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European Parliamentary Research Service Blog
European Parliamentary Research Service Blog
Updated: 2 months 2 weeks ago
EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Energy supply and security [Policy Podcast]
Written by Alex Benjamin Wilson,
© Leonid Ikan / Fotolia
Energy policy is a competence shared between the EU and its Member States. Whereas the EU has a responsibility under the Treaties to ensure security of supply, Member States are responsible for determining the structure of their energy supply and their choice of energy sources. EU legislation on security of supply focuses on natural gas and electricity markets, and is closely related to other EU objectives: consolidating a single energy market, improving energy efficiency, and promoting renewable energy sources to decarbonise the economy and meet the Paris Agreement goals.
The current legislature has seen several initiatives on security of supply. The EU institutions reached agreement on a revised regulation on security of gas supply, a revised decision on intergovernmental agreements in the energy field, and new targets for energy efficiency and renewables by 2030. Parliament has adopted several own-initiative resolutions in the energy field, including one on the new EU strategy on liquefied natural gas and gas storage, which is key to gas supply security. EU projects of common interest finance energy infrastructure that improves interconnection and supports security of supply. Negotiations between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission (trilogue) are ongoing on a proposal to revise the regulation on security of electricity supply, as part of the clean energy package.
There is growing expectation among EU citizens that the EU will intensify its involvement in energy supply and security. If this view was shared by just over half of Europeans in 2016 (52 %), it is now expressed by roughly two thirds of EU citizens (65 %).
The EU will retain a key role in monitoring security of supply throughout the energy transition from a historic system of centralised generation dominated by fossil fuels in national markets, towards a new system characterised by a high share of renewables, more localised production and cross-border markets. However, the EU would need to use a special legislative procedure to intervene directly in determining the energy supply of its Member States, requiring unanimity in Council.
Read the complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Energy supply and security‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Click to view slideshow.
Categories: European Union
EU policies – Delivering for citizens: The fight against unemployment [Policy Podcast]
Written by Marie Lecerf,
© ty / Fotolia
By promoting a high level of employment, the European Union (EU) has been fighting against unemployment since as long ago as the early 1950s.
The fight against unemployment was brought to the top of the European agenda with the onset of the 2008 economic and financial crisis, and the consequent rise in unemployment rates in all European Union (EU) Member States. In its Europe 2020 strategy, the European Commission set a target to get 75 % of 20 to 64 year-olds into employment by 2020.
EU labour market conditions have significantly improved in recent years, and most labour market indicators have strengthened steadily. Since mid-2013, the unemployment rate has continued to decline, and the EU is back to its pre-crisis level (6.8 % in July 2018). Despite the recovery in economic growth and its positive impact on the labour market, the EU has still to face unemployment challenges, particularly concerning differences between Member States, youth unemployment and long-term unemployment.
Since 2014, efforts have been made in a number of areas, including to help young people enter the labour market, to combat long-term unemployment, upgrade skills, and facilitate workers’ mobility in the European Union.
The improvement in labour market indicators has been reflected in citizens’ improved evaluation of the EU’s involvement in the fight against unemployment, but there is still a very high demand for even more EU intervention in this policy area (76 % of EU citizens).
In the future, new or updated legislation relating to employment could modernise work to help in adjustment to a digital world, support sustainable transitions from unemployment into employment and between jobs, increase labour mobility and create closer coordination between economic and social policies.
Read the complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: The fight against unemployment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Click to view slideshow.
Categories: European Union
CAP strategic plans [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by James McEldowney and Patrick Kelly (1st edition),
© Rawpixel.com / Fotolia
The Commission’s legislative proposals on the future of the common agricultural policy (CAP) were published on 1 June 2018. They comprise three proposals: a regulation setting out rules on support for CAP strategic plans; a regulation on the single common market organisation (CMO) and a horizontal regulation on financing, managing and monitoring the CAP.
The proposal for a regulation on CAP strategic plans introduces a new delivery model, described by the Commission as a fundamental shift in the CAP, involving a shift from compliance towards results and performance. It includes a new distribution of responsibilities between the EU and Member States. A new planning process is proposed which will cover both Pillar I (direct payments) and Pillar II (rural development) of the CAP.
- December 2018: ‘CAP strategic plans‘ (1st edition)
1.6.2018 Rapporteur: Esther Herranz García (EPP, Spain) 2018/0216(COD) Shadow rapporteurs:
Maria Noichl (S&D, Germany)
James Nicholson (ECR, UK)
Jan Huitema (ALDE, the Netherlands)
Luke Ming Flanagan (GUE/NGL, Ireland)
Maria Heubuch (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Martin Häusling (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Bronis Ropė (Greens/EFA, Lithuania)
Marco Zullo (EFDD, Italy)
Angelo Ciocca (ENF, Italy)
Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)
Next steps expected:
Vote in committee
Categories: European Union
Reconsidering the General Food Law [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Tarja Laaninen (1st edition),
© Viacheslav Iakobchuk / Fotolia
On 11 April 2018, the European Commission published a proposal to review the General Food Law Regulation and amend eight legislative acts dealing with specific food chain sectors: GMOs, feed additives, smoke flavourings, food contact materials, food additives, food enzymes and flavourings, plant protection products and novel foods. The proposal follows-up on the European Citizens’ Initiative on glyphosate; and especially on concerns regarding the transparency of the scientific studies used in the evaluation of pesticides. The proposal also responds to a fitness check of the General Food Law, completed in January 2018. The proposal’s objective is to increase the transparency and sustainability of the EU scientific assessment model, and other aspects such as governance of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). In the European Parliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) adopted its report on 27 November 2018 by 43 votes in favour, 16 against, with one abstention. A vote in plenary to finalise Parliament’s position is expected to take place in December.
- December 2018: ‘Reconsidering the General Food Law‘ (1st edition)
11.4.2018 Rapporteur: Renate Sommer (EPP, Germany) 2018/0088(COD) Shadow rapporteurs:
Pavel Poc (S&D, Czech Republic)
Arne Gericke (ECR, Germany)
Fredrick Federley (ALDE, Sweden)
Anja Hazekamp (GUE/NGL, the Netherlands)
Martin Häusling (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Piernicola Pedicini (EFDD, Italy)
Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)
Next steps expected:
First-reading vote in plenary
Categories: European Union
Enabling SMEs’ access to capital markets [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Ioannis Zachariadis (1st edition),
© andranik123 / Fotolia
Making it easier for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to access financing through public markets lies at the heart of the capital markets union – the plan to mobilise capital in Europe. Among the various reasons for going ahead with this union is the fact that existing requirements and listing costs in both regulated and multilateral trading venues continue to be disproportionate to the size and level of sophistication of SMEs. To further respond to this situation, the Commission has proposed adopting a regulation to address the administrative burden placed on SMEs when listing or issuing equity and bonds, with the aim to increase liquidity on SME growth markets. The latter are a new category of multilateral trading facilities, which was established under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II. To this end, the proposal provides for targeted amendments to two key pieces of financial services legislation, namely the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) and the Prospectus Regulation.
- December 2018: ‘Enabling SMEs’ access to capital markets‘ (1st edition)
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)
COM(2018) 33124.5.2018 Rapporteur: Anne Sander (EPP, France) 2018/0165(COD) Shadow rapporteurs:
Neena Gill (S&D, UK);
Kay Swinburne (ECR, UK);
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE, Spain);
Paloma Lopez Bermejo (GUE/NGL, Spain);
Philippe Lamberts (Greens, Belgium)
Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)
Next steps expected:
Vote on draft report in committee
Categories: European Union
COP 24: Making the Paris Agreement operational
Written by Gregor Erbach,
The 24th UN climate change conference (COP24), which starts today in Katowice, Poland, is focused on the full implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change and the adoption of the operational ‘rulebook’. In the political phase of the Talanoa dialogue, initiated by the Fijian presidency of COP23, high-level representatives of the Parties will discuss collective efforts to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, guided by the questions Where are we?, Where do we want to go? and How do we get there?
A number of difficulties will have to be overcome at COP24. Some major economies have weakened their commitments: the United States plans to withdraw from the Paris Agreement as soon as possible, and Brazil has retracted its offer to host the COP25 conference in 2019. Despite new pledges from funders like the World Bank, the provision of finance to support climate action in developing countries remains a major stumbling block in the negotiations. Countries’ commitments to emission reductions would need to be strengthened, as the current pledges would result in around three degrees of global warming, according to the 2018 UN emissions gap report. The International Energy Agency reports that energy-related carbon emissions have been rising again since 2017. In Brazil, deforestation of the Amazon has greatly increased during the last year. These worrying trends are in sharp contrast with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special report on global warming of 1.5°C that calls for ‘rapid and far-reaching’ social and economic transitions to limit the impacts of climate change and meet the targets of the Paris Agreement.
The EU has adopted comprehensive policies to meet its pledge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 40 % below 1990 levels by 2030. Legislation on the emissions trading system (ETS), effort sharing for non-ETS sectors, land use and forests, energy efficiency, renewable energy, sustainable bioenergy, and buildings has been agreed recently. Policies for sustainable mobility, including emission targets for cars, vans and trucks are still under negotiation. The EU has been a global leader in the fight against climate change, but lately struggles to keep up the pace of emission reductions, as reported by the European Environment Agency.
The European Parliament advocates a more ambitious EU target of a 55 % emission reduction by 2030, and a delegation from the European Parliament will attend COP24. Last week, the European Commission adopted a long-term strategy for emission reductions, requested by the Parliament in October 2017. The strategy, entitled ‘A clean planet for all’, outlines pathways to reach the aim of net zero greenhouse gas emissions in the EU by 2050. With these strategic targets, supporting policies and contributions to international climate finance, the EU is well positioned to play a leading role in bringing the COP24 negotiations to a successful conclusion.
Visit the European Parliament page on ‘Climate change‘.
Categories: European Union
International Day of Persons with Disabilities – Leave no woman behind
International Day of Persons with Disabilities
Written by Ingeborg Odink and Rosamund Shreeves,
According to the UN, an estimated one in five women worldwide live with disabilities and the prevalence of disability is actually higher among women than men (19.2 versus 12 %). Women and girls with disabilities are also among the most vulnerable and marginalised, because of the multiple and intersecting discriminations they face based on their gender, age, disability and other factors, as the UN rightly and alarmingly pointed out in its 2017 Resolution on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
As we celebrate the International Day of Persons with Disabilities on 3 December, one cannot but conclude that for women and girls with disabilities in Europe full inclusion is also still a distant aspiration. Political awareness, however, is rising, and initiatives are being taken to empower these particularly vulnerable women and girls and protect their rights to enable them to fully and equally participate in society.
The prevalence of disability in the EU is higher among women than men. Women are the majority (54 %) of people with disabilities and are more likely than men to report a basic activity difficulty (15.1 % versus 12.9 %) or a disability (14 % versus 11.7 %). Considering the increase in the number of elderly people and longer female life expectancy, this number is expected to increase.
Legal and policy frameworkUnder the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), often described as the ‘international bill of rights for women’, and the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which sets out a worldwide agenda for women’s empowerment, all EU Member States are committed to upholding and protecting women’s rights and eliminating the additional barriers some women, e.g. women with disabilities, face in achieving full equality and advancement. The EU itself is not party to CEDAW, but gender equality, non-discrimination and protection of human rights are established general principles of the EU.
The 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is the first human rights convention to which the EU has become a party, and is the first international legally binding instrument setting minimum standards for rights for people with disabilities. The CRPD not only introduces a human rights based approach in disability policies (moving away from medical and charity models), it also explicitly recognises discrimination on the ground of gender and disability (Article 6) and calls on State Parties to take measures ensuring women with disabilities full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Optional Protocol to the CRPD allows for submission of complaints to the CRPD Committee by individuals and groups of individuals, or by a third party on behalf of individuals and groups of individuals, alleging that their rights have been violated under the CRPD. For the EU, the CRPD Convention entered into force on 22 January 2011. In addition, all the EU countries have signed and ratified the Convention, and 22 EU countries have also signed and ratified its Optional Protocol.
The international community’s commitment to advancing the human rights of women with disabilities was also strengthened with the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES 70/1), which pledges to ‘leave no one behind’. While not explicitly mentioned under Goal 5, ‘Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’, women with disabilities are included in target 5.1, ‘End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere’.
The European disability strategy 2010-2020 (ESD) is a key tool to fulfilling the EU commitments under the CRPD, the CEDAW and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. The strategy entails actions in eight priority areas (accessibility, participation, equality, employment, education and training, social protection, health, external action) for the active inclusion and full participation of disabled people in society. However, the European Parliament and women’s rights organisations have criticised the lack of a gender perspective in the EDS, and that, despite progress in some areas, much more still needs to be done to improve the situation of both men and, especially, women with disabilities in the EU.
The 2017 EIGE Gender Equality Index (GEI) shows that women with disabilities in the EU score lower when it comes to access to the labour market, earnings and education level. Women with disabilities have a particularly low employment participation, with a FTE employment rate of only 19 %, compared to 28 % for men with disabilities, and the gender pay gap is similar to those who do not have disabilities. People with disabilities also face a higher risk of poverty and social exclusion than the general population. Here too, the poverty rate is slightly higher for women with disabilities compared to men with disabilities.
No less worrying is that women with disabilities indicate a higher prevalence of various forms of violence (see FRA 2014 EU-wide prevalence survey on violence against women). The biggest differences are found in terms of physical or sexual partner violence: 34 % of women with a health problem or disability have experienced this during a relationship, compared with 19 % of women who do not have a health problem or disability. Women with disabilities are also often denied equal sexual and reproductive rights. At the beginning of this year, the European Disability Forum (EDF) and CERMI Women’s Foundation released a comprehensive report denouncing the practice of forced sterilisation, which, under certain circumstances, is still carried out in some EU countries on women with (intellectual and psychosocial) disabilities.
EU accession to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention) in this context is an important step towards better protection of these rights. It is the first instrument in Europe to set legally binding standards to prevent gender-based violence, protect victims of violence and punish perpetrators, defining and criminalising various forms of violence against women, including physical, sexual, and psychological violence, stalking, sexual harassment, female genital mutilation, forced marriage, forced abortion and forced sterilisation
Action taken by the European Parliament- The European Parliament has a cross-party Disability Intergroup, whose 188 members actively work on promoting disability policy and advancing the rights of persons with disabilities in their work at the European Parliament as well as at the national level.
- As a guardian of human rights, Parliament consistently raises gender and disability issues. In its resolution of 29 November 2018 on the situation of women with disabilities, it reiterated its call for gender and disability mainstreaming in the gender equality and disability strategies and all other strategies, policies and programmes of the EU and its member states, and called for concrete measures, in different areas, including positive measures, to protect the rights of women and girls with disabilities.
- The European Parliament has also consistently taken a strong stance on the issue of violence against women, including women with disabilities, and has repeatedly called for EU accession to the Istanbul Convention (the EU signed the Convention in June 2017) and for its ratification by individual Member States.
- The European Disability Strategy 2010-2020, EPRS briefing, July 2017
- Discrimination and access to employment for female workers with disabilities, IPOL study, August 2017
- Violence against women in the EU: State of play, EPRS briefing, November 2018
- The Istanbul Convention: A tool to tackle violence against women and girls, EPRS at a glance, November 2018
- EIGE Fact sheet on gender and disability, 2018
- 3D bio-printing for medical and enhancement purposes, EPRS In-depth study, July 2018
- What if technology helped society become more inclusive?, EPRS at a glance, June 2017
Categories: European Union
Global and regional trends [What Think Tanks are thinking]
Written by Marcin Grajewski,
© sdecoret / Fotolia
The European Union’s key institutions held a joint conference on 28-29 November entitled ‘Global trends to 2030: Shaping the future in a fast-changing world’. The annual event was organised under the auspices of the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), which is a framework for cooperation between the administrations of the European Parliament, the European Commission, Council of the European Union, European External Action Service and other bodies to work together on medium- and long-term trends facing or relating to the European Union.
This note brings together commentaries, analyses and studies by major international think tanks and research institutes on longer term trends – global and regional, with a focus on Europe. Some reports listed here were presented at the conference, some others can be found in the ESPAS repository of strategic studies, named Orbis.
Digital revolutionGlobal trends to 2030: The future of work and workplaces
European Political Strategy Centre for the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), November 2018
Global trends to 2030: Identities and biases in the digital age
European Political Strategy Centre for the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, November 2018
Révolutions en orbite: L’espace au XXIème siècle
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, November 2018
Comment l’intelligence artificielle va transformer la guerre
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2018
The future of jobs report 2018
World Economic Forum, September 2018
L’Europe face à la numérisation du travail
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2018
The digital enterprise: Moving from experimentation to transformation
World Economic Forum, September 2018
The European answer to the digital revolution: How to ensure Europe’s competitive advantage?
Jacques Delors Institute, September 2018
The future of work: Robots cooking free lunches?
Wilfried Martens Centre, July 2018
Audiovisual media in the digital era
European Policy Centre, July 2018
No middle ground: Moving on from the crypto wars
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2018
Living with uncertainty: Social implications of precarious work
TASC, April 2018
The Internet and jobs: Opportunities and ambiguous trends
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2018
Stealing thunder: Cloud, IoT and 5G will change the strategic paradigm for protecting European commercial interests
European Centre for International Political Economy, February 2018
Global Trends to 2035: Economy and Society
Centre for European Policy Studies for the European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2018
Global trends to 2030: The future of migration and integration
European Political Strategy Centre for the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, November 2018
What is globalization? And how has the global economy shaped the United States?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2018
Towards a “senseable city”: Technology, trial and error to make a city really “smart”
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2018
Are sound democratic and legal institutions necessary for growth?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2018
The quality of democracy is declining in many industrialized states
Bertelsmann Stiftung, October 2018
Is globalisation dying?
European Centre for International Political Economy, October 2018
Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Oversees Development Institute, October 2018
Regime change? The European economy to 2030
Centre for European Reform, October 2018
The next wave of global LNG investment is coming
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2018
A vision of Africa’s future
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, October 2018
New trends in identity politics in the Middle East and North Africa and their impact on state-society relations
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, October 2018
Harnessing the fourth industrial revolution for water
World Economic Forum, September 2018
The future of international trade and investment
European Political Strategy Centre for the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), September 2018
The nature of democratic backsliding in Europe
Carnegie Europe, July 2018
In Eurasia new financial centers are in offing: Is Shanghai ready for prime-time?
European Centre for International Political Economy, July 2018
How the baby boomers’ retirement wave distorts model-based output gap estimates
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, June 2018
Africa’s future is urban: Implications for EU development policy and cooperation
Overseas Development Institute, June 2018
How the US lost: China’s growing foothold in Africa
Cingendael, June 2018
The digital revolution is transforming energy: Whether it slows climate change is up to policymakers
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2018
10 trends shaping innovation in the digital age
European Political Strategy Centre, May 2018
Digital Australia: An economic and trade agenda
Brookings Institution, May 2018
Can Europe save the world order?
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018
The future of Arctic cooperation in a changing strategic environment
Rand Europe, May 2018
The phase zero digital toolbox: Visualizing global security, state instability, climate change, and vulnerability of natural resources
New America Foundation, May 2018
Coal exit or coal expansion? A review of coal market trends and policies in 2017
Institut français des relations internationales, May 2018
Chinese investment trends in Europe
Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, May 2018
Discontinuities and distractions: Rethinking security for the year 2040
Rand Europe, April 2018
The geography of future water challenges
Clingendael, April 2018
Migration through the Mediterranean: Mapping the EU response
European Council on foreign Relations, April 2018
MENA stability in a changing climate: A transatlantic agenda on preventive investment
E3G, March 2018
Abusing the people: Global challenges of authoritarian populism
Libertarian Club, March 2018
Italy is the West’s future
Chatham House, March 2018
Income convergence in the EU: Within-country regional patterns
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2018
Recession and renewal in European democracy
Carnegie Europe, February 2018
The EU battery alliance: Can Europe avoid technological dependence?
Institut français des relations internationales, February 2018
Creditworthiness trends of Eurozone countries
Centrum für Europäische Politik, January 2018
Electric vehicles for smarter cities: the future of energy and mobility
World Economic Forum, January 2018
Analysis of development in EU capital flows in the global context
Bruegel, January 2018
Electric vehicles for smarter cities: The future of energy and mobility
World Economic Forum, January 2018
The demise of the international liberal order and the future of the European project
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2018
New realities in foreign affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st century
Stiftung Wissenschalft und Politik, November 2018
The erosion of strategic stability and the future of arms control in Europe
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2018
The uncertain future of warfare
East-West Institute, November 2018
Rebuilding strategic thinking
Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2018
UN reforms for the 2030 agenda
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2018
Will international institutions fail again? International power shifts and the future of global cooperation
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, October 2018
China expands its global governance ambitions in the Arctic
Chatham House, October 2018
Trends in women’s participation in UN, EU and OSCE peace operations
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, October 2018
Global trends to 2035: Geo-politics and international power
Oxford Analytica for EPRS, September 2017
The uncertain trends in the “wars” on terrorism
Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2018
Opposing trends: The renewed salience of nuclear weapons and nuclear abolitionism
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2018
Balkan futures: Three scenarios for 2025
European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 2018
The future of warfare
EPRS for the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), September 2018
The rise and fall of EU trade law: Narratives on quantitative trends
Lueven Centre for Global Governance Studies, September 2018
Taking stock of a shifting world order
Rand Corporation, August 2018
Climate and security revisited
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2018
With “strategic partners” like this, who needs competitors? Europe needs to change its military to military relations with China
German Marshall Fund, July 2018
Remaking the case for NATO: Collective security and the British national interest
Policy Exchange, July 2018
China in the era of ‘Xi Jinping thought’: Five key trends for Africa
South African Institute of International Affairs, March 2018
Towards Putin’s last presidency?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2018
Terror overseas: Understanding the GCC counter extremism and counter terrorism trends
Henry Jackson Society, February 2018
Indian investments in Africa: Scale, trends, and policy recommendations
Observer Research Foundation, February 2018
Between change and continuity: Making sense of America’s evolving global engagement
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, January 2018
Europe is back: Economic, financial, social and technological trends in a changing world
European Political Strategy Centre, January 2018 (on top)
Testing the value of the postwar international order
Rand Europe, January 2018
Europe’s defence train has left the station: speed and destination unknown
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2017
Creditworthiness trends of Eurozone countries
Centrum für Europäische Politik, January 2018
Analysis of development in EU capital flows in the global context
Bruegel, January 2018
Military factors in the MENA Region: Challenging trends
Egmont, November 2017
Smart logistics for future armed forces
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2018
Read this briefing on ‘Global and regional trends‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Digital democracy in the age of new technologies
Written by Zsolt G. Pataki with Riccardo Molinari
© plotplot /shutterstock
Technologies permeate all levels of modern society and economy, the internet and electronic devices are basic tools in our everyday lives; we are increasingly dependent on technologies. Some of these technologies – such as quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and blockchain, to name the newest and most dynamic – are now entering the democratic processes. However, none of this will benefit society unless we know whether regulation is necessary. How can we ensure that this immense potential does not damage our democracies, as well as attain a higher level of cybersecurity?
Assessing the impact of these new technologies on our democratic processes and institutions is truly relevant in the context of our ‘post-truth society’, where facts seem to be less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief. This is a challenge for scientists, experts, the media, and also for policy-makers and society as a whole. Science and technology are crucial to democracy and there is a clear need to create the conditions for a vigorous dialogue between scientists, politicians and the public.
#FutureTechLecture
Democratic institutions must therefore face both the positive and the negative side of technological evolution that, on the one hand increases transparency and strengthens democratic processes, but on the other, facilitates the proliferation of illegal activities. These characteristics allow state and non-state actors to be both victims and perpetrators. Theft of data, fraud, industrial espionage, as well as terrorism and trafficking, are just a few examples of threats coming from the web, where technologies such as artificial intelligence, blockchain or quantum technologies are used to implement criminal intentions.
In this context, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) is organising two highly relevant and interesting events on 4 December 2018:
The EPTA Conference 2018, scheduled for the morning and entitled ‘Towards a digital democracy – Opportunities and challenges’, will focus on the topic of democracy in the era of breakthrough technologies. This event takes place in the framework of STOA’s presidency of the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment (EPTA) network in 2018.
Following the opening by European Parliament Vice-President Ramón Luis VALCÁRCEL SISO and an introduction by STOA Vice-Chair Paul RÜBIG, representatives of EPTA members from different countries will present their contributions and share their experiences, mainly from the point of view of the impact of these new breakthrough technologies on our societies and political systems. Panel discussions will follow the individual presentations, grouped in three sessions, and opening the floor to questions from the public.
The 17th STOA Annual Lecture, which takes place in the afternoon, is thematically linked to the EPTA Conference and is entitled ‘Quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity: Catching up with the future‘. This event will focus on the opportunities and challenges created by greatly enhanced computing power, as well as other applications of quantum technologies, touching upon issues of cybersecurity and data protection at a time of widespread use of big data, artificial intelligence and data analytics.
© geralt / Pixabay
The speakers are world-renowned personalities of great authority and influence on these developments: Professor Anton ZEILINGER, Professor of Physics and President of the Austrian Academy of Sciences; and Esther WOJCICKI, American technology educator and journalist at the Palo Alto High Media Arts programme.
Technologies evolve and, with them, our vulnerabilities; measures to protect us must keep up. The very experienced and committed speakers at this year’s Annual Lecture will share their valuable insights into the development of these technologies and their impacts on our societies.
Interested? Register for the Annual Lecture and join the debate. To keep up to date with STOA activities, follow our website, the EPRS blog, Twitter and Think Tank pages.
Categories: European Union
Discontinuing seasonal changes of time [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Ariane Debyser (1st edition),
© mizar_21984 / Fotolia
To end the biannual change of clocks that currently takes place in every Member State at the end of March and the end of October, on 12 September 2018 the European Commission adopted a proposal to discontinue the seasonal changes of time in the Union.
The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, presented the initiative in his State of the Union address as an issue of subsidiarity, underlining that ‘Member States should themselves decide whether their citizens live in summer or winter time’.
The initiative, which would repeal existing provisions governed by Directive 2000/84/EC, proposes a timetable to end seasonal clock-changing arrangements in a coordinated way, in order to safeguard the proper functioning of the internal market and avoid the disruptions that this may cause, for instance, to the transport or communications sectors.
- November 2018: ‘Discontinuing seasonal changes of time‘ (1st edition)
Transport and Tourism (TRAN)
COM(2018) 63912.9.2018 Rapporteur:
Marita Ulvskog (S&D, Sweden)
2018/0332(COD) Shadow rapporteurs:
Pavel Svoboda (EPP, Czech Republic)
Kosma Złotowski (ECR, Poland)
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE, Spain)
Jakop Dalunde (Greens/EFA, Sweden)
Merja Kyllönen (GUE/NGL, Finland)
Rolandas Paksas (EFDD, Lithuania)
Marie-Christine Arnautu (ENF, France)
Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)
Next steps expected:
Publication of draft report
Categories: European Union
Plenary round-up – Brussels, November II 2018
Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,
© European Union 2018 – Source : EP
The highlights of the November II plenary session were the debate on the future of Europe with the Prime Minister of Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, and the discussion on the Council and Commission statements on UK withdrawal from the European Union. Debates were held on a Commission statement on the single market package and the long-term strategy for reducing EU greenhouse gas emissions. Members debated and adopted reports on five Western Balkan countries, as well as a report on the way forward for the World Trade Organization (WTO). A number of legislative reports were voted without debate, including on trade in goods that could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel treatment or punishment, the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the internal borders, and common rules for the operation of air services.
Statements on United Kingdom withdrawal from the European UnionIn advance of the European Parliament vote on the withdrawal agreement expected in early 2019 (pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union), Parliament heard a statement from the Council, and Michel Barnier as chief negotiator, on the conclusions of the special European Council meeting of 25 November. While regretting the UK decision to leave the EU, Heads of State or Government backed the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration regarding future relations with the UK, negotiated respecting the ‘red lines’ set down by both the UK and the EU. Noting that the withdrawal leads to losses on both sides, the political declaration nevertheless provides for ambitious future cooperation with the UK.
World Trade Organization: the way forwardA strong supporter of the multilateral trading system, the Parliament supports WTO reform. Responding to serious challenges to the body’s legitimacy and effectiveness, Members debated and voted (by 471 to 80 with 86 abstentions) to approve an INTA committee report on an approach to keep the WTO relevant and efficient. Of particular concern is US blockage of new appointments to the Appellate Body, which fulfils a key role in the WTO dispute settlement system. This impasse could paralyse practical enforcement of multilateral trade rules, undermining the rules-based system. Other issues include the lack of possibilities for recourse against contentious trade practices and uneven compliance with transparency rules.
Country reports – Western BalkansParliament debated and adopted resolutions on five enlargement reports from the European Commission on Western Balkan countries: Albania (459 votes to 112, with 62 abstentions), Montenegro, (484 to 80, 63 abstentions), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (470 to 116, 46 abstentions), Serbia (503 to 85, 47 abstentions) and Kosovo (393 to 139, 71 abstentions). Members endorsed the process to open EU accession negotiations with Albania in June 2019, once conditions are met. Members called for more progress in Montenegro on outstanding border disputes. Members expect the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to progress on implementing the Prespa agreement with Greece. While Serbia’s accession process shows progress, Members consider the country should align itself closer to EU foreign and security policy, and normalise relations with its neighbour, Kosovo. Limited success on EU-related reforms in Kosovo itself mean progress on the conditions for visa liberation is an urgent step in moving closer to the EU.
Opening of trilogue negotiationsThe decisions of nine parliamentary committee (ECON, EMPL, IMCO, ITRE, JURI, LIBE and PECH) to enter into interinstitutional (trilogue) negotiations were confirmed. Two further decisions, of the EMPL committee, will be the subject of a vote during the December session.
Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – Brussels, November II 2018‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Outcome of the special European Council (Article 50), 25 November 2018
Written by Ralf Drachenberg,
fotolia
On 25 November 2018, EU-27 leaders met to finalise and formalise the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. They endorsed the withdrawal agreement, as presented by the negotiators of the EU and the United Kingdom (UK), and approved the political declaration on future EU-UK relations, accompanying the withdrawal agreement. Last minute statements regarding Gibraltar and clarification on a possible extension to the transition period removed all obstacles, so that the European Council (Article 50) was able to agree unanimously to move to the ratification phase. The agreement is due to enter into force on 30 March 2019.
1. European Council (Article 50) meetingEU-27 Heads of State or Government endorsed the withdrawal agreement and approved the accompanying political declaration at their special European Council (Article 50) meeting of 25 November 2018. Commenting on the results, the Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, stressed that ‘this is the best deal possible for Britain, this is the best deal possible for Europe, this is the only deal possible’. He added that, whilst he was very satisfied with the results of the negotiations, ‘this was a very sad day’. Theresa May, the UK Prime Minister, for her part acknowledged that ‘many people are sad at this moment’, but that she did not personally share this feeling, stressing her ‘full optimism’ for the future of the UK.
EU-27 Heads of State or Government also adopted a declaration regarding the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration, in which they recalled that ‘the Union negotiated and will conclude the Withdrawal Agreement in the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council under Article 50 TEU’. They pledge to ‘continue to provide the necessary political direction in respect of the implementation of this agreement’. For example, ‘as regards the negotiations of agreements governing the future relationship with the UK, the negotiating directives will be elaborated on the basis of the previously agreed European Council guidelines’.
In their conclusions from the meeting, EU-27 Heads of State or Government thanked the EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, ‘for his contribution to maintaining the unity among EU27 Member States throughout the negotiations on the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union.’
GibraltarIn the final days leading up to the European Council (Article 50) meeting on 25 November 2018, Gibraltar became a major issue. The Spanish government wanted to ensure that any future trade deal between the EU and the UK would not apply to Gibraltar, unless explicitly agreed between the UK and Spain bilaterally.
An agreement was reached on 24 November 2018, consisting of four components: an interpretative declaration of the European Council (Article 50) and Commission on Article 184 of the Withdrawal Agreement; a second declaration by the two on the territorial scope of the future agreements; a letter from the UK Government; and a joint letter from Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker.
The first declaration gives an interpretation of Article 184 of the Withdrawal Agreement, stating that the obligation to negotiate future agreements does not impose any obligation on the territorial scope to which they would apply. The UK Government’s letter confirms that it shares the same interpretation. In the second declaration, on the territorial scope of the future agreements, the European Council (Article 50) and the European Commission state that ‘Gibraltar will not be included in the territorial scope of the agreements’ to be concluded between the EU and UK. ‘However, this does not preclude the possibility to have separate agreements between the Union and the United Kingdom in respect of Gibraltar’. This reflects the negotiation position already outlined in the guidelines for Brexit negotiations adopted by the European Council (Article 50) on 29 April 2016. This solution alleviated Spanish concerns and paved the way for the EU-27 to unanimously approve the Withdrawal Agreement. After the meeting, President Juncker recalled the importance of the issue for Spain and emphasised that the agreement reached was good for Spain.
2. Withdrawal AgreementAs flagged up in the EPRS outlook for the meeting, the Withdrawal Agreement addresses the main issues for the EU – namely citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, and governance of the agreement itself – while also including provisions on a transition period to run from the point of UK withdrawal until 30 December 2020 (21 months). Provisions on a possible extension to the transition period were completed in the run-up to the 25 November meeting, with an extension of ‘up to one or two years’ from 1 January 2021 being able to be agreed by June 2020. The issue is controversial in the UK since throughout the transition period the UK would be a rule-taker, no longer having any say in making those rules.
In his invitation letter to this special European Council (Article 50) meeting, President Tusk recalled the EU-27 negotiating guidelines which had set the following objectives:
- ‘to minimise the uncertainty and disruption caused by Brexit for our citizens, businesses and Member States;
- to settle the status of EU citizens who live, work and study in the UK, with reciprocal guarantees [for UK citizens in EU Member States];
- to make sure that the UK honours all financial commitments and liabilities;
- to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland;
- to prevent a legal vacuum for our companies.’
In Mr Tusk’s view the withdrawal agreement ‘ensures that the rights of our citizens are fully protected, the peace process in Northern Ireland should not be affected, the UK will continue its payments to the EU budget during the transition period, and legal certainty will be secured’. While the withdrawal agreement is still subject to final legal revision in the coming days, Michel Barnier underlined that it will give ‘legal certainty to all those affected: citizens, businesses and Member States’.
Main messages of the EP President: In his speech at the opening of the European Council (Article 50), Antonio Tajani expressed the Parliament’s satisfaction with the Withdrawal Agreement, as it sets out the appropriate responses on the European Parliament’s three priority issues: citizens’ rights, finances, and the border issue in Ireland. Concerning the governance of the agreement, he stressed that the ‘Parliament must be consulted before changes to the withdrawal agreement necessitated by new circumstances are made and before important provisions, such as Article 132 on extending the transition period, are activated’. This would require a mechanism which ensures that Parliament has a say in decisions which the Union takes within the Joint Committee provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement. He suggested drawing up a common understanding with the Council on the arrangements for such a mechanism before the consent procedure concludes in Parliament.
3. Future EU-UK relationshipThe political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the EU and UK calls for an ‘ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership across trade and economic cooperation, law enforcement and criminal justice, foreign policy, security and defence and wider areas of cooperation’. But, the declaration also clearly stresses that the future relationship ‘cannot amount to the rights or obligations of membership’. The scope of issues reflects the guidelines on the framework for post-Brexit relations with the UK adopted on 23 March 2018 by the European Council (Article 50), which called for a free trade agreement, including socio-economic cooperation and specific partnerships regarding police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, security, defence and foreign policy.
Table 1: Overview of topics covered in the political declaration
Topic Overview Areas of shared interest UK participation in some EU programmes; ‘innovation, youth, culture and education, overseas development and external action, defence capabilities, civil protection and space’. This participation should also be accompanied by a fair and appropriate financial contribution.Economic partnership
Goods The EU and UK envision their relationship on trading goods will be ‘as close as possible’. To facilitate this they will work towards ‘comprehensive arrangements that will create a free trade area, combining deep regulatory and customs cooperation’. This would include tariffs, regulatory aspects, customs and implications for check and controls. Services and investment Both parties will aim for ‘ambitious, comprehensive and balanced arrangements on trade in services and investment in services and non-services sector’, while respecting each party’s right to regulate. Digital The EU and UK aim to assist ‘electronic commerce, address unjustified barriers to trade by electronic means, and ensure an open, secure and trustworthy online environment for businesses and consumers’. This will also include cross border data flows, telecommunications services and exchange of information on emerging technologies. Mobility Free movement of people will no longer apply to the UK, and the parties should establish mobility arrangements based on non-discrimination between Member States and full reciprocity. Issues include short-term visits, family law and social security coordination. Transport Cooperation in areas of aviation, road transport, rail transport and maritime transport and establish agreements such as a ‘Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement’, to enable cooperation in the area of transport. Energy Both parties agree they should ‘cooperate to support the delivery of cost efficient, clean and secure supplies of electricity and gas’, and address their future relationship regarding civil nuclear and carbon taxing. Fishing opportunities The parties agree that they should cooperate on fishing opportunities, including sustainability, clean healthy marine environments, and regulatory autonomy. Level playing field for open and fair competition To provide open and fair competition, provisions ‘should cover state aid, competition, social and employment standards, environmental standards, climate change, and relevant tax matters’, in line with relevant EU and international standards.Security Partnership
Law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters The future relationship will support ‘comprehensive, close, balanced and reciprocal law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters’ keeping in mind the ‘geographic proximity, shared and evolving threats the Parties face’. Cooperation areas: data exchange, operational cooperation between law enforcement authorities and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism financing. Foreign policy security and defence Future relationship would ‘provide for appropriate dialogue, consultation, coordination, exchange of information and cooperation mechanisms’. Topic covers consultation and cooperation, sanctions, cooperation and missions, defence capabilities development, intelligence exchanges, space and development cooperation. Thematic cooperation Both parties aim to cooperate in the future on cybersecurity, civil protection, health security, illegal migration, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism.The political declaration is not a legally binding document that could be relied upon in court. Rather it is more an outline for the commencement of negotiations after 29 March 2019. President Tusk noted that ‘we will have around two years to work out and agree a precise framework for such cooperation. And if, in spite of our best efforts, additional time is needed to negotiate the future relationship, an extension of the transition period by up to two years will be possible’.
Main messages of the EP President: President Tajani stressed that the European Parliament ‘welcomes the Political Declaration on the future relationship and regards it as an excellent basis on which to develop [the EU’s] post-Brexit cooperation with the United Kingdom’. He recalled the European Parliament’s suggestion to use an association agreement as the legal basis for the future relationship.
4. Next steps in the ratification processThe meeting of the European Council (Article 50) was followed by a meeting with the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, at which the next steps were considered. After the meeting, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, emphasised that ‘the difficult process of ratification’ still lies ahead. He reported that ‘the European Council invited the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council to take the necessary steps to ensure that the agreement can enter into force on 30th March 2019’.
According to Theresa May, the House of Commons will vote on the withdrawal agreement before Christmas 2018, probably on 11 December. The European Parliament is expected to vote on a Brexit resolution in December 2018, and on the Withdrawal Agreement itself in early 2019.
Main messages of the EP President: Antonio Tajani welcomed the outcome of the negotiations, seeing this as ‘balanced and comprehensive’. However, he also expressed his ‘regret at seeing the United Kingdom leave’ and argued that ‘no-one can be in any doubt that there is no upside to any of this: it is a lose-lose situation’.
Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the special European Council (Article 50), 25 November 2018‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Protecting the EU budget against generalised rule of law deficiencies [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Rafał Mańko (1st edition),
© Tanja Esser / Fotolia
On 3 May 2018 the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on the protection of the Union’s budget in the event of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in a Member State. The proposal addresses, from a budgetary perspective, generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law, including threats to the independence of the judiciary, arbitrary or unlawful decisions by public authorities, limited availability and effectiveness of legal remedies, failure to implement judgments, or limitations on the effective investigation, prosecution or sanctions for breaches of law. The proposal provides for the possibility for the Commission to make proposals to the Council on sanctions measures with regard to EU funding. These include suspension of payments, suspension, reduction or even termination of legal commitments (to pay), suspension of programmes, and the transfer of money to other programmes. Such a proposal would be deemed to have been adopted if the Council failed to reject it by a qualified majority. On 17 August 2018, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) delivered its opinion on the proposal and on 3 October 2018, Parliament’s co-rapporteurs presented their draft report on the proposal. While sharing the broad objectives put forward by the Commission, they have proposed a number of amendments.
Versions- November 2018: ‘Protecting the EU budget against generalised rule of law deficiencies‘ (1st edition)
Budgets (BUDG) and Budgetary Control (CONT) (jointly under Rule 55)
COM(2018) 3242.5.2018 Rapporteurs:
Petri Sarvamaa (EPP, Finland) and Eider Gardiazabal Rubial (S&D, Spain)
2018/0136(COD) Shadow rapporteurs:
Esteban González Pons (EPP), Inés Ayala Sender (S&D), Ali Nedzhmi (ALDE), Anneli Jäätteenmäki (ALDE), Dennis De Jong (GUE/NGL), Younous Omarjee (GUE/NGL), Sven Giegold (Greens/EFA), Jávor Benedek (Greens/EFA), Marco Valli (EFDD) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote on report in committee
Categories: European Union
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III) [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by Velina Lilyanova and Martin Svášek (1st edition),
© svetazi / Fotolia
On 14 June 2018, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation establishing the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III as part of a set of external action instruments under the new 2021 to 2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF). The proposed financial envelope represents a 1.1 % decrease compared with current funding (€12.9 billion in 2018 prices). Beneficiaries include the Western Balkan countries and Turkey.
The IPA, set up for the 2007 to 2013 MFF, aims to prepare candidate and potential candidate countries for EU membership and supports them in adopting and implementing the necessary political, institutional, legal, administrative, social and economic reforms. IPA III is clearly positioned in the context of the new Western Balkan strategy, adopted in February 2018, and builds in flexibility via à vis the evolving situation in Turkey. It is also designed to complement the EU’s internal policies.
In Parliament, the file has been allocated to the Committee for Foreign Affairs (AFET), with José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (EPP, Spain) and Knut Fleckenstein (S&D, Germany) as co-rapporteurs. The draft report presented by the rapporteurs on 30 October 2018 is now awaiting adoption by AFET.
Versions- November 2018: ‘Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III)‘ (1st edition)
14.6.2018 Rapporteurs: José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (EPP, Spain)
Knut Fleckenstein (S&D, Germany) 2018/0247(COD) Shadow rapporteurs:
Charles Tannock (ECR, United Kingdom)
Urmas Paet (ALDE, Estonia)
Takis Hadjigeorgiou (GUE/NGL, Cyprus)
Jaromír Kohlíček (GUE/NGL, Czech Republic)
Igor Šoltes (Greens/EFA, Slovenia)
Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD, Italy)
Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)
Next steps expected:
Vote in committee
Categories: European Union
Relations between the European Council and the European Parliament
fotolia
The most notable change in the European Union’s institutional architecture since the beginning of the European project was the launch in 1975 of the European Council, which became a formal institution in 2009. From the outset, the European Council has had a profound impact on the EU’s development. The dynamism of the EU system is apparent also in the rising prominence of the European Parliament (EP). Both institutions were major beneficiaries of successive rounds of Treaty reform; both benefited as well from the EU’s rapidly widening policy scope and growing political importance, with the European Council assuming more and more responsibility for setting the agenda, providing direction, and taking key decisions, and the EP acquiring greater power and prestige as the only directly elected institution at the European level.
The differences between the two institutions are nonetheless striking. The European Council, consisting principally of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, is a forum for promoting and reconciling national interests; the EP is a supranational body, the majority of whose members sit in trans-national political groups. The European Council is the EU’s emergent political executive; the EP is part of the EU’s legislature. The European Council surveys EU affairs from on high; the EP is deep in the trenches of European integration.
Despite their different character and purpose, the European Council and the EP view each other with circumspection. Their relationship is not inherently antagonistic, but nonetheless generates friction. Specifically, the EP is wary of the European Council’s increasing involvement in a range of policy areas going well beyond those traditionally associated with intergovernmentalism. The EP is also concerned about accountability and transparency regarding the work of the European Council. For its part, the European Council is happy to keep the EP at arm’s length. Subject, in most cases, to national parliamentary scrutiny of their activities, the Heads of State or Government enjoy operating in the European Council relatively free of EP scrutiny.
Although the European Council and the EP occupy separate spheres of EU activity, the conduct of certain policies and procedures brings them together, as does the interaction between the President of the European Council and the leadership of the EP, notably the speech by the EP President at the beginning of every regular meeting of the European Council, and the report by the European Council President to the EP after every such occasion, followed by a Parliamentary debate. The onset of the crisis years added a layer of complexity to European Council-EP relations, with the European Council meeting more frequently and acting more decisively in a range of policy areas, and the EP chafing at the European Council’s apparent high-handedness, opacity, and unaccountability. Personal factors have sometimes complicated this political and institutional rivalry, as various European Council Presidents and European Parliament leaders have interacted with each other in different ways.
This study analyses European Council-EP relations, a crucial though so far under-researched part of the EU’s institutional evolution, largely in the post-Lisbon Treaty period. It begins with a discussion of the recent rise of the two institutions, notably in the form of new intergovernmentalism and assertive parliamentarianism, and the implications of this development for the EU’s institutional landscape. This section also links the European Council and the EP in the ways that they help to strengthen the EU’s democratic legitimacy, both formally and informally. The next section outlines the Lisbon Treaty framework, which embeds European Council-EP relations. The study goes on to identify key interlocutors in European Council-EP relations, before assessing the quality of their interaction. The penultimate section explores points of contention in the relationship. The conclusions reiterate key topics and themes previously discussed in the study, and raise the possibility of the EP President’s greater participation in the European Council.
Read the complete study on ‘Relations between the European Council and the European Parliament‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
Prudential requirements and supervision of investment firms [EU Legislation in Progress]
Written by David Eatock (1st edition),
© ipopba / Fotolia
Investment firms play an important role in capital markets, facilitating savings and investment flows across the EU. However, the current EU rules are seen as fragmented, overly complex, inconsistently applied and often a poor fit for the actual risks taken by the various types of investment firms. The Commission has proposed a new regulation on the prudential requirements of investment firms and a new directive on the prudential supervision of investment firms. These proposals update the framework for investment firms, making it more effective and more closely calibrated to the size and nature of the various investment firms and their risks. Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) agreed its report and negotiating mandate on 24 September 2018. Work in Council is ongoing.
Versions- November 2018: ‘Prudential requirements and supervision of investment firms‘ (1st edition)
Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prudential supervision of investment firms and amending Directives 2013/36/EU and 2014/65/EU Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2017) 790
COM(2017) 791
20.12.2017 Rapporteur: Markus Ferber (EPP, Germany) 2017/0359 (COD)
2017/0358 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs:
Mady Delvaux (S&D, Luxembourg)
Bernd Lucke (ECR, Germany)
Nils Torvalds (ALDE, Finland)
Miguel Viegas (GUE/NGL, Portugal)
Sven Giegold (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Barbara Kappel (ENF, Austria)
Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’)
Next steps expected:
Launch of trilogue negotiations
Categories: European Union
Inequality [What Think Tanks are thinking]
Written by Marcin Grajewski,
© Hepta / Fotolia
Inequality has diminished on a global scale in the last 30 years, as more than two billion people have been lifted out of poverty in countries such as China or India. However, in the United States and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe and other developed regions, inequality whithin individual countries has often increased in recent years after decades of general growth in prosperity. Many analysts attribute the latter phenomenon both to globalisation and inadequate policy responses to the pace of technological change.
This note brings together commentaries, analyses and studies by major international think tanks and research institutes on economic and social inequality. Reports on gender or racial inequalities will be covered in greater detail in a future edition in these series.
Inequality.org reports
Institute for Policy Studies, November 2018
Factors driving wealth inequality in European countries
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, November 2018
Examining interrelation between global and national income inequalities
Bruegel, November 2018
The relative impact of different forces of globalisation on wage inequality: A fresh look at the EU experience
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, November 2018
Economic convergence or divergence in the EU?
Centre for Economic Policy Studies, October 2018
Health inequalities in Europe: Setting the stage for progressive policy action
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, October 2018
Women’s workplace equality index
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2018
3 problems with how the media looks at inequality
Ludwig Von Mises Institute, October 2018
Inequality in China
Bruegel, September 2018
Inequity aversion, welfare measurement and the Gini Index
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, August 2018
Urbane Sicherheit(en): Thesen zur Verbindung von sozialer und innerer Sicherheit
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, August 2018
Reducing inequalities and strengthening social cohesion through inclusive growth: A roadmap for action
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, August 2018
EU income inequality decline: Views from an income shares perspective
Bruegel, July 2018
An equal exit? The distributional consequences of leaving the EU
Institute for Public Policy Research, July 2018
Which places have the highest concentration of billionaires?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2018
Slower productivity and higher inequality: Are they related?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2018
Manufacturing jobs: Implications for productivity and inequality
Brookings Institution, May 2018
Unequal chances and unjust outcomes: Confronting inequality in Southeast Europe
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, May 2018
The dynamic effects of fiscal consolidation episodes on income inequality
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, April 2018
Raising the bar: How household incomes can grow the way they used to
Fabian Society, April 2018
Global income inequality is declining: Largely thanks to China and India
Bruegel, April 2018
Freedom, inequality, primitivism, and the division of labor
Ludwig Von Mises Institute, April 2018
A G20 agenda for technological justice
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2018
Social location matters: Inequality in work and family life courses at the intersection of gender and race
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, March 2018
Why is it so hard to reach the EU’s poverty target
Bruegel, March 2018
The new tax law’s impact on inequality
Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2018
Deliberative structures and their impact on voting behaviour under social conflict
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, February 2018
Has global trade liberalisation left Canadian workers behind?
Centre for International Governance Innovation, February 2018
Inequality in Europe
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, January 2018
The right question about inequality and growth
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2018
Pauvreté, un combat européen à mener avec les démunis
Jacques Delors Institute, December 2017
Inventions and inequality: Class gaps in patenting
Brookings Institution, December 2017
How governments tax reduces inequality more than how they spend
Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2017
Recessions, income inequality and the role of the tax and benefit system
Institute for Fiscal Studies, November 2017
Income inequality and the labour market in Britain and the US
Institute for Fiscal Studies, November 2017
Inégalités économiques et populisme aux États-Unis
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2018
Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK: 2017-18 to 2021-22
Institute for Fiscal Studies, November 2017
Reducing inequality: The key to a strong and cohesive social Europe
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, October 2017
Inequalities, growth and the future of liberal democracies
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, October 2017
Tax reform in the age of inequality
Brookings Institution, October 2017
Income inequality and growth in Europe
European Ideas Network, September 2017
Middle class: Winners or losers in a globalized world?
Center for Global Development, August 2017
Does rising income inequality threaten democracy?
Heritage Foundation, June 2017
Financial systems and income inequality
College of Europe, April 2017
Wealth inequality is a barrier to education and social mobility
Urban Institute, April 2017
An investment and equality-led sustainable development strategy for Europe
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, April 2017
Understanding wealth inequality in Canada
Fraser Institute, April 2017
Power and inequality in the global political economy
Chatham House, March 2017
Reasons for rejecting globalisation: Beyond inequality and xenophobia
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2017
Inefficient inequality: The economic costs of gender inequality in Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2017
Explaining inequality
Bruegel, December 2016
The connection between a slow-down in productivity and growing inequality
Foundation for European Progressive Studies, December 2016
The welfare costs of well-being inequality
National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2016
Globalization and wage inequality
National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2016
Read this briefing on ‘Inequality‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women
Written by Rosamund Shreeves,
© sunsdesign0014 / Fotolia
This year’s International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women on 25 November marks just over a year since revelations about harassment by a prominent film industry executive and the resulting global sharing of women’s personal experiences on social media raised public awareness of the scale and omnipresence of sexual harassment. Over this time, the issue has remained in the public eye. The Pew Research Center estimates that the initial #MeToo hashtag on Twitter has been used around 19 million times over this period, whilst national variations have emerged, for instance in France, Italy and Spain. Similar hashtag campaigns have also emerged around other forms of gender-based violence. In Spain, for instance, #cuéntalo and nationwide protests were ignited this May, following a court decision to acquit five men of the crime of rape after they performed non-consensual sex with a teenager.
Are these movements prompting concrete and lasting change? A 2018 European Parliament study on bullying and sexual harassment in the workplace, public spaces and political life found that the #MeToo movement has not only been successful in evidencing and raising awareness of the magnitude of the phenomenon but also led to debate about its underlying causes and possible responses. Looking at the reaction in nine EU countries (Sweden, Finland, UK, Spain, Italy, Poland, France, Denmark and Greece), it concludes that the movement has led to the standards of what is considered acceptable being redrawn. The campaign has also been credited with providing the momentum to push through a new law in France outlawing street harassment (‘wolf-whistling’), and new legislation in Sweden, clarifying what qualifies as consent and removing the requirement to provide evidence of force and/or resistance in order to establish rape. A similar law has been proposed in Spain, where the greater awareness brought by #MeToo is reported to be connected to a rise in the number of women coming forward to report rape and assault.
However, both this study and the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency caution that much remains to be done to arrive at a clear picture of sexual harassment across the EU, particularly to ensure that voices from marginalised groups such as women with disabilities, Roma women, women from rural areas and undocumented migrant women are heard, to change attitudes, and to ensure that sexual harassment is addressed holistically, in connection with wider gender inequalities, particularly in view of the current backlash against gender equality both globally and within the EU itself.
One specific area that has come under the spotlight is the nature and extent of online sexual harassment and abuse, particularly against women in the public eye and in politics and the potential impact on women’s political participation and the representativeness of our political institutions. The UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women has looked into both issues in her 2018 report to the UN General Assembly.
In October 2018, the IPU released a follow-up to its 2016 global study on sexism, harassment and violence against women parliamentarians, focusing this time on the European region and including respondents from all EU Member States except Malta and Slovakia. The study confirms that female members of parliament (MPs) in Europe are particular targets of online attacks. Of the 81 female MPs interviewed, 58.2 % had experience of abusive, sexual or violent content and behaviour on social networks. Most of the threats against female MPs were also made via electronic communication. A recent study for the European Parliament also finds that women who have a public role, including journalists and politicians are particularly targeted by online and offline harassment. Studies conducted for national Parliaments paint a similar picture. In the UK, a House of Commons inquiry into abuse, hate and extremism online found that all MPs were vulnerable to abuse, but that it particularly affected women MPs, and that it was possible to ‘break that down even further to ethnic minority MPs and, in particular, ethnic minority women MPs’.
The studies highlight that this level of abuse is one of the factors that can dissuade women from entering politics and hinder them from fulfilling their mandate when they do take office. The fact that younger MPs under the age of 40 and MPs from minority groups are more likely to have experienced abuse in the media and on social networks is particularly concerning, as it presents a real threat to progress towards making politics more representative. Research by the European Institute for Gender Equality has also flagged the extent of cyber-harassment against young women in general and the chilling effect on young women engaging in debates and being politically active online. Female MPs taking a stance on gender equality and gender-based violence were also a particular target.
Academic research in the UK has found that events such as general elections and referenda see a huge spike in online hate. With the European elections fast approaching and online campaigning using social media becoming an increasingly important channel, there is much to be done to ensure that women are genuinely able to participate.
Action by the European ParliamentIn the past year, the European Parliament has issued two resolutions highlighting the issue of sexual harassment:
- Resolution of 26 October 2017 on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU
- Resolution of 11 September 2018 on measures to prevent and combat mobbing and sexual harassment at the workplace, in public spaces and in political life in the EU (Rapporteur: Pina PICIERNO, Italy, S&D)
- Violence against women in the EU: State of play, EPRS briefing, November 2018
- The Istanbul Convention: A tool to tackle violence against women and girls, EPRS at a glance, November 2018
- Sexual harassment of women in the EU, EPRS infographic March 2018
- Bullying and sexual harassment at the workplace, in public spaces, and political life in the EU, Pol Dep C, March 2018
- Cyber violence and hate speech online against women, Pol Dep C, September 2018
Categories: European Union
European elections: common rules and national provisions
Citizens are asking what are the main common rules and national provisions for electing Members of the European Parliament. The procedures for electing Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are governed both by European Union (EU) legislation, which defines certain rules common to all Member States, and by provisions specific to each Member State.
Common rules© Momius / Fotolia
Common rules for electing MEPs are defined in Article 14 of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 20, 22 and 223 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, Article 39 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Act of 20 September 1976, amended in 2018, concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage.
The main common rules include:
- Representation of the EU’s citizens shall be digressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of 6 members per Member State and a maximum of 96 seats. The overall total number of seats shall not exceed 751.
- MEPs shall be elected for a term of 5 years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.
- MEPs shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation, using the list system or the single transferable vote, where the voter has one vote, but can rank the candidates.
- Elections to the European Parliament are held within the same period in all Member States, starting on a Thursday morning and ending on the following Sunday, with the exact date and times being fixed by each Member State.
- Member States may provide for the possibilities of advance voting, postal voting, and electronic and internet voting. They shall ensure the reliability of the result, secrecy of the vote and protection of personal data. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure the prevention of double voting.
Furthermore, Directive 93/109/EC lays down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals.
National provisionsIn addition to the common rules, Member States set up their own provisions. For instance, Member States may establish constituencies for elections to the European Parliament and/or may set a minimum threshold for the allocation of seats. At the national level, this threshold may not exceed 5 % of valid votes cast.
Voting is compulsory in five Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Greece): both nationals and registered non-national EU citizens are under a legal obligation to vote.
Other matters are also governed by national provisions, such as the minimum voting age or the minimum age for standing as a candidate.
More informationThe ‘2019 European elections: National rules‘ infographic provides an overview of the national provisions for electing MEPs.
More information is available on the European Parliament website, in the section entitled ‘EU fact sheets – The European Parliament: electoral procedures‘.
The ‘European elections‘ section of the ‘Your Europe‘ website offers further insight into the various aspects of the European elections.
Continue to put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP). We reply to you in the EU language that you use to write to us.
Categories: European Union
Outlook for the special European Council (Article 50), 25 November 2018
Written by Ralf Drachenberg,
fotolia
On 25 November 2018, EU Heads of State or Government are scheduled to meet for a special European Council to endorse the Brexit withdrawal agreement and approve a political declaration on future EU-UK relations accompanying the withdrawal agreement. This briefing outlines the main elements of the withdrawal agreement, notably the solution to the Irish border issue. It also provides an overview of the European Council’s deliberations and guidance regarding the Article 50 negotiations to date, as well an outlook of the next steps towards ratifying the agreement.
1. European Council meeting 25 November 2018On 14 November 2018, the EU and UK negotiators agreed on a draft Article 50 withdrawal agreement, which was subsequently approved by the UK government. The EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, announced that ‘decisive progress’ had been achieved. Achieving sufficient progress in the eyes of the EU, was set as a condition, at the October 2018 European Council, for holding a special European Council meeting. Consequently, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, called for a special European Council (Article 50) meeting on 25 November 2018, with the aim being to ‘finalise and formalise the Brexit agreement’. This includes endorsing the draft withdrawal agreement and the draft political declaration outlining the future EU-UK relationship.
2. Draft withdrawal agreementThe draft withdrawal agreement comprises 185 articles, and has three protocols (on Gibraltar, the UK base areas in Cyprus, and Ireland/Northern Ireland) and numerous annexes. It addresses the main issues (see Table 1), such as citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, and governance of the withdrawal agreement, as well as a number of other areas, and provides for a transition period.
Table 1: Main agreements on priority issues in the withdrawal agreement
Priority issue Main solution Citizens’ rights EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU retain the right to stay and continue their current activities. Financial settlement The EU and UK will meet the financial commitments which were agreed while the UK was a member of the EU. Governance of the agreement Disputes regarding the interpretation of the withdrawal agreement will initially be dealt with by a Joint Committee (comprising representatives of the EU and UK) responsible for the implementation of the withdrawal agreement.If no resolution is found, the issue can be referred to an arbitration panel (in cases not involving EU law). The decision of the panel is binding on the UK and EU. The Court of Justice of the European Union is the ultimate authority for issues related to EU law. Protocol on Northern Ireland and Ireland Includes a ‘backstop’ solution which would establish a common EU-UK customs territory, thus ensuring there will be no hard border on the island of Ireland and more broadly ensuring mutual respect for the provisions of the Good Friday agreement. Transition period As it stands, the transition period will end on 31 December 2020. The transition can be extended only once, for a limited period of time, and such a decision must be taken before 1 July 2020 by the Joint Committee. The Irish ‘backstop’ solution
The Irish ‘backstop’ was one of the most difficult subjects for negotiators to reach agreement on. From the outset, preventing the creation of a hard border on the island of Ireland was a core priority for the EU. This can be seen in the guidelines for Brexit negotiations, adopted by the European Council (Article 50) on 29 April 2017, outlining the main EU priorities. In the draft withdrawal agreement, the ‘backstop’ solution would only come into play after the transition period (including any extension) has ended, and if a better solution had not been agreed by then.
If the ‘backstop’ were to be used, the UK would leave the single market but remain in a single EU-UK customs territory. Such a customs arrangement would facilitate free trade by ensuring both the EU and UK apply the same import duties on goods entering either area. This means goods can then travel freely between the EU and UK. There would be no checks on rules of origin between the EU and UK, because the UK would align its rules to those of the customs union. The UK would comply with state aid and competition rules, and maintain current international and EU standards on goods. Existing checks at airports and ports on agricultural products would be increased. Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK’s VAT area but would remain aligned to the EU VAT rules with respect to goods. By contrast, the concept of the single market has a broader scope, including the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. Being closely linked to the customs union would, however, make it more difficult for the UK to agree trade deals with third countries, since it would have to maintain EU and international standards and could not apply lower customs tariffs or have different rules of origin on products from third countries.
The backstop provides an ‘insurance policy’ for the EU to avoid the possibility of a hard border at any point on the island of Ireland, as indicated by the Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar. This was also confirmed by Michel Barnier: ‘This backstop is not meant to be used. Our objective remains to reach a new agreement between the EU and the UK before the end of the transition.’
3. The European Council and the negotiation processTimeline and key milestones of European Council involvement
Following the UK referendum on EU membership, the Heads of State or Government of the EU-27 have met regularly, first informally, often in the margins of regular European Council meetings, and later, after the triggering of Article 50, in the European Council (Article 50) format, where they have reviewed the process and provided guidance when appropriate.
Procedural arrangementsTable 2: Responsibilities of the different EU institutions in the negotiation process
EU institution Involvement / responsibilities European Council Adopted guidelines defining the negotiation framework, setting out the overall position and principles of the EU in the negotiations. Updated the guidelines in the course of negotiations as necessary. General Affairs Council invited to swiftly adopt the decision authorising the opening of negotiations. General Affairs Council Adopted negotiating directives, inter alia, setting out the arrangements governing the relationship between the Council, its preparatory bodies and the Union negotiator. Ensured that negotiations are conducted in line with the European Council guidelines and provided guidance to the Union’s negotiator. Amended or supplemented negotiating directives as necessary. Council, Coreper, and dedicated working party Ensured that negotiations are conducted in line with European Council guidelines and Council negotiating directives, and provided guidance to Union negotiator. Presidency of the Council Informed, and exchanged views with the European Parliament before and after each General Affairs Council meeting European Commission Made recommendations to Council on the decision authorising the opening of negotiations. Acts as the Union’s negotiator. Included a representative of the rotating presidency of the Council in the negotiation team. Invited representatives of the President of the European Council to attend and support all negotiation sessions alongside Commission staff. Systematically reported to the European Council, the Council and its preparatory bodies. Kept the European Parliament closely and regularly informed. European Parliament Representatives of the European Parliament invited to participate in the preparatory meetings of the representatives of the 27 Heads of State or Governments (Sherpas / Permanent Representatives). European Parliament President invited to be heard at the start of European Council meetings. NB: The members of the European Council, the Council and its preparatory bodies representing the United Kingdom do not participate in the discussions or in the decisions concerning it.At their informal meeting in December 2016, EU-27 Heads of State or Government and the Presidents of the European Council and Commission issued a statement, outlining procedural arrangements for the Article 50 TEU negotiation process with the United Kingdom. Donald Tusk described the organisational structure of the negotiation process on the EU’s side as ‘the European Council maintaining political control over the process and the Commission as the Union’s negotiator’. He justified the limited role of the European Parliament in the negotiation process, pointing to the specific roles of the various European institutions.
At the first formal meeting of the European Council (Article 50) of the EU-27 on 29 April 2017, EU leaders took a united stance on the main priorities for the Article 50 negotiations, namely to i) guarantee EU and UK citizens’ rights, ii) settle the UK’s financial obligations to the EU, and iii) avoid a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. They agreed on a phased approach for the negotiations, i.e. the negotiations on the future relationship with the UK could only start once sufficient progress had been made on the three priority issues.
4. Recent and next stepsFollowing the agreement between EU and UK negotiators on 14 November 2018, various steps have been taken to prepare for the special European Council (Article 50) meeting on 25 November. Afterwards both the UK Parliament and the European Parliament will debate and vote on the draft withdrawal agreement, before the Council can conclude the agreement from the EU side.
Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the special European Council (Article 50), 25 November 2018‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Categories: European Union
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