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116/2016 : 26 octobre 2016 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-590/14 P

Cour de Justice de l'UE (Nouvelles) - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 10:28
DEI / Alouminion tis Ellados et Commission
Aide d'État
La prolongation de la durée de validité d’une aide d’État existante doit être considérée comme la modification de cette aide et donc comme une aide nouvelle

Categories: Union européenne

116/2016 : 2016. október 26. - a Bíróság C-590/14 P. sz. ügyben hozott ítélete

DEI kontra Alouminion tis Ellados és Bizottság
Állami támogatás
The extension of the period of validity of existing State aid must be regarded as the alteration of that aid and, therefore, as new aid

116/2016 : 26 October 2016 - Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-590/14 P

European Court of Justice (News) - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 10:28
DEI v Alouminion tis Ellados and Commission
State aid
The extension of the period of validity of existing State aid must be regarded as the alteration of that aid and, therefore, as new aid

Categories: European Union

116/2016 : 26. Oktober 2016 - Urteil des Gerichtshofs in der Rechtssache C-590/14 P

DEI / Alouminion tis Ellados und Kommission
Staatliche Beihilfen
Die Verlängerung der Gültigkeitsdauer einer bestehenden staatlichen Beihilfe ist als Umgestaltung dieser Beihilfe und damit als neue Beihilfe anzusehen

Categories: Europäische Union

Burkina : qui est l'adjudant Gaston Coulibaly, accusé d'être le cerveau d'une « tentative de déstabilisation » ?

Jeune Afrique / Politique - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 10:28

Activement recherché, cet ex-sous-officier de l'ex-Régiment de sécurité présidentielle (RSP) proche de François Compaoré est accusé d'être l'instigateur d'une récente tentative de déstabilisation contre les autorités burkinabè.

Cet article Burkina : qui est l’adjudant Gaston Coulibaly, accusé d’être le cerveau d’une « tentative de déstabilisation » ? est apparu en premier sur JeuneAfrique.com.

Categories: Afrique

Le Foll, Valls : entre lucidité et fol espoir

Le Point / France - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 10:26
VIDÉO. Le porte-parole du gouvernement reconnaît qu'en termes d'impopularité Hollande est au fond du trou. Mais, comme le Premier ministre, il assume le bilan.
Categories: France

Demandez le programme ! Bruno Le Maire

Fondapol / Général - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 10:25

La Fondation pour l’Innovation politique organise en partenariat avec le Parisien une série d’entretiens avec les candidats à la primaire de la droite et du centre. Découvrez sur notre site, les extraits clés de notre entretien avec Bruno Le Maire ainsi que les photos prises tout au long de cet échange. Retrouvez le programme de […]

Cet article Demandez le programme ! Bruno Le Maire est apparu en premier sur Fondapol.

Europe’s real crisis is complacency and inertia

Europe's World - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 10:22

‘Send not to know for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee.’

Ernest Hemingway borrowed the title of his celebrated Spanish civil war novel from 16th century English metaphysical poet John Donne. Now, the words are fast becoming a solemn knell for the European Union.

There is a sense of complacency enveloping much of Europe, contrasting uncomfortably with the resentful anger that is fuelling Eurosceptic populism. Unfortunately, when it comes to policymaking, complacency has the upper hand.

The warning bells that tell of Europe’s decline in terms of global influence, solidarity between EU governments and economic wellbeing have so far been little heeded. But they must be – or they risk becoming akin to Donne’s funeral chimes.

As I noted in my last column, the European project’s achievements over half a century still far outweigh its present shortcomings. But in a global economy and European political climate undergoing such rapid change, this is no time for the EU to rest on its laurels.

“We Europeans need to take a long, hard look at our current position and future prospects. They’re not encouraging”

We Europeans need to take a long, hard look at our current position and future prospects. They’re not encouraging. Quite apart from the ‘live’ issues pressing in on the EU – Brexit, the refugee influx and propping up the eurozone – Europe has deep and unresolved structural problems.

Generalisations are difficult. What’s defined as poverty or social progress in one EU country may not be perceived in the same way in others. Average figures, nevertheless, have the value of pointing to overall weaknesses.

Take demographic patterns. Patchy as they are in some member states (Germany is shrinking rapidly but the UK’s population is growing healthily, in economic terms), they offer vital lessons.

Europe has roughly four people actively in work for every retired pensioner. By the middle of this century, if not before, that ratio will have dwindled to 2:1. The implications for virtually bankrupt pension and social security systems are horrendous. So the first step is to get unemployed young people into work, whatever the cost. They are among Europe’s most precious assets.

Perhaps Europeans can square the circle by escaping the economic doldrums in which many have been trapped since 2008? If only. The forecasts point towards Europe falling further behind in the global wealth race. Average GDP per capita in the EU is now about two-thirds that of the United States, and is set to drop to three-fifths by 2025.

And the 2020s are shaping up to be a most unpleasant watershed. When top European business executives were surveyed by consultancy firm Accenture, a substantial majority thought China would draw ahead of Europe on technological innovation by the early part of the next decade.

“The first step is to get unemployed young people into work, whatever the cost. They are among Europe’s most precious assets”

Every year, Europe’s universities still account for half of the world’s major scientific breakthroughs. But for reasons that are well known – mainly a lack of capital and government help, but also an absence of entrepreneurism – these discoveries often don’t translate into commercial innovations.

These are uncomfortable facts. But they aren’t secrets hidden away from the public gaze. Sadly, nor are they part of the policy debate animated by national politicians or by the EU itself. If Europe’s voters are both complacent and seduced by the simplistic solutions of populism it is in large part because they don’t have the bigger picture.

The EU’s various arms grapple daily with most of these issues, and they report their progress in piecemeal ways and technocratic detail. What they avoid doing is tolling the bell that warns of overall, and perhaps irreversible, decline. That’s because they fear to appear ineffectual. But it is the only way to wake Europeans to the reality that no single EU country has the means to resolve these problems alone.

Giles Merritt is Founder and Chairman of Friends of Europe, and the author of Slippery Slope – Europe’s Troubled Future (Oxford University Press) which is shortlisted for the 2016 European Book Prize.      

Related content

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – European Parliament

The post Europe’s real crisis is complacency and inertia appeared first on Europe’s World.

Categories: European Union

Increased Great Power Competition Changes Strategy of “Swing” Powers

Foreign Policy Blogs - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 10:20

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Filipino Rodrigo Duterte ( The New York Times)

Intensified U.S.-Russian and U.S.-China rivalry is actually proving beneficial to several states as it increases their room for maneuver between the major powers and pushes them more toward a multi-vector foreign policy strategy. Unlike during the Cold War, where most states were either strictly aligned with one camp or the other, or non-aligned, these modern states have several features in common.

They are all: 1) U.S. allies, 2) situated at the geographical confluence of great power influence, 3) struggling with local nationalistic sentiment with respect to local great powers, and 4) eager to conclude trade and investment deals with these very same local great powers, particularly in energy and/or infrastructure. The Philippines, Japan, and Turkey are all case studies of this new phenomenon.

The Philippines

Recent attempts to portray the Philippines’ new President as a “strongman in the making” willing to “jump into bed with China” have been quite simplistic. Rather than making a full tilt towards China, the Philippines’ new foreign policy strategy is much more nuanced. The goal is to achieve more of an actual balance between the U.S. and China (as well as Japan and Russia). This approach will give the Philippines maximum flexibility to achieve its security objectives (U.S.), while simultaneously seeking new avenues of economic cooperation (China).

This strategy is a necessity not merely from a negotiating standpoint, but from an eternal geographic reality as well. In order to ensure that it will not be taken for granted by any party (not even its treaty ally, the U.S.), the Philippines needs to diversify its foreign policy “investment portfolio”. With respect to actual financial investment, the Philippines has chosen to take a level-headed approach to China after the recent favorable Hague South China Sea ruling. This has occurred despite widespread domestic opposition to China regarding its conflicting South China Sea claims.

The Philippines has used the court’s findings as a platform to begin negotiations with China, not end them. Economically, the Philippines is hungry for investment opportunities. Although the U.S. and, especially, Japan currently account for a sizable share of the Philippines’ inbound FDI portfolio, the Philippines is looking specifically at more infrastructure-related investment. Because of this, China’s traditional political conditions-free investment packages and its previous quick infrastructure investment turnaround times in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America have made quite an impression on the Philippines. Lastly, the opportunity to be part of China’s OBOR initiative, specifically focused on infrastructure, is highly appealing as well.

Japan

Japan, the anchor of the U.S.’s re-balance to Asia to contain China, is currently in the midst of its most independent foreign policy stance in quite some time.  Japan, still considered a great power in its own right for historical reasons, feels the pressure of great power rivalry even more acutely than does the Philippines. This is because Japan is situated in Northeast Asia, home to China and Russia, both of whom have had their own historical issues with Japan.

From a security perspective, Japan still considers the U.S. to be the bedrock of its overall security portfolio. However, Japan also can not ignore the potential benefit of enlisting other great powers in its own bid to counter China. In South Asia, India fits this bill perfectly. In Northeast Asia, Russia would be extremely useful to Japan in creating some strategic uncertainty on China’s northern and northwestern frontiers. Japan sees this Russian benefit despite their ongoing dispute over the Kuril Islands and strong domestic nationalistic undercurrents in both the Japanese and Russian populations on this particular issue.

Crucial to resolving the Kuril Islands dispute, and actually signing a peace treaty with Russia, is increased economic cooperation between the two neighbors. Resource-hungry Japan and geographically-proximate resource-rich Russia are a match made in heaven. Because of U.S. and European sanctions, Russia is desperate for much-needed infrastructure investment and technical expertise to more fully develop the Russian Far East. Japan has displayed a willingness to explore this possibility despite the application of its own post-Ukraine sanctions on Russia, although these sanctions aren’t quite as severe as their American and European counterparts. Lastly, these economic maneuvers with Russia are given increased salience due to the uncertain future of actual TPP passage.

Turkey

Turkey, a U.S. NATO ally, nonetheless has its own calculus to follow in crafting a holistic foreign policy strategy. Like the Philippines and Japan, this is a necessity for Turkey as it sits at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Asia. This rich historical and unique geographical position has led to hostilities with Russia in the past, eventually leading to the Crimean War, and with Europe, eventually leading to World War I, and presently continuing uncertainty over eventual EU accession and Syrian refugee crisis resolution.

More recently, Turkey’s relations with Russia had taken a nosedive due to the shooting down of a Russian airplane near Syria. At the time, it was widely assumed that this incident would strengthen Turkish solidarity with the West with respect to Russia in the wake of U.S.-Russian hostilities. However, the recent coup attempt in Turkey has altered this calculus with Turkish suspicions that the U.S. might itself, in fact, have been behind the coup attempt. As a result, Russia and Turkey have temporarily put the aircraft incident behind them with Turkey pursuing more of a balanced diplomatic track between Russia and the West.

This reorientation, however, is not without its problems as Turkey and Russia both have competing visions over Syria’s future. Regardless, the two powers have not allowed these differences to impede potential economic cooperation, already faltering post-Ukraine sanctions and post-Russian aircraft incident. The Turkish Stream project, once thought to be dead because of past Russo-Turkish hostilities, is currently proceeding apace. Ukraine is referenced yet again, as the project would allow Russia to export more gas to Europe through Turkey, bypassing Ukraine in the process. Lastly, this rapprochement has occurred despite historical Russo-Turkish domestic grievances with respect to influence over the Black Sea.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe meet in Vladivostok (RT)

The post Increased Great Power Competition Changes Strategy of “Swing” Powers appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Páncél nélküli hülyeségek. Az „O” osztályú német csatacirkálók. 2.

Héttenger - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 10:18

Az 1939 szeptemberére véglegesített paraméterek alapján a csatacirkálók –melyeket a német dokumentumokban többnyire gyors csatahajókként említenek- teljes hosszúsága 248,15 méter lett volna, szélessége 30 méter, merülésük a legnagyobb terhelés mellett 8,8 méter. A gerinctől a fedélzetig a hajótest magassága a főbordánál 15,5 méter volt, vagyis a vízvonal és a fedélzet közötti szabad oldalmagasság még a legnagyobb merülés esetén is elérte a 6,7 métert. Ez a német hadihajók között igen jó értéknek számít, főleg ha összehasonlítjuk az előző osztályokéval. A Scharnhorst esetében maximális vízkiszorítás mellett a szabad oldalmagasság alig 4,1 méter volt, és a Bismarcknál se sokkal több, mindössze 4,8 méter. A nagyobb oldalmagasság erősebb, a hosszirányú terhelést jobban bíró hajótestet jelent, jobb tengerállóságot, és legfőképpen nagyobb tartalék felhajtóerőt, vagyis a hajó a nagyságához képest nagyobb mennyiségű víz betörése esetén is felszínen tudta volna tartani magát, mint elődei.

[...] Bővebben!


Categories: Biztonságpolitika

115/2016 : 26 octobre 2016 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-211/15 P

Cour de Justice de l'UE (Nouvelles) - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 10:18
Orange / Commission
Aide d'État
La Cour rejette le pourvoi de France Télécom dans l’affaire de la réforme du financement des retraites des fonctionnaires rattachés à cette entreprise

Categories: Union européenne

115/2016 : 2016. október 26. - a Bíróság C-211/15 P. sz. ügyben hozott ítélete

Orange kontra Bizottság
Állami támogatás
The Court rejects France Télécom’s appeal in the case involving the reform of the arrangements for financing the pensions of civil servants working for that company

115/2016 : 26 October 2016 - Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-211/15 P

European Court of Justice (News) - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 10:18
Orange v Commission
State aid
The Court rejects France Télécom’s appeal in the case involving the reform of the arrangements for financing the pensions of civil servants working for that company

Categories: European Union

115/2016 : 26. Oktober 2016 - Urteil des Gerichtshofs in der Rechtssache C-211/15 P

Orange / Kommission
Staatliche Beihilfen
Der Gerichtshof weist das Rechtsmittel von France Télécom in der Rechtssache zurück, die die Reform der Finanzierung der Ruhegehälter der bei diesem Unternehmen beschäftigten Beamten zum Gegenstand hat

Categories: Europäische Union

Haïti : des unités militaires pour de l’eau potable

Déployés le 9 octobre à Haïti suite aux dégâts causé par l’ouragan « Matthew » quelques jours plus tôt, soixante sapeurs-sauveteurs de la sécurité civile ont œuvré durant 8 jours au profit de la population. Mission des militaires : produire et distribuer de l’eau potable.
Categories: Défense

New Debate on Wahhabism Threatens Saudi Arabia

Foreign Policy Blogs - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 09:58

Written By Shehab Al Makahleh and Theodore Karasik

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the richest Arab nation and the home to Islam’s holiest sites, must feel under siege these days. Pressure is coming from many fronts, among them a costly war in Yemen, diplomatic tensions with the U.S. over a new law in which families of 9/11 victims can sue Saudis, and low oil prices that have lead to financial austerity. However, a little-reported debate over the future of a strain of Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi creed could be a tipping point that destabilizes the whole country.

A consortium of UAE and Egyptian interests meeting of all places in Grozny, Chechnya, is the front line of this new pressure point. They are there to discuss Wahhabism, a Saudi belief system that breeds Salafist terrorists from al-Qaeda to Islamic State. In this sense, the Grozny venue is significant. The Wahhabi creed in the Caucuses region seems to have undergone its own “reformation” in recent years.

Gone are the days of Chechnya being a terrorist outpost in the Russian Federation, attacking aviation, transportation, schools, hospitals, and theaters. A new strain of Wahhabism is now an integral part of the Kremlin’s current drive to make Chechnya, under Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, a shining example of Islam and politics working in unison for social and economic development.

Kadyrov’s pro-Russian government sees Grozny as a model for expunging takfiri (violent excommunication) thinking from Wahhabism. Benefitting from intelligence from the Chechen community in Arab countries, the Chechen president plays a role in helping Russia, Syria, and Jordan to target Chechen networks in the evaporating Islamic State.

In other words, a functional model of political Islam is being generated out of all places from Russia. With backing from Egypt and the UAE, this new model of political Islam based on moderate, politically-oriented Sufism is now at the center of the discussion on Wahhabism. Sufi teachings focus on the spiritual rather than the political side of religion and tend to interpret main religious principles, such as jihad, as spiritual matters that one must tame and guide along the path of goodness.

Discussing Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabist creed in such a public forum with the active support and participation of the greater Arab world is a direct challenge to the vulnerable House of Saud. In addition to its external pressures, the Kingdom has new leadership following the death of King Abdullah in 2015, and an uncertain succession plan. The country is trying to deploy an ambitious new agenda, including a National Transformation Program (NTP) and a massive “Vision 2030” plan advanced by the Deputy Crown Prince.

This is a delicate balancing act: Saudi is trying to accommodate its young population with reforms and development, while placating older conservatives as well as the Kingdom’s clerics, many of whom adhere to the strict Salafist doctrine.

To boot, Sufis make up a tiny minority of the Saudi population. Although Sufis in Saudis faced repression under the Al-Saud, since the mid-2000s a reconciliation between Wahhabi and Sufi clerics has helped the latter feel more included in Saudi society. Now, with Sufism seen as a guiding light against Wahhabist Salafism, Saudi Sufis might make themselves heard in new ways on social media against the Saudi clergy.

Because of a focus on Sufism emanating from Chechnya, the Kingdom faces another pressure point and an accelerated threat to its stability. Why Arab allies, in conjunction with Russia, would try to undermine Saudi Arabia is questionable. Relations between Sufis and adherents of other non-Sunni religions and sects is largely friendly. This fact is especially true given the deep-rooted idea of pluralism in Sufi eschatology in addition to diverse cultural norms, which makes Sufism more open to neighboring religions and cultures. For the Kingdom, this fact may be too much.

The Salafi-Jihadists of al-Qaeda and Daesh will see an opportunity to exploit this debate to their own ends. They know that if Saudi Arabia’s creed is being debated, then the Kingdom will be in a weakened position. Terrorist attacks against key targets to bring instability to Saudi Arabia will be a primary objective. This new debate on Wahhabism will only empower extremists, not neuter them.

Dr. Al Makahleh is the co-founder of Geostrategic Media and Dr. Karasik is senior advisor at Gulf State Analytics.

The post New Debate on Wahhabism Threatens Saudi Arabia appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Une revue de programmes (et des priorités) s'impose

Le mamouth (Blog) - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 09:58
Les documents budgétaires, mais aussi les auditions parlementaires le font comprendre, même à un
Plus d'infos »
Categories: Défense

Focus Group on Corruption and Good Governance in Greece, 21/10/2016

ELIAMEP - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 09:52

On 21 October 2016, ELIAMEP organised in cooperation with Hertie School of Governance a focus group on the topic of corruption and good governance in Greece. The focus group took place in the framework of the Anticorrp project (www.anticorrp.eu) and it was led by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, professor of policy analysis and democracy at Hertie. The aim of the focus group was to discuss key issues concerning corruption and anti-corruption efforts in Greece in order to generate specialised knowledge in the field. The focus group brought together participants from the academia, the public sector, anti-corruption bodies, staff from the European institutions, legal practitioners and representatives from civil society.

The focus group started with a presentation of the Anticorrp project and the concept of corruption that is used in its framework. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi explained that corruption should be understood as a ‘governance regime’, encompassing any form of favouritism, legal or illegal, which results in the privilege or discrimination of citizens and companies by public authorities. Participants were subsequently invited to react to various questions. The discussion focused in particular on the following issues:

  • Why is Greece below the EU average on corruption? Is the country as corrupt as it was? Has there been any real redress?
  • Is there a domestic demand for less corruption? If yes, what forms does it take?
  • Has the Greek deficit been caused by corruption? If there are any causal links, have they been removed?
  • Has Greece become a merit-based society? Does corruption lead to brain drain? What should be done in order to promote meritocracy?
  • Corrupt societies discourage innovation. Is this true in the case of Greece? If yes, is any action taken to prevent this?
  • Are EU funds a resource for corruption or one for redress?

Participants exchanged views and opinions on the above mentioned themes and more broadly, they had a fruitful discussion on the pros and cons of anti-corruption strategies in Greece. One of the points they tended to agree upon was the significant improvements brought to the legal framework during the past few years in the context of the crisis, and largely in response to the reforms that the Greek government agreed with its lenders to undertake. The institutional anti-corruption arsenal has been substantially strengthened. However, implementation problems were said to persist mainly due to limited resources, the lack of personnel and expertise, and the absence of coordination and interconnected procedures. Participants also agreed on the lack of objective surveys and statistics on corruption in Greece. This allowed Prof. Mungiu-Pippidi to suggest research avenues for the future. For more information on the focus group, you can contact Dia Anagnostou (danagnos@eliamep.gr), Evangelia Psychogiopoulou (epsychogiopoulou@eliamep.gr) and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos (dsotirop@pspa.uoa.gr).

Article - Budget glossary: what the terms experts use mean

European Parliament - Wed, 26/10/2016 - 09:50
Plenary sessions : When it comes to budget talks, the stakes are high, but the terminology can be baffling. On Wednesday 26 October MEPs vote on Parliament's position regarding the EU's 2017 budget and the revision of the long-term budget, while in the afternoon the EU Court of Auditors presents its assessment of the 2015 budget. All of this is important, but it can be challenging to decode the terms used. Read our brief glossary to make sense of it all.

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP
Categories: European Union

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