European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Szczepański,

© zapp2photo / Fotolia

Through its industrial policy, the European Union (EU) has been striving to create conditions conducive to increasing industry growth and competitiveness since 1992. European industry remains a cornerstone of the economy, providing one job out of five and is responsible for the bulk of EU exports and investment in research and innovation. Today, the aim of EU policy is to enable a successful transformation towards a digital, knowledge-based, decarbonised and more circular industry in Europe. To reach this goal, the EU supports, coordinates or supplements Member State level policies and actions, mainly in the areas of research and innovation, SMEs and digital technologies.

In a recent Eurobarometer poll conducted for the European Parliament, more than half of EU citizens expressed support for increased EU action on industrial policy. Despite this, it is still the least understood policy area covered in the poll.

Since 2014, efforts have been made in a number of areas, including investment (mainly through the European Fund for Strategic Investment, which supports industrial modernisation); digitalisation (for example setting up a number of research partnerships, or a growing network of digital innovation hubs); financing (making it easier for industry and SMEs to access public markets and attract venture funds); greener industry (for example through the revised 2030 emission targets, or measures on clean mobility); standardisation (bringing together relevant stakeholders to collectively develop and update European standards); and skills (mobilising key stakeholders to close the skills gap and providing an adequate workforce for modern industry). The European Parliament has called for ambitious policies in many of these areas.

In the future, EU spending on key areas relevant to industrial policy is expected to rise moderately. The European Commission proposes to boost the share of EU spending on research, SMEs and key infrastructure, although not as much as Parliament has requested. In the coming years, policies are likely to focus on fairer global competition, stimulating innovation, building digital capacities and increasing the sustainability of European industry.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Industrial policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Percentage of respondents who would like the EU to intervene more than at present
• Expectations for more EU action than at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018
• Perception of EU action as adequate at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass,

© michelangeloop / Fotolia

The concept of cultural diversity lies at the heart of the European project. Recent years have seen renewed interest in the sector’s potential for promoting social cohesion, unity and tolerance, on the one hand, with continued recognition of its valuable economic role, on the other. There is a strong commitment at the EU level to ensure that culture is mainstreamed in all policy areas, with a special focus on the protection of cultural heritage and cultural diversity, which are key elements in cultural identity and expression. From the economic point of view, the cultural and creative sector, which employs 8.4 million people in the European Union, is dynamic and has a large potential for growth due to its diversity and scope for individual creative freedom. Yet the development of this potential is hampered by barriers, notably linguistic diversity, fragmentation and different financial mechanisms across the EU. The EU’s cultural and creative industry also faces challenge from digital technologies and global competition, particularly from the United States’ (US) audiovisual industry, and from US and Chinese diplomatic efforts to promote their cultural output.

Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the EU’s role in the context of cultural policy is a supportive and complementary one, direct responsibility in the area being largely a matter for the individual Member States. Nevertheless, since 2014, these challenges have been addressed at the EU level, inter alia via the strengthening of the digital single market, which is essential for access to culture, the circulation of European cultural works, the fair remuneration of creators and fair competition. Since the economic crisis, additional funding has also been made available for the sector via the European Fund for Strategic Investment introduced by the Juncker Commission in 2015.

As indicated in a 2017 European Commission communication on the role of culture and education, the synergies between the socio-economic aspects are to be enhanced. The European Year of Cultural Heritage in 2018 is to feed into a reflection and actions related to shared culture and history. These issues are addressed in the New European Agenda for Culture, while the new multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027 envisages increased funding for culture. This will also support efforts to combine artistic and technological skills, which are a prerequisite for artistic expression in the new digital environment.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Promoting European culture‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Market share of European films in terms of admissions % in 2016
• Cinema admissions in millions
• Unesco World Cultural Heritage Sites
• Investment in cultural diplomacy, 2014, in €million
• Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020
• Creative Europe budget in € million

Written by Christian Kurrer,

Allowing consumer electricity prices to fluctuate from one time of the day to another could help accelerate the transition towards renewable energies and drive down the costs of this transition. Electricity production from renewable sources, such as wind and solar energy, is expanding rapidly in Europe and around the world. However, integrating these fluctuating sources into the grid is becoming increasingly challenging for grid operators that need to match electricity supply with demand. Switching over to a new electricity market system, in which demand would better adapt to supply, could be crucial for the success of the transition towards a low-carbon society.

© Galaxy67 / Fotolia.

The amount of electricity that we consume varies significantly over the course of the day. Consumption generally goes up in the early morning hours and reaches a peak in the late afternoon. Up to now, utility companies essentially respond to intra-day differences in electricity demand by adapting the production of electricity accordingly. With fossil-fuel power plants, this can be done quite easily, provided that sufficient capacity is in place to cover the peaks in demand.

With the rapid increase of electricity production from fluctuating energy sources such as wind and sun, this picture is becoming significantly more complicated. On windy or sunny days, there can be an oversupply of energy that needs to be absorbed by the power grid, while on calmer and cloudy days, the electricity production rate drops sharply. In order to balance out supply and demand, utility companies need to either maintain expensive fossil fuel plants to cover occasional peak loads, or find ways to store electricity locally or redistribute it over longer distances. In the end, the increasingly high cost of storing or redistributing electricity is beginning to counterbalance the decreasing cost of renewable electricity production.

This is increasingly a problem not only for consumers and utility companies, but also for renewable electricity producers. Wind turbines, for instance, produce most of their electricity exactly at those times when all the other neighbouring wind turbines also produce at maximum rates, pushing down wholesale electricity prices. This is making it more difficult for wind energy to become economically viable without relying on government support.

The introduction of smart electricity meters now offers an opportunity to redesign our energy market system. Smart meters would allow operators to charge consumers variable rates throughout the day, which would follow the evolution of electricity wholesale prices. How would that affect the overall system?

Potential impacts and developments

At first, the change would perhaps not yet be dramatic: electricity would become cheaper for some hours of the day, but more expensive at other times. Most consumers would not necessarily check the current price of electricity before switching on the coffee machine or the hair dryer, just to possibly save a couple of cents. However, new, more adaptive smart electrical devices could start to appear on the market that would monitor electricity prices for us, optimise the way we use energy overall and lower our utilities bill. Examples could include washing machines or dryers that select for us the best time of the day to finish their job; freezers that lower their temperature when electricity is cheap to save electricity when it is more expensive; charging systems for electric cars that take advantage of the cheapest periods of the night to recharge their batteries; or stand-alone battery systems that would ‘buy’ cheap electricity from the grid when prices are low, and deliver it to the consumer when prices are higher.  

The greatest potential might however be in the area of building heating systems: most domestic heating systems today rely on fossil fuels to heat water, because oil or gas is (still) cheaper than the (average) price of electricity. However, if the price of electricity fluctuated sufficiently, it might become cheaper to switch to heating water electrically during certain periods of the day. This would not only allow heating bill reductions, but would also gradually replace oil and gas with electricity generated from renewable sources. Moreover, the storage tank for warm water, present in many households, could be heated electrically whenever prices are low, further reducing the need for fossil fuels at other times of the day.

In this way, fluctuating consumer electricity prices could not only lower our electricity bills, they could also reduce the amount of oil or gas we need for heating, as well as help push the decarbonisation of the transport sector. At the same time, the additional electricity used by these smart systems at times when wind and solar energy is most abundant would help stabilise electricity prices during these times and therefore boost the economic attractiveness of investing in more wind and solar power. The resulting positive feedback loop would therefore mean smart consumers would not only benefit from fluctuating electricity prices, but would also increase the economic viability of further investments in fluctuating renewable energy production.

Anticipatory policy-making

As wind and solar energy becomes an increasingly prevalent part of our energy production capacity, we need to fundamentally transform our consumer electricity market system to become more responsive to short-term fluctuations in electricity production rates.

This would require smart meters that adapt the prices of electricity to the supply, and at the same time, smart consumer devices such as heating systems that switch over to electricity whenever the fluctuating price of electricity falls below a certain level.  

From the technical point of view, smart meters and/or smart heaters are quite straightforward to develop, but initially, one without the other makes only limited sense. Political leadership, industrial coordination, financial incentives and the setting of common standards will be important for setting this transition in motion. Eventually, this would also require a different approach to the energy-efficiency labelling system. A smart freezer that could modulate its temperature according to electricity prices would perhaps use slightly more energy than one that maintains a constant temperature, but the cost of the electricity would be lower, and it would make more use of fluctuating wind and solar energy, and thereby help reduce carbon emissions.

Written by Etienne Bassot,

©EU2017 – EC

The Treaty of Lisbon is the current legal foundation for the work of the European Union and its institutions. Although there is at present no general debate within the institutions on the revision of the Treaties, senior EU politicians have recently hinted at the possibility of expanding Parliament’s powers. However, given that the ordinary procedure for revision of the Treaties is cumbersome and lengthy, and that the simplified procedure cannot be used to broaden EU competences, it makes sense to explore possibilities for unlocking the full potential of the existing Treaties as they stand now.

Characteristically, European citizens are less concerned about how precisely the EU institutions operate, than whether the Union is capable of delivering on specific policy issues of importance to them, such as consumer protection, free movement of citizens, irregular migration and combatting transnational crime and terrorism. Even in matters which lie at the heart of state sovereignty as traditionally conceived – such as the broad domain of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – large proportions of EU citizens call for more EU action. The expectations of the European public therefore represent an important guideline for the European institutions, and delivering upon such expectations, within the Treaty framework, contributes to enhancing the EU’s democratic legitimacy. In this vein, the present study explores the possibilities for unlocking the full potential of the legal bases already available to the Union, with a view to better delivering on citizens’ expectations. 

The European Union is a community of law, and therefore any action or measure undertaken by the Union institutions – whether legislative or non-legislative – no matter how much it is needed or how much citizens demand it, must have a solid legal basis in the Treaties. This is in line with the well-established principle of legality, which is a key component of the ‘rule of law’ principle. In the EU context of multilevel governance, the principle of legality is connected with the principle of conferral, meaning that the EU enjoys only such competences as have been explicitly conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties. Therefore, the EU co-legislators – the European Parliament and the Council of the EU – are bound by the will of the Member States, expressed in the Treaties, laying down the precise fields of potential EU legislative activity. Such rules are referred to, especially when it comes to enacting EU legislation, as legal bases. For the purposes of this paper, EPRS policy analysts have identified and analysed those legal bases which can be described as either unused or under-used. However, it must be remembered that the Treaties should not be read independent of their changing context. A ‘static interpretation’, sticking to the ‘original’ intent of the drafters, would quickly find itself out of touch with the changed context, both within the EU and in the wider world. The Treaties, including the legal bases for EU action, should therefore be interpreted dynamically, in order for the EU to be able to address new challenges.

The study is based on both legal analysis of the relevant Treaty articles and on policy analysis focused on current challenges, and how they could be addressed through more EU action. Obviously, it is up to policy-makers to decide which legal basis should be used to further action and what kind of EU action is needed. Our intention has been to demonstrate that there are still unused or under-used possibilities for the EU institutions to deliver even more in terms of citizens’ expectations and meeting current challenges. The outcome of the project, in the form of a systematic overview of the 34 under-used, or even unused, legal bases should be seen as a kind of toolbox for political decision-makers. The possible forms of EU action that have been identified might take, not only the most obvious one of legislation (i.e. adoption of directives or regulations), but also improving procedural mechanisms (e.g. moving beyond unanimity and unlocking the ordinary legislative procedure), enforcing delivery of legislation which already exists but the potential of which remains to be fully tapped, enhancing complementary administrative capacity at EU level (e.g. a European Anti-Fraud Corps), and finally, increasing financing in a given policy area.

Read the complete study on ‘Unlocking the potential of the EU Treaties: An article-by-article analysis of the scope for action‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Etienne Bassot,

© lazyllama, Andrey Popov, sdecoret, Zerbor, Richard Carey, Siarhei, SFIO CRACHO, peshkova, EdNurg / Fotolia; Lightspring / Shutterstock.com

This annual publication offers up-to-date insight from policy analysts in the European Parliamentary Research Service on ten key issues and policy areas that are likely to feature prominently on the political agenda of the European Union (EU) in 2019. Each of the ten contributors presents the state of play on the issue, highlights what the European Union is doing and the specific role of the European Parliament, considers possible interactions with the other issues, and looks to the future to identify some of the major staging posts ahead.

This new edition covers three clusters of issues. The institutional cluster starts with ‘A new European Parliament – A new European Commission’, focussing on the institutional implications of the new political landscape which citizens will define when they vote in the European elections in May 2019. It suggests the ways the new European Parliament may differ from the current and previous ones, and looks at how the new European Commission will be appointed. Next, this cluster puts the spotlight on ‘The way forward’ for a Union of 27 Member States, looking at the direction of the current debate and the future beyond Brexit. Finally, the ‘Future financing of the Union’ presents the content and objectives of the Commission’s proposals for the financial framework for the next seven years, and the Parliament’s ambitions and position in the negotiations.

Four geopolitical issues form the second cluster: first, the relationship between the European Union and Africa – referred to by the President of the European Commission in his 2018 State of the Union speech as our ‘twin continent’. This section looks at the push for stronger relations and explores potential partnerships. Then, ‘Trade wars’ takes stock of current relations between Europe, China and the United States and addresses the political, economic and legal implications and the EU’s response in this context. Next, ‘Internal security’ reveals how crime is increasingly becoming digital in nature and how the EU is dealing with the issue. Lastly, environmental and climate challenges are studied from an unusual perspective, albeit one constituting the largest part of the surface of our planet, namely the oceans. ‘Towards a policy for the oceans’ looks at the benefits of, and pressures on, the oceans, as well as at EU and global policies in this area, and at likely developments in the coming year.

Technological issues close the circle of these ‘Ten issues to watch in 2019’, starting with a reflection entitled ‘From artificial intelligence to collective intelligence’, which explores this emerging topic and the role of the EU in 2019 and beyond. This is followed by a piece on ‘Electric mobility’, looking at the growing market for electric road vehicles and EU action to support it. Finally a more general contribution on ‘Digital transformation’ takes stock of this omnipresent phenomenon and looks at how best to build a digital economy and shape the legal, ethical and regulatory framework it needs.

Complementing the two previous issues in this annual series, and the extensive offer of EPRS publications in general, this 2019 issue of ‘Ten issues to watch’ seeks to inform Members of the European Parliament and the broader public, and to stimulate reflection and discussion at the start of a decisive year for the future of Europe and its citizens.

Read this In-depth analysis on ‘Ten issues to watch in 2019‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou,

© doganmesut / Fotolia

Following the mid-term elections of 6 November 2018, the new United States Congress will start work on 3 January 2019 with a Republican majority in the Senate and a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives. The shift of power in the House is likely to affect key issues including oversight and immigration.

Background

The 2018 mid-term election recorded the highest voter turnout in mid-term since 1912, with over 116 million voters casting ballots, and 49.4 % of eligible voters participating. The election saw a record number of women elected to Congress, with the first Muslim women and Native American women among them. Immigration and healthcare were key issues for voters, but the election was also seen by many as a referendum on President Donald Trump.

As a result of the election, the Democrats took control of the House of Representatives, gaining 40 seats to hold 235 of the 435 seats overall. (One seat remains contested due to a dispute over alleged fraud: the 9th district in North Carolina.) The Republicans retained control of the Senate, gaining two additional seats, which brings their total to 53 of 100 seats. This allows them to confirm (or to withhold consent from) candidates nominated by the President for Administration posts, and to ratify (or block) international treaties. Through gaining a few more seats, Senate Republicans can afford some Republican defections on particular votes but still have a majority. With a divided Congress, passing legislation will now depend on both parties working across the aisle. However, according to opinion polls, few Americans expect bipartisan relations to improve.  

The current Congress returned from recess on 13 November and continued to work until mid-December. The new Congress will start work on 3 January 2019.

Implications of the change in the House of Representatives

With the House of Representatives under Democrat control, that party will hold both the influential position of Speaker of the House and committee chairs, as well as wielding the ‘power of the purse’. As a result, the Democrats should be able to set the legislative agenda, modify the rules of debate, conduct oversight hearings and allocate funds.

Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-California) has been nominated by her Democrat peers to be the next Speaker of the House, after initially facing opposition from a faction within her party. When the new Congress convenes, Pelosi will need to receive 218 votes in the House to officially become the next Speaker. Steny Hoyer (D-Maryland) will return as House majority leader (the post he held when the Democrats were last in the majority in the House) after running unopposed for the position. With House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wisconsin) retiring, the Republicans elected Kevin McCarthy (R-California) as minority leader in the House. Steve Scalise (R-Louisiana) will remain House Republican whip for this Congress.

The Democrats will now chair all of the committees in the House, owing to Congress’s ‘winner-takes-all’ system of assigning chairs. As a result, they will now be able to advance legislation to full chamber consideration as well as arrange oversight and investigatory hearings. Control of the Foreign Affairs Committee will mean that Democrats will be able to question the Administration on its foreign policy decisions, and advance legislation to the full chamber. Additionally, they will now influence foreign aid and military expenditure.

Key issues

Tariffs and trade: Congress has Constitutional authority (Article I, Section 8) to regulate commerce with foreign nations, conduct oversight on trade policy and pass legislation on the matter. However, in limited circumstances, the President may bypass Congress and impose tariffs by executive order. One of these is in the instance of ‘national security threats’. This mechanism comes from Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and it is the basis for President Trump’s tariffs on steel and aluminium. As a result, Congress can only stop the current tariffs by passing legislation that strips the executive of this authority, or overturns the executive action with a veto-proof majority. The level of support needed for the latter is unlikely to occur in this Congress.

The Ways and Means Committee has primary jurisdiction over trade in the House of Representatives and will face several contentious issues in the new Congress, given disagreements between the executive and legislature, but also within the Democratic Party itself. These include:

• ratifying the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA);
• future free trade deals with the EU, the UK and Japan;
• conducting oversight with regard to the President’s unilateral use of tariffs and the escalation of tensions with China.

There is legal uncertainty as to whether or not the President can unilaterally withdraw the US from free-trade agreements without Congressional approval.

Immigration: Under unified Republican control, Congress was unable to pass immigration legislation. Under a divided Congress, passing a comprehensive immigration reform package is an even more unlikely prospect in the next session. House Democrats intend to pursue more narrow immigration reform in the House that will protect those brought to the US illegally as children (DACA), retain highly skilled graduates and reform visa programmes. A policy that pursues these more narrow issues combined with increased border security may have a chance of seeing movement in the upcoming session of Congress.

Infrastructure: One of the first legislative packages that Democrats intend to introduce is designed to promote US$1 trillion in infrastructure investment. According to their proposal, this would create 16 million jobs and ‘invest in American iron and steel and new American-made green infrastructure materials’. Rebuilding US infrastructure is something that President Trump campaigned on. Following the mid-terms, he has signalled openness to working with House Democrats in this area.  

Oversight: Thus far, throughout his presidency, President Trump has enjoyed a unified Republican Congress. Consequently, his Administration has not had to endure the scrutiny which is likely to come from a divided Congress. Democrats will now be able to conduct oversight hearings in House committees where the Administration can be obliged to provide witnesses and documentation under subpoena. Democrats on the Oversight Committee have already listed areas they intend to investigate, ranging from national security issues to the President’s alleged financial conflicts.

Nominations: The power to consent to Presidential nominations lies in the hands of the Senate (Article II, Section 2). The change in House leadership therefore has no impact on forthcoming appointments.

Key new committee chairs in the House of Representatives

House Foreign Affairs Committee: Jurisdiction over investigations and legislation relating to foreign affairs.
Eliot Engel (D-New York) – Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD) participant and member of the EU Caucus.

House Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia and emerging threats: Relations between the US and the region. Oversees matters related to the regional activities of the United Nations, its affiliated agencies, and other multilateral institutions.
Gregory Meeks (D-New York) – TLD participant and EU Caucus co-chair.

Housed Armed Services Committee: Jurisdiction over defence policy, military operations, Department of Defence, Department of Energy.
Adam Smith (D-Washington) – TLD participant and member of the EU Caucus.

House Ways and Means Committee: Jurisdiction over taxes, tariffs, social security, Medicare.
Richard Neal (D-Massachusetts).

House Subcommittee on Trade: Jurisdiction over trade and related matters.
Bill Pascrell (D-New Jersey) – TLD participant. Source: European Parliament Liaison Office (EPLO), Washington, DC.

Source: European Parliament Liaison Office (EPLO), Washington, DC.

Read this At a glance note on ‘ The US Congress in 2019: What to expect ‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gianluca Quaglio,

Research gap between drug development and real world healthcare delivery © Pot Regnier/STOA Introduction

The STOA workshop entitled ‘Innovative solution for research in healthcare’, chaired by Paul Rübig (EPP, AT), first STOA Vice-Chair, is an opportunity to discuss the implementation of an ‘innovation-centred’ system, exploring a truly ‘patient-centred’ paradigm with systematically coordinated applied clinical research carried out in conjunction with drug development. The workshop will be held on 10 January 2019, 9:30-12:30, at the European Parliament in Brussels (Altiero Spinelli building, room 5E2).

Webstream

#HealthSTOA

In 2015, the Council of the EU, while accepting that there is no common definition of the term precision (personalised) medicine, noted at the same time that this is generally understood to refer to a medical model, which uses the characterisation of individuals’ phenotypes and genotypes for tailoring the right therapeutic strategy for the right person at the right time, and/or for determining the predisposition to disease, and/or for delivering a targeted prevention strategy.

As the number of authorised drugs that target specific proteins implicated in the disease phenotype increases on the market, and as next-generation sequencing and other technologies bring comprehensive genome-wide analyses to affordable levels, precision medicine begins to play a much wider role in routine practice.

However, once a drug enters the market following regulatory approval, each EU Member State determines its real-world use based on its own criteria: pricing, reimbursement and clinical indications. Such an innovation-centred clinical research landscape might neglect patient-relevant issues in a real-world setting. There is a demand for reform of the current system to create a truly ‘patient-centred’ paradigm, with systematically coordinated treatment optimisation in conjunction with the drug development process.

Two disconnected stages: from drug development to real-world application

In Europe, most of the clinical research dedicated to therapeutic innovations in drugs aims primarily at regulatory approval. In this first stage, scientific issues on the efficacy of a new drug are addressed in selected patient populations and lead up to European Medicine Agency (EMA) approval.

Once a drug enters the market, the second stage begins, where research addresses clinically relevant questions to tailor the therapeutic indications to ‘real-life’ clinical practice. Due to this discontinuity between the first and the second stage, research during the second stage results – for various reasons – in suboptimal uptake of findings into practice or clinical guidelines.

Administration of improper treatment may generate unnecessary toxicity for patients, but also affects national healthcare budgets and adds cost to already highly priced treatments. Therefore, following the drug development phase, independent investigations are needed on the optimal use of medicines (known as ‘treatment optimisation’).

Regulatory approval

The regulatory approval of new treatments does not address clinical issues relevant to patients in real-world settings, such as: (i) how to combine new treatments with the existing therapeutic options; most patients may need some form of combination therapy, which is determined individually, based on a number of clinical and biomarker predictors; (ii) how to evaluate the clinical outcomes when new treatments are administered in off-label indications; (iii) how to determine the optimal scheme/treatment duration and at which benefit/risk ratio; (iv) what the long-term issues related to the treatment are. When addressed, the above-mentioned issues are studied mostly following EMA’s approval and rely on the goodwill and agendas of independent research groups.

Reasons for a lack of real-world evidence

There are a number of reasons for such lack of real-world evidence, mentioned briefly here. First, regulatory approval of new treatments requires data on ‘quality, safety and efficacy’ and not on ‘comparability’. This approach is centred on the innovative treatment, as its value is assessed in absolute terms, not relatively to the pre-existing therapeutic armamentarium of medicines, equipment and techniques available. Second, in order to maximise the experimental treatment effect, patients included in clinical trials represent only 2-4% of the overall targeted population, leading to a poor external validity of clinical trials. Finally, there is a lack of evidence that would make it possible to rank the multiple therapeutic options available and define the conditions for optimal care.

Aim of the STOA workshop

This workshop will provide patients, clinicians, payers, Health Technology Assessment (HTA) agencies, regulators, pharmaceutical companies, researchers, policy-makers and the public at large with an opportunity to present their point of view and their innovative suggestions for future drug development in Europe.

The establishment of a new developmental framework through close collaboration between industry, patient representatives, and regulatory, governmental, academic and other stakeholders would hopefully facilitate comparisons of assay performance before regulatory approval, harmonising the approval process. Such a framework could mitigate the somewhat problematic current situation. The issue is ubiquitous in modern biomarker/drug development processes and is not related to particular targets or pathways.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for astronomers.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

European astronomers have always been leaders in exploring the final frontier. The EU helps to continue this tradition, regardless of whether astronomers are amateur or professional. In 2017, for example, a Belgian astronomer made international headlines with the discovery of seven Earth-like planets orbiting another star (Trappist-1 system), and a French astronomer discovered the existence of a ring around a dwarf planet in our own solar system (Haumea). Both discoveries were made possible through EU financial support.

© AZP Worldwide / Fotolia

The EU helps to fire up the next generation of astronomers through its financial support to the ‘EU-Universe Awareness project’. This initiative uses astronomy to inspire and encourage a lifelong interest in science among young children (aged 4 to 10). The EU’s support was used to develop the project in five EU countries from 2011 to 2013, and it has since grown into an international network of 16 EU countries.

The EU also pays for the development of world-class research infrastructure to ensure that professional astronomers can continue to conduct cutting-edge research. One example is EU funding of the ‘ASTERICS project’, supporting future collaboration between four new large telescopes. At the same time, the EU provides grants to ambitious astronomers, to encourage further important discoveries.

Every astronomer, whether working from an observatory or from their backyard, can enjoy the remarkable results of EU-funded projects, and hopefully future generations will be inspired to boldly go where no one has gone before!

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation, https://ec.europa.eu/info/research-and-innovation_en
• European Commission’s Community Research and Development Information Service, https://cordis.europa.eu/home_en.html
• Website of Universe Awareness, http://www.unawe.org/

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for watersports enthusiasts.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

European rivers, lakes and seas offer plenty of opportunities to practise watersports. Swimming is by far the most popular activity, but you can also dive, surf or sail, or paddle in a canoe or on a stand-up board.

None of these activities would be enjoyable without clean water. Thanks to EU rules, the vast majority of sites in the EU boast good or excellent bathing water quality.

© KarlGroße / Fotolia

Diving and boating also provide a unique opportunity to enjoy nature and observe marine wildlife such as birds and fish. To preserve this natural heritage, the EU has established the ‘Natura 2000’ network of protected areas that allow for the coexistence of wildlife with human activities.

To have an enjoyable and safe watersports experience, you need the right equipment, from swimwear to boats and paddles. Thanks to the EU internal market, you have a wide choice, as a product available in one EU country can be sold in all the others as well. Furthermore, under EU law, defective products must be repaired or replaced within a legal guarantee period of two years, without cost to the consumer.

When you venture out in a boat or with diving gear, your life and safety depends on the equipment. EU rules require watercraft and personal protective equipment sold in the EU to bear the CE label which shows that they conform to safety standards. For the safe and effective use of watersports equipment, such as life vests, it is essential that you understand the instructions. That is why EU rules require the manual to be available in the language of the country where you buy the equipment.

Further information

• European Commission website on bathing water quality, europa.eu/environment/water/water-bathing/
• European Commission website on Natura 2000, europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/
• European Commission website on CE marking, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/ce-marking_en

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for refugees.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

People who flee war and persecution in their own country have a right to apply for protection in another country as refugees. International refugee law obliges countries to provide access to protection and adequate reception conditions that respect applicants’ human rights.

© Andrey Popov / Fotolia

EU law upholds these principles and aims to ensure that all EU countries not only offer protection, but also have the same understanding as to who qualifies as a refugee. While the final decision to accord protection is taken at national level, EU law has shaped national provisions and added guarantees that a similar level of protection is available to refugees across the EU.

To help countries outside the EU that currently host large numbers of refugees, such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, the EU has also established a system for all EU countries to receive refugees directly from those countries. This is largely based on EU cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which helps to resettle refugees directly from refugee camps.

The EU also contributes through funding, both in and outside the EU. Within the EU, €7.4 billion funding is planned for 2015-2017. The EU also offers development and humanitarian aid to countries outside the EU, to help them strengthen their societies in the face of difficult times, and to support refugee reception and integration.

Further information

• European Commission, European agenda on migration, COM(2015) 240 final
• European Commission, Delivery of the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2017) 558 final
• European Commission, Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance. Forced Displacement and Development, COM(2016) 234 final
• European Commission factsheet, The EU and the refugee crisis, July 2016

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people travelling with cash.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

If you are travelling to or from the EU by air, road, rail or sea with €10 000 or more in cash you must declare it to the customs authorities. This obligation is not designed to make your life difficult but to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and other financial crimes. If you are travelling in a group, the €10 000 limit applies to each person individually.

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Cash includes not only banknotes and coins in circulation all over the world but also cheques, promissory notes, money orders and traveller’s cheques. It does not include currency out of circulation, antique coins, bullion coins and casino chips. Gold, precious metals and precious stones are not considered cash yet, but they will be soon.

The Cash Control Regulation, which is currently being revised, states that people who do not declare their cash may have it confiscated and receive a substantial fine. Customs authorities can carry out individual checks and checks on baggage and vehicles. All this may inconvenience law-abiding citizens, but it is done to prevent crime. You must fill in an EU Cash Declaration Form on entering and leaving the EU, in the official language of the country concerned. There are some non-EU language versions to help you understand the form if you are not from the EU.

Your personal information will be available to the intelligence agencies that monitor financial transactions, but it will be kept confidential to protect your security when carrying cash. Be aware that individual EU countries may have their own cash control rules and limits for travelling within the EU.

Further information

• EPRS publication ‘Controls of cash movements’, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593780/EPRS_BRI%282016%29593780_EN.pdf
• European Commission, website ‘Cash Controls’, https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/individuals/cash-controls_en
• The Cash Control Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005)
  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:309:0009:0012:EN:PDF

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for cross-border creditors.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

Around 50 % of all consumers shop online, and the number of cross-border transactions in the internal market is growing steadily. However, the individual value of such transactions remains relatively small, with almost half coming under €100. Because the amounts involved are small, not all contracts are properly performed, which sometimes leads to cross-border disputes, most of which do not end up in court. According to estimates, there could be as many as 0.5 million cross-border consumer cases of a value below €2 000 and some 130 000 such cases between businesses per year in the EU. The annual number of consumer claims for amounts between €2 000 and €10 000 is estimated at 84 000, and claims between businesses at 208 700.

© leszekglasner / Fotolia

To assist cross-border creditors who need to take a debtor in a different country to court over a small sum of money, the EU created the European small claims procedure in 2008. This simple, fast procedure is available only for small monetary claims in cross-border cases. Using ready-available standard forms, in all EU languages, its basic elements are identical throughout the EU.

Reform of the procedure in 2015 means creditors can now make cross-border claims up to €5 000. Court fees were reduced, and digital technology is increasingly used to take evidence, further reducing costs and making the proceeding easier.

Further information

• EPRS publication ‘Reform of the European Small Claims Procedure’, 2015, link1.euhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-565871-Reform-European-Small-Claims-Procedure-rev-FINAL.pdf
• European e-Justice Portal, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_small_claims_forms-177-en.do?clang=en

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people living in remote areas.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

If you live in a remote region, you will be aware of the unique challenges that arise from being a long way from urban areas, or possibly from certain geographical or demographic conditions. Despite their differences, islands, mountainous areas and sparsely populated regions are remote areas that share common challenges, including poorer access to a range of job opportunities and to basic services in areas such as transport, education and healthcare. In general, remote regions also experience lower economic growth than the rest of the European Union.

© marios_b / Fotolia

The EU plays an active role in helping remote regions to address these challenges and to exploit their development potential. EU-funded projects, for example, helped people living in a remote village in Sweden organise their own public transport by setting up a village bus and isolated people living in a sparsely populated Alpine region on the French-Italian border set up a homecare service system. Certain remote areas, referred to as ‘outermost regions’, benefit from specific EU measures, for instance, to support local agricultural production. The EU’s priorities include developing broadband coverage and enhancing the use of digital technologies in these regions, as this improves access to the job market and services. One example is an EU-funded telemedicine project aimed at providing medical services at a distance in remote parts of Saxony. In the case of mountainous areas, priorities include measures to fight environmental degradation and to promote energy efficiency and sustainable tourism.

Further information

• EPRS publication on ‘Islands of the EU: Taking account of their specific needs in EU policy’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573960/EPRS_BRI(2016)573960_EN.pdf
• EPRS publication on ‘Sparsely populated and under-populated areas’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586632/EPRS_BRI(2016)586632_EN.pdf
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/regional_policy/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1137

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

2018, the last full year of the current European Parliament’s current term brought tougher challenges and choices for the European Union than the previous year, when, in the words of European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, the ‘wind was back in European sails’, along with the economic recovery. Still, the passing year was better than the annus horriblis of 2016, when the EU faced a number of existential threats.

The 2018 agenda was dominated by US President Trump’s decisions, which raised the spectre of a trade war, Brexit negotiations, the unabated rise of populism and anti-establishment movements, unsolved migration issues, problems with the rule of law in some EU countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy moves and a gradual slowing of economic growth in Europe. Those events and processes featured in the debate on ‘What mattered in 2018 and why: What think tanks are thinking’, organised by the European Parliamentary Research Service in the Library Reading Room on 18 December. These tough issues and other developments form the backdrop for the European elections in 2019.

Speakers from major international think tanks who took part in the debate concluded that most of the challenges discussed have not yet been overcome and some might not even be resolvable for the time being. For example, the long-term stability of and sustainable growth in the European Monetary Union and a wider EU requires far-reaching reforms, involving considerable centralisation, and yet there is no political nor democratic appetite for that, said Maria Demertzis, deputy Director at Bruegel, an influential economic think tank. This is why, despite an ambitious reform agenda advocated by French President Emmanuel Macron, progress in reforming the EMU was limited in 2018. There is also no ideal solution to the migration problem, which has haunted the EU ever since hundreds of thousands of migrants escaping war and poverty in Africa and Asia made it to European shores in 2015 and 2016, noted Camino Mortera-Martinez, a senior research fellow at the Centre for the European Reform, a London-based think tank, which now has an office in Brussels. The refusal of several EU Member States to back the UN-sponsored Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, exposed deep divisions over the issue in the Union, as well as difficulties in formulating a common foreign policy in general.

Mortera-Martinez and others, including Dušan Reljić, head of the Brussels office of the powerful German think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, noted that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, now set for 29 March 2019, will wreak economic and political havoc, especially in the UK, where the political atmosphere is completely poisoned by the Brexit debate. Among the several possible scenarios, the least damaging in the short-term would be the approval of the agreed departure agreement in a crucial vote in January. It is also possible that the government falls, that there is what is known as a ‘hard Brexit’, or that a new referendum is held.

Wojciech Białożyt, Managing Director of the Warsaw-based WiseEuropa think tank, said central and eastern European countries, such as Hungary and Poland, were acting against their own long-term interest when they implemented judicial and other reforms that many EU politicians believe violate the bloc’s rule of law principle. While the Hungarian government has a constitutional majority to pursue the controversial changes, the Polish one however does not, thereby breaking its own constitution. Białożyt expressed hope that some new members from central and eastern Europe would stop attempts to weaken local institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, or the EU might face difficult choices as to what action to take.

All speakers agreed US President Donald Trump’s volatile policies posed the biggest threat to the global economy and rules-based, multilateral system. A full-blown trade war could throw the world into recession. Suggestions how the EU should react to Trump varied. Bruegel’s Demertzis argued that Europe should be ‘reactive’, so as not to exacerbate the situation. Others believed that the abdication of the US from its traditional role of benign protector of the global order offers opportunities for the EU to forge new trade ties and boost its defence cooperation and capability.

The EPRS conference was held under the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking‘ brand, which is also the title of a weekly publication that gathers links to recent think tank publications on a given topic.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Suzana Anghel,

© Fotolia

The meetings of EU Heads of State or Government that took place on 13-14 December 2018 dealt with a more extensive agenda than originally planned. The European Council set a timeline for the negotiations on the MFF, assessed the implementation of its comprehensive approach to migration, and announced that an in-depth discussion on the Single Market would be held next spring. On external relations, it discussed the February 2019 summit with the League of Arab States, expressed its concern regarding the escalation in the Azov Sea, welcomed progress in the field of security and defence, and addressed the issue of disinformation. Additionally, EU Heads of State or Government issued conclusions on climate change and the fight against racism and xenophobia, as well as on citizens’ dialogues and citizens’ consultations.

Due to developments in the UK, EU Heads of State or Government also needed to discuss Brexit. While the European Council (Article 50) provided assurances on the ‘backstop’, it reiterated that the Withdrawal Agreement ‘is not open for renegotiation’. At the Euro Summit, leaders endorsed the reform of economic and monetary union (EMU) by strengthening the role of the European Stability Mechanism and envisaging the possibility of establishing a euro-area budget.

1. European Council commitments: Implementation and new deadlines

Sebastian Kurz, Austrian Chancellor and President-in-Office of the Council, provided an overview on the progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions, as well as on the progress in MFF deliberations

Table 1: New European Council commitments and requests with a specific time schedule

Policy area Action Actor Schedule MFF Develop an orientation for the next stage of the negotiations, with a view to achieving an agreement Incoming Presidency Autumn 2019 Single Market Agree on as many of the pending proposals relevant to the Single Market as possible Co-legislators Before
18 April 2019 Single Market Hold an in-depth discussion on the future development of the Single Market European Council Spring 2019 Climate Change Provide guidance on the overall direction and political priorities in this field European Council First half of 2019 Disinformation Continue work on this issue and report back to the European Council Council March 2019 2. European Council meeting Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)

In the event, among the points originally foreseen for the MFF discussion, the European Council conclusions only address the issues of the timetable for negotiations, leaving out the definition of political priorities for the 2021-2027 MFF and the question of the overall level of expenditure for that period. Currently, the aim is for the European Council to reach an agreement in autumn 2019. This wording leaves room for interpretation: were there to be no agreement at the October 2019 European Council, the 12-13 December 2019 meeting could still provide a possible alternative date.

If the European Council only reaches a political agreement at the end of 2019, and if the timetable of the negotiating process for the 2014-2020 MFF were to be repeated, the Parliament and Council would not be expected to reach an agreement before the summer of 2020 at the earliest. Accordingly, the new European Parliament would be responsible for concluding the negotiations for the next MFF. Moreover, the European Council’s agreement on the MFF might come only under the next President of the European Council, since Donald Tusk’s second and final mandate ends on 30 November 2019. This could pose an additional challenge for the negotiations, in the event of delays and last-minute bargaining between Member States, as was the case during the last MFF negotiations (see EPRS Briefing).

Main messages of the EP President: The President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, reiterated the Parliament’s priorities for the next MFF, including the need for greater flexibility in the future EU budget and the need for sufficient progress on the Union’s own resources system, which is an essential precondition for obtaining the Parliament’s consent. He criticised the ‘negotiating box’ as presented by the Austrian Presidency, which ‘includes important parts of the legislative proposals for sectoral programmes’, and has therefore been ‘excluded from the negotiations with the Parliament and agreed only between Member States’. He also expressed his regret that it will not be possible to reach an agreement before the European elections.

Single market

EU leaders decided to hold an in-depth discussion on future developments in the single market and European digital policy in spring 2019, looking ahead to the next ‘strategic agenda’. Among the challenges to be addressed, they mentioned services, data economy and artificial intelligence.

Migration

In its conclusions, the European Council pointed out that the ‘number of detected illegal border crossings has been brought down to pre-crisis levels’. It nevertheless reiterated the need to remain vigilant on all existing and emerging migration routes. EU Heads of State or Government invited the co-legislators to rapidly conclude the negotiations on the Asylum Agency and the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG). While welcoming the agreement reached in Council on enhancing the EBCG’s mandate in the area of return and cooperation with third countries, the European Council also called for ‘further efforts to conclude negotiations on the Return Directive and on all parts of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)’. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, expressed his dissatisfaction with the outcome of the discussion, as the European Council did not come to a political agreement on the five (of seven) legislative proposals on the reform of the Common European Asylum System already close to agreement in Council.

Main messages of the EP President: President Tajani stated that the Parliament is only prepared to adopt the five proposals from the package on reform of the CEAS if the Council approves a negotiating mandate for the remaining two. Furthermore, the Parliament is very disappointed by the negotiating mandate adopted by Council on the EBCG, as it ‘lacks ambition’ and only addresses some of the elements proposed by the Commission.

Other items External relations

The Heads of State or Government discussed the preparation of the summit with the League of Arab States, to be held in Egypt in February 2019. The President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, expressed the incoming Romanian Presidency’s commitment to a results-oriented summit. The agenda could include trade, investment, countering illegal migration and the fight against terrorism.

The European Council expressed its concern over the situation in the Azov Sea and requested the release of all detained Ukrainian seamen, the return of the seized vessels and free passage of all ships through the Kerch Strait. It reaffirmed its support to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and reconfirmed the EU’s policy of non-recognition of the illegal annexation of Crimea. The President of France, Emmanuel Macron, and the Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, informed their colleagues about the lack of progress in implementing the Minsk Agreements. President Tusk announced agreement on renewing the sanctions on Russia following its illegal annexation of Crimea.

The EU leaders also discussed, without adopting conclusions, the situation in the Western Balkans.

Main messages from the EP President: President Tajani recalled that the European Parliament’s 2018 Sakharov Prize was awarded to Oleg Sentsov, a Ukrainian filmmaker and opponent of the illegal annexation of Crimea, detained by Russia since 2014. The Parliament had adopted several resolutions condemning the illegal detention of Ukrainian citizens by Russia, whilst the European Council had deplored this situation in March 2016.

Climate change

The European Council considered the outcome of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP24) held in Katowice, Poland, in December 2018, and referred to the November 2018 ‘strategic vision of the European Commission for achieving a climate-neutral economy by 2050’.

Security and defence

The European Council took stock of progress made since June 2018 on security and defence cooperation, notably on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), the European Defence Fund, and EU-NATO cooperation. It also endorsed the Civilian CSDP Compact adopted by the Council in November 2018 with the aim of strengthening and streamlining civilian crisis management.

Disinformation

The European Council discussed disinformation for the third time in 2018. It considered it as a form of hybrid warfare, stressing its challenge to democracy and free elections in Europe. President Tusk spoke of a ‘deliberate, large-scale and systemic’ threat which EU leaders are ‘determined to counter’. The latter called for the implementation of the Joint Action Plan on disinformation presented on 5 December 2018, following a request from the European Council.

Fight against racism and xenophobia

The European Council condemned all forms of antisemitism, racism and xenophobia. Chancellor Kurz expressed his satisfaction that the Heads of State or Government all welcomed the adoption on 6 December 2018 of the Council declaration on the fight against antisemitism

Citizens’ Dialogues and Citizens’ Consultations, and preparations for the Strategic Agenda

The European Council welcomed the Citizens’ Dialogues and Citizens’ Consultations as ‘an unprecedented opportunity to engage with European citizens; these could serve as an inspiration for further consultations and dialogues’. Moreover, EU leaders indicated that they will discuss the priorities for the next institutional cycle (2019-2024) at their informal meeting in Sibiu on 9 May 2019, with a view to agreeing on the next Strategic Agenda in June 2019.

3. Euro Summit

EU leaders endorsed the agreement on reform of economic and monetary union (EMU) reached at the Eurogroup meeting of 3 December: (i) the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), if sufficient progress in risk reduction is made by 2020; (ii) the ESM will be able, under strict conditionality, to provide precautionary loans to Member States and be more closely involved in the surveillance of countries’ finances. The Euro Summit asked the Eurogroup to come up with necessary amendments to the ESM Treaty by June 2019.

Building on the Eurogroup compromise, EU leaders gave finance ministers a mandate to work on the design of a euro-area budget, which would focus on convergence and competitiveness. The size of the new budgetary instrument will be decided in the context of the MFF. However, they did not mention a crucial missing piece in the Banking Union framework: the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). They also declined to envisage the euro-area budget having a stabilisation function.

4. Special European Council (Article 50) meeting

Contrary to original plans, EU-27 Heads of State or Government also met in the European Council (Article 50) format on 13 December. Donald Tusk called the meeting following the postponement of the vote on the withdrawal agreement in the UK House of Commons, initially planned for 11 December. The British Prime Minister, Theresa May, wanted to discuss with EU leaders ‘the clear concerns that the House has expressed’. Prior to the meeting, President Tusk indicated that EU leaders would ‘not renegotiate the deal, including the backstop, but are ready to discuss how to facilitate UK ratification’.

After listening to Mrs May’s assessment of the ratification process, EU-27 Heads of State or Government adopted conclusions which state clearly that the Withdrawal Agreement ‘is not open for renegotiation’. However, they provided an assurance that the backstop was purely intended to be ‘an insurance policy to prevent a hard border on the island of Ireland and ensure the integrity of the Single Market’. The EU-27 stressed that the aim was to work speedily on a subsequent agreement that would, by 31 December 2020, establish alternative arrangements, so that the backstop would not need to be triggered. It is also specified that ‘if the backstop were nevertheless to be triggered, it would apply temporarily, unless and until it is superseded by a subsequent agreement that ensures that a hard border is avoided’. The European Council also called for work on preparedness at all levels for the consequences of the UK’s withdrawal to be intensified, taking into account all possible outcomes. Following the announcement of President Juncker, the Commission published a further series of legislative proposals to cope with a ‘no-deal’ scenario on 19 December.

Main messages of the EP President: The backstop is the guarantee that there will not be a hard border on the island of Ireland. For the Parliament, this is not negotiable. While the Parliament is prepared to clarify the terms of future relations, the withdrawal agreement could not be reopened.

 

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© christianchan / Fotolia

After 2017 brought optimism for the European Union, 2018 has proved a year of tougher challenges and choices. It was a time of slower growth, with the spectre of a global trade war. Turbulent negotiations on Brexit brought an agreement, but the chances of its approval by the UK House of Commons look unpromising. It was a year of uncertainty for transatlantic ties and for US global leadership. Tensions re-emerged over migration. Progress in overhauling the euro-area was limited. The simmering Russia-Ukrainian conflict erupted again. These and other developments form the backdrop for the European elections in 2019.

This note offers links to recent selected commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on the state of the EU in 2018 and its outlook in several important areas.

Brexit

The proposed UK-EU Brexit deal: An explainer
Open Europe, December 2018

Le Brexit dans tous ses états
Institut français des relations internationales, December 2018

Brexit brief: Special edition
Institute of International and European Affairs, November 2018

New research shows economic and fiscal consequences of the Brexit deal
The UK in a Changing Europe, November 2018

The November Draft Withdrawal Agreement
Institute for Government, November 2018

The Brexit deal and the UK-EU security relationship
DCU Brexit Institute, November 2018

What happens if Parliament rejects May’s Brexit deal?
Centre for European Reform, November 2018

What impact would a No Deal Brexit have on European Parliament elections?
Institut Jacques Delors, November 2018

LSE blog: Brexit
London School of Economics, November 2018

Brexit: Next steps in UK’s withdrawal from the EU
House of Commons Library, 2018

More think tank papers on Brexit
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, December 2018

Trump and trade

Trump, Xi reach trade war truce… for now
Atlantic Council, December 2018

The Trump-Xi meeting at G-20: Kicking the can down the road
Rand Corporation, December 2018

What the 2018 (and 2020) elections mean for U.S. trade policy
European Centre for International Political Economy, December 2018

What might a Trump withdrawal from the World Trade Organization mean for US tariffs?
Peterson Institute of International Economics, November 2018

Consequences of U.S. trade policy on EU-U.S. trade relations and the global trading system
German Marshall Fund, November 2018

Disciplining China’s trade practices at the WTO: How WTO complaints can help make China more market-oriented
Cato Institute, November 2018

The EU response to US trade tariffs
Bruegel, October 2018

Crisis in the WTO: Restoring the dispute settlement function
Centre for International Government Innovation, October 2018

How the United States should confront China without threatening the global trading system
Peterson Institute of International Economics, August 2018

Power in the international trading system: Trump Administration risks destroying world trade order
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2018

More papers on Trump’s presidency, trade and international policies
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, September 2018

Foreign policy, defence

New realities in foreign affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st century
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2018

American climate leadership without American government
Brookings Institution, December 2018

Strategic autonomy: Towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence?
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2018

Western countries must rethink how to deter Russian aggression against Ukraine
Chatham House, December 2018

The EU and NATO: A partnership with a glass ceiling
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2018

From the Azov Sea to Washington DC: How Russophobia became Russia’s leading export
Atlantic Council, November 2018

Under the gun: Rearmament for arms control in Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018

Fighting terrorism and radicalisation in Europe’s neighbourhood: How to scale up EU efforts
European Policy Centre, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2018

NATO in the Trump era: Surviving the crisis
Clingendael, September 2018

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy
Real Instituto Elcano, July 2018

More think tank papers on global trends
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, December 2018

More think tanks papers on climate
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, December 2018

More think tank papers on China
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, September 2018

More think tank papers on Russia
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, September 2018

More think tank papers on NATO
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, July 2018

EMU reform, economy, institutions

Euro area reform: An anatomy of the debate
Centre for Economic Policy Research, Bruegel, November 2018

The European Parliament after the elections
Clingendael, November 2018

European fiscal rules require a major overhaul
Bruegel, October 2018

Reform of the international monetary system and new global economic governance: How the EU may contribute
Egmont, October 2018

The Italian budget: A case of contractionary fiscal expansion?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2018

European Parliament elections 2019: The litmus test for the Spitzenkandidaten process
Centre for European Reform, December 2018

ESM reform: No need to reinvent the wheel
Jacques Delors Institut, Bertelsmann Stiftung, August 2018

Competing visions of Europe are threatening to tear the Union apart
Chatham House, August 2018

Europe’s surprising economic success story
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2018

The future of the Economic and Monetary Union
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Clingendael, June 2018

More think tanks papers on EMU reform
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, November 2018

More think tanks papers on the State of the Union
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, November 2018

Migration

The Global Compact for Migration and the EU: Global effects of a regional backlash
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2018

À propos du Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2018

EU migration policies in the Sahel-stagnation in a mode of crisis
Clingendael, December 2018

Three years into the refugee displacement crisis
German Marshall Fund, December 2018

For a European policy on asylum, migration and mobility
Institut Jacques Delors, November 2018

EU migration policy bears no relation to reality
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2018

In search of a new equilibrium: Immigration policymaking in the newest era of nativist populism
Migration Policy Institute, November 2018

It’s not a refugee crisis: It’s a crisis of shrinking humanity and inequality
Friends of Europe, November 2018

Reforming Europe’s refugee policies: Austrian-Danish plan will not work
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2018

State of play in the debate on migration management in Europe
Clingendael, October 2018

More think tanks papers on migration
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, December 2018

Read this briefing on ‘2018: Challenges and choices‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Visit the European Parliament page on ‘Migration in Europe‘.

Written by Joanna Apap and Ionel Zamfir,

© nito / Fotolia

These figures are expected to grow for a number of reasons, including population growth, conflicts,increasing connectivity, trade, rising inequality, demographic imbalances and climate change. Migration provides immense opportunity and benefits – for the migrants, host communities and communities of origin. However, when poorly regulated it can create significant challenges. These challenges include overwhelming social infrastructures with the unexpected arrival of large numbers of people and the deaths of migrants undertaking dangerous journeys.

Today, over 258 million persons around the world live outside their country of birth. In 2017, high-income countries hosted 64 %, or nearly 165 million, of the total number of international migrants worldwide. Moreover, most of the growth in the global population of international migrants is due to movements toward high-income countries, which host 64 million of the 85 million migrants added since 2000.

The large-scale migratory flows affecting several regions in the world in the last several years have brought the plight of persons who are forced to flee their homes due to war, insecurity or persecution more forcefully than ever to the world’s attention. They have also exposed how ill-prepared the international community has been to deal with this challenge and how disproportionate the distribution of the burden of caring for such people has been among countries.

The number of international migrants includes 26 million refugees or asylum seekers, or about 10 % of the total number of migrants in the world. At the end of 2017, almost 20 million were recognised as refugees under the UNHCR mandate – a figure the UN agency considers a record.

Although a majority of the world’s international migrants live in high-income countries, low- and middle-income countries host nearly 22 million, or 84 %, of all refugees and asylum seekers. While critical voices have pointed to the lack of political will in developed countries as an explanation for this state of affairs, the causes are more complex and nuanced. Most often, refugees tend to move to neighbouring countries for practical reasons.

Moreover, there are huge discrepancies not only in the number of refugees hosted in the world across regions and countries, but also in the quality of protection offered. Many of the countries that host refugees, particularly developing countries in Africa and Asia, have either not ratified the Geneva Convention or do not comply with all their obligations. They hold refugees in camps, do not grant them the right to move freely and to work and rely largely on international solidarity to fulfil their basic needs. They do not provide a path to integration and naturalisation, generating protracted refugee situations. This encourages secondary movements of refugees, who try to reach countries offering more adequate protection and integration prospects, such as in Europe. These imbalances among countries and regions have clearly exposed the need for fairer burden sharing and more solidarity across countries.

To meet these growing challenges, the international community has adopted two distinct legally non-binding compacts on refugees and migration, respectively. The latter has received a lot of public attention and been the focus of much political controversy, while the first has been quietly adopted. As some commentators have failed to adequately distinguish between the two,it is important to highlight their distinct scope and role. Refugees are persons fleeing persecution in their home countries, as defined in the Geneva Refugee Convention. Persons who may face torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if returned to their countries of origin and thus deserve international protection are treated similarly to refugees under international law. For migrants, on the other hand, there is no international legal definition. The countries that have ratified the Geneva Convention – and this is the case for all EU countries – have clearly defined legal obligations with respect to refugees. This is not the case with migrants, although states are bound to respect general international human rights obligations towards any person on their territory, including migrants – such as the prohibition of arbitrary detention.

The drafting process was initiated in September 2016, when all 193 UN member states adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, paving the way for two non-binding international compacts on refugees, and migration. Two global compacts were prepared and negotiated during two years, a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and a Global Compact on Refugees. The Global Compact on Migration was prepared by the International Organization on Migration (IOM) through broad consultations with UN member states and stakeholders. This was endorsed by oral acclamation in Marrakech by164 UN member states after two years of negotiations. The compact on refugees was, on the other hand, drafted by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), which also underwent a similar rigorous consultations process. The Global Compact on Refugees was endorsed by the UN General Assembly on 17 December 2018.Conversely, the EU was both supportive and involved in the UN-launched process for the preparation of both global compacts.

The Global Compact on Migration, comprising of 23 objectives for better managing migration at local, national, regional and global levels, is the first ever UN global agreement on a common approach to international migration in all its dimensions. The global compact is non-legally binding. It is grounded in values of state sovereignty, responsibility-sharing, non-discrimination, and human rights, and recognises that a cooperative approach is needed to optimise the overall benefits of migration, while addressing its risks and challenges for individuals and communities in countries of origin, transit and destination. It will therefore be up to the Member States to implement it in full respect of their sovereignty. The EU has shared competence with Member States with regards to migration, and migration policy is a matter of domestic law.

Addressing issues such as a fairer distribution of refugees(e.g. through broader voluntary participation in UNHCR led-resettlement),better integration of refugees in their host society as well as supporting appropriate conditions for return to their home countries, are among the main objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees. The Global Compact on Refugees also encourages the involvement not only of state actors but also of other stakeholders, such as local authorities and private entities in responding to refugee crises. However, with regard to refugees, the Compact does not include any new commitments compared to the Geneva Conventions, but only practical solutions about how to implement these. The Compact explicitly states that it is non-binding. It also envisages involving refugees themselves and host communities in designing the appropriate policy responses. The Global Compact on Refugees proposes a global refugee forum at ministerial level, which, according to the third draft,will convene every four years from 2019. It will provide participating states with the opportunity to make pledges in various forms, such as providing financial, material and technical assistance to host countries; and providing resettlement places and complementary pathways for admission. The Refugees Compact includes a programme of action, which outlines a threefold set of solutions to end refugee crises, based on voluntary repatriation when conditions allow,integration into the host society and resettlement to third countries.

EU Member States, however, are bound by the EU Treaties to respect human rights and uphold the values of the Union as well as respect UN norms (Articles 2 and 3 TEU). The European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights will always have a role should a Member State fail to fulfil its obligations with respect to the EU treaties and,respectively, its human rights obligations. The UN universal periodic review is a further mechanism of oversight as to how well UN member states respect UN norms and values.

To read more on these two compacts, see our forthcoming EPRS briefings:

• A global compact on migration: Placing human rights at the heart of migration management by Joanna Apap
• A global compact : Strengthening international cooperation to ease the plight of refugees in the world by Ionel Zamfir

Written by Alina Dobreva,

© Silkstock / Fotolia

The Guarantee Fund for External Actions (GFEA) backs loans and loan guarantees granted to non-EU countries, or to finance projects in non-EU countries. It was established back in 1994 with the objective to help protect the EU budget against the risks associated with such loans. Although it had undergone amendments over the years, the Fund maintains its core purpose and managing it, the European Investment Bank (EIB) provides support to the EU’s external policies.

Currently, the main objective of the particular actions backed by the GFEA is to support the increase of growth and jobs, and to improve the business environment in developing countries by strengthening the involvement of the private sector. The GFEA resources are used to repay the EU’s creditors in the event of a default on a loan granted or guaranteed by the Union or for which the Union has provided a guarantee. The lending and guarantee operations are carried out for the benefit of a third country or for the purpose of financing projects in third countries.

The GFEA also contributes to the European External Investment Plan, which addresses the root causes of migration, the ongoing refugee crisis and security-related issues.

The main purpose of the EU budget guarantee is to act as a liquidity cushion covering default or late payments for projects in non-Member States. Once the beneficiaries of a loan to third countries fail to service its loans to the bank, the EIB calls on the GFEA to cover the default within three months of the call. The size of the contributions transferred to the GFEA is determined annually, depending on the budget that is adopted. The contributions for 2018 amount to €137.8 million, down by about €102.7 million compared to the2017 budget. Despite some criticism on the lack of sufficient geographical focus, focus on climate change and general sub-optimal use of the GFEA, it is an instrument that is appreciated by the stakeholders. Evaluations also recognise the flexibility of the ELM with regards to the Union’s external policy agenda, mentioning its adequate response to geopolitical and economic challenges as in the case of Syria, Ukraine (the Ukrainian crisis), Egypt and Morocco (the ‘Arab spring’) and Jordan (the refugee crisis).

Read the complete briefing on ‘How the EU budget is spent: Guarantee Fund for External Actions‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2018 – Source : EP

The December plenary session was marked by the terrorist attack that took place in Strasbourg on 11 December. Members had that very day debated the report of Parliament’s Special Committee on Terrorism, concluding its year’s work. The December plenary session also featured debates on the preparations for the same week’s European Council and Euro Summit meetings, as well as on the future of Europe, with Nicos Anastasiades, President of Cyprus. Parliament awarded the 2018 Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought to the imprisoned Ukrainian filmmaker, Oleg Sentsov, and adopted a report on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Parliament adopted the EU’s 2019 budget, and held debates and voted on proposals on a digital services tax; risk assessment in the food chain; risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work; revision of the statutes of three EU agencies; as well as an own initiative legislative report on expedited settlement of commercial disputes. Finally, Parliament adopted positions on seven of the three dozen proposed funding programmes for the 2021-2027 period, enabling negotiations with the Council to be launched.

Award of the Sakharov Prize

This plenary session marks the 30th anniversary of the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought, which this year goes to imprisoned Ukrainian filmmaker, Oleg Sentsov. Awarded annually for a specific achievement in human rights, the 2018 Sakharov Prize is recognition of Sentsov’s courageous contribution to the ‘Euromaidan’ resistance against Russian aggression in Ukraine, and as a representative of political prisoners worldwide.

EU-Japan Partnership Agreement

Parliament gave its consent, with a comfortable majority, to the conclusion of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, following a joint debate. The Strategic Partnership Agreement provides the legal framework for future EU-Japan relations, increasing the possibilities for cooperation between the two partners in areas such as combating climate change and cybercrime. Importantly for EU businesses, the Economic Partnership Agreement, the largest-ever bilateral free trade deal, will provide customs-free access to the Japanese markets for EU companies.

Digital services tax

During a joint debate on a proposed digital services tax, Members discussed and adopted reports on two proposals: for an interim digital services tax on revenues from certain digital services, and for corporate taxation of a significant digital presence. The first proposal would broaden the Member States’ tax bases, by making revenue from digital content services taxable in the short term. The second, for a permanent system, would define the circumstances under which a digital company’s ‘significant digital presence’ in a country would make it liable to pay tax. The final rules, however, require unanimity in the Council.

EU agencies: Cedefop, EU-OSHA and Eurofound

Members adopted interinstitutional agreements on proposals to revise the statutes of three decentralised EU agencies that support the EU’s wider employment-related objectives. Reports from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs confirm the need to define the agencies’ tasks to avoid any overlap. A new governance structure proposed for each agency should include independent representation on behalf of the Parliament on their management boards dealing with strategic and budgetary priorities.

Protection from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work

Members adopted, by a very large majority, the interinstitutional agreement on the second revision of the Directive on the protection from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work. The agreement sets a limit value for diesel vapour of 0.05 mg/m³, with a transition period of two years. The change to legal exposure limits to certain chemical agents will benefit an estimated 15.6 million EU workers.

Transparency and sustainability of EU risk assessment in the food chain

Members debated and adopted, by a comfortable majority, a report on risk assessment in the food chain, which supports the Commission proposal to revise the General Food Law to widen public access to commercial studies used by the European Food Safety Authority. Parliament also agreed to the ENVI committee opening trilogue negotiations on the proposal

EU-Ukraine Association Agreement

Against the background of continuing Russian aggression in the region, Members debated and adopted a report on progress on implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. While the report acknowledges the progress the country has made on implementation in very difficult circumstances, it nevertheless expresses dissatisfaction with the continued level of corruption and politicisation in the country’s institutions. Parliament also calls on the EU and its Member States to adopt targeted sanctions if Russia does not release captives seized in the Kerch Strait, or in the event of further military escalation.

EU Budget 2019

When budgetary conciliation on the first draft budget for 2019 failed to find agreement, the Commission put forward a new draft budget. Based on this second draft and subsequent negotiations, the European Parliament and Council agreed the general budget for the European Union for 2019 (with Parliament adopting the agreed text by 451 votes in favour, 142 against, with 78 abstentions), which sets out €165 795.6 million in commitments and €148 198.9 million in payment appropriations. Compared to the 2018 budget, this represents an increase of 3.2 % in commitments and 2.4 % in payments. Parliament also approved: draft amending budget No 6/2018, and two instances of mobilisation of the Flexibility instrument, to address the ongoing challenges of migration, refugee inflows and security threats, and to provide for the payment of advances in the 2019 budget.

Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on Terrorism

Parliament debated and adopted the final report of the Special Committee on Terrorism on the fight against terrorism in the EU. The report highlights that, while each Member State is responsible for its own national security, cooperation is vital to effective counter-terrorism and intelligence. The committee also underlined that an effective fight against terrorism requires, among other things: an appropriate data retention regime; an EU centre of excellence for preventing radicalisation; swift removal of terrorist content posted online; external borders that are well secured through interoperable databases and biometric checks; checks on financial flows; better tracking of suspects; and tighter control of explosives and firearms.

Expedited settlement of commercial disputes

Members considered, and adopted by a large majority, a report requesting that the European Commission make a proposal on expedited settlement of cross-border commercial disputes. The report proposes the introduction of a European expedited civil procedure to solve cross-border business disputes, to cut costs and accelerate the process of adjudication to 6-12 months by instigating tight deadlines and ending lengthy appeals on procedural grounds.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Thirteen parliamentary committee decisions (from ECON, REGI, ITRE, LIBE, JURI, IMCO, AFCO) to enter into interinstitutional (trilogue) negotiations were confirmed. Only one vote was held, on an Economic & Monetary Affairs Committee report on minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures, where the committee’s decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations was approved. Parliament also confirmed two Employment & Social Affairs Committee decisions, on a European Labour Authority and on the coordination of social security systems, following requests made during the November II plenary session.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – Strasbourg, December 2018‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Hepta / Fotolia

On 10 December 2018, at a conference in the Moroccan city of Marrakech, more than 160 United Nations members adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. This is the first multilateral framework providing a global response to migration, and comes at a time of mounting public concern about the issue, in particular in the EU and US. Even though the agreement is non-binding and serves more as a set of best practices for the international community to improve global cooperation on migration, nearly 30 countries, including the US and a number of EU Member States, have decided to oppose it. 

This note offers links to commentaries and studies on migration by major international think tanks. Earlier papers on the same topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’, published in October 2018.

The Global Compact for Migration and the EU: Globaleffects of a regional backlash
Istitutoper gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2018

À propos du Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2018

EU migration policies in the Sahel-stagnation in a mode of crisis
Clingendael, December 2018

Three years into the refugee displacement crisis
German Marshall Fund, December 2018

The costs of fuelling humanitarian aid
hatham House, December 2018

Is Italian agriculture a ‘pull factor’ for irregular migration, and, if so, why?
Open Society Institute, December 2018

For a European policy on asylum, migration and mobility
Institut Jacques Delors, November 2018

EU migration policy bears no relation to reality
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2018

Some EU governments leaving the UN Global Compact on Migration: A contradiction in terms?
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2018

Migration in the EU-ACP Partnership after 2020: Implementing the UN Global Compact
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2018

UN migration agreement leads to splits in the European Union
Atlantic Council, November 2018

Migration dynamics in play in Morocco: Trafficking and political relationships and their implications at the regional level
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2018

Real people, true stories: Refugees for more inclusive societies
Friends of Europe, November 2018

The future of migration policy in a volatile political landscape
Migration Policy Institute, November 2018

Welcome! And the Global Compact’s ‘continental pull-out’
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2018

Competing priorities at the EU’s external border
European Policy Centre, November 2018

Testing the water: How water scarcity could destabilise the Middle East and North Africa
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018

In search of a new equilibrium: Immigration policymaking in the newest era of nativist populism
Migration Policy Institute, November 2018

It’s not a refugee crisis: It’s a crisis of shrinking humanity and inequality
Friends of Europe, November 2018

Transformative technology for migrant workers: Opportunities, challenges, and risks
Open Society Institute, November 2018

Who secures the U.S. border?
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018

When facts don’t matter: How to communicate more effectively about immigration’s costs and benefits
Migration Policy Institute, November 2018

Cities and migration in Europe: All integration is local
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2018

Changing patterns of migration from Pakistan to Germany
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2018

Reforming Europe’s refugee policies: Austrian-Danish plan will not work
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2018

Creating legal pathways to reduce irregular migration? What we can learn from Germany’s ‘Western Balkan Regulation’
German Marshall Fund, October 2018

State of play in the debate on migration management in Europe
Clingendael, October 2018

States are challenging new policy that denies asylum to survivors of domestic violence
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2018

Notes for understanding African migration
Atlantic Council,October 2018

Not always on a boat to Europe: Movements of Africans within and beyond the continent
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, October 2018

Trump’s cuts to central America aid will lead to more caravans
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2018

Balancing acts: Policy frameworks for migrant return and reintegration
Migration Policy Institute, October 2018

Turkey’s migration policy revisited: (Dis)Continuities and peculiarities
Istituto Affari Internazionali, October 2018

The future of Schengen
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2018

The European Council and migration: Any progress?
Fundacion Real Instituto Elcano, October 2018

Applying behavioral insights to support immigrantintegration and social cohesion
Migration Policy Institute, October 2018

Read this briefing on ‘Migration‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.