European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marianna Pari,

© Oleksii Lishchyshyn / Shutterstock.com

The European Union’s long-term budget, the multiannual financial framework (MFF), sets out the maximum annual amounts of spending for a seven-year period. It is structured around the EU’s spending priorities, reflected in broad categories of expenditure or ‘headings’.

Heading 1 – Single market, innovation and digital – is one of the seven headings in the MFF proposed by the European Commission for the new 2021-2027 financial period. The heading covers spending in four policy areas: research and innovation, European strategic investments, single market, and space. The Commission, with a view to matching the budget to the EU’s political ambitions, is proposing an overall amount of €166.3 billion (in 2018 prices) for this heading, representing 14.7 % of the MFF proposal. However, the new Commission’s six priorities for 2019-2024 could have a budgetary impact on this heading, in particular the support for investment in green technologies and a cleaner private and public transport, which are among the actions included in the European Green Deal, and efforts to enable Europe to make the most of the potential of the digital age.

This briefing presents the structure and budget allocation of Heading 1 and compares it with the current MFF. It describes each policy cluster and compares the Commission’s budgetary proposal with the European Parliament’s negotiating position and the negotiating box presented by the Finnish Presidency in December 2019. It then explores some considerations that could contribute to the forthcoming budgetary negotiations on the 2021-2027 MFF.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Single market, innovation and digital: Heading 1 of the 2021-2027 MFF‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

A joint EPRS-EUI policy roundtable

Written by Marcin Cesluk-Grajewski and Joanna Apap,

The Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA): What future for stabilisation and reconstruction

Nearly a decade after the Arab Spring, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remains ravaged by war and social conflict and mass migration of refugees, as well as suffering economic impoverishment. This unstable neighbourhood poses many threats and challenges for the European Union (EU), including terrorism and radicalisation of local minorities and mass migration. The EU should therefore increase its engagement in the MENA and, perhaps, exchange its traditional model of conflict resolution and reconstruction for a ‘bottom up’ one, focused on citizens and local communities, according to analysts speaking at a conference in the European Parliament. A lack of meaningful EU action is likely to increase China and Russia’s efforts to gain more influence in the oil-rich area and allow regional powers, for example Iran, to solidify and expand their spheres of influence.

The ‘Outlook for the MENA Region: What future for stabilisation and reconstruction’ event was organised by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) and the Florence-based European University Institute (EUI) in the European Parliament’s Library Reading Room on 21 January 2020. Gathering an audience of more than 100 policy-makers, diplomats and members of civil society, it evolved around a recent e-book – ‘Fractured stability: war economies and reconstruction in the MENA‘ – a collection of essays by eminent scholars, who explore alternative approaches to reconstruction.

The EUI hosts the  Middle East Directions Programme, promoting multidisciplinary research on the region. EUI Professor Luigi Narbone, one of the key contributors to the e-book, told the audience ‘We must think forward and see what Europe can do to create appropriate conditions for real-term, sustainable conflict resolution in the MENA countries’. He added that the traditional model of diplomatic negotiations, followed by power-sharing deals and reconstruction fuelled by foreign aid does not seem to work in the MENA region. More than nine years have passed since popular uprisings in the region, but war still rages in Syria, Yemen and Libya, while politics and economies remain highly fragile in many other counties.

‘We need a new approach. We need to think outside the box. It is important to continue diplomatic pressures. Nevertheless, we need to start reconstruction with a bottom-up approach, a people-centred approach. We need to work with local communities, to provide basic service to the population, some security, foster an inclusive bottom-up economy to create islands where very construction starts’, said Narbone.

Professor Steven Heydemann of Smith College, a co-author of the e-book, concurred, saying that the complex situation in the region requires fresh ideas. He challenged a long-standing view that wars and revolutions, in fact, provide a fresh opportunity to re-build economies. Conflicts usually do not destroy previous systems, which are ‘parasitic, illicit and predatory. ‘War-time economies in Syria, Libya and Yemen exhibit a lot of continuity with pre-war economies’, he stated. ‘The principal objective of post-conflict economic reconstruction should be to insulate citizens from the predatory, coercive, extractive norms and institutions that are the every-day practices of dominant political elites.’

Brando Benifei, Member of the European Parliament and Rapporteur on Parliament’s ‘Post-Arab Spring: Way forward for the MENA region‘ report, deplored that the EU’s inconsistent approach towards the region, with some countries driven by their economic interests or post-colonial ties. This diminishes the EU’s leverage in the MENA region. He also cautioned European diplomacy against ‘quick-fixes’ intended to address pressing issues in the short-term, such as migration and terrorism. Benifei felt that EU policy should be oriented towards democratisation and respect for human rights.

Acting in their role as discussants, Perla Srour-Gandon, Policy Adviser on the Middle East and Gulf Countries at the Secretariat of Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and Branislav Stanicek Policy Analyst in the External Policies Unit of EPRS, shared their views from a country-based focus. Srour-Gandon focused on Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen and gave a comprehensive overview of how the European Parliament is engaged in the region, notably through formal and informal meetings with parliamentarians and ministers. She noted the growing role of the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for individuals engaged in peace-making and democratisation.

Branislav Stanicek, who focused on Libya and Syria, portrayed a picture of the region, which emerged as complex and facing humanitarian crisis. Sadly, there are no easy answers to putting the region on the path towards stability. Should the EU negotiate with dictators to achieve a short-term alleviation of the situation, or fix its problems with, for example, migration? If the EU refuses to engage, what if China and Russia are willing to do so? Such questions call for deep reflection by the EU in its efforts to boost engagement in the MENA region.

An ex-ante impact assessment/ex-post evaluation perspective for parliamentary committees

Written by Milan Remáč and Stefano Vettorazzi,

© fotolia

This briefing is intended as a background overview for parliamentary committees planning their activities in relation to the European Commission’s 2020 work programme (CWP 2020). It offers a brief description of the work programme’s content and of related publications provided by the Ex-Ante Impact Assessment Unit (IMPA) and the Ex-Post Evaluation Unit (EVAL) of the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in particular initial appraisals of Commission impact assessments and implementation appraisals.

Following the same format as in previous years, the CWP 2020 announces multiple legislative proposals, whether entirely new or updating existing legislation. Also, as in previous years, the annexes to the CWP 2020 provide a fairly clear overview of new initiatives, regulatory fitness and performance (REFIT) initiatives, pending priority proposals, intended withdrawals and repeals of existing legal acts envisaged. Under the CWP 2020, the Commission plans to submit at least 97 new legislative and non-legislative initiatives to the European Parliament, and at least 44 REFIT initiatives (both legislative and non-legislative), by the end of 2020.

Commission work programme 2020 communication

On 29 January 2020, the new European Commission published and presented its work programme for 2020: ‘A Union that strives for more’, COM(2020) 37. This sets out a targeted agenda to implement the von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities for 2019-2024 and the key initiatives that support them. The six priorities are:

• A European Green Deal,
• An economy that works for people,
• A Europe fit for the digital age,
• Promoting our European way of life,
• A stronger Europe in the world and
• A new push for European democracy.

The European Commission presented the CWP 2020 in the form of a communication, with five annexes providing more in-depth information about the Commission’s legislative and non-legislative intentions for 2020.

The communication is structured along the six priorities set out in President von der Leyen’s political guidelines and focuses on the priorities for the European Parliament and those in the European Council’s Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024. The work programme focuses in particular on the opportunities that can be generated by ‘the twin ecological and digital transition’. According to the CWP 2020, the UN Sustainable Development Goals will be placed at the centre of EU policy-making.

The Commission underlines its strong commitment to strengthen its special relationship with the European Parliament, and in this regard supports a right of initiative for the Parliament. Better regulation will continue to be the main tool for designing and evaluating EU policies and laws. The CWP 2020 explicitly refers to the application of a ‘one in, one out’ approach (although it does not provide any further explanation),and draws on the benefits of strategic foresight for the design and implementation of policies for the years to come.

The unprecedented challenge of negotiating a new partnership with the United Kingdom distinguishes the CWP 2020 from previous work programmes.

Based on the CWP 2020, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council will now start discussions with a view to establishing a list of joint legislative priorities on which co-legislators agree to take swift action.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Commission Work Programme for 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nera Kuljanic with Evangelia Thoukididou,

© shutterstock

Synthetic pesticides are often denounced as harmful to both human health and the environment. European Union (EU) policy has a tendency to encourage a reduction in their use. But what effective alternatives are there to protect plant health and boost crop yields?

Plant protection products (PPPs) are formulations containing active substances, key ingredients that repel, control or eliminate crop-disruptive living organisms such as weeds, pests and insects, thus preventing crop losses and enabling high agricultural yields. The ‘active substances’ can be produced by chemical synthesis or derived from a biological source such as plants, animals, microbes or minerals. ‘Pesticides’ is a broader category, also comprising biocides used to control organisms harmful to human and animal health.

The use of pesticides has remained relatively stable globally in recent years. This is also the case for PPP sales in the EU, but with considerable differences between Member States. At the same time, the biopesticides market is growing (see next section). On the other hand, the number of active substances approved for use in the EU has decreased, because they did not pass the strict safety assessment in place, were no longer profitable or because better alternatives were identified.

Together with intensive modern breeding techniques, the use of fertilisers, irrigation and mechanisation, the increase in PPP use contributed to boosting agricultural yields. However, yields have now reached their plateau, given the current cultivation techniques and varieties in developed countries, while agricultural losses due to harmful organisms and weeds are still significant. In parallel with their growing use, synthetic PPPs have been at the centre of controversy, as they have worrying consequences for human health and the environment, including soil. At the same time, the pests they fight are becoming increasingly resistant, making the need for alternatives even more crucial. Current EU legislation lists ‘candidates for substitution‘, i.e. active substances currently on the market, which could potentially be replaced by non-chemical control and prevention. Guidelines for the sustainable use of pesticides and the promotion of integrated pest management with alternative approaches in the EU were set out in a separate piece of legislation. With all this in mind, is it possible to reduce the use of synthetic pesticides while feeding 3 billion more people by 2050?

Potential impacts and developments

Biological control agents (BCAs) or ‘biopesticides’ is an umbrella term for a set of tools used to control pests such as insects, weeds and plant diseases, using other organisms. These long-used methods rely on natural mechanisms, but are not without risk, notably for biodiversity, as non-target species could be negatively affected by BCAs. For example, some organisms, such as insect pests and plants, communicate with the help of pheromones or other semiochemicals to modify a recipient’s behaviour. Applications of this in pest control include population suppression by affecting the survival and/or reproduction of insect pests. First used over one hundred years ago, semiochemicals are considered eco-friendly, but face application challenges due to their physical instability and high cost of deployment in the field.

Advances in genetics could help us understand mechanisms of plant self-defence, a kind of plant immune system, as a basis for new plant protection methods. For example, a spray-on biopesticide containing a molecule involved in the plant immune system can trick the plant into believing it is under attack, initiating a protective response. This in turn reduces the need for PPPs without altering the genetic sequence of the plant. The substance then degrades, reducing risk to the environment and human health. The effectiveness and safety of this method, however, are still to be proven in field tests. Another promising approach involves plant microbiomes. Microbes living on and around plants benefit plant health and are affected by cultivation practices. It is now possible, through DNA sequencing and computational bioinformatics, to assemble databases on microbes, which are based on samples collected from ‘survivor’ plants. Algorithms applied to such a database then find the best microbiome combinations, which can then be applied to seeds – a sort of ‘plant probiotics’. These complement natural processes in plants in much the same way as gut flora in humans, helping to improve overall plant and soil health, and increasing crop yields without the need for agro-chemicals, while they can even help prevent bacterial food poisoning.

Another approach to decreasing PPP use is the breeding of resistant cultivars. Many (often wild) crop varieties are resistant to specific pests and diseases. Although not prioritised in the past, these resistance genes are becoming as important today as a propensity for high yield. It is suggested that high-precision gene editing enabled by CRISPR-Cas9 could make the process very efficient. Alternatively, genetic material from other species, such as micro-organisms, could be introduced to crops. However, issues around genetic manipulation remain the subject of intense discussion and some controversy.

Lastly, the internet of things has also arrived, enabling smart farming practices, and helping to accurately predict, detect and manage diseases and pest outbreaks. This can facilitate approaches such as mapping the layout of wildflowers across fields to attract pest-eating predators to the right places, and, while it does not eliminate the need for PPPs, it significantly reduces it.

Anticipatory policy-making

Seemingly safer alternatives, e.g. nature-based methods and products, may appear harmless, but they are not without risks. When using selective, narrow-range PPPs instead of one broad-spectrum product, PPPs often need to be sprayed more often, or require a combination of approaches to achieve a desired result. Therefore, in light of the development of new plant protection approaches which could reshape the agricultural landscape, assessments and authorisation procedures may need to be updated to better understand the overall risks and impacts associated with their individual and combined use. Furthermore, the research seems inconclusive as to whether a reduction in PPP use is possible for all crops and across all circumstances without negative effects on productivity, crop quality and farmers’ income.

Development of new PPPs is an expensive and lengthy process: industry costs have almost doubled since 1995 and it now takes more than 11 years between the first laboratory synthesis and the first sale of a PPP. Such costs and administrative compliance can be particularly burdensome for SMEs. With the biopesticide market growing, the EU is funding research in sustainable plant protection options. Environmentally friendly methods for protecting plant health are also a focus of the UN’s International Year of Plant Health in 2020.

EU legislation on PPPs is designed to ensure a high level of protection for human health and the environment, and PPPs are among the best-studied categories of products. The legislation prioritises non-chemical alternatives for plant protection and allows for faster procedures for authorising low-risk active substances. The European Commission recently evaluated EU chemicals legislation and found significant benefits, but also identified areas for improvement. As part of the European Green Deal, the Commission has also promised to propose measures for reducing the use of and risks associated with synthetic pesticides, to increase the land area under organic farming and to develop innovative plant protection methods. The European Parliament assessed the pesticides authorisation procedure in 2018 and called for, among other things, all studies, data and information used in the authorisation procedure to be made publicly available, as well as stronger post-market evaluation, and called for studies on long-term toxicity. With regard to products and approaches involving genetic manipulation, according to a recent Court of Justice of the EU judgment, organisms obtained by new breeding techniques, even if they do not involve the insertion of foreign DNA, fall under EU GMO legislation. More clarity as to how novel genomic techniques are to be legally classified and regulated in the future is expected in 2021.

Finally, continued guidance and support from the EU and national authorities will be needed, as farmers may be resistant to transition away from products they have grown accustomed to using. Consumers’ desires for ‘perfect’-looking products and their attitudes to alternative plant protection approaches could also play a role in their uptake by the agricultural sector.

Read the complete ‘At a glance’ on ‘What if crop protection were environment-friendly?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if crop protection were eco-friendly?‘ on YouTube.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Ahmad Hammoudeh,

©NOAA photo library /flickr

Internet satellite companies, such as Starlink, OneWeb and Blue Origin (Amazon), aim at providing global internet access via satellites. This will bring many benefits to citizens, isolated regions and the global economy, but what if internet satellites collide with other satellites? What if an internet satellite company becomes the next internet monopoly? What if satellite debris hits people on the ground?

Throughout history, humans have developed ways of communicating and transferring knowledge over long distances, from transmitting public information via smoke signals and sending private messages via homing pigeons to developing modern telecommunication technologies, with the internet at the top of the list.

The internet is a global network of interconnected computers that communicate with each other by sending and receiving signals. Although the military used the internet as early as the 1960s (ARPANET), it took until the 1990s to commercialise the network for the public. The internet is provided at local level by different organisations that serve limited geographical areas either via wire (fibre optic, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless connections. The organisations that connect end-users to the internet are known as internet service providers (ISPs).

Starlink aims at providing worldwide high-speed internet access via thousands of satellites. The project is run by an American aerospace company, SpaceX, which plans to serve North America by 2020 and the rest of the globe by 2021. In October 2019, paperwork for an additional 30 000 satellites was filed, on top of 12 000 that have already been approved by the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Once approved, the FCC will submit these filings to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations agency that coordinates telecommunications at international level. Although launching a great number of satellites was hitherto considered an expensive option, SpaceX benefits from its relatively cheap launchers due to its success in developing reusable rockets. The revenue from Starlink will be invested in SpaceX and CEO Elon Musk‘s goal of colonising Mars. Europe has long been interested in Mars exploration, and the European Union supports missions to Mars via the European Space Agency (Aurora and ExoMars).

Potential impacts and developments

With the explosive spread of digital transformation, the internet has become a vital element of human life, from contacting people and shopping online to controlling internet-connected devices. Nevertheless, half of the world’s population still has no internet access, and many areas in the world, including oceans and remote islands, are not easily accessible. Global internet access would therefore not only connect isolated regions of the planet to the internet but also provide dense cities with high-speed internet of low latency (the delay between sending a signal and receiving a response). This would have a positive impact in various sectors, including the following examples.

• Every internet of things (IoT) device needs the internet to communicate. For example, medical devices could access the internet to contact an ambulance, and self-driving cars could access the internet to pick the best route.
• Rural areas, which historically suffer from a lack of services, could accelerate their development. Moreover, children in these areas would have access to online education.
• In the ocean, fishermen and sailors could access the internet easily, and the availability of the internet would help in ocean governance.
• Internet coverage in farming would allow for more information transfer, and increase capabilities for planting, harvesting and other activities in the food cycle.
• Global internet access would open new markets for internet technologies, as well as boost the creative industries. It is worth mentioning that internet satellites could be a cheaper solution for 5G deployment than replacing ground infrastructure. For example, it is estimated that shifting to 5G in the USA using fibre optics will cost US$130–150 billion, whereas the entire Starlink project will only cost around US$10 billion.

Some technical risks arise from the life cycle of satellites and the nature of satellite communications. Signals transferred in an open medium (air or space) are easier to interrupt and could be collected by unintended receivers, although decrypting the signal would have to take place before accessing useful information. At the end of its life, an internet satellite turns into uncontrolled space debris that contaminates space and can potentially cause collisions. While there are projects that aim at removing debris from space, such as RemoveDEBRIS and ESA ADR, Starlink satellites are designed to avoid contamination of space by burning up in Earth’s atmosphere, which results, however, in fragments that could reach the ground. In addition, astronomers are concerned that the growing number of satellites obscures their view of the Universe.

Since covering the globe with internet via satellites implies no escape from exposure to electromagnetic waves, there are concerns about the health impacts of the radiation. Although the relation between cancer and telecommunication waves is controversial, it is agreed that the risks depend on the type of wave and the intensity of radiation. International standards, set by the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP), define radiation exposure limits. The EU rules on electromagnetic fields are laid down in Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC, based on the ICNIRP guidelines.

Data has grown exponentially in recent years, and globalising internet connectivity would boost the already tremendous growth of data. However, storing massive amounts of data comes at a cost: it consumes energy, much of which contributes to carbon emissions. Moreover, the machine-learning industry is hungry to develop what can be sold as artificial intelligence by mining these data using intensive computing power.

Having thousands of satellites in space would intersect with European space projects and would require coordination of satellites in order to avoid collisions between European and internet satellites. In September 2019, the European Space Agency performed an evasive manoeuvre to avoid a potential collision with SpaceX, demonstrating an urgent need for space traffic management with more intelligent control.

As internet infrastructure (cell towers or fibre optic cables) is expensive to build, it is not easy to break the monopoly of the current players in the market. If successful, internet satellites would break the present ISP monopoly, but might perhaps replace it with another monopoly. A global internet satellite service would also weaken the potential for internet censorship compared to the present situation, where local authorities control internet access by blocking websites or even shutting down the internet via national ISPs.

Anticipatory policy-making

As internet satellites are not deployed in air space, but in outer space, which according to international law, is free for use by all states and thus not subject to a claim of sovereignty. However, international space law enforces liability for any damage caused by space objects and obliges states to avoid harmful contamination.

It is advisable that future EU space policy consider the swift development of internet satellites. It is vital that EU legislation is reviewed with an eye on the potential risks such as the health impacts, the internet monopoly, signal disturbances by destructive interference, and the consequences of satellite debris. Some of these issues (i.e. signal disturbances and satellite debris) were addressed in the Commission’s proposal for the Space Programme in 2018. A critical issue is the balance between the risks and gains, especially the trade-off between the security of the European Union and catching up with competitive technological advances. The security aspects include ensuring the robustness of communications and the ISPs’ compliance with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Additionally, handling soft impacts is also needed, perhaps by pushing ICT industries towards cleaner energy.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if internet by satellite were to lead to congestion in orbit?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Miroslava Karaboytcheva,

© PopTika / Shutterstock.com

The fifth generation of telecommunications technologies, 5G, is fundamental to achieving a European gigabit society by 2025.

The aim to cover all urban areas, railways and major roads with uninterrupted fifth generation wireless communication can only be achieved by creating a very dense network of antennas and transmitters. In other words, the number of higher frequency base stations and other devices will increase significantly.

This raises the question as to whether there is a negative impact on human health and environment from higher frequencies and billions of additional connections, which, according to research, will mean constant exposure for the whole population, including children. Whereas researchers generally consider such radio waves not to constitute a threat to the population, research to date has not addressed the constant exposure that 5G would introduce. Accordingly, a section of the scientific community considers that more research on the potential negative biological effects of electromagnetic fields (EMF) and 5G is needed, notably on the incidence of some serious human diseases. A further consideration is the need to bring together researchers from different disciplines, in particular medicine and physics or engineering, to conduct further research into the effects of 5G.

The EU’s current provisions on exposure to wireless signals, the Council Recommendation on the limitation of exposure of the general public to electromagnetic fields (0 Hz to 300 GHz), is now 20 years old, and thus does not take the specific technical characteristics of 5G into account.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Effects of 5G wireless communication on human health‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Is 5G wireless communication safe for human health?‘ on YouTube.

Written by Rachele Rossi,

© wk1003mike / Shutterstock

Desertification is a land degradation process that occurs in drylands. It affects the land’s capacity to supply ecosystem services, such as producing food or hosting biodiversity, to mention the most well‑known ones. Its drivers are related to both human activity and the climate, and depend on the specific context. More than 1 billion people in some 100 countries face some level of risk related to the effects of desertification. Climate change can further increase the risk of desertification for those regions of the world that may change into drylands for climatic reasons.

Desertification is reversible, but that requires proper indicators to send out alerts about the potential risk of desertification while there is still time and scope for remedial action. However, issues related to the availability and comparability of data across various regions of the world pose big challenges when it comes to measuring and monitoring desertification processes. The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the UN sustainable development goals provide a global framework for assessing desertification. The 2018 World Atlas of Desertification introduced the concept of ‘convergence of evidence’ to identify areas where multiple pressures cause land change processes relevant to land degradation, of which desertification is a striking example.

Desertification involves many environmental and socio-economic aspects. It has many causes and triggers many consequences. A major cause is unsustainable agriculture, a major consequence is the threat to food production. To fully comprehend this two-way relationship requires to understand how agriculture affects land quality, what risks land degradation poses for agricultural production and to what extent a change in agricultural practices can reverse the trend. Cropland expansion and intensification of agriculture are among the drivers of land degradation processes that can lead to desertification. Yet, agriculture itself can provide solutions to land degradation.

Almost half of the EU Member States have declared that part of their territory is affected by desertification, yet there is no EU-level strategy to tackle this problem.

EU agricultural policy can have an impact on the elements and drivers of desertification, for example, by promoting sustainable agriculture in the awareness that protecting farmland productivity is of interest to the public and farmers alike.

Read this briefing on ‘Desertification and agriculture‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi,

Every year, millions of live animals are transported within and outside European Union (EU) territory for trade purposes. EU legislation regulates the protection of animals during transport, but reports of breaches of the rules and accidents raise doubts on the transport of live animals and have rekindled the debate on the need to improve the current legislation.

Background

© Jiri Foltyn / Shutterstock

The EU has a large population of farm animals. In 2018, EU herds counted 87 million bovine animals, 147 million pigs, some 100 million sheep and goats, 290 million laying hens, not to forget countless chicks and other types of animals, from rabbits to horses. Most of these animals experience transport during their life. In most cases, it is essentially domestic transport, i.e. transport from the farm to the slaughterhouse, or from one farm to another for production reasons (such as calves transported to cattle-fattening farms). In some cases, transport of live animals from one place to another occurs in relation to trade, because animals are sold alive on the market for different purposes. This happens in both intra‑EU trade and with EU imports and exports to or from third countries. The distances travelled can vary a lot.

The EU legislative framework

Transport of live animals is regulated by Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations. It covers the transport of live animals (mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and fish) taking place in connection with an economic activity, both within the EU and when entering or leaving the Union. An EPRS European Implementation Assessment of October 2018 provides a comprehensive overview of the main issues at stake in transport of live animals and of the implementation of the legislation by national competent authorities, with which lies primary responsibility for carrying out checks on both animals and means of transport, and taking appropriate enforcement measures.

EU transport of live animals in numbers Number of animals transported for trade

Approximately 3.5 million sheep and goats, 4.3 million head of cattle, 33.4 million pigs, and 1 000 million poultry were traded alive between EU countries in 2018. Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, and Italy exchanged more than 1.8 million head of cattle. The reason behind over 70 % of animal transfers within the EU was the production cycle, in the case of cattle and pigs, and slaughtering, in the case of sheep and goats. The import and export of live animals with third countries represents less than 10 % of intra‑EU trade. Cattle is the most traded live animal category, mostly for export to third countries (below half a million animals in 2015). The number of live pigs traded with third countries is much lower than the number of pigs exchanged for intra‑EU trade, whereas the number of live sheep exported from the EU (2 million a year) is almost as high as the number of sheep traded within the EU.

EU countries of origin and destination of animals transported for trade

Trade of live animals involves all world regions. Some EU countries appear among the main importers and exporters at global level. Table 1 provides an overview of the main EU players for each animal category.

Economic value of EU trade in live animals The value of EU trade in live animals

The value of intra‑EU trade in live animals was €8.6 billion in 2018. Bovine animals, pigs and poultry made the highest values. The value of EU trade in live animals with countries outside the EU was much lower, and amounted to less than €3 billion in 2018, the greatest part represented by EU exports to third countries. Bovine animals, poultry, and sheep and goats made the highest values in EU exports of live animals for food production. EU exports of live horses are typically related to non‑food purposes, as well as the vast majority of EU imports of live animals, which involves mostly horses and other categories of animals (such as other mammals, birds, reptiles, bees, insects, etc.). EU exports of live animals to third countries have been rising in recent years.

Live animals vs animal products

Value of EU exports of live animals and of meat and edible meat offal in 2018

In 2018, EU countries traded meat and edible meat offal for about €37 billion in intra‑EU trade and for about €14 billion outside the EU (70 % of which was represented by EU exports and 30 % by EU imports).

Generally, for any type of trade and animal category, the value of EU trade in meat and edible meat offal is much higher than the value of EU trade in live animals. Only the value of EU exports of live sheep and goats and, to a lesser extent, of live bovine animals, is higher than the value of EU exports of the respective meat and meat offal, as shown in Figure 1.

European Parliament position

The conditions of transport of live animals are part of the wider sphere of animal protection and welfare. The EU policy on animal welfare, including its 2012-2015 strategy, has lifted EU standards in this domain. To continue delivering, Parliament has advocated on a number of occasions – such as in its January 2020 resolution on the European Green Deal – a proposal for a new strategy to pave the way for a general EU animal welfare law. However, what has prevailed so far is to prioritise the implementation and enforcement of existing legislation. Parliament has also brought up the issues of export and transport of live animals and the treatment of animals exported to third countries (such as slaughtering methods). In a 2019 resolution, it acknowledged progress made, but expressed concerns over reports of breaches of the rules and of inappropriate vehicles used for animal transport. In November 2019, the sinking in the Black Sea of a cargo ship with more than 14 000 sheep on board reignited criticism of the cruel conditions in which animals are transported over long distances and, more generally, against the export and transport of live animals, due to the harsh conditions in which animals are kept. Following this accident, on 17 December 2019, Parliament held a debate in plenary, during which the Council representative announced the adoption of Council conclusions on animal welfare that acknowledge the need to continue improving the welfare of animals in transport over long distances. The Commissioner for Health and Food Safety, Stella Kyriakides, reiterated the initiatives undertaken by the Commission and the need to address unresolved issues. A number of Members took the floor to demand better treatment of animals during transport, and some Members called for new rules to limit or prohibit transport of live animals. Moreover, the Parliament’s Animal Welfare Intergroup held a meeting focused on the transport of Romanian sheep to the Persian Gulf, and more generally on the conditions of the transport of unweaned animals, including within the EU.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘EU trade and transport of live animals‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp,

On 28 January 2020, United States President Donald Trump released his administration’s ‘vision for Israeli-Palestinian peace’. The White House Plan, coupled with earlier Trump administration moves, marks a distinct departure from past US policy on the Middle East Peace Process. Key elements are illegal under international law, as they advocate the annexation of occupied territory. Israeli leaders have welcomed the plan, seen as meeting Israel’s key demands. The leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas have been united in rejecting the proposal, and the PA has since cut ties with Israel and the USA. The plan is meant to serve as the basis for future direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, to stretch over four years. However, the Israeli government has announced plans to implement parts of it unilaterally in the near future.

Key points of the White House plan

Palestinian statehood. The ‘Peace to Prosperity’ plan would see Israel agree to the creation of a future Palestinian state as set out in ‘a conceptual map‘. However, the establishment of a – demilitarised – Palestinian state within four years is subject to several conditions, which are difficult to meet under current circumstances. They include the Palestinian Authority (PA) taking control in Gaza, the disarming of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other armed groups, a commitment to non-violence and recognition of Israel as ‘the nation state of the Jewish people’. The capital of the Palestinian state would comprise a Palestinian town outside the city of Jerusalem and several eastern Jerusalem neighbourhoods (see below).

Borders and Israeli settlements. Israel would acquire sovereignty over about 30 % of the West Bank, through the annexation of the vast majority of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, as well as most of the Jordan Valley. A future Palestinian state would incorporate the remainder of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as additional land located in the desert straddling the Israeli-Egyptian border. The total would be ‘reasonably comparable in size to the West Bank and Gaza’, with the non-contiguous areas connected by roads, bridges and tunnels. Many commentators have likened the result to a ‘Swiss Cheese’.

Security arrangements. A future Palestinian state would be demilitarised. Israel would ‘maintain overriding security responsibility for the State of Palestine’, including control of border crossings, airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. Counter-terrorism efforts would remain under Israeli control until the Palestinian security apparatus meets predefined security criteria.

© Haaretz Newspaper

Palestinian refugees. The plan explicitly renounces Palestinian refugees’ ‘right to return’ to Israel (a key Palestinian demand in previous negotiations), instead offering them the option of ‘absorption into the State of Palestine’, or ‘local integration in current host countries’, or in third countries (subject to their agreement).

Jerusalem. The plan proposes that Jerusalem become the ‘undivided capital of Israel’, giving Israeli sovereignty over all parts of the city west of the Israeli separation barrier, including most of East Jerusalem, with nearly 300 000 Palestinian residents, and the Old City. It disregards Palestinians’ claim to all of East Jerusalem. Palestinians are offered a capital in Abu Dis, and several neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, including Kafr Aqab and Shuafat (see map). It is ambiguous and potentially provocative regarding the city’s holy sites, advocating ‘maintaining the status quo at the Temple Mount/Haram a-Sharif’, but permitting ‘people of every faith to pray there’.

Economic framework. The second part of the plan, which the White House had already released in June 2019, comprises a US$50 billion economic plan, intended to spur the Palestinian economy.

US endorsement of key Israeli positions

In December 2017, the USA recognised Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, mirroring the official Israeli position on the status of the city, and subsequently moved the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. On 21 March 2019, President Trump announced that the USA would recognise Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which Israel captured from Syria in 1967. On 18 November 2019, the Trump administration declared that Israel’s West Bank settlements did not violate international law. During the unveiling of the plan on 28 January 2020, President Trump said that the USA would ‘recognise Israeli sovereignty over the territory’ that the plan provides to be part of the state of Israel. Emboldened by the plan, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that his government would move to annex Jewish West Bank settlements and the Jordan Valley, but only after the Israeli elections on 2 March 2020. Left-wing Israeli politicians have spoken out against the White House plan.

Reactions to the plan

The Palestinian leadership severed contact with the US administration after the latter recognised Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in December 2017. In June 2019, the Palestinian leadership rejected the economic part of the US plan, calling the 96-page document ‘meaningless’ and ‘impractical’. The PA has refused to be involved in the elaboration of the political part of the US administration’s peace plan, having lost faith in the role of the US as an ‘honest broker’. On 1 February 2020, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced that the Palestinian Authority would cut ties with Israel and the USA over the proposed plan, including over security cooperation. The Arab League has unanimously rejected the ‘US-Israeli deal of the century’, as has the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Arab states, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, agreed ‘not to cooperate with the US administration to implement the plan’. Reactions from Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Qatar had earlier shown qualified support, calling for the renewal of negotiations, while three Gulf Arab states (Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates) actually attended the unveiling of the plan at the White House on 28 January 2020. Russia has questioned the feasibility of the White House plan, noting that it contravenes several United Nations (UN) resolutions. The PA is calling for a UN Security Council resolution to condemn the US peace plan. The USA is expected to veto the resolution, in which case it is likely to be submitted for a vote to the UN General Assembly.

The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians

There have been many attempts to resolve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians since the Middle East war of June 1967, in which Israel occupied the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), Gaza, the Golan Heights and parts of the Sinai peninsula. UN Security Council Resolution 242, passed on 22 November 1967, embodies the principle that has guided most of the peace negotiations – the exchange of land for peace. Clause 1 of Resolution 242 called for Israel to withdraw from the ‘territories’ conquered in 1967, including the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Efforts to resolve the dispute between Palestinians and Israelis have centred on the principle of a ‘two-state solution’ to the conflict, with an independent Palestinian state created alongside the state of Israel. One of the most intractable issues in peace talks has been Jerusalem. The Israeli 1980 Basic Law on Jerusalem declared Jerusalem to be the ‘complete and united’ capital of Israel. Israel officially rejects any division of the city, the seat of the Israeli government. Palestinians, for their part, seek to establish the capital of their future Palestinian state in East Jerusalem. The international consensus has so far been that Jerusalem would have to be the capital of both states, in a manner to be agreed between the two sides in the conflict during ‘final status’ negotiations. Other critical issues have been the approximately 230 settlements Israel has built in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, home to approximately 660 000 Israelis; and the right of return to Israel of Palestinians who fled Israel in 1948, as well as their descendants. There are 5.5 million registered Palestine refugees across the Middle East.

The position of the European Union and the European Parliament

In reaction to the White House plan, EU High Representative Josep Borrell recalled the established EU position and commitment to a negotiated, viable two-state solution, respecting all relevant UN resolutions and internationally agreed parameters. He criticised the US initiative as departing from these parameters and noted that the EU does not recognise Israeli sovereignty over territories occupied in 1967, that annexation of such territories would be contrary to international law, and that such a move would ‘not pass unchallenged’. In 2017, the European Parliament reiterated its strong support for the two-state solution, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states. In 2014, Parliament recognised Palestine statehood.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘US ‘Peace Plan’ for the Middle East‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© luzitanija / Fotolia

The European Union is preparing its next long-term budget – the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). However, more than one and a half year after the European Commission made its MFF proposal, differences persist over the size of the budget and spending levels on particular policies. The European Parliament has called for an ambitious budget, capable of financing new initiatives, such as the European Green Deal. Despite tensions, a decision on the next MFF is still expected in 2020, before the planned start of the next financing period the following year. The later the decision comes, the more significant the negative consequences for beneficiaries of the EU budget, as some aid programmes could be delayed.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the EU’s long-term budget and related issues. The current item includes a recent package of publications on the MFF prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service.

How could net balances change in the next EU budget?
Bruegel, January 2020

EU budget negotiations: The ‘frugal five’ and development policy
European Think Tank Group, January 2020

A new look at net balances in the European Union’s next multiannual budget
Breugel, December 2019

The future of EU finances: New own resources
EUROPEUM, December 2019

How much will the UK contribute to the next seven-year EU budget?
Breugel, December 2019

Budget debate: the battle of the 1% threshold
Fondation Robert Schuman, December 2019

The MFF non-decision: More at stake than delays
European Policy Centre, December 2019

Who pays for the EU budget rebates and why?
Bruegel, December 2019

10 Years of redistribution between the EU Member States
Centrum für Europäische Politik, December 2019

Cross-border, but not national, EU interregional development projects are associated with higher growth
Bruegel, October 2019

New beginnings: An EU budget in support of the next Commission’s agenda
Notre Europe, September 2019

Reconciling foreign policy and development priorities in the EU budget (MFF 2021-2027)
Institute of International and European Affairs, September 2019

A new budget for the EU: Negotiations on the multiannual financial framework 2021–2027
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2019

Paris-proofing the next Multiannual Financial Framework
European Policy Centre, June 2019

Mainstreaming innovation funding in the EU budget
Jacques Delors Institute, May 2019

From ‘paymaster of Europe’ to ‘shaper of Europeʼs future’: A new self-perception of Germany in the EU
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, May 2019

Migration and the next EU long-term budget: Key choices for external action
European Centre for Development Policy Management, March 2019

A jumbo financial instrument for EU external action?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, February 2019

Reducing climate risk in the post-2020 EU budget
E3G, February 2019

Leveraging the next EU budget for sustainable development finance: The European fund for sustainable development plus
European Centre for Development Policy Management, February 2019

The MFF: Europe’s other ticking clock
European Policy Centre, January 2019

EU budget implications of a no-deal Brexit
Bruegel, January 2019

Reforming the MFF and cohesion policy 2021-27: Pragmatic drift or pragmatic shift?
European Policies Research Centre, January 2019

Financing EU external action: Understanding member state priorities
European Think Tanks Group, December 2018

Budget européen 2021-2027: Doter l’Europe des moyens de nos ambitions
Terra Nova, November 2018

Funding the just transition to a net zero economy in Europe: Opportunities in the next EU budget
E3G, November 2018

Can the V4’s priorities shape ‘Europe’s Priorities’? The multiannual financial framework 2021-2027
EUROPEUM, November 2018

Die Finanzierung der EU nach 2020: Zeit für Reformen
Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, October 2018

Strengthening cohesion in the EU: How can structural reforms contribute?
European Policy Centre, October 2018

Negotiating the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework in an electoral year: Which consequences?
Notre Europe, Jacques Delors Institute, September 2018

Aiming high or falling short? A brief analysis of the proposed future EU budget for external action
European Centre for Development Policy Management, September 2018

More money, fewer problems? How the ‘Migration Crisis’ affected funding under the MFF
Jacques Delors Institute, Berlin September 2018

Resources for a prosperous Europe: Redesigning the EU budget in a progressive way
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2018

The EU’s multiannual financial framework and some implications for CESEE countries
Bruegel, September 2018

The EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework: Where should Italy stand?
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2018

The EU Budget and Common Agricultural Policy beyond 2020: Seven more years of money for nothing?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, August 2018

ESM reform: No need to reinvent the wheel
Jacques Delors Institute, Berlin August 2018

Making better use of public funding: The role of national promotional banks and institutions in the next EU budget
Notre Europe, Jacques Delors Institute, August 2018

Winners or losers? The Baltic States in the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations
International Centre for Defence and Security, July 2018

EU reform: Does everything have to change for things to remain the same?
Carnegie Europe, July 2018

Le Fonds européen de défense ou l’enfant prodige de la défense européenne
Confrontations Europe, July 2018

Budget de l’Union européenne: Quel compromis possible entre la France et l’Allemagne?
Fondation Robert Schuman, June 2018

Financing sustainability: Triggering investments for the clean economy
European Political Strategy Centre, June 2018

A stabilization fund can make the euro area more crisis-proof
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, June 2018

The MFF proposal: What’s new, what’s old, what’s next?
Notre Europe, Bertelsmann Stiftung, May 2018

Should the EU budget have a stabilisation function?
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2018

New EMU stabilisation tool within the MFF will have minimal impact without deeper EU budget reform
Bruegel, May 2018

Common or own goals: Reforming the financing of the European Union
Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, April 2018

No escape from politics: Four tests for a successful fiscal instrument in the euro area

Notre Europe, Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 2018

EPRS publications

Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2020
January 2020

The 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework in figures
January 2020

European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund 2021-2027
January 2020

Single market, innovation and digital: Heading 1 of the 2021-2027 MFF
January 2020

Natural resources and environment: Heading 3 of the 2021-2027 MFF
January 2020

Migration and border management: Heading 4 of the 2021-2027 MFF
January 2020

Financing EU security and defence: Heading 5 of the 2021-2027 MFF
January 2020

Financing the EU’s administration: Heading 7 of the 2021-2027 MFF
January 2020

Neighbourhood and the world: Heading 6 of the 2021-2027 MFF

November 2019

Cohesion and Values: Heading 2 of the 2021-2027 MFF

January 2019

2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and new Own Resources: Analysis of the Commission’s proposal
June 2018

Read this briefing on ‘Financing the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

Now that both the new Parliament and the new European Commission are in place and making their positions clear on a number of fronts, Members return to a full agenda for the February plenary session in Strasbourg.

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

This year’s European Union (EU) budget is the last under the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF). Time is therefore pressing to finalise negotiations on the MFF for 2021-2027. However, negotiations on the proposals put forward by the previous Commission are proving rather complicated, not least due to the withdrawal of a major net contributor, the United Kingdom, from the EU. Charles Michel, President of the European Council, has called an Extraordinary European Council Meeting on the MFF, scheduled for 20 February 2020, to attempt to finalise an agreement on the proposed new structure for EU finances, which aims to shift the priority for spending towards a climate-resilient economy. Members are due to hear statements from the European Council and Commission on Wednesday morning on the preparation of that meeting. Parliament will also hear Council and Commission statements on the previous morning, on the negotiating mandate for the negotiations for a new partnership with the UK. Members are expected to vote on a resolution on the subject on Wednesday.

Parliament will also hear a statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles, on the EU response to the United States Middle East plan proposed by US President Donald Trump and referred to as the White House plan. While Parliament will not vote a resolution on the subject, the EU position and its strong commitment to a two-state solution that respects international law is already well established.

An important aspect of relations with non-EU countries, Members will continue on the theme of international trade in a joint debate on Tuesday morning. Parliament is then set to vote (on Wednesday lunchtime) on whether to consent to two trade agreements with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The agreements (a Free Trade Agreement covering exclusive EU competences, including customs and competition rules, and an Investment Protection Agreement based on competences, such as agriculture and environment, that are shared with EU Member States), could see exports to Vietnam rise by almost 30 %. Although there is some concern regarding the human rights situation in the country, Parliament’s committees scrutinising the proposed agreements have concluded that engaging with Vietnam is the best way to encourage improvement. The agreements must subsequently be ratified by Vietnam (as well as EU Member States in the case of the IPA), before entering into force.

With so much focus in the news on the effects of globalisation and giant multinationals, it may be easy to forget that companies with fewer than 250 employees account for 99.8 % of non-financial firms in the EU, and create 85 % of new jobs. The Commission has not forgotten, and uses its ‘SME Test’ to look at the impact of new legislation on such companies. Parliament is a staunch supporter of a business-friendly EU where small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and innovators benefit from a level playing field, and promotes the use of impact assessment to gauge the effects of new legislation on SMEs in particular. The Commission will make a statement to plenary on Monday evening on the progress made with minimising the impact of EU legislation on SMEs through the better regulation initiative. It may also give an indication of what to expect in the new industrial strategy for Europe, expected in March 2020 and its communication on better regulation, expected sometime afterwards.

Christine Lagarde will attend the plenary session on Tuesday afternoon for the first time in her capacity as President of the European Central Bank (ECB), for the presentation of an Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee report on the ECB’s annual report for 2018. Reflecting on the rather mixed economic results of the period, the committee points out the need for a review of ECB monetary policy, with full Parliament involvement, as well as public consultation. It also underlines the ECB’s responsibility to consider the impact of policy on the environment, and urges the ECB to continue to improve transparency and communications with citizens. The report also calls for better gender balance on the ECB Executive Board and Governing Council.

Progress towards gender equality more generally has stalled, and the current Parliament has lost no time in demanding a robust EU gender equality strategy. The Commission will make a statement on Wednesday afternoon on its proposals for a new gender equality strategy, the preparation of which involved informal input from the Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). Following a related plenary debate on 18 December 2019, Members are also due to vote on a motion for resolution on Wednesday lunchtime on the EU strategy to put an end to female genital mutilation around the world. Parliament has long been active in raising awareness of the need to act to end the practice, which it considers a form of persecution, as part of its combat against all forms of violence against women and girls.

For the strengthened European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG – formerly Frontex) to carry out its work in support of EU countries’ border and migration management, it needs to be able to verify the documents presented by people wishing to cross the EU’s external borders. However, the proliferation of both authentic and fake documentation makes the agency’s work that much harder. On Wednesday evening, Members will debate the details of a provisional agreement with the Council (and vote the following day) on the online system collecting False and Authentic Documents Online (FADO). Under the agreed text, the EBCG will take over management of the system, which stores details of travel, identity, residence and civil status documents, driving and vehicle licences issued by Member States or the EU. Personal data will be kept to the minimum necessary for operations and availability filtered according to status, such as authorities involved in document fraud, or the general public.

Finally, the Council and Commission will also make statements on the ongoing threat to the Rule of law in Poland on Tuesday evening.

An autonomous vehicle is a robot that can bring people or goods from one place to another without a human driver. But such a thing as a fully autonomous vehicle does not exist yet not even in the testing phase.

Listen to Tatjana Evas, an EPRS policy analyst, explaining the issues in 3 key questions on autonomous vehicles.

Or read more in our publications:

• A common EU approach to liability rules and insurance for connected and autonomous vehicles
• Artificial intelligence in transport: Current and future developments, opportunities and challenges
• Artificial Intelligence ante portas: Legal & ethical reflections

Our “3 Key Questions on …” series of video interviews with our policy analysts include visual aids to getting a swift grasp of the policy challenges at hand. Take a look at the full series on YouTube.

Written by Cemal Karakas, Carla Stamegna, Ioannis Zachariadis,

© frank_peters / Shutterstock.com

State aid can be defined as an advantage given by a government that may provide a company with an unfair competitive edge over its commercial rivals. State aid can take several forms, such as public subsidies, tax relief, or the purchasing of goods and services on preferential terms. While the European Union (EU) competition rules consider State aid to be incompatible with the internal market, they allow such aid when it promotes general economic development, for example, when tackling the challenges of global competition, the ongoing financial crisis, the digital revolution, and demographic change. To this end, all EU Member States provide some public economic support, for instance, to the coal mining sector, banks, or the digital economy. To contribute to regional development and to increase competitiveness, some Member States have created special economic zones (SEZs), which offer an attractive combination of tax-and-tariff incentives, streamlined customs procedures, less laws, provision of infrastructure, and creation of business clusters.

The European Commission is currently evaluating the State aid modernisation (SAM) package and some of its related laws, as these will expire by the end of 2020. The European Parliament takes a two‑fold stance towards public economic support in the EU. On the one hand, Parliament stresses that State aid should support ecological transformation and foster the development of services, knowledge, and infrastructure rather than providing support to specific companies. On the other hand, it calls on the Commission to ensure that State aid is reduced in the long term, given its distortive effects on the internal market. While the temporary State aid offered to the financial sector to stabilise the EU financial system might have been necessary, Parliament calls on the Commission to scrutinise and eventually remove this aid. Parliament, inter alia, also calls on the Member States to abandon unfair competition practices based on unjustified tax incentives and to adopt appropriate rules in the Council.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Public economic support in the EU: State aid and special economic zones‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘How State aid works in the EU‘ on YouTube.

Written by Branislav Stanicek,

How can enlargement of the European Union remain a realistic, merit-based and politically credible exercise, when some Member States are unwilling to move forward with concrete steps, such as opening negotiation talks? This was the key question at the heart of the European Parliamentary Research Service policy roundtable held on Tuesday, 28 January 2020, which gathered over 120  participants, including Members of the European Parliament, experts and think-tankers.

EPRS roundtable ‘ Western Balkans : A rocky road to enlargement ‘

Organised on the same day as the European Parliament’s Western Balkans Summit (convened by President David Sassoli and attended by the speakers of the Western Balkan parliaments), the timely roundtable provided a moment for reflection one week ahead of the European Commission’s presentation of a new methodology of enlargement. Eduard Kukan, former Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, and former Member, opened the discussion was opened with a keynote speech. Previously appointed United Nations (UN) Special Envoy on Kosovo by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, a role he held alongside Carl Bildt, Kukan warned against the deepening frustration of regional leaders, pointing out that ‘with new and new additional requests, the whole process will lose credibility’. Taking the positive experience and transformational power of past enlargements for central and eastern European countries into account, he remarked that it is in the interest of the both the EU and the Balkan countries to propose tangible benefits for the people when acceding countries are closing negotiation chapters. With regard to the speed of and calendar for EU enlargement, Kukan said that ‘not acting quickly enough would worsen the situation’.

Tanja Fajon (S&D, Slovenia) also warned against possible enlargement fatigue and strongly supported the accession process. As Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Serbia, Fajon will visit Belgrade, together with the EP Rapporteur for the country, Vladimir Bilčik (EPP, Slovakia) and the new Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Olivér Várhelyi, on 6 and 7 February 2020. It is expected that the Serbian electoral crisis and the implementation of the obligations to improve electoral conditions will be the focus of the visit. Fajon and Bilčik were involved in mediating inter-party dialogue on this issue in November and December 2019, while this will be Várhelyi’s first visit to Serbia since his appointment as Commissioner.

The economic aspects of enlargement, as well as the changes proposed in the French ‘non-paper’, were presented by Milica Delevic, Director for Governance and Political Affairs at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Member of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Delevic warned against the risk of slipping into theology on enlargement, with promises of a ‘future life’, and underlined the importance of the pace of enlargement and opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia for the credibility and success of the process. The alternatives could be increased third power influence and a slower pace of reforms.

Tim Judah, Balkans Correspondent for The Economist, then presented the demographic challenges facing the whole region. All Balkan countries are in strong demographic decline, facing ‘brain drain’, as well as undocumented migratory flows. There is a lack of serious analysis of the region’s demographic decline, depopulation and the hollowing-out of the labour force. In 2050, Serbia’s population will fall by 23.8 %, Croatia by 22.4 % and Kosovo by 11 %, compared to 1990. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a fertility rate of 1.26, one of the lowest in the world. With a median age of 29, Kosovo is the youngest country in the region, but does not escape demographic decline: as almost a fifth of its population lives abroad. Branislav Stanicek, Policy Analyst with EPRS noted that such declining demographics will have a direct impact, slowing GDP growth, the main component of which is household consumption. In addition to slower growth, declining demography will also accentuate deflationary pressures, as an ageing population tends to decrease spending, and deflation is much harder for monetary institutions to tackle than inflation. To provide tangible benefits to Balkan citizens, Stanicek supported the proposal of a gradual integration of European policies by the countries of the region. European broadband networks, digital, transport and energy infrastructures as well as investment within the Horizon Europe programme all provide the possibility of excellent initiatives for the region. As an example, in addition to the 2019 inter-regional agreement to curb roaming fees (the six Western Balkan countries agreed to cut roaming fees by 27 % in July 2019, and to abolish all roaming fees from July 2021), roaming fees could be cut for Western Balkans citizens travelling within the EU as well.

Concluding the roundtable, Lívia Járóka (EPP, Hungary), Vice-President of the European Parliament replacing the EP President for the Western Balkans, thanked the participants for their engagement and shared her personal experience as the first female Roma MEP, as well as her activities in favour of social inclusion, education and Roma communities. Járóka noted the excellent opportunity available to the EU to be the driver of positive change and reforms throughout the region, as has already been observed in central Europe. She also underlined the importance of keeping all communities engaged, and doing more for the social inclusion of minorities in the Western Balkans. It is important that EU and Croatian Presidency work together to prepare a pan-European Roma strategy and that Western Balkan countries play an integral part. Finally, Járóka noted the European Parliament’s support for the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia ‘as soon as possible’ and that the Parliament will work together with other EU institutions and Member States to accompany future enlargement policy. She also thanked the Croatian Presidency for their strong support and the emphasis they have placed on Western Balkan European integration.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Angelos Delivorias, Magdalena Sapała and Carla Stamegna,

Trade in goods with the world, euro area and US © European Union, 2020

Growth in the European Union and euro-area economies – albeit still positive – slowed significantly in 2019. Moreover, prospects for the next two years remain muted, against the backdrop of a generalised slowdown. Uncertainty is the overarching theme of this year’s outlook, whether at regional level, or more globally, and whether in terms of short-term policy or deeper, structural economic factors affecting the world’s important economies.

Gross domestic product (GDP) growth in Europe progressed at uneven speeds, from both geographic and sectoral perspectives. Moreover, while downward trends are expected for all the factors underpinning GDP (private and public consumption, investment and exports), their respective contributions to the final figure are also set to change (for example, private consumption will carry less weight). When it comes to employment, the positive trends observed last year are continuing. In this context, the forecasts for 2019 and 2020 have observed – and tried to explain – the reasons why, contrary to textbook theory, (i) an increase in wages did not come immediately after the improvement in employment conditions, and (ii) when the increase in wages came, it did not translate into an increase in prices (inflation).

For 2019, the general government deficit is expected to reverse its previous decline and pick up modestly, a trend that is likely to continue for the next two years. The debt-to-GDP ratio, meanwhile, decreased in 2019 both for the euro area and for the EU as a whole, and is expected to maintain its downward trend in 2020. Lastly, inflation for the euro area is expected to remain below the ECB target of 2 % in the near future, a trend that played a part in the European Central Bank’s decision to resume its asset purchase programmes in 2019, after a brief pause, and to take further accommodative measures. The 2020 EU budget amounts to €168.7 billion, representing only 2 % of total public spending in the European Union – approximately 1 % of gross national income (GNI). Despite its volume, the overall impact of the EU budget is amplified by a number of features, including: a higher share of resources devoted to investment than in national budgets; the capacity to leverage additional funding from other sources; and attention to policy areas where the pooling of resources can provide the EU as a whole with added value (such as research, innovation and development cooperation).

The most prominent aspect of the agreement between the European Parliament and the Council of the EU on the 2020 budget, highlighted by all the negotiating parties, was the increased focus on climate-related action. This additional ‘greening’ of the EU annual budget is designed to help the EU meet the 20 % goal for climate-related spending over the 2014-2020 MFF period. Other spending priorities include stimulating investment, growth and research, and new jobs, especially for young people, as well as addressing migration and security challenges. As in all previous years of the 2014-2020 MFF, the budgetary authority had to resort to the flexibility provisions in order to finance these persistent policy challenges.

The 2020 EU budget is the last under the EU’s current financing framework. This year, the EU institutions and Member States are expected to finalise the design of the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) to cover the 2021-2027 period. Negotiations, which are based on the proposals that the Juncker Commission tabled in mid-2018, are proving lengthy and complex. Taking into account the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, the proposal organises allocations for 27 Member States, around a new structure reinforcing priorities that emerged during the current MFF, such as research, innovation, digital transformation, climate action, borders, migration, security and defence. Against the backdrop of the new agenda for Europe set out by the von der Leyen Commission, financial support for the recently proposed European Green Deal and the transition to a climate-resilient economy will be a major topic in the debate on the next MFF.

Current global trends, the emergence of new economic powers and the development of new technologies are leading to a potential transition of the international monetary system from a still dollar-dominated environment to a more diversified and multipolar system involving several international currencies. After quickly establishing itself as the second most important global currency, the euro gradually lost international standing from the mid-2000s onwards, and has only recently shown signs of reversing the trend.

Recent unilateral third-country actions, such as the renewal of sanctions on Iran, and challenges to international rules-based governance and trade, have highlighted the need to reinforce the EU’s economic and monetary sovereignty. As a result, the idea that the single currency could be a tool of foreign economic policy is coming back into fashion, and the case for an increased international role for the euro being considered more prominently. The benefits arising from this role would seem to offset the possible challenges, nonetheless the consequences of a stronger international role for the euro should be carefully assessed, including those affecting the ECB’s monetary policy.

Against this backdrop, the Commission adopted a communication, ‘Towards a stronger international role of the euro’, and a recommendation on the international role of the euro in the field of energy in December 2018. In this context, the strengthening of the euro’s international role is seen ‘as part of Europe’s broader commitment to an open, multilateral and rules-based global economy’. In the same month, the Euro Summit discussed economic and monetary union reform and, in this context, noted the Commission’s communication, and called for ‘work to be taken forward to this end’.

Policies supporting the euro’s international role should address three broad weaknesses in the institutional design of the EU and EMU: the ability to provide stability both domestically and internationally; the limited depth and liquidity of euro-area financial markets; and Europe not speaking with a single voice on international matters, including security.

Read the complete study ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2020 – Source : EP

The highlights of the January II plenary session included discussion and the vote on the agreement on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, the ceremony to mark International Holocaust Remembrance Day, and a debate on the von der Leyen Commission’s first work programme, for 2020. Parliament also debated the coronavirus outbreak, the humanitarian situation on Greek islands, the strategy for sustainable mobility and transport, and the EU’s response to devastation following floods in Spain. It also debated statements on the rights of indigenous peoples and India’s Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019. Finally, Members adopted Parliament’s calendar of part-sessions for 2021 and 2022.

International Holocaust Remembrance Day

Holocaust remembrance in the EU takes place around International Holocaust Remembrance Day on 27 January, the date on which the Auschwitz Birkenau extermination camp in Poland was liberated. The European Parliament has long warned against the rise of neo-fascist violence, and particularly the increase in violence against Jews, calling for EU countries to take action to counter revisionist narratives that aim at denying or trivialising the mass murder of 6 million European Jews. Jewish communities in the EU have consequently been shrinking recently, in reaction to increasing anti-Semitic acts. The commemoration provides an ideal opportunity to promote public discourse on the facts of the Holocaust. It is also an occasion in many EU Member States, as in Parliament itself, to honour the victims of the less well known Roma and Sinti Holocaust.

Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union

Members gave consent in a single vote to the conclusion, by the Council on behalf of the EU, of the treaty on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The Withdrawal Agreement was agreed between EU leaders and the UK Prime Minister in October 2019. It includes provisions covering citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, rules on the transition period, governance, protocols and annexes. It will enter into force at the end of January, whereupon the United Kingdom will become a third country, ending 47 years of EU membership. With the departure of 73 British Members, the Parliament itself will consequently change. Twenty-seven seats will be redistributed among 14 Member States, with the remaining 46 seats held in reserve for future EU enlargements and/or the possible creation of a transnational constituency.

Commission 2020 work programme

Members heard and discussed a statement on the Commission’s work programme for 2020, adopted on 29 January 2020. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has announced considerable changes in the focus and scope of the Commission’s work for the next few years. President von der Leyen’s ambitions include forging a stronger partnership between the Commission and Parliament by, among other things, providing greater support for Parliament’s right of legislative initiative, prioritising dialogue between the institutions during international negotiations, and submitting legislative proposals in response to Parliament resolutions adopted by a majority (in line with Article 225 TFEU).

Negotiations ahead of Council’s first reading

The President announced two committee decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 2021-2027 (EMPL) and on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparts (ECON). Parliament’s earlier first-reading positions provide the mandates.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – Brussels, January II 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen,

How should democracies respond to disinformation, without compromising freedom of expression? This question preoccupied policy-makers in and beyond Europe in the previous policy cycle and will continue to dominate the debate in Brussels in the new legislature.

Against this backdrop, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) invited Peter Pomerantsev – a renowned, seasoned expert on information disruption; Director of the Arena Initiative; Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics; and Research Fellow at Johns Hopkins University – to speak about disinformation at the EPRS Reading Room on Thursday, 23 January 2020. Pomerantsev’s first book, ‘Nothing is true and everything is possible‘, was published in 2014, at the beginning of the Parliament’s 8th legislature. His most recent work, ‘This is not propaganda – adventures in the war against reality‘, was published in 2019, just ahead of the new legislature.

This first EPRS event on disinformation of the 9th legislature was an excellent opportunity to take stock of the EU’s response to online disinformation so far and at the same time to hear about Pomerantsev’s new book. Philipp Schulmeister, Head of the European Parliament’s Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, opened the event with a reminder that the war against reality, the undermining of trust in facts and in democracy itself – concerns the future of democracy and thus of the European Parliament itself.

Monika Nogaj, Head of the EPRS External Policies Unit who moderated the event, asked Pomerantsev to elaborate on the seemingly surrealist title of the new book ‘This is not propaganda’. Indeed, Pomerantsev explained that the title is a reference to Magritte’s painting ‘This is not a pipe’. The surrealist gap between word and meaning seems to have returned: in a world of ‘influence campaigns on steroids’, the words ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom of expression’ are increasingly used in a way that is detached from their meaning.

Pomerantsev explained that the attempt to manipulate reality and make truth unknowable (which he experienced himself when he was working in Russia as a reality TV producer in 2001-2010 and captivatingly analysed in ‘Nothing is true and everything is possible’), has now spread to the rest of the world. In ‘This is not propaganda’, Pomerantsev analyses the different manifestations of emotional influence, disinformation and coercion in the rest of the world: the Philippines, Mexico and the Balkans. These frontlines involve technological and ideological players, as well as a change in culture: when nostalgia is more important than the future, when emotions trump facts – partly because they bring more revenue for online platforms – real information becomes secondary.

Building a bridge between the hotspots in Pomerantsev’s book and the political reality in Brussels, Naja Bentzen of EPRS pointed out that the awareness of disinformation in Brussels has increased significantly since Pomerantsev’s first book was published, coinciding with Russia’s hybrid war and information attacks against Ukraine in the wake of the pro-democratic and pro-EU Maidan revolution. The US Presidential elections and the Brexit referendum in 2016 increased the sense of urgency in Brussels, further exacerbated by the 2018 revelations that Cambridge Analytica had harvested the personal data of millions of people’s Facebook profiles without their consent and used it for political advertising purposes. The EU’s response to disinformation has evolved accordingly. The first key milestone, the establishment of the East StratCom Task Force in 2015, consistently supported by the European Parliament, was followed by the launch of the EU’s European approach to online disinformation, which included a Code of Practice signed by the major online platforms in 2018. The European Commission’s final response to the behaviour of online platforms ahead of the European elections in May 2019 is expected this spring.

EPRS Book talk – ‘ This is not propaganda, adventures in the war against reality ‘

Against this backdrop, Pomerantsev elaborated on his expectations for the EU’s final response, on the likely ‘Brussels effect‘. Although Pomerantsev indicated that we cannot trust platforms to regulate themselves, banning microtargeting, as some suggest should be part of the response, is hardly feasible or practical, as we cannot sufficiently define the terms. Instead of focusing on content, Pomerantsev suggests focusing on behaviour and, more generally, increasing transparency. In addition, he proposes that a non-commercial public service internet, that rewards collaboration instead of attention-seeking behaviour, should be created.

The phrase ‘knowledge is power’ can mean very different things. In authoritarian systems, ‘knowledge is power’ means controlling access to information and suppressing public debate. For the tech industry, ‘knowledge is power’ can mean controlling access to our data and monetising the public debate. In an open democracy, we multiply power by sharing knowledge; this is the key mission of the European Parliamentary Research Service.

Pomerantsev’s first book was a source of inspiration in the debate in Brussels during the previous legislature. In sharing his knowledge and reports (with a spellbound audience), Pomerantsev has already enlightened the disinformation-related debate in the new policy cycle: empowering his audience of experts from EU institutions, as well as Members of the European Parliament such as Markéta Gregorová (Pirates, Czechia) and Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia), to empower others to survive the war against reality.

Further reading:

• The sharp power of knowledge: Foreign authoritarian meddling in academia, EPRS, European Parliament, December 2019
• Ukraine: Religion and (geo-)politics: Orthodox split weakens Russia’s influence, EPRS, European Parliament, February 2019
• From post-truth to post-trust?, EPRS, European Parliament, October 2018
• Foreign influence operations in the EU, EPRS, European Parliament, July 2018
• Multimedia: 3 questions on disinformation and democracy, EPRS, European Parliament

Written by Agnieszka Widuto,

© Marcin Kadziolka / Shutterstock.com

The EU plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50 % by 2030, and to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. This will require a socio-economic transformation in regions relying on fossil fuels and carbon-intensive industries. As part of the European Green Deal, the new Commission has announced a ‘Just Transition Mechanism’ of €100 billion to support the territories most affected by the transition towards climate neutrality.

Background

In December 2019, the European Commission published a communication presenting the European Green Deal. Further details on financing followed in January 2020 in the communication on the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan (European Green Deal Investment Plan), including the ‘Just Transition Mechanism’. On 14 January 2020, the Commission also published the legislative proposal on the ‘Just Transition Fund’ (JTF), which specified its scope of support. The establishment of the Fund entailed amendments to the proposal on the Common Provisions Regulation governing cohesion policy funds, which are expected to complement the resources of the JTF. These steps come in response to the need for finance for the transformation towards climate neutrality and investment in restructuring of regional economies, to mitigate the social impacts and expand activities supporting the green transition.

Just Transition Mechanism

The mechanism will consist of three pillars: the Just Transition Fund, a just transition scheme under InvestEU and a loan facility with the European Investment Bank (EIB). Taken together, it is expected to mobilise at least €100 billion for just transition in EU regions.

The Just Transition Fund will have its own budget of €7.5 billion, complemented by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), as well as national co-financing. With these additional resources, it is expected to generate €30-50 billion in total. Support will be available to all Member States, while focusing on the regions most affected by climate transition. It will be allocated on the basis of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of industrial facilities in NUTS2 regions with high carbon intensity, employment in industry in these regions, employment in coal and lignite mining, production of peat and production of oil shale. The allocation method will also take into account the country’s level of economic development (gross national income (GNI) per capita). Eligible territories will correspond to NUTS3 regions or parts thereof. The activities supported will include investments in SMEs, clean technologies, renewable energy, energy efficiency, and reskilling of workers. Territorial just transition plans will be prepared, and a set of indicators used to monitor progress.

Source: European Commission, 2020.

The dedicated just transition scheme under InvestEU is expected to mobilise up to €45 billion, mostly of private investments. The target of generating this amount corresponds to a provision of around €1.8 billion from the EU budget under the InvestEU programme. Its scope will be broader than the Just Transition Fund, financing projects not only in just transition territories, but also outside (if these projects are key to the transition within the just transition territories). It will fund renewable energy investments, energy efficiency schemes, and energy and transport infrastructure, including gas infrastructure and district heating, as well as decarbonisation projects, economic diversification of the regions and social infrastructure.

The public-sector loan facility with the European Investment Bank, backed by the EU budget, will provide subsidised financing to local authorities in the regions concerned. It is expected to leverage public funding and mobilise €25-30 billion in investments. The loan facility will rely on a contribution of €1.5 billion from the EU budget and EIB lending of €10 billion at its own risk. Support may take the form of an interest rate subsidy or an investment grant (financed from the EU budget), blended with loans provided by the EIB to municipal, regional or other public authorities. It will finance energy and transport infrastructure, district heating networks, energy efficiency measures including renovation of buildings, and social infrastructure. Similar to InvestEU funding, its scope will go beyond the transition territories to include other regions, if the projects are key to transition within the just transition territories. This may be the case for instance for transport or energy infrastructure projects that improve the connectivity of the just transition territories.

Advisory support and technical assistance

In addition to funding and technical assistance available under the Just Transition Mechanism, the communication on the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan also lists a number of supporting measures. The InvestEU Advisory Hub will offer tailored advisory services on sustainable projects, including just transition. The Structural Reform Support Programme (and its successor, the Reform Support Programme) will provide technical support to public authorities on reforms to achieve climate transition, including preparation of territorial just transition plans. Moreover, assistance will be available through a new Just Transition Platform, managed by the Commission and building on the existing Platform for Coal Regions in Transition.

Links with cohesion policy

The Just Transition Fund will be implemented under cohesion policy and complemented by its resources. Its delivery will be governed by the amended Common Provisions Regulation and included in partnership agreements and programmes. According to the proposal on the JTF, the Fund will be a key tool to prevent regional disparities from growing as a result of the transition towards climate neutrality. Thus, it will contribute to strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion. In terms of funding, the Fund will have its own resources of €7.5 billion. The proposed amendments to the CPR also introduce a new article 21a stipulating that JTF resources will be complemented from ERDF, ESF+ or a combination of these two funds. The total of ERDF and ESF+ resources transferred to the JTF will be between 1.5 and 3 times the amount of JTF support. In order to ensure continued impact of cohesion policy, the resources transferred from either the ERDF or the ESF+ cannot exceed 20 % of the respective ERDF and ESF+ allocation to the Member State concerned. Member States are also expected to provide national resources, with levels of EU co-financing set according to the categories of regions in which the territories concerned are located.

European Parliament position

Parliament called for the establishment of a Just Energy Transition Fund of €4.8 billion in its November 2018 resolution on the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. The call for the establishment of the Fund was echoed by the European Committee of the Regions in its opinion on ‘The socio-economic structural change in Europe’s coal regions’ of October 2019. In its resolution of January 2020 on the European Green Deal, Parliament stressed that just transition is about more than just a fund, but a whole-policy approach underpinned by investment, which must ensure that no one is left behind. In a debate during the January 2020 plenary session with the Commission, some MEPs expressed scepticism about the complementary transfer of funds from cohesion policy to JTF. The work on the Just Transition Fund proposal is currently in preparatory phase. The European Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development (REGI) is expected to take the lead (publication of the rapporteur’s draft report will be the next step). While revisiting the proposal on InvestEU is not envisaged, a new legislative proposal to set up the EIB loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism is expected in March 2020.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Just transition in EU regions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Etienne Bassot,

EP Plenary session – Implementing and monitoring the provisions on citizens’ rights in the Withdrawal Agreement

In her statements to the European Parliament in July and November 2019, as candidate for European Commission President and President-elect respectively, Ursula von der Leyen outlined the six political priorities that would shape the working programme of the European Commission over the next five years. While the former Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, had claimed to lead a ‘political Commission‘, his successor, Ursula von der Leyen, has pledged to lead a ‘geopolitical Commission‘. Such a Commission will have a political agenda in which reinforcing the EU’s role as a relevant international actor, and trying to shape a better global order through reinforcing multilateralism, is to become a key priority (‘A stronger Europe in the world’). The other main political priorities of the Commission are brought together under five broad headings: ‘A European Green Deal’, ‘A Europe fit for the digital age’, ‘An economy that works for people’, ‘A new push for European democracy’, and ‘Promoting the European way of life’. Together they define the framework within which the Commission will act in the coming five years. The structure and working methods announced by von der Leyen show that her Commission will differ from its predecessors in a number of ways.

What is new in the ‘geopolitical Commission’ New structure

Concerned about the coordination and coherence of the College’s activities and decisions, von der Leyen has decided to structure the Commission around three executive vice‑presidents (Frans Timmermans, Margrethe Vestager, and Valdis Dombrovskis) and five vice‑presidents (Josep Borrell Fontelles, Maroš Šefčovič, Věra Jourová, Dubravka Šuica, and Margaritis Schinas). The executive vice-presidents are to assume a dual role as commissioners dealing both with a specific portfolio and as coordinators responsible for one of the core topics of the political agenda, while the five remaining vice-presidents will assume a single coordinating role for specific policy priorities.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Borrell), who also has the role of Vice-President (HR/VP, Article 18(4) TEU), coordinates the external aspects of the work of all Commissioners, in addition to being responsible for the European External Action Service (EEAS). The importance attached to the EU’s external action under von der Leyen’s political priorities explains why external policy will be systematically discussed and decided upon by the College. A specific Group for external coordination (EXCO) has been created to prepare the external aspects of College meetings on a weekly basis and to enhance coordination between the Commission and the EEAS. It remains to be seen how this new approach and emphasis will fit with the dual character of the mandate of the HR/VP and the prevalence of the Council in every decision taken under the common foreign and security policy.

The Commission President had originally assembled a gender-balanced College, although this balance was lost with the new candidates replacing those who failed to pass the parliamentary hearings process. But von der Leyen has sought to favour gender equality with new rules for the composition Commissioners’ cabinets (private offices), requiring Commissioners to include 50 % of women among their administrator staff. She has also pledged to work towards gender equality among the Commission’s senior management.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The von der Leyen Commission’s priorities for 2019-2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Union, EP

The agenda for the European Parliament Plenary Session of 29 and 30 January 2020 is a sombre one, featuring a solemn ceremony in remembrance of the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, and a vote on the Withdrawal Agreement of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU).

The European Parliament has been warning against the rise of neo-fascist violence and particularly the increase in violence against Jews for some time, calling for EU countries to take action to counter revisionist narratives that aim at denying or trivialising the mass murder of 6 million European Jews. Jewish communities in the EU have consequently been shrinking recently, in reaction to the increase in acts of anti-Semitism. Holocaust education is vital to keeping the memory of victims alive and learning from past mistakes. Holocaust remembrance in the EU takes place around International Holocaust Remembrance Day on 27 January, the date on which the Auschwitz Birkenau extermination camp in Poland was liberated. The commemoration provides an ideal opportunity to promote public discourse on the facts of the Holocaust. It is also an occasion in many EU Member States, as in Parliament itself, to honour the victims of the less well known Roma and Sinti Holocaust.

Later on Wednesday evening, Members will approve or deny consent in a single vote (with no amendments possible), to the conclusion, by the Council on behalf of the EU, of the treaty on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The text of the treaty was agreed between EU leaders and the UK Prime Minister in October 2019. The product of a rather tortured process, the Withdrawal Agreement includes provisions covering citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, rules on the transition period, governance, protocols and annexes. A separate Political Declaration provides the basis for future EU-UK economic and security cooperation. Should Members concur with the Constitutional Affairs Committee recommendation to give their consent to the agreement, it should enter into force at the end of January, whereupon the United Kingdom will become a third country, ending 47 years of EU membership. With the departure of 73 British Members, the Parliament itself will consequently change. Twenty-seven seats will be redistributed among 14 Member States, with the remaining 46 seats held in reserve for future EU enlargements and/or the possible creation of a transnational constituency.

Looking to the future, Members will hear a statement on the Commission’s Work Programme for 2020 on Thursday morning. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has announced considerable changes in the focus and scope of the Commission’s work for the next few years. President von der Leyen’s ambitions include forging a stronger partnership between the Commission and Parliament by, among other things, providing greater support for Parliament’s right of legislative initiative, prioritising dialogue between the institutions during international negotiations, and submitting legislative proposals in response to Parliament resolutions adopted by a majority (in line with Article 225 TFEU).