European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for surfers.

The EU makes it easier for you to enjoy riding the waves in several ways.

Most importantly, you can enjoy improved water quality at many EU surfing spots, thanks to EU rules that protect the environment, including against sewage and industrial waste. This reduces your chances of getting sick. The EU also publishes information on bathing water quality online, so that you can easily check the water quality at your favourite surfing spots.

© oneinchpunch / Fotolia

As a surfer, you know how hard it can be to find the best surfing spots. If you love surfing but live inland, there’s nothing to stop you trying out the surf in another EU country, as there are no borders within the EU Schengen Area. The EU has provided financial support to several projects that can help you explore new destinations. One example is ‘SURFINGEUROPE‘, which enables you to discover an entire surfing route, from Bundoran in Ireland to Viana do Castelo in Portugal. Another example of EU funding is ‘Green Room‘, which helps you plan a sustainable surfing experience in six Surf Camps, including in Bornholm in Denmark and Gran Canaria in Spain. Such projects promote local tourism and increase employment, from which you might also benefit.

Finally, a special free app called ‘MeteoSurf‘ uses data from the EU-managed Copernicus earth observation programme to provide surfers with information on sea conditions in the Mediterranean Sea. Once you select a surfing spot, MeteoSurf produces a table with the forecast for wave height, wave direction, wind speed and wind direction. All you need to do is catch the perfect wave!

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Environment website on ‘Bathing water quality’, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-bathing/index_en.html
• Official website of Surfing Europe, http://europesurfing.eu/
• Official website of the Green Room Surf Alliance, http://www.greenroom-surfalliance.org/philosophy.php
• European Commission’s Copernicus Marine Environment Monitoring Service website on ‘Meteosurf’, http://marine.copernicus.eu/usecases/met-ocean-conditions-surfers/

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for rail passengers.

Considerable growth in passenger transport in the EU and a wider choice of transport operators has led the EU to consider that passengers should benefit from the same standards of treatment, regardless of how and where they travel. It has therefore adopted a common set of 10 basic rights for rail, air, road and waterborne passengers, to provide them with information and assistance and forbid discrimination.

If you are a train passenger, you may know that additional specific rights and obligations have been in force since December 2009. As a passenger, you must be kept informed before and during your journey, for instance on the lowest fares, delays, access conditions and facilities for people with disabilities.

© kasto / Fotolia

In the event of a foreseeable delay of more than one hour you can choose between a refund (full or partial) of your ticket, continuation, or rerouting to your final destination. You can also get assistance: meals, refreshments and, under certain conditions, accommodation. If you continue your journey, you can get 25 % to 50 % delay compensation.

Involvement in a train accident, entitles you to compensation and to advance payment for immediate needs. You are also entitled to compensation if a registered piece of luggage is lost or damaged. Disabled people have the right to assistance in stations and on board trains; and passengers can bring easy-to-handle bicycles onto the train. If you are dissatisfied with the service you receive, you can complain to the railway company. The Commission published a fresh proposal on rail passenger rights in September 2017.

Further information

• EPRS publication on ‘Rail passenger rights in the European Union’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/593566/EPRS_ATA%282016%29593566_EN.pdf
• EPRS publication on ‘Rail passenger rights and obligations’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/it/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282016%29587352

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for teachers.

Most people have heard of Erasmus, the EU’s successful student exchange programme, which has enabled millions to study abroad. Less well known is that teachers – from universities, schools, vocational colleges and adult education – can also take part. In 2015, over 100,000 teachers travelled abroad with the help of EU grants.

Erasmus offers teachers opportunities to travel to 33 countries for up to two months. During their trips, some teachers take part in training courses, others join the staff of schools and universities to experience working in a different educational system. Another option is job shadowing to learn how teachers from other countries deal with day-to-day challenges. All of these activities are a great way for teachers to develop professionally, get new ideas and make new contacts.

© johoo / Fotolia

As well as Erasmus, the EU brings together teachers from different countries through networks and online communities. For example, on eTwinning, there are nearly half a million teachers from 180 000 schools all over Europe exchanging ideas on subjects as varied as awareness-raising of smoking health risks to craft activities for school libraries. School Education Gateway offers access to free online training courses and teaching materials.

For teachers who would like to spend more than a few months abroad, the EU has removed some of the barriers to working abroad through mutual recognition of teaching qualifications; this means that, for example, a teacher who qualified in one EU country can teach in another without having to take additional exams.

Further information

• The EU and the teaching professions: http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/school/teaching-professions_en
• eTwinning home page: https://www.etwinning.net/en/pub/index.htm
• School Education Gateway: https://www.schooleducationgateway.eu/en/pub/index.htm

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for early school leavers.

Did you leave school early? Or do you know someone who might? Leaving school without qualifications may seem a personal choice, yet around 6.4 million young people in Europe are in the same situation. School can seem too difficult or irrelevant and other problems may make walking out seem like the thing to do. Yet young people who leave school early are less likely to find a job, will probably earn less, might miss out on some benefits of technology, and can have more health problems later on.

© Monkey Business / Fotolia

This is not always the case, but as the risks are high, the EU has made it its business to work on the situation. It brought education ministers together to agree to bring down the share of early school leavers in the EU to less than 10 % by 2020. Member States will need to try different solutions to achieve this result, so the EU offers support by helping them exchange experiences. In this way they can learn from each other which changes are more likely to produce good results. It is also monitoring results so Member States can understand how well they are doing.

You may feel all this is too late for you now, but if you regret not having much to show for your skills, and if you wish to improve them further, it’s never too late to go to your local job office or education authority. The EU developed the Youth Guarantee to help Member States give people a second chance, not necessarily in a classroom, but possibly even in a workplace setting. Tools are also being developed to recognise the skills you might have developed outside school in a way future employers are likely to appreciate.

Further information

• Early School Leaving Commission webpage http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/school/early-school-leavers_en
• Youth Guarantee http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1079
• Basic skills http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/school/math_en

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© pixs:sell / Fotolia

European Union officials have warned the United Kingdom that time is running out if definitive agreement on the country’s withdrawal from the Union is to be reached by this autumn. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Theresa May is struggling to keep her Cabinet and Conservative Party united as the focus of negotiations has shifted to the future customs regime and the accompanying, highly sensitive, issue of the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.

This note offers links to reports and commentaries from some major international think-tanks and research institutes on Brexit negotiations and related issues. More reports on the topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’, published in January 2018.

Brexit: Next steps in UK’s withdrawal from the EU
House of Commons Library, May 2018

Brexit and EU agencies
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2018

Brexit: What Theresa May’s White Paper must do
European Policy Centre, May 2018

How “special” will the UK-EU security partnership really be?
Open Europe, May 2018

Brexit endgame: Uncertainty mounts in face of deep Tory divides
Scottish Centre for International Relations, May 2018

UK must swallow the unpalatable Irish backstop
Centre for European Reform, May 2018

Theresa May’s Cabinet customs row is irrelevant, it’s the Brexit backstop that really matters
Centre for European Reform, May 2018

Getting over the line: Solutions to the Irish border
Policy Exchange, May 2018

Brexit Brief
Institute of International and European Affairs, May 2018

While May must decide what to do about Northern Ireland and Brexit, here’s what the people themselves think
UK in a Changing Europe, May 2018

Brexit: Implications for cross-border lives
UK in a Changing Europe, May 2018

India and the UK adjust to the realities of Brexit
UK in a Changing World, May 2018

Voting on Brexit: Parliament’s consideration of the withdrawal deal and future framework
Institute for Government, April 2018

Devolution after Brexit: Managing the environment, agriculture and fisheries
Institute for Government, April 2018

The reopening of the Irish question
Carnegie Europe, April 2018

Brexit: What impact on British global power?
Institut Thomas More, April 2018

Plugging in the British: EU defence policy
Centre for European Reform, April 2018

What third-country role is open to the UK in defence?
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2018

The EU budget after Brexit: Reform not revolution
Centre for European Reform, April 2018

‘Zero-sum’ approach to defence and security during Brexit negotiations risks a less secure UK and EU
Rand Corporation, April 2018

Deepening political divisions and exacerbating peripherality: Scotland, Northern Ireland and Brexit
Scottish Centre for International Relations, April 2018

Brexit roundup series
Scottish Centre for International Relations, April 2018

The bigger EU problems hidden by Brexit
Friends of Europe, April 2018

Who will cope with the post-Brexit resentment?
Notre Europe, April 2018

Wishful Brexiting: Or the complicated transformation of what Britain wants into reality
Fondation Robert Schuman, March 2018

Brexit: Half in, half out or right out?
European Policy Centre, March 2018

Believe it or not, EU doesn’t share Britain’s obsession with Brexit
Friends of Europe, March 2018

Brexit and the financial services industry: The story so far
European Policy Centre, March 2018

Negotiating Brexit: The views of the EU27
Institute for Government, March 2018

Keeping Europe safe after Brexit
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2018

Rethinking the European Union’s post-Brexit budget priorities
Bruegel, March 2018

The Brexit transition deal
Bruegel, March 2018

Costing Brexit: What is Whitehall spending on exiting the EU?
Institute for Government, March 2018

A Brexit gentlemen’s agreement
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2018

The impact of the UK-EU agreement on residence rights for EU families
UK in a Changing Europe, March 2018

There is life for the EU after Brexit
Carnegie Europe, March 2018

Getting accustomed to Brexit: UK and the customs union scenario
Bruegel, March 2018

Will the unity of the 27 crack?
Centre for European Reform, March 2018

Plugging in the British: EU foreign policy
Centre for European Reform, March 2018

Theresa May’s deep and comprehensive free trade agreement
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2018

Brexit: Promising the impossible
Carnegie Europe, March 2018

Implications of Brexit for food and agriculture in developing countries
Trinity College Dublin, March 2018

Why a good Brexit outcome matters (and it’s not just the economy, stupid!)
Bruegel, February 2018

Ireland-UK relations and Northern Ireland after Brexit
LSE Ideas, February 2018

Global champion: The case for unilateral free trade
Policy Exchange, February 2018

Brexit and beyond: The future of Europe
Dahrendorf Forum, February 2018

Over-the-counter interest rate derivatives: The clock is ticking for the UK and the EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2018

Brexit: The transition period
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2018

Brexit and human rights
Centre for International Governance Innovation, February 2018

Cross-border insolvencies after Brexit: Views from the United Kingdom and Continental Europe
Centre for International Governance Innovation, February 2018

Failing financial institutions: How will Brexit impact cross-border cooperation in recovery, reconstruction and insolvency processes?
Centre for International Governance Innovation, February 2018

Brexit and environmental law: The rocky road ahead
Centre for International Governance Innovation, February 2018

Leaving the EU, not the European model? New findings on public attitudes to Brexit
Institute for Public Policy Research, February 2018

Have your cake or eat it
Institute for Public Policy Research, February 2018

Theresa May et le bateau ivre du Brexit
Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, February 2018

Brexit and European security
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, February 2018

UK foreign and security policy post-Brexit: The search for a European Strategy
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, February 2018

Brexit, strategy, and the EU: Britain takes leave
Egmont, January 2018

Read this briefing on ‘Brexit negotiations‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Russell,

© cone88 / Fotolia

Sanctions have become an increasingly central element of the EU’s common and foreign security policy. At present, the EU has 42 sanctions programmes in place, making it the world’s second-most active user of restrictive measures, after the US.

Unlike the comprehensive trade embargoes used in the past, the EU has moved towards asset freezes and visa bans targeted at individual persons and companies, aiming to influence foreign governments while avoiding humanitarian costs for the general population. Other measures in the sanctions toolkit include arms embargoes, sectoral trade and investment restrictions, as well as suspensions of development aid and trade preferences.

Listen to podcast ‘EU sanctions, A key foreign and security policy instrument‘

The declared purpose of EU sanctions is to uphold the international security order as well as defending human rights and democracy standards, by encouraging targeted countries to change their behaviour. Measuring their effectiveness is difficult, as sanctions rarely achieve all their aims, and usually there are other causes to which changes can be attributed. However, even when this primary purpose is not achieved, sanctions may have useful secondary effects, for example by deterring other actors from similar behaviour.

The broader the international support for EU sanctions and the closer the relationship between the EU and the targeted country are, the stronger the prospects for success will be. On the other hand, effectiveness can be undermined by inconsistent application of sanctions standards and by the difficulty of coordinating implementation between multiple stakeholders.

Read this briefing on ‘EU sanctions, A key foreign and security policy instrument‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański,

© spql / Fotolia

Ten years have passed since the app economy was launched. Since then apps have evolved to play an increasingly important role in the life of citizens and became crucial to the success of many industries. Growing connectivity and availability of portable devices ensure that this trend will continue.

The European app economy is rather successful and accounts for just under a third of revenues in the global market. Clusters of app developers exist in a few western European and Nordic Member States creating well-paid jobs, value and innovation in the digital economy. However, some bottlenecks still exist and hamper the growth of the sector. These include limited availability of finance, shortage of digital skills, the need to constantly upgrade infrastructure, and improving access to data.

Listen to podcast ‘European app economy, State of play, challenges and EU policy‘

The EU strives to address these issues by creating an environment conducive to growth of the app economy. The main policy actions include strengthening the digital single market, funding research and innovation, creating fair taxation rules, developing standards and interoperability, fostering consumer protection and confidence, reforming training and education systems and supporting the development of a data economy and the internet of things.

Read this briefing on ‘European app economy, State of play, challenges and EU policy‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Estimated global app economy and number of Apple apps

Written by Philip Boucher,

© NaMaKuKi / Shutterstock.com

Social media platforms are often thought of as open and connected spaces, since they allow users to communicate with a wide range of people and organisations. It seems obvious that to have access to a social network it should be necessary to open an account with the platform, and that on closing the account that access would be lost. However, telephone and email networks do not restrict access to their networks depending on which provider or platform is being used, and there are ways in which social media too could be more open and connected, providing greater connectivity and allowing users to change platform without losing access to the network. This could help foster a more competitive market that is more responsive to challenges such as privacy and disinformation.

The implications of changing provider for telephone, email and social media, three transformative communication services, vary. First, telephones. With both landlines and mobile phones, regardless of the service provider used, it is possible to call friends and family on other networks competing in the market. Any phone, using any service provider, can call any other phone. This means that customers can change provider if they become unhappy with their current provider or want to test the services of a new market entrant. They can even keep the same phone number, so they do not have to tell their contacts to update their phone books. Indeed, their contacts will probably not even notice.

Just like with phone calls, emails pass freely between accounts managed by different providers. Many people have several accounts, perhaps including a personal account from a commercial provider and a professional account maintained by an employer. Here, a customer who wants to change provider can open a new account elsewhere without losing the ability to email friends and colleagues who still use the original provider. Advanced users who are dissatisfied with what the market has to offer, for whatever reason, can even set up their own domain names and servers and control the whole account themselves. They can still send and receive emails to and from anyone else, with any email address. A change of provider, however, means a change of address, requiring contacts to update their directories.

Listen to podcast ‘What if social media were open and connected?‘

When it comes to social media profiles, there are many options available, and some people manage several profiles for different aspects of their personal and professional lives. However, social media platforms do not usually offer interconnectivity, so users cannot interact with accounts on a particular social media platform without having an account on it. This also means that the price is high for any customer who decides to leave a platform. They lose access to the network and their contacts and so might no longer receive invitations to events, and might not even realise what they have missed because they cannot see the pictures posted by their erstwhile contacts.

On the markets for telephone, email, internet or electricity services, customers can choose between several companies that provide access to the same open and connected network. There might be a small fee or minor inconvenience involved in changing provider, but the customer is not penalised by losing access to the whole network. Social media platforms, on the other hand, not only provide access to a network but, rather, they are the network. So the only way to participate in a particular social media network is through an account with the platform itself. Leaving the platform means losing access to that space.

In this sense, social media platforms are less open and less connected than old-fashioned telephone and email networks. As a result, their market is also less competitive. While new entrants to the telephone and email markets can immediately connect their new customers with all other telephone and email users, a new entrant to the social media market does not have the same luxury. Only platforms that are already large can offer a large network and, since they have full control over access to their network, they continue to attract more users. As large networks grow even larger, the cost of leaving them grows accordingly, and so do the barriers to new market entrants.

With high penalties for leaving platforms and little competition in the market, life is difficult for the discerning customer. Yet, there is a long and growing list of reasons to be judicious when it comes to social media providers. Citizens are increasingly concerned about immediate personal risks related to privacy, cyberbullying, depression and addiction, as well as wider social issues such as taxation, fake news and political interference. Perhaps a more competitive market would foster more robust responses to these problems. One way of fostering a healthier ecosystem of social media platforms might be to encourage the emergence of an open model for social media.

Potential impacts and developments

An open model for social media would have two separate features, open accounts and open platforms. Open accounts are just like standalone social media profiles, so they would include basic personal details as well as contacts with other accounts – using their email, phone number or other identifiers – and familiar content such as status updates, events, photos and videos. They would also specify the user’s preferences for how content could be shared with other accounts and how information from the network should be presented and communicated to them. These open accounts could be used with any open platform.

Open platforms would host and maintain these accounts. They would be responsible for managing communications with other platforms and accounts, protecting the user’s privacy, and presenting the user with information from the whole network – including contacts from all of the open accounts on all of the other open platforms – according to the user’s preferences. Open platforms could be funded by advertising revenue, subscriptions, donations, endowments, the state or some mixture of sources. They could offer specialist features and services catering for different users’ needs and preferences. Advanced users could set up their own servers and manage their own accounts and their relationships with the network. They could pay for this themselves, and offset the cost by charging advertisers to use their data. With such an open model, there would be no contradiction in a social media platform that has only one user, because it could still connect with any other open account on any other open platform.

The key to this is developing open standards that describe how open accounts and open platforms should communicate with each other, such as W3C‘s social web. The open standard should have full connectivity and portability so that any account on any platform that complies with the standard can connect with any other account on any other open platform. This means that users could change platforms without losing access to the network. In this way, if they felt that their current social media platform was untrustworthy or unethical, they could leave it and join another without missing invitations to events. En masse, such behaviour could help foster a competitive market that could respond to the immediate personal risks and wider social problems posed by social media. Users who already had accounts on closed social media platforms that did not comply with the open model could download a readable copy of all their data and convert it into an open account format, which they could then use with any open platform.

Anticipatory policy making

Several EU policies are already encouraging the portability of social media accounts, as well as the development of open standards. For example, Article 20 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) gives citizens the right to obtain readable, portable copies of data about them that is held by their social media platforms. This could help discerning users to change platform if they are dissatisfied. EU procurement strategy also supports open source and open standards. Further initiatives supporting user control and open standards, combined with consumer demand for a new approach, could lead to the emergence of a genuinely open and connected model for social media.

Read this At a glance on ‘What if social media were open and connected?’ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou,

The event was part of the series on the future of EU.

Speakers including David McAllister (EPP, Germany), Chair of the AFET Committee, Julia de Clerck-Sachsse (Adviser, Strategic Planning Division, EEAS), Tomáš Valášek (Director, Carnegie Europe) and Elena Lazarou (Policy Analyst, EPRS), as well as moderator Alexandre Stutzmann, Director of Committees, DG EXPO, joined the EPRS on 15 May 2018 for a roundtable event entitled ‘Roadmap for the Future of Europe: shaping EU Security and Defence Policy’. The event was held in the European Parliament’s Library and was the occasion for the launch of a new EPRS publication on ‘Peace and Security in 2018 – Overview of EU action and outlook for the future‘, which will be updated annually and which complements the existing annual publications on the Economic Outlook for the EU and the Demographic Outlook for the EU.

In his introductory keynote, David McAllister referred to the topic as a very timely one. In the past two years, the EU’s Member States have begun for the first time to put words into action in the area of security and defence. Looking back to the Bratislava Summit of 2016, which followed the Brexit vote and aimed at breathing new life into the EU integration process; one area of priority EU action was Security and Defence. This meant moving to the implementation of the Global Strategy and of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. David Mc Allister identified three decisive factors in the EU’s decision to move ahead in the area of defence: the EU’s defence efficiency problem; improving EU-NATO relations to an unprecedented degree; and external factors such as the growing pressure on the international rules-based system and the shifting of economic and political power globally. He discussed ongoing challenges, such as Russian aggression, cyber threats and interference with elections, as well as the changes in United States’ foreign policy, and perceived those challenges as ‘push’ factors for European integration in defence. Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence (PESCO), implemented through projects such as Military Mobility, is perhaps the most illustrative example of this move towards integration. He also highlighted that the next challenges for PESCO will be arrangements on financing and governance, which will be discussed in the European Council in June 2018. The developments we have witnessed, such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund, led David McAllister to express optimism about the future, based on the fact that, contrary to the situation in the past, political will has emerged that could give rise to a new momentum. He ended his speech by reiterating the European Parliament’s call for an EU Security and Defence White Book, with more details and specifications on the implementation of the Global Strategy.

In the subsequent roundtable, experts discussed the challenges ahead for the EU’s security and defence policy, such as relations with NATO, implementing decisions and managing to keep up with the pace of events. The discussion also focused on the Global Strategy and how it translates into action, including in terms of the objectives set in Bratislava, but also with regard to the identity of the EU as a global peace and security actor. It was highlighted that security and defence is one of five priorities in the Global Strategy that include resilience, an integrated approach, a focus on prevention, regional orders and strengthening the multilateral order and global governance making it more inclusive and sustainable. That the multilateral rules-based order is being challenged today was a recurrent theme of discussion, and the EU’s need to work with partners on this was highlighted. The role of media and public perceptions of peace, security and the global environment was also emphasised as a source of anxiety about the future of the international system.

On the particular issue of PESCO, experts agreed that the combination of political will and the specific process that it represents, coupled with external factors (fragility, crises, a confrontational global environment), are encouraging. PESCO is also putting pressure on governments to spend more on defence and defence innovation, something which is needed in the EU. However, finding a compromise in the ambitions, interests, threat perceptions and capacities of Member States, is bound to be the major challenge ahead. Nevertheless, within an environment which is becoming increasingly unstable, this is a challenge – experts agreed – to be dynamically tackled.

Click to view slideshow.

In preparation for the European Youth Event (EYE 2018), taking place in the European Parliament’s seat in Strasbourg on 1 and 2 June 2018, the European Parliamentary Research Service has prepared 18 short and punchy ‘At a glance’ notes on a range of themes from EYE 2018.

The papers cover topics ranging from health apps to protecting our water and oceans, and from the urban-rural divide to dealing with cyber-attacks. The topics chosen are close to young people’s hearts and lives: they touch on key themes including youth unemployment, sport and equal opportunities.

The European Youth Event is for young people aged 16-30. They will exchange ideas and perspectives on youth-related issues, develop innovative solutions to crucial questions for the future and meet with European decision-makers and speakers with a wide range of professional experience.

As a follow-up to EYE, in July 2018 a report with the main ideas discussed will be made available to all 751 Members of the European Parliament. Furthermore, some of those participating at EYE will have the chance to present the most concrete ideas to a number of European parliamentary committees and receive feedback from MEPs.

The topics covered in this compendium are divided into the five main themes of the programme of EYE 2018, namely:

• Keeping up with the digital revolution
• Calling for a fair share
• Working out for a stronger Europe
• Staying alive in turbulent times
• Protecting our planet

Download all the EPRS publications prepared for the EYE 2018 or access them below.

Young and old

Youth unemployment: The race to zero

Quantum leaps: This time it’s the EU!

I am Doctor Robot. What can I do for you?

Schools of tomorrow: Learning for ever-changing times

Rich and poor

Equal opportunities: Forever poor or born to be free?

Urban-rural divide: Blame it all on my roots…

Globalisation: In the twilight zone

Trade for all: Please fasten your seat belt

Apart and together

Free speech in the digital era

Safe and Dangerous

Sport without corruption

Sakharov Prize: Voices of humanity

Europe’s fight against terror

Cyber-attacks: Not just a phantom menace

The DNA revolution: We better talk this over

Local and global

Ocean protection: Hooked on heavenly habitat

Sustainable city: Global picture, local colour

Water for all: Born to run…

Biodiversity and wildlife crime

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© European Union, European Parliament

If the succession of Heads of State, leaders and other well-known personalities that continue to visit Parliament is anything to go by, the Parliament is definitely ‘the place to be’ on the diplomatic map. The second Parliamentary session in May will feature the attendance of the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel, who will contribute to the series of debates on the Future of Europe on Wednesday lunchtime. Alpha Condé, President of the Republic of Guinea, will also address Parliament on Tuesday lunchtime, and the President of the Republic of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, will address the plenary in a formal sitting on Wednesday lunchtime.

Over 70 % of EU fish caught in the North Sea, worth more than €850 million, are species that live close to the seabed, such as cod and haddock. Parliament is particularly concerned that fisheries measures should be taken based on the best available scientific advice, with a view to managing fishing stocks to secure the long-term sustainability of the North Sea fisheries, including joint management with third countries in the region. On Monday evening, Members will debate a provisional agreement with Council on a multi-annual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks. Members will then also discuss a provisional agreement on the transposition of management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Convention Area of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, making the measures applicable to EU fishing vessels that fish for jack mackerel and other species in the area, with the aim of, among other things, controlling the types of nets used, reducing seabird capture, and managing fishing that affects the sea bottom.

Also on Monday evening, Parliament will consider a report on the interpretation and implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, in force since 2016. Through their commitment to greater simplicity, clarity and consistency in Union legislation, and better coordination and transparency in the legislative process, the EU institutions have issued joint declarations on legislative priorities and improved access to information in the preparation of delegated acts. However, the report deems progress on other issues, such as information flow from the Council, and lack of transparency in Member States regarding their ‘gold-plating’ of EU legislation, as unsatisfactory.

On Tuesday morning, there will be statements from the Council and Commission on the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021 to 2027 and Own Resources, for which the Commission adopted overarching proposals on 2 May, and is planning to adopt individual proposals for spending programmes during the week of the plenary session. Following that debate, Parliament will debate the agreement reached with the Council on the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive. Posting of workers is increasingly common in the internal market, particularly in the services sector, but such workers often find themselves at a disadvantage to counterparts in their host country, through being paid less and lacking legal protection. The Commission proposed revisions to the 1996 directive which currently governs the treatment of posted workers, with a view to adapting them to today’s labour market and the needs of firms while ensuring fair social protection for workers.

On Tuesday evening, Parliament will debate a recommendation for second reading of an important agreement on a Commission proposal on the protection against dumped and subsidised imports from countries not members of the EU. Modernising trade defence instruments, which allow countries to counter unfair trade practices under World Trade Organization rules, is needed to ensure Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Regulations are fit for the fast evolving global trade environment. A key issue is the proposal for partial waiver of the ‘lesser duty rule’ (LDR) for vulnerable countries, as well as the introduction of interested party status for trade unions.

Also on Tuesday evening, Members will debate a report assessing the implementation of the Victims’ Rights Directive – legislation ensuring EU-wide protection and support for victims of crime. Parliament has long supported ensuring minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime throughout the EU, aiming at better protection against domestic violence and crimes such as stalking. However, some Member States have delayed introduction of the legislation, leading to differences in the treatment of victims.

A vote will take place on Wednesday on a proposal to amend the EU budget, aimed at providing €97 646 105 in EU Solidarity Fund assistance for Greece, Spain, France and Portugal to help their recovery from natural disasters, earthquakes, hurricanes, and catastrophic fires suffered in the course of 2017.

On Wednesday afternoon, Members will discuss EU values and the proliferation of corruption and crime through ‘golden visas’, a practice whereby some EU Member States offer citizenship and residence to persons who commit to bringing funding into their country. As these persons also automatically acquire EU citizenship in the process, concern has been expressed regarding the equity of such schemes, and their possible links to corruption and crime, as well as the effect on other Member States.

Parliament will debate a report on revising the EU legal framework on odometer manipulation in motor vehicles – or tampering with the mileage gauge in cars – on Wednesday afternoon. The practice is particularly prevalent in the very large EU second-hand car market and poses risks to consumers, who are often unaware of the fraud, and to road safety. The report proposes that hardware solutions are introduced to protect new vehicles, that mileage recordings are made mandatory, and that long-term solutions are explored, as well as making odometer fraud an offence.

A motion for a resolution is tabled for debate on Wednesday evening concerning the implementation of the Gender Action Plan, and particularly transforming the lives of girls and women through EU external relations in the development sphere, by ensuring gender equality and women’s empowerment, including within the EU institutions themselves.

 

A list of all material prepared for this Plenary Session: Protection and support for victims of crime (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Modernising trade defence instruments (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) South Pacific fisheries management measures (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Multiannual plan for North Sea fisheries (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Odometer manipulation in motor vehicles (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Golden visas, EU values, corruption and crime (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Amending Budget No 1 to the 2018 EU budget: Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Transforming the lives of girls and women through EU external relations, 2016-2020 (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Revising the Posting of Workers Directive (available in EN)

Written by Martin Russell,

DG EPRS Policy round table – ‘ EU sanctions against Russia : What’s next? ‘

Four years after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, the issue of sanctions against Moscow is more topical than ever. Relations between Russia and the West have continued to deteriorate to a level not seen since the end of the Cold War, with revelations of the Kremlin’s interference in the United States elections and elsewhere – for example, in the United Kingdom’s EU referendum. Then in March 2018 came the attempted assassination on UK territory of former Russian spy Sergey Skripal, with the likely involvement of Russian security services. Against this tense backdrop, the European Union is expected during the next few weeks to reach a decision on whether or not to extend its economic sanctions against Russia, due to expire in July 2018, for another six months. On the other side of the Atlantic, the US adopted its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in August 2017, and on the basis of this new legislation, has adopted a range of new sanctions. Among other things, these strengthen existing restrictions on cooperation with Russian defence and energy companies, and penalise individuals and businesses not previously targeted, such as oligarch Oleg Deripaska and aluminium producer Rusal. Further US sanctions are expected over the coming months.

KALNIETE, Sandra (EPP, LV)

With sanctions very much in the news, there was particularly strong attendance at the EPRS roundtable discussion on the topic of ‘EU sanctions against Russia: What next’, held in the European Parliament library on 16 May 2016. EPRS Director General Anthony Teasdale delivered a welcoming speech, while the event was moderated by Monika Nogaj, acting head of the EPRS External Policies unit. First to speak was Sandra Kalniete (European People’s Party, Latvia), a prominent Member of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee with a long-standing interest in Russia that goes back to her time as Latvian Foreign Affairs Minister. Sandra Kalniete pointed out that Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine, as well as its support for the Syrian regime, highlighted the need for the EU to have a policy of credible deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. She felt that sanctions targeted at Russia’s political leaders and allied oligarchs were particularly important, as they raised the personal cost of Russia’s unacceptable foreign policy actions for members of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. She also called for the EU to follow the example of the United States and some EU Member States in adopting Magnitsky-type sanctions against individuals involved in human rights violations in Russia.

The next two panellists outlined the economic impacts of EU sanctions against Russia. EPRS policy analyst Martin Russell began with an overview of the various sanctions regimes currently in place against Russia, before going on to describe the effects of EU and US measures targeted at the Russian defence, energy and financial sectors. In the longer term, restrictions on cooperation between EU and Russian companies on projects to develop new oil reserves were expected to seriously undermine Russia’s capacity to maintain production of oil, its number one export; however, in the short term the most immediate impact had come from financial sector sanctions cutting off Russian banks and businesses from access to western finance. Sanctions were not the only cause of Russia’s 2015-2016 economic recession, but they had significantly aggravated it, and were continuing to dampen growth. A muted economic recovery meant that Russia was increasingly falling behind the rest of the world as its share of the global economy continued to decline.

PETERS, Eric

By contrast, Eric Peters, Fulbright Scholar at the Hungarian think tank Antall József Knowledge Centre, focused on the economic effects of sanctions on the EU, above all on the four Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Agrifood exports to Russia had been particularly hard hit, with Poland and Slovakia the worst affected. Nevertheless, the agrifood sector had successfully adapted, thanks to EU payments compensating farmers for lost exports, and to efforts to diversify into new markets. With three of the four countries relying on Russia for over half of their gas supplies, energy sanctions also had a potential impact; at the same time, several initiatives had been taken at both EU and Visegrád country level to reduce dependence on Russian gas. In the defence sector, even before sanctions, Russia had only had a very small share in weapons supplies to Visegrád countries, which were increasingly turning to fellow NATO countries for their armament needs. Peters therefore concluded that the economic costs for EU countries had been limited, and recommended that sanctions be continued.

Professor Irina Busygina from the Higher School of Economics discussed the political effects of sanctions in Russia. According to her, Russia’s leadership had initially miscalculated that EU countries would not be able to reach consensus on restrictive measures. After the adoption of sanctions, expectations that they would soon be lifted again had given way to acceptance of the situation as the ‘new normal’. Russia’s leaders had attempted to present sanctions to the public in a positive light, arguing that they reflected western fears of a strong Russia, and that they could stimulate economic reforms. In reality though, far from encouraging beneficial reforms, sanctions were widening inequalities between Russia’s regions, leading to more state intervention in the economy, and isolating Russia from global markets. Meanwhile there had been a ‘rally round the flag’ effect, illustrated by Vladimir Putin’s overwhelming victory in the March 2018 presidential election.

Fernando Andresen Guimarães, Head of Division for Russia in the European External Action Service emphasised that the sanctions had been adopted in response to Russian actions in violation of international law and the European security order: its illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and its destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. Regarding the latter, the duration of the EU’s restrictive measures had been linked by the European Council to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements, and although this had not yet happened, it could be argued that sanctions had helped to avoid further escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, EU sanctions were carefully targeted not to cause damage to the broader economy and the Russian people. Due to the way in which sanctions worked and in light of the pressure that they evidently created, it was important to show patience and keep them in place until the desired outcome was achieved. Sanctions were a tool in support of a broader EU policy towards Russia, based on the five principles expressed unanimously by EU foreign ministers in March 2016, and recently reaffirmed in the April 2018 Foreign Affairs Council, which stressed firmness on Ukraine and principles of international law, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, while keeping communication channels open, engaging on foreign and security policy and global issues, and continuing to strengthen bridges between Russian and EU citizens. An example of the latter was the EU’s Erasmus Plus programme of educational exchanges, with Russian students and teachers the largest non-EU group of participants.

The roundtable discussion was followed by a lively Q&A session.

Click to view slideshow.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for patients getting treatment abroad.

Do you suffer from a medical condition that cannot be treated in your home country, or you have to wait too long for treatment? You might be interested to know whether you can access other EU countries’ health systems and if your home insurance will cover at least a part of the costs of getting treatment abroad.

EU rules on cross-border healthcare could come to your aid in such a situation. They grant patients the right to benefit from planned medical treatment, such as specialist consultation, surgery or treatment for a specific medical condition, in another EU country on the same terms and at the same cost as people who live in that country. While some countries may have restrictions in place for access to treatment for organisational reasons, these should not discriminate against patients coming from another EU country.

© satyrenko / Fotolia

And what about the issue of reimbursement? If the treatment is covered by your insurance, but is not available at all, or not in time, in your home country, your health insurer is obliged to reimburse your expenses up to the level of costs you would have normally incurred in your home country.

National Contact Points for planned medical treatment, either in your home country or in the country where the treatment is available, will help you identify the health provider offering the treatment you need. Your home National Contact Point also provides information about reimbursement options and about whether you need to ask for prior authorisation.

Further information

• European Commission Directorate General for Health website: https://ec.europa.eu/health/cross_border_care/overview_en
• European Commission Your Europe portal https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/health/planned-healthcare/get-more-info/index_en.htm
• Network of National Contact Points https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/cross_border_care/docs/cbhc_ncp_en.pdf

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people in an emergency situation.

Hopefully it will never happen to you, but many people find themselves in emergency situations while travelling abroad, because they have a car accident, need medical assistance or fall victim to a crime, for instance. The EU has set up an emergency phone number to enable you to get help quickly: 112. You can dial it anywhere in Europe for free to summon the local police, ambulance or fire brigade to your immediate assistance.

Meanwhile, since March 2018, all new cars have to comply with EU legislation and be equipped with the eCall on-board emergency call system. The system will be activated by sensors if you have a serious car accident and will automatically call the 112 number, communicating your car’s location, the time and the direction of travel, even if you are unconscious or unable to call. You can also trigger it manually by pushing a button in the car, for instance if you witness a serious accident. It is estimated that the system could save up to 2 500 lives a year.

© vchalup / Fotolia

If you fall sick while travelling in Europe, EU legislation gives you the same right to state-provided healthcare as people insured in the country concerned, and if you carry the European Health Insurance Card, you can avoid paying upfront in most EU countries.

Another example of EU provision for people in emergency situations is the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, which supplies coordinated assistance to victims of natural and man-made disasters. This can include health assistance from the European Medical Corps, who send doctors and medical equipment in response to emergencies in and outside the EU.

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Communications, networks, content and technology https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/emergency-and-support-lines
• European Commission’s Directorate General for mobility and transport, https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/its/road/action_plan/ecall_en
• European Commission’s European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for small farmers.

Most of the farms in the EU are small, although the term includes a wide diversity of operations. Although small farms produce only a portion of the total EU agricultural output, their contribution in creating rural employment, supporting rural societies and landscapes, and ensuring that traditional and local production continues, makes them a cornerstone of European agriculture.

© ronedya / Fotolia

Because small farms are generally run by the family, who often consume what is produced themselves, they have few assets and few opportunities to innovate. They generally have very little bargaining power in the food supply chain. However, many small farmers are flexible enough to diversify their farm activities, or take on another job to increase their income.

As a small farmer, the EU recognises your important role and grants smallholdings a simplified scheme that cuts the administrative burden for accessing EU direct payments. This scheme is implemented in more than half of the EU countries, including those where small farms outnumber large ones. EU rural development policy also benefits small farmers by financing rural investments that improve the quality of life in the countryside, diversify rural economies, and offer services in remote areas that are important to the many elderly and female farmers among smallholders.

Further information

• EPRS publication on ‘Small farms’, europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/stspotlight/2014/140794/LDM_STS(2014)140794_REV1_EN.pdf
• European Commission fiche on ‘The Small Farmers Scheme’, ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/direct-support/direct-payments/docs/small-farmers-scheme_en.pdf
• European Commission brief on ‘What is a small farm?’, www.ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/rural-area-economics/briefs/pdf/02_en.pdf

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for film makers.

If you go to the cinema more than twice a year, you are already doing better than the average European. If so, you must have noticed that American productions make up three quarters of the films on offer. This situation is disconcerting, not least because US-based companies produced ‘just’ 789 feature films in 2016, for instance – compared to 1 740 European productions in the same period…

© Sunny studio / Fotolia

The strong US presence in the EU film market explains why public support is provided to assist European cinema in gaining a competitive edge. Since 2013, state aid rules allow the level of support to film production, distribution and promotion to reach 50 %, and up to 60 %in the case of co-productions funded by more than one EU country. By contrast, there are no limits on aid for script writing or film-project development, or for difficult audiovisual works, as defined by each EU country.

Creative Europe – the EU programme supporting the cultural and creative sectors until 2020 – will dedicate more than €800 million to cinema. In addition, €210 million has been made available since 2016 for a new financial guarantee facility, which should make it easier for small companies to access bank loans.

Helping overcome distribution barriers for European films is one of the goals of the European Parliament’s LUX Prize, awarded annually since 2007. The winner does not receive a direct grant. Instead, the three films in the final stage of the competition are subtitled in the 24 official EU languages and are screened in more than 40 cities and at 18 festivals, allowing many Europeans to see them.

Further information

• EPRS publication on ‘2015 – A record year for European cinema’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/593514/EPRS_ATA%282016%29593514_EN.pdf
• Official website of Cineuropa – the best of European cinema, http://www.cineuropa.org/
• Official website of the International network of cinemas for the circulation of European films, https://www.europa-cinemas.org/en/
• EPRS publication on ‘LUX Prize: Ten years of support for EU cinema’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/593521/EPRS_ATA%282016%29593521_EN.pdf

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Stockninja / Fotolia

President Donald Trump announced on 8 May that the United States was withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement, ignoring calls from other signatories to preserve the 2015 deal, which lifted sanctions on Teheran in return for measures scaling back its nuclear ambitions. The decision paves the way for reinstating US sanctions against Iran, which will also affect non-US companies doing business with that country. President Trump justified the move by saying that the deal did not go far enough in removing the threat posed by Iran to the United States and its allies in the Middle East.

This note offers links to reports and commentaries from some major international think-tanks and research institutes on the Iran nuclear deal and the US decision.

After Trump’s Iran decision: Time for Europe to step up
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018

Point of view: What Germany, France and Britain should do after Trump nixes the Iran deal
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2018

Removing the stabilizing block of the Iran deal: Trump toys with global equilibrium
German Marshall Fund, May 2018

The Iran deal: Withdrawal symptoms
Atlantic Council, May 2018

Debating the Iran deal
Brookings Institution, May 2018

Trump decision on Iran will squeeze US allies in East and Central Europe
Atlantic Council, May 2018

Trump pulled out of the Iran deal: What now?
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018

The President’s speech and the prospects of an Iranian-Israeli war
Atlantic Council, May 2018

The impact of the Iran nuclear agreement
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018

Will Trump’s decision on Iran end Europe’s servility?
Egmont, May 2018

EU has little choice but to try to keep the Iran deal alive
Centre for European Reform, May 2018

The strategic fallout of U.S. withdrawal from the Iran deal
Rand Corporation, May 2018

Saving the Iran Nuclear Deal Without the U.S.
Crisis Group, Ma 2018

The view from the capitals: Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran deal
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2018

Post Iran-deal: Israel in the post-American era
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, May 2018

US-Europe unity needed on Iran
Transatlantic Institute, May 2018

A new Israeli-Arab axis against Iran
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, May 2018

By pulling out of nuclear deal, Trump hands gift to Iranian hardliners
Chatham House, May 2018

Iran-Abkommen ohne die USA
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, May 2018

Europe should stand its ground after U.S. Iran deal pullout
Carnegie Europe, May 2018

The world faces dangerous reality with Iran nuclear deal left for dead
Carnegie Europe, May 2018

What to do the day after killing the Iran deal
German Marshall Fund, May 2018

L’Organisation Badr en Irak: L’ancrage étatique d’une milice pro-iranienne
Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, May 2018

Netanyahu and the Iran nuclear deal: Using half-truths to support a lie
Instituto Affari Internazionali, May 2018

Accord nucléaire iranien: Les sanctions américaines et la désillusion des entreprises étrangères
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, May 20189

Between a rock and a hard place: Europe’s uncertain role in Middle Eastern geopolitics
Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2018

EU policy options in case of U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal
Carnegie Europe, April 2018

Europe should strike a tough pose with Trump on the Iran nuclear deal
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2018

The art of sticking with the nuclear deal: Why Europe should defy Trump on Iran
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2018

Germany should mediate between Iran and Israel
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2018

What to know about the protests in Iran
Chatham House, January 2018

Read this briefing on ‘U.S. withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Piotr Bakowski, Marc Lilienkamp and Rosamund Shreeves,

International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia (IDAHOT)

Although prohibiting discrimination and protecting human rights are key elements of the EU legal order, discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons persists throughout the EU, taking various forms including verbal abuse and physical violence. The first ever EU-wide survey on the extent and nature of discrimination, violence and hate speech experienced by LGBT people across the EU, conducted by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency in 2012, found that almost half of the respondents had felt personally discriminated against or harassed within the previous year, whilst a quarter said that they had been attacked or threatened with violence in the past five years. Lesbian women (55 %), young people (57 %) and poorer LGBT people (52 %) were more likely to be discriminated against, whilst trans persons were shown to experience the highest levels of discrimination, harassment and violence amongst all LGBT subgroups. One of the key findings was that 90 % of such incidents go unreported to the authorities. A study issued for Parliament in 2018 has quantified the serious impact of discrimination on LGBTI individuals and wider society (including increased health risks, estimated lost earnings of €19-53 million and a GDP loss of €25-71 million) and highlighted the uneven protection in the current EU anti-discrimination legislation.

Although sexual orientation is recognised in EU law as a ground of discrimination, the scope of the provisions is limited and does not cover social protection, healthcare, education and access to goods and services, leaving LGBTI people particularly vulnerable in these areas. Moreover, EU competence does not extend to recognition of marital or family status. In this area, national regulations vary, with some Member States offering same-sex couples the right to marry, others allowing alternative forms of registration, and yet others not providing any legal status for same-sex couples. Same-sex couples may or may not have the right to adopt children and to access assisted reproduction. These divergent legal statuses have implications, for instance, for partners from two Member States with different standards who want to formalise/legalise their relationship or for same-sex couples and their families wishing to move to another Member State. In practice, lesbian and gay couples can encounter problems getting their partnership and rights recognised in another EU country. For instance, two women legally married in the Netherlands may lose pension, inheritance, next-of-kin, or child custody rights when moving to, say, Italy, Latvia, or Romania.

During its eighth term, the European Parliament has adopted a number of resolutions strongly condemning homophobia, highlighting discrimination and calling for further legislation and action to protect and extend LGBTI rights:

• Regarding the EU legislative framework, it has called for monitoring to ensure proper transposition and implementation of existing EU legislation and reiterated its support for a proposed new directive, which would protect against discrimination outside the labour market, but on which the Member States have as yet been unable to agree.
• On family and free movement issues, Parliament has encouraged the EU and the Member States to ‘reflect on the recognition of same-sex marriage or same-sex civil union as a political, social and human and civil rights issue’ and called for further action to ensure that same-sex couples and their families can truly exercise their right to free movement across the EU, including automatic cross-border recognition of adoption orders, without discrimination.
• In March 2018, Parliament’s Annual resolution on the situation of fundamental rights in the EU condemned all forms of discrimination against LGBTI people, including the practice of LGBTI conversion therapies and the pathologisation of trans people, and stressed the urgency of tackling increasing levels of hate speech and hate crime. Its resolution on gender equality in the media sector in the EU, adopted in February 2018, puts forward concrete proposals for combating hate speech and harmful stereotypes.
• Parliament has also drawn attention to the human rights situation for LGBTI people outside the EU and the need to ensure that their situation is taken into account in asylum procedures.

To mark this year’s International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia (IDAHOT) on 17 May, the Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBTI Rights – an informal forum for MEPs – is organising a specific event to highlight the situation of LGBTI people seeking asylum in Europe.

The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) notes that, in addition to the risks faced by refugees at large, LGBTI refugees also face a series of risks that that are unique to sexual minorities. In 2017, the first annual report from the UN’s Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity gave an overview of the current global situation. It documents widespread physical and psychological violence against LGBTI persons in all regions — including murder, assault, kidnapping, rape, sexual violence, as well as torture and ill-treatment in institutional and medical settings — and highlights that displaced LGBTI persons may face continued or additional discrimination in the country in which they seek asylum or when they are internally displaced within their country of origin. UNHCR guidelines on interpreting claims to refugee status based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity were adopted in 2012.

Nevertheless, in 2017 the EU Fundamental Rights Agency’s review of the current situation in the EU for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex asylum seekers, found that although international and EU law guarantees safety to those fleeing persecution, in practice LGBTI people are not receiving the protection they need. There are considerable differences between procedures in the EU Member States in terms of how they take account of claims based on sexual orientation and gender identity and only some EU Member States are applying the UNHCR guidelines. Advocacy organisations, such as ILGA-Europe and Transgender Europe, have also called for further action to ensure that LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees are given more effective protection in the EU and that the proposed new package of measures on the Common European Asylum System takes the specific situation of LGBTI people into consideration.

For its part, the European Parliament is preparing a number of amendments to this new migration legislation, to ensure that the specific problems encountered by LGBTI refugees and asylum seekers are taken into account in procedures for assessing asylum claims and arrangements for reception and resettlement. Parliament has already adopted a resolution highlighting the need for asylum professionals, including interviewers and interpreters, to receive proper training on the needs of LGBTI people and for LGBTI-sensitive reception facilities across all Member States. Its resolution of February 2017 on equality between women and men in the European Union in 2014-2015 also calls for refugees who are victims of violence based on [their] sexual orientation or gender identity to be given support ‘at all stages of the migration process’, including measures such as immediate relocation if their safety cannot be guaranteed, mental health support and immediate gender identity recognition for the duration of asylum procedures.

See also our briefing on The rights of LGBTI people in the European Union.

Written by Joanna Apap, Eulalia Claros and Maria-Margarita Mentzelopoulou,

Areas targeted by main migration funding programmes

Funding instruments in the field of migration and asylum management cover, on the one hand, different EU policy fields, such as enlargement, neighbourhood, development cooperation and common foreign and security policy, as well as, on the other, international projects such as those managed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) at a more global level. The legal basis of each funding instrument provides for the range of its geographical and thematic coverage. In addition, interaction takes place between the different areas covered by the thematic and geographic programmes and other external financing Instruments. The funding landscape changed in 2013 with the new Financial Regulation applicable to the EU budget. This enabled the European Commission to create and administer Union Trust Funds in the field of external action, from 2014: these include multi-donor trust funds for emergency, post-emergency or thematic actions such as the Bêkou and the Madad Fund. The European Parliament welcomed this development in an April 2013 resolution, considering that it would allow the EU to raise the visibility of its external action and to have greater control over the delivery chain of such funds.
Following the Valletta Summit in November 2015, an Emergency Trust Fund for stability, to address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa was created. To meet the increased migratory challenges, EU funding for the 2015-2018 period has more than doubled. More-over, the crisis in Syria and in the neighbouring region led to the creation of different funding instruments, by the EU and the international community. EU agencies active externally are also funded through the EU budget. For the 2015-2018 period contributions for support to such EU agencies and their operations reaches €1.4 billion. Funding is one of the main instruments for EU cooperation with third countries in the area of migration, asylum and borders.

This paper aims to map and clarify the different funding instruments established for migration-related projects, financed by the EU as well as by the international community.

Read this briefing on ‘Migration & asylum: Projects & funding‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou,

© fotomaster / Fotolia

The promotion of global peace and security, following the model of its own peace project, is a fundamental goal and central pillar of the external action of the European Union (EU). Both within and beyond the EU, there is a widespread expectation among citizens that the Union will deliver results in this crucial area. Yet, the deteriorating security environment of the past decade has posed significant challenges. Following the release of its Global Strategy in 2016, and in line with the wording and spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been intensifying its work in pursuit of peace and security in a number of key policy areas. In this respect, 2017 was a year of implementation and of transforming vision into action.

The world has become more peaceful in recent centuries. Europe in particular has experienced the longest period of peace in its history, not least thanks to a regional network of international organisations, of which the EU is a major example. Today, peace is defined in a positive way, not only as ‘the absence of war’, but also in terms of the quality of government, the free flow of information and low levels of corruption. In this context, out of the 39 most peaceful countries in the world, based on the 2017 Global Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, 22 are EU Member States. Nevertheless, the instability that characterises the geopolitical environment has translated into a sharp deterioration of peace in the EU’s neighbourhood and has challenged its internal security.

The over-arching objectives of the EU guide it in all facets of its activity in this area, including common foreign and security policy (CFSP); democracy support; development cooperation; economic, financial and technical cooperation; humanitarian aid; trade; and neighbourhood policy. As foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, the 2016 Global Strategy introduced several elements to refine and improve the EU’s efforts, including the promotion of resilience and capacity-building in the world. This approach is reflected in the EU’s external policies.

Read also: ‘Peace and Security in 2018: An evaluation of EU peacebuilding in the Western Balkans‘.

As far as development is concerned, a significant share of EU aid goes to fragile states and to issues related to securing peace. In 2017 the EU committed to a ‘new consensus on development’, which emphasises the role of development cooperation in preventing violent conflicts, in mitigating their consequences and in aiding recovery from them. The new consensus clearly focuses on fragile and conflict affected countries, which are the main victims of humanitarian crises. On the ground, the EU has been able to strengthen the nexus between security, development and humanitarian aid through the implementation of comprehensive strategies, for example in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel.

With the launching of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund and other such initiatives, 2017 saw remarkable progress towards a more autonomous and efficient EU common security and defence policy (CSDP). Of all the policy fields in the area of peace and security, this is the one that has enjoyed the greatest support from EU citizens (75 %) for more EU spending. Through the CSDP, the EU also runs 16 missions and operations, making it one of the UN’s main partners in peacekeeping. These elements of ‘hard power’, together with the EU’s long-standing experience in the practice of soft power, form the backbone of its action for peace and security.

Looking to the future, the complexity of the global environment is expected to increase.  At the same time, an analysis of ongoing EU legislation indicates that the EU is aiming to strengthen its presence and efficiency in the area of peace and security. The discussions on the funding of specific initiatives in the context of the 2019 annual budget and the post-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF) will focus on streamlining the EU’s various programmes and instruments, allowing for sufficient flexibility to respond to unforeseen threats, as well as implementing innovative financial instruments. Underlying the quest for flexibility, efficiency and innovation, is the strategic goal to empower the EU in its global role as a promoter of peace and security, while adapting to the new realities of the international order.

Read this study on ‘Peace and Security in 2018: Overview of EU action and outlook for the future‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.