Central Europe

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. In Pikuzy, a member of the armed formations fired shots in the general direction of the SMM. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Kuibyshevskyi district of Donetsk city. It observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Donetskyi. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three areas as well as in or near the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district, Pokrovka, Kozatske, Donetsk’s Kuibyshevskyi district and near Dovzhanske at the border with the Russian Federation. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near residential areas in Donetskyi. The Mission continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. It continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 250 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions).

On the evening and night of 13-14 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 110 undetermined explosions and over 320 bursts of heavy‑machine-gun fire, all 4-5km west-north-west.

On the evening and night of 13-14 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 3-5km south-east and about 80 further explosions (32 assessed as impacts of mortar rounds, 22 undetermined mortar rounds and the remainder undetermined) and about 550 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-7km south-east and south-west.

On the evening and night of 13-14 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, a shot in vertical flight, a muzzle flash and five projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west, followed by, in aggregate, 21 undetermined explosions, 752 projectiles (118 from north-west to south-east, 631 from south-east to north-west, two from south to north and one in vertical flight), 40 bursts and shots of undetermined weapons and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km east-north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 170 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (21 explosions).

On the evening of 13 June, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 130 undetermined explosions 10-15km west. During the day on 14 June, positioned in Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 36 undetermined explosions about 10km north.

Members of the armed formations fired shots in the general direction of the SMM. In Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw two men in military-style clothing standing about 50m away, one of whom fired two short bursts with an assault rifle (AK-74) in the general direction of the SMM, at an upwards 45-degree angle. The armed man then took two to three steps in the direction of the SMM and fired another shot into the air in the general direction of the SMM, at an upwards 45-degree angle, after which both men turned and departed the area. (See SMM Spot Report 15 June 2018.)

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of civilian casualties. Following up on reports of two civilian casualties from the Kuibyshevskyi district of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled), the SMM spoke with a 42-year-old man with bandages on both his legs at the Donetsk Trauma Hospital. The man said that on 11 June he had been repairing the roof of a dormitory damaged by shelling at 13 Sofievska Street in Kuibyshevskyi district when shelling had started and he had been injured by shrapnel. The medical staff added that another man (25 years old) was still in the intensive care department but provided no further information.

The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk). (See SMM Daily Report 12 June 2018.) On 13 June, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted fresh impacts at a residential property in the south of Donetskyi – two north-west of the house, one in a shed, and one in the garden south-east of the house – all assessed to have been probably caused by 120mm mortar rounds. At a nearby school (where the SMM observed a hole in its roof on 9 June), 100m west of the property, the UAV spotted two fresh impacts in the roof of the east-wing of the school and two fresh impacts in the yard, 60m north of the school, all assessed to have been probably caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a north-westerly direction. The UAV also spotted two trucks in revetted positions 30m east of the school and a truck in a revetted position 40m south of the school. The same UAV spotted a fresh crater 15m north-west of the nearest civilian property and at least 13 fresh craters on the southern edge of Donetskyi, near previously spotted underground shelters and a mortar pit – with a probable 120mm mortar (see below) – as well as 11 fresh craters in a field about 400m further south (all not visible in imagery from 9 June 2018), all assessed to have probably been caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a north-westerly direction. 

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the early hours of 12 June, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded, in sequence, a burst of an undetermined weapon 0.5-1km south-west and two explosions assessed as impacts 1-1.5km south (all assessed as inside the disengagement area), followed by eight explosions assessed as impacts 1-1.5km at directions ranging from west-north-west to north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 13 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, an illumination flare 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), eight projectiles in flight from west to east 4-6km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area), four projectiles in flight from west to east 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area), a projectile from east to west 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area), a burst 4-6km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and seven projectiles from north to south 4-6km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same evening, the SMM camera near the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion 5-10km north-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 14 June, positioned near all three disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines on 13 June in a non-government-controlled area, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable 120mm mortar on the southern edge of Donetskyi (see above).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites, the SMM saw approximately 30 tanks (T-64) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska, 152mm) near a railway station in Zachativka (government-controlled, 74km south-west of Donetsk) and five tanks near Pokrovka (non-government-controlled, 36km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank weapons[2] and new military-type positions in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 10 June, aerial imagery revealed the presence of ten armoured combat vehicles near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). On 13 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM observed two IFVs (BMP-1) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 14 June, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) – one mounted on a truck in Popasna and one hitched to a truck near Shchastia – and a loaded anti-tank rocket launcher (RPG-22 Netto, 72.5mm) propped up on a stack of tyres at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk), pointing at passing vehicular traffic.

In non-government-controlled areas, west of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, 90km south-east of Donetsk), aerial imagery revealed the presence of three new military-type positions on 7 June (not visible in imagery from 26 May 2018). On 12 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a new firing position near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 26 May 2018). On 12 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a new firing position near Rozsadky (62km north-east of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 26 May 2018). On 13 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk), two APCs (BTR-80) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP variant) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Horlivka. On 14 June, the SMM saw two APCs (BTR-80) near Holubivske (51km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed recently laid mines. On 14 June, at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the north-eastern outskirts of Popasna, the SMM observed 22 anti-tank mines (TM-62). Ten of the mines were laid in a row at 20-30cm intervals 5m from the north-side of a road. Two more rows, consisting of six mines each, were on the south side of the road, also 5m from the road and spaced at 20-30cm intervals. Earlier the same day, the mines had not been present there.

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to and from the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as demining activities around the station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see table below for ceasefire violations). Positioned about 2km east of the DFS, the SMM observed about 40 people fortifying a trench and probable bunker near road H-04, about 150m south-west from the nearest civilian house. The SMM observed trucks carrying at least 12 loads of dirt to the site.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM also noted ten Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel repair a broken bridge south-west of Popasna.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for 15 minutes, the SMM saw three cars, a mini-bus and a bus (all with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and a bus and four cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates) and three pedestrians entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 13 June, two armed formation members prevented the SMM from entering the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.
• On 14 June, three armed formation members prevented the SMM from entering Pokrovka.
• On 14 June, an armed formation members prevented the SMM from proceeding east from Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol).

• On 14 June, armed formation members at a checkpoint in Donetsk city’s Kuibyshevskyi district, approximately 1.3km south-west of the Donetsk central railway station, told the SMM not to proceed beyond the railway station.
• On 14 June, at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, an armed formation member told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 14 June, in Pikuzy, an armed formation member fired shots in the general direction of the SMM from a distance of 50m.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. 4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 14 June, a woman in Holubivka stated she could not provide the SMM with additional information regarding the alleged shelling of a school in Donetskyi without permission from a “DPR” member.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka and Pyshchevyk were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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A five-day training course aimed at strengthening the capacity of Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Security Service and Prosecutor’s Office officials to disrupt the financing of terrorist networks and to apply sanctions pursuant to relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions concluded on 15 June 2018 in Astana.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the Academy of Law Enforcement Agencies under the Prosecutor General’s Office, the  Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE Secretariat, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

The training course, led by OSCE and UNODC experts, focused on examining terrorist financial networks, disrupting financial flows, and conducting vulnerability and impact analyses. How to formulate and submit proposals for UN sanctions was also covered. Based on localized scenarios, the trainers identified specific instruments used during investigations to counter terrorist financial networks and to enhance inter-agency co-operation. The trainers focused in particular on compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1988, 1989, 2253, 2255 and 2368.

The event builds on the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance and is part of its multi-year efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

Current challenges and solutions for the ensuring the rule of law topped the agenda of this year’s annual Shaikenov Readings, which took the form of an OSCE-supported international conference on 15 June 2018 in Astana.

The event, named in honour of Nagashbay Shaikenov, former Minister of Justice and one of the most prominent legal scholars and state figures in the modern history of Kazakhstan, was dedicated to the 25th anniversary of Kazakhstan’s Legislation Institute.

Some 150 high-level government officials, parliamentarians, legal practitioners, and representatives of academia, international organizations and NGOs discussed a wide range of issues related to importance and role of the rule of law in the administration of justice. They reviewed existing practice in relation to the execution of administrative acts, and the improvement of Criminal Code provisions on responsibility for environmental criminal offenses. The development of legal education and legal expertise were also discussed.

Legal experts from Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation presented their perspectives on the development of the rule of law in the so-called digital era, as well as the existing trends in reforming administrative, commercial and family law in their countries.

Separate sections of the conference were devoted to the role of the public in the legislative process, as well as to enhancing the effectiveness of public law branches, such as the implementation of international criminal law norms in national legislation.

The event was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the Justice Ministry’s Legislation Institute.

The conference is part of the Programme Office’s long-term activities in supporting the process of legal system reform in Kazakhstan.

ROME, 15 June 2018 – It is an honour to be the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. In a world of complex and inter-linked challenges that require effective multilateral solutions, the OSCE has a crucial role to play in fostering inclusive dialogue and improving our regional security. As the world’s largest regional security organization, the OSCE is a unique platform for political co-operation.

The concept of comprehensive security, upon which the OSCE is based, is today more topical than ever. It means that domestic and international security, economic and environmental co-operation, political and military dialogue, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental principles are intimately interconnected and must be pursued with a holistic approach. It is at the core of our vision for an innovative international security architecture.

This is the reason why “Dialogue, Ownership and Responsibility” is the motto of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, reflecting the main principles which inspired the establishment of our Organization four decades ago and which can guide us on the way ahead.

Italy will do its utmost to build bridges and promote consensus. To relaunch the spirit of Helsinki, we need to strengthen the effectiveness of our Organization. Making the OSCE stronger, more responsive, more transparent, more resilient and open to new and effective collaboration, also with our Mediterranean and Asian Partners, is essential for the European and global security architecture.

As holder of the OSCE Chairmanship, Italy will continue to give great importance to the many challenges and opportunities emanating from the Mediterranean region, including migration. This is why intensifying dialogue and co-operation with the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean is essential for us.

We will continue to give top priority to the crisis in and around Ukraine, fully supporting the diplomatic efforts of the Normandy Format and of the Trilateral Contact Group to find a peaceful solution through the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

As for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, the positive outcome of the 5+2 talks, which took place in Rome on 29 and 30 May, proves that proactively supporting existing negotiation frameworks can contribute to delivering continued progress and tangible results for the benefit of people.

We will also encourage a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by supporting the efforts of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. And we will continue to ensure an active OSCE contribution as Co-Chair of the Geneva International Discussions, which deal with the consequences of the 2008 war in Georgia.

The Italian Chairmanship will continue to work intensively to strengthen the three security dimensions of the OSCE: the politico-military dimension, the economic and environment dimension, and the human dimension.

We will maintain the strong focus on transnational threats. This includes fighting terrorism and radicalization, with a focus on combating the use of the Internet by terrorist groups; cybersecurity; and combating all forms of illicit trafficking. Fighting corruption will also remain high on our agenda, as corruption undermines the relationship - built on trust - between governments and their citizens.

The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is our greatest common good. We therefore encourage the participating States to pay greater attention to countering trafficking in human beings and protecting the rights of victims, especially women, children and unaccompanied minors. We will counter all forms of racism, xenophobia, intolerance and discrimination.

In the OSCE we need a long-term, positive vision: to inspire and guide our actions; to defuse tensions through dialogue; to fully utilize the tool-kit of co-operative security; and to rediscover the bonds of civility that unite 57 participating States, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, despite their differences.

As OSCE Chairmanship, we will apply all our efforts, our determination and our resources to drive this vision forward. And we look forward to co-operating with all participating States and Partners for Co-operation to achieve these common goals.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

At 14:03 on 14 June, an SMM patrol consisting of six members and two armoured vehicles was in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) on the corner of roads T-0519 and C-051235, where it stopped to observe fresh tracks from what it assessed to be an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-type) on the asphalt.

One of the patrol members exited his car, after which the entire patrol heard two short bursts of small-arms fire. From inside one of the vehicles, one of the SMM patrol members saw two men in military-style clothing standing about 50m south on the road. One of the men was armed with an assault rifle (AK-74) and firing his weapon, pointed in the general direction of the SMM, at an upwards 45-degree angle. The armed man then took two to three steps in the direction of the SMM, and fired another shot into the air in the general direction of the SMM, at an upwards 45-degree angle. After the last shot, both men turned and walked south along road C-051235.

The SMM assessed that the shots were fired to warn the patrol and force it to leave the area. The SMM immediately departed and returned safely to its base in Mariupol.

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The Border Security and Management Unit (BSMU) of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in close co-operation with the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, organized a workshop on establishing an Advance Passenger Information (API) system in Uzbekistan from 13 to 14 June. The event was aimed at detecting and preventing the movement of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), particularly those returning or relocating from conflict zones.

An API system is an electronic system through which biographic data from a traveller’s passport and flight details are collected by airlines. They are then transmitted to the relevant national authorities at the border before the departure or arrival of a specific flight. By checking the data against law enforcement watch lists, such as those of INTERPOL, border officials can know in advance whether FTFs or other passengers with suspicious profiles are attempting to enter their country.

The event brought together 45 representatives from all the national agencies involved in passenger processing.  They included the Head of the Aviation Security Department, police and customs officers, members of the State Security Service and the State Personalization Centre, as well as representatives from the INTERPOL National Central Bureau.

The main purpose of the workshop was to draft a tailored action plan outlining the relevant technological and operational procedures for setting up an API system in Uzbekistan. The workshop was also attended by border control officers from Australia, Hungary and the United States, as well as commercial services providers and representatives from Uzbekistan Airways, who shared their experience in implementing and using API systems.

Ambassador John MacGregor, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, said: “Establishing an API system can play a crucial role in enhancing border management and ensuring a more efficient co-ordination between national law enforcement authorities in the fight against organized crime and terrorism, which is one of the commitments included in Uzbekistan’s Development Strategy for 2017-2021.”

The path to the establishment of an API system in Uzbekistan was paved by the adoption on 21 December 2017 of the Decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, which grants border and customs officers the authority to collect, store and process passenger data while fully respecting citizens’ right to privacy. The Decision sets 2020 as the deadline for the establishing of the API system in the country.

The event in Uzbekistan was the eighth workshop on API that has been organized in the OSCE region since December 2016. TNTD/BSMU will conduct one more workshop in 2018, which will take place in Chișinău (Moldova) from 10 to 12 July.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Holubivske. It observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Pikuzy as well as damage to a school in Betmanove. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it observed military hardware inside the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three areas. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near residential areas in Tarasivka as well as in Oleksandropil, Novoaidar and Topolyne. The Mission continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station through monitoring the security situation around the station. It continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to water pipelines near Holmivskyi and mine clearance at the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (about 230 explosions).

On the evening and night of 12-13 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from north-east to south-west, an undetermined explosion and eight projectiles from west to east, followed by totals of 23 undetermined explosions, two shots and about 155 projectiles (146 from west to east and nine from east to west), all 1-3km south, as well as an explosion assessed as an impact of a mortar or other artillery round less than 1 km south.

On the evening and night of 12 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an outgoing mortar round 4-5km south-east, as well as 61 undetermined explosions and about 250 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-9km at directions ranging from east to west.

On the evening and night of 12-13 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from south to north, three undetermined explosions, two projectiles from south to north and six projectiles from north to south, followed by totals of 12 undetermined explosions and 286 projectiles (212 from south to north, 69 from north to south, one from south-east to north-west and four from south-west to north-east), all 3-6km east. During the day on 13 June, positioned in Maiorsk, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-5km south.

During the day on 13 June, positioned on the northern edge of Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and 20 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 0.5-5km north-east and west-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 21 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions).

During the day on 13 June, positioned in Komyshuvakha (government-controlled, 68km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 10-12km south.

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of civilian casualties. At the hospital in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), medical staff told the SMM that two patients were still being treated for injuries sustained during an explosion in a bus on 7 June (in which seven people were reportedly injured, see SMM Daily Report 13 June 2018). Medical staff added that one of the patients was a man (about 20 years old) who had suffered a concussion and the other was a woman (late fifties) who had a shrapnel wound to her right elbow, but that both were in stable condition. Medical staff said that another man (about 50 years old), the driver of the bus, had first been admitted to the hospital on 7 June with shrapnel wounds to his left eye and remnants of shrapnel in the bridge of his nose and then had been re-admitted on 12 June.

The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). On 13 June, the SMM saw a fresh crater (about 2m in diameter) 4m west of the west-facing wall of the school gym building, about 6m east of a barn in the yard of a house and 12m east of a residential building at 10 Pobedy Street. Shrapnel pieces were visible in the crater. The SMM also saw fresh shrapnel scarring on the west-facing wall of the gym (at least 50 marks) and on the east-facing wall of the barn (about ten marks), as well as corrugated asbestos panels that had been blown off the roof of the barn. Branches from trees and bushes 2-3m from the impact site showed fresh shrapnel marks. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a west-south-westerly direction. A male resident (in his fifties) of 10 Pobedy Street told the SMM that he had heard explosions the evening of 12 June, one of which had impacted near his home.

In Betmanove (non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM followed up on reports of damage from gunfire to a school on Haharina Street. The SMM saw a broken north-west facing window in the ground floor office, a broken north-west facing window in the stairwell to the first floor and a bullet hole in the north-west facing wall. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by bullets fired from a north-westerly direction. According to a community representative and the head of the school, the damage had occurred on 11 and 12 June.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

After midnight on 8 June, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded, in sequence, four bursts from west to east, a projectile from north-west to south-east and a projectile from west-north-west to east-south-east, all 200-500m south and south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 13 June, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) inside the disengagement area near Petrivske, about 1.5km inside the south-western edge.[2] On the same day, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Petrivske and east of the north-eastern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM saw a stationary armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (BTR variant) and several men in military-style clothing loading or unloading ammunition, small arms and a small recoilless gun (SPG type) on a tripod, as well as an IFV (BMP variant) heading east.

On 12 June, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) and a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces within a residential area on the southern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-1) on the south-western edge of Katerynivka, all inside the disengagement area near Zolote (see SMM Daily Report 26 April 2018 and SMM Daily Report 13 June 2018).  

On the night of 12-13 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded four undetermined explosions 5-15km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 13 June, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, an SMM mini-UAV on 12 June spotted five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) about 100m from an abandoned school and residential buildings in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk), two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a residential area of Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S3), two of which were probable, near Oleksandropil. On 13 June, the SMM saw six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a military compound near Topolyne (19km north-west of Mariupol) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S3) loaded on a flatbed truck heading west near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, an SMM mini-UAV on 12 June spotted eight tanks (T-64) near Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) about 80m from an abandoned school and residential buildings near Tarasivka (see SMM Daily Report 24 May 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw three tanks (two T-64 and one T-72) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM noted for the first time that two weapons holding areas were abandoned with eight towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12) missing, including five towed howitzers (2A36) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) missing for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In a government-controlled area, on 12 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk). In a non-government-controlled area, on 13 June, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP) and an ACV (BTR) near Petrivske (see above).

In Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk), at the gate of a house, the SMM saw an advertisement by the armed formations (a poster with a picture of a tank) of vacancies for tank operators and free courses for operating tanks.

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to and from the DFS, as well as demining activities around the station, through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below for ceasefire violations). The SMM noted that a previously reported 82mm mortar shell tailfin located between the DFS and Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 11 June 2018) had been removed.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to 3km of a water pipeline near Holmivskyi by a Voda Donbassa repair team. It also facilitated mine clearance at the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk by an international organization. 

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw a bus and a minibus (both with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and six cars (five with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates) and a bus and a minibus (both with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw, among other vehicles, 20 trucks with semi-trailers (eight with Ukrainian licence plates, of which two were uncovered empty trailers and the remainder had covered cargo areas, including two cooler trailers; two with Russian Federation licence plates, three with Belarusian licence plates and covered cargo areas, including one cooler trailer, as well as seven with “DPR” plates and covered cargo areas, including one cooler trailer) in a queue to exit Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for 20 minutes, the SMM observed no pedestrians present.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 12 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka and Pyshchevyk were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Addendum: In reference to the SMM Daily Report of 12 June 2018, the relevant part should read “On 10 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a 70m-long extension of a trench system about 100m north of the disengagement area, about 150m north-west of Petrivske (not visible in imagery from 7 February 2018)”, not 150m north-east.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 14 June 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today said he was concerned about recent proposals to amend the Law on Audio-Visual Media in Albania.

The country’s Audio-Visual Media Authority transmitted several amendments to the Law on Audio-Visual Media to the Ministry of Finance and Economy on 8 June. The amendments were drafted by the owners and directors of four local and two national television stations in Albania. One of their key demands is that the private broadcasters should be allocated part of the TV licence fee that is currently funding the public service broadcaster, RTSH.

“I am concerned that this proposal could affect the financial sustainability of the RTSH,” said Désir. “Public service broadcasters have an important role in providing quality information and nationwide coverage and must have the adequate resources to perform their duties.”

“Any system of state subsidies to media needs to be subject to a public consultation including all the media stakeholders. It should also have a clear and broad objective of support to all media sectors, including online, print and local press, with transparent criteria and procedure, no political interference and with the aim to strengthen media plurality,” he added.

The Representative offered the support of his Office in providing a legal analysis of any media-related draft legislation once it is officially proposed by the government.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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The OSCE Mission to Serbia and the Sremska Mitrovica Correctional Institution organized an Open Doors Day in the dog shelter of the Sremska Mitrovica penitentiary on 22 June 2018 to promote innovative ways for rehabilitation and resettlement of offenders.

The Open Doors Day is part of the project supported by the OSCE Mission to Serbia and implemented by the Ministry of Justice’s Directorate for Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions, the City of Sremska Mitrovica, and the German relief organization Help – Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V.

At the event, the first group of 14 inmates received certificates of completion of a ten-week training programme during which they learned how to care for and train dogs. The carefully designed, comprehensive programme is meant to improve the education prospects of offenders, and to prepare them for re-integration into society after release.

The inmates also earned a certificate issued by the University of Belgrade’s Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, which is required for all employees of animal shelters and will increase their employment prospects after release.  The project is modelled on a similar one successfully implemented by the Scottish Prison Service/University of Stirling Psychology School.   

“I am very happy to see that the project we support has managed to achieve its key goals: to provide offenders with the opportunity to participate in meaningful activities, improve behaviour and employability skills, as well as to enhance educational and community engagement.  Based on the principle of local ownership, the OSCE Mission will continue to work in partnership with the host country on improvement of rehabilitation and resettlement of prisoners,” stated Ambassador Andrea Orizio, Head of the OSCE Mission to Serbia.    

The event is part of the OSCE Mission to Serbia’s wider efforts to support Serbia’s initiatives aimed at improving the rule of law and performance of the criminal justice system, including the enforcement of criminal sanctions.

VIENNA, 14 June 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today expressed his concern following last night’s disappearance of Stefan Cvetković, a journalist from Bela Crkva in Serbia.

According to the police, who already started an investigation, Cvetković’s car was found in Bela Crkva with the doors open and headlights switched on.

In addition, journalists who tried to contact him report that all his mobile phones were turned off.

“I’m deeply worried by Cvetković’s disappearance and urge the Serbian authorities to do their utmost to find him,” Désir said, welcoming the fact that the police have deployed substantial resources and that President Vučić is closely following the case.

Cvetković was reportedly working on a story lately related to the murder of Oliver Ivanović, a politician assasinated in Kosovo in January this year.

Moreover, he has been the subject of several threats in the past. In March last year the journalist was sentenced by the Basic Court in Vršac to two years and three months in prison and given a fine of 2,150,000 million dinars following a lawsuit filed by three local politicians. These verdicts were annulled by the High Court.

Désir also noted concerns regarding the disappearance of the journalist raised by many local journalists’ associations and foundations including, UNS, NUNS, NDNV, LP, AM, ANEM, AOM and Slavko Ćuruvija Foundation.

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The current human rights situation in Crimea and the challenges faced by human rights defenders working on and in Crimea were discussed at an expert meeting on 14 June 2018 in Kherson, Ukraine. The meeting was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

The event brought together 28 participants (15 women and 13 men) from leading civil society organizations working on Crimea human rights issues, intergovernmental organizations and the presidential Mission. Participants examined the current human rights situation in light of the recommendations provided in the 2015 Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea, prepared by ODIHR and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).

“The ODIHR/HCNM report highlighted a number of human rights challenges and provided a list of recommendations to address them. It is important to revisit together the recommendations and assess their implementation,” said Jennifer Croft, Deputy Head of the Human Rights Department at ODIHR. “ODIHR’s aim with this event is to facilitate the dialogue between Ukrainian civil society and relevant authorities, with the aim of strengthening joint and co-ordinated responses to the identified challenges and issues.”

Eskender Bariiev, Director of the Crimean Tatar Resource Centre, said: “Co-operation and collaboration among human rights organizations, minority communities and state authorities in Ukraine are at the core of timely and efficient response to pressing challenges that residents of Crimea, including minority and indigenous communities and other vulnerable groups, face.”

“The expert meeting is of great importance for enhancing co-operation between human rights defenders and the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,” said Borys Babin, Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. “This will further the efforts of my office to promote and monitor the observance of the human rights of Ukrainian citizens living in Crimea and of internally displaced persons from the peninsula.”

KYIV, 14 June 2018 – Alexander Hug, the Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, will hold his regular news briefing on Friday, 15 June, in Kyiv.

He will talk about the security situation throughout Ukraine and the Mission’s recent activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 15 June, at 12:30 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at the Ukrainian House, 2 Khreshchatyk Street.

Live streaming of the news briefing will be available at http://uacrisis.org/ru/stream/#eng

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A team of experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) visited Skopje from 13 to 14 June 2018 to provide assistance at the final meeting of the working group on electoral reform, which is mandated to review the country’s electoral code.

The working group was established by the Ministry of Justice, and the meeting was co-organized with the civil society organization MOST. The group included representatives of parliamentary political parties, relevant institutions and civil society organizations, and met five times since it was set up in May. Previous ODIHR electoral recommendations were an integral part of the discussions.

The ODIHR team shared expertise and good practices for effective electoral reform, including on the benefits of broad engagement, inclusiveness and transparency in the group’s work. Experts supported the group by providing technical and legal expertise, particularly in the areas of election administration, voter registration and media coverage of campaigns.

The output of the sessions will serve as the basis for the Ministry of Justice to either draft amendments to or prepare a new electoral code in the coming months. ODIHR will continue to support this process by offering technical expertise and a legal review.

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to promptly following up on ODIHR’s electoral recommendations, and ODIHR has consistently supported these efforts.

The support to the working group was provided under the project Support to Elections in the Western Balkans, which aims to strengthen ODIHR’s assistance to the electoral follow-up processes in the region. The project is funded by the European Union and the Austrian Development Agency. The visit was co-ordinated with the OSCE Mission to Skopje.

YEREVAN, 14 June 2018 - The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stephane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) together with the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk, met with Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan, and President Armen Sarkissian during an introductory visit to Yerevan on 12-14 June.

The Co-Chairs and the Armenian officials reviewed the status of negotiations and discussed next steps to move the process forward, including a ministerial meeting in the near future. They also exchanged views on the current situation on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and the line of contact, underscoring the importance of maintaining a constructive environment. ‎

The Co-Chairs reiterated their commitment to helping the sides find a peaceful solution to the conflict based on the core principles of the Helsinki Final Act, including the non-use or threat of force, territorial integrity, and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Armenian officials expressed their support for the work of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs and Personal Representative and their willingness to continue working productively under the auspices of the Co-Chairs.

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The OSCE Mission to Montenegro, in partnership with Montenegrin National Coordinator’s Office for Combating Human Trafficking, organized a workshop dedicated to the preparation of the 2019-2024 Draft National Strategy for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (THB) and the 2019 Action Plan from 11 to 13 June 2018 in Podgorica.

Topics discussed in the workshop, led by international expert Bistra Netkova, included the legal framework against THB; analysis of the results from 2012 to 2017 and recommendations for the next five years; European Union strategy on combating THB; THB prevention; THB victims’ identification and protection, and strategy co-ordination and implementation.

Some 20 practitioners, representing the national inter-agency working group for THB strategy, Higher Court, Justice Ministry, State Prosecutor’s Office, Interior Ministry, Foreign Affairs Ministry, Health Ministry, Finance Ministry, Education Ministry, Tourism and Sustainable Development Ministry and NGO sector, participated.

“Co-operation on this level is considered essential for the development of a legal framework for combating trafficking in human beings and advancing with the activities in this area,” said OSCE Robert Kucharski, OSCE Programme Manager for Security Co-operation and Governance.

The Strategy and the Action Plan are expected to be adopted by the end of 2018. The activity is part of the Mission’s efforts to address transnational threats to security and is a continuation of support provided in the preparation of the key documents.

The second workshop will be held from 25 to 27 June in Podgorica.

MINSK, 13 June 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 13 June 2018:

“As you know, the Normandy Four Foreign Ministers meeting took place in Berlin the day before yesterday. The sides expressed their recommitment to the Minsk agreements and the peaceful settlement of the conflict. I am convinced that the activation of the Normandy Four at different levels will also give significant political impetus to our work here in Minsk.

Today I would like to note a few important trends. This year, to date, the number of civilian casualties has been significantly reduced compared to the similar period of 2017. The total number of casualties declined by 55%, and the number of fatalities by 37%. I want to say, however, that even a single casualty is too much. Regrettably, this year the number of child fatalities is bigger by one child compared to the last year; this raises my indignation. 

As regards the Donetsk Filtering Station (DFS), I am glad that all the repair works have been completed thanks to the security guarantees provided to the employees. I hope that in the future I will not have to talk again about the DFS in my briefings. 

This topic was discussed today in the Security Working Group. Besides, issues related to the disengagement of forces and hardware in the agreed disengagement areas were duly considered.

The Economic Working Group continued its discussion on the way to restore and improve the mobile communication of Vodafone-Ukraine in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR). It was noted that more time and considerable technical investments are required to restore full-fledged high-quality communication services.

The participants also considered the issues of water deliveries in the supply systems "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbassa".

The Working Group on Humanitarian Issues continued its discussion on the exchange of detainees as well as on the issue of missing persons.

Another important topic for the Working Group was the improvement of conditions for crossing the contact line via checkpoints, including the one in Stanytsia Luhanska. In particular, the repairs of the access pathway to the bridge on the northern bank of the Seversky Donets were discussed.

The Working Group on Political Issues further considered the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and modalities of local elections in CADR and CARL. As I have already mentioned, active interaction with the Normandy Four is of particular importance for the activities of the Political Working Group.”

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ROME/VIENNA - OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Italy’s Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero Milanesi and OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger welcomed the announcement of an agreement between Athens and Skopje on resolving the name issue, which they hailed as a major step towards advancing regional stability.

“Congratulations to Prime Ministers Alexis Tsipras and Zoran Zaev for their leadership and commitment to this momentous process for both countries, for South-Eastern Europe and for Europe as a whole,” Chairperson Moavero said. “This is a unique opportunity that one must seize and further build upon.”   

Secretary General Greminger stressed the significance of dialogue and compromise in this process. “This historic agreement can now lead to a long-term solution for the benefit of all citizens and the entire region.”

The Secretary General also expressed his appreciation to the United Nations, which has led mediation efforts to resolve this dispute for more than 25 years.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Holubivske. The SMM observed damage caused by shelling at a civilian residence in Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations nearby and observed military equipment and new positions of the armed formations inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three areas and it was also prevented from following up on civilian casualties at a hospital in an area outside of government control. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Zolote (outside the disengagement area) and Khlibodarivka. The Mission continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station through monitoring the security situation around the station. It continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and water repairs near Holmivskyi.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 230 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (280 explosions).

On the evening and night of 11-12 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from east to west, a projectile from west to east, a projectile from east to west, a projectile from west to east, two undetermined explosions and a projectile from west to east, all 3-5km south.

During the day on 12 June, positioned north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 5-8km north-north-west, small-arms fire 1km north-north-west, as well as two undetermined explosions and bursts of small-arms fire 1-3km west-south-west.

The same day, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-4km south-east. Positioned on the eastern edge of Avdiivka, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and small-arms fire 3-4km south-east and south-south-east.

On the evening and night of 11-12 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 125 undetermined explosions and about 300 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-east. During the day on 12 June, at the same location, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east.

On the evening and night of 11-12 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from south to north, two bursts in flight from south-east to north-west, a projectile from south-east to north-west and six projectiles from south to north, followed by totals of nine undetermined explosions, 224 projectiles (172 from south to north, 51 from north to south, and one from south-east to north-west), 30 bursts (18 from south-east to north-west, 11 from south to north, and one from north to south) and an illumination flare from east to west, all 4-6km east-north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, two explosions, compared with the previous reporting period  (no explosions).

At a checkpoint of the armed formations in the Trudovski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), a man in military-type clothing, who appeared to the SMM to be inebriated, threw a hammer in the direction of the SMM patrol members. The hammer flew over the patrol members’ heads and landed about 2m from two parked SMM vehicles, and the inebriated man then left the spot. A member of the armed formations from the nearby checkpoint apologized to the SMM for the other man’s behaviour.

The SMM continued to follow up on media reports of civilian casualties. In Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), a woman (45 years old) told the SMM that she had been a passenger on a bus that had been damaged during an explosion on 7 June. (See SMM Daily Report 8 June 2018.) The woman told the SMM that she had been injured and had shrapnel removed from her right shoulder. The woman said she had been standing behind the bus driver, and at about 10:30 she heard an explosion on the passenger side of the bus, which immediately blew out all the windows. She said there had been 18-19 passengers on the bus and she had heard screaming, and many of the passengers had blood and broken shards of glass on them. She said she had been treated at, and later released from the hospital in Holubivka (formerly Kirovske, 51km west of Luhansk) the same day.

The SMM observed damage caused by shelling at a civilian residence in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk). On the third floor of an apartment building at 15 Vatutina Street, the SMM observed damage to the outer wall and window frame of a balcony on the south-west side of the building, assessed as caused by shrapnel. The SMM saw that the glass had been broken out of the window frame and that the frame and window sill were dotted with holes caused by shrapnel. The SMM saw a hole caused by shrapnel in the ceiling of the living room. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a round fired from a south-westerly direction. A couple residing in the apartment told the SMM that they had heard shooting and explosions that caused the damage around 06:00 on 12 June and that they had been at home with their daughter (13 years old) at the time. 

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 11 June, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) (inside the Zolote disengagement area). The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck inside the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, about 2km north-east of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM mini-UAV also spotted new military-type positions under construction adjacent to previously observed trenches of the armed formations, about 60m inside the southern edge of the disengagement area (not visible in imagery from 28 May 2018).

On the night of 12 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion and three projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, all 4-8km east-north-east and east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

While on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska during the early morning of 12 June, the SMM heard an explosion 5-7km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 12 June, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a military compound near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 22 May 2018), and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in Zolote-3 (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), about 1.5km north-west of the Zolote disengagement area.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw three tanks (T-72) near Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk), two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khlibodarivka and eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a military compound near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Luhansk region, the SMM saw five towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and noted that 34 towed howitzers (26 2A65 and eight 2A36) and twelve anti-tank guns (MT-12) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft weapon[2] and fresh craters in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 11 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted eight IFVs (two BMP-1, three BMP-2 and three BMP variants) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk) and three IFVs (two BMP-1 and a BMP-2) in Novoselivka (66km south of Donetsk). On 12 June, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP variant), one of which was next to a school, in Zolote-3.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 11 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a camouflaged ACV (type unknown) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP-1) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk). On 12 June, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) in Holubivske (51km west of Luhansk) and six APCs (MT-LB) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

On 11 June, near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km north-west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted six fresh craters in a field about 1.3km north-east of the closest civilian house, assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a south-easterly direction.

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to and from the DFS, as well as demining activities around the station, through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below for ceasefire violations).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to 3km of a water pipeline by a Voda Donbassa repair team near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also facilitated and monitored ongoing construction of a winter shelter near the Maiorsk entry-exit checkpoint by an international organization. 

The SMM continued to see unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 11 June, in Pervomaisk, the SMM saw an 82mm mortar round on the territory of a coal mine. On road T-0504, the SMM saw the remnants of an artillery shell (122mm) embedded in the concrete and two rounds of ammunition (7.62mm) near an abandoned fuel station on the north-western edge of Pervomaisk. About 8m west of a road 700m south-west of Molodizhne, the SMM saw the tailfin of an artillery round lodged in a tree, about 120-150cm from the ground, and an expended rocket-propelled-grenade round near a building on the north-eastern edge of Molodizhne.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 12 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. 4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. 4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• At a hospital in Rovenky (non-government-controlled, 54km south of Luhansk), while the SMM was speaking to the chief doctor, the hospital “administration” instructed the doctor not to speak to the SMM and said that all future visits by the SMM should be co-ordinated with the armed formations in Luhansk city.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka and Pyshchevyk were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 13 June 2018 – Ways to enhance women’s participation in the armed forces were a key area of focus at this year’s Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, held today in Vienna. Representatives of the OSCE participating States shared their experiences on implementing the Code, a unique and fundamental document which aims to regulate the role of armed forces in democratic societies.

Opening the meeting, Ambassador Andrej Benedejčič, Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the OSCE and Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation, reminded representatives of the participating States that the Code is one of the OSCE’s most important normative documents and occupies a fundamental place among the body of commitments developed within the politico-military dimension of security.

The meeting’s first working session centred on a presentation of a new baseline study on women in the armed forces in the OSCE region commissioned by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

“Servicewomen are still a small minority in the armed forces across the OSCE region. On average, they make up 9.7 per cent of all service personnel,” said Susan Atkins, author of the report. “Whilst no legal barriers to women's full participation across the armed forces exist in over three-quarters of participating States, there are still a number of practical barriers in many states, including a lack of appropriate facilities and equipment, low maximum recruitment targets, male-focused working environments and abuse, from which women suffer disproportionately,” she said.

She added that three-quarters of OSCE participating States have introduced new laws or policies in the last ten years, and there is a wealth of good practice across the OSCE region.

Omer Fisher, Head of the Human Rights Department at ODIHR, said that this OSCE institution has a track record of assisting OSCE participating States in upholding the rights of female and male security sector personnel. He recalled that ODIHR’s mandate in this area of work is based particularly on Article 32 of the Code, which states that each participating State will ensure that military and security forces personnel are able to enjoy and exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In the meeting’s second working session, representatives of the participating States reviewed the results of a statistical overview prepared by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, which details the participating States’ efforts in implementing the Code of Conduct.

Today’s meeting followed an event held yesterday in Vienna by the Slovenian Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation, which saw representatives of Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Sweden present their best practices and practical materials on implementing the Code, with an emphasis on the governance and democratic control of armed and security forces as well as international humanitarian law and the human rights of armed and security forces.

That event was followed by a special panel focused on private military and security companies and their potential impact on human rights and the rule of law.

Alan Bryden of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) presented a study commissioned by the OSCE, which analyses responses provided by participating States since 2009 in the framework of the Annual Information Exchange on the Code of Conduct pertaining to private military and security companies. The study highlighted the need to foster dialogue and increase engagement on regulating private military and security companies and to encourage comprehensive, thoughtful and regular reporting on this industry in the Annual Information Exchange.

Representatives of Switzerland and Austria also presented their national experiences in regulating private military and security companies.

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Addressing the security needs of Jewish communities was the focus of an event co-organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, in co-operation with the Interior Ministry of the Slovak Republic, the Jewish Community of Bratislava/Slovakia and the Museum of Jewish Culture, on 14 June 2018.

The event brought together Slovak law-enforcement and Jewish community representatives, as well as officials from other relevant ministries and NGOs, to raise awareness of issues related to ensuring security for Jewish communities. Discussions focused on co-operation between law-enforcement agencies and Jewish communities in Slovakia and the challenges, opportunities and recommendations for such co-operation in the future.

The event also provided an opportunity to present the Slovak-language version of the ODIHR publication Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities – A Practical Guide. The publication details practical steps that governments can take, in co-operation with Jewish communities, to prevent and respond to Anti-Semitic hate crimes and better address the security needs of those communities. 

Ilan Cohn, ODIHR Project Manager, said: “The Slovak authorities may use the Guide as a roadmap for a thoughtful assessment of the security issues that Jewish and other communities face on a daily basis and consider a wide range of measures they can implement to effectively address them.”

“Tolerance, non-discrimination and respect for diversity are crucial for peaceful co-existence in every society. Responsibility for the protection of all citizens lies with governments in close co-operation with representatives of respective communities and other relevant actors,” said Lukáš Parízek, State Secretary of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “We hope that this meeting will be useful for launching a discussion on the specific challenges posed by anti-Semitism to Jewish communities and also serve as a model for addressing the security needs of other communities that are also vulnerable to hate crimes.”

Building on the expressed interest of Slovak authorities to address anti-Semitism and promote tolerance more generally, ODIHR will organize an additional event in Bratislava from 19 to 21 June, in partnership with the State Pedagogical Institute. This event will provide a platform to consult staff from teacher training institutes and school directors from throughout the OSCE region about the development of a framework curricula and guidance materials to be used to train teachers in addressing intolerance, bias, prejudice, and particularly anti-Semitism.