Central Europe

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. Small arms were again fired near an SMM patrol, near Molodizhne. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Troitske, Svatove, Marinka, Kruta Balka and Zaitseve. It also followed up on reports of a collapsed bridge and injuries to civilians near Ivanivka, and reports of shelling near a residential area of Talakivka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including near Voznesenivka at the border with the Russian Federation, at a checkpoint near Khreshchatytske, and near Ivanivka. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Teple, Kalynove, Vrubivka, Vodiane and Bohoiavlenka. It continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station to facilitate repair works and keep it operational; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. The SMM also continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including 640 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions).

On the evening of 22 May, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, five muzzle flashes and a projectile in vertical flight, followed by totals of three undetermined explosions and 15 projectiles (ten from north to south, two from south-west to north-east and three in vertical flight), all 3-5km east-south-east.

On the evening of 22 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 22 projectiles and seven bursts, all from south-east to north-west, 0.5-2km south-west.

On the evening of 22 May, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from north to south and three undetermined explosions, all 3-8km north-east.

On the evening and night of 22-23 May, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, five explosions (three assessed as outgoing, two as undetermined) and six projectiles in flight from east to west, all 1-2km south-south-east.

On the evening of 22 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-5km south-west and west; saw about 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun tracer fire 4-6 km south-west; and heard and saw about 30 bursts of heavy-machine-gun tracer fire 4-6km south-west.

On the evening and night of 22-23 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 42 undetermined explosions and 140 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km south. During the day on 23 May, the SMM heard 66 undetermined explosions and 13 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-6km south-east and south.

On the evening of 22 May, while in Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 45 minutes of overlapping explosions assessed as at least 400 artillery rounds, at an unknown distance north-east.

During the day on 23 May, positioned in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 34 explosions (32 assessed as outgoing, and two as undetermined) 3-5km west; and heard and saw an explosion assessed as an impact 1km west.

Positioned 3km south-east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 105 undetermined explosions and ten bursts of small-arms fire, all at unknown distances north-east, east and north-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 240 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (18 explosions).

During the day on 23 May, positioned near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 79 undetermined explosions 2-12km at directions ranging from east to south-south-east.

An SMM patrol heard shots fired near its position. On 23 May, an SMM patrol was positioned at a junction 1km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) when it heard three shots of small-arms fire approximately 200m north-west. The SMM could not determine the direction of the fire but assessed it as not directed at the SMM. It left the area and moved to a safe location. A member of the armed formations told the SMM that the shots had been caused by an unintentional weapon discharge.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Troitske, Svatove, Marinka, Kruta Balka and Zaitseve. Medical staff at a hospital in Lysychansk (government-controlled, 75km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that a woman (36 years old), who they said was a resident of Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), had been admitted on the early morning of 18 May with serious injuries to her abdomen and lungs and severe blood loss, due to direct shrapnel injuries. The medical staff said the woman was conscious but breathing through a ventilator. They also added that the woman’s son (18 years old) had also been admitted to the hospital with non-critical injuries. In Troitske, three local residents told the SMM that they knew that the husband and the younger son (13 years old) of the injured woman had been killed in shelling at 15 Kuznechna Street around midnight on 17 May, when the woman and her older son had been injured. The SMM was not able to reach Troitske to assess the damage at this address due to security considerations.

At the District Hospital in Svatove (government-controlled, 125km north-west of Luhansk), on 22 May, the SMM saw a man (19 years old) with his arms and the top of his head covered with bandages. The deputy head of the hospital informed the SMM that on 20 May, the man and his father (45 years old) had been admitted to the hospital and treated for skin burns and shrapnel injuries. The chief of police in Svatove told the SMM that both men had been injured on 20 May after mishandling unexploded ordnance (UXO) that they had found and picked up in 2017 in a field near Svatove.

Medical staff at the hospital morgue in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) told the SMM on 23 May that a man (36 years old) had died on 21 May in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) of a gunshot wound and added that the bullet had probably exploded inside the man's body as small fragments of the bullet were found during the autopsy. A man, who introduced himself as the man’s brother, told the SMM that his brother-in-law and himself had found his brother around 16:15 on 21 May lying on the ground in the backyard of his house in Marinka (at 249 Prokofieva Street, about 2.5km west of the contact line) with a large wound on his right forearm. (See SMM Daily Report 23 May 2018).

At the neurosurgical department of the Kalinina Hospital in Donetsk city, the SMM saw two men (30-40 years old) receiving intravenous fluid in their arms. The two men told the SMM that they were journalists from the Russian Federation and that on 17 May they had been visiting positions of the armed formations near Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk). They added that around 15:00 shelling had begun in the area and continued until 23:00 when they had been injured by a shell. The doctor treating them told the SMM that the two men had been hospitalized on 18 May and treated for barotrauma and a concussion resulting from a blast wave.

At the municipal morgue in Horlivka, on 20 May, the SMM saw the bodies of a woman (43 years old) with a large wound on the upper part of her right leg, and of a man (46 years old) with a large open wound and a fracture on his lower right leg. On 21 May, staff members of the Horlivka hospital no. 2 told the SMM that they had both died of shrapnel wounds on 19 May. On 23 May, a man who introduced himself as the woman’s son, told the SMM that on 19 May the woman and the man had been in the garden at 127 Polietaieva Street in the non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) when shelling had occurred. According to him, the man died at the scene, while his mother died later at the hospital in Horlivka.

On 21 May, a representative of a non-governmental organization told the SMM that a woman (60 years old) had been injured on 21 May due to shelling at 32 Zhuravskoho Street in the government-controlled Zhovanka neighbourhood of Zaitseve. On 23 May, a staff member of the Central Hospital in Bakhmut (government-controlled 67km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that the woman had been admitted at the hospital on 21 May with shrapnel penetration. He also said that the woman was in a post-operative moderate condition in the intensive care unit.

On 19 May, a staff member of the Hospital no. 2 in Horlivka told the SMM that a woman (86 years old), said to be a resident at 21 Molokova Street in Horlivka, had died from penetrating wounds caused by fragments on 18 May after being admitted at the hospital. On 23 May, at 21 Molokova Street the SMM saw damage to the house assessed as caused by the impact of either an artillery round or a mortar shell coming from a north-westerly direction. A neighbour at 26 Molokova Street told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the area on 18 May around 18:30.

On the southern outskirts of Ivanivka (non-government-controlled 46km south-east of Luhansk), on 22 May, the SMM followed up on reports of a collapsed bridge and injuries to civilians. The SMM observed that road H-21 between Ivanivka and Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, non-government-controlled, 56km south-west of Luhansk) was blocked by a police car and sand bags, and approached the bridge by foot. The SMM saw that the bridge had collapsed and observed about 20 armed members of the armed formations present, some of whom were clearing rubble from the destroyed bridge. A woman told the SMM that her son-in-law and grandson (about 45 and 20 years old respectively) had sustained injuries after their car had fallen off the damaged bridge. The SMM spoke with three local residents (two women and a man, 35-80 years old) who told the SMM that they had heard loud sounds that they believed had been a possible explosion and collapse of the bridge, and that the two injured men had been treated by an ambulance crew from Antratsyt (non-government-controlled, 55km south-west of Luhansk) and sent home the same day. 

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling near a residential area near Talakivka (government-controlled, 17km north-east of Mariupol) on the evening of 22 May. Accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer, it observed nine impacts assessed as caused by shelling on the eastern edge of the village near a sunflower oil refining plant currently occupied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces logistic unit and located 600m east from the nearest residential house. Inside the compound, the SMM saw 13 fresh craters 5-100m apart from each other assessed as caused by the impact of 122mm and/or 152mm artillery rounds fired from an easterly direction. The SMM saw a fresh hole (1.5m in diameter) in the south-facing roof edge of the plant’s storage building at the south-western end of the compound. It saw one of the building’s ceiling concrete pillars had collapsed, assessed as the result of an impact, and all windows inside the building were shattered. It also observed a fresh impact in the south-eastern roof edge of a one-storey building located at the south-east end of the compound and damage to four military vehicles inside the compound (two military trucks and two unknown types). A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the area on the evening of 22 May.

On 22 May, in a field approximately 2km east of Romanivka (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted track marks assessed as caused by probable self-propelled howitzers (likely two, type undetermined) and debris on the ground indicating that weapons had been fired from this location probably in the direction of Horlivka, as suggested by track indentation on the ground. In the same location, the SMM mini-UAV spotted 11 impacts assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a south-easterly direction, from the direction of Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk).

Approximately 2.6km east of Romanivka, an SMM mini-UAV also spotted track marks assessed as caused by probable self-propelled howitzers (likely two, type undetermined) as well as debris on the ground indicating that weapons had been fired from this location previously. About 2km south-west of this location, the SMM mini-UAV spotted three impacts assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 22-23 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, 12 projectiles in flight from east to west, two muzzle flashes from north to south and four projectiles from north to south, followed by totals of five projectiles (one from east to west, one from north-north-west to south-south-east and three from south to north) and two muzzle flashes, all 2-8km at directions ranging from east to south-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 22 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted about 400m of newly excavated trenches (not seen in imagery taken on 7 February 2018 near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and 1.7km north-east of the Petrivske disengagement area.

During the day on 23 May, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard a single shot of small-arms fire 1km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 21 May an SMM mini-UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in a residential area of Teple (31km north of Luhansk) within 200m of a civilian house, on 22 May an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) about 2km north-east of Teple, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa). On 22 May, the SMM saw three tanks (T-72) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk). On 23 May, the SMM saw 12 towed howitzers (2A65 MSTA-B, 152mm) and five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Vodiane (42km south-west of Donetsk) and nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bohoiavlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in government-controlled areas, on 22 May an SMM mini-UAV spotted three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) about 50m south-east of a school building in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk). On 23 May, the SMM saw 11 towed mortars (eight 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm; and three PM-38, 120mm) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk), three tanks (T-64) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) near Kasianivka (22km north of Mariupol) as well as three tanks (T-64) near Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 23 May, the SMM saw four tanks (two T-64 and two T-72) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) and ten tanks (type unknown) near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw four anti-tank guns (MT-12) and noted that five towed howitzers (2A65), 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12), six towed artillery (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 28 mortars (12 M-120 Molot, 120mm; 15 2B11 Sani, 120mm; a BM-37 82 mm) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were again missing, and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing for the first time.

On 23 May, the SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in areas of Luhansk region outside government control and noted that a tank (T-64) was missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 21 May an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) in a residential area of Teple within 63m of a civilian house. On 22 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP variants) under camouflage near Peredilske (24km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) and ammunition boxes near Teple, as well as an IFV (BMP-2) and an APC (MT-LB) north of Bohdanivka. On 22 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) near Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-1), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) near Zaitseve. On 22 May, the SMM saw four IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) near Vrubivka, an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Stanytsia Luhanska, four IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna and an anti-aircraft-gun (ZU-23) near Romanivka.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 22 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted two APCs (MT-LB), two IFVs (BMP-1) and a man armed with a rocket-propelled-grenade launcher near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk). On 23 May the SMM saw four APCs (BTR-80) in Luhansk city.

The SMM observed demining activities near a checkpoint near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel conducting mine and UXO clearance.

The SMM continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) to facilitate repair works. On 23 May, the SMM observed that power supply to the DFS had been restored. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire, despite explicit security guarantees (see ceasefire violation section above). On the same day, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that water supply to residents of Avdiivka had been fully restored.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw 23 cars (seven with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and six with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine; and six cars (three with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and four pedestrians (two men and two women, 50-60 years old) entering Ukraine.

The SMM monitored a public gathering in Kyiv of about 350 people (90 per cent men, 55-70 years old) in front of the Cabinet of Ministers at 12/2 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street. The SMM saw some people holding orange flags with the inscription “Chernobyl Union of Ukraine” and others holding banners demanding action from politicians in support of benefits and compensation for veterans of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The SMM observed a group of 30-40 people temporarily block traffic on the street. The SMM saw 20 National Guard officers securing the area as well as two National Guard and three police buses parked nearby. The SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a checkpoint near Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), ten armed members of the armed formations prevented an SMM patrol from proceeding, saying that it was unsafe as a criminal had escaped and a search was ongoing in the area.
• Between Ivanivka and Khrustalnyi, while attempting to access the site of the destroyed bridge on road H-21 (see above), an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM that it could not proceed.* The SMM noted that all civilian traffic traveling in the same direction had been blocked as well. The SMM left the area.  

 

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the general public and the media. 

SUMMARY

On 24 May 2018 at 06:31 (Moscow time), the seventy-fifth[1] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of 16 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 16 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 14:33 on 24 May.

DETAIL

Leaving the Russian Federation

On 24 May at 06:31, the Observer Mission observed the arrival of a Russian convoy at the gate of the Donetsk BCP. A Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) team co-ordinated and led the movements of the convoy. The convoy consisted of ten cargo trucks and six support vehicles, including one ambulance. All but two cargo trucks bore the inscription “Humanitarian help from the Russian Federation”.

At 06:31, the vehicles entered the customs control area and queued in three lines. Once the convoy arrived, the vehicles were visually checked from the outside by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers. The Russian MES staff rolled up/opened the tarpaulins of the trucks and the border guards and customs officials performed a visual observation from the outside.

One service dog was present and used by Russian Federation border guards to check the vehicles from the outside. Three Ukrainian border guards and three customs officers were observed accompanying their Russian counterparts; they also performed visual observation of the vehicles from the outside (without entering the trucks’ cargo space). The Ukrainian officials had clipboards in their hands and were taking notes. By 06:50 all of the vehicles had left the BCP towards Ukraine.

Returning to the Russian Federation

At 14:16, the convoy returned and queued in the customs area. The tarpaulins of the trucks were opened and Russian Federation border guards and customs officers visually checked the returning convoy from the outside. One service dog was present and used by Russian Federation border guards to check the vehicles from the outside. Ukrainian representatives – three border guards and three customs officers – were present during this check. The Ukrainian officials also performed visual checks of the opened trucks from the outside. By 14:33 all 16 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation.

 

[1]According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the seventy-seventh Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” border crossing points, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the seventy-fifth convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

 

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The links between respecting human rights and countering violent extremism and radicalization that may lead to terrorism were explored during a training workshop for police officers from the Spanish municipality of Fuenlabrada, from 22 to 24 May 2018. The course was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

The 22 mid- to high-ranking officers who participated – 20 men and 2 women – discussed human rights standards related to the work of the police with communities, the treatment of detainees,  the use of force, stop-and-search procedures, and the arrest of criminal suspects.

“Frontline police officers at the local level perform an important role in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that may lead to terrorism,” said Jennifer Croft, Deputy Head of the ODIHR Human Rights department. “Respecting and protecting human rights is a central part of this role and helps officers enhance their operational effectiveness.”

The workshop built on ODIHR’s standard training curriculum for law-enforcement officers on protecting human rights and effectively countering terrorism, tailored to the specific needs of local police. The workshop was based on the findings of a pre-training assessment mission and incorporated elements from the OSCE guidebook Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community Policing Approach.

The training was part of the local implementation of the Spanish national strategy against violent radicalization. It followed a similar exercise for Spanish local police officers from Andalusia, which took place in Málaga in June 2017.

382330 Communication and Media Relations Section

The OSCE’s Mobile Training Team delivered a three-day interactive course on identifying foreign terrorist fighters to 30 border and security officers from Ukraine. The event took place from 22 to 24 May 2018 in Odesa. The deployment of the Mobile Training Team, the fifth of its kind, was organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department.

The participants learned how to identify potential foreign terrorist fighters at border crossing points, in compliance with international human rights standards. The programme focused on international, regional and national legal frameworks and the effective use of Interpol databases.

The border and security officers of Ukraine were provided with a practical training session on travel document security including the detection of forged documents and imposters. They were also able to improve their knowledge of the risk analysis model applied to foreign terrorist fighters and the history, background, trends and current cases of such individuals.  

Participants also engaged in an interactive exercise to deepen their understanding of the behavioural indicators of foreign terrorist fighters.

“Foreign terrorist fighters constitute one of the major threats to international and regional security,” said Albina Yakubova, Porgramme Management Officer of the OSCE Border Security and Management Unit, as she opened the training course. “Without adequate training it is nearly impossible to identify them successfully and in a human rights-compliant manner”.

The course was delivered by members of the OSCE Mobile Training Team from Malta, Spain and Ukraine. Expert speakers from the Asia-Pacific Foundation, the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, Austria’s Interior Ministry, INTERPOL and the OSCE shared their knowledge and expertise in the identification of foreign terrorist fighters at the borders.

The OSCE Mobile Training Team was established by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in 2016. It is composed of 17 selected border and counter-terrorism experts from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation.

VENICE, Italy, 24 May 2018 – Economic progress and security in the OSCE area through innovation, human capital development and good public and corporate governance were the focus of the two-day Second Preparatory Meeting of the Economic and Environmental Forum which opened today in Venice.

Organized by the Italian 2018 OSCE Chairmanship and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, the event brought together some 150 high-level officials from the OSCE’s 57 participating States and 11 Partners for Co-operation as well as representatives of the business community, civil society and academia to  discuss how the Fourth Industrial Revolution has already and will continue to transform the dynamics of demand and supply in the labour force.  

Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE Alessandro Azzoni welcomed the participants, underlining how the promotion of joint strategies at the international level “could certainly assist our governments and citizens to manage the digital transition with the least possible disruption”.

In this regard Italy’s 2018 OSCE Chairmanship Co-ordinator Vinicio Mati stressed how the OSCE was good platform of dialogue where participating States can have a fruitful exchange of best national practices. “The major challenge for our governments is that of transforming digital societies into fair and inclusive societies, capable of helping citizens to reinvent themselves in a constantly changing reality,” he said. 

One of the main topics of discussion over the next two days will be how to maximize potential benefits and make innovation a concrete source of prosperity, competitiveness and well-being for all. Participants will look at some of the key challenges presented by digital innovation in the labour market and the role the OSCE can play in addressing them, including their security implications and human capital development.

Paola Severino, the first Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Corruption, stressed that public authorities have to assume the fundamental and complex responsibility of ensuring sustainable economic development: “The most successful action that good public governance can take actually consists in enhancing good governance and thus preventing corruption, boosting mechanisms that reward compliance by economic actors.”  

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the OSCE agreed last year to deepen their co-operation and establish a strategic partnership to promote good governance, connectivity and economic development. 

Enzo Quattrociocche, the EBRD Secretary General, said: “Promoting good governance at both national and corporate levels is one of the EBRD’s core activities in countries where it invests. We are pleased to join forces with the OSCE and step up efforts to support good governance and promote an enabling business environment.” 

The topics of the debate will also intersect with relevant UN Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 4 “Quality of education for all”, Goal 8 “Decent work for all” and Goal 17 “Partnerships and co-operation”. 

Vuk Žugić, Co-Ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, said that it is essential that the dialogue on the future of work is inclusive, involving major stakeholders, governments, think tanks, enterprises, workers’ associations and experts. “Only together can we move beyond good intentions,” he said. 

The Concluding Meeting of this year’s Economic and Environmental Forum is due to take place in Prague from 5 to 7 September 2018.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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ANKARA, 24 May 2018 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today formally opened an election observation mission for the 24 June early presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey. The mission’s deployment follows an invitation from the Turkish authorities.

The mission is led by Ambassador Audrey Glover and consists of a core team of 12 experts based in Ankara and 22 long-term observers to be deployed across the country.

The mission will observe these elections for their compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with domestic legislation. Observers will follow candidate registration, campaign activities of the presidential and parliamentary contestants, the work of the election administration and relevant state bodies, implementation of the legislative framework and the resolution of election disputes. As part of the observation, the mission will conduct comprehensive monitoring of the media.

In the course of its observation, the mission will meet with representatives from state authorities, political parties and candidates, and with representatives from civil society, the media and the international community. On election day, observers will monitor the opening of polling stations, voting, the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results. 

The day after the elections, the mission will join with observer delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to issue a statement of preliminary findings and conclusions at a press conference. ODIHR will issue its final report on the observation of the entire electoral process approximately eight weeks after the end of the observation mission.

 

For further information, please contact Kira Kalinina, Media Analyst with the election observation mission, at +90 312 457 6126(Ankara office) or +90 537 2362273(Ankara mobile) or at kira.kalinina@odihr-turkey.org.

or

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

 

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382309 Željka Šulc

The first OSCE Model workshop concluded on Wednesday, 23 May 2018 in Banja Luka. Over 25 participants from Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the host-country Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) gathered to enhance their theoretical and practical knowledge about the history, role and functioning of the OSCE, its Permanent Council and field operations, particularly with regards to conflict prevention.

The event was organized by the OSCE Mission to BiH, its Youth Advisory Group and the Students’ Organisation of the School of Political Science of the University of Banja Luka.

“We are hopeful that this activity will motivate young people in BiH and in the wider region – particularly students of political science and law – to learn more about the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Our workshop participants studied how  international organisations work and co-operate to enhance regional and global security,” said Dmitry Iordanidi, Head of OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Field Office in Banja Luka of the.

Ismet Bolic, a student at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Banja Luka, said: “The Model OSCE simulation was an opportunity to bring together different competent and capable young people from all over BiH and the region to network and exchange views and experiences.”

Matteo Pugliese, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Special Representative on Youth and Security stressed that “youth mainstreaming is one of the key elements of the Italian 2018 OSCE Chairmanship programme. Thanks to the commitment of the OSCE Mission to BiH and its Youth Advisory Group, this Model OSCE in Banja Luka represents a landmark initiative in the Western Balkans.”

This activity is the first in a series of simulations in BiH meant to provide students with a unique opportunity to explore various aspects of the OSCE’s work across the politico-military, economic–environmental and human dimensions.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of a casualty in Marinka near the contact line. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, where it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including at a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees and others to the Donetsk Filtration System to assess damage and facilitate repair works which were completed by 17:00. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka, Almazna, and Veselohorivka. The Mission also monitored a gathering in Kharkiv in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 200 explosions,  compared with the previous reporting period (about 580 explosions).

On the evening of 21 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 12 undetermined explosions, two projectiles in flight from east-north-east to west-south-west, an undetermined explosion and a projectile from north to south, all 0.2-1km south-west and west-south-west, followed by totals of three explosions assessed as impacts less than 50m west-south-west, nine undetermined explosions, an airburst and four projectiles (two from north to south and two from west to east), all 0.2-3km west-south-west and a projectile from east to west within 200m west-south-west.

On the evening and night of 21-22 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 0.5-1km north, 31 undetermined explosions and about 60 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-8km south and south-south-west, and five undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-west.

On 22 May, positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and heavy-machine-gun fire 2-7km east, east-south-east and south.

Positioned in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 1-5km south-west and west. 

Positioned in Novoselivka (non-government-controlled, 37km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions 2-4km east, assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

Positioned in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 2-4km north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, but more explosions (18) compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions).

The SMM followed up on reports of a casualty in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), reported in the media on 21 May. On 22 May, in Avdiivka, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) confirmed the report. In Marinka, a representative from the Civil/Military Administration told the SMM by phone that on 21 May at 18:00, a resident of Marinka (man, aged 36) was killed on the outskirts of Marinka near the contact line and that the circumstances of his death were currently under investigation. Medical staff of the hospital morgue in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) told the SMM by phone that the body had been admitted late in the evening of 21 May with multiple wounds containing bullet fragments.

The SMM followed up on reports of fresh damage to an aid station inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk). In the disengagement area, in the parking lot south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, a member of the armed formations (male, aged 30) approached the SMM and requested that it observe shrapnel damage to the mobile centre for “social assistance and administrative services”, which is located 85m south-west of the nearest armed formation checkpoint and about 300m south-west of the bridge. The SMM saw a fresh hole in the vinyl ceiling under the north-eastern section of the centre’s roof, another fresh hole inside the centre in its western wall (panelling over corrugated metal) as well as a piece of metal lodged between the panelling and the outside metal of the western wall. A dent approximately 3cm wide was also observed on the exterior metal wall of the structure. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by fragmentation from a mortar or grenade round fired from a north-easterly direction, which had penetrated the north-eastern section of the roof and the western wall. A mobile centre worker (woman, aged 35) told the SMM that when she had arrived at the centre in the morning, she had seen a hole in the north-east section of the roof and a single piece of shrapnel lodged in the western wall of the structure.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 22 May, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an explosion 1-2km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 21 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 24 bursts and a projectile, all 4-9km south and south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). In Katerynivka (government-controlled 64km west of Luhansk, inside the Zolote disengagement area), the SMM saw a military vehicle (UAZ) with two uniformed persons on board (neither insignia nor weapons were visible) and a military fuel truck (ZIL type) with two uniformed persons (neither insignia nor weapons visible) on board.

On 22 May, positioned in Petrivske, the SMM heard eight bursts and shots of small-arms fire 1-2km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 17 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded two tracer rounds in flight (trajectory undetermined) 0.5-1km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw three tanks (one T-64, two undetermined) at a training area in Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and recently dug protective berms in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 21 May the SMM observed an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) and two infantry fighting vehicles IFVs (BMP-1) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 22 May, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol) and an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three IFVs (BMP-2) near Zalizne (42km north-east of Donetsk), three IFVs (a BMP-1 and two BMP variants) and an armoured personnel carrier APC (BTR-80) near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 22 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 400m of protective berms near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk) (not visible in aerial imagery from 29 April). The SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed demining activities and a mine hazard sign. Positioned on the south-eastern outskirts of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw four military vehicles (one UAZ and three KRAZ) and 25 Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel engaging in demining activities. Near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on road T0519, the SMM observed three Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel clearing the adjacent minefield of anti-tank mines. Four anti-tank mines were observed beside the area being demined on road T0519. The SMM observed a mine hazard sign for the first time in the eastern outskirts of Petrivka (government-controlled, 27km north of Luhansk) on the road T-1309 with “Mine” written in Cyrillic.

The SMM continued to facilitate access of Voda Donbassa water company employees and others to the DFS to assess damage and facilitate repair works. On 21 May, an electric company representative told the SMM that power supply lines leading to the DFS along road M04 on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) were damaged. On 22 May repair works were conducted near Kruta Balka. The DFS chief electrician told the SMM that the repairs had been completed and would be tested once the electricity had been switched on. A DFS representative later told the SMM by phone that electricity to the DFS had been restored.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk), and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM observed 55 cars (22 with Ukrainian and 17 with Russian Federation licence plates, and 16 with “DPR” plates), three vans (one with Ukrainian and one Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates), nine trucks (four with Ukrainian, two Russian Federation and two Belarusian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates), and one bus with Ukrainian licence plates, all exiting Ukraine. During the same period, the SMM observed 22 cars (five with Ukrainian, ten Russian Federation and three Lithuanian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates), two mini-buses with Ukrainian licence plates, three tank-trucks (with “BITUM” written on the tanks) and a bus with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. While at a border crossing near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about half an hour, the SMM observed two pedestrians (women, aged 55-60) with bicycles entering and one pedestrian (woman, aged 35) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Kharkiv. The SMM observed 40 people (28 men and 12 women, aged 25-55) carrying Ukrainian national flags, chanting “Free Sentsov!” and “Free political prisoners!”, and singing the Ukrainian national anthem. The SMM observed about 50 police and National Guard personnel near the consulate. The protestors dispersed without incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

 

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint stating that he needed approval from his superiors.

 

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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STRASBOURG, France, 23 May 2018 – Co-organized by the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Office of the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR/CTHB), a meeting of National Anti-Trafficking Co-ordinators and Rapporteurs from across the OSCE regional framework concluded at the Palais de l’Europe today.

Participants from 41 OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation gathered to identify joint actions on how best to address current human trafficking-related challenges in the OSCE region and foster the implementation of relevant OSCE commitments as well as obligations under the CoE Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.

“Meetings such as this are a very useful expert platform for streamlining our national and regional responses to human trafficking, and I am glad that today we have the possibility to discuss our mutual challenges and identify opportunities and solutions by learning from each other and establishing closer operational ties,” said Madina Jarbussynova, OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.

“Regular exchanges between National Anti-trafficking Coordinators of States Parties to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings are vital for pooling knowledge, strengthening partnerships and promoting the implementation of the Convention,” said Petya Nestorova, Executive Secretary of the Council of Europe Anti-trafficking Convention.

During the morning session, participants discussed the recommendations from this year’s 18th Alliance Against Trafficking in Persons conference and from the most recent report of the CoE Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), with a thematic focus on human trafficking for labour exploitation, which was followed by an exchange on current THB patterns and trends.

In the afternoon, the discussion focused on ways to strengthen the role of National Co-ordinators and build strategic partnerships that involve civil society and the private sector. The session concluded with participants examining how best to further enhance the role of National Rapporteurs or other national mechanisms for monitoring anti-trafficking activities and policies, as well as identifying a way forward to ensure a more effective and coherent anti-trafficking response both within individual participating States, and across the OSCE area as a whole.

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VIENNA, 23 May 2018 – The importance of nuclear security was emphasized by speakers at today’s OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) meeting in Vienna, held under Slovenia’s Chairmanship.  The meeting was a follow-up to the OSCE Decision on the Update of the OSCE Principles Governing Non-proliferation, which designates the FSC as a forum for discussions on issues relating to the effective security of all nuclear materials and nuclear facilities in the OSCE area.

Ambassador Andrej Benedejčič, Chairperson of the Forum and Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the OSCE, opened the discussion by noting that two-thirds of all nuclear power plants in the world are located in the OSCE participating States. He added that OSCE participating States also account for 20 out of 30 countries with fully-fledged civilian nuclear programmes. 

Ambassador Benedejčič emphasized the importance of managing radioactive sources, which must not fall into the wrong hands.  "Many terrorist organizations pose a potential threat to civilian nuclear facilities and subsequently to the peaceful use of nuclear technology and its applications," he said.

Andrej Stritar, Director of the Slovenian Nuclear Administration, noted the importance of co-operation between power plant operators, the police and the military.  He highlighted the lessons learned from a recent unannounced force-on-force exercise on the premises of the Krško nuclear power plant, and described the arrangements the country currently has in place for the event of an airplane crash or a cyber security attack. "Strengthening co-operation between civil and military authorities represents the main challenge," he said.

Juan Carlos Lentijo, Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) highlighted some of the Agency’s activities in this field. He discussed the IAEA's central role in strengthening the nuclear security framework, including the assistance it provides in work related to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment and UN Security Council Resolution 1540.  "Like the OSCE, we promote international co-operation, which we see as an effective way to bolster nuclear security globally," he said. 

Elena K. Sokova, Deputy Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, said: "The OSCE participating States own and host the lion's share of global nuclear facilities, materials and radioactive sources. Despite significant progress in strengthening nuclear security over the past 20 years, many challenges and vulnerabilities remain."  She added that the OSCE participating States are at the forefront of emerging technologies that could have both negative and positive impacts on nuclear security and countering terrorism.

"The OSCE’s ongoing work to counter terrorism, secure borders, combat trafficking in arms and human beings, and protect against cybercrime are integral elements in addressing nuclear security challenges," she said. "Both the individual participating States and the Organization itself are well positioned to contribute to policy changes and work with various branches of government, industry and the professional community to enhance nuclear security."

Roger Howsley, Executive Director of the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), spoke of the need for personnel with responsibilities for nuclear security to be demonstrably competent. He called on OSCE participating States to support the development of comparable, certified professional training courses for nuclear security as already exist for aviation security, and to encourage the IAEA to take a lead role.

He also said that WINS has become a member of the International Gender Champions Initiative and intends to identify and overcome the barriers to women's greater participation in nuclear security. "It is a fact that we need greater diversity to address the evolving threats," he said.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission heard small-arms fire 100m from its position near Kriakivka. Small-arms fire hit an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle which fell to the ground near Vesela Hora.* The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in Avdiivka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area and explosions assessed as rounds of multiple launch rocket system near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line near Buhaivka, Novoamvrosiivske and Khlibodarivka. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including near Izvaryne at the border with the Russian Federation, at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, at a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske, as well as at two compounds near Pavlopil and Myrne.* It continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees and others to the Donetsk Filtration Station to assess damage and facilitate repair works; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka. The SMM monitored gatherings in Chernivtsi, Dnipro and Odessa.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including more explosions (about 580 explosions), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 280 explosions).

On the evening of 20 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard six explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons and about ten shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-4km south-west. In the early hours of 21 May, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 230 undetermined explosions and about 310 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-10km at directions ranging from south-west to north. During the day, it heard 19 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds (four 2-4km south-west and the remainder 1-4km south-east), as well as 110 undetermined explosions and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-8km west-north-west and north-west.

On the evening of 20 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions 4-6km south-west. The following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 220 undetermined explosions 4-7km south and south-west.

On the evening of 20 May, positioned 2km north-west of Donetsk city centre (non-government-controlled), the SMM heard 14 explosions (seven assessed as outgoing rounds and the reminder as impacts) and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-8km north-west.

During the day on 21 May, positioned on the western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about ten shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-3km west and north-west. The same day, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata for about two hours, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 20 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-5km south-south-west and west.

Positioned on the north-western edge of Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions 8-12km west and north.

Positioned 2km south-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions at undetermined distances north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 15 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (38 explosions).

During the day on 21 May, positioned on the western edge of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire about 100m south. The SMM immediately left the area. (See SMM Spot Report 21 May 2018.)

On the morning of 21 May, positioned on the southern edge of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard about five shots of small-arms fire 0.8-1km north, assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying 1.2km north. Following the second shot, the Mission saw the UAV lose altitude and fall to the ground 1.2km north. The SMM immediately left the area.*

The SMM followed up on reports of damage caused by recent shelling in a residential area of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk). At 4 Vesniana Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in soft soil 6m south of a one-storey house, assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from an east-south-easterly direction. The owner of the house told the SMM that she had heard a loud sound at around 05:00 on the morning of 20 May and seen the abovementioned crater outside her house.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 9 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded 73 tracer rounds in flight from west to east 1-2km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the evening and night of 19-20 May, the same camera recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion 400-500m west-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area), six undetermined explosions 1-3km west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area), 36 tracer rounds in flight from south to north 0.5-3km west (assessed as inside the disengagement area), four tracer rounds from west to east 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and two undetermined explosions 2-4km west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 19 May, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near a treeline inside the Petrivske disengagement area about 2km east from its western edge and 1.2km south from its northern edge. (See SMM Daily Report 21 May 2018.)

On the evening of 20 May, the SMM camera near Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded three explosions assessed as rounds of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (probable BM-21 Grad, 122mm) 3-5km south-east, six explosions assessed as impacts of MLRS (probable BM-21) rounds 0.5-2km east and an undetermined explosion 4-8km north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the evening and night of 20-21 May, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded five undetermined explosions 2-8km south-east, south-south-east and south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 20 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three undetermined explosions 5-12km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 21 May, positioned near all three disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 20 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) south-east of Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (in the same area the UAV spotted about 60 armoured combat vehicles and other hardware). The following day, the SMM saw four MLRS (BM-21) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

In a government-controlled area, the SMM saw four stationary MLRS (BM-21) in a compound near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 20 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 21 tanks (T-64), four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and seven mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Buhaivka (at the same location of the abovementioned weapons).

In a government-controlled area, the SMM saw five stationary towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in a compound and an additional four stationary towed howitzers (2A36) in a training area near Khlibodarivka.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 122mm), and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were again missing. It also noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned with nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and two an anti-tank guns (MT-12) missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 19 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Vodiane (15km north-west of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP variant) near Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk), an ACV (type undetermined) near Berezove (31km south of Donetsk), two IFVs (one BMP-1 and one BMP-2) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV (type undetermined) and three IFVs (one BMP-1 and two BMP variants) as well as an artillery reconnaissance vehicle (PRP-3 Val) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an ACV (BTR variant) in residential areas of Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk). On 20 May, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Pervomaiske. On 21 May, the SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP variants) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) in Luhansk city, an APC (BTR variant) near Novosvitlivka (16km south-east of Luhansk) and an APC (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees and others to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) to assess damage and facilitate repair works. On 21 May, an electric company’s staff member told the SMM that power supply lines leading to the DFS along road M04 on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata were damaged. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard explosions and heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above and ceasefire violation table below), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 12 cars (licence plates not visible) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and two pedestrians entering Ukraine. After 15 minutes, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for half an hour, the SMM saw nine pedestrians exiting Ukraine and two pedestrians entering Ukraine.

In Chernivtsi, the SMM monitored gatherings of activists of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) community. On 17 May, the SMM observed a flash mob at the central square in Chernivtsi city entitled “Campaign against homophobia”. The SMM saw seven people (six women and a man, all in their twenties) who identified themselves members of the Chernivtsi regional branch of a non-governmental organization (NGO). The SMM also saw four young people (two men and two women) nearby handing out stickers offensive of the LGBTI community. While present, the SMM noted negative comments made by people passing by. About 30 police officers were around the participants in the gathering and another 30 police officers were present in the area. On 19 May, the SMM monitored another event organized by the same NGO in support of LGBTI rights at a media centre at 2 Kobylianskoi Street. At the entrance to the centre, the Mission saw about 80 protesters (mostly men, aged around 25), some of whom were wearing balaclavas and camouflage clothes and holding flags with the message “Ukraine for family”. About 170 police and National Guard officers were present. Later, the SMM saw the participants of the event leaving the centre under police escort due to what they said was a bomb threat. It also saw minor scuffles between some protesters and the police and that a protestor sprayed police officers with a chemical irritant assessed as tear gas. The SMM did not observe further incidents.

In Dnipro, the SMM monitored a protest by representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The SMM saw about 60 people (men and women aged 30-60) gathered at 2 Oleksandra Polia Street. Some of them said that they were protesting against the recognition of a different canonical, autocephalous Orthodox church in Ukraine. The SMM also saw another group of about 40 people (men and women aged 30-60) nearby chanting “Glory to Ukraine. Glory to heroes.” The SMM noted verbal exchanges between the two groups. About 30 police officers were present. Later, the first group started moving towards the regional state administration building while the second group lined up and were loudly expressing criticism of the first group. The gathering later dispersed without any incidents.

The SMM monitored a protest in Odessa. The SMM saw about 50 people (mostly men, aged 18-35) gathered in front of the office building of a private company on 16/8 Fontanska Street in Odessa, some of them wearing insignia of groups such as the State Initiative of Yarosh (DIYA), National Corps and the Council for Public Security. The SMM saw what seemed to be private security guards in front of the building and about 60 police officers in riot gear cordoning off the area in front of the building. Some of the participants were throwing plastic bottles of water and other objects towards the private security guards and shouting slogans critical of the owner of the company. The SMM saw that one of the vehicles of the company parked nearby had broken windows and later it saw some of the protestors smashing the windows of another vehicle belonging to the company. The SMM saw the police bringing a man out of the office building and putting him inside a police vehicle. Shortly thereafter, the gathering dispersed.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Kyiv.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• Three members of the armed formations (two armed) denied the SMM access to parts of a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• At a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint.
• At a compound near Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM access to the compound, stating that prior permission from his superior was required.
• At a compound on the northern edge of Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM access to the compound, citing orders from his superior.

 

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

 

Other impediments:

• While flying its mini-UAV near Vesela Hora, the SMM heard shots of small-arms fire 0.8-1km north, assessed as directed at the UAV. The SMM saw the UAV fall to the ground and immediately left the area (see above).

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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382300 Communication and Media Relations Section

A two-day discussion-based tabletop exercise on how to respond to a simulated wildfire in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, in close partnership with the Global Fire Monitoring Center, was held on 17 and 18 May 2018 in the city of Gomel in Belarus near the border with Ukraine.

The exercise brought together the authorities from Belarus and Ukraine responsible for emergency, forest and fire management, and management of the territories affected by the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant accident as well as border guard and customs agencies.

Wildfires in the Chernobyl-affected areas are likely to become more frequent and intense as a result of climate change. Wildfires respect no borders and responding to them effectively requires joint action and transboundary co-operation.

“This joint exercise contributes to the implementation of management decisions, crisis management and the improvement of cross-border procedures in wildfire suppression in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone,” said Sergiy Dichkovsky, Head of the Gomel Oblast Department of the Emergency Situations Ministry of Belarus.

Sergiy Savinsky, Deputy Head of the Department of the Fire Rescue Organization of Ukraine’s State Service for Emergency Situations commended the initiative: “This exercise will strengthen co-operation between Belarus and Ukraine in jointly addressing wildfire management risks.”

Johan Goldammer, Head of the Global Fire Monitoring Center, underlined the importance of sharing experiences and best practices in wildfire management. “The Global Fire Monitoring Center and the Regional Eastern European Fire Monitoring Center are ready to offer their support for enhancing cross-border co-operation on wildfire management between Belarus and Ukraine,” he said.  

“This event is an example of how the OSCE commitments related to disaster risk reduction are translated into action” said Hanna Plotnykova, National Project Officer in Ukraine.    

The exercise was organized within the framework of the project Improving Radiological and Environmental Awareness in Territories Affected by the Chernobyl Accident in Belarus and Ukraine with a Focus on Wildfire Management, one of a set of projects the OSCE is conducting in co-operation with Belarus. It is funded by Austria, Germany and Liechtenstein.

 

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs. On 16 May, a delegation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited the Mission area.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

On 16 May, a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accompanied by representatives of the regional authorities, visited the Gukovo and Donetsk BCPs and the BOM office in Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 10,569 to 10,996 per day for both BCPs compared to last week. The average net flow for both BCPs went from plus 516 to plus 203 (i.e., more entries into the Russian Federation).

The Donetsk BCP continues to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for 36.7 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region[1].

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions was 53 at both BCPs compared to 54 last week; 25 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, 28 into Ukraine. Approximately 85 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continue to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, three families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when four such families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and six into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continue to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed 407 buses crossing the border at both BCPs (compared to 353 observed during the previous week), 218 of them were bound for the Russian Federation and 189 for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Alchevsk-Kyiv; Kyiv; Luhansk – Kharkiv and Rovenky-Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a significant increase in the number of trucks crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 559 to 1,008 (327 at the Gukovo BCP and 681 at the Donetsk BCP); 585 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 423 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                          

Among them, the OTs continued also to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks almost doubled, from 46 to 90 (compared to the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks have hazard signs, indicating that they are transporting propane or a mix of propane with butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks. At the Donetsk BCP the OTs observed 108 X-ray checks: out of the total number of trucks scanned during the reporting period, 59 trucks (55 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 49 trucks (45 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation.

As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 112 to 189; 91 crossed into the Russian Federation and 98 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the train tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 46 occasions, compared to 40 last week; the OTs assessed that 25 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 21 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. In addition, the OTs also observed vehicles registered in Georgia and Poland. A number of vehicles with “LPR” and “DPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions.

During the reporting period, four ambulances were observed on two separate occasions.

On 16 May, at 10:42, the OT at the Gukovo BCP observed three ambulances with Russian Federation licence plates entering the BCP area from the Russian Federation. The vehicles, without undergoing border formalities, quickly reached the area behind the BCP facilities, which meant that the OT was unable to observe if any activities were carried out. At 11:16 all vehicles crossed back into the Russian Federation.

On 17 May, at 12:27, the OT at the Donetsk BCP noted an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates entering the BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle parked inside the BCP area and crossed back into the Russian Federation at 12:40.

On each occasion, the OTs observed only the driver inside the medical vehicles.

In addition, on 16 May, at 11:56, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a military helicopter flying at a distance of about 500m to the north-east from the BCP. The aircraft flew along the border at an altitude of approximately 100m within Russian Federation territory and left in an easterly direction.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 17 April to 22 May 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from Rostov-on-Don region Border Guard Service

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                    

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KYIV, 22 May 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group, Ambassador Martin Sajdik, issued today the following statement:

“The recent surge in combat activity along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine is causing more and more victims and destruction. It puts at risk essential local infrastructure, such as water supply, on which hundreds of thousands of people rely for their basic needs. I call strongly upon the sides to immediately stop the fighting, in line with their earlier public commitments, and do their utmost to protect the civilian population, allow for the repair and smooth operation of civilian infrastructure, and facilitate the crucial work of the Special Monitoring Mission.”

 

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The public presentation of the Report on the Activities of Kazakhstan’s Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) in 2017 took place with OSCE support on 22 May 2018 in Astana.

Some 80 parliamentarians, government officials, legal scholars, representatives of non-governmental organizations and media discussed the activities of the Ombudsman institution, which serves to protect the rights of different groups of the population, including children, people with disabilities, prisoners and other socially vulnerable groups.

The report contains a comprehensive summary of the main areas of activity of the Ombudsman in 2017, including statistics and analysis of complaints handled, recommendations to government bodies, as well as interaction with civil society, international organizations and foreign human rights institutions.

The translation and publication of the report into English, Kazakh and Russian was supported by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana.

The presentation was organized by the Ombudsman’s Office in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the Regional Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. It is part of the Programme Office’s long-standing activities to support national human rights institutions and promote human rights awareness in the host country.

 

 

382246 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

Representatives of Turkmenistan’s State Committee for Television, Radio and Cinematography, lawmakers, journalists and officials from relevant ministries and research and educational institutions discussed broadcasting regulation and new models of broadcasting at an OSCE-supported seminar. The event took place in Ashgabat on 21 and 22 May 2018.

International experts presented different models of broadcasting, focusing on the respective advantages and challenges of public service, private and commercial television. Special attention was paid to best international practices and national experiences of the countries with transitional models.

“In January, the Mejlis of Turkmenistan passed the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting. The adoption of this law is an important step towards enhancing the national media legislation and bringing it into compliance with international standards and the requirements of the modern media environment,” said Ambassador Natalya Drozd, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

She also noted that the seminar provided an opportunity to share best practices of transition to new models of broadcasting and facilitate discussions on efficient mechanisms of broadcasting regulation to promote the pluralism of broadcast media.

The seminar included interactive group discussions on possible models of broadcasting at the national and regional level and issues pertinent to the establishment of private broadcasting companies, including the development of the business model and identification of the audience and content. The participants exchanged views on private television and competition, highlighting the importance of the company’s organizational structure and strategy.

The seminar was organized as part of the OSCE Centre’s Project “Co-operation in the area of enhancing media legislation and promoting freedom of expression”.

381715 Kunduz Rysbek

A roundtable discussion on the implementation of Advance Passenger Information (API) in Kyrgyzstan, organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the Kyrgyz State Committee for National Security, was held on 15 and 16 May 2018, in Bishkek.

The event brought together representatives from Kyrgyz state agencies involved in passenger information processing, including national security authorities, civil aviation, border and customs control officials, and IT service providers. One important purpose of the meeting was to present and discuss the draft National Roadmap to implement an API system in Kyrgyzstan.  

An API system analyses biographic information about travellers before they arrive at international borders. Airlines collect API data and transmit it to the authorities in countries requiring API. The information is then analysed by the authorities in the destination country to pre-screen travellers before they arrive. This allows customs, border services, and other authorized agencies to react to incoming passengers who may be of interest. Legitimate travellers are subject to less stringent controls upon arrival as checks relating to their admissibility have already been completed using API.

At the event, the representatives of IT service providers presented their proposals for the most efficient implementation of an API system. Representatives from state authorities of the Netherlands and the United States Customs and Border Protection shared their experience and expertise in API system implementation in their respective countries. Overall, the roundtable discussion helped the Kyrgyz authorities to collect best practices and practical recommendations on an effective implementation of API.

As a signatory to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, the 2016 OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Enhancing the Use of Advance Passenger Information, and Amendment 26 to the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Chicago Convention, Kyrgyzstan is obligated to implement an API system. Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated its willingness to implement an API system and enhance its airport and border security checks to meet its international obligations, especially in preventing the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups.

Previously, during April-May 2018, a feasibility study assessing the national system of external migration management and legal framework related to API was conducted. Its key findings provided the basis of the draft National Roadmap. 

382240 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Preventing torture and the role of Poland’s national preventive mechanism was the focus of a roundtable event organized in Warsaw by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Republic of Poland on 22 May 2018.

Representatives from various ministries and state institutions, as well as experts from international and regional human rights bodies, national and international civil society organizations and academia, discussed European jurisprudence related to cases of torture in Poland. They also elaborated on states’ responsibilities under international treaties to prevent torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to ensure the right to rehabilitation for survivors.

“The Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland has a clear mission: We aim for a state without torture, and we will not cease in our efforts until torture is eradicated in our country,” said Hanna Machinska, Deputy Commissioner for Human Rights in Poland. “The National Preventive Mechanism has achieved a lot in the past ten years, but there is still a lot to do and we will continue our dialogue with the authorities and civil society on the local and on the international level.”

Participants identified ongoing challenges in the fight against torture in Poland, including the lack of a clear definition of acts of torture in legislation and the limited resources of the national preventive mechanism.

“Empowering national preventative mechanisms in the OSCE region to strategically and effectively implement their mandate is one of our Office’s key priorities,” said Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, ODIHR First Deputy Director. “Independent monitoring of all places of detention, including by civil society monitors, has proven to be one of the most effective tools to prevent torture and other ill-treatment. Moreover, all states have an obligation to define and criminalize acts of torture within their legal systems, in line with international human rights obligations and OSCE commitments.”

This report is for the media and the general public.

At 11:57 on 21 May, an SMM patrol consisting of five SMM members and two armoured vehicles was positioned on the western edge of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk). Four patrol members were inside the vehicles and one member was outside when the patrol members heard four shots of small-arms fire approximately 100m south. The patrol could not determine the direction of fire.

The patrol immediately left the area and returned safely to its base in Sievierodonetsk (government-controlled, 74km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM notified the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination about the incident and requested follow-up.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region between the evenings of 18 and 19 May compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 19 and 20 May, it recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM observed damage caused by gunfire to civilian properties in Pikuzy and Kriakivka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it heard an explosion inside the Zolote disengagement area 300-500m from SMM patrols. The SMM observed military hardware and positions inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line near Vidrodzhennia, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Kostiantynivka and Sofiivka. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in Dovzhanske near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station to assess damage and facilitate repair works; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. Small arms were fired towards an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and a water pipeline near Obozne. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] between the evenings of 18 and 19 May, including about 420 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 250 explosions). Between the evenings of 19 and 20 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 280 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the night of 18-19 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded a projectile in flight from south to north 1-3km west. On the evening and night of 19-20 May, the same camera recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from south to north, an undetermined explosion and 16 projectiles in flight from south to north, all 1-4km west. During the day on 19 May, positioned at the DFS for about an hour and a half, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-3km south-west. During the day on 20 May, the SMM heard four bursts of small-arms fire 1-2km north-north-east.

On the evening and night of 18-19 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 40 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 0.5-1km west, as well as 135 explosions (85 assessed as tank rounds and the remainder undetermined) and about 100 shots and bursts (four assessed as infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire and the remainder as heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire), all 3-7km at directions ranging from west to north-west. During the day on 19 May, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and 12 shots and bursts of IFV cannon and small-arms fire 1-5km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west. On the evening and night of 19-20 May, the SMM heard about 225 explosions (46 assessed as tank rounds, 84 as artillery rounds, and the remainder undetermined) and about 230 bursts and shots of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), IFV (BMP-2) cannon, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-7km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west.

On the evening and night of 18-19 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 96 explosions (55 assessed as artillery rounds, three as rounds of a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7), three as rounds of a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) and the remainder undetermined) and about 570 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-15km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west. During the day on 19 May, the SMM heard 11 shots and bursts of small-arms fire 4-6km north-west. On the night of 19-20 May, the SMM heard two explosions (one assessed as outgoing, the other undetermined) and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-7km east and south-east. On the evening of 20 May, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and 32 shots and bursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and small-arms fire 2-5km south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations between the evenings of 18 and 19 May, including eight explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). Between the evenings of 19 and 20 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 38 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On 20 May, positioned 2km west of Orikhove-Donetske (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven explosions (six assessed as artillery rounds, and one undetermined) and four bursts 4-7km south and north-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of damage to civilian properties in residential areas of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk). In Pikuzy, at 34 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the west-facing outer brick wall of a residential house and assessed it as caused by an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) round fired from a westerly direction. The SMM observed that the round had not penetrated inside the house and had not caused damage other than the crater. The owner of the house (man, aged 30-40) told the SMM that gunfire had occurred at around 14:30 on 18 May, while he had been in his house.

In Kriakivka, at 73 Naberezhna Street, the SMM saw a hole surrounded by cracks (which the SMM assessed as recent) in the glass pane of a south-facing window of a residential house. The owner of the house (woman, 60-70 years old) told the SMM that around 22:00 on 18 May while she had been inside the house with her mother, she heard a whistling sound above her head followed by the sound of glass breaking.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and military positions inside and near the Petrivske disengagement area (for previous observations in this area, see SMM Daily Report 28 March 2018 and SMM Daily Report 3 May 2018). On 18 May, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable IFV inside the disengagement area 1.2km from its western and northern edges (previously observed on 10 March, see SMM Daily Report 14 March 2018), and 600m-long tracks some of which appeared to be leading to a military position in a tree line with an IFV (BMP-2). The same UAV spotted for the first time Ukrainian Armed Forces positions with firing positions and tracks leading to the west about 600m further north, all inside the disengagement area. The same UAV also spotted a recently dug 100m-long trench just north of a road between Bohdanivka (non-government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk) about 200m north of the disengagement area and a recent 30m-long extension of a 300m-long trench system 600m further north – none of which were visible in imagery from 1 February 2018 – as well as a nearby IFV (BMP-2).

On 9 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded three undetermined explosions 1km west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). On 19 May, positioned in Petrivske for about 35 minutes, the SMM heard 36 bursts of small-arms fire 3-4km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the morning of 19 May, positioned in Bohdanivka for about 15 minutes, the SMM heard 120 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance east-north-east (assessed as outside the Petrivske disengagement area).

On the evening of 18 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five undetermined explosions 1-3km at directions ranging from east to south-west (it assessed two as outside the disengagement area and was unable to assess whether the other three were inside or outside the disengagement area). On the evening and night of 19-20 May, the same camera recorded, in sequence, a muzzle flash, a projectile in flight from north to south, and a muzzle flash, followed by totals of ten explosions (three outgoing and the remainder undetermined), four projectiles (three from north to south, and one from north-west to south-east) and 21 airbursts, all 3-8km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 20 May, positioned near Zolote close to a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 300-500m north of its position (assessed as inside the disengagement area on its southern edge). (See SMM Spot Report 20 May 2018.)

On 18 May, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and 15 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-3km west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the night of 19-20 May, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-4km west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 18 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted two probable self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk). On 19 May the SMM saw a self-propelled howitzer (2S3) on a flatbed truck travelling north-west near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S3) on a flatbed truck near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 16 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Sofiivka (40km north-east of Donetsk)

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 16 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted a tank (T-64) on the eastern edge of Kostiantynivka. On 20 May the SMM observed 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Kremenivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 27km north-west of Mariupol).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 20 May the SMM saw a tank (type unknown) being towed on a flatbed trailer about 1.5km north-east of Malomykolaivka (36km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. On 20 May, in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) and 12 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and noted as missing a surface-to-air missile system (9K35).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 16 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) and a fire control vehicle (MT-LB 1VXX-variant) in a residential area of Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk). On 18 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) in Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk) and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and a probable APC (BTR-70) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk). On 19 May the SMM observed an IFV (BMP-2) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk). On 20 May, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five APCs (MT-LB) near Sofiivka, three IFVs (BMP-1) near Lohvynove (59km north-east of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-2) and an armoured command vehicle (BMP-1Ksh Potok-2) near Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk) on 16 May; and four APCs (BMP variant) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk) on 18 May. On 19 May the SMM observed an IFV (BMP-1) on the main street in Bohdanivka.

The SMM observed demining activities and mine hazard signs. About 10m south of the junction approximately 700m north-west of Bila Hora (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), the SMM on 19 May observed for the first time a small wooden sign with “mines” written on it in Ukrainian language. On 20 May while on the M03 road, 2km west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw one explosion, around 1km south of its position which it assessed as a controlled explosion, part of demining activities. It observed two unarmed men in military-style clothing and a KAMAZ truck stationary 300-400m south-east of the explosion site.

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company representatives and others to the DFS to assess damage and facilitate repair works. On 19 May, the SMM observed cut power supply lines as well as damaged electrical transformers at the DFS. Voda Donbassa representatives informed the SMM that since the DFS has been shut down due to damage caused to the electrical infrastructure by shelling during the night of 17 May (see SMM Daily Report 18 May 2018), no water has been reaching Avdiivka and Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk) and water available to residents of Donetsk and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) has been reduced respectively by about 20 and 50 percent. On 20 May residents of Avdiivka told the SMM that water had not been available since 19 May. On 20 May, the SMM facilitated access of Voda Donbassa employees to repair the electrical infrastructure of the DFS. A Voda Donbassa representative informed the SMM that, as a result, electricity power had been restored at the DFS. On 19 and 20 May, positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard explosions and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation table below), despite explicit security guarantees. On 19 May, positioned in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) while the SMM was conducting a long-range UAV flight near the DFS, the SMM heard uncountable shots of small-arms fire 200-800m south-west of its position assessed as directed at the UAV; the SMM completed the UAV flight and landed it safely.

On 19 and 20 May, the SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the water pipeline near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and the power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). On 19-20 May, positioned in areas near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka, the SMM heard explosions as well as heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation table below), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. On 19 May, at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 26 trucks, two buses and 22 cars (including one with Georgian and one with Latvian licence plates, and one with "LPR" plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line. On 18 May, on road M03 between the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and a checkpoint in Horlivka, a group of about 50-80 women prevented the SMM from driving through by standing on the road. They told the SMM that they were worried about their security as they were blocked between the checkpoints due to the absence of a public bus that was supposed to come from Horlivka. About ten minutes later, the SMM was able to proceed. Positioned 1.1km south-east of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and small-arms fire 1-2km north-east and south-east. (See SMM Daily Report 19 May 2018.)

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in the city centre. On 19 May, the SMM saw about 300 people (mixed gender and age), some of whom are known to the Mission as members of C14 (Sich) and Sokil, gathered at Independence Square. Some of them were wearing C14 insignia and Sokil T-shirts, as well as holding banners and posters with political messages. The SMM then saw them walking from the square to Tarasa Shevchenka Boulevard and noted that the number of the participants had increased to 800. Later, participants walked to the office of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine at 16 Striletska Street; by then, the number of participants had decreased again to 300 participants. Five police officers were present; the gathering ended without incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example see SMM Daily Report 23 April 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• On 19 May, while present at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, a member of the armed formations demanded that the SMM leave the area.

 

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 19 and 20 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[3]
• On 19 and 20 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.4
• On 19 and 20 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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