As the old saying goes, the more things change, the more they remain the same. Somalia seems ahead of the curve as the debate over how to ensure a legitimate outcome in the upcoming August 2016 election is already underway. Still, the fact that the whole debate on political legitimacy within the country is limited to the upcoming election in and of itself indicates that little has changed.
The Somali state did not disintegrate because of elections or lack thereof. It disintegrated because of institutional injustice and the chronic meddling of foreign powers. That is why the state imploded and over million people died. It’s also how clan-based balkanization or “federalism” has come to destroy an already ailing state by keeping it in a state of perpetual dependency and subjugation.
Make no mistake, the most serious existential threat facing the Somali nation is the status quo.
Any time that the peripheries resort to entering into international relationships that first and foremost serve the interests of the elite, haphazardly signing agreements with foreign countries, and building clan militaries, they make the recovery of the state an increasingly impossible task.
What’s on First?In broken nations, all political issues of contention must be renegotiated and reconciled before the nation can be pieced back together and the healing process can be set in motion. Through such process, trust is cultivated and sustainable peace is achieved. However, the process must be both genuine and indigenous.
Failing to recognize these fundamentals or haphazardly rushing into a power-sharing arrangement only exacerbates the problem. Somalia has a quarter-century-long experiment to prove that. Placing the Somali political dilemma within the fallacious framework that election is a panacea undermines the direly needed debate on justice, reconciliation, and breaking the shackles of foreign dependency.
What Might be a Viable Alternative?Under the current system, where foreign political actors, particularly from Ethiopia and Kenya, dominate the process, genuine reconciliation is a pipedream. Total transformation of the current system that perpetuates status quo is an imperative. After all, it is not only the Somali state that failed; the international community and those who have squandered Somalia’s resources have allowed the state to fail.
The system at hand has sustained itself by periodically reinventing itself. On the domestic end, by partnering with “leaders” who possess relentless appetites to hoard executive power, the state has locked an entire branch of the government in “on-the-job-training” by annually changing prime ministers and their cabinets.
Regionally, the system has sustained itself by partnering with states — such as Ethiopia and Kenya, who are legally in Somalia as part of AMISOM — bent on implementing their own thinly disguised zero-sum schemes to co-opt Somali political actors in order to expand their spheres of influence. Internationally, the system has allowed the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) to replace the stained United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). This change did little to prevent Somalia from being trapped in a perpetual transition. Decisions are dictated; lucrative security projects are sustained; corruption and economic exploitation are facilitated; and shadowy characters are allowed to maintain backdoor entries to keep the cash flowing. The abuses and financial costs placed on the Somali state by the international community and its regional partners far outweigh their benefits.
As I have argued before, it is time to cut this umbilical cord of dependency. It is time to focus on bilateral strategic partnerships in which parties could hold each other accountable. The benefits are self-evident, as practically all foreign financed successful development projects in Somalia are the byproducts of nation-to-nation relationships.
Misplaced Focus, Erroneous OutcomeA few individuals have recently proposed a couple election-focused alternatives. The most prominent of said proposals argues, in essence, that political legitimacy requires sidelining the federal parliament, empowering regional actors and their clan exclusive parliaments, while arbitrarily keeping political parties with any Islamic identity at bay. This proposal, needless to say, considers reconciliation before power-sharing as irrelevant, the Somaliland issue as an independent problem, and constitutional reform as a priority over reconciliation.
While these may satisfy certain domestic and foreign actors and special interests groups who may see benefit in another four years of transition, they by no means ensure legitimacy.
By contrast, Gurmad Movement underscores the importance of reclaiming Somalia’s right to independently shape its political future and craft its own strategy to pull the nation out of its current subservient dilemma. Real legitimacy, according to Gurmad, could only be attained through a Somali-led process that is negotiated in the interest of the collective good, not by drive-thru legitimization process that may or may not be motivated to maintain the status quo.
All proposals agree that an election of some sort will be necessary in August 2016. According to Gurmad’s proposal at least, the current federal parliament should be given a conditional two-year extension, at which point the parliament would have to complete, among other things, the establishment of the Constitutional Court and National Reconciliation Commission, and elect an interim president for that duration.
The election process must be open to ensure fair participation of any and all candidates who possess fresh ideas to salvage this dying nation.
No More Scotch Tape SolutionsDespite the façade of sustainable recovery, beneath the veneer of Mogadishu’s rapid development is societal erosion rooted in an innate hopelessness perpetuated by lack of genuine reconciliation.
Against that backdrop, the need for indigenous discourse and a process to repair this broken nation and inspire its demoralized and beaten psyche is a dire priority. But you would not know that from the actions of the current political actors, domestic and foreign. That is why Somalia is caught in that stubborn Sisyphus effect, where we as a nation periodically roll the bolder of peace to the top of the hill, only to helplessly watch it roll back to the bottom.
One of the most prevalent fallacies that prolonged the status quo of distrust, division and sporadic hostilities in Somalia is the erroneous claim that the multifaceted Somali political conundrum could be solved by holding an election.
Herded LeadershipThe many shepherds herding Somali leadership has been one of the corrosive phenomena that facilitated the systematic destruction of the Somali nation. The current government is just one example. There is the irrefutable failure of its political strategy, its failure to pay its soldiers for over six months, which has caused insecurity to exacerbate, and its reputation as the poster child of corruption. It certainly occupies a infamous and unique space in history.
Granted, the herded leadership — both in the center and the peripheries — as well as those within the civil society who are direct beneficiaries of the current arrangement, may attempt to torpedo any transformative effort that threatens the status quo. Neither of these entities have the necessary public support withstand any type of resistance.
At this do-or-die moment, Somalia needs more than random political belches from its so-called leaders. Granted, at all times, leaders ought to be judged, not by what they promise, but by what they deliver. It needs leaders who would govern ethically and justly, who would lead the nation in the best interest of Somalia and its people.
Difficult as it may seem, history attests to the fact that when the human will is driven by good intention and a willingness to compromise for peace, it can beat all odds and overcome all obstacles. Failure is not a permanent status unless those who experience it opt to make it so!
It goes without saying: The Somali people desperately need transformational leaders whose vision, strategy, courage and willingness to sacrifice for the common good will help prevent the nation from self-destructing.
A Necessary FoundationReconciliation is the foundation that is yet to be built for sustainable peace to materialize. Somalia is a broken nation that is handicapped by a generation long bloodshed and trauma.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom of Somalia’s political elite and power brokers, reconciliation is not made up of powwows, artificial communiques, and photo opportunities in banquet halls. Rather, it is a deliberate and a systematic process driven by a comprehensive strategic plan fully understood and implemented by the Somali people.
Reconciliation is necessary as it deflates the hateful narrative that sustains inter-clan distrust and enmity. It opens a new page for negotiating the terms of a social contract that will allow for co-existence. It enables the center and the peripheries to recognize their interdependence. It plays a significant role in teaching future generations that impunity and the habit of sweeping problems under rugs only makes matters worse. It sets in motion a genuine process of repairing our broken nation.
Finally, reconciliation is a critical post-conflict element necessary for healing and trust-building; it is a noble objective and a process that takes time. Neither its pace nor its broad impact could be rushed for political expedience.
Photo Credit: U.S. Army Africa
Skepticism over vaccines isn’t just an American problem anymore.
As Africa celebrates one year of being polio free, renewed controversy over the polio vaccination efforts in Kenya may threaten to push back that milestone.
Last week, the Kenyan Conference of Catholic Bishops announced its intention to boycott the World Health Organization’s (WHO) polio vaccination campaign until authorities verify the vaccine will have no sterilization effects. Those skeptical of the vaccine’s effect on fertility claim it may be laced with sterilizing elements — namely beta human chorionic gonadotropin (beta-hCG), a chemical produced during pregnancy that is claimed to be used to sterilize women — and demanded the drug be tested independently.
The Catholic Church in Kenya’s skepticism of vaccines is nothing new. In 1995, the WHO proposed a similar campaign to vaccinate against tetanus. Kenya’s Catholic bishops protested, citing concerns over the presence of beta-hCG, and the WHO gave up on the campaign.
Nearly two decades later, the debate over the WHO and UNICEF’s joint vaccine program came to the fore yet again. The program sought to inoculate newborns against a severe form of tetanus by targeting women of reproductive age (15–49). In a statement released in November 2014, the Catholic Health Commission of Kenya and the Kenya Conference of Catholic bishops asserted they now have proof these vaccinations contained beta-hCG.
Public health officials have responded to these accusations by raising two points. Even if beta-hCG is there in trace amounts — which it shouldn’t be — the bishop’s own report has found it’s not at levels high enough to cause permanent damage a woman’s reproductive health. As James Elder, a spokesman for UNICEF, told the Washington Post in November 2014, its presence would be a result of “extremely rare contamination,” not some secret depopulation program.
Alternatively, these tests could have come up with a false positive. In a 1995 article detailing the tetanus vaccine controversy, the authors noted that the testing mechanisms being used by hospital laboratories were insufficient. Many used pregnancy tests, which do test for hCG in women but are inappropriate for testing a vaccine. The combination of certain chemicals in the tetanus vaccine make it highly likely these results were simply false positives.
The recent controversy over the polio vaccine, then, is just an extension of a much longer debate between large multi-national organizations and national authorities. The Kenyan bishops’ skepticism, at its core, isn’t an issue with Catholic writ large.
Today, what debate there is in the church at the institutional level is over whether it is or is not moral to vaccinate one’s self or one’s family with vaccines consisting of stem cells. Even here, church officials note, “the burden of this important battle cannot and must not fall on innocent children and on the health situation of the population — especially with regard to pregnant women.” In the case of Kenya, the burden the bishops are asking their parishioners to take falls squarely on that demographic.
Indeed, the Kenyan church’s position points more to concerns over the activities of these large, seemingly opaque multinational institutions, such as the WHO and UNICEF. The church’s boycott may be misguided and misinformed, but their actions seem to be rooted in a desire for more transparency and better protection of the country’s citizens. Given the country’s recent struggles with corruption and security, it’s easy to see where those broader concerns may be coming from. Still, whatever the deeper reasons for their objections, keeping a new generation of Kenyans polio-free is definitely in the church’s best interests.
Canada made an agreement recently to adopt the radar technology behind the Iron Dome anti-aircraft missile system. In an agreement between ELTA Systems, Rheinmetall and the Canadian Government, a version of the radar behind the Iron Dome will be produced in Canada in cooperation with companies from Israel and Germany. Delivery of the Iron Dome to Canadian forces is set to begin in 2017.
With Russia’s increased investment in defense in its Arctic region, Canada hopes to use their new Iron Dome-inspired system to manage any possible threats in the north. Despite minimal threats to Canada coming from aircraft and ballistic missiles, the Canadian defense system will replace an almost non-existent air defense capability that had eroded after the removal of Canada’s ADATS system a few years ago.
The logic behind Canada’s need for an Iron Dome-like system sheds light on what NATO anticipates will be international security concerns abroad in the near future. The system may serve as a starting point for a low-cost NATO-wide system that could deter Russian aircraft and missile systems in Eastern European countries concerned with rebel movements near Russia’s border. The Iron Dome also allows for an easing of tensions and reduction of causalities in many cases, so it’s as much of a political tool as it is a technological instrument. The system also allows for the targeting of other missiles and mortars, possibly giving it the ability to knock down missiles like those from the
There is a slight possibility that an Iron Dome-type system will find its way to countries in the Middle East that are at odds with Iran but would not purchase defense technology from Israel directly. Balancing the Russia’s S-300 in Iran with a system like the Iron Dome may contribute to reducing the use of ballistic missile technology from both sides, keeping the conflict limited to alternative military systems. Besides the S-300, the Iron Dome is likely one of the best systems for targeting medium-range threats.
Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff talks with Vice President Michel Temer during the launch ceremony of Brazil’s 2015/2016 agriculture program in June. REUTERS/Bruno Domingos
A poll on Thursday revealed new lows for embattled Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, with her approval rating hitting eight percent – the lowest of any Brazilian president in the last three decades. Datafolha, the polling institute, found that 71 percent of respondents described her administration as “bad” or “terrible,” up from 65 percent in a June poll. Only eight percent percent described it as “great” or “good,” compared to 10 percent in June. More importantly, Brazilians are fed up – two out of three said they would support her impeachment.
Support for Rousseff’s impeachment has grown in the last several months and has been largely fueled by growing unrest triggered by the country’s worst economic downturn in 25 years. Inflation hit a multiyear high of 9.25 percent in mid-July, and the long-running political kickback scandal at state-run oil company Petroleo Brasileiro (“Petrobras”) has captured headlines.
Although Brazil has a formal mechanism for impeachment and has impeached leaders in the past (former President Fernando Collor de Mello was impeached in September 1992), calls for Rousseff’s impeachment by legislators have so far been muted. Former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and other senior leaders of the opposition Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) have so far not publicly backed impeachment. Even one of Rousseff’s main opponents, Eduardo Cunha (speaker of the lower house of Congress) wrote an opinion piece last Friday arguing an impeachment is too risky for Brazil’s fragile democracy.
But legislators’ patience is wearing thin. Last Wednesday, the governing coalition in Congress failed to pass a lower chamber bill intended to raise salaries for police officers, prosecutors and government attorneys. This latest failure comes just six months Dilma’s second term, and it reveals the waning confidence of her allies and a possible turn toward her opponents. Her main ally, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), reportedly sat down for dinner with senators of the opposition PSDB last week and discussed a potential pact to govern moving forward.
Eurasia Group, a New York-based political risk consulting firm, believes the call for impeachment could be realized if Rousseff’s approval rating continues to drop. Three other conditions must be met: 1.) a direct link between Rousseff and the corruption; 2.) former President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva failing to support the current administration; and 3.) the opposition gathering behind the call for impeachment.
The PSDB is hoping to establish a direct link between Rousseff and bribe money used to fund her re-election campaign. Yet they may not need it – Dilma is now being accused of manipulating government accounts. Should that link be established by a federal audit court ruling in late August, impeachment proceedings by Cunha could be initiated in the lower chamber.
And former president Lula’s support for Rousseff may falter, after news last Monday of another arrest tied to the Petrobras kickbacks – that of Jose Dirceu, the ex-president’s former chief of staff. Lula is also being investigated for helping influence the award of contracts to Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction company, for contracts in Panama and Venezuela. Many of the allegations date back to Lula’s administration and may weaken his standing and ability to protect Rousseff.
The final condition, that of the opposition gathering behind impeachment, could gather steam should Rousseff’s popularity continue to fall and ability to govern become more impaired. Opposition leaders are increasingly facing pressure from protestors, many of whom gathered last Thursday night in major cities to bang pots and honk horns during the television broadcast of a political commercial featuring Rousseff, Lula and other Workers’ Party officials. The next test could come on August 16, when crowds are expected for a nationwide protest against Rousseff – the first protest the PSDB will openly support.
Photo Credit: Kremlin Press and Information Office
Kyrgyzstan has canceled a two decades-old agreement governing U.S. economic aid in response to the State Department’s decision to recognize a jailed human rights campaigner with a prestigious commendation. The dispute concerns Azimjon Askarov, who was arrested in 2010 for “inciting ethnic hatred.” Askarov, a member of Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek minority, filmed rioting by Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in June 2010 that claimed that lives of 400 people. The Kyrgyz-led government in Bishkek accused Askarov of encouraging the violence and handed him a life sentence. Since then, international NGOs and human rights groups have called for Askarov’s release, alleging he is the victim of political and ethnic persecution.
The State Department’s recent decision to bestow the Human Rights Defender Award on Askarov follows years of work to obtain his exoneration. In response to the award, Kyrghyz President Almazbek Atambayev accused the U.S. of “trying to stir up ethnic hatred,” and canceled the 1993 Bilateral Agreement governing American aid to the former Soviet republic. Atambayev suggested that Washington is deliberately destabilizing the country, darkly referencing unspecified “attempts to sow division [and] chaos.”
The move is part of a general trend in Central Asia that has seen U.S. influence decline and official commitment to human rights weaken, with Russia eagerly stepping into the vacuum.
Since 1993, Kyrgyzstan has received $2 billion in aid from the United States, mainly through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Under the terms of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement, USAID and other U.S. aid organizations are exempt from taxation and auditing requirements and their personnel are granted the same immunity from prosecution as diplomats.
Atambayev’s dark hints that the U.S. is trying to “sow division” may sound paranoid, but one needs only look to recent events in Ukraine to see their underlying logic. USAID provided unaccountable millions in funding to various organizations and news outlets opposed to former President Viktor Yanukovych prior to his overthrow in February 2014. There’s no doubt that the work these organizations played some role in the Euromaidan protests that ousted Yanukovych last year. Atambayev has taken the lesson to heart: seemingly innocuous aid organizations can act as catalysts for unwanted political change.
But Ukraine is just the tip of the iceberg. Russia and the United States are involved in a Cold War-esque struggle for influence across Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan is a political football that has been tossed between the two superpowers for more than a decade.
Kyrgyzstan is one of the most politically volatile states in the world today. The so-called Tulip Revolution in 2005 overthrew the country’s pro-Russian president, Askar Akayev, with support from the United States. Five years later, Russia allegedly supported yet another revolution to overthrow Akayev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. After two revolutions in the last decade, Atambayev is seeking security by decisively entering the Russian camp.
For more than a decade, the country was the only in the world to host both a US air base and a Russian one. The Manas Transit Center proved instrumental in supporting the troops fighting in Afghanistan – hundreds of thousands of passengers passed through Kyrgyzstan on their way to the frontlines. However, the base was closed in June 2014, coinciding with a $2 billion Russian loan for Kyrgyzstan.
Then, on Aug. 6, Kyrgyzstan officially joined the Eurasian Economic Union, becoming the fifth member of Russia’s response to the European Union. The EAEU now includes Russia and three other former Soviet republics: Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the EAEU marks a further step into Russia’s economic and political domain, away from the U.S. and the West.
In the realm of domestic policy, as well, Kyrgyzstan is increasingly modeling itself after Russia. On June 4, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed a “foreign agents” law modeled after Russia’s through the first stage of the legislative process. If successful, the law would require all NGOs that receive funding from foreign donors to register as “foreign agents” and submit to intrusive auditing by the state.
Russia’s own “foreign agents” law — passed in 2012 — has targeted NGOs and human rights groups including the GOLOS Association (Russia’s only independent election monitoring organizations), the Levada Center (the country’s only independent polling agency), and the Committee Against Torture, an investigative body that researches allegations of torture by Russian police and military forces. Since 2012, many Russian NGOs have been forced to close their doors or curtail important work to avoid scrutiny, fines and imprisonment by the state.
Kyrgyzstan looks to be following in Russia’s footsteps: the repeal of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement, the passage of its own “foreign agents” law, and its entry into the Eurasian Economic Union point to a decisive shift towards Russia and a further attenuation of U.S. influence in the former Soviet periphery. NGOs, aid workers and human rights groups will be the first to feel the wrath of Krygyzstan’s eastward slide.
President Barack Obama has shown a recent willingness to engage forcefully on tough issues in a manner some found lacking earlier in his presidency. With re-election behind him, he discovered the value of the bully pulpit. His recent discussion of prison reform may be the initial steps of the long walk other social issues — like marriage equality — had to take before they were addressed fully. Presidents cannot resolve issues like these alone — no president can move gun control through an obstructive Congress, for example — but they can set down markers for action on an issue so that successors can approach it with the ball moved a little further down the field. In short, while it’s not an endgame, the bully pulpit adds value.
Since Obama uses the bully pulpit domestically, can he take it abroad? In a sense, he has. His trip to Africa last month aimed to clarify U.S. policy towards the continent’s major nations. His openness toward Cuba showed a willingness to take action to “unfreeze” American policy toward the country that was mired in Cold War thinking. Even in the waning months of his presidency, there is still more that he could accomplish abroad. In the remaining months before the 2016 presidential campaign kicks into high gear and soaks up all available media, here are three areas where Obama’s “foreign policy bully pulpit” could be useful.
NATO. Obama’s administration coined the term “leading from behind” in reference to U.S. participation in the ouster of Moammar Gadhafi from power in Libya, and the amount of responsibility it could shoulder for the results. “Leading from behind” positioned U.S. forces as facilitators of collective actions, but not as the spearhead they were for the Iraq War.
Such actions not only honor alliances they diffuse burdens to a U.S. military that is still looked to first as the global policeman. NATO now encompasses Central and Eastern Europe; its members are best positioned to counter Russian influence in the region. NATO’s rounds of enlargement and efforts to partner with Russia have not matched the level of strategic reassessment NATO undertook with the 1967 Harmel Report. That document outlined the alliance’s guiding principles during the Cold War. Some analysts have called for a repeat of the Harmel process to clarify NATO’s post-Cold War principles and mission. Obama’s motive to share alliance responsibilities more equally with European powers still applies.
Moreover, well into their second decade of NATO membership, rising Central European economies like Poland have increasing resources and strategic need for a revitalized alliance. Obama could call for a second Harmel process, led in part by NATO’s most recent Central and Eastern European members, to determine how the alliance will continue to ensure European security. A a second Harmel process could clarify circumstances under which NATO would take out-of-area action, such as the criteria for an equivalent of the Libya intervention.
Japan. Central to Obama’s foreign policy has been a “pivot” toward Asia. China commands a separate level of attention from U.S. policymakers; but the most important U.S. ally in Asia is Japan. It is the world’s largest economy behind the U.S. and China. Its financial contribution to the United Nations (close to $294 million in 2015) are second only to the U.S. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s new security legislation passed Japan’s lower house last month and is headed to its upper chamber.
The new security measures have been controversial in Japan and the U.S. for proposing to alter Article 9 of Japan’s post-World War II constitution to allow Japan to project military force. But they offer Obama an opportunity to move U.S.-Japan relations forward from its World War II-era posture in the way he pushed the U.S.-Cuba relations out of their Cold War stasis. Japan’s economic might, like Germany’s was long seen as a potential security threat; it is time that its economic power carry with it responsibilities to global security.
A reformed Article 9 could open options for Japanese contribution to security actions without encouraging unilateral action by Japan. Abe’s domestic critics pose the greater challenge, but Obama can make further steps towards getting Japan to shoulder more of Asia’s security burdens while incorporating Japan into global security leadership more directly (by endorsing its addition as a UN Security Council Permanent Member, for example.) A full course correction in policy will not be accomplished in the next year, but Obama can move it forward while he has time.
Germany. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger’s famous comment, when Obama has to “call Europe,” he has to call Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel has directed Europe’s response to the Greek crisis, cementing Germany’s position as the guiding voice of the euro.
Germany, like Japan, has been run deliberately as a militarily rudderless economic engine. Any path to a common EU security policy, however, will go through Germany. Likewise, the EU’s response to Russian aggression has centered on Germany’s energy and economic relations with that country.
In short, if President Obama wants to be on good terms with Europe, he needs to leave office on good terms with Germany. The Obama administration has made efforts to clean up the mess of the NSA’s alleged tapping of Merkel’s cell phone, but it still stands that the U.S.’ standing in Germany has been dinged during Obama’s tenure. An effort on his part to cement good relations with Berlin would pay dividends for his successor and America’s ongoing ties with the EU.
It is hard to underestimate the power of the media in today’s politics. Obama is a master communicator, and his rhetorical gifts have played a key role in moving America forward on some key domestic issues. As he aims to cement his legacy, why not take his talents abroad?