European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Szczepański (1st edition),

© momius / Fotolia

There is a consensus that the digital economy is relatively undertaxed when compared with traditional businesses. Certain inherent characteristics such as reliance on cross-border provision of services without physical presence, easy transfers of intangible assets, and novel ways to create value make it particularly easy for enterprises to limit their tax liabilities.

In order to provide a solution to this problem, in March 2018 the Commission adopted the ‘fair taxation of the digital economy’ package, comprised of two proposals. One concerns a permanent reform of corporate tax regime while the second is a proposal for a directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services, which would apply as an interim measure until the permanent reform has been implemented.

The tax is to cover businesses above two thresholds: total annual worldwide revenues exceeding €750 million and annual revenues in the EU exceeding €50 million. The proposed single rate is at 3 %, levied on gross revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services where user value creation is essential. The stakeholders and the Member States seem to be divided on the issue.

Versions

• July 2018: ‘Interim digital services tax on revenues from certain digital services‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2018) 148
21.3.2018 Rapporteur: Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D, Spain) 2018/0073(CNS) Shadow rapporteurs:

 

  Paul Tang (S&D, the Netherlands)
Gabriel Mato (EPP, Spain)
Ashley Fox (ECR, UK)
Petr Ježek (ALDE, Czech Republic)
Martin Schirdewan (GUE/NGL, Germany)
Barbara Kappel (ENF, Austria) Consultation procedure – parliament adopts only a non-binding opinion Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou and Costica Dumbrava (1st edition),

© nd700 / Fotolia

The European Union Code on Visas is one of the core elements of the EU’s visa policy. It lays down the procedures and conditions for issuing short-stay visas for third-country nationals.

On 14 March 2018, the Commission adopted a proposal to revise the Community Code on Visas (visa code). The main objective of the proposal is to strengthen the common visa policy while taking into account migration and security concerns, by increasing the role of visa policy in the EU’s cooperation with third-countries, as well as economic considerations, by facilitating processing of visas for legitimate travellers who contribute to the EU’s economy and its cultural and social development.

Currently, the proposal is still at the early stage of discussions in committee.

Versions

• July 2018: ‘Revision of the Community Code on Visas‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) Committee responsible: Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) COM(2018) 252 Rapporteur: Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D, Spain) 2018/0061(COD) Shadow rapporteurs:

 

  Heinz K. Becker (EPP, Austria)
Helga Stevens (ECR, Belgium)
Gérard Deprez (ALDE, Belgium)
Marie-Christine Vergiat (GUE/NGL, France)
Bodil Valero (Greens/EFA, Sweden)
Ignazio Corrao (EFDD, Italy) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Figure 1 – EU visa applications and granted visas (in millions)

Written by Ionel Zamfir,

Adopted on 17 July 1998, the Rome Statute is the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was set up to deal with the most serious crimes of international concern – genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Its establishment inspired much hope that such horrendous crimes will no longer go unpunished, and that it will significantly deter their occurrence. From its creation, the EU has been a strong supporter of the ICC system. Even if it deals with crimes that are to be universally proscribed, only around two thirds of world countries have ratified the Rome Statute to date. Those still missing include important global and regional players, such as the USA, Russia, China and India, as well as Israel, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The ICC exercises jurisdiction over four types of crime: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and, more recently, the crime of aggression. Its jurisdiction is limited to the states parties’ territories and nationals, unless the UN Security Council explicitly asks it to investigate situations in a country that is not an ICC member. These limitations in the Court’s jurisdiction have prevented it from investigating the atrocities committed in the civil wars in Syria and Iraq, as securing a referral of the situations there from the Security Council has proved impossible.

Since it started operating in 2003, the Court has conducted investigations and trials on some of the world’s most brutal conflicts and has not shied away from investigating those at the highest level of power, such as presidents in office. The Rome Statute explicitly excludes immunity for high-ranking officials. Immunities attached to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, do not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over that person.

To date, of the 11 situations under investigation, 5 have been investigated at the request of states’ parties (in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR) twice, and Mali); 2 at the request of the UN Security Council (in Sudan (Darfur) and Libya); and 4 at the initiative of the Prosecutor (with the assent of the pre-trial chamber (in Burundi, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire and Georgia). Of the 11 situations investigated, 10 concern African countries, which has raised questions regarding a possible ‘African bias’ at the Court. However, such allegations ignore the fact that African states themselves referred many of these situations to the Court. This ‘African bias’ criticism has generated some momentum among African states for non-cooperation with the Court, and even for leaving the ICC system, for which a one-year withdrawal notice is required. Three of the four countries that have announced their decision to withdraw to date are African. In the Gambia, the decision was a personal one taken by the former president that his successor immediately annulled. South Africa considered withdrawing after it refused to arrest the Sudanese president, under a Court warrant, on its soil, but the procedure has proved more complicated domestically. Burundi remains the first and only country to date that has actually withdrawn from the Rome Statute. The fact the ICC has started investigations in their territories may actually have contributed to the decision of certain countries to leave. Two of the four that have announced the decision to withdraw are under ICC investigation for possible crimes within its competence committed on their territory: Burundi and the Philippines. Withdrawal has, however, no impact on ongoing proceedings or any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date upon which the withdrawal became effective.

The ICC has been under intense public scrutiny. Some voices have pointed to a certain ‘political bias’ in the selection of cases (the ‘African bias’ being part of this more general problem). To guarantee the Prosecutor’s impartiality in the selection and prioritisation of cases, extensive internal rules were developed. The Court has also developed extensive tools to protect its most important asset – witnesses, who in many cases have faced intimidation, violence and even death.

With some €1.5 billion spent in 15 years of operation, and with only three final convictions, the Court has been criticised as ineffective. Effectiveness cannot be judged, however, based solely on convictions. The ICC is a court of last resort and the complementarity principle limits its activities: the ICC is competent to conduct investigations only when states are unable or unwilling to prosecute the crimes themselves. The Court’s impact on national judicial systems has also been significant, with many countries having adopted national legislation on the crimes under ICC jurisdiction.

The European Union is a staunch supporter of the ICC and of the principles underpinning the Rome Statute. All its Member States are states parties to the ICC. The EU has developed specific policy tools to structure its cooperation with the Court and to encourage and assist third states to join the ICC system. The EU has included an ICC clause in several of its cooperation agreements with partner countries and has been providing assistance for countries that encounter difficulties in ratifying, accessing and implementing the Rome Statute. It has funded a range of actions with regard to the ICC system through its European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. The EU also recognises the importance of the complementarity principle, prioritising accountability, and justice at the national level. The European Parliament has expressed its support for the ICC in numerous resolutions. It has also called for the appointment of an EU Special Representative on International Humanitarian Law and International Justice to mainstream EU commitment to the ICC across EU foreign policy.

To learn more about the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court and the EU support to it, please read this EPRS briefing “International Criminal Court: Achievements and challenges 20 years after the adoption of the Rome Statute“, published in July 2018.

Written by Katharina Eisele with Anne van Heijst,

© Mike Fouque / Fotolia

This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission’s impact assessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, submitted on 17 April 2018 and referred to the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE).

Currently, there are at least 86 different versions of identity cards (ID cards) and 181 types of residence documents in circulation in the EU. The Free Movement Directive (2004/38/EC) stipulates the conditions that EU citizens and their third-country-national family members need to meet in order to exercise their right of free movement and residence within the Union. However, it does not regulate the format and minimum standards for the ID cards and residence documents to be used for entering or leaving an EU Member State (IA, pp. 9-10). This proposal aims to strengthen the security features of ID cards and residence documents of EU citizens and their non-EU family members. Passports and travel document issued by Member States are already regulated by EU law.

Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC.

See also the European Commission’s inception impact assessment of 6 September 2017.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Security of ID cards and of residence documents issued to EU citizens and their families‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Écrit par Etienne Bassot,

EPRS mobilisé pour appuyer la visite du président Tajani au Niger : tables-rondes à Niamey sur la recherche en matière de numérique, d’eau et d’agriculture, et d’énergies renouvelables

Le Président du Parlement européen se rendra au Niger les 17 et 18 juillet. Une nouveauté totale pour ce genre de déplacement : il a tenu à ce que sa visite comporte un important volet dédié à la recherche et que s’engagent un dialogue et une réflexion sur les expériences de l’Europe, les expériences du Niger, les enjeux et les défis communs, les réponses possibles. Autour de trois tables-rondes, les chercheurs et experts de haut niveau d’Europe et d’Afrique vont échanger leurs expériences sur la transformation numérique, l’agriculture et la gestion de l’eau, et les énergies renouvelables.

Transformation numérique

Les technologies de l’information et de la communication (TIC) apparaissent aujourd’hui comme un maillon clé du développement durable. Le Niger a adopté récemment un Plan stratégique sur les technologies de l’information et de la communication autour de plusieurs axes stratégiques : e-gouvernement, villages intelligents, cité de l’innovation, et promotion du numérique. La mise en œuvre de la stratégie numérique pour l’Europe initiée en 2010 dans l’Union européenne a été réalisée en partie – avec le développement des réseaux et services numériques et l’amélioration de l’accès aux biens et services numériques pour les citoyens, consommateurs et les entreprises – mais de nouveaux défis liés au développement de la société de l’information apparaissent. La table-ronde ‘Transformation numérique’ sera l’occasion de croiser les expériences et points de vues entre experts nigériens, européens et internationaux en discutant des enjeux, défis, contraintes et réponses réglementaires, notamment en matière de commerce électronique et de formation au numérique.

Agriculture et gestion de l’eau

Le panel ‘agriculture et gestion de l’eau’ discutera les défis rencontrés par le secteur agricole qui doit à la fois gérer les ressources naturelles – l’eau en particulier – tout en assurant la production alimentaire et le maintien des territoires ruraux. La politique agricole commune (PAC) est l’une des politiques les plus emblématiques ayant marqué le processus d’intégration à l’Union européenne depuis ses débuts dans les années 1960 jusqu’à aujourd’hui. L’Union Européenne s’efforce d’adapter cette politique aux nouveaux défis. Dans ce contexte, la recherche et l’innovation sont considérées comme des éléments clés de la gestion durable des ressources naturelles. Ce dernier point est décisif pour maximiser l’impact du secteur agricole du Niger sur la réduction de la pauvreté. De plus, mobiliser les ressources en eau en vue de sécuriser les différentes productions est une des lignes d’intervention prioritaires dans la stratégie de développement rural du Niger. Le partage des résultats de la recherche et des réussites en matière d’innovation peut bénéficier à la fois à l’Europe et au Niger. Les orateurs discuteront des exemples concrets de recherche menée en Europe et en Afrique et des projets réalisés au Niger sur la thématique de la gestion de l’eau dans l’agriculture.

Énergies renouvelables

Les énergies renouvelables, comme l’éolien et le solaire peuvent aider à réduire la dépendance en matière d’importations d’énergie, réduire la pollution et lutter contre les effets du changement climatique. L’Union européenne soutient les énergies renouvelables dans tous les secteurs économiques et s’est fixé l’objectif d’atteindre une part de marché de 32 % d’énergie renouvelable pour 2030. Pour le Niger, les énergies renouvelables peuvent contribuer à améliorer l’accès à l’énergie, par le réseau électrique ou par les solutions ‘off-grid’ (hors réseau). Lors de la table ronde, des experts vont aborder les thèmes suivants : le potentiel et les bénéfices des énergies renouvelables, le cadre réglementaire, les expériences et les plans pour l’avenir en Europe et au Niger, l’état du développement des énergies renouvelables en Afrique de l’Ouest, les obstacles rencontrés ainsi que les conditions de succès – y compris le financement – pour leur déploiement.

Pour en savoir plus

Promotion des sources d’énergie renouvelables dans l’UE, EPRS, analyse approfondie, 2016

Financer la transition vers les énergies propres en Europe, EPRS, briefing, 2017

Énergies renouvelables, PE, fiche technique, 2018

L’innovation dans l’agriculture de l’Union européenne EPRS En bref 2016

Solutions technologiques pour une agriculture durable EPRS En bref 2016

L’agriculture de précision et l’avenir de l’agriculture en Europe. Étude de prospective scientifique EPRS, étude, 2016

Une stratégie numérique pour L’Europe, PE, fiche technique, Mai 2018

S’adapter aux nouvelles réalités numériques, EPRS briefing 2018 (traduction en FR imprimée)

L’économie européenne des applis : Situation actuelle, enjeux et politique de l’Union, EPRS briefing 2018

Vers une société européenne du gigabit : Objectifs en matière de connectivité et de 5G, EPRS briefing 2017

Preparing FP9: Designing the successor to the Horizon 2020 research and innovation framework programme, EPRS analyse approfondie (traduction en FR imprimée)

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people living in mountainous regions.

Mountains cover nearly 30 % of EU territory. Highly valued for their rich natural resources, their fresh, bracing air and their beautiful landscapes, mountain areas are attractive places to live. Mountain dwellers know first-hand, however, that their regions’ specific geographical features (remoteness, topography and climate) also pose concrete problems for day-to-day activities, the most obvious being difficult access to key infrastructure, facilities and services, be that transport, education, healthcare, broadband, or business support.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

Through its regional policy programmes, the EU supports a wide range of projects offering practical solutions to these problems, including cross-border initiatives. The construction of a French-Spanish hospital in Cerdanya in the Pyrenees is one prominent example. The EU has also set up a specific strategy for the Alps, within which 7 countries and 48 regions have joined forces to secure the sustainable development of their territory. The focus ranges from accessibility and mobility to employment and energy.

© Adisorn/ Fotolia

Altitude, climate and steep slopes sometimes prevent the use of conventional machinery, and mountain farmers work in a particularly challenging environment. The EU, through its common agricultural policy, supports farmers located in mountainous areas and facing ‘natural or other specific constraints‘, compensating them for their agricultural production under difficult conditions. It has also launched a ‘mountain product‘ quality label to help mountain farmers market and raise the profile of their produce.

Further information

• EPRS publication on ‘The EU Strategy for the Alpine Region’, 2016, europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586640/EPRS_BRI(2016)586640_EN.pdf
• European Parliament Intergroup on Rural, Mountainous and Remote Areas, rumra-intergroup.eu
• European association of mountain areas, https://www.euromontana.org/en/

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people living in border regions.

If you are one of the 150 million people living near an internal EU border, you probably cross it regularly, whether for work, study, shopping or leisure. The EU makes such trips easier. As an EU citizen, you have the right to free movement when travelling within the EU. If, in addition, your country and its neighbour are in the Schengen area, there are no border checks.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

The EU has put various tools and mechanisms in place to facilitate cross-border work, including: the European network of employment services (EURES), which provides information and advice on all kinds of issues relating to cross-border commuting; the rules for the coordination of social security systems; the European Qualifications Framework, which makes qualifications more readable and understandable across borders; the Europass Framework, which enables users to present their skills, qualifications and experience by means of five standardised documents, including a CV; and the European Professional Card, an electronic procedure for the recognition of professional qualifications.

© tanjakolosjko / Fotolia

Since 1990, as part of its regional policy, the EU has been funding projects to support cross-border cooperation between European countries and regions, helping them to find joint solutions to common challenges and enhance their citizens’ quality of life. Examples of activities funded include measures to improve cross-border transport, increased cooperation between emergency and firefighting services, the development of cross-border healthcare services, and environmental protection, to name but a few.

Further information

• EPRS publication on European territorial cooperation, 2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614773/EPRS_BRI(2018)614773_EN.pdf
• European Commission, ‘Boosting growth and cohesion in EU border regions’, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/communications/2017/boosting-growth-and-cohesion-in-eu-border-regions

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for women entrepreneurs.

If you are a self-employed woman seeking support to launch your own company, you may be interested to know that the EU is encouraging women to start up in business and lending a helping hand.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

As women represent only a third of Europe’s self-employed workforce, the EU has tried to identify the obstacles that can make starting and growing a business more difficult for them, including lack of access to information, training, funding, mentors and support networks – not to mention difficulties balancing work and family life.

The EU has created the ‘WEgate-platform’, an online gateway with practical advice on how to start up and grow a business and access funding, e-learning materials, networking opportunities and details of local support organisations across Europe. It also finances the European Community of Business Angels, which helps women entrepreneurs to find funding, and cooperates with the WES policy network, which promotes female entrepreneurship at national level.

© Alliance / Fotolia

Under EU legislation, all self-employed women are entitled to a maternity allowance and to leave of at least 14 weeks, if they choose to take it. Additional flexible working arrangements in the EU’s new proposal for a work-life balance directive will hopefully enable more women to take part in the labour market as well in business activities.

Lastly, if you have received EU research and innovation funding at some point in your career, and founded or co-founded a successful company based on your innovative ideas, you could receive one of the annual cash prizes awarded as part of the EU Prize for Women Innovators.

Further information

• European Commission, GROWTH, Promoting entrepreneurship, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting-entrepreneurship_en
• European Commission, GROWTH, The Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting-entrepreneurship/action-plan_en
• European Commission, Research and Innovation, Funding, EU Prize for women innovators, http://ec.europa.eu/research/prizes/women-innovators/index.cfm

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for young Entrepreneurs.

Have you always wanted to be your own boss? You are not alone: around 44 % of young Europeans would like to set up their own business. Reality paints a different picture however: in 2011, only 4 % of 15-24 year-olds were self-employed. A lack of skills and funding are what usually get in the way.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

The EU promotes young entrepreneurs in many ways. In 2009, the EU launched ‘Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs’. The idea is that new entrepreneurs learn from experienced entrepreneurs in another EU country. They gain the valuable skills they need to start their own business, while the EU offers financial and practical support. In the first five years of the programme, 2 500 exchanges took place involving 5 000 new and experienced entrepreneurs.

© lassedesignen / Fotolia

Another source of financial support for the would-be self-employed is the European Social Fund (ESF). For several years now, the ESF has been opening up learning and training opportunities and helping young business starters gain valuable skills and experience. One success story is the COPIE project – a network with partner organisations in five countries that works to make it easier for people from disadvantaged and under-represented backgrounds to set up in business. Meanwhile, as many aspiring entrepreneurs face financial difficulties in the start-up phase, the European Progress Microfinance facility can help improve access to microcredits.

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs website, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting-entrepreneurship/support/erasmus-young-entrepreneurs_en

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig, Laura Tilindyte and Sidonia Mazur,

© Elena Abrazhevich / Fotolia

With less than one year to go before the planned Brexit date of 30 March 2019, talks are continuing as regards the terms of the United Kingdom’s (UK) withdrawal from the European Union (EU). Beginning in June 2017, the withdrawal negotiations have focussed on three key priority issues – citizens’ rights, the financial settlement and the situation of Northern Ireland – alongside other ‘separation’ provisions (e.g. ongoing EU judicial and administrative procedures, Euratom related issues, data protection etc.). In addition, in December 2017, the European Council decided to begin negotiations on the terms of a transitional period as requested by the UK government.

On 19 March 2018, EU and UK negotiators announced that significant progress had been achieved regarding the draft withdrawal agreement: more than 75 % of the legal text had been settled, based on previous commitments undertaken by both sides in a joint report in December 2017. In particular, in the draft withdrawal agreement negotiators settled two of the priority issues in their entirety – citizens’ rights and the financial settlement; and importantly also approved the proposed transitional arrangements – to cover a 21-month period following the UK’s date of withdrawal from the EU until 31 December 2020. Furthermore, as regards the future governance of the agreement, it was agreed that a Joint Committee made up of an equal number of UK and EU representatives would assume responsibility for the implementation and application of the agreement. A few days later, the European Council (EU-27) welcomed this advance in the talks, which opened the door to discussions on defining the future framework of EU-UK relations, in accordance with the newly adopted European Council guidelines.

Despite these important steps towards reaching a withdrawal deal, divergences persist, particularly as regards two important elements: firstly, the jurisdiction and powers of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) as regards the interpretation and application of the agreement, as part of the dispute settlement process; secondly the issue of the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland after Brexit. The EU and UK agreed in principle that the Protocol on Northern Ireland/Ireland annexed to the draft agreement should include a default scenario, or backstop option, that would apply to the territory of Northern Ireland in the absence of any agreed solutions, with a view to avoiding the establishment of a hard border on the island of Ireland after Brexit. However, despite further talks in recent months the negotiators have yet to settle either of these issues, although some limited progress on other parts of the draft withdrawal agreement was announced in a joint statement on 19 June. The European Council meeting at the end of June welcomed this further progress from 19 June, but expressed its concern that no significant headway was achieved with regard to the backstop solution for Northern Ireland.

Negotiators are now aiming for October 2018 as the deadline for finalising the withdrawal deal, to allow time for the completion of approval procedures in the EU and the UK.

As part of these procedures, the European Parliament will have to give its consent to the deal. Having closely monitored the negotiations and provided input at every stage in the process, Parliament’s resolutions have particularly emphasised the importance of upholding citizens’ rights in the future deal, including throughout the transition period. Even with the part on citizens’ rights now agreed, Parliament will continue to monitor the negotiations and push for further rights to be included in the deal. As regards the remaining unresolved issues, Parliament has expressed support on several occasions for the Commission’s proposals.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘The EU-UK withdrawal agreement: Progress to date and remaining difficulties‘ in PDF on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timeline of key events in the Brexit negotiations

Written by Nicole Scholz (1st edition),

© gustavofrazao / Fotolia

The European Commission has proposed to amend Directive 2004/37/EC by expanding its scope and by including and/or revising occupational exposure limit values for a number of cancer- or mutation-causing substances. The initiative is proceeding in steps. The first proposal of May 2016 covered 13 priority chemical agents, the second, of January 2017, a further seven. The current (third) proposal addresses an additional five.

Broad discussions with scientists and the social partners fed into all three proposals. Reacting to the Commission’s set of measures as a whole, trade unions have acknowledged the importance of further action to improve the existing framework, reiterating the need to reach the target of 50 limit values in 2020, while some considered it necessary to extend the scope of the CMD to substances that are toxic to reproduction. Actors on the employers’ side, while in principle supporting further revisions of the directive, have underlined, among other things, the need to ensure that values are proportionate and feasible in terms of technical implementation.

While welcoming the Commission proposal, the rapporteur’s draft report of 29 June 2018 proposes, inter alia, to grant incentives to businesses that comply with the directive. Moreover, it opts to include, within the scope of the directive, the protection of workers from exposure to hazardous, or harm-causing, medicines (including cytotoxic ones, which are used in the treatment of cancer).

Versions

• July 2018: ‘Limits on exposure to carcinogens and mutagens at work: Third proposal‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2004/37/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work Committee responsible: Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) COM(2018) 171
05.04.20182018/0081(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Rapporteur: Laura Agea (EFDD, Italy) Shadow rapporteurs: Marita Ulvskog (S&D, Sweden) Next steps expected: Discussions in EMPL and committee vote

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for victims of terrorism.

Every year Europe commemorates victims of terrorism on 11 March. This European Remembrance Day was established after the 2004 Madrid bombings, which left 191 people dead and around 2 000 injured. But Europe does not limit its action to commemoration. European legislation aimed specifically at combating terrorism dates back to 2002, and introduced a common understanding of terrorist offences and minimal penalties for perpetrators across Europe. It recognised the vulnerability of terrorism victims and the assistance they and their families need.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© MoiraM / Fotolia

With the recent wave of attacks, which affected nine EU countries between 2015 and 2018, the European Union reinforced its arsenal to protect citizens and help victims. A law adopted in 2017 not only tightens the rules and sanctions related to terrorist activities, but also provides for better support for victims. Complementing earlier legislation on the rights of victims of crime, this law addresses victims’ needs, such as medical and psychological care or legal advice, and puts emergency mechanisms in place to assist them in the aftermath of an attack. Moreover, victims from another European country should receive the same assistance and compensation as residents of the country where the attack occurred, even when they return home. To ensure more efficient cooperation between countries, a Coordination Centre for Victims of Terrorism will open in 2019. An EU country faced with a terrorist attack can also ask for help under the EU solidarity clause and benefit from the crisis response arrangements involving political coordination.

Further information

• European Commission webpage on assistance to victims of terrorism and their families, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/victims_en
• European Parliament, study ‘How can the EU and the Member States better help victims of terrorism?’, 2017,  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596805/IPOL_STU(2017)596805_EN.pdf
• Fight against terrorism – definitions of terrorist crimes and support to victims, summary of legislation, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/LSU/?uri=CELEX:32017L0541

Written by Irina Popescu (1st edition),

© aterrom / Fotolia

On 23 March 2018, the European Commission proposed a multiannual plan for management of fisheries in a northeast Atlantic area along the western coast of the EU, known as the Western Waters. The plan covers fisheries exploiting stocks of fish and crustaceans living close to the sea bottom (i.e. ‘demersal fisheries’), and several deep-sea stocks. The proposed plan aims to ensure that stocks are exploited sustainably and that management is based on the most up-to-date scientific information. The EU fishing fleet concerned mainly includes vessels from Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom.

The proposal follows the pattern set by the recently adopted North Sea multiannual plan. It would allow a certain flexibility in setting fishing opportunities, by defining ranges of fishing mortality based on the best available scientific advice, and would introduce safeguard measures based on biomass levels, so as to restore stocks when they fall below safe biological limits. The plan would not include quantified values for fishing mortality or biomass levels. These are instead provided by the latest scientific advice available, and directly used by the Council when fixing fishing opportunities.

Versions

• July 2018: ‘Multiannual plan for fisheries in the Western Waters‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a multiannual plan for fish stocks in the Western Waters and adjacent waters, and for fisheries exploiting those stocks, amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1139 establishing a multiannual plan for the Baltic Sea, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No 388/2006, (EC) 509/2007 and (EC) 1300/2008 Committee responsible: Fisheries (PECH) COM(2018) 149
23.3.2018

 

2018/0074(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Rapporteur: Alain Cadec (EPP, France) Shadow rapporteurs:

 

  Ricardo Serrão Santos (S&D, Portugal)
Baroness Nosheena Mobarik (ECR, UK)
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE, Spain)
João Ferreira (GUE/NGL, Portugal)
Linnéa Engström (Greens/EFA, Sweden) Next steps expected: Committee vote

Written by Krisztina Binder, graphics: Giulio Sabbati,

© chris / Fotolia

Negotiations on an EU-Japan trade agreement were officially launched in March 2013. Following the political agreement in principle reached in July 2017, a final accord on the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) was announced in December 2017. On 18 April 2018, the European Commission proposed to the Council of the European Union to sign and conclude the agreement. The Commission expects that the EU-Japan EPA can be signed in July 2018, and aims to have the agreement come into effect before the end of its mandate in 2019, following approval by the Council and the European Parliament.

The EU-Japan EPA will establish a free trade area with a combined market of around 640 million consumers that accounts for roughly a third of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). The 2016 Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (Trade SIA) of the agreement indicated that EU exports to Japan could rise by up to 34 %, and according to a more recent Commission estimate, European companies would save up to €1 billion in customs duties per year as a result of the EU-Japan EPA.

In addition to exploiting the untapped potential of bilateral trade, the agreement is also of strategic importance, conveying a strong message of the parties’ commitment to promoting a free and fair trading system based on rules, and to reject trade protectionism.

Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Japan, of the other part Committee responsible: International Trade (INTA) Rapporteur: Pedro Silva Pereira (S&D, Portugal)

Read the complete briefing on ‘International Agreements in Progress – EU-Japan trade agreement: a driver for closer cooperation beyond trade‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou and Costica Dumbrava,

© Uskarp / Shutterstock

Access to citizenship status is an important prerequisite for enjoying rights and privileges, such as migration and political rights, as well as for developing a sense of identity and belonging. Since the establishment of Union citizenship, all persons who are nationals or citizens of an EU Member State enjoy the status of EU citizenship, which confers on them a number of additional rights and privileges. However, Member States retain full control over who can be recognised as a citizen.

Although the legal rules on the acquisition and loss of citizenship in the EU Member States remain fairly divergent, one can identify a number of key trends and issues. The need to integrate long-term immigrants has pushed EU countries to amend their citizenship laws. This often resulted in making citizenship both more liberal (lowering residence requirements and tolerating dual citizenship) and more restrictive (introducing integration clauses and citizenship tests). The surge in terrorist activities in the EU, which involve citizens, prompted several Member States to revise or reactivate citizenship provisions allowing for citizenship to be revoked.

Concerns about immigrants’ integration, allegiance and belonging, as well as about the cultural and economic consequences of regional integration and globalisation are at the heart of recent debates about citizenship in Europe. As the Maltese case of investor citizenship shows, the issue of access to citizenship is no longer a matter that concerns Member States alone. The bundling of national and EU citizenship means that Member States have a certain responsibility towards each other when taking decisions over who to accept (or reject) as citizens.

Read this briefing on ‘Acquisition and loss of citizenship in EU Member States: Key trends and issues‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Didier Bourguignon (1st edition),

© Arcansél / Fotolia

Most of the plastic in our oceans originates from land-based sources. On European beaches, plastics make up 80-85 % of marine litter, which is considered a major threat to marine and coastal biodiversity. Marine litter also costs the European Union economy an estimated €259 million to €695 million per year.

In May 2018, the European Commission put forward a legislative proposal seeking to address the issue of marine litter from plastics. The proposal would introduce a series of measures regarding the top 10 single-use plastics found on European beaches, as well as fishing gear, with a view to reducing their impact on the environment and ensuring a functional internal market.

In the European Parliament, the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) is considering the proposal. The Environment Council discussed the proposal on 25 June 2018.

Versions

• July 2018: ‘Single-use plastics and fishing gear: Reducing marine litter‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment Committee responsible: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) COM(2018) 340
12.3.2018

 

2018/0172(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Rapporteur: Frédérique Ries (ALDE, Belgium) Shadow rapporteurs:

 

 

  Karl-Heinz Florenz (EPP, Germany)
Massimo Paolucci (S&D, Italy)
Mark Demesmaeker (ECR, Belgium)
Lynn Boylan (GUE/NGL, Ireland)
Margrete Auken (Greens/EFA, Denmark)
Piernicola Pedicini (EFDD, Italy)
Sylvie Goddyn (ENF, France) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report.

Marine litter on EU beaches, by count (2016)

Written by Elena Lazarou,

© railwayfx / Fotolia

On 11 and 12 July 2018 the NATO Heads of State and Government will meet in Brussels for the 28th NATO summit. The summit comes at a time of tension in transatlantic relations, but also of continuing threats and challenges posed to the alliance. Against this background, leaders will focus on strengthening defence and deterrence, modernising the alliance and enhancing relations with the EU. Burden-sharing among allies is set to be one of the most controversial items on the agenda. In 2018 only eight out of twenty nine NATO members are estimated to be reaching the 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP) defence spending target.

The Brussels summit aims to push forward the agenda, decisions and actions agreed upon at previous summits, notably in Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016). Yet there are fears that the insistence of US President Donald Trump that the focus be placed on burden sharing and demands that the NATO allies spend more on defence, might lead to the side-lining of other items on the agenda. The situation is aggravated by the current climate in transatlantic relations, which has deteriorated since the most recent G7 summit in Canada.

The summit in Brussels will also seek to secure progress on EU-NATO cooperation, aiming to produce a second joint statement, following that agreed upon in Warsaw in 2016. After two years of increased EU action to build up strategic autonomy in defence through initiatives such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund, cooperation with NATO is critical when it comes to taking European defence forward.

Introduction

Defence expenditure estimates for 2017 (% GDP)

The 2018 NATO summit will take place in Brussels on 11 and 12 July 2018. The Heads of State and Government of the 29 members of the alliance are likely to reach a consensus on practical proposals on enhancing deterrence and responding to the ongoing political, security and economic challenges emanating from the east and south. Discussions on the future of the alliance, for instance on burden sharing and potential enlargement, will almost certainly prove more contentious.

Founded in 1949, NATO ‘remains committed to fulfilling its three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security’. These are reflected in the six themes around which the Brussels summit has been organised, namely (1) strengthening deterrence and defence; (2) projecting stability and fighting terrorism; (3) enhancing the NATO- EU partnership; (4) modernising the alliance; (5) achieving fairer burden-sharing; and (6) shared values and transatlantic unity.

Following a meeting of NATO’s defence ministers in June, there is a fair expectation that some key deliverables will emerge from the summit. These include launching a new NATO readiness initiative, referred to as the ‘Four Thirties’ (capacity for 30 mechanised battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels to be ready within 30 days or less to counter possible aggression by 2020), and increasing the NATO command structure by 1 200 personnel and two new commands (for the Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, and for military mobility in Ulm, Germany). Significant progress is also expected on NATO-EU relations, in the form of a new joint declaration between NATO’s secretary general and the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission. Military mobility, a flagship area of EU-NATO cooperation, is meanwhile likely to figure prominently.

Progress in these areas will inevitably depend on achieving a climate of unity among allies from the two sides of the Atlantic. Diverging positions between the EU and the US on issues such as the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and potentially Russia, as well as issues beyond security, such as trade and tariffs, have raised concerns in this regard. Moreover, the expected tension over the item of burden-sharing among NATO members, particularly following the issuing of letters from President Trump to several NATO member leaders, urging them to spend more on defence, has done little to improve the climate. In 2018, just eight out of twenty-nine NATO members are estimated to be reaching the 2 % of GDP defence spending target agreed upon in 2014 as a pledge with a view to 2024.

Background

Since the first NATO summit in Paris in 1957, 27 summits have taken place at key junctures in the history of the alliance. Decisions taken at summits are issued in the form of declarations and communiqués and then translated into action by the relevant actors, namely the North Atlantic Council’s subordinate committees and NATO’s command structure, which cover the whole range of functions and activities of the alliance. NATO summits are normally attended only by member countries, but occasionally convene in different formats, including, for example, meetings of defence or foreign ministers, Heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission or the NATO-Georgia Commission. They can also include leaders from countries contributing troops to a NATO-led operation or high-level representatives from international organisations such as the UN.

Deteriorating security, globally and on Europe’s periphery, led to two landmark summits being held in 2014 and 2016. The 2014 NATO Wales summit was marked by the Ukraine crisis, growing instability in the southern neighbourhood and rising transnational threats, for instance from ISIL/Da’esh. Allied leaders had been expected to focus on NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, but Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine shifted their focus. NATO leaders returned to the fundamental debate over NATO’s strategic approach to Russia, its deterrence and defence posture, and its core purpose: collective defence as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Many of the same issues were on the Warsaw agenda in 2016 but additional challenges to Euro-Atlantic security included rising terrorism and unprecedented migrant and refugee flows. A major outcome of the summit was the agreement to intensify NATO’s deterrence posture by increasing the alliance’s military presence in the east. First steps included deploying multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In the Middle East, allies pledged to make further capacity-building efforts in Iraq, to support the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL by deploying surveillance aircraft to gather intelligence, and to maintain Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan beyond 2016. A decision was also made to expand NATO’s presence in the Mediterranean Sea, especially in cooperation with EUNAVFOR MED (Operation Sophia). An important outcome of the summit was the EU-NATO joint declaration which outlined areas for enhanced cooperation, including countering hybrid threats, stepping up operational cooperation at sea and on migration, coordinating cyber-security and defence, developing the interoperable defence capabilities of EU Member States and alliance members, strengthening the defence industry, increasing coordination on exercises and building up the defence and security capacity of partners in the east and south. The range of decisions made at the Warsaw summit reflected the division of interests and priorities within the alliance. At the 2016 summit leaders adopted the ‘Enhanced Forward Presence’ (EFP) in Poland and the Baltic States and the ‘Tailored Forward Presence’ (TFP) in the Black Sea region.

Issues to watch and stakeholder views

Within the context of the summit’s official agenda, experts analysing and forecasting the outcomes of the leaders’ encounter have been focusing on the following specific themes:

Transatlantic relations and burden sharing

This will be President Trump’s first official NATO summit. The summits are traditionally an opportunity for allies to show a common front against security challenges, but the aforementioned tension in transatlantic ties risks jeopardising this. Experts are concerned that distrust generated in the area of trade will seep into discussions and weaken consensus on the way ahead for NATO. They argue that the summit should move past the issue of burden sharing. Yet, as others point out, this age-old debate is expected to ‘reach a moment of reckoning this year’ leading to what is referred to as ‘strategic adjustment on a grand scale’ whereby the European allies will move towards investing more in defence capabilities. Further concern has been raised by the American president’s decision to meet Russian president Vladimir Putin in Helsinki shortly after the summit, on 16 July.

For some, much will much will depend on how President Trump decides to approach the summit, both publicly and privately, and on whether he will confirm the US unconditional commitment to NATO’s collective defence clause, regardless of the issue of defence budgets and burden sharing. In spite of his rhetoric, the Trump administration has so far supported the defence of Europe’s eastern flank through the European Deterrence Initiative which adds more than US$15 billion to NATO’s hard power. The US is also expected to outline its role for the new Atlantic command.

EU-NATO relations

With growing threats in Europe’s periphery, the summit will inevitably focus on boosting security in Europe, including through countering Russian aggression and tackling challenges related to the ongoing crises in the Middle East and North Africa. EU Member States are expected to reiterate the benefits for NATO of closer EU cooperation in the field of defence, such as PESCO, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) and the European Defence Fund, and to downplay any concerns held by non-EU NATO members. In this respect, the expected EU-NATO joint statement will further solidify complementarity between the EU initiatives and NATO.

Regional focal points

Russia’s growing presence in the BIack Sea has led several think tanks to argue that the summit will be used to focus on NATO’s operations in the region, as well as on the role of the partnerships with Georgia and Ukraine. NATO’s Mediterranean partnerships should also come into the spotlight, as they are important in building defence capacity, as should the potential NATO training mission in Iraq. A ‘hub’ for the south was recently established at Joint Force Command in Naples. NATO leaders are also likely to open accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Russia represents the most pressing and, according to the Heritage Foundation, ‘existential’ threat to NATO members; the effort to build up deterrence measures is explicitly in response to Russia. For the American conservative think tank, a united and robust response to Russia should be the major outcome of the summit. In the same vein, Chatham House experts argue that tensions among allies should not get in the way of dealing with Russia, and offer several recommendations in this vein, including a focus on the Arctic and the Black Sea; making progress in the areas of military mobility and situational awareness; and updating the 2011 NATO maritime strategy. Concrete actions aside, however, according to experts from the German Marshall Fund, ‘it is not the military deliverables from the Brussels summit that will be key for deterring Russia; what is paramount is unity among the allies, and especially transatlantic unity’.

Main references

Anxious anticipation ahead of NATO Brussels summit, German Marshall Fund, July 2018.

Counting dollars or measuring value. Assessing NATO and partner burden sharing, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2018.

Download this briefing on “2018 NATO summit: A critical time for European defence” in PDF.

Read also: ‘European Deterrence Initiative: the transatlantic security guarantee‘.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© luzitanija / Fotolia

NATO heads of state or government will meet in Brussels on 11 and 12 July for a keenly awaited summit. Some analysts and diplomats fear a tense atmosphere, following US President Donald Trump’s tough treatment of European allies at a recent meeting of the G7 group of developed countries, and his imposition of steep tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium from the EU.

President Trump is expected to pressure many NATO members to increase their military spending level to the agreed 2 % of GDP guideline, with particular emphasis on Germany. The NATO summit precedes President Trump’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 16 July in Helsinki, where some analysts speculate some rapprochement might take place. President Trump’s unpredictability and his widely criticised attitude towards President Putin is causing unease at home and abroad regarding the potential outcome of this summit.

This note offers links to commentaries and studies on NATO and European defence by major international think tanks. Earlier papers on the same topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’, published in December 2017.

Anxious Anticipation Ahead of NATO Brussels Summit
German Marshall Fund, July 2018

Counting Dollars or Measuring Value. Assessing NATO and Partner Burden Sharing
Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2018

Trump’s two summits: Can NATO navigate the dangers?
Centre for European Reform, July 2018

The 2018 NATO summit: The burden of transatlantic burden-sharing
Clingendael, July 2018

Tailored assurance: Balancing deterrence and disarmament in responding to NATO-Russia tensions
Institut français des relations internationales, July 2018

NATO’s force generation and deployment
German Marshall Fund, July 2018

NATO needs a strategy for countering Russia in the Arctic and the Black Sea
Chatham House, July 2018

More than burden-sharing. Five Objectives for the 2018 NATO Summit
Center for New American Security, June 2018

EUISS Yearbook of European security 2018
European Union Institute for Security Studies, June 2018

Why joining France’s European Intervention Initiative is the right decision for Germany
Egmont, June 2018

EU defence capability development: Plans, priorities, projects
European Union Institute for Security Studies, June 2018

Military mobility returns to the forefront in Europe
Rand Corporation, June 2018

The future of NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue
German Marshall Fund, June 2018

The United States and Russia target Germany
Carnegie Europe, June 2018

Rethinking the regional order for post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia
Rand Corporation, June 2018

Priorities for Central Europe ahead of NATO Brussels summit
German Marshall Fund, June 2018

Ein schwieriger Gipfel für die Nato
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2018

A perennial candidate waits for NATO to open its door
German Marshall Fund, June 2018

Security needs a new narrative
German Marshall Fund, June 2018

Can Reagan show Trump how to save the INF Treaty?
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2018

The defence of Finland and Sweden: Continuity and variance in strategy and public opinion
Finnish Institute for International Studies, June 2018

The Other Europe? How Central Europe views the continent’s security concerns and aspirations
Royal United Services Institute, June 2018

Will the upcoming Missile Defense Review maintain the current course or plot a new direction?
Brookings Institution, June 2018

Before the Brussels Summit: How is the NATO Alliance Doing, Really?
Royal United Services Institute, May 2018

The EU and multilateralism in an age of great powers
Egmont, July 2018

NATO Brussels summit: Prospects and opportunities
International Centre for Defence and Security, May 2018

European defense cooperation: Headed in the right direction?
Rand Corporation, May 2018

Poland courts American boots
Carnegie Europe, May 2018

The ‘New Turkey’ as a NATO member: Domestic state transformation and competing strategic cultures
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 2018

The dangerous geopolitics of populism, and what NATO and the EU can do about it
Egmont, May 2018

The art of dealing with Trump
Clingendael, May 2018

Defending Europe: ‘Global Britain’ and the future of European geopolitics
The Henry Jackson Society, May 2018

Georgia looks to the NATO Brussels summit
German Marshall Fund, April 2018

NATO’s bad apples
Carnegie Europe, April 2018

NATO allies go head to head in Syria
German Marshall Fund, April 2018

The future of the United States and Europe: An Irreplaceable partnership
Chatham House, April 2018

Between continuity and erosion: Three scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations
College of Europe Policy Brief, April 2018

Preventing escalation in the Baltics: A NATO playbook
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2018

Strategic warning on NATO’s Eastern flank
Rand Corporation, March 2018

A guide for EU-NATO security cooperation on foreign terrorist fighters
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, March 2018

NATO’s intelligence: Adaptation challenge
GLOBSEC Policy Institute, March 2019

Franco-German differences over defense make Europe vulnerable
Carnegie Europe, March 2018

Report on EU comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Centre for European Policy Studies, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, March 2018

EU-NATO alignment after Brexit
Carnegie Europe, March 2018

Autonomie stratégique: Le nouveau Graal de la défense européenne
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, March 2018

Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, March 2018

NATO’s next nuclear challenges
Carnegie Europe, March 2018

PESCO: Good News for NATO from the EU
Egmont, February 2018

Preparing for the NATO summit: Why military mobility should be on top of the agenda
Rand Corporation, February 2018

Assessing the conventional force imbalance in Europe: Implications for countering Russian local superiority
Rand Corporation, February 2018

European regional organizations and climate-related security risks: EU, OSCE and NATO
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February 2018

NATO summit 2018: An implementation summit?
German Marshall Fund, February 2018

Why we are unconvinced NATO’s cyber policy is more aggressive, and that’s a good thing
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2018

European defense vs. NATO: Not the right fight
Carnegie Europe, February 2018

NATO and the south: Opportunities for coherence and integration
Real Instituto Elcano, February 2018

New tasks for EU-NATO cooperation
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2018

An American perspective on Pesco: The dangers of de-linking EU defence from NATO
Policy Exchange, January 2018

Revisiting the EU’s security partnerships
European Union Institute for Security Studies, January 2018

Transatlantic relations: Converging or diverging?
Chatham House, January 2018

The United Kingdom and the future of European security and defence
Friends of Europe, January 2018

Poland and European defence integration
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2018

Read this briefing on ‘NATO Summit and European defence‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Polidori,

© Drical/Shutterstock.com

A study and a briefing published by the European Parliament’s (EP) Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel, based on a proposal submitted by the EP Committee on Regional Development (REGI), provide policy options offering new directions in cohesion policy for the post-2020 period. The publications focus on scientific and technological priorities and means for policy implementation aimed at enhancing regional economic strengths and thereby building confidence in the EU’s added value. The study and briefing stem from a workshop organised by STOA, and draw upon follow-up interviews, and recent research and policy evaluation reports. Their draft versions were presented to the STOA Panel and the REGI Committee. A sample of the main policy options is given below:

New technologies for improved productivity: The least competitive regions need to develop more flexibility when facing new challenges and improve their ability to position their economies dynamically. In the next stage, cohesion policy should promote ‘excellence in innovation’ in the regional economic context, as a new EU policy instrument.

Knowledge for innovation-led growth through smart specialisation: The implementation of the smart specialisation strategy is often disappointing, due to a lack of resources, potential partners, tech transfer support systems etc. To overcome the huge differences in the tangible and intangible resource base among EU regions, an ‘impact-focused’ approach is recommended in designing future cohesion policy initiatives, to make innovation-led growth more relevant and achievable.

Better governance through technology and big data: Digital technology represents an opportunity to make cohesion policy initiatives more effective and transparent. It provides a variety of instruments for rethinking public policy, and the workings of democratic institutions at the regional and national levels.

Bringing the regional authorities back in: To speed up regional policy-making and achieve more and better results, regional authorities should reconsider their leadership role. For these reasons, cohesion policy should allow for a wider variety of management practices and operational programmes to help EU funding of innovation-led growth to succeed in any type of region.

Dynamic positioning as a fast and flexible approach: Following failures to ‘smartly specialise’ by using a region’s own resources, a dynamic strategic approach by the regional authorities can be achieved by: (a) an ongoing regional ‘economic diagnosis’, which defines and explains principal and practical challenges; (b) a flexible guiding policy dealing with both obstacles and opportunities; and (c) a set of coherent actions needed to address the ever-changing regional circumstances.

Revising the current framework of regional innovation policy: Mission-oriented innovation policy could become an important complement to other development policies, especially in regions that lack the variety of resources needed to develop strategies through smart specialisation. Mission orientation will typically respond to sector-specific needs and wider societal challenges, and could open up new markets.

Shaping markets through mission-oriented investments: Some regional authorities are implementing more ‘market-creating’ policy frameworks, by combining horizontal (sector-neutral) policies and vertical (sector-specific) policies. EU cohesion policy needs to embrace the evolution towards more active public-sector involvement in innovation-led growth in various regions and promote conditions for evolving business ecosystems that generate growth.

‘Outside-in’ approaches to innovation-led growth: Some regions are implementing ‘outside-in’ policies to seize opportunities for acquiring up-to-date technology, expertise and inventive solutions by actively inviting inward investments. European and global production networks, in particular in manufacturing, are potential assets for promoting innovation-led growth in a region, serving as catalysts for advancing new industrial capabilities in the region.

Science parks as nodes of innovation: Science and technology parks highlight the importance of local and regional clustering of competencies for invention and innovation. Cohesion policy could support them as effective nodes in networks that foster business development, particularly small, knowledge-intensive enterprises with growth potential.

Tapping the potential of the digital platform economy: Digital platforms easily attract new customers, clients and other users and drive the scaling-up of SMEs into larger enterprises. This affects regions too. Cohesion policy must help the EU’s regional economies to increase value by availing of existing digital platforms and by building new ones.

To find out more about the policy options, consult the study. As recommended by Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (EPP, Spain), EP Vice-President responsible for STOA, Constanze Krehl (S&D, Germany) and Lambert van Nistelrooij (EPP, The Netherlands), all Members of the REGI Committee, STOA will circulate the study and the briefing to the relevant actors responsible for future cohesion policy at European and national levels.

Written by Nera Kuljanic,

Scientists and Members of the European Parliament recently got together at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The aim of the event, organised jointly by the Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel of the European Parliament (EP) and the European Research Council (ERC), was to showcase Europe’s research and innovation efforts through programmes such as Horizon2020 and one of its most successful initiatives, the ERC. The event also aimed at stimulating exchanges on the role of fundamental research in designing the future of Europe. The event was very timely, as it took place just a week before the European Commission (EC) announced its proposal for Horizon Europe, the next research and innovation framework programme, due to start in 2021.

The event attracted 14 Members (including Industry, Research and Energy Committee Chair Jerzy Buzek) and 22 researchers funded by the ERC, Commissioner for Research, Science and Innovation Carlos Moedas and three Nobel Prize winners, among other participants. In addition, EP President Antonio Tajani, EC Vice-President Andrus Ansip and Bulgarian Minister of Education and Science Krassimir Valchev took part in the high-level science-policy debate organised the day before.

Building bridges between science and politics

Science and technology are more and more part of our everyday lives and even part of who we are. A lot of issues coming before policy-makers and politicians have a scientific or technological dimension and can be extremely complex. In addition, policy-makers need to design research and innovation programmes that will best respond to the opportunities and challenges that Europe will face over the next decade and beyond. So how do we know what these opportunities and challenges are, and how can we prepare a programme of scientific research that will deliver a meaningful response to them at the European level?

Collaboration is the answer: researchers and experts from different domains must work together, and policy-makers need to make sure the issues are put on the agenda and design policies which stimulate progress for the benefit of the whole society.

“ERC is the best thing that ever happened in Europe for the quest for knowledge”. #Nobel laureate, ERC grantees Jean-Marie Lehn speaks to @Europarl_EN. “Without basic research there is no progress” @EP_ThinkTank https://t.co/5SmnWsUmHe

— ERC Europe (@ERC_Research) May 31, 2018

“ERC is the best thing that ever happened in Europe for the quest for knowledge”. #Nobel laureate, ERC grantees Jean-Marie Lehn speaks to @Europarl_EN. “Without basic research there is no progress” @EP_ThinkTank https://t.co/5SmnWsUmHe

— ERC Europe (@ERC_Research) May 31, 2018

Terrific debate on Science and Communication, Science and Society Engagement for Social Innovationa and Social Impact @ERC_Research #ERCSTOA. Here the link to our piece coming straight from #Villaverde https://t.co/fcjm7CBIaw pic.twitter.com/1nzPKpi4y8

— Manuel Franco (@mfranco_uah) May 31, 2018

Are you already working alongside a #robot? #Digital transformation is going to affect all our workplaces – policymakers ask scientists what the impacts might be at #ERCSTOA @ClareMoodyMEP @EvaKaili @PaulRuebig #STOA pic.twitter.com/hRNIlQsm08

— EP Research Service (@EP_ThinkTank) May 30, 2018

‘Don’t be shy about what you do!’

Opening the event, Eva Kaili (EL, S&D), STOA Chair, emphasised once again that Members need to have access to the scientific evidence when working on different issues and how much they value interactions with scientists like this one. To emphasise the need for making such exchanges a regular practice, Professor Jean-Pierre Bourguignon, ERC President, went on to point out the differences between the two worlds: science needs time, patience and perseverance, while politicians often think and act on shorter time-scales, and the two worlds seem to speak different languages.

Commissioner Carlos Moedas made a link between the exploration of the world in the 1400s and the world of research. Highlighting some of today’s remarkable discoveries by European researchers, which were hardly publicised in the media (graphene, 7 Earth-like planets orbiting a star), he told the scientists ‘Don’t be shy about what you do!’ and emphasised the importance of science communication in raising awareness and excitement about scientific progress and the potential of its discoveries. His words were echoed by Professor Jean-Marie Lehn, co-recipient of the 1987 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, who invited young people to embrace a career in science: ‘Science should build bridges between disciplines and generations … It will shape the future of humanity … Participate in this!’

From rethinking the role of the car to engaging citizens through science

Besides the line-up of distinguished speakers, the highlight of the event were the parallel exchange sessions during which MEPs, ERC grantees and other participants discussed techno-scientific topics of interest to them and/or linked to their ongoing work. The exchange sessions were organised around the following topics: modern energy solutions, eco-efficient transport, sustainable management of natural resources, potentials and challenges of the information society, health and life sciences, and science policy, communication and global networking.

A more detailed account of the event is available in the report. A short video clip about the event is available here. To keep up to date with STOA activities, follow our website, the EPRS blog, Twitter and the Think Tank pages.

Click to view slideshow.