OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. It recorded ceasefire violations assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Bezimenne, Novoazovsk, Lebedynske, Alchevsk and Bohdanivka.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske and Aidar water pumping stations, a gas pipeline near Yasynuvata and the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station, as well as to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit and Nyzhnoteple.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 140 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 115 explosions).

On the evening and night of 21-22 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 45 explosions (two assessed as incoming and one as outgoing, one as an airburst and the remainder undetermined), 46 projectiles in flight (the majority from south-easterly to north-westerly directions) and 13 muzzle flashes, all 0.5-3km at southerly directions.

On the evening of 21 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and about 445 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire (mostly 2-3km east), all 2-6km east and south-east. During the day on 22 October, while in the same location, the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 120 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire (mostly 2-3km east), all 2-7km east and south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 40 explosions).

Positioned about 800m east of Svitle (non-government-controlled, 11km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions (ten assessed as outgoing and the remainder undetermined) as well as eight bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-7km south-south-west. 

The SMM continued to follow up on reports that a woman and a man (both in their forties) had died in a location between Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled 59km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). As of the morning of 23 October, no agreement had been reached on a recovery operation despite dialogue facilitation efforts undertaken by the Mission since the explosion was reported on 18 October. (See SMM Daily Report 22 October 2018.)

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 22 October, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard 11 shots and bursts of small-arms fire 2km south-south-west, assessed as outside of the disengagement area.

On the evening of 21 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded seven projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east, all 2-4km south-east and assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske and also in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation in the Petrivske disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three towed howitzers (probable D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Dyliivka (49km north of Donetsk), three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in firing positions near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk).

In violation of respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk), four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk) and eight MLRS (BM-21) about 2km west of Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) about 3.5km north of Bila Hora. On 22 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (S-300) and two towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) on trucks near Nikolske (formerly Volodarske, 97km south of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM observed two towed howitzers (D-20) on the western outskirts of Urzuf (40km south-west of Mariupol).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35, Strela-10), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 11 tanks (T-64) in a training area near Miusynsk; nine tanks (type undetermined), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and three towed howitzers (D-30) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk); and 45 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Manuilivka. The same long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Zhytenko (70km east of Donetsk), which was turned on and operating, north-west of a non-government-controlled area near the border with the Russian Federation where the SMM had previously observed convoys entering and exiting Ukraine (for most recent observations see SMM Daily Report 18 October 2018).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft guns[3] and other signs of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Yurivka (35km north of Donetsk), three ACVs near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk), an infantry fighting vehicle  (BMP-1) near Opytne (12km north-west of Donetsk) and an APC (type undetermined) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk). On 22 October, the SMM saw two APCs (BTR-70) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 21 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable ACV (type undetermined) near Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk). The same long-range UAV spotted two sets of trenches seen for the first time about 2km north-west of Stavky (30km north of Donetsk). Also on 21 October, an SMM mid-range UAV for the first time spotted about 300m of trenches, assessed as belonging to the armed formations (not visible in imagery from 15 August 2018), on the western outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) and three houses destroyed by recent shelling (probable artillery) (not visible on imagery from 8 October 2018) about 500m north of the trenches. On 22 October, the SMM observed two APCs (MT-LB) mounted with anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the Aidar water pumping station near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), a gas pipeline near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM continued to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk) and in Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM did not observe traffic traveling in either direction and noted that the border crossing point on the Ukrainian side continued to not be staffed.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw seven vehicles (three with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) as well as three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM observed five vehicles (two with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates) and a bus with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 22 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from a superior”.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from traveling west on road M14. The SMM saw a civilian vehicle cross through the checkpoint from west to east.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), one armed member of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through to the city, citing an “ongoing operation”.
• At a checkpoint on road M14 south of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer again prevented the SMM from proceeding east, citing the security of the SMM. (The SMM was later allowed to proceed through the same checkpoint.)
• While following up on allegations of the presence of heavy weapons at a compound of the armed formations on the south-eastern edge of Alchevsk (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk), two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from accessing the site.
• While following up on allegations of the presence of heavy weapons at a compound of the armed formations on the southern edge of Bohdanivka (non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), two armed men denied the SMM access to the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines remained present on the road leading north to the bridge and that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km NW of Luhansk) was not operational.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

VIENNA, 23 October 2018 – A conference entitled “Human trafficking and human rights – access to justice for victims of human trafficking” will be held in the OSCE conference centre, Vienna Hofburg, on the occasion of EU Anti-Trafficking Day on Monday, 29 October 2018.

The conference is organized by the Austrian Task Force on Combating Human Trafficking in co-operation with the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, the Office of the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, the Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Co-operation (VIDC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).

Following opening remarks by Ambassador Petra Schneebauer, Austrian National Co-ordinator for Combating Human Trafficking, the conference will be opened by Karoline Edtstadler, State Secretary of the Austrian Interior Ministry and Alessandro Azzoni, Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE.

In two panel discussions, international experts and representatives of international organizations will speak about access to justice for human trafficking victims, from national and international as well as the gender perspective.  

Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, UN Special Rapporteur for Combating Human Trafficking in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Myria Vassiliadou, EU-Co-ordinator for Combating Human Trafficking, among others, will provide insights into existing issues and challenges.

The entire event, taking place in the Hofburg Conference Centre’s Neuer Saal on 29 October 2018 from 9:00 to 16:30, is open to the media.  

Interested media representatives are requested to register by sending an e-mail by Friday, 26 October at 17:00 to press@osce.org.

Media accreditation will take place at the entrance to the Hofburg Conference Centre (Heldenplatz). Journalists will be required to present a valid press badge or a recent accreditation from their media outlet. In view of possible delays at the entrance, please arrive by 08:30 at the latest.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons slightly decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO) and one first-responder[1]. The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits slightly decreased from 10,689 to 10,312 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[2].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 46 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs increased to 36 (compared to 31 last week); 20 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 16 into Ukraine (72 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, nine families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and eight were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when eight families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and five into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (387 compared to 426 observed during the previous week). There were 202 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 185 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Luhansk-Kharkiv; Luhansk-Simferopol; and Stakhanov- Kharkiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 806 to 853 (278 at the Gukovo BCP and 575 at the Donetsk BCP); 445 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 408 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 66 (compared to 72 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 63 to 88: of the total number of trucks scanned, 63 trucks (73 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 25 trucks (28 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[3] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 163 to 148 vehicles; 76 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 72 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 22 occasions, compared to 13 last week; the OTs assessed that 13 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and the rest to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Georgian, German and Polish licence plates and with “DPR” plates.

On 17 October at 14:27, the OT observed an ambulance entering the Gukovo BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle parked behind the main building and drove back in the same direction at 14:44. Due to its unfavourable position, the OT could not observe if any assistance was provided during its stay inside the BCP area.

On 17 October at 14:55, the OT observed a green MI-8 type helicopter which flew over the Donetsk BCP. The aircraft came from the north and continued flying in  a south-easterly direction.

In addition, on 18 October, two different helicopters were observed flying over the Gukovo BCP coming from the north-east before heading away in a southerly direction. The first white and green helicopter was recorded at 12:17. A second military helicopter was observed at 14:03 . All these mentioned helicopters remained inside Russian Federation airspace during the whole time they were visible by the OTs.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 18 September to 16 October 2018, please see the attachment here. 

[1] First responders are OSCE staff or mission members deployed to another mission for a short period of time.

[2] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[3] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The last in a series of three OSCE-supported roundtable discussions on the prospects of agricultural development in Kazakhstan with a focus on recently adopted national standards of organic production and certification concluded on 23 October 2018 in Astana.

Some 35 parliamentarians, officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and representatives of civil society and the business community discussed  key challenges and proposed a set of recommendations to the Parliament to promote organic production in Kazakhstan. Experts from Germany presented organic production practices in the European Union and highlighted the government’s role in developing incentives for effective organic farming.

The event was organized in partnership with the Coalition for Green Economy, G-Global Development, and the German-Kazakh Agricultural Policy Dialogue. It is a follow-up to a training-of-trainers series on international organic farming standards held in the Almaty and Kostanay regions.

The seminar is part of the OSCE Programme Office’s long-term efforts to assist the host country in promoting sustainable development and green growth policies.

THE HAGUE, 23 October 2018 – OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Lamberto Zannier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Stef Blok will present the Max van der Stoel Award to a group of high school students from the municipality of Jajce, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The award ceremony will take place in The Hague, the Netherlands, on Friday, 9 November.

The high school students from Jajce were selected as the 2018 winners of the award for their year-long battle against a cantonal decision to set up a new segregated school, which would have further divided students along ethnic lines. Learn more about the winners here.

On the margins of the ceremony, a photo exhibition will be launched to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the HCNM. From 12 November to 1 December, the photo exhibition will be viewable by the public at the Atrium, The Hague City Hall, Spui 70, 2511 BT Den Haag. Entrance is free-of-charge.

The OSCE Secretary General, Thomas Greminger, the First Vice-President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, the General Director of the Carnegie Foundation - Peace Palace, Erik de Baedts, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bruce Berton, and the Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Netherlands, Mirsada Čolaković, will address the event. The full event programme is available here.

The event is by invitation only. Media representatives should register by Friday, 26 October, midnight, by sending their name, contact details and the name of the media they represent to Anastasia Rybachenko, Communications Assistant at HCNM, anastasia.rybachenko@osce.org.

For more information about the Max van der Stoel Award and the winners, visit: osce.org/mvdsaward2018.

Follow the discussion on Twitter using the hashtag #mvdsAWARD.

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Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

A delegation of members of Albania’s Parliamentary Committee on Productive Activities, Trade and Environment, consisting of representatives of both the ruling majority and opposition parties, participated in a study visit to Lake Constance from 19 to 23 October 2018 to learn about cross-border co-operation with regards to managing the lake. The visit was organized by the OSCE Presence in Albania as part of a custom-tailored programme highlighting multilateral co-operation between parliaments and parliamentary oversight mechanisms.

The delegation attended the International Lake Constance Conference at the invitation of the Lake Constance Parliamentary Commission.

“Participating in the International Lake Constance Conference was an extremely worthwhile experience,” said Eduard Shalsi, who headed the delegation. “Lake Constance is jointly managed in a successful way by Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Albania and its neighbours can borrow from this experience with the aim of applying it to the Lakes Scutari, Ohrid and Prespa. I am thankful to the OSCE Presence in Albania for supporting this visit.”

The delegation learned about the obligations shared by the involved parties, who co-operate on a regular basis, and success stories and challenges. The discussions focused on the cross-border management of lakes, sustainable use of natural resources, rehabilitation of water bodies, and the involvement of different levels of policymakers in these processes.

The delegation visited several lake maintenance facilities, including waste water treatment plants, and received information on the procedures, management, and financial and human resources needed to operate them. They also participated in the Third Special Lake Conference organized by the Ministry for Environment, Climate and Energy of the German State of Baden Württemberg, on the sustainable use and rehabilitation of lakes, and met representatives of the Integrated Commission for the Transboundary Management of Lake Constance.

The activity was organized as part of the inception phase of the OSCE Presence’s extra-budgetary project on supporting the parliament and civic education in Albania. The project will begin in November 2018 and will be funded by the Swiss Government.

ROME, 23 October 2018 – Government officials and representatives of civil society and religious communities discussed good practices for addressing racism, xenophobia and other forms of discrimination, including on the basis of gender, and for countering anti-Semitism and intolerance against Muslims, Christians and members of other religions at an OSCE conference in Rome yesterday.

Organized by the 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the "Conference on Combating Intolerance and Discrimination, with a Focus on Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief: Towards a Comprehensive Response in the OSCE Region" also provided an opportunity to focus on ways to make future efforts more effective.

“Fighting intolerance has been among the priorities of Italy’s OSCE Chairmanship. We firmly believe that freedom of religion or belief, individual or collective, is indivisible: each offense to a religion is an offense to all,” said Guglielmo Picchi, Italian Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation. “We think that the OSCE’s human dimension of security provides a positive agenda for fighting intolerance and discrimination. For Italy, this agenda has a particularly Mediterranean meaning.”

In her remarks at the conference opening, Gísladóttir stressed that the discrimination and intolerance that continue to confront different groups today have to be a matter of vital concern to all.

“Despite extensive, long-standing and well-meaning commitments, intolerance and discrimination remain a reality for many members of different religious or belief communities, ethnic or other minority groups in the OSCE region,” the ODIHR Director said. “We need to counter polarization, which in light of history, carries a tremendous risk to peace and security, to the detriment of all. Once the principle of tolerance has been eroded and we start down the slippery slope of allowing intolerance and discrimination to thrive, no group – and I repeat, no group – can assume that they are immune.”

Following morning plenary sessions devoted to challenges faced in addressing racism, xenophobia and discrimination based on religion or belief the afternoon sessions were devoted to panel discussions examining, among other issues, the role of media in addressing intolerance and discrimination, good practices to promote religious pluralism, and the role of educational programmes in addressing negative stereotypes.

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400559 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE-supported Women’s Resource Centres (WRCs) in Tajikistan together with local authorities celebrated the International Day of the Girl under the theme “Empowering Girls” in rural regions of Tajikistan on 11 October 2018. The campaign was organized around various thematic activities, which included painting contests, fashion design competitions, conferences and sessions bringing together different rural communities. It aimed at raising awareness of girls’ and boys’ equal rights to opportunities in society.

The International Day of the Girl is also an occasion to highlight the importance of school attendance among girls, as well as the issue of forced marriage, which affects particularly rural girls. More than 300 people participated in the activities, including 170 young women and 20 young people with disabilities.

Since 2012, 11 October has been marked as the International Day of the Girl. It was declared by the UN General Assembly to protect girls around the world from discrimination and violence and ensure their right to education and security.

400529 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Women’s engagement in conflict prevention and resolution, negotiating and maintaining peace, and addressing humanitarian challenges was the focus of a train-the-trainer course organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe on 19 October 2018 in Dushanbe. The event marked the 18th anniversary of the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

The course brought together 40 participants, including men and women from seven registered political parties as well as gender experts and gender champions active in promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment in Tajikistan.

“Conflicts exist in households, communities, and societies. Domestic violence is one of the first early warning signs, often times ignored. Women along with men must be equally and meaningfully represented in law enforcement and security,” said Vesna Ivanovikj-Castarede, the Gender and Anti-Trafficking Officer of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

During the event, emphasis was placed on the role of men and youth in supporting the effective and efficient implementation of the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, as well as on the importance of this resolution for the promotion of women’s engagement in conflict prevention.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 19 and 20 October, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 20 and 21 October, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in a location between Zolote-4/Rodina and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. It observed damage to civilian infrastructure in Novoluhanske and to a tent caused by bullets near the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk. It recorded ceasefire violations assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko, Novoazovsk, Lebedynske and Yuzhna-Lomuvatka as well as Izvaryne, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station and to a water pipeline between Zolote and Popasna. In Lviv, it monitored a peaceful gathering in front of the Prosecutor’s office.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 19 and 20 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 215 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 300 explosions). Between the evenings of 20 and 21 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 115 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 19 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 12 undetermined explosions and about 80 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east and from east to west), all 0.2-3km at southerly directions. The following evening, the camera recorded about 60 undetermined explosions and about 40 projectiles (mostly from west to east), all 1-4km at southerly directions.

On the evening of 19 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 13 undetermined explosions and about 190 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north), all 2-5km at easterly directions.

Between the evenings of 19 and 21 October, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard at different time intervals about 105 explosions (four explosions as caused by artillery rounds and the remainder undetermined) and about 525 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-8km at southerly and westerly directions.

On the evening and night of 20-21 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions 2-6km at easterly and southerly directions. During the day on 21 October, while in the same location, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 2-6km at easterly and southerly directions.

During the day on 21 October, positioned about 1.5km east of Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk) for about 2.5 hours, the SMM heard 15 explosions (13 assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, one as an airburst and one undetermined) 1.5-4km east and north-east.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 19 and 20 October, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (15), compared with the previous reporting period (13 explosions). Between the evenings of 20 and 21 October, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

During the day on 21 October, positioned in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM heard 35 undetermined explosions and 26 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-2km south-south-east.

During the day on 21 October, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 14 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-2km south-south-east. On the same day, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 60 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-10km north-east.

The SMM followed up on reports that a woman and a man (both in their forties) had died in a location between Zolote-4/Rodina and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. On 19 October, the SMM conducted a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight in the area and spotted two bodies. [The Mission was unable to reach the location, which is about 130m east of the closest position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and about 500m west of the closest position of the armed formations, by road or foot due to safety concerns regarding the possible presence of mines.] On 21 October, in Zolote-5/Mykhailivika, the brother (aged 40-50) of the deceased man told the SMM that he had asked for the bodies to be recovered and moved to a non-government-controlled area. As of the morning of 22 October, no agreement had been reached on a recovery operation despite dialogue facilitation efforts undertaken by the Mission since the explosion was reported.

The SMM observed fresh damage to the Bakhmut Agrarian Union Pig Farm in Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 8 October 2018). On 20 October, accompanied by Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and de-miners, the SMM saw at least 20 scattered fragmentation holes in the east- and north-facing parts of a metal container, assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon fired from a northerly direction. A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that shelling took place at 21:00 on the evening of 15 October. The SMM saw a well-maintained trench about 10m south of the metal container. On 15 October, at the same location, the SMM had seen burn marks and a hole in the middle part of the south-facing section of the roof of one of the farm’s buildings. The SMM noted that repairs were ongoing and was unable to assess what weapon caused the damage. Approximately 25m north of the building, the Mission saw an impact on the road, assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the area on 28 September and 13 October.

The SMM followed up on reports of damage to an inflatable tent used by civilians to keep warm approximately 70m north of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) on the eastern side of road T0513. The SMM saw two patched holes in the exterior wall of the tent (one in the south-facing wall and one in the north-facing wall) and two holes in the interior walls of the same tent (one in the south-facing wall and one in the north-facing wall), assessed as consistent with the characteristics of a through-and-through trajectory caused by bullets fired either from an east-south-easterly direction or from a west-north-westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 20 October, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 6-8km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 20 October, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard six explosions assessed as caused by mortar rounds (82mm) 5km west-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening of 21 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion and eight projectiles in flight (five from north-east to south-west, two from south-west to north-east and one in vertical flight), all 2-4km south-east and assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 20 October, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2-3km west-north-west, four undetermined explosions 4-6km west and about 100 shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 19 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 12 tanks (T-64) in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) (for similar observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 20 October 2018). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Kasianivka (81km south of Donetsk) and two antitank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk). On 20 October, the SMM saw four tanks (T-64) loaded on trucks near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk). On 21 October, the SMM saw three tanks (T-72) near Druzhne (39km north of Mariupol) and a tank (T-64) near Lysychansk.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In such storage sites, beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas in Donetsk region, on 20 October, the SMM saw eight towed howitzers (two D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and six 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) continued to be missing.

In such storage sites, beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas in Donetsk region, on 21 October, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10), eight MLRS (BM-21) and eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and noted that two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), 23 MLRS (BM-21), 22 self-propelled howitzers (11 2S1 and 11 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and six towed howitzers (D-20, 152 mm) continued to be missing, as well as that four MLRS (BM-21) and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing for the first time.

On 20 October, the SMM revisited two heavy weapons permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 18 tanks (eight T-64 and ten T-72) remained missing.

On 20 October, the SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in an area of Luhansk region outside government control and noted that a tank (T-64) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft guns[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 19 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Sartana (91km south of Donetsk) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) near Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol). On 21 October, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) in Prymorske (13km east of Mariupol), an APC (BTR variant) in Shchastia, an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and an APC (BTR-80) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 19 October, the SMM saw two APCs (BTR variant) near Donetsk city. On 20 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted ten APCs (two BTR-80 and eight MT-LB) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk). On 21 October, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) in Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

On 20 October, the SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). On 21 October, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline between Zolote and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). On both days, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM visited five border areas not under government control. On 20 October, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 60 minutes, the SMM saw eight cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates and four with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine, and ten cars (nine with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates), two mini-vans (one with Russian Federation licence plates, the other with “DPR” plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about five minutes, the SMM observed no traffic or pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

On 21 October, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw a pedestrian (man, aged 30-40) entering Ukraine and a man (aged 50-60) on a bicycle exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a car (with Russian Federation licence plates) and 15 pedestrians (seven men and eight women, all aged 35-55) exiting Ukraine, and a car (with Ukrainian licence plates), a bus (plates not visible) and six pedestrians (four men, two women, aged 35-45) entering Ukraine. After ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point in Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw five pedestrians (two men, three women, aged 25-60) exiting Ukraine and three pedestrians (two men, one woman, aged 50-55) entering Ukraine.

In Lviv, the SMM monitored a gathering in favour of the creation by the regional government of an independent commission composed of representatives of non-governmental organizations and civil services. In front of the Prosecutor’s office at 19 Shevchenka Street, it saw 200 people (70 per cent men and 30 per cent women, all ages), about half of them wearing jackets with insignia of the Right Sector movement and carrying flags of the same movement. Approximately 80 police officers were present. The gathering ended without any incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 20 October, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing demining activities in the area”.
• On 20 October, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, two armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through, citing “orders from superiors not to allow the SMM into Novoazovsk”.
• On 20 October, at a mobile checkpoint about 2km east of Novoazovsk, two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from passing through, citing “orders from their commander not to allow the SMM to travel eastward to Siedove” (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk).
• On 20 October, at a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “demining and engineering works ongoing in the area”.
• On 20 October, at a checkpoint south of Lebedynske, two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM passage eastward, citing an “exchange of fire in the area”. After the patrol mentioned it would travel southward, the two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied it access again.
• On 21 October, at a checkpoint near Lebedynske, three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM passage further east, citing “an ongoing exchange of fire in the area”. The SMM observed five cars passing through the checkpoint in both directions while it was at the location.
• On 21 October, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 20 and 21 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[4]
• On 20 and 21 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times. [4]
• On 20 and 21 October, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 19 October, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming[5], near Kashtanove (non-government-controlled, 13km north of Donetsk), Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk).
• On 21 October, at a checkpoint in Horlivka, a member of the armed formations indicated to a patrol’s lead vehicle that it could proceed through the checkpoint. The patrol’s remaining three vehicles were then stopped and told by the same member of the armed formations that he had the authority to shoot at the lead vehicle because it did not stop. The three vehicles were allowed through the checkpoint after approximately five minutes.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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400562 Edita Buçaj Ivana Milatovic, OSCE Mission to Serbia

The fourth OSCE Dialogue Academy for Young Women, which brought together 24 participants from Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština, concluded on 21 October 2018 in Stadtschlaining, Austria.

Over ten days, the participants had the opportunity to build up their personal contacts, exchange views on the issue of women empowerment in decision-making, learn about the challenges that members of each community face, and address issues of common concern.

The programme included intensive team-building exercises, lectures on the topics “Dialogue, Mediation and Reconciliation” and “Women in Politics” delivered by international experts, and an exchange of views on dialogue with six prominent women from Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština - members of the Follow Us Initiative.

To become acquainted with the OSCE’s work, the participants heard Ambassador Melanne Verveer, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Gender and first US Ambassador for Global Women’s Issues, share her views and respond to their questions. In addition, the participants attended a session of the OSCE Permanent Council and met with representatives of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship.

“The OSCE Dialogue Academy for Young Women reaffirmed to us that politics is going to serve women only when women are involved in it,” said Kaltrina Ahmeti, a participant from Prishtinë/Priština.

Isidora Šmigić from Belgrade said: “The OSCE Dialogue Academy taught us that women need to stand together and be united in fighting for our rights, crossing the ethnic, religious and political divides. That is the only way we can achieve change in our societies.”

As a follow-up, participants of the fourth Dialogue Academy will have the opportunity to meet in November in Belgrade for an alumni exchange visit. There they will further develop their project ideas for 2019 that are designed to enhance their collaboration and promote cultural exchanges.

The Academy is organized annually under the auspices of the Follow Us Initiative, supported by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo and the OSCE Mission to Serbia, as part of their work to enhance women's participation in dialogue, conflict resolution and decision-making processes.

The Initiative, which gathers prominent women from Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština, was launched in 2012, and has been facilitated since then by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo and the OSCE Mission to Serbia.

COPENHAGEN, 22 October 2018 – Leading members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s election observation mission to the 28 October presidential election in Georgia are arriving this week in Tbilisi for final preparations of the mission. 

Kristian Vigenin from Bulgaria was appointed by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office as Special Co-ordinator to lead the short-term OSCE observer mission and will deliver the preliminary post-election statement at a press conference in Tbilisi on 29 October. The OSCE PA’s observation mission for the election is headed by Margareta Cederfelt from Sweden and includes 50 parliamentarians and staff from 17 OSCE countries. 

“Clearly, this election is important both to Georgians and to the international community, and represents another test for the development of democracy in Georgia,” Vigenin said today. “As observers, we will bring a critical eye to this process, assessing it for compliance with the election-related commitments to which all OSCE countries have agreed, and will ensure that our assessment is fair, balanced, and based on the broadest information possible.” 

“Our presence in Georgia demonstrates our solidarity and support of the Georgian people, who we hope will turn out to vote in high numbers,” Cederfelt said. “We hope for a competitive and calm election, mindful that this election marks the conclusion of the shift from a presidential system initiated eight years ago.” 

The observation mission is a common endeavour involving OSCE parliamentarians, observers deployed by the OSCE/ODIHR, and election observers from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. In total, the OSCE expects to have more than 350 observers active on election day throughout Georgia. 

This is the 12th time that the OSCE PA has sent election observation missions to Georgia, including for the presidential election in 2013 and for both rounds of the parliamentary elections in 2016. The OSCE PA’s observation activity in Georgia dates back to 1995. 

Media contact: Iryna Sabashuk, +45 60 10 81 73, iryna@oscepa.dk

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400565 Communication and Media Relations Section Giovanni Davoli

The likely challenges that the law enforcement agencies will face in the years to come and strategies for future policing were the focus of the OSCE’s 2018 Annual Police Experts Meeting, held in Vienna on 22 and 23 October 2018.

The meeting brought together 130 law enforcement experts from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation as well as representatives of international and regional organizations and academia. They discussed recent developments and trends, and prospects for the future. International experts presented innovative approaches to addressing the new and changing operational environment. There was also a particular focus on ways to enhance efforts to seize, confiscate, manage and re-use criminal assets. 

“The challenges that today’s law enforcement is facing have become more demanding, complex and multi-dimensional,” said Ambassador Luca Fratini, Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE, in his opening remarks. “The criminal world is truly transnational in nature and making full use of globalization and new technologies. So must our policies, strategies and operations.”

Participants noted that while already existing transnational crimes – like trafficking in illicit drugs and human beings, the smuggling of weapons and terrorism – are expected to become even more difficult to combat, cybercrimes including ransomware, online fraud, hacking and data theft will  become central issues for law enforcement agencies to deal with. The expansion of online payment methods, cryptocurrencies and anonymous websites further contribute to the changing nature of crime.

Guy Vinet, Head of the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, said: “Traditional policing methods alone cannot effectively contain these new types of crime and we have to look to new methods. This does not mean that traditional policing has failed. No, it means that there is a need to expand it and to supplement it with new strategies, including by making use of modern means such as the social media, analysis software and crime predictive techniques.”

400352 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A series of training courses organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe to enable police officers to work more effectively with victims of domestic violence and with aggressors and perpetrators of violence concluded on 18 October 2018.  

A total of 65 police officers attended three separate training courses, which commenced on 3 October and were held in Garm, Khujand and Dushanbe. Two Tajik experts and one international expert from Moldova delivered the courses. The participants learned about the national and international practices of dealing with domestic violence cases as well as how to work with victims and perpetrators of violence. The training sessions were organized in co-operation with the Interior Ministry of Tajikistan.

“The police are the first responders to cases of domestic violence. They must be free of gender stereotypes when dealing with cases of violence in the family. The training courses put special emphasis on gender inequality roles and gender issues as one of the contributing factors to this type of violence,” said Vesna Ivanovikj-Castarede, the Gender and Anti-Trafficking Officer at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Vladimir Kazakov, expert from Moldova, said: “The main goal of these training courses for police officers was to increase the participants’ knowledge with regard to counteracting family violence. During the training the participants learned how to co-operate with other governmental and non-governmental organizations to prevent domestic violence.”

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

A five-day training course aimed at further strengthening the capacity of Kazakhstan to counter terrorist financing was organized in Burabay, Kazakhstan from 16 to 20 October 2018. The training seminar was delivered to Kazakh participants from the capital and from the country’s Akmola, Aktobe and Karagandy regions.

The course was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Global Programme against Money Laundering, the Academy of Law Enforcement Agencies under the Prosecutor General’s Office of Kazakhstan, and in partnership with the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism.

The training course was conducted to strengthen Kazakhstan’s compliance with international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s standards and OSCE commitments. It was led by international experts together with six local government officials who were previously trained by the OSCE, UNODC and the EAG   in a train-the-trainer setting.

The course emphasized the key role of inter-agency co-operation in disrupting terrorist financing.  Based on country- and region-specific scenarios, it included sessions on national, regional and transnational threats, sources of information, money flows, tackling financial intelligence and strategic analysis. More than half of the course was devoted to practical work on exercises highlighting specific instruments and techniques that play an important role in countering the financing of terrorism.

Experts and practitioners from the Committee for Financial Monitoring, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Counter Terrorism Center, the Academy of the National Security Committee, the Academy of Law Enforcement Agencies under the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the State Revenues Committee participated in the training course.

The course was organized with the financial support of Germany, United States of America and the Russian Federation, as part of a comprehensive multiannual capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in Central Asia.

KYIV, 22 October 2018 – The Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Alexander Hug, is traveling to eastern Ukraine from 22 to 27 October to assess the security situation in the area and its impact on civilians.

He will visit the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, meet OSCE SMM teams there as well as interact with civilians on both sides of the contact line. He will also encourage all concerned to work towards normalization of the situation. Hug will also visit the city of Dnipro in the beginning of the week.

Hug will hold press briefings, the exact time and location of which will be communicated via social media (@OSCE_SMM, www.facebook.com/oscesmm).

Journalists interested in covering the visit should contact: Tetiana Tesliuchenko: +38 050 334 14 54; tetiana.tesliuchenko@osce.org; smm-press@osce.org

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Life values, growth opportunities and essential needs of young people in the modern society were the focus of the annual three-day Zhas (Youth) Camp that concluded on 21 October 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Some 150 young people from across the country, sociologists, and representatives of academia, media and non-governmental organizations took part in the event comprised of expert panels, guest lectures and interactive workshops. Participants discussed issues related to the development of critical thinking and media literacy among youth, gender equality and the implementation of gender-oriented policies, as well as volunteering and civic engagement of young people.

Guest speakers from Germany, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation shared their vision of what steps should be taken in order to deliver successful social projects. The Youth Mapping study prepared by the NGO Youth Information Service of Kazakhstan on the needs of young people and related development programmes in a number of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries was also presented at the event.

The youth camp was co-organized by the Youth Information Service of Kazakhstan, a national NGO, and the OSCE Programme Office in Astana with support from the Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the United States Embassy in Astana.

The event is part of the Office’s efforts to promote youth engagement in resolving issues of security and development.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas and observed enhanced military and military-type presence inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as in Staromykhailivka and near Bezimenne.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines near Pyshchevyk. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station; it also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions).

On the evening of 18 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 95 undetermined explosions and 140 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km at directions ranging from east to west.

On the evening and night of 18-19 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 58 explosions (35 assessed as impacts and the remainder undetermined) and about 125 projectiles in flight (most from west to east), all 1-4km south-south-east, south and south-south-west.   

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) recorded two undetermined explosions and about 340 projectiles in flight (most from south-west to north-east), all 2-5km south and south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 29 explosions (six assessed as impacts and the remainder undetermined) and about 440 projectiles in flight (most from south to north and from north to south), all 2-4km in easterly directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 13 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (11 explosions).

During the day on 19 October, positioned 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 3-5km west-south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM saw a recently deepened trench leading to a position assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, about 500m south of its northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge. About 700m north-east of that trench, also inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw another recently deepened trench and fortified position, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, about 150m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area and about 500m west of its eastern edge. From the same location, the SMM saw three members of the armed formations, one armed, outside the disengagement area moving to positions in a treeline north of its north-eastern edge.

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of agreed withdrawal lines, on 19 October, the SMM saw a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 18 October, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 18 self-propelled howitzers (11 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and seven 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), three towed howitzers (D-30), six anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) and six anti-guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at a railyard near Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Predtechyne (58km north of Donetsk), 12 tanks (T-64), 13 self-propelled howitzers (11 2S3 and two 2S1) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) near Rubizhne and a tank (T-64) near Siversk (99km north of Donetsk). On 19 October, the SMM saw four tanks (T-72) loaded onto trailers on the western outskirts of Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), five tanks (T-72) loaded onto trailers on the south-eastern outskirts of Sievierodonetsk, 17 tanks (T-72) being loaded onto trains in Rubizhne, a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Memryk (33km north-west of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) at the train station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 18 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted seven armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Leonidivka (41km north of Donetsk) and an SMM long-range UAV spotted four ACVs (type undetermined) 2km north-west of Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) in Zolote, and three IFVs (BMP-1) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk). The same day, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Toretsk (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), an ACV (type undetermined) inside a compound of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk). On 19 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) and an IFV (BTR-4) at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces west of Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 18 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted seven IFVs (BMP-1) and one armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk)[4]. It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM monitored a border area outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM observed 12 cars (four with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine and eight cars (three with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and three covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM observed nine stationary gasoline tank railcars with inscription “RZhD” and 70 stationary coal railcars on tracks in Rovenky (non-government-controlled, 54km south of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “the need to submit a request to the armed formations for crossing the checkpoint”. The SMM observed that civilian vehicles were allowed to pass the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a checkpoint near Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing demining activities in the area”. The SMM observed that civilian vehicles were also refused passage west at the checkpoint, however civilian vehicles were allowed to turn north towards Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel south across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 18 October, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost communications[6]  on five occasions, assessed as due to jamming, near Ivanopillia (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk), between Predtechyne and Klishchiivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), between Pokrovske (government-controlled, 74km north of Donetsk), Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), Novotoshkivske and Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk), near Kudriashivka (government-controlled, 83km north-west of Luhansk) and near Pryvillia (government-controlled, 90km north-west of Luhansk).
• At a school in Koshary (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Luhansk), staff refused to speak with the SMM, citing the need for written permission from the armed formations. 

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The region of Oleksandrivka was incorrectly referenced in SMM Daily Report 19 October 2018 and should read 20km south-west of Donetsk.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on a civilian car carrying a family that was struck by a ricocheted bullet at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas and observed military presence in the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Kovske.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station; it also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The SMM observed public gatherings marking the European Union’s Anti-Trafficking Day in Kyiv, Sievierodonetsk, Mariupol, Lviv and Chernivtsi.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 260 explosions).

On the evening and night of 17-18 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 13 undetermined explosions, about 45 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east) and 24 muzzle flashes, all 1-4km at southerly directions.

On the evening and night of 17-18 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded seven undetermined explosions, about 330 projectiles in flight (most from northerly to southerly directions) and six muzzle flashes, all 2-4 east-north-east, east and east-south-east. The following day, the same camera recorded about eight undetermined explosions, 30 projectiles in flight (all from southerly to northerly directions) and a muzzle flash, all 3-4km east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 17-18 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-4km south-south-east and south-west. On 18 October, from the same location, the SMM heard 34 undetermined explosions and 135 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-4km at south-east and south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations and no explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (seven explosions).

Positioned in Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 14 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and ten shots of small-arms fire, all 5-7km north-east.

The SMM saw damage to a civilian car carrying a family of a man, woman and two children at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). In the line for traffic traveling east, the SMM saw a white Skoda Octavia with an 8mm hole in the upper left corner of the rear windshield. About 1.5-2m east of the car, the SMM observed a tall metal support pole that serves as part of an open shelter structure at the checkpoint. About 3.5m high the SMM saw a scratch on the pole about 8mm in diameter, which it assessed was caused by small-arms round (7.62mm) hitting the pole. The SMM assessed that the hole in the rear windshield was caused by a small-arms round (7.62mm), fired from a north-easterly direction in a downward trajectory, which had ricocheted off the nearby metal pole and penetrated the rear windshield. The Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint commander said that the car had been struck by a bullet about two minutes prior and that he had immediately notified the SMM for observation. The Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM that the driver (male, late twenties) of the vehicle had been standing outside the car with a State Border Guard Service official who was inspecting the car at the time of the incident and that the woman (late twenties) and two children (boys, 18 months and seven years old) had all been in the back seat. The SMM saw the family standing nearby and observed that they appeared to be in shock and none of them could speak.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the night of 18 October, the SMM camera positioned at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight from west to east 2-4km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and ten projectiles in flight from north-east to south-west 3-5km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, on 17 October, the SMM saw two Ukrainian military personnel walk south into a field on the northern edge of the disengagement area. On 18 October, the SMM saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer carrying a chainsaw exit the disengagement area on the north-eastern edge near Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and a black Volkswagen sedan with two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel inside drive into the disengagement area from Katerynivka and travel west. The same day, the SMM observed an IFV (BMP-1) on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-3km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and four bursts of small-arms fire 1-2km south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on two separate occasions, the SMM observed four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in the same area  being transported on trucks on road T-1306 2-3km east of Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 17 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 15 tanks (T-72) in a known training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 17 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted seven tanks (T-64), six anti-tank-guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a railyard in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). On 18 October, the SMM observed four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Rivnopil (65km south-west of Donetsk), eight MLRS (BM-21) near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk), six trucks each loaded with a tank (T-72) on the north-western outskirts of Sievierodonetsk and 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S3) and four towed howitzers (type undetermined) at a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).  

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 17 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol). On 18 October, the SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-4) near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk), five IFVs (BMP-2) on the northern outskirts of Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol), three IFVs (BMP-2) north-west of Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol) and an IFV (BMP-1) in Zolote-4/Rodina (60km west of Luhansk).

On 17 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted at least 25 fresh craters, assessed as caused by (82mm) mortar rounds, in a residential area of Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk) (some of the impacts were 200m away from the closest house).

On 17 October, about 4km south of Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk) and 100m north-west of military-type positions, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four fresh craters, assessed as caused by mortar rounds. The SMM could not assess the direction of fire.

On 18 October, the SMM observed two members of the armed formations reinforcing a trench north of a road about 1km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM was restricted three times in this area.*

The SMM continued to observe mines for the first time. On 17 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least newly laid six anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road on the north-eastern outskirts of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk). 

The SMM observed marking of mines and demining. On the western side of road P-66 between Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled 67km north-west of Luhansk) and Toshkivka (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw six workers wearing clothing with the logo of an international demining organization. They were working in an area about 20m west of the road where the vegetation had been cut and stakes and marking tape were being put in the ground.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water wells near Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk), to electrical infrastructure in Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and at the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM monitored a border area outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM observed 26 pedestrians exit Ukraine and seven cars (two with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation and two with Georgian licence plates) and 29 pedestrians enter Ukraine.

In Kyiv, Sievierodonetsk, Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), Lviv and Chernivtsi the SMM observed gatherings marking the European Union’s Anti-Trafficking Day. The SMM observed between 20 and 300 people (men and women, mainly young adults) in each city gather and march through central squares, some people carrying banners reading “Walk for Freedom” and “People are not for sale.” The SMM observed peaceful situations at each gathering.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Dnipro.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 17 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On two separate occasions, at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again prevented the patrol from traveling east to non-government-controlled area, on one occasion citing “orders from a superior”.
• At the northern entrance of Kovske (non-government-controlled, 91km south of Donetsk), two armed men in camouflage clothing at a checkpoint of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing “ongoing special operations in the area as well as attempting to capture some criminals”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• At the same checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske where two others patrols had again been denied access, three armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and prevented it from traveling east. After 60 minutes, the SMM was allowed to travel east.
• At a military compound near Rivnopil, a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM that he had orders from his superiors not to allow anyone into the compound. After 50 minutes, the SMM was granted access.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 17-18 October an SMM temporarily lost communications[5] with an SMM long-range UAV near Vodiane (government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), Pikuzy (non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk), Vershynivka (non-government-controlled, 62km south-east of Donetsk), Novozarivka (non-government-controlled, 47km south-east of Donetsk), Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk), Petrivka (43km north of Donetsk).  

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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VIENNA, 19 October 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today deplored the intimidation and death threats directed at journalists with the well-known Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta. He urged the authorities to swiftly and fully investigate these incidents and ensure journalists’ safety.

“Threats to media workers are completely unacceptable, as they undermine independent and investigative journalism, sow fear and affect freedom of expression and the free flow of information,” said Désir. “I deplore the latest death threats directed at Novaya Gazeta’s staff and urge the authorities to ensure the journalists’ safety and bring the responsible to justice.”

On 17 and 18 October, the editorial office of Novaya Gazeta received a funeral wreath and a dead lamb’s head, and the accompanying notes “Denis Korotkov – traitor of the motherland” and “To chief editor of Novaya Gazeta, greetings to you and Korotkov”. Korotkov is a journalist with Novaya Gazeta, who previously worked as an investigative reporter with the St. Petersburg-based online media outlet Fontanka.Ru. His recent investigative stories published by Fontanka.Ru uncovered the participation of mercenaries from Russia in the Syrian conflict, for which he reportedly has received threats. Additionally, on 17 October, Korotkov received a bouquet of four carnations with a mourning ribbon and a note stating “We will not forget you”.

According to Novaya Gazeta, there is also an ongoing online campaign accusing the newspaper of allegedly divulging the data about Russian pilots in Syria, which placed their families in danger, and calling for reprisals against journalists. The newspaper rejects these accusations and says that no such data has ever been published.

“I understand that law enforcement officials have already been notified of these incidents and have started looking into them,” said Désir. “I call on the authorities to prioritize the investigation into this case and find all those behind the attacks. If not addressed in a timely manner, such threats can easily escalate and incite hostility and violence.”

The journalists working with Novaya Gazeta have been subjected to intimidation, harassment and threats on numerous occasions in the past. Several of the newpaper’s journalists were murdered for their work, including Anna Politkovskaya, Igor Domnikov and others. 

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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