European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Zsolt G. Pataki and Evangelia M. Thoukididou,

What should innovation policy look like as we approach 2020 and prepare for the next Multiannual Financial Framework? Based on a proposal submitted by MEP Lambert van Nistelrooij, STOA held a workshop on 5 June 2018 to assess whether there is sufficient coordination among all stakeholders in view of the roll-out of the new, integrated EU innovation strategy.

Opening the event, STOA First Vice-Chair Paul Rübig, noted that, with more than 40 hubs across the continent, the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) plays a key role in European innovation, and has the full support of the European Parliament. The EIT was created in 2008 and as an independent body, plays a crucial role in boosting and coordinating innovation and entrepreneurship across Europe with one simple idea: through diversity, there is strength.

© European Union 2018 – Source: EP/ Jan VAN DE VEL

Commissioner Tibor Navracsics, who is responsible for the EIT, presented the main factors hindering innovation in Europe: a shortage of skills, lack of infrastructure and poor investment. ´We have to create the right conditions for innovation’, he shared. The answer to the innovation challenges faced by Europe is increased collaboration with those within the innovation landscape – universities, research organisations, companies – both small and large, NGOs, and of course, its citizens. Commissioner Navracsics highlighted that solutions to the question of innovation must be targeted and tailored to local and regional capabilities and needs. Horizon 2020 and its successor should be complemented with national, regional and local resources wherever possible.

This is where the EIT comes in, as it has the ability to bridge the European, regional and local levels. Martin Kern, Interim Director of the EIT, represented the institute at the workshop and shared its achievements, as well as its goals and objectives going forward. He quoted Commission Vice-President Jyrki Katainen, who once said, ‘If someone is interested in the future of the EU look to the EIT’.

© European Union 2018 – Source: EP/ Jan VAN DE VEL

Indeed, with a strong portfolio of projects including Volocopter, Advantis and Alina, the future of the EIT looks promising. The EIT has managed its success through an innovation model that places it at the centre of educational institutions, research organisations and businesses, including SMEs. Martin Kern explained that the EIT would like to engage in increased collaboration with EU bodies, such as the European Innovation Council (EIC), in the same way it has already worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC). During the workshop, Boris Dimitrov, CEO of Checkpoint Cardio, a medical start-up which has benefited from the services of EIT Digital, presented the key advantage provided by the EIT as being the access provided to consolidated funding across different European regions. Going forward, the EIT aims to increase participation from low-involvement members and continue dissemination of knowledge in less innovative regions of the EU.

 

© European Union 2018 – Source: EP/ Jan VAN DE VEL

Jean-David Malo, Director for Open Innovation and Open Science, DG Research and Innovation at the European Commission, referred to the Commission’s call for national and regional authorities to develop smart specialisation strategies for research and innovation. This will allow them to identify specific competitive advantages, which will serve as a basis for prioritising research and innovation investment under current and future cohesion policy. The communication on ‘Strengthening Innovation in Europe’s regions: Strategies for resilient, inclusive and sustainable growth‘, takes stock of the progress made in the area of decentralised innovation thus far. According to Lambert van Nistelrooij, MEP, this communication is largely descriptive and limits itself to ESI funds, Horizon 2020 and its successor, Horizon Europe.

Christian Ehler, MEP, and STOA Panel Member, discussed the integration of the EIT into broader programmes, such as the international dimension of European innovation policy. The European Parliament will be requesting an increase in the budget and Mr Ehler would like to see this go towards the third pillar of the Horizon Europe programme, from which the EIT can benefit. An increase in funding would allow for actionable initiatives that can translate academic research into business practice, a process in which the EIT can act as an experienced instrument.

© European Union 2018 – Source: EP/ Jan VAN DE VEL

As Mr Malo stated, with a €100 billion budget targeted at boosting the sectors of science and technology, transforming research into business opportunities will be possible for the first time. In the past two years, Europe has in fact created more start-ups than the US, but has failed to grow them into successful enterprises. Therefore, much of the new funding will go towards supporting scientists in creating tangible businesses and aiding them in their growth. This will be achieved through practical support and the provision of equity, in addition to the grants already offered in the growth stage. In the long-term, these actions aim to make companies not currently supported by banks and the fragmented venture capital market more attractive to private investors. The EIT will play an integral role in these initiatives, along with the EIC and the European Innovation Ecosystem, covering raw materials, energy, climate, food, health and digital innovation sectors, across which it holds specialised expertise.

To keep up to date with this project and other STOA activities, follow our website, the EPRS blog, Twitter and Think Tank pages.

#innovation4eu

Click to view slideshow.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for air transport passengers.

Do you enjoy travelling by plane, visiting new destinations, friends and family, even for short periods? Whether you like city trips in Europe or going to the other side of the globe, travelling by air has become much more affordable and accessible over the last 25 years, largely owing to EU action in the field of civil aviation.

© pict rider / Fotolia

Air travel used to be controlled largely by national authorities and dominated by monopolistic national carriers. The creation of the internal market for aviation in the EU has, however, profoundly changed the way aviation operates. By removing many national rules and replacing them with European ones, the liberalisation of aviation has increased competition among airlines. This has resulted in new services and new players, in particular low-cost airlines, new connections, lower fares and wider access to air transport. The European Union has also reinforced common rules on safety and security, passenger rights (e.g. assistance and compensation for denied boarding, cancellations or delays) and promoted greater access to third countries via its external aviation policy.

Previously reserved for a minority of privileged people or business travellers, aviation has witnessed a surge in the number of passengers and destinations, giving a far greater choice to consumers who have access to more flights, more routes and more airports. The number of daily flights has risen from fewer than 10 000 in 1992 to around 23 000 in 2016 and the number of routes from fewer than 2700 in 1992 to around 7 400 now. It is easier and cheaper than ever to travel by air.

Further information

• EPRS publication on Airports in the EU: Challenges ahead, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_IDA(2016)583820
• EPRS publication on EU external aviation policy, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)582021
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Mobility and Transport, https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/aviation-strategy_en
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Mobility and Transport, https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/25years-eu-aviation_en

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for volunteers abroad.

Volunteering abroad is a way for you to enhance both your skills and your awareness of the various challenges around the globe. But how much do you know about the possibilities out there?

© mangostock / Fotolia

If you are a European citizen over the age of 18 or a long-term resident in the EU, you can become an EU aid volunteer. The initiative started in 2011 as a pilot project and is designed to contribute to providing humanitarian aid in disaster-affected communities all over the world. It gives you a chance to volunteer abroad for a period of 1 to 18 months. The programme covers the costs of accommodation, travel, insurance and a monthly allowance. By the end of 2017, more than 200 volunteers had been deployed to 28 non-EU countries to provide assistance in areas such as resilience building, gender issues support or disaster risk reduction. The places where you can volunteer include Senegal, Haiti and Colombia, among others. The programme also funds capacity building and communication. For the period 2014-2020, the EU Aid Volunteers initiative aims to deploy 4 000 EU citizens worldwide, so there are plenty opportunities for you to participate.

You can also volunteer in areas such as culture, environment and education thanks to another international volunteering initiative, the European Voluntary Service within the Erasmus+ programme. These projects are usually available in the EU or in neighbouring partner countries and last from 2 weeks to 12 months. In order to take part you must be aged between 17 and 30. So, now that you are fully informed, all you need to do is volunteer.

Further information

• EPRS publication on EU Aid Volunteers initiative, 2016 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593567/EPRS_BRI(2016)593567_EN.pdf
• European Commission’s website ‘EU Aid Volunteers’, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/eu-aid-volunteers_en
• European Commission’s website ‘Erasmus +’, https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/opportunities/individuals/young-people/european-voluntary-service_en

Written by Lucienne Attard (The Directorate-General for the Presidency),

Austria will hold the EU Council Presidency from July to December 2018. Its presidency comes at the end of the Trio Presidency composed of Estonia, Bulgaria and Austria. The last time Austria held the Council Presidency was in 2006.

Austria has a federal system of government with the Chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, as head of government, a Vice-Chancellor and federal ministers. Chancellor Kurz has been in office since December 2017. The President and the government together form the executive branch in Austrian politics. The current government is a coalition government composed of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).

Austria has a bicameral parliamentary legislature consisting of two chambers: the National Council (Nationalrat) and the Federal Council (Bundesrat). The former currently has 183 members elected through proportional representation in a general election, while the Bundesrat has 61 members elected indirectly through provincial diets.

Political priorities of the Austrian Presidency

This note looks at the Austrian Presidency’s priorities, with those dossiers which figure in the Joint Declaration agreed to by the three institutions as priorities for 2018 until May 2019 marked with an asterisk (*).

A EUROPE THAT PROTECTS is the motto Austria has chosen for its Presidency. Austria considers that there have been several crises in recent years that have given rise to mistrust in the EU amongst European citizens. This mistrust needs to be addressed.

To this end, the Austrian Presidency has announced three main priorities for its term in office: security, competitiveness and stability. On security, it intends to focus on the fight against illegal migration, by securing Europe’s external borders, and on the reform of the Common European Asylum System. On competitiveness, it will work on matters related to the digital single market, specifically digitalisation. On stability, it has announced its intention to work towards EU accession of the Western Balkan countries.

A number of ongoing complex and challenging dossiers will also feature prominently during the second half of 2018, such as Brexit, the interinstitutional negotiations of a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027and the reform of the EU.

Subsidiarity is another key element for the Austrian Presidency. The idea is that the scope of action of the EU would be re-defined via a ‘Subsidiarity Pact’, whereby tasks, which are better handled at Member State level, would be carried out at this level, thus taking decisions closer to the citizens. In the light of the upcoming European Parliament elections, this proposal may well find support amongst some Member States. The Austrian Presidency plans to hold a high-level conference in Bregenz, Austria on 15-16 November 2018, the conclusions of which would serve as substantial input to the European Council meeting in December 2018.

As part of the six-month roadmap, Austria will host several key events; most significant amongst these is the special summit on security, in Salzburg on 20 September 2018, and the EU-Asia conference on 23 and 24 November 2018. On the special summit on security, the Austrian Presidency position is that instead of fighting over the distribution of refugees, the EU must implement and improve external border protection. While Member States that are particularly under stress due to migratory flows should receive more support, it is also necessary to strengthen the mandate of Frontex as a way of combating illegal migration.

Read the full briefing here: Priority Dossiers under the Austrian EU Council Presidency.

The Directorate-General for the Presidency (DG Presidency) plays a key role throughout each parliamentary procedure, from its launch until its conclusion through the adoption of an EP resolution or legislative act, in particular in ensuring the smooth running of the plenary sessions. The staff of the DG play a key coordination role across the different services of the Parliament, and support Members in a wide range of activities. The Interinstitutional Relations Unit within DG Presidency, amongst other tasks, prepares a broad range documents concerned with strategic programming, such as on activities of the Commission and the Council.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for fathers.

When fathers take leave to look after their children, the whole family benefits. Research shows there is a link between the amount of days’ leave fathers take and their satisfaction with their relationship with their child. Increasing fathers’ uptake of child-related leave is also considered beneficial for children’s development and gender equality. Fathers’ involvement in childcare also affects women’s decisions to have children. Despite this, fathers took only 2 % of the leave available to either parent in the EU in 2010. The EU wants to change that and give men more opportunities to get involved in caring for their families.

© Christin Lola / Fotolia

Thanks to EU law, mothers and fathers in all EU countries have the right to at least four months of parental leave each. In principle, this leave period can be taken by either parent, except for one month, which is non-transferable, to encourage fathers to take up more parental leave. The EU also offers protection from discrimination on the grounds of taking parental leave, which is especially relevant for fathers who wish to spend more time with their family, but are worried about possible negative consequences for their career. EU law guarantees job protection during and after such leave, which means that fathers are entitled to return to the same or equivalent job.

The EU is working on improving the current situation. It is considering the introduction of paternity leave and four months of non-transferable leave, both paid at least at the level of sick pay.

Further information

• EPRS publication on Maternity, paternity and parental leave in the EU, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599323/EPRS_BRI(2017)599323_EN.pdf
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Justice website, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/discrimination/gender-equality/equal-economic-independence_en
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion website, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1311&langId=en

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for mothers.

Despite progress on gender equality, mothers are generally still the primary carers in the family. If they have young children, they are more likely to be unemployed than women without children, while the opposite is true for men. The EU is committed to gender equality and aims to narrow this gap. It also aims to improve leave provisions for both parents, so that they are better able to combine work and private life.

© sushytska / Fotolia

Thanks to EU law, all EU countries have common minimum standards for maternity leave: minimum 14 weeks, two of which are mandatory, paid at least as much as sick pay. Pregnant and breastfeeding workers are also entitled to protection against working conditions that would jeopardise their health and that of their babies, and against dismissal from the beginning of pregnancy to the end of their maternity leave. Each parent is entitled to at least 4 months’ parental leave. One month of this is in principle non-transferrable, with the aim of encouraging uptake by fathers. Under EU law, the rights to protection from discrimination and job security also apply to parental leave, meaning that mothers are entitled to return to the same or equivalent job when the leave ends. Before all these changes, some countries did not satisfy EU standards and had to improve their legislation.

The EU is now working on improving the status of mothers through new rules and enforcement of the existing ones on leave, especially regarding protection against dismissal. It is also encouraging countries to improve the accessibility and quality of early childhood education and care systems.

Further information

• EPRS publication on Maternity, paternity and parental leave in the EU, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599323/EPRS_BRI(2017)599323_EN.pdf
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Justice website, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/discrimination/gender-equality/equal-economic-independence_en
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion website, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1311&langId=en

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Parliament Strasbourg

Financial matters figure largely on the Parliament’s agenda for this last plenary session before the summer recess. The series of debates on the Future of Europe also continues, with a contribution from the Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, expected on Wednesday morning, followed by an address by the President of the Republic of Angola, João Lourenço, in a formal sitting on Wednesday lunchtime. Just as the summer recess begins, the Bulgarian Council Presidency comes to a close on 30 June, and Parliament will hear statements from the Council and the Commission on the outgoing presidency on Tuesday morning, as well as a presentation of the programme of activities of the Austrian Presidency, which starts on 1 July. The European Council and Commission will also make statements on Tuesday afternoon on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 28 and 29 June 2018.

Parliament will begin its discussion of the EU’s finances with Amending Budget No 2 to the 2018 EU budget, which moves the surplus in the 2017 EU budget to the 2018 budget. The sum involved, €555.5 million, will decrease Member States’ contributions to the 2018 budget. The surplus is a result of the previous amending budget, plus the high level of competition fines feeding into the EU budget in 2017, and delays in implementation of programmes and therefore spending. Parliament will vote on a Committee on Budgets report on Wednesday lunchtime, followed by consideration of Amending Budget No 3 to the 2018 EU budget: Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Parliament’s Committee on Budgets has agreed to the allocation of funding for some 5 000 teachers currently providing education for over 300 000 refugee children in Turkey, on the condition that Parliament must be fully associated in the future decision-making process over the facility, when it comes up for review within the 2019 budgetary procedure. Returning to budgetary matters later on Wednesday afternoon, Parliament will also consider the mandate for trilogue for the 2019 draft EU budget, its position for initial negotiations with the Council. Parliament’s priorities for the 2019 budget are sustainable growth, innovation, competitiveness, citizenship, security, the fight against climate change, transition to renewable energy and migration, and young people. Parliament’s Committee on Budgets, however, notes that the current proposals leave very little flexibility for unexpected expenditure. Still on the budget, while the reform of EU financial rules for five sectoral regulations in the common agricultural policy field has already been separately agreed, Parliament will discuss the compromise its negotiators have agreed on the revision of the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union on Wednesday evening. The new amended Financial Regulation would limit trust funds to external actions; retain the non-profit principle and end transfers from structural funding to the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI); as well as maintaining the competences of the budgetary authority. Finally, a statement is expected by the President of the Eurogroup on Wednesday afternoon on the conclusion of the third economic adjustment programme for Greece.

The related issues of EU migration and security are likely to eat up a fair proportion of the EU budget for some time to come. During the July plenary session, Parliament will consider the next building block in the EU’s efforts to increase its military capabilities, the European defence industrial development programme (EDIDP), to be discussed on Monday evening. The proposed programme would be part of the European Defence Fund, and the EU has responded to an increasing security threat and key allies’ withdrawal of support, by setting up an envelope of €500 million to fund the development of defence equipment and technologies and boost the competitiveness of the EU defence industry.

Still on security, Parliament will again consider proposals for a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) to manage information about third-country nationals travelling within the Schengen area on Wednesday afternoon. The proposals seek to create an online system similar to those used in the USA and Canada to address the current lack of information about visa-exempt nationals travelling into Europe. Parliament wants to ensure that the information used in the system is strictly relevant, and that the system is secure, transparent and accountable.

When it comes to spending the EU budget, farm statistics provide the evidence used to make decisions on where to allocate funding within the framework of the EU common agricultural policy. In line with its policy to update all its statistical data, the Commission has made a proposal to update integrated farm statistics to make their collection more flexible, more detailed, more coherent, and to reduce the burden of data collection. Parliament will consider the agreed text on Monday evening.

Parliament will consider three current proposals on mobility in the EU during this session, in a joint debate on Tuesday afternoon. While the Transport Committee adopted the reports on social and market rules in the road transport sector, the Parliament as a whole did not endorse the committee’s mandates during the June session, and the three reports thus automatically come onto the agenda this session. While the majority of the Transport Committee voted in favour of enforcement requirements and specific rules for posting drivers in the road transport sector; and on daily and weekly driving times, minimum breaks and rest periods and positioning by means of tachographs, the Employment and Social Affairs Committee has decided to reintroduce its amendments in order to provide greater focus on working conditions for drivers in the road transport sector.

On employment more generally, a statute for social and solidarity-based enterprises would establish a common definition, based on specific criteria and good practices, enabling enterprises with a positive social, environmental or community impact, and which provide employment for 14.5 million people, to overcome regulatory obstacles. A great many legal forms of social enterprise exist in the EU, and Parliament will consider a recommendation to create a ‘European social label’ scheme on Thursday lunchtime.

Finally, with just under a year to go, Members are naturally turning their minds to the next European elections. On Wednesday afternoon, Parliament will vote on the reform of the electoral law of the EU which, among other things, sets new minimum thresholds for constituencies. While these will not be implemented until the 2024 EU elections, the proposals also include facilitating the extension of voting to different methods, and increased data protection. The idea of ensuring all EU citizens resident in third countries are able to vote was, however, not taken up by the Council. The Commission will also make a statement on the participation of persons with disabilities in the European elections on Thursday morning.

A list of all material prepared for this Plenary Session: European defence industrial development programme (EDIDP) (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Integrated farm statistics (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Reform of the electoral law of the EU (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Road transport: Social and market rules (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with Armenia (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Statute for social and solidarity-based enterprises (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Amending Budget No 2 to the 2018 EU budget: Surplus of 2017 (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Revision of EU financial rules (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) 2019 draft EU budget: Mandate for trilogue (available in EN) Amending Budget No 3 to the 2018 EU budget: Facility for Refugees in Turkey (available in EN)

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© piick / Shutterstock

Technology does not operate outside its legal context. Law reacts to technological developments through the adoption, for example, of health and employment rules, or tax and risk assessment standards, to prevent technological advances from undermining human rights, environmental standards and democratic values. Law imposes critical choices upon objectively uncertain scientific judgements and value-biased knowledge. But what if law, overcoming the pacing and regulatory connection problems, could restore human agency in the face of overwhelming technological developments, shape the diffusion and adoption of technology in its various forms and even anticipate technological trends?

Legal provisions contain or imply decisions about the scope and ownership of intellectual property, about the permissible degree of extraction and processing of personal data, and about who is allowed to access technological outputs. These legal interventions mostly take the form of a reactive approach to today’s wide range of technological risks. The law’s ex-post-facto intervention, in this respect, may not necessarily constitute a weakness; the vagueness inherent in legal provisions may compensate for unforeseeable cases that require the questioning of traditional assumptions about the socio-technical context in which law will operate.

However, disruptive technologies develop at such an exponential pace that traditional legal oversight mechanisms are outpaced by the rate of technological change, the evolution of which is so rapid that it can escape the language of existing regulations. By the time new regulations become legally binding, they are often only able to address a minor part of the wider technological effects which have already spread beyond the conceptual scheme of law.

Listen to podcast ‘What if law shaped technologies?‘

As a result, the pre-existing legal structure may prove a poor match for new types of disputes raised by disruptive technologies. And the gaps are getting wider as technology advances ever more rapidly. So can the legal system overcome the temporal gap between the emergence of a technology and the subsequent need to exercise control over its possible effects, and retain both flexibility and responsiveness? What regulation is justified by a particular technology? Are particular legal instruments better suited to controlling particular technological developments characterised by high scientific uncertainty or high development costs? How can law regulate uncertain and unknown futures in the face of limited knowledge?

Uncertainty and lack of knowledge can be dealt with through the introduction of ‘sunset clauses’, which make rules subject to revision after a predetermined period of time, and forward-looking ex-ante regulatory impact assessments. Alternatively, under such conditions, regulation by agency may be considered a useful supplement to the traditional regulation by contract, as, in the case of the former, the regulatory regime can then be adjusted in a timely and more flexible manner in the light of market and technological developments. The question is if, given the constraints of a ‘hard law’ approach, legal systems are ready to adopt ‘prospective and homeostatic’ instruments, capable of adapting themselves to a changing technological landscape? In the frame of EU law, this role can be exerted, for example, by the numerous agencies established at the EU level in technology-based domains, such as the European Food Safety Authority, the European Chemicals Agency and the European Medicines Agency. These decentralised authorities have been empowered to adjust the EU regulatory regime to the latest technological developments by issuing expert opinions, decisions and guidelines, which, despite their non-binding legal character, constitute authoritative points of legal reference, due to their specificity, expert-driven nature and evidence-based approach.

Some countries like the UK, the USA, Switzerland and Australia have tried to bridge this gap by offering what is known as a ‘regulatory sandbox’. These initiatives aim to provide space where, primarily, fintech (financial technology) firms can test their innovations in a less restrictive regulatory environment for a limited period. This helps the firms in question to get licences and develop in a way that will make them compliant but in a more efficient manner.

What does the legal conceptualisation of technology mean for European policy-making?

Though the early stages in the development of a technology, when there are still many unknowns, are a challenging time for developing a legal framework, they can also be an opportune time for taking advantage of the flexibility of a new approach. Although no law can encode the entire complexity of technology as it is, let alone predict its future development, there is an imperative need for EU law to develop a proactive and iterative function, to anticipate technological trends and future risks of activities that are in constant evolution. While technology itself is not a reason to regulate, such a proactive approach could ensure that disruptive technologies are deployed in a way that is consistent with established principles and values.

In the frame of EU law, the adoption and application of the precautionary principle and the principle of intergenerational equity could affect the way a specific technology is framed and, if necessary, contained. The precautionary principle basically holds that, since every technology and technological advance poses some theoretical danger or risk, public policy should be crafted in such a way that no possible harm will occur when the technology is deployed. The principle of intergenerational equity requires legislators in the field of technology regulation to consider the impact current decisions will have on future generations’ interests in a variety of contexts, including fiscal policy, pension fund regulation and financial regulation more generally.

The role of delegated and implementing acts in the frame of the EU rule-making process is crucial, as their adoption may lead to the prioritisation of one technological path over another. Despite their apparent technical nature – given that their activation is triggered by scientific and technological developments – these acts might involve important political choices and have a significant impact on citizens’ daily lives. They are used in a wide range of policy areas, for example, implementing measures on energy labelling, authorisation of certain types of food additives and civil aviation safety control equipment. Technology assessments that forecast the social and economic impacts of new technologies, and regulatory impact assessments that attempt to predict the social and economic impacts of proposed EU legal acts are usually conducted ex ante, and may shape technological trajectories in an upstream manner.

The apparent effectiveness of regulatory sandboxes may also pave the way for the creation of testbeds for new technologies in the domain of the Internet of Things and driverless cars. The ability of the law to break with established traditional perceptions of technology, and operate in uncharted territory, will depend on the willingness of EU legislators to introduce new types of legal instruments.

It would also require the introduction of new forms of engagement with the evolving nature of scientific and technological ecosystems. While some ‘black swan’ technological events will remain impossible to predict, a real-time regulatory system that constantly analyses scientific trends would go a long way towards ensuring that regulatory policy proactively adapts to an evolving disruptive ecosystem, and influences the design of technologies.

Read this At a glance on ‘What if law shaped technologies?‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański (1st edition),

© wladimir1804 / Fotolia

Despite achieving unprecedented growth and profit rates, the digital economy seems to be relatively undertaxed when compared to more traditional ‘bricks and mortar’ companies. The current rules are based on the physical presence of taxpayers and assets, and there is a general understanding that they are not suited to taxing a digital economy characterised by reliance on intangible assets and ubiquitous services whose location is often hard to determine. International bodies are currently working on how to adapt tax rules to the digital reality.

The European Commission adopted a proposal in March 2018. It would allow taxation on the basis of digital rather than physical presence linked with the EU, for digital activities generating turnover of over €7 million, and with more than 100 000 users or 3 000 business to business contracts annually.

The proposal has met with mixed reactions from stakeholders. Although there is growing recognition that digital companies should pay similar tax rates to traditional companies, some consider the initiative to be premature given the ongoing search for a compromise at the level of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which is thought of as the permanent solution. Furthermore, the Council seems to be divided on the issue, whereas it needs to reach unanimity in order for the law to be adopted.

Versions

• June 2018: ‘Corporate taxation of a significant digital presence‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2018) 147
21.3.2018 Rapporteur: Dariusz Rosati (EPP, Poland) 2018/0072(CNS ) Shadow rapporteurs:

  Paul Tang (S&D, the Netherlands)
Ashley Fox (ECR, UK)
Petr Ježek (ALDE, Czech Republic)
Martin Schirdewan (GUE/NGL, Germany)
Barbara Kappel (ENF, Austria) Consultation procedure – Parliament adopts a non-binding opinion only Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Listen to podcast ‘Corporate taxation of a significant digital presence‘

Effective average tax rate in the EU for international enterprises

Written by Isabelle Ioannides and Velina Lilyanova,

The EU and the Western Balkans: Where next?

On 18 June, EPRS hosted a roundtable discussion on ‘The EU and the Western Balkans: Where Next?’ in the Library of the European Parliament. It took place the day after the prime ministers of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Alexis Tsipras and Zoran Zaev respectively, signed a deal on the name issue that could potentially resolve the bilateral dispute that has run for over a quarter of a century. This only highlighted the timeliness of the question, ‘Where next?’, as Etienne Bassot, Director of EPRS’ Members’ Research Service, outlined in his introductory remarks.

2018 is a year of revived interest in the region. In February, the European Commission published a new EU enlargement strategy that aims to revitalise relations with the region. In April, it released its annual reports, taking stock of the situation in each of the candidate and potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans. In parallel, the European perspective and connectivity of the Western Balkans was at the top of the priorities of Bulgaria’s EU Council Presidency, which organised the first EU-WB summit in 15 years in Sofia. In July, when Bulgaria passes the baton on to Austria, the region will remain high on the agenda. Given this increased activity, the roundtable discussion aimed to revisit the state of play in the process of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, assess achievements and challenges from the first half of 2018, and discuss how the EU can help support the transformation of the region in view of future enlargement.

The panellists were experts with varied and vast experience, both academic and political: Tonino Picula (S&D, Croatia), Member of the EP and Chair of the Delegation for relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina; Genoveva Ruiz Calavera, Director for the Western Balkans in the European Commission’s DG NEAR; Ivan Vejvoda, Permanent Fellow at the Vienna Institute for Human Sciences; Erwan Fouéré, Senior Associate Research fellow at CEPS; and Isabelle Ioannides, policy analyst in EPRS’ Ex-Post Evaluation Unit. The debate was moderated by Monika Nogaj, acting Head of the External Policies Unit in EPRS.

The EU and the Western Balkans: Where next?

Tonino Picula, who spoke first, framed the debate, drawing on his long experience on the region, having been Croatia’s Foreign Affairs Minister in the early 2000s. Tonino Picula stressed the strategic importance of the Western Balkans and pointed to the pertinence of the EU examining the prospects of its relations with the region. He emphasised in particular the present context: a unique situation, in which the EU is negotiating the exit of a Member State, faces growing criticism from the inside, is surrounded by multiple external crises, and is confronted by the need to rethink the EU project as a whole. In such a context, achieving EU membership is an ever-more demanding task for the Western Balkans. Nevertheless, Tonino Picula asserted that, for a plethora of reasons, the EU needed to keep up the pace of its work in the region despite existing scepticism. He concluded by saying that he expected the political manifestos of political parties in next year’s European Parliament elections to reflect this topic, and the EU to continue to serve as a good mediator and facilitator. ‘EU membership, after all, remains the best way to promote reform and cooperation within the Western Balkans, as well as an insurance policy for the EU itself’, he said.

Genoveva Ruiz Calavera presented the new European Commission strategy and highlighted its two major achievements: on the one hand, its clear message that there would be no shortcuts to accession and that EU values would need to be abided by; and, on the other, the renewed EU commitment through six new flagship initiatives on key issues. Enlargement is a two-way process: just as the countries have to prepare for accession, so the EU has to prepare to absorb them and support them on their accession path. According to Ms Ruiz Calavera, it is crucial for the EU to ensure capacity to actually implement these flagships. To that end, the European Commission has put forward a proposal for increased funding for pre-accession in the new multiannual financial framework (MFF). She agreed with Tonino Picula on the need for political parties in the European Parliament to embrace the region in their agendas and have a clear vision on the issue of EU enlargement. Commenting on the name deal signed by Prime Ministers Tsipras and Zaev, she considered it a positive example for the region. Precisely for that reason, the upcoming June European Council decisions would be crucial for keeping momentum.

According to Ivan Vejvoda, what is really at stake is the credibility of the EU project itself. He reminded the audience that the enlargement perspective was never officially put in doubt by the EU, but rather within individual Member States (known as ‘enlargement fatigue’). This is illustrated in French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent statements (that the EU has to reform first, and expand afterwards), but it is also a false debate since the countries in the region themselves are not ready to join the EU in the next 5 to 10 years. What is key, however, is that the process continues and that credibility works, backed up by action. In that sense, if the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania do not receive a green light to start negotiations in June, we will not really be ‘in the credibility business’, he pointed out. The June Council decision, he reminded the audience, might be a fleeting piece of news, quickly passed over elsewhere, but one that would be closely monitored in the candidate countries and would linger on. It would have a demotivating effect on EU supporters in times when third parties (Russia, Turkey, China, and others) are lurking around the corner. Referring to the Western Balkans as ‘the non-integrated core part of Europe’, Ivan Vejvoda said that Europe would be doing its job if it manages to ‘keep this train moving’. Referring to the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, he argued that both sides have realised that the issue cannot linger on forever and that the process is therefore imbued with a sense of realism. The economic links between the EU and the Western Balkans and the support of people in the region for the EU (even if at times this is silent) show that there is no alternative to EU enlargement. Last but not least, Ivan Vejvoda stressed the importance of education and the need for statesmanship and leadership in admitting to the young generation the darker side of the region’s history as a way to move towards reconciliation.

The EU and the Western Balkans: Where next?

Erwan Fouéré welcomed the fact that the Western Balkans were back on the EU radar after having been neglected in recent years. The positive developments in 2018 are praiseworthy, but in parallel the EU needs to adopt an approach other than ‘business as usual’. In view of the future, the EU also has the responsibility to demonstrate more clearly the successes of EU enlargement policy, as the benefits of enlargement have not been sufficiently explained to an increasingly sceptical public. Erwan Fouéré spoke of the 17 June signing of the name deal, which he considers a diplomatic success. He commented on the strengths and weaknesses of the Zaev-Tsipras deal, pointing out that the weaknesses would complicate its ratification and implementation. Still, he agreed with the other speakers on the importance of the June European Council: it presents an opportunity to reward the work done on the ground and to show EU commitment in practice. An important message was also that all bilateral issues should be addressed by all sectors of societies, not political elites alone. On a concluding note, he expressed hope for the coming years, recalling the need for permanent EU efforts in the region and proper follow-up on its commitments.

Isabelle Ioannides focused on the ‘where next?’ in the event’s title. She agreed with the other speakers that the key word in the debate was credibility: how does the EU build and retain its credibility in the region? In her view, the EU must provide manageable, understandable perspectives, combined with specific roadmaps. The EU needs to insist on the implementation of reforms, but also better spell out the monitoring instruments announced and clearly name the spoilers in the process. Isabelle Ioannides raised the need for increased EU support for economic development – one way to counter frustration among youths and the consequent brain drain from the region. The EU also needs to consider further investing in structural reforms to boost growth in the medium term, and to include candidate countries in sectoral policies and programmes. More generally, it is essential for the EU to move away from a vision of the Western Balkans as mere recipients of funding, but rather to see the countries as co-designers of EU policies, which need to be included in the debate on the future of Europe. In parallel, it is important, she noted, that there be more transparency in the process: that the public (in both the Western Balkans and the EU Member States) be kept informed of the different benchmarks and of the EU contribution in supporting transformation in the region. The best proof that EU intentions are credible is to include a provision for potential accession of one or more of the candidate countries in the new MFF, something that may become unavoidable with the potential resolution of the name issue. In conclusion, enlargement is a win-win situation, momentum is there, but ultimately, more responsibility lies with the political leaders in the region to commit to real reforms, implement them, and fully exploit the current opportunity.

A lively Q&A session followed, which brought to the fore the issues of reconciliation, outstanding border disputes, the need to invest in young people, and the role of civil society as a much needed actor in the accession process.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Suzana Anghel,

© Fotolia

Expectations are high for the meetings of EU Heads of State or Government on 28 and 29 June 2018, as important decisions are required on several policy topics, including the reform of the euro area and the revision of the Dublin Regulation. Whether concrete results will emerge from this meeting on any, or all, of the controversial topics remains to be seen. The very full agenda of the European Council includes security and defence, migration, innovation and digital Europe, jobs, growth and competitiveness, the next multiannual financial framework and external relations. Following recent developments at national and European level, migration is likely to take an even more prominent place than originally expected. After the formal European Council meeting, EU Heads of State or Government will also convene for a Euro Summit and a European Council (Article 50) meeting. The Euro Summit will discuss further developments in the euro area, banking union, the gradual completion of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and a possible budget for the eurozone. At the European Council (Article 50) meeting, EU-27 leaders are expected to review the state of play in the Brexit negotiations, and adopt conclusions on the progress made.

1. Implementation: Follow-up on previous European Council commitments

In accordance with commitments made in its previous conclusions, the European Council should return to various aspects of security and defence policy (Table 1) at its June meeting. This is reflected in the annotated draft agenda for this European Council. Heads of State or Government are also expected to formally adopt the decision on the future composition of the European Parliament (EP).

Policy area Previous commitment Meeting at which the commitment was made Security and defence ‘Report on progress regarding capabilities to address hybrid threats, including in the areas of cyber, strategic communication and counter-intelligence in June 2018 March 2018 Security and defence Report on the work undertaken regarding the
Strengthening of civilian CSDP in June 2018 December 2017 Security and defence Return to the field of security and defence in June 2018 December 2017 2. European Council meeting Migration

Heads of State or Government are expected to discuss the internal and external dimensions of migration policy. On the latter, the European Council is expected to recall the importance of effective external border control for a functioning EU migration policy. It will most likely reiterate its continuous vigilance and action on all three migration routes (i.e. the Central, Eastern and Western Mediterranean routes), stressing in particular its support to Italy as well as to the Libyan coastguard. The draft conclusions also foresee the creation of ‘disembarkation platforms’, in cooperation with UNHCR and IOM, which aims at reducing incentives for people to embark on perilous journeys, and at accelerating the division of economic migrants and those requiring international protection. The idea of such platforms had been considered previously, but re-emerged recently following an initiative by the Austrian Chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, in cooperation with a small group of Member States. In order to prepare a joint European approach to asylum and migration, as opposed to a series of individual national approaches, a group of countries, including Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, Spain Sweden and Finland, met on 24 June in Brussels, hosted by European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker. No statement was issued, but some proposals discussed are expected to feature in the European Council conclusions, including an increase in the EU Trust Fund for Africa, a call on Member States to step up the effective return of irregular migrants, and more resources and a wider mandate for Frontex.

Concerning the internal dimension of migration, the European Council will notably address the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) under discussion since May 2016. During a plenary debate to prepare the June European Council, where many MEPs criticised the lack of decision by the Council on this issue, the European Parliament’s President, Antonio Tajani, stressed that Parliament had agreed its position on the matter in November 2017, and that its text would be an ideal basis for a compromise. On 14-15 December 2017, Heads of State or Government held an informal discussion on migration without any written conclusions, in the Leaders’ meetings format, which set the aim of deciding on the CEAS at the June 2018 meeting. President Tusk underlined that he still aimed to find a decision by consensus, but that reaching a compromise on the relocation mechanism might be hard to achieve and that the use of QMV would be an alternative if no compromise could be found. According to the new working methods under the Leaders’ Agenda, the result of the discussions at the informal leaders’ meetings should lead to an agreement at the following formal meeting dedicated to the matter – in this case the June European Council. It remains to be seen whether a consensus can be found at this meeting, some Member States having openly expressed doubt on the likelihood of meeting the June deadline. Recent developments, such as the position of the newly formed Italian government on migration, the situation resulting from Italy and Malta’s refusal to allow the rescue ship Aquarius, with 629 migrants on board, to dock, as well as the internal German government debate on migration, further complicate this already very sensitive dossier, and at the same time puts pressure on the European Council to find a solution.

Security and defence

On security and defence, the European Council will call to continue work on defence and counter-intelligence cooperation, including through the allocation of appropriate resources for fighting disinformation. Defence featured high on the Foreign Affairs Council’s agenda in the first half of 2018 and has been discussed at four meetings (in March, April, May and June 2018). Progress was made on a select number of cooperation mechanisms, notably on the European Defence Fund (EDF), with the European Commission proposing a regulation on 13 June 2018 on funding through the European Defence Fund under the next Multiannual Financial Framework, and on the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), on which the co-legislators reached a provisional agreement in May, which may lead to the legislative procedure being finalised by the end of 2018, as suggested by the European Council in its December 2017 conclusions. The European Commission and High Representative have also put forward a Joint Communication on hybrid threats, which the European Council will probably acknowledge in its June 2018 conclusions. Regarding civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), progress was evaluated in May, and a civilian CSDP compact is expected for autumn 2018.

The European Council will request the continuation of work on the institutional architecture of permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and on the development of programmes. It will also stress the importance of pursuing an inclusive approach where consistency between the requirements of the newly revised Capability Development Plan, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and PESCO projects is privileged. A first series of 17 PESCO projects was approved by the Council in March 2018, whilst more projects will be adopted in autumn 2018. The Dutch-led ‘military mobility’ project is the flagship of PESCO. It represents one of three complementary initiatives aimed at fostering military mobility (the November 2017 Joint Communication on improving military mobility in the EU and March 2018 Action Plan, and NATO’s own military mobility programme). Analysts consider that the upcoming NATO Summit, to be held in Brussels on 11-12 July 2018, could offer an opportunity to build synergies between these initiatives. In the interim, the European Council is expected to reiterate its previous December 2017 call to strengthen cooperation with NATO on military mobility. The EU leaders will also consider EU-NATO cooperation. They are expected to review the implementation of the 2016 Warsaw Joint Declaration with NATO and to call for a new Joint Declaration to be adopted at the July 2018 NATO Summit.

Jobs, Growth and Competitiveness

The European Council is expected to endorse the integrated country-specific recommendations as discussed by the Council, thus allowing the conclusion of the 2018 European Semester. In the field of taxation, the European Council will follow up on its informal discussion of 23 March 2018. It is likely to stress the EU fight against tax avoidance and evasion both internally and globally, while addressing the need to adapt taxation systems to the digital era, also taking into account the Commission proposals on digital taxation, and on VAT reform.

On trade, the EU remains committed to a rules-based multilateral system with an important role for the WTO. EU leaders are expected to discuss ways of improving its functioning, with regard to, inter alia, market distortive practices such as subsidies, and also ways of developing more effective and transparent enforcement of WTO rules. The European Council is also likely to reiterate its support for measures undertaken by the European Commission to protect the EU’s market in response to the US tariffs on steel and aluminium, including through legal proceedings initiated at the WTO.

Innovation and Digital Europe

During the meeting, leaders will most probably stress the need to deliver on the remaining legislative proposals concerning the Digital Single Market before the end of the current legislative cycle. The European Council will take stock of the informal discussion in Sofia on 16 May to call for a stronger and inclusive innovation ecosystem improving business access to financing, for encouraging greater risk-taking, and for promoting coordination between academia, industry and governments. It is likely to refer to the European Innovation Council pilot initiative under the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to support disruptive innovation. The European Council may also address the question of a European data economy, encouraging further action to foster trust in data treatment and full enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation for all economic actors in the EU single market. The meeting may also underline the need for a coordinated approach of the Commission and Member States on artificial intelligence, and call for a swift agreement on the latest Commission data package on copyright and e-Privacy.

Multiannual Financial Framework

Heads of State or Government will continue their discussions on the next MFF following their informal meeting of 23 February 2018, held in an EU-27 format as the discussions were ‘future-oriented’. This time the UK is expected to take part in the discussions. The first European Council since the publication of the Commission’s proposals on the MFF in May will focus on its future handling and timeline (i.e. whether or not concluding the MFF negotiations before the EP elections will be attempted). Some members, such as the Portuguese Prime Minister, Antonio Costa, and Angela Merkel, indicated their aim is to complete the negotiations during the current legislature. The European Council is most likely not going to commit to concluding the negotiations before the elections, but will ask Council and Parliament to accelerate the pace of their discussions.

External Relations

The Heads of State or Government could discuss the outcome of the recent G7 Summit in Canada and its impact on transatlantic relations, and come back to the issue of trade relations with the US. They could also raise other dossiers, such as the future of the Iran nuclear agreement.

The European Council might adopt conclusions on the Western Balkans. The timing of enlargement remains a divisive subject among Member States, and analysts are of the opinion that the decision to start accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania could be postponed, despite the Commission’s April 2018 recommendation in favour of their opening.

After the announcement by the governments of the Netherlands and Australia on 25 May 2018 that they ‘hold Russia responsible for its part in the downing of flight MH 17’, the European Council is likely to reiterate its October 2015 and October 2016 calls to fully establish the truth.

Other Items Composition of the European Parliament

While not part of the draft agenda, Heads of State or Government are expected to formally adopt the decision on the future composition of the European Parliament. The European Council has, under Article 14(2) TEU, the obligation to adopt by unanimity, at the initiative of the EP and with its consent, a decision establishing the composition of the EP. With 566 votes for, 94 against, 31 abstentions, the EP has already given its consent in plenary on 13 June 2018. If the European Council confirms this proposal, the number of MEPs will be reduced from 751 to 705 in the 2019-2024 legislature, following the UK’s exit from the EU. The decision also provides for partial redistribution, among some Member States, of seats now held by UK Members.

3. Euro Summit

The Euro Summit will take place in an ‘inclusive’ format (with 27 Member States, including the 19 euro-area members, as well as the other Member States which have ratified the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU, TSCG). The Member States’ representatives will discuss the long-term development of EMU, and the reforms called for during the last Euro Summit, on 23 March, notably the completion of the Banking Union, the development of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the deepening of EMU. They might also discuss the creation of a eurozone budget, as proposed during the Franco-German meeting of 19 June 2018.

4. European Council (Article 50) meeting

On 29 June 2018, the Commission’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, will update the EU-27 Heads of State or Government on the state of play in the Brexit negotiations. The European Council (Art. 50) will focus on the completion of work on withdrawal issues; the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland; and the framework for the future relationship with the UK. Following the latest round of negotiations, on 19-20 June 2018, Mr Barnier outlined the issues where progress had been made such as customs, VAT, Euratom and certificates for goods. He stressed however that ‘serious divergences remain on the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland’ and recalled ‘that the Withdrawal Agreement must contain a fully operational backstop solution for Ireland and Northern Ireland’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 28-29 June 2018‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read also ‘The European Council’s ‘rolling agenda’ on European defence cooperation‘.

Current membership of the European Council

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people with substance abuse issues.

Drug use can lead to addiction, which has harmful consequences for health. In 2015, around 3.5 million European adults used cocaine, 1.8 million amphetamines and 1.3 million opioids. The number of Cannabis users reached 23.5 million. Misuse of prescription medicines, such as sedatives, pain relievers and stimulants, is also a growing concern.

© Andy Dean / Fotolia

If you have a substance abuse issue, you might be interested to know that the EU has a drugs strategy and action plan. The aim is to reduce the health and social risks and harm caused by drugs, and to ensure that treatment offered to drug users will help them recover and reintegrate into society. The EU has also established a European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) to provide information at European level, and has created a consultative body, the Civil Society Forum on Drugs (CSF). In 2017, the EU adopted legislation to include new psychoactive substances (‘designer drugs’) in the definition of ‘drug’, and to set up an information exchange and an early warning system on them. Drugs-related health damage is among the priorities of the current EU health programme.

Some of the numerous projects financed by the EU to help people with substance abuse issues include a web survey on drugs; a network to strengthen research into the problem of illicit drugs; a responsive website and app for mobile devices for young consumers of new psychoactive substances, with background information, a self-assessment test and an intervention programme; and an initiative to improve training in addiction medicine for primary care doctors.

Further information

• Council of the EU, European Union Drugs Strategy 2013-2020, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/european-union-drugs-strategy-2013-2020/
• European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction’s website, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/about
• EPRS study on Technological innovation strategies in substance use disorders, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2017)581942

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition),

© olrat / Fotolia

The European Union’s efforts to reduce the negative impacts of transport include promoting a shift from road freight transport to lower-emission transport modes. This also includes combined transport operations, which consist of at least one road leg for initial or final haulage and one non‑road leg on rail or water. The 1992 Combined Transport Directive set out measures that were meant to increase the competitiveness of combined transport against road-only transport.

In 2017, 25 years after the directive entered into force, the Commission conducted a legislative review and proposed to simplify the existing rules and make combined transport more attractive by means of economic incentives. The initiative is part of the ‘mobility package’, a set of legislative proposals presented by the Commission to make EU transport safer, greener and more modern.

In the European Parliament, the TRAN committee is due to vote on its report in July, while the Council has found solutions to several issues, and published a progress report on 18 May 2018.

• June 2018: ‘Combined transport directive review: Getting more goods off EU roads‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 92/106/EEC on the establishment of common rules for certain types of combined transport of goods between Member States Committee responsible: Transport and Tourism (TRAN) COM(2017) 648
8.11.2017 Rapporteur: Daniela Aiuto (EFDD, Italy) 2017/0290(COD) Shadow rapporteurs:

 

  Claudia Schmidt (EPP, Austria)
Isabella De Monte (S&D, Italy)
Kosma Złotowski (ECR, Poland)
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE, Spain)
Marie-Pierre Vieu (GUE/NGL, France)
Jakop Dalunde (Greens/EFA, Sweden)
Georg Mayer (ENF, Austria) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote on draft report in committee

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for consumers purchasing smartphones.

Your smartphone provides you with many very useful services, such as communication, navigation, entertainment, and payment. As smartphones have become vital accessories for many people, it is important that they are reliable, safe and available when needed.

Thanks to EU rules introduced in 2018, you can buy your device from an online store in any EU Member State, at the same price, no matter which EU country you live in. EU law provides a legal guarantee period of two years, during which defective devices must be repaired or replaced free of charge. EU rules ensure that that you receive the documentation for your device in the language of your country and that mobile telecommunication products sold in the EU bear the CE label to show that they conform to safety standards.

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As a smartphone is only useful when its battery is charged, the EU promoted a universal charger for smartphones sold in the EU. The industry committed to use the micro-USB connector or a charger with a USB-connected detachable cable. So now (in most cases) you only need to carry one charger for all your devices.

If you forget to unplug your charger, you need not worry about your electricity bill. EU ecodesign regulations require that external power supplies use only negligible amounts of electricity (no more than 0.3 Watts) when not in active use.

Smartphones contain materials such as tin, tungsten, and gold, whose mining and illegal trade are often controlled by armed groups. To protect human rights, new rules will oblige EU manufacturers to take responsibility for the origin of imported minerals.

Further information

• European Commission FAQs on guarantees and returns, https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/shopping/guarantees-returns/faq/
• Parliament votes to end barriers to cross-border online shopping, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180202IPR97022/parliament-votes-to-end-barriers-to-cross-border-online-shopping
• European Parliament, Conflict minerals: the bloody truth behind your smartphone, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/world/20170314STO66681/conflict-minerals-the-bloody-truth-behind-your-smartphone

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for consumers purchasing electric appliances.

Electrical appliances such as refrigerators and washing machines are found in almost every European home, along with dryers, freezers, dishwashers and small appliances such as toasters and kettles.

Thanks to the internal market, EU consumers have a wide choice, as products that available in one EU country can be sold in all the others as well. EU law provides for a legal guarantee period of two years, during which defective products must be repaired or replaced without any cost to the consumer.

For the safe and effective use of your appliances, it is essential that you understand the instructions. That’s why under EU rules the manual must be available in the language of the country where the product is sold. EU rules also require electrical appliances sold in the EU to bear the CE label, to show that they conform to safety standards.

© JackF / Fotolia

When choosing an appliance, you tend to compare the function and the price. Thanks to EU energy labels, you can also see how much energy and water the appliance will use. Each appliance is labelled with a category from F (worst) to A (best). Thanks to EU rules on ecodesign, household products are becoming more energy efficient, and many products nowadays fall into class A, which has been divided into four subclasses (A, A+, A++, A+++). In order to keep up with technological progress and make the labels easier to understand, the labelling system is going to be revised to return to the F to A system, without subdivisions. Ecodesign rules also ensure that power consumption when appliances are on standby mode is negligible (no more than 0.5 Watts).

Further information

• European Commission FAQs on guarantees and returns, https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/shopping/guarantees-returns/faq/
• European Commission website on energy efficient products, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficient-products
• European Commission website on CE marking, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/ce-marking_en

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for lawyers without borders.

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Divergent national rules on access to the legal professions create a barrier for lawyers wishing to benefit from the internal market. So that lawyers can move freely, the European Union has enacted two tailor-made directives (in 1977 and 1998), enabling a form of mutual recognition of legal qualifications. Under this legislation, a qualified lawyer established in an EU Member State may provide legal services to clients in other Member States. They must use their professional title from the country where they are established, and must follow the professional conduct requirements of the country of origin and the host country. While the legislation allows lawyers to practice law permanently in a different Member State, the host country may require that the foreign lawyer act jointly with a local professional when representing a client in court. After three years of practice, a lawyer may join the legal profession of the host country without any additional examinations. As of 2012, some 3 500 lawyers have established themselves in another Member State and 300 lawyers have become fully integrated with the local legal profession.

Lawyers can also benefit from the rules of the Professional Qualifications Directive (2005). Member States may require either a three year adaptation period, or an aptitude test on local law. As of 2012, some 3 500 lawyers have had their professional titles recognised under this legislation.

Further information

• European Commission, website ‘Recognition of professional qualifications in practice (professions falling under specific legislation, lawyers), http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/services/free-movement-professionals/qualifications-recognition/specific-legislation_en
• Directive 98/5/EC to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31998L0005
• Professional Qualifications Directive, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:32005L0036

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for nurses without borders.

If you are one of the nearly 3.5 million nurses practicing in the EU and you are wondering which European countries offer the best job prospects in your line of work, here is a tip for you! In 2015, there were between 400 1 000 nursing professionals per 100 000 inhabitants in most of the EU countries, peaking at 1 191 in Luxembourg and Ireland, and falling as low as 260 or less in Slovenia, Greece, Croatia and Romania.

Under EU law, the training requirements for nursing staff in general care were harmonised across all EU countries. To prove you are qualified to work as a nurse in your new country of choice, you only need to apply to the relevant authorities in that EU country. Within a few months, these should be recognised automatically, and you can start looking for work.

© auremar / Fotolia

To further ease your move, the authorities in the EU country where you choose to move cannot ask you for certified translations of your professional qualifications, nor may they require certified translations of standard documents, such as identity cards, or passports. Obtaining a European Professional Card enables you to communicate with the authorities within a secure network. The card is electronic proof that your professional qualifications have been recognised. Finally, the EU also introduced Europass, a tool that helps you to present your skills and qualifications clearly and easily, to help you move for work throughout Europe.

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion website, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=457&langId=en
• Your Europe website, https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/work/professional-qualifications/recognition-of-professional-qualifications/index_en.htm

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass,

© Samuele Gallini / Fotolia

2018 is devoted to the European Union’s cultural heritage. This paper focuses on the evolution of the very notion of cultural heritage, its role and place in society, as well as the way it is perceived and interpreted in the context of related EU prerogatives. The European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018 is a result of this evolution, and allows EU citizens to gain a broad understanding of their cultural heritage in all its aspects, democratically share responsibility for it, celebrate it and benefit from the creation it inspires.

Despite the fact that the EU has limited powers in respect of cultural heritage – the role of the European institutions is generally limited to financial support, coordination of joint projects and efforts, and sharing of knowledge – it has contributed to raising awareness about preservation, conservation and restoration issues, technological research (for example 3D reconstructions) and scientific progress in technological solutions. Furthermore, the EU has become an international expert in the field.

See also our Topical Digest on Cultural heritage in Europe: linking past and future

Cultural heritage has been taken into consideration in numerous EU funding programmes, which has allowed Member States to undertake action to revive their national or local heritage, keep their traditions and crafts, and thereby develop their cultural tourism.

The European Parliament has adopted resolutions highlighting, inter alia, the dangers from which cultural heritage is to be protected both in the EU and the world, and underlining the necessity to address trafficking and looting of cultural heritage artefacts, the protection of cultural heritage, including traditional crafts, and the role of cultural heritage in sustainable tourism.

Read this briefing on ‘Cultural heritage in EU policies‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© stadtratte / Fotolia

Next week, European Union Heads of State or Government will discuss the politically charged issue of reforming the EU’s migration and asylum policies. Divisions among EU members over how to handle migrants were exposed again earlier this month when Italy’s new government tightened its migration policy, while the German ruling coalition faced a potentially destabilising rift over the issue.

The EU’s southern borders remain under pressure from irregular migrants escaping poverty and war in the Middle East and Africa. Although the 2016 agreement between the EU and Turkey significantly slowed the influx of migrants into Europe, the problem continues to be used for political gain by nationalist, anti-immigrant and populist movements across the EU.

This note offers links to commentaries and studies on migration by major international think tanks. Earlier papers on the same topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’, published in March 2018.

Merkel’s options, Europe’s future
Carnegie Europe, June 2018

The Conte government: Radical change or pragmatic continuity in Italian foreign and defence policy?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2018

Flexible solidarity: A comprehensive strategy for asylum and immigration in the EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2018

Italy’s new maverick government: Mixed signals for the EU, bad news for asylum seekers
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2018

Social innovation for refugee inclusion conference report: Maintaining momentum and creating lasting change
Migration Policy Institute, June 2018

Africa-Europe ties need a reset, but not just because of migration
Friends of Europe, June 2018

Refugees are a ‘win-win-win’ formula for economic development
Brookings Institution, June 2018

Syrian refugees in Turkey: Beyond the numbers
Brookings Institution, June 2018

Annual report on migration and asylum EU 2017
European Migration Network, May 2018

Refugee integration: Millennials do it differently
Friends of Europe, May 2018

Calls to begin returning refugees to Syria must be resisted
Chatham House, May 2018

Plugging in the British: EU justice and home affairs
Centre for European Reform, May 2018

Cinq thèses sur la ‘crise des réfugiés’ en Allemagne
Institut français des relations internationales, May 2018

On the way to a global compact on refugees: The ‘Zero Draft’, a positive, but not yet sufficient step
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2018

EPIM policy update
European Policy Centre, European Programme for Integration and Migration, April 2018

L’impact budgétaire de 30 ans d’immigration en France: (I) une approche comptable
Centre d’études prospectives et d’informations internationales, April 2018

Avoiding the sandstorm in the Sahel: A reflection on security, migration and development
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2018

La politique migratoire de l’UE, facteur d’instabilité au Sahel?
Confrontations Europe, April 2018

Europe’s great challenge: Integrating Syrian refugees
Rand Corporation, April 2018

Social distance, immigrant integration, and welfare chauvinism in Sweden
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, April 2018

Intelligente Grenzen und interoperable Datenbanken für die innere Sicherheit der EU
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2018

Migrationsprofiteure? Autoritäre Staaten in Afrika und das europäische Migrationsmanagement
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2018

The cost of remittances
Bruegel, April 2018

The EU remains unprepared for the next migration crisis
Carnegie Europe, April 2018

Responding to the ECEC needs of children of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and North America
Migration Policy Institute, April 2018

It’s relative: A cross-country comparison of family-migration policies and flows
Migration Policy Institute, April 2018

Leading the way? Italy’s external migration policies and the 2018 elections: An uncertain future
Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 2018

The future of the Schengen Area: Latest developments and challenges in the Schengen governance framework since 2016
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2018

Complaint mechanisms in border management and expulsion operations in Europe: Effective remedies for victims of human rights violations?
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2018

Les partenariats entre l’Union européenne et les pays africains sur les migrations: Un enjeu commun, des intérêts contradictoires
Institut français des relations internationales, March 2018

Scaling up refugee resettlement in Europe: The role of institutional peer support
Migration Policy Institute, March 2018

Balanced migration: A progressive approach
Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, March 2018

Oversight and management of the EU Trust Funds: Democratic accountability challenges and promising practices
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2018

On International Women’s Day: More focus needed on integrating migrant women
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2018

Cracked foundation, uncertain future: Structural weaknesses in the Common European Asylum System
Migration Policy Institute, March 2018

Read this briefing on ‘The migration challenge‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Roderick Harte,

© Maren Winter / Fotolia

On 1 June 2018, US tariffs entered into force for steel and aluminium imports from the EU, Canada and Mexico, following US President Donald Trump’s decision not to extend temporary exemptions. Argentina, Australia, Brazil and South Korea managed to obtain permanent exemptions as a result of deals struck with the Trump Administration. For all other countries, the US tariffs had already taken effect at the end of March 2018. After talks with the Trump Administration failed to result in a permanent exemption, the EU responded to the new tariffs by lodging a complaint at the WTO and instituting rebalancing measures on specific US exports. A safeguard investigation on steel imports into the EU is also on-going. Other US trading partners have responded in similar ways, raising fears that this could be the start of a full-blown trade war that would harm economic growth.

Background

On 23 March 2018, US tariffs of 25 % on steel imports and 10 % on aluminium imports took effect, following two Section 232 investigations that had concluded that such imports threatened to impair US national security. One day earlier, however, President Trump had decided to grant exemptions until 1 May 2018 to the EU as well as to Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico and South Korea. The purpose of these exemptions was to provide these trading partners with an opportunity to discuss and address the Trump Administration’s security concerns. On 30 April 2018, the US President decided to extend these temporary exemptions for another 30 days. This ultimately resulted in US agreements with Argentina, Australia, Brazil and South Korea that warranted permanent exemptions from the tariffs in one form or another (see Box 1).

Box 1 – Permanent exemptions obtained by Argentina, Australia, Brazil and South Korea
Four countries have struck deals with the USA, resulting in the following exemptions from the tariffs:

• Argentina: permanent exemptions from both tariffs after it agreed to absolute quotas on both its steel and aluminium exports.
• Australia: permanent exemptions from both tariffs (details on what it agreed to are not (yet) available).
• Brazil: permanent exemption from the steel tariffs after it agreed to an absolute quota on its steel exports.
• South Korea: permanent exemption from the steel tariffs after it agreed to an absolute quota on its steel exports (70 % of the annual 2015-2017 average) and improved market access for US exports of cars.

The EU also pursued intense talks with the Trump Administration to obtain a permanent exemption. Among other things, it made a specific offer for trade talks (see Box 2), but this ultimately did not satisfy the US Administration. Similarly, the USA did not achieve any major breakthrough in its ongoing renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico. President Trump therefore decided on 31 May 2018 that these three trading partners would not be granted any further temporary exemptions. The US tariffs subsequently entered into force on 1 June 2018 for the EU, Canada and Mexico.

Box 2 – EU offer for trade talks with the US in return for a permanent exemption
At the Western Balkans summit (Sofia) in May, EU leaders expressed a willingness to conduct trade talks with the Trump Administration in four areas, provided that the EU would first be granted a permanent exemption:
(1) Deepening of energy cooperation, in particular in the field of liquefied natural gas;
(2) Voluntary regulatory cooperation;
(3) Reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO), in particular unblocking appointments to the Appellate Body;
(4) Reciprocal market access for industrial products, including cars, and public procurement. EU response to the US tariffs

The EU’s response has been three-pronged, in line with the strategy outlined by the Commission in March:

1. On 26 March 2018, the Commission initiated a safeguard investigation in relation to the EU’s imports of 26 steel This investigation is on-going and enables the Commission to impose safeguard measures to protect EU producers in case of excessive imports due to trade diverted from the USA. Temporary measures could be applied as of July and potential exemptions are being discussed.
2. On 1 June 2018, the EU launched legal proceedings against the USA at the WTO by filing a request for consultations. Despite the Trump Administration’s justification of its measures on grounds of national security ( XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT), the EU considers these tariffs to be safeguard measures (in disguise) to which GATT security exceptions do not apply.
3. EU rebalancing measures will apply to imports of selected US products as of 22 June 2018, and could ultimately target up to €6.4 billion in US exports to the EU (see Box 3). In May, the EU notified the WTO of a list of US products that could become subject to duties. This list was subsequently approved by the Member States and adopted by the Commission in June 2018.

Box 3 – Two stage-approach of EU rebalancing measures

(1) The initial rebalancing measures taking effect on 22 June 2018 will be applied to around 180 products worth up to €2.8 billion in US exports. These include agricultural (e.g. bourbon, orange juice, corn), industrial (mainly steel and aluminium items) and manufactured goods (e.g. make-up, clothes, motor cycles, boats).

(2) After three years or after a positive WTO outcome, the EU will target an additional 150+ American products worth around €3.6 billion in US exports. These again include agricultural, industrial and manufactured goods.

The total amount of US exports that could eventually be targeted by the EU’s rebalancing measures would correspond to the amount of EU steel and aluminium exports hit by the US tariffs (based on 2017 figures). These measures are in line with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, according to the Commission.

Global responses to the US tariffs and potential trade wars ahead

In response to the US tariffs, other countries have taken steps similar to the EU, raising fears of a trade war:

• China imposed duties in April on 128 US products (mostly agricultural and industrial goods) worth US$3 billion in US exports. In June Mexico instituted duties on US exports worth US$3 billion, and Canadian duties targeting C$16.6 billion in US exports will take effect in July. Both countries’ measures target 100-200 agricultural, industrial and manufactured goods. On 21 June 2018, Turkey became the latest country to impose tariffs on US goods (worth US$1.8 billion in exports). Japan, Russia and India have notified the WTO of their intention to take similar action against the USA.
• Five countries have initiated WTO proceedings: China was the first to do so on 5 April, followed by India (18 May), Canada (1 June), Mexico (5 June) and Norway (12 June). Japan is reportedly also considering launching a WTO case and Canada filed an additional legal challenge under NAFTA.
• Turkey has notified the WTO of a safeguard investigation on iron and steel products.

At their recent summit, G7 leaders were unable to resolve their differences on trade. Initially, it had looked as if they had agreed on a joint communiqué that included a reference to ‘a rules-based international trading system’ and a vow to ‘fight protectionism’. Shortly after the summit, however, President Trump withdrew his support. It is not yet clear what this means for transatlantic cooperation on trade matters. Until recently, regular trilateral meetings between the EU, Japan and USA to discuss common trade concerns suggested that cooperation with the USA was still possible. On 14 June, the USA (and Japan) also requested to join WTO proceedings that the EU recently initiated against China in relation to technology transfers.

Fears of a trade war have also been stoked by rising trade tensions between the USA and China. Following the findings of a US Section 301 investigation, the two countries have been in talks for some time to address US concerns about Chinese trade practices related to technology. On 15 June, however, President Trump followed through on prior threats and imposed tariffs on up to US$50 billion of Chinese imports starting on 6 July, to which China responded in kind. The US President has threatened to target an additional US$400 billion in Chinese imports should China retaliate, which could result in a sharp response from China.

Box 4 – Will cars be the next target of US tariffs?
On 23 May 2018, the US Department of Commerce started a Section 232 investigation into US imports of cars and car parts. If this investigation determines that these threaten US national security, President Trump could take action to adjust US imports. He has previously expressed his readiness to impose tariffs on car imports from the EU.

Read this At a glance on ‘US tariffs: EU response and fears of a trade war‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.