and 17 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

  Other Impediments

• On 16 June, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km west of Donetsk), assessed as due to jamming. 

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]     Addendum: In reference to SMM Daily Report published on 13 June 2018, the relevant part should read “Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw three tanks (type undetermined) near Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk)”, not “three tanks (T-72)”.

[3]     This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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385029 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported international conference entitled Advocates 2018. Improving the Quality of Legal Services concluded on16 June in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The two-day event brought together over 100 legal experts and advocates from 15 countries, as well as representatives of the Justice Ministry and judiciary of Kazakhstan. The participants focused on various aspects related to the legal profession and the draft law On the Professional Activities of Advocates and Legal Assistance, which is currently being considered by the Parliament of Kazakhstan.

During panel discussions, participants from countries including Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan touched upon the issues of continuing legal education, guaranteed legal aid and the rules of ethics.  A particular focus was placed on the independence of advocates and disciplinary proceedings vis-à-vis advocates. Each panel discussion resulted in the elaboration of specific recommendations that will be distributed to all stakeholders.

The event was organized by the Republican Bar Association in co-operation with the European Association of Lawyers, International Bar Association, Council of Europe and the OSCE Programme Office in Astana. It is part of the Programme Office’s long-standing efforts to strengthen the rule of law and to support the development of the legal profession in the host country.

 

VIENNA, 18 May 2018 – The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) today announced the 18 finalists of the OSCE Scholarship Programme for young people from the Western Balkans to attend the European Innovation Academy (EIA), one of the world’s leading summer entrepreneurship programmes in Turin, Italy.

Out of 1035 applications and 166 motivational videos received, 11 females and 7 males successfully completed the competitive process: Aleksandar Momiroski (20), Brisilda Munguli (28), Damjan Postolovski (20), Dian Fishekqi (20), Diellza Hyseni (23), Diella Salihu (19), Isidora Perovic (21), Jelena Aleksic (19), Kerim Panjeta (19), Luka Topić (24), Ljubica Smolović (21), Marina Angelovska (23), Mario Hysneli (21), Milica Novaković (21), Natalija Nikolić (22), Oltjana Beci (24), Uroš Ranković (22) and Xhemal Kodragjini (20).

“We are glad to offer a quality learning opportunity to young people from the Western Balkans,” said Ambassador Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council, on behalf of the Italian 2018 OSCE Chairmanship. “The economic future of the region is in the hands of young generations. We have the duty to support their efforts and invest in their skills.”

From 8 to 27 July in Turin, the selected finalists will be immersed in a multicultural ecosystem with professionals and mentors from the world’s top institutions, including business leaders from America, Europe and Asia, to help talents emerge and make a difference in society. 

Anni Sinijarv, CEO of the European Innovation Academy, said that the selection process was a hard one. “The videos we received were full of motivation, good ideas, and hope for the future. We chose those whose motivation was the best fit for the EIA. We will do our best to empower the participants and leverage their potential to be ambassadors of positive change in their own societies.”

The OSCE Scholarship Programme is sponsored by the Italian 2018 OSCE Chairmanship in the framework of the project YDEAS (Young Developers and Entrepreneurs to Advance Start-ups in the Western Balkans) managed by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA). The scholarship’s benefits include attendance at the 21-day programme, 6 ECTS credits, travel and accommodation, follow-up mentorship and networking events.

Đuro Blanuša, Secretary General of the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), said that his office believes the youth of the Western Balkans should be active contributors to social and economic prosperity, democratic development and European integration in an increasingly open region. “We are honoured that we had a chance to contribute to the EIA scholarship programme and we wish the winners a great and productive learning time in Turin.”

This pilot initiative is an integral component of the engagement of the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) in the field of human capital development, in line with the priorities of the Italian 2018 OSCE Chairmanship.

Representatives from the OSCE, the EIA, the Regional Youth Cooperation Office, and the Italian 2018 OSCE Chairmanship met in Tirana today for a co-ordination meeting.  Two finalists, Xhemal Kodragjini and Brisilda Munguli, were also present. 

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VIENNA, 18 June 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today expressed concern following the adoption of legislative amendments in Belarus which further restrict media activities in the country. The amendments affect the work of national mass media, internet resources, and foreign media outlets.

“The adoption of these amendments sends a worrying signal about media freedom and pluralism – online and offline –in Belarus,” Désir said. “I call on the Belarusian authorities to carefully review the law and bring it in line with international standards and OSCE commitments on freedom of expression and freedom of the media.

Among other things, the latest amendment to the law “On the mass media”, adopted 14 June by the House of Representatives of the National Assembly, includes a general ban on foreigners, foreign legal entities, Belarusian entities with at least 20 percent stock belonging to foreign or international entities, and stateless persons establishing media outlets in the country (para 3 of Article 3).

Additionally, the amendments to the law provide the Ministry of Information with strict control over all online resources (Art. 51-1). “No Ministry should have the exclusive power to block access to any online resource without a court decision. Content removal should require judicial oversight,” Désir said.

The owners of online resources are now obliged to “analyse” all content as the law demands that they are responsible for preventing dissemination of untruthful information that may harm State or public interest, or defame individuals or legal entities. They are also liable if their resources are used to disseminate information or comments by internet users who have not gone through prior identification, as defined by the State (Art. 30-1).

“Many of the provisions are excessive and disproportionate and could result in the curtailing of freedom of expression, including the right of citizens to remain anonymous online,” Désir said.

The Representative also noted that the concerns expressed by national media NGOs, such as the Belarus Association of Journalists, had not been taken into account.

The law also continues to forbid citizens from contributing to foreign media without special accreditation, despite calls by the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media to discontinue this practice.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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384459 Kunduz Rysbek

Representatives of the Presidential Administration of Kyrgyzstan, the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda (CEC), the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Swiss Embassy to Kyrgyzstan participated in the opening ceremony of the Capacity Development Centre for the State Registration Services under the Government (SRS) in Bishkek on 14 June 2018.

The Centre will be a venue for conducting professional training sessions for SRS and CEC personnel during preparations for elections, as well as focused sessions for SRS specialists that provide public services, use of IT and digitalization processes in their work.

During the 2015–2017 electoral cycle, with the support of the OSCE Programme office in Bishkek and the UNDP, the SRS introduced new technologies, which required special training of the staff. More than 13,000 SRS/CEC experts were trained in use of the new ICT equipment as well as in the efficient organization of elections, the appropriate delivery of information and effective electoral disputes resolution mechanisms. This co-operative work led to the opening of the Capacity Development Centre.

“The need for having such a training centre is still urgent, as skills and knowledge should be updated regularly to remain in step with new technologies and innovations,” emphasized Daniyar Bakchiev, the State Secretary of the SRS.

 “Change is the driver of progress and today the SRS is demonstrating that change is already taking place in Kyrgyzstan’s public services. The OSCE is pleased to have this opportunity to support and encourage these changes,” said Mr. Chiveri, Deputy Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek. The Centre will continue to play a significant role in maintaining and upgrading the SRS’ knowledge for improving the provision of public services and heightening inter-organizational communication.

Vienna, 17 June 2018 – A group of 25 Permanent Representatives to the OSCE will be traveling to Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan from 18 to 22 June 2018. In all three countries, the ambassadors will meet with representatives of the national authorities and parliaments, as well as with civil society.

They will use the opportunity to see the reality on the ground at first hand and to convey messages to the national authorities and others whom they will meet during the trip. In particular, the visit aims to reconfirm the ambassadors’ support to stability, peace and prosperity in line with OSCE commitments and principles as well as their support to the OSCE’s past, current and potential future engagement in each of the three countries.

 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. Surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft gun rounds were fired in the direction of an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle flying over Betmanove. The Mission observed damage caused by shelling and small-arms fire in and near residential areas of Pikuzy, Dokuchaievsk, Holubivske and Holubivka, as well as near Bohdanivka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted near Sosnivske. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. It monitored and facilitated repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and to sewage and water pipelines leading to the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 185 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 250 explosions).

On the evening and night of 14-15 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, four undetermined explosions, 11 projectiles in flight from east to west and five undetermined explosions, followed by totals of 38 undetermined explosions, one illumination flare in vertical flight, three muzzle flashes, 55 projectiles (19 from east to west and 36 from west to east) and two bursts of undetermined weapons, all 1-3km south.

On the evening and night of 14-15 June, the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east, one projectile from east to west and one projectile from south-west to north-east, followed by totals of seven undetermined explosions, 12 projectiles (five from east to west, six from south-west to north-east and one from west to east) and a burst of an undetermined weapon, all 2-4km north-east.

On the evening of 14 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 81 explosions (76 assessed as undetermined, three as outgoing and two as impacts of undetermined weapon rounds) and about 750 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-6km south-east. On 15 June, while in the same location the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east.

On the evening and night of 14-15 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and eight bursts of small-arms fire, all 3-6km west and north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 170 explosions).

While in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 58 explosions (ten assessed as outgoing rounds of artillery and the remainder assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons), all 4-12km at directions ranging from west to north.

Surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft gun rounds were fired in direction of an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying over Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk). On 15 June, the UAV recorded the condensation trail of a missile following a ballistic trajectory at a significantly lower altitude than the UAV from the north-east. Immediately after, the UAV recorded a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) about 2km north-west of Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk), and about 4km north-east of the area where the UAV was flying, firing a second missile in the direction of the UAV which also followed a ballistic trajectory at a significantly lower altitude than the UAV. About three minutes later, the UAV recorded a probable anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) located near the surface-to-air missile system also firing several rounds in the direction of the UAV. The SMM assessed the fire as directed at the UAV (see SMM Spot Report 15 June 2018).*

The SMM observed damage caused by shelling and small-arms fire in and near residential areas. On 14 June, in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) near an abandoned school located at 14 Peremohy Street the SMM saw a fresh round-shaped crater 30m north-east of the north-facing wall of the school’s sports hall, assessed as caused by a 73mm recoilless gun (SPG-9) fired from a west-south-westerly direction. The SMM also observed two aluminum pieces (2.5cm by 2.5cm) lying on the ground next to the crater, assessed as stemming from a projectile.

At 27/2 Akhmatovoi Street in Pikuzy, the SMM observed two fresh holes on the west-facing wall of the abandoned building of the village council, assessed as caused by a 73mm recoilless gun projectile (SPG-9) fired from a west-south-westerly direction. The SMM also saw that around 20 corrugated roof panels on the south side of the roof above the holes had been destroyed or twisted, assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round.

On 15 June, in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), at 112a Lenina Street the SMM saw two bullet holes in a west-facing window of a flat on the fourth floor of a five-storey apartment building, assessed as caused by 7.62mm calibre ammunition from an undetermined weapon fired from a westerly direction. The owner of the flat (woman, 36 years old) told the SMM that she was at home with her six-year-old son around 17:00 on 14 June in another room when she heard a thumping noise and then saw the damage.

In Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), while accompanied by members of the armed formations and local media, the SMM observed damage caused by shelling in a residential area. At 6 Sevastopolska Street, the SMM saw a residential one-storey house with its roof entirely destroyed as well as asbestos and wooden beams’ debris lying on the ground, and a fresh hole in the west-facing wall, assessed as caused by an artillery round fired by an undetermined weapon from a westerly direction. The owner (woman, 60 years old) told the SMM that an explosion occurred around 20:20 on 14 June while she was on the street. She added that her husband, a 64-year old man with a disability, was inside the house at the time but did not sustain any injury.

On the same street, four workers who were repairing a torn electrical wire lying on the ground told the SMM the damage had been caused by shelling on the evening of 14 June.

                                                                                                             

About 50m south-east of the first impact site in Holubivka, at 25 Chapaieva Street on 14 June the SMM met a woman (18 years old) who told the SMM that her mother was at a hospital in Holubivka. Three members of the armed formations told the SMM that they had been informed that the woman was injured as a result of shelling in the garden of her house at 25 Chapaieva Street around 20:20 on 14 June. On 15 June, medical staff at a hospital in Holubivka told the SMM that a woman (41 years old) resident of 25 Chapaieva Street had been admitted to the hospital around 21:00 on 14 June with a shrapnel wound to her right hand and had been released on the same evening.

About 0.5-1km east of the first impact site, in Holubivka, at 5 Hirnychoriatuvalna Street in the yard of a one-storey house, the SMM observed a fresh crater assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon fired from a west-north-westerly direction. About 15m east of the crater, the SMM saw that the west-facing window of a summer kitchen was shattered and observed a hole in the body of a refrigerator inside the room as well as three holes in the east-facing wall and a broken window, assessed as caused by shrapnel. The SMM saw that two west-facing windows of the house (located 25m east of the crater and 9m east of the summer kitchen) were shattered. The SMM also observed multiple shrapnel marks to internal walls, doors and furniture. The owner (woman, 55 years old) told the SMM that she had heard an explosion at around 20:15 on 14 June while she was inside the house.

In Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), accompanied by members of the armed formations, at 55 Luhanska Street, the SMM observed a fresh hole on the north-facing side of an asbestos roof of a barn located 20m west of a house, assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon fired from a northerly direction. The owner (man, 35 years old) told the SMM that he was in his garage when he heard an explosion at around 20:25 on 14 June.

In a field 150m south-east of the nearest civilian house on Luhanska Street in Holubivske, the SMM observed a fresh oval-shaped crater assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon round fired from a northerly direction.

The SMM also saw two fresh craters in a field 20m south of the road leading from Novohnativka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk) to Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), and 50m south-west of the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint located at the western entrance to Bohdanivka.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 14-15 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, five undetermined explosions, two projectiles in flight from south to north and an explosion assessed as the impact of a mortar or artillery round, all 3-5km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the night of 14 June, the SMM camera near Prince Ihor monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion 3-5km west-north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On 15 June, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-6km west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) loaded on a truck heading east near Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk). In a non-government-controlled area, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Panteleimonivka (see above).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw 17 tanks (T-64) and 12 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk) and 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk). In a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw three tanks (T-72) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM noted that six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and five towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were present and four towed mortars (2B9) were present for the first time.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that a tank (T-64) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns[2] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 14 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) near Khriashchivka (22km east of Luhansk). On 14 June, the SMM saw two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (a BTR and an MT-LB) in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk). On 15 June, the SMM observed three IFVs (BMP-1) in a training area near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk) and an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Panteleimonivka (see above).

In government-controlled areas, on 15 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (type undetermined) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM also saw an APC (BTR-60) and an IFV (BMP-2) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-2) near Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol), an APC (BTR-variant) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and an APC (BTR-80) in Stanytsia Luhanska about 200m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area.

The SMM observed new unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Petrivske. Approximately 30m west of the SMM camera, in a parking area used regularly for OSCE SMM vehicles, the SMM observed for the first time a piece of UXO, assessed as the tailfin of an exploded recoilless gun (SPG-9) round.

The SMM noted that the previously observed anti-tank mines at the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in the north-eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) had been removed.

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to and from the DFS, as well as demining activities around the station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for ceasefire violations).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) as well as to sewage and water pipelines leading to the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw 20 cars (six with Ukrainian and nine with Russian Federation licence plates as well as five with “DPR” plates) and a cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw 13 cars (two with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates as well as eight with “DPR” plates), a cargo truck (with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) as well as two pedestrians (a woman, 30-40 years old, and a girl, five years old) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 15 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Near Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from entering the village.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. At a checkpoint south of the bridge, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a long-range UAV flight near Betmanove, the SMM recorded the condensation trail of a missile as well as a second missile from a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) and several rounds from a probable anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) assessed as fired in the direction of the UAV. The UAV was retrieved without any damage.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

At 05:06 on 15 June, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was flying over Betmanove (non-government-controlled, formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, 23km north-east of Donetsk) recorded a condensation trail of a missile following a ballistic trajectory at a significantly lower altitude than the UAV from the north-east.

Immediately after, the UAV recorded a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) (in violation of withdrawal lines) about 2km north-west of Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk), and about 4km north-east of the area where the UAV was flying, firing a second missile in the direction of the UAV which also followed a ballistic trajectory at a significantly lower altitude than the UAV. About three minutes later, the UAV recorded a probable anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) located near the surface-to-air missile system also firing several rounds in the direction of the UAV. The SMM assessed the fire as directed at the UAV which was returned to base safely.

The UAV transponder had been tested prior to the flight and was functional at the time of the incident. The SMM had also, as per established procedure, given notice of the UAV flight in the general area.

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