OSCE

Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day train-the-trainer course for Albanian participants on countering terrorist financing was organized in Vienna from 27 February to 1 March 2019 by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Presence in Albania, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Global Programme against Money Laundering (UNODC/GPML).  

The six participants of the course will go on to deliver training courses for local government officials upon their return to Albania, together with OSCE and UNODC international experts.

The course, which took place in the premises of the OSCE Secretariat, was led by international experts and tailored to the Albanian context. It covered national, regional and transnational threats, sources of information, money flows, tackling financial intelligence, and strategic analysis. More than half of the course consisted of practical exercises, often based on localized scenarios.

The aim of the course was to assist Albania in countering terrorist financing, in line with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, standards of the Financial Action Task Force and OSCE commitments.

Participants deepened their understanding of how improving inter-agency co-operation can help to identify and disrupt terrorist financial networks and how specific instruments and techniques can significantly improve efforts to counter terrorist financing. 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area and noted that a piece of unexploded ordnance previously observed near the road inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area had been removed.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at checkpoints near Popasna, Verkhnoshyrokivske and in Staromykhailivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 470 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded no ceasefire violations. During the previous reporting period , the SMM had recorded 72 ceasefire violations (about 20 explosions).

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 28 February, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km south-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. [3]

Inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM noted that a metal object assessed as a mortar (possibly 82mm) tailfin, previously observed 1-1.5m west of the road and about 270m north of the bridge (first reported on 25 December 2018, see SMM Daily Report 27 December 2018), had been removed.

During the day on 28 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

28 February

The SMM saw:

• a mortar (type unknown) on a truck parked inside the yard of a residential house in Kyrylivka (26km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

28 February

The SMM saw:

• 22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

Weapons storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

28 February

The SMM noted the presence of weapons observed previously.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

28 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Kyrylivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

27 February

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• an APC (BTR variant) in the yard of an apparently abandoned building on the northern edge of Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk), as well as a previously observed extensive trench system and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on an APC (MT-LB M) near the village.

On 28 February, the SMM saw two automated jamming stations (R-330T) near Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, government-controlled, 67km north of Donetsk).

Presence of new mine hazard sign

The SMM saw for the first time a red metal plate with “Stop Mine” written in Russian language attached to a post in the western outskirts of Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside of government control

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw a man exiting Ukraine, and no pedestrians entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier again did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T-0504, citing orders from his commander.
• On two occasions at a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing a “lack of security guarantees”.
• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), five armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “subversive activities in the area”. While present at the checkpoint, the SMM saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at Oktiabr mine were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded a workshop for the promotion and implementation of the 2019 Community Cohesion Action Plan on 1 March 2019 in Trebinje.

The workshop gathered over 20 participants from city and local authorities, police, media and civil society organizations clustered around the Coalition against Hate, Security Forum and youth. They discussed the plan’s activities and agreed on future concrete steps for its implementation and promotion within local communities.

The implementation of the Community Cohesion Action Plan will focus on establishing a mechanism for a public response in cases of bias-motivated incidents and the promotion of a more tolerant and open community.

Supported by the Mission, this plan was developed in 2018 by a working group appointed by the mayor. The first document of this kind in BiH, the plan was adopted by the mayor in late November 2018, and has also received support from the City Assembly leaders.

This was the first of three workshops facilitated by the OSCE Mission to BiH, with similar events planned in Nevesinje and Bileca in the coming period.

VIENNA, 1 March 2019 – The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, Stéphane Visconti of France, and Andrew Schofer of the United States of America) met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Yerevan on 20 February and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on 21 February to discuss preparations for a meeting of the leaders in the near future, including possible topics for discussion.  The Co-Chairs also held discussions with the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in their respective capitals.  The Co-Chairs were joined by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Andrzej Kasprzyk.

During the meetings in the region, the leaders briefed the Co-Chairs on their recent conversation on the margins of the World Economic Forum in Davos in January.  The leaders and the Co-Chairs discussed the situation on the ground and their expectations for next steps. 

The Co-Chairs assessed positively the continuing lack of casualties on the line of contact.  They also welcomed the developing discussions in the region about preparing populations for peace.

The leaders accepted the Minsk Group Co-Chairs‘ proposal to meet soon under their auspices.

Following their visit to the region, the Co-Chairs and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office travelled to Vienna and Bratislava from 28 February to 1 March to brief the Permanent Representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group countries, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák.

412712 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

16 representatives of the Akimats (regional administration) of 14 regions of Kazakhstan responsible for the work of the regional commissions on combating illegal export, import and trafficking in human beings took part in an OSCE-supported training seminar on combating human trafficking, which concluded on 1 March 2019 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Representatives of law enforcement bodies and non-governmental organizations also participated in the two-day event, which was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, the United States Embassy in Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The seminar focused on the role of the Akimats in the fight against trafficking, co-operation between governmental agencies and international, non-governmental organizations, the working mechanisms of the Interdepartmental Commission on combating trafficking in persons, as well as on the monitoring and exchange of information.

“The OSCE supports the efforts of the government of Kazakhstan in combating trafficking in persons through training and enhancing the professional skills and knowledge of law enforcement officials, judges, social workers and non-governmental organizations involved in providing social services to victims of trafficking,” said György Szabó, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Madiyev Sagat, Deputy Chief of the Criminal Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, added: “The police devote considerable attention and are taking increased measures to prevent human trafficking. For instance, in 2018, the police uncovered 14 cases of trafficking, 5 cases of child trafficking, and 20 cases of abduction and illegal deprivation of liberty for the purpose of exploitation.”

“We are proud of our long-term co-operation with the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the OSCE Programme Office in Astana. Over the period of 17 years, together with our partners, we have implemented many projects aimed at training law enforcement personnel, improving legislation and assisting victims of trafficking. The seminar for the representatives of Akimats was conducted for the first time and is a timely initiative,” said Jorgan K. Andrews, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

The event is part of the OSCE Programme Office’s long-standing efforts to support the host country in combating human trafficking and in implementing the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings.

KYIV, 28 February 2019 – OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) and Treasurer Doris Barnett (MP, Germany) have wrapped up a two-day visit to Kyiv where they were on a pre-electoral visit ahead of the observation mission to be deployed for the 31 March presidential election.

The OSCE PA delegation, which included Secretary General Roberto Montella and Special Representative Ambassador Andreas Nothelle, met with Andriy Parubiy, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada and the Head of the OSCE PA Delegation Artur Gerasymov. They held talks with presidential candidates Yulia Timoshenko, Yuriy Boyko and MP Svitlana Zalishchuk representing Anatoliy Grytsenko.

The PA delegation took note of concerns regarding the campaign including allegations of misuse of state resources and vote-buying. Tsereteli and Barnett said that every allegation needs to be fact-based, substantiated and addressed to the appropriate state bodies. They praised the co-operation they have received and encouraged all authorities and stakeholders to send a clear signal that electoral violations will not be tolerated.

“It has been five years since the momentous Euromaidan events of February 2014 and all of the tragic developments that followed, including the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing military conflict in eastern Ukraine,” said President Tsereteli. “Holding a competitive, peaceful and well-administered presidential election next month is vital to advance the democratic development of Ukraine and promote stability and security in the OSCE region.”

“We look forward to continuing our strong co-operation with the authorities in Ukraine as we prepare to deploy a robust observation mission for this important election,” said Barnett. “The circumstances in Ukraine present particular challenges to holding elections and to observing elections. From our side, we will diligently follow the process and provide a fair and solid assessment.”

Meetings were also held with Tatyana Slipachuk, Chair of the Central Election Commission; Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission; Ambassador Henrik Villadsen, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, as well as representatives of the international community, civil society and the media. The PA delegation lauded the PCU’s efforts to assist Ukraine in ensuring that the elections are in line with international standards and to advance a broad package of reforms.

President Tsereteli appointed Barnett to lead the PA’s delegation of observers to the 31 March election and President Emeritus Ilkka Kanerva (MP, Finland) was nominated to serve as Special Co-ordinator. It is expected to be one of the biggest election observation missions the OSCE PA has ever deployed. The PA has previously observed 12 elections in Ukraine.

Photos of this week's visit to Kyiv are available for public use on Flickr.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM followed up on reports of three men who sustained shrapnel wounds following the explosion of a device near government-controlled Hrodivka.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines and military hardware on the road inside the Zolote disengagement area and recorded ceasefire violations near the same area.  
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of both Luhansk and Donetsk region.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as the recovery of human remains from an area in Luhansk region close to the contact line.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region, at a checkpoint near Popasna and, on three occasions, at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*
• In Odessa, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 180), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and close to essential civilians infrastructure, including the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), in areas south-west, west and north of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (about 20), compared with the previous reporting period. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk).

Three men injured by explosion of a device

At a hospital in Myrnohrad (formerly Dymytrov, government-controlled, 52km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw two men (aged 25 and 34) with bandages on their hands, elbows and legs. Medical staff told the SMM that the two men had been admitted to the hospital on 25 February with several shrapnel wounds. Medical staff added that a third man (aged 29) had also been admitted with shrapnel wounds to his legs, chest and right hand, as well as a bone fracture in his left foot; however, at the time of the SMM’s visit, medical staff told the SMM that the man had been undergoing medical examinations. The two men told the SMM that they had been collecting wood in a forest near Hrodivka (government-controlled, 43km north-west of Donetsk) when their friend (the aforementioned 29-year-old man) had stepped on a device and triggered an explosion. They added that they had not seen any sign marking the area as contaminated by mines. Police in Pokrovsk (government-controlled, 55km north-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that an investigation into the incident was ongoing and that the remnants of the explosive device had been sent for expert analysis.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 26 February, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) on road T-1316, about 900m south of the area’s northern edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 200m further south, inside the disengagement area, the same UAV spotted at least 12 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in two rows across the same road (spotted for the first time on 15 February 2019, see SMM Daily Report 19 February 2019).

During the night of 26-27 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight from north-west to south-east at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 27 February, positioned 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions as well as bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 0.6-6km north and north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). 

During the day on 27 February, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) and inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation. [3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

25 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk).

27 February

The SMM saw:

• a stationary tank (type undetermined) in the northern outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn*

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region[4]

21 February

The SMM noted that:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were present and
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and 35 MLRS (BM-21) were missing, including 12 MLRS missing for the first time.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

26 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP variant) inside a partially destroyed building on the eastern edge of Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) and
• four IFVs (BMP-1) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

27 February

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Zalizne (42km north-east of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP variant) in Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

25 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an APC (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) next to a former school building used by the armed formations in Donetskyi.

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• three new trench networks near Vedenske (90km south of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 27 October 2018).

Presence of new mine hazard signs

The SMM saw for the first time two mine hazard signs in the eastern outskirts of Horlivka: one wooden board with “Stop Mines” written in Russian language and one wooden stake with “Stop Dangerous Zone, Access Forbidden” written in Russian language.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to water pipelines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a water pipeline near Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. Due to ceasefire violations in the area, the SMM was unable to monitor the security situation near the Vasylivka Pumping Station (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

SMM monitoring recovery of human remains in Luhansk region

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the recovery of human remains from an area between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations near Novooleksandrivka.

Gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Odessa

On 26 February, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation at 14 Haharinske Plateau in Odessa. Onsite, the SMM saw about 25 people (mostly men, aged 20-40), including one holding a red-and-black flag, placing about 20 disposable plastic bags filled with pieces of paper and other items into the grating of the fence at the main entrance of the Consulate building. It also observed about 25 law enforcement officers present in the area. The gathering dispersed without incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel (one of them visibly armed) denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• On three occasions, armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint after the SMM refused to show its patrol plans all three times.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) again did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T-0504, citing orders from his commander.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
   

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at Oktiabr mine were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

An OSCE-organized photography and photojournalism master class for persons with disabilities took place from 22 to 26 February 2019 in Ashgabat.

The five-day class introduced 17 participants to the basics of photojournalism and build their photography skills.

The master class was delivered by national experts who provided insights into the history of photography and its types. They also explained the rules of composition and the basics of light as well as the use of photo cameras and photo equipment.

The participants discussed the role of photography in journalism, principles of photo journalism and skills that photo reporters should possess to create powerful, yet impartial and truthful stories.

“Being one of the most creative forms of journalism, photojournalism tells us a news story through images, which communicate information, send messages and evoke emotions,” said Natalya Drozd, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat organized the master class as part of its activities in the area of media development and journalism education. We believe that this event will help our participants discover their own talents and identify opportunities to create photo reports that show the world as they see it”.

The practical part of the master class included indoor and outdoor photo sessions.

The Centre plans to exhibit the photographs of the participants at a photo exhibition “The World Around Us” dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat which will be celebrated in April 2019.

VIENNA, 28 February 2019 – Key stakeholders will report on the progress of Ukraine’s reforms in the areas of the judiciary and decentralization at an event organized for Vienna-based delegations to the OSCE, on Monday, 4 March 2019, from 10:00 to 12:45.

The first part of the event will provide an opportunity to review the progress of judicial reforms. The discussion will focus on  outcomes of the first year of the Ukraine’s newly formed Supreme Court and the process of selection of High Anti-Corruption Court judges. The impact of decentralisation on enhancing the ability of communities to deal with local issues, independently of the central government will be discussed during the second part of the presentation.   

Speakers at the event will include OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger;  Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the OSCE Ihor Prokopchuk; OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine Henrik Villadsen; President of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice George Stava; Judge of the Supreme Court of Ukraine and Secretary of the Grand Chamber Vsevolod Kniazev; Judge of the Supreme Court of Ukraine Hanna Vronska; Chair of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine Serhiy Koziakov; Chair of the Judicial Reform Council, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine Oleksiy Filatov; Head of European Union Anti-Corruption Initiative in Ukraine Eka Tkeshelashvili; First Deputy Minister for Regional Development of Ukraine Vyacheslav Nehoda; and Deputy Governor of Luhansk Oblast Olha Lishyk.

The event will take place at the Hofburg Conference Centre's Neuer Saal, and is open to the media. Journalists interested in attending the event should register by e-mail to Liana.Khorovytska@osce.org, by 17:00, Friday, 1 March 2019.

The event is organized by Ukraine’s Delegation to the OSCE with the support of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Georgia, Presidential Election, 28 October and 28 November 2018: Final Report

The final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the 28 October and 28 November 2018 presidential election in Georgia recommends a comprehensive review of the election legislation in order to eliminate gaps and ambiguities and ensure uniform application. The report, published on 28 February 2019, also recommends enhancing regulations on what constitutes acceptable speech during election campaigns.

The report notes that the election was competitive and professionally administered, candidates were able to campaign freely, fundamental freedoms were generally respected and voters had a genuine choice, although there were instances of misuse of administrative resources, and senior state officials from the ruling party were involved in the campaign.

The legal framework provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections, even though key aspects of the second round were not sufficiently regulated, the report says. It recommends reviewing the appointment formula for lower-level commissions to ensure more balanced political representation.

The report notes that the use of negative, harsh and at times violent rhetoric significantly overshadowed the campaign, particularly for the second round, and went unaddressed by the authorities. Enhancing regulations on acceptable speech during election campaigns would allow reviewing potential cases of hate speech and, where appropriate, applying sanctions in a timely manner.

The report further recommends establishing an effective and timely mechanism for addressing complaints on cases of misuse of state resources during the campaign before an impartial and competent authority, to ensure a clear separation between party and state.  

Additional recommendations include aligning the number of commission members at each level to the actual need, introducing expedited deadlines to address campaign finance violations, making all decisions and legal opinions of the media regulator publicly available, reviewing the legal framework for election dispute resolution and ensuring that voters cast their ballot free of fear of retribution.

For election day observation, ODIHR was joined by delegations from the Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE, the Council of Europe and NATO, and a European Parliament delegation.

MINSK, 28 February 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 27 February 2019:

“I have repeatedly stated that last year the number of civilian casualties was reduced to the lowest level since the beginning of the conflict. This trend continues also in the current year.

Yet, on February 23, 2019, two civilians died and one was injured when a minivan detonated an explosive device on the road in the ‘grey zone’ very close to Olenivka checkpoint in the Donetsk region.

This tragic incident points to the indisputable importance of demining, in particular along the roads around the checkpoints.

Along with the demining issue, I would like to touch upon another aspect of entry-exit checkpoints. The number of crossings of the contact line via the existing checkpoints is constantly increasing.

In this regard, I call on the sides to take urgent measures to improve the capacity of the checkpoints, especially in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR).

These issues, along with the sustainability of the cease-fire, were today in the focus of the Security Working Group.

The Humanitarian Working Group also discussed the question of improving the conditions for crossing the contact line. Of course, the topic of exchange of detainees was also duly considered.

The Economic Working Group considered topical issues of water deliveries, including the audit for the “Voda Donbassa” company to be conducted according to the previously agreed schedule. Another discussion topic was the payment of pensions to residents of CADR and CALR.

Today, the Head of the ICRC in Ukraine, Alain Aeschlimann, also participated in the meetings of the Humanitarian and Economic Working Groups. He will soon leave his post. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Mr Aeschlimann for his valuable contribution to the solution of several important issues discussed in the TCG.

The Political Working Group took forward its exchanges on its well-known agenda, namely the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR as stipulated by the Minsk agreements.”

STRASBOURG, France, 27 February 2019 – Presenting the priorities of the 2019 Slovak OSCE Chairmanship to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg today, Chairperson-in-Office and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, Miroslav Lajčák called on all 47 Member States of the Council of Europe to defend institutions, rules and effective multilateralism. 

“Human rights”, he said speaking at Europe’s leading human rights organization, “need defence and renewal. So let´s continue the trek towards a future where democracy flourishes, autocracy fails and the human rights of every woman, man, boy and girl are guaranteed.”

Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe is currently preparing for its 70th anniversary. “For seven decades, this Council has been preserving and promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law. But – fortunately - for a long time now, it does not stand alone. Built on the same ideals of security and democratic governance – the OSCE tied together over a billion people spanning three continents,” – the Minister stated.

The two organizations “translate the words of human rights into the reality of people´s everyday lives” and “have close and solid co-operation” – he continued.

Praising the long-standing relations between the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office pointed out similar challenges facing the two organizations - from shrinking resources to maintaining trust and constructive dialogue between the participating or member States, despite their differences in mandate, membership or functions.

Before concluding his address, he urged all Member States to work together more closely: “Different characteristics must be seen and utilized as comparative advantages - creating space for complementarity of actions.”

While in Strasbourg, Lajčák also met with Council of Europe Secretary-General Jagland.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Bullets flew over the heads of SMM patrol members in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling to a functioning school in Sakhanka and houses in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region, at a compound in Samiilove, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk and at a checkpoint in Popasna.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 170 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (220 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly and westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 23 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (53 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded west-north-west and north of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and adjacent to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Small arms fired near the SMM in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

While monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, an SMM patrol, positioned on the village’s western edge, heard about five shots of small-arms fire about 200m west-north-west, followed by the sound of bullets flying over their heads and hitting a tree about 5-10m south-east. (See SMM Spot Report 26 February 2019.) The Mission members took cover on the ground and then inside the vehicles. The SMM saw Luhansk Water Company employees, who had been conducting the repair works, take cover as well (see below SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure). Shortly before this incident, the SMM had heard about 30 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km west-north-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as 18 undetermined explosions and about 15 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Damage caused by shelling to school in Sakhanka

In the yard of a functioning school at 3 Vartazarovoi Street in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed two fresh craters and damage to school properties, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a south-south-westerly direction. About 2m from the first crater (10m south of the school building), the Mission saw a hole in a water pipeline used for heating, assessed as caused by shrapnel. About 10m north-east of the second crater, the Mission saw a west-facing entrance door of the school building dislodged from its doorframe. A man, who said that he was a resident of the village, told the SMM that between 08:00 and 08:30 on 25 February, while in the neighbourhood of the school, he had heard explosions and then seen the abovementioned damage at the school. He added that there had been no pupils present at the time of shelling as the school had been closed for the holidays. In front of the school, the SMM observed fresh tracks of undetermined vehicles on a road leading west into a field. (About 1.5km west of the school, the Mission had previously observed positions of the armed formation.)

Damage caused by shelling to houses in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi

In Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), on 24 February, the SMM saw a shattered south-facing window of an inhabited two-storey house at 2 Vysoka Street and fresh damage (multiple holes) to the south-facing side of the roof of a single-storey inhabited house at 4 Vysoka Street. The Mission observed five fresh craters nearby, three of which were less than 15m south of the houses, assessed as caused by rounds of undetermined weapons fired from a south-easterly direction. A resident of the former house told the SMM that at around 05:30 on 24 February, while at home, his house had been damaged by shelling (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 26 February 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 25 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the early hours of 26 February, the camera recorded four projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 26 February, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a previously observed tailfin of a mortar (possibly 82mm) round on the ground 1-1.5m west of the road and about 270m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (see SMM Daily Report 27 December 2018).

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

26 February:

The SMM saw:

• a towed howitzer (type unknown) being transported by a truck moving north near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) moving south near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a tank (T-64) near Novoselivka (99km north of Donetsk).

26 February

The SMM saw:

• 32 tanks (T-64) stationary at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk);
• seven IFVs (two BMP-2, one BMP-1 and the remainder BMP variants) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two IFVs near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

25 February

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

-           two armoured personnel carriers (BTR variant) in Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk) about 20m from the nearest house.

Non-government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk);
• 16 IFVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk).

Recent impact craters

On 25 February, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least seven fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by mortar (120mm) rounds, in and near Vodiane. Two of them were spotted near destroyed houses and the remainder near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of the village. About 3km east of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and about 1.3km south-east of the aforementioned positions, the UAV spotted at least 50 fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by probable mortar (82mm or 120mm) rounds, near positions of the armed formations.

Presence of mines

On 24 February, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 40 previously observed anti-tank mines (undetermined mines) laid across on road M03 between Svitlodarsk and Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk)(see SMM Daily Report 21 June 2018).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to water pipelines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a water pipeline near Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. Following the occurrence of ceasefire violations in the area (see above), representatives of the Luhansk Water Company told the SMM that repairs and assessments of water pipelines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka had been suspended.

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw 25 cars (three with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as 17 with “DPR” plates and one with plates marked with a green-and-white striped flag and the letters “ABH”) entering Ukraine. The Mission also saw eight cars (five with Russian Federation and two with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw eight cars (two with Russian Federation licence plates, and six with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and ten cars (three with Russian Federation, two with Ukrainian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian license plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about ten minutes, the SMM saw three cars (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine and four cars (three with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, citing “orders” not to allow the Mission to enter the area without written permission.
• Three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a compound on the eastern edge of Samiilove (non-government-controlled, 89km south of Donetsk).
• Four armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint towards the town or west, citing “ongoing special forces operation”. The Mission saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in all directions.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T0405, citing orders from his commander.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments

• An SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as jamming, while flying over areas north and north-east of Donetsk region.[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka, at Oktiabr mine and in Svitlodarsk were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

VIENNA, 27 February 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today said he is concerned about the detention of several journalists and bloggers who were covering rallies in the cities of Almaty, Zhanaozen and Uralsk in Kazakhstan.

“I am concerned about the practice of short detentions of journalists and bloggers, which hinders them in pursuing their professional duties,” Désir said. “Informing the public about social protests and issues of public interest is an important role of journalists - they should not be punished for doing their work.”

On 27 February, blogger Ashat Bersalimov was detained in Almaty; journalist Saniya Toiken of Radio Free Europe’s Azattyq service, and camera operator Sanat Nurbekov were detained and questioned for several hours in Zhanaozen; while blogger Askar Shiygumarov was detained in Uralsk after leaving his house.

Désir noted that the practice of arbitrary detentions of journalists has recently become more frequent in the country, and conveyed his concerns to the authorities.

Toiken was also briefly detained on 12 February while covering a protest in Astana. Several journalists were briefly detained in Almaty in mid-December.

The Representative recalled that the “Special Report on Handling of the Media during Political Demonstrations: Observations and Recommendations” published by his Office, states that “law-enforcement officials have a constitutional responsibility not to prevent or obstruct the work of journalists during public demonstrations, and journalists have a right to expect fair and restrained treatment by the police.”  

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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412652 Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day training course for fifteen Tajik experts and practitioners aimed at strengthening the capacity of Tajikistan to counter terrorist financing was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department and the OSCE Programme in Dushanbe, in co-operation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Global Programme against Money Laundering, from 25 to 27 February 2019.

The training course, held in Dushanbe, was led by international experts from the OSCE and UNODC. The training participants work in the headquarters of the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Financial Monitoring Department of the National Bank of Tajikistan, the Ministry of the Interior, and the State Committee for National Security of the Republic of Tajikistan.

The participants learned how improving inter-agency co-operation can help to disrupt terrorist financing. Based on country- and region-specific scenarios, the course included sessions on tackling financial intelligence and strategic analysis. The participants were familiarized with specific instruments and techniques that will help to significantly improve their effectiveness in countering terrorist financing.

The course aims to assist Tajikistan in countering terrorist financing in line with international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s standards and OSCE commitments.

The training course is part of a comprehensive multi-annual OSCE-UNODC capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in Central Asia.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

On the morning of 26 February, an SMM patrol consisting of six members and two armoured vehicles was positioned on the western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), about 500m east of the eastern edge of the Zolote disengagement area. The patrol was monitoring the security situation in the area to enable repair works to water pipes in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. Three patrol members were standing next to the vehicles and the others were inside them. Six employees of the Luhansk Water Company were conducting the repair works about 100m west-north-west of the SMM’s position.

Despite security guarantees having been provided, at 12:18, the SMM patrol members who were standing next to their vehicles heard about five shots of small-arms fire approximately 200m west-north-west, followed by the sound of bullets flying about 10m over their heads; subsequently, they heard and saw the bullets hitting at least one tree about 5-10m south-east of the SMM’s position. The three SMM patrol members took cover on the ground and then inside their vehicles and saw the Luhansk Water Company employees taking cover behind a tractor. At 12:20 the SMM patrol and the Luhansk Water Company employees departed the area. No injuries or damage to property were reported. The SMM patrol returned safely to its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled 50km west of Luhansk).

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

 OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

 OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                        

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 9,124 to 8,760 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 6 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

 Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 59 this week (compared to eight last week); 32 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 27 into Ukraine (46 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, two families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when six families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and three into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (307 compared to 327 observed during the previous week). There were 160 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 147 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Stakhanov - Kyiv and Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 739 to 665 (194 at the Gukovo BCP and 471 at the Donetsk BCP); 341 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 324 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” (sometimes “DPR”) plates.

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 49 (compared to 59 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 264 to 203: of the total number of trucks scanned, 110 trucks (54 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 93 trucks (46 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 170 to 133 vehicles; 66 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 67 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on nine occasions, compared to four last week; the OTs assessed that five trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and four to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

 Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

On 19 February at 09:47, the OT observed an ambulance that arrived at Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle drove behind the main building and was not visible to the OT. At 09:58 the same day, the ambulance left the BCP towards the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 22 January 2019 to 26 February 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                      

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer ceasefire violations and Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Staromykhailivka, at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, as well as in government-controlled Taramchuk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (220), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 275 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south and west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), at westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and again in areas south-east, south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 53 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 300 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 24 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 25 February, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard seven undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-5km west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as seven shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-5km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).[3]

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

The SMM saw:

24 February

• a surface-to-air-missile system (9K33 Osa) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three tanks (T-64) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk) and
• three mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled

25 February

The SMM saw:

• a tank (type undetermined) at a train station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk) and

• a surface-to-air-missile system (9K33) near Zoria (22km north-east of Mariupol).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

24 February

The SMM noted that:

• nine howitzers (seven 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and two D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

25 February

The SMM noted previously observed weapons.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• five armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (61km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• seven IFVs (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

On 23 February, in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man wearing green camouflage clothing standing in front of a green sport utility vehicle with Russian Federation licence plates, apparently recording the SMM with a hand-held camera.

Recent impact craters

On 23 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 12 recent craters, assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds, in a wooded area (non-government-controlled), about 500m south of the Zolote disengagement area.

On 24 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted fresh damage to a house (part of its roof destroyed), assessed as caused by an artillery or mortar round, within a residential area of government-controlled Zolote. The same UAV spotted also 14 fresh craters, assessed as impacts of artillery or mortar rounds, in a nearby field (one of the craters was 2m from a house).

New mine hazard signs

The Mission saw for the first time two mine hazard signs with a “skull and crossbones” and “Danger Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian placed on the south-western edge of a local road about 4km north-east from Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk). About 300m south of that location, the Mission saw for the first time a sign advising in Ukrainian how to act in case of spotting an explosive object.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to water transmission lines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border area outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 35 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as one with "LPR” and one with “DPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates), three buses (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 14 pedestrians (12 men and two women, 25-40 years old) exiting Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw five cars (two with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage on two occasions, after the Mission refused to show its patrol plan. Both times they cited “demining activities in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “military movements in the area”.
• At a checkpoint in Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing demining operations”.
• The SMM was unable to visit a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The site was locked and no personnel were present.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras at Oktiabr mine and in Svitlodarsk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 22 and 23 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 23 and 24 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Two persons were killed and one person was injured in a mine explosion near a checkpoint close to the contact line in Donetsk region.
• The Mission saw fresh damage caused by shelling in Oleksandrivka.
• It saw weapons in violation on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.
• It was also restricted near Zaichenko, Petrivske and Verkhnoshyrokivske, at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region,  at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region as well as  near Izvaryne and Sievernyi, areas near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 22 and 23 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 35 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east, south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 23 and 24 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 275 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of the central railway station in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) and at southerly and south-westerly directions of Chermalyk.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 22 and 23 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-east and north-east of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 23 and 24 February, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations (including all explosions) were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled 69km west of Luhansk).

Mine explosion kills two civilians, injures another near checkpoint close to the contact line in Donetsk region

On 23 February, the SMM saw the burning wreckage of an overturned mini-van on the soft ground of a median strip between the lanes of road H-20, south of the forward position of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) (see SMM Spot Report 25 February 2019). The Mission also saw a fresh crater in the median strip, assessed as caused by an explosive device (probably an anti-tank mine) detonated by the vehicle. Following up on reports of three civilians involved in the incident, on 24 February, the director of the morgue in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the bodies of a man (aged 34) and of a woman (aged 85) had been brought to the morgue on the afternoon of 23 February. He added that the two individuals had died from severe injuries caused by a mine explosion. In Shakhtarsk (non-government controlled, 50km east of Donetsk), a man (aged 59) told the SMM that on 23 February, he had been travelling with his mother and a driver in the abovementioned van and that an explosion had occurred after the vehicle entered the abovementioned median strip south of the forward position of the armed formations near Olenivka. He had scratches and bruises on his cheeks, as well as a bandage covering his head.

Fresh damage caused by shelling to a residential house in Oleksandrivka

On 22 February, at 339 Horkoho Street in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a shattered outer window pane on the east-facing side of a single-storey house, as well as a fresh hole (7cm in width) in the west-facing side of a shed (about 3m east from the house) and 20 fresh shrapnel holes (2-6cm in width) on the surface of a concrete yard (about 4m east of the same house).

The SMM assessed the damage to the shed as caused by a round of a weapon (30mm calibre) fired from a south-westerly direction and the damage to the yard and the window of the house as caused by shrapnel from the abovementioned round. The owners of the house (a man and a woman, aged 50-60) told the SMM that in the morning of 19 February, the woman had been alone in the house when she had heard an explosion in their yard. They said that they had found a piece of shrapnel (with several holes in it) in the yard and that members of the armed formations had come that same day and had cleared the yard. 

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 23 February, positioned in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard six shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1.5-2km south-south-east (assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area) and a shot of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1.5-2km east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area. Positioned about 1.3km north-north-east of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 2-3km north-north-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-8km south and south-west and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 2-3km east (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area). Positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement near Zolote, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day of 24 February, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact of a mortar round and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-east (all assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area), as well as 21 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

On 23 and 24 February, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations. [3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled

22 February

The SMM saw:

• eight multiple launch rocket systems  (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Nykanorivka (86km north of Donetsk).  

24 February

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in the yard of a house being used by military personnel near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) stationary near railway tracks on the north-eastern edge of Olhynka (40km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled

22 February

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• five towed howitzers (undetermined variants) near Yasnodolsk (41km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled

22 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• ten tanks (T-72) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observation, see SMM Daily Report of 21 February 2019).

Government-controlled

24 February

The SMM saw:

• ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) loaded on tractor trailers at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

22 February

The SMM noted that:

• 25 tanks (T-64) and  ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present (for the first time) and
• 102 self-propelled howitzers (62 2S1 and 40 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 86 tanks (T-64) (of which 31 were missing for the first time)), 67 mortars  (54 2B11 Sani, 120mm (of which three were missing for the first time), 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37, 82mm), 21 MLRS (BM-21), 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), nine towed howitzers (six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and three D-44, 85mm), six towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

22 February

The SMM noted that:

•  13 anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Non-government-controlled

22 February

The SMM saw:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1) in Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a military truck with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top and an IFV (BMP-2) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk).

Government-controlled

23 February

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (undetermined variant) moving west near the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk ( 45km north-east of Donetsk);
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-1) in Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP-2) at a military-type compound in Luhansk city.

24 February

The SMM saw:

• two military personnel holding two mini-UAVs and one holding a control panel for a mini-UAV near Popasna.

Presence of mines and demining activities

On 24 February, about 500m north-north east of the northern edge of Petrivske, the SMM saw for the first time six anti-vehicle and directional mines (three assessed as MON-200 and three assessed as TM-83) laid about 10m of each other in a field about 12m east of road CO51532.

On 24 February, the SMM saw about 50 new mine hazard signs (red with skulls and crossbones reading “Stop Mines” in Russian) laid out over an area of 700m in a field 200m north-east of a road leading to the northern edge of Sartana (government-controlled 15km north-east of Mariupol). About 100m north from the aforementioned signs, the SMM saw seven members of a non-governmental organization dressed in blue uniforms conducting demining activities (using mine detectors and marking clearance areas) in the same field.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 23 February, the Mission monitored the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and on 23 and 24 February, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside of government control

On 24 February, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 15 covered cargo trucks (14 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and a vehicle (with Ukrainian licence plates) queuing to exit Ukraine, as well as two covered cargo trucks (with Belarusian licence plates) and two pedestrians (women, aged 30-40) entering Ukraine. After seven minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw one pedestrian (woman, aged 40) exiting Ukraine. After two minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 15 cars (with Russian Federation licence plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates), two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), two mini-buses (with Russian Federation licence plates) and two milk tankers (with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 44 cars (11 with Ukrainian, 25 with Russian Federation and two with Georgian licence plates and six with “DPR” plates),  25 covered cargo trucks (17 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates),  two open cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates)  and a tanker truck with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 23 February, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near Petrivske, citing the presence of “a sniper” in the area and lack of permission from superiors.
• On 23 February, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security concerns”.
• On 23 February, at a heavy weapon holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk, the SMM was denied access by an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces citing lack of permission from superiors.
• On 24 February, at a border crossing near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), an unarmed member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 24 February, at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Luhansk), an unarmed member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 24 February, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), after the SMM refused to show its patrol plan.
• On 24 February, the SMM was unable to enter a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region because the gate was locked. A civilian guard at the site told the SMM that the site had been closed and it should return on another day.

Conditional access:

• On 23 February, at a checkpoint of the armed formation on road T0513 near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting its trailer.

Other impediments:

• On 22 February, in Chystiakove (formerly Torez, non-government controlled, 62km east of Donetsk), the head doctor of the hospital told the SMM to address senior members of the armed formations for a meeting.
• On 23 February, while positioned 1.5km south-west of Sarabash (formerly Komunarivka, non-government-controlled, 30km south of Donetsk), conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM lost control over the UAV due to what the SMM assessed as external interference,  most likely caused by jamming of the control link.[6] The UAV landed about 240m south-east of the SMM in a field marked with mine hazard signs. The SMM was unable to recover the UAV.  
• On 24 February, while positioned on the north-western edge of Makiivka (non-government-controlled, 12km north-east of Donetsk), while conducting  two mini-UAV flights, the SMM lost control over one of the UAVs due to what the SMM assessed as external interference, most likely caused by jamming of the control link.[7] The SMM was able to regain control over one of the UAVs which landed safely while the other one crash-landed 10m east-south-east of the SMM’s position (and sustained damage to its propeller).  

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

At around 12:40 on 23 February, while moving south past the forward position of the armed formations along the contact line on road H-20 near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), about 200m south of the above-mentioned position of the armed formations, the SMM saw the burning wreckage of an overturned minivan on the soft ground of a median strip between the road lanes. Within a radius of 15m of the wreckage, the Mission saw debris from the vehicle scattered around, including three tyres and two doors, all scorched. The SMM saw a fresh crater in the median strip about 3m from the wreckage as well as three mine hazard signs: one lying on the ground less than 10m from the crater and the other two attached to a post and a barrier nearby. The SMM assessed that the vehicle had detonated an explosive device (probably an anti-tank mine) in the median strip.

On 24 February, the SMM followed up on reports of three civilians involved in the explosion. The head of the morgue in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) told the SMM that the bodies of a man (34 years old) and of a woman (85 years old) had been brought to the morgue on the afternoon of 23 February. He said that the two civilians had died from severe injuries caused by a mine explosion.

In Shakhtarsk (non-government controlled, 50km east of Donetsk), a man (59 years old) told the SMM that he had been one of the three people in the aforementioned minivan. He said that on 23 February, he had been returning to non-government-controlled areas with his mother and a driver after having received pensions in government-controlled areas. He added that an explosion had occurred after the vehicle had entered the median strip on road H-20 just south of the armed formations’ forward position. The man had scratches and bruises on his cheeks, as well as a bandage covering his head.

The incident site is located in the area between the forward positions of the armed formations and the Ukrainian Armed Forces (about 4km south-west of the site) near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM had previously seen at least ten freshly dug circular mounds approximately 30-40cm in diameter in the same median strip and mine hazard signs surrounding it (see SMM Daily Report of 2 July 2018). The Novotroitske entry-exit checkpoint near Berezove is one of the five official routes for civilians to cross the contact line.

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