Dominique David, rédacteur en chef de Politique étrangère, présente le numéro d’automne, consacré à l’Algérie : « L’Algérie, nouvelle puissance régionale ? »
Le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (3-2015), consacré à l’Algérie, vient de paraître !
Dans un environnement en feu, l’Algérie semble étrangement calme, mais les orages s’approchent : chute du prix des hydrocarbures dans une économie très dépendante, baisse d’une rente qui assure la paix sociale, blocage du système politique, déstabilisations du Maghreb (Tunisie, Libye…) et du Sahel (Mali…). Alger se retrouve face à des choix difficiles. Comment régler la succession du président Bouteflika, avec une société de plus en plus dépolitisée mais qui conteste l’opacité du régime ? Est-il possible de diversifier enfin une économie toujours structurée par la rente ? Comment se garder des désordres extérieurs ? Principale puissance militaire de la région, l’Algérie a choisi depuis des décennies le non-engagement extérieur, une option qui n’est plus viable. Au plan interne et au plan externe, le régime va devoir démontrer une souplesse qui lui permette de gérer des situations nouvelles et potentiellement très dangereuses.
Cette livraison de Politique étrangère s’attache également à deux thèmes majeurs de l’actualité de 2015 : le centenaire du génocide arménien, occasion de rapprochement entre Ankara et Erevan gaspillée, mais révélatrice, entre autres, des contradictions turques ; et la mutation des migrations internationales, en particulier celles qui concernent l’Europe et l’espace méditerranéen.
La négociation d’un éventuel TTIP, la vision chinoise des « nouvelles Routes de la soie », l’état de la Somalie, la piraterie dans le golfe de Guinée, les rapports entre les États musulmans et l’islam de France : autant d’autres sujets de réflexion développés dans ce numéro, au cœur des débats internationaux les plus présents.
Découvrez le sommaire ici.
Téléchargez le dossier de presse ici.
Achetez le numéro 3-2015 de Politique étrangère ici.
Abonnez-vous à Politique étrangère ici.
Flickr via donkeyhotey
Last Thursday, Greece was momentarily shaken out of its crisis funk when Alexis Tsipras announced that he was resigning from the post of Prime Minister and calling for new elections to be held on September 20th. Tsipras had only been in office since January, but he declared that his mandate had “exhausted its limits”. Having lost a third of his party’s support, the now ex-Prime Minister prefers to wager on the chance that a favorable majority will form by September rather than risk struggling with negotiating coalitions for the rest of his term.
Tsipras splintered Syriza, a radical left party, when he agreed to the bailout terms presented by the troika—the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund—just weeks after 61.3 percent of Greeks had voted against them on July 5th. Despite his drastic U-turn, polls still indicate that Greeks favor Alexis Tsipras as a leader over most other candidates. This popularity, however, is not very useful to a Prime Minister who faces a hostile parliament. Observers say that Tsipras had no choice but to agree to the creditors’ terms for another bailout. But for some, agreeing to the memorandum after holding a national referendum was the straw that broke the camel’s back. The party fractured itself between pro- and anti-memorandum partisans; the latter working hard to form stronger coalitions in order to oppose creditor conditions and leave the Eurozone to return to the Greek drachma.
On Friday, the former Energy Minister under Tsipras, Panagiotis Lafazanis, became the head of Popular Unity, a new left-wing party looking to bring together Syriza’s disenfranchised electorate and politicians. If the 25 Syriza MPs that defected to Popular Unity were not enough to cause a tight race, pressure is also mounting on the right. While radical socialists hurry to organize on time for elections and a caretaker government takes Syriza’s place, far-right party Golden Dawn is addressing the overlooked immigration crisis that Greece faces in the Aegean sea, at the expense of Tsipras’ and Syriza’s MPs.
Despite such active opposition, it seems unlikely that parties, especially newly-formed ones, will have time to campaign and win over many new supporters. Tsipras’ idea that next month’s elections will allow for a more cohesive government to form is not senseless. The former Prime Minister has gained right-wing voters at the expense of left-wing voters. Even if this was unintentional, the shift from radical ideologist to being perceived as a social democrat might work in his favor.
It is difficult to predict whether Tsipras is simply breeding more uncertainty for Greece’s future or if his resignation is a ploy meant to ensure stronger bargaining power on the national stage. Many say that Greece should be actively implementing reforms to meet the expectations of creditors, rather than putting Greeks through a new round of political brinkmanship. On the one hand, it may seem like Tsipras is stalling the implementation of strict austerity measures, but, on the other hand, he also appears to be heading in a direction that favors dialogue with the troika.
Tsipras’s new style of politics, which cost him a third of his party, is one driven by survival instinct. Steering away from the idealistic (and reactionary) goals first set by Syriza, a Greek utopia that wanted to avoid austerity while maintaining the Euro, Tsipras is now appealing to wider political base.
A 2013 Pew Research Center poll indicated that a majority of EU citizens considered Greeks to be the least hardworking country in Europe. This kind of stereotype demonstrates the finger-pointing tendency that the Jacques Delors Institute warned against: “It is of crucial importance that backward looking criticism will be replaced by forward looking constructive dialogue on how to strengthen the euro”. According to the Institute, that aims to advise European Union leaders, the EU needs to customize its approach to countries’ economies in the future and invest in Greek industries in a way that will trigger growth. Rafael Correa, Ecuador’s President, who knows a thing or two about sovereign debt, told Euronews in June, “All those measures are not meant to overcome the crisis, they are just to liquidate the debt”.
However, irrespective of the outcome of the vote, I would venture a guess that Tsipras, both lacks the political will and the common sense to see through the reforms demanded by the creditors. The Greek default, often compared with Latvia’s, Iceland’s, Ireland’s or Argentina’s, is nevertheless unique. Athens not only lacks a strong export sector or any significant comparative advantage over other EU members (the much-touted olive oil and cheese industry only account for $790 million worth of exports), but the shabby state of the Greek institutional framework and inefficient court system render the austerity-driven bailout vacuous.
Increasing the country’s competitiveness through austerity measures without bolstering its manufacturing sector, imposing tax hikes without strengthening its tax collection capacities, selling off state assets without stamping out corruption, and holding elections on the fickle platform “paying lip service to the creditors while bemoaning the European diktat” are the wrong ways to put Greece back on track. As much as some pundits have tried to spin the Greek crisis into a case of victim blaming whereby evil European creditors snuffed democracy in the name of finance and at the expense of the Greeks themselves, without deep, comprehensive structural reforms Athens will be dead in the water.
China watchers around the world are alarmed at the significant fall in Chinese stock markets and many are warning that the recent crash has alarming prospects for the underlying Chinese economy. Their worries reached new heights following the 8.5% drop in the Shanghai Composite Index on Monday – the biggest fall in eight years. Many attempts were made to stem the decline in the stock markets, including the banning of short-selling and new listings, the threat to arrest short sellers, the freezing of close to half the companies traded, and massive influx of state capital to buy shares. Perhaps in an attempt to prop up the financial position of its exporters, a supposed one-time yuan devaluation of 1.9% was announced last Tuesday by the People’s Bank of China. Since then, the yuan (or renminbi) has had its value cut an additional two consecutive days.
Some prominent China watchers are calling into question the Communist Party’s ability to control not only its stock markets, but also other policy-making areas. Paul Krugman, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2008 and professor of economics and international affairs at Princeton University, calls the Chinese leadership “naked emperors” and says “they have no clue what they’re doing.” Despite Krugman’s admonition, the Party may have a few tricks up its sleeve.
Beijing has been expanding its reach in other markets, such as Africa, where ten out of the top twenty fastest-growing economies between 2013 and 2017 are located according to the International Monetary Fund. Indeed, it has done so for some time now, with China’s trade with Africa reaching an estimated $200 billion in 2012. Chinese companies are also winning massive infrastructure contracts to build railways, airports, highways and ports, typically supported by large, state-owned financial institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of China. Most of the financing of these large projects is tied to procurement of Chinese equipment, machinery and materials—a boost to its exporters. And many Chinese have flocked to Africa to set up small retail stores and sell cheap Chinese-made household items.
Yet, while providing new markets for Chinese state-owned enterprises and traders may help improve China’s gross domestic product (GDP), this strategy is not without risk. As Howard French, author of China’s Second Continent relates, it is “outcomes that count.” Chinese citizens and companies have been welcomed by many African leaders who believe they can quickly build much-needed infrastructure. And in many countries they have done just that. However, French reports in his many travels throughout Africa, that some of the Chinese-built infrastructure is substandard, with airports subject to flooding or newly-built highways crumbling. In another example, French points to the “outraged Ghanaians who seem to have awoken one recent day to the discovery that thousands of Chinese newcomers were scrambling illegally to take control of their country’s lucrative gold mining sector, digging up the countryside, despoiling the land, and bribing local chiefs and police officials in the process.”
If Chinese policy-makers want to sustain their stated GDP growth near 6-7 percent for the near future, increasing the number of countries their exporters have access to would certainly help. With Chinese-led initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS New Development Bank, and the Silk Road Fund, their exporters and state-owned enterprises could well gain access to new markets. But given the backlash many Chinese companies are now facing in Africa, new efforts will need to be undertaken to improve their behavior—lest better-governed countries turn to their competitors.