Diplomacy & Crisis News

Singapore proves that holidays in a multiethnic country don’t have to be occasions for divisiveness.

Violent drug cartels and Islamic terror networks increasingly cooperate.

A last-ditch effort to avert what could be a massive political crisis came to an impasse on Friday — though the deal’s not dead yet.

Ukraine and the U.S. ask Russia to make sure this attempt at peace holds.

The president-elect wants a shiny, new nuclear football to play with. But he doesn’t realize what it’s going to cost him.

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin shakes with his Iran’s counterpart Hassan Rouhani. (Alexey Druzhinin/AFP/Getty Images)

As Iran’s economy is likely to become a bonanza for foreign companies in the upcoming years, Russia is preparing to secure its share. In early December, Tehran became the gathering spot for the executives of top Russian corporations seeking to extract commercial benefits, as Iran—a country of almost eighty million people and an economy worth more than $400 billion—is set to open up to the world.

The meetings were carried within the frameworks of two major events: the Intergovernmental commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation and the Russia-Iran Business Forum.

While the permanent Russo-Iranian Commission has taken place in the past, this year’s business forum by all accounts is an unprecedented event, highlighting the growing bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. By various estimates, the Russian delegation to Iran consisted of almost 200 business representatives, making it the largest group of Russian businessmen to ever visit the Iranian capital.

The diversity in businesses represented was one of the peculiarities of the delegation. In addition to the expected representatives from major Russian oil and defense corporations, there were also members of the top banks, agricultural companies, as well as governors and even the head of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, an influential organization directly controlled by the Russian President. Overall, Russian and Iranian companies have signed nine deals that are potentially worth almost $10 billion, according to Bloomberg. Moscow and Tehran also signed agreements to construct a heat and power plant, and railway electrification worth more than €2.2 billion.

There are good reasons behind this. Year-on-year trade between the two nations has increased by almost 80%, according to the statement by Russian Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak. Novak has also stated that the amount of bilateral financial payments has tripled in 2016 alone. Hence, both sides are hoping to further commercial ties, increasing bilateral trade from $1.6 billion in 2014 to around $10 billion in the upcoming years.

Interestingly, the trade dynamics between Iran and Russia indicates one of the largest increase throughout all international Russian commercial ties, percentage-wise.

As the West maintains its sanctions regime against Moscow—even though the sanctions might be removed or softened in the upcoming years—many Russian businesses are desperate to find new “friends” abroad. Therefore, as Iran gradually opens up to the world, many in Russia perceive it as an opportunity and, in contrast to Western counterparts, are not afraid of repercussions of such “friendship” in the foreign policy arena.

Indeed, the growth in bilateral trade is easier to achieve due to Moscow’s and Tehran’s similar views on a number of key foreign policy issues, in particular regarding the Middle East. The Kremlin supports the Assad regime in Syria and maintains friendly ties with the current government in Iraq. Most people that I personally spoke to in Tehran were enthusiastically pointing out to the fact that Russia and Iran were each other’s “best friends” at the moment.

Walking in the streets of Tehran, the abundance of Chinese cars and Korean electronics is striking. For Russians, who are seeking to diversify their trade, the success of these Asian countries in Iran shows the path for their own trade expansion. While the West is more timidly entering the Iranian market, Moscow has the opportunity to take a lead in areas where it has sufficient competence and even a modest competitive advantage.

For instance, one of the proposals during the business forum was to promote a Russian alternative to Visa payments technology called “MIR”. Furthermore, many Russian banks look for opening exchanges with Iranian counterparts and even establishing headquarters in Tehran. Russia’s attempt might be particularly fruitful, taking advantage of the fact that Iran is still cut off from the SWIFT network.

Indeed, Moscow is specifically interested in banking, an industry that is potentially worth several trillions of dollars. As Russia is just beginning to expand its influence within the area, Iran’s experience might be helpful in boosting Islamic banking in the southern Russian territories in particular.

The future of the Iranian economic and its growth potential remain uncertain, even more so in the light of the statements of President-elect Trump and his hawkish rhetoric against the Iran Deal. Nevertheless, Russians do not seem to be bothered.

The post As Sanctions are Lifted, Russia Eyes Trade Opportunities with Iran appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

President-elect Donald J. Trump and National Security Adviser-designate Michael T. Flynn. Flynn at the Republican National Convention in July.

Since the election, commentators have repeatedly voiced concern over the uncertainty of a Donald J. Trump administration’s foreign policy direction. This is true despite the fact that Trump focused on foreign policy issues during the campaign more than most presidential candidates. Even his proposed solutions to domestic problems—such as spurring economic growth by opposing foreign trade treaties and limiting immigration—have strong foreign policy implications.

Why, then, is there so much confusion about his intentions? I can suggest a couple of reasons.

Trump’s Statements Are Not Reliable

The first problem is that Trump’s statements are not reliable. It is important to note that most politicians running for office try to be consistent in their statements and, once elected, try to fulfill their promises (although they may not always succeed in doing so or may be forced to make compromises). I know that is not the common wisdom, but it is generally true.

Also, most presidential candidates are closely tied to their party, share their party’s basic outlook and policy agendas, and will be encouraged and supported by their staffers and their party colleagues in Congress. This tends to bolster consistency.

Trump, however—as he and his supporters regularly boast—is not a politician, and he does not think like a politician. Part of not being a politician is that, instead of fretting about what the voters will say next election if he doesn’t pursue his stated agenda, he may very well believe the common wisdom that campaign promises are meaningless.

Indeed, in the days following the election he appeared to change his position suddenly on a number of seemingly essential campaign promises (although, to be sure, the new statements have often been vague and conditioned and may be just as easily dropped the next time he addresses a different audience).

He has little concern for consistency. NBC News has listed 141 positions that Trump took on 23 issues in the course of the campaign. His statements do not conform to any conventional ideological schema. As one political analyst put it:

“We probably know less about what the Trump administration will be like than any incoming administration in modern American history. Trump could end up being one of the most moderate presidents in a generation, or he could be one of the most extreme. He might be both.”

Moreover, members of his campaign staff have advised foreign dignitaries not to take everything he says about their countries, or about his intended policies toward their countries, literally. Overall, one cannot assume that he is strongly committed to anything he has said.

His supporters may not care—as The Atlantic’s Salena Zito quipped, “. . . the press takes him literally, but not seriously; his supporters take him seriously, but not literally.”

The people in Trump’s entourage have taken that perspective and run with it. Corey Lewandowski, Trump’s former campaign manager (who, somehow, continued to receive $20,000 a month from the campaign after allegedly being fired and becoming a paid commentator on CNN) castigated the press for believing what Trump had said during the campaign.

“You guys took everything Donald Trump said so literally. The American people didn’t. They understood it. They understood that sometimes—when you have a conversation with people, whether it’s around the dinner table or at a bar—you’re going to say things, and sometimes you don’t have all the facts to back it up.”

Leaving aside the question of whether comments made around the dinner table or at a bar constitute an accetable standard of truth for a presidential campaign, this leaves it up to all commentators, all citizens, all foreign observers to decide for themselves what Trump really meant. To suggest that they will all come to the same conclusion because that conclusion is so obvious is ridiculous.

Regarding his ties to his party, Trump regularly took stances opposed to standard Republican positions and occasionally denounced the party as dishonest and corrupt. Speaker Paul Ryan, R-Wisc., drew up his own legislative agenda as an alternative to Trump’s proposals, and despite his denunciations of the party, Trump has suggested that he may defer to Ryan on legislative matters. So, at least with regard to legislation, there may be a basis for predictability—based on Ryan’s positions rather than Trump’s.

Nevertheless, Trump, as president, will have the power to intervene on issues as the mood strikes him, and Ryan will have to deal with the relatively small but intimidating Freedom Caucus within his own party conference, which introduces whole new vectors of unpredictability. Beyond that, foreign policy is not like legislation; the president often has a freer hand to act without regard for the wishes of Congress.

Finally, we have to remember that Trump simply lies a lot. For some reason, many voters came to view him as more honest than Hillary Clinton, but in the hundreds of statements that it reviewed, Politifact found that Trump made more than three times as many “mostly false,” “false,” or “pants on fire” statements as Clinton. He regularly makes false statements of fact, such as the notion that “the murder rate in the United States is the highest it’s been in 45 years” (although there was an uptick in 2015, 2014 had the lowest rate in 54 years and 2015 was still among the lowest) or the notion that Trump won “one of the biggest Electoral College victories in history” (of the 54 presidential elections using the current Electoral College system, i.e., since 1804, his outcome ranked 44th, in the bottom fifth).

A reputation for lying will not benefit him in the conduct of foreign policy. Whether you hope to deter aggression through threats or solicit cooperation through promises, your efforts will be hindered if no one believes you mean what you say.

His Positions Never Made Much Sense

While Trump has exhibited considerable flexibility on policy details, however, he has shown greater consistency in a few underlying aspects of his worldview. For instance, his view of politics is highly personalized, highlighting the role of individuals. He sees dependence as weakness. His view of international relations is extremely transactional, suggesting that nothing should be done unless it generates a profit in real terms.

The abhorrence of dependence and the transactional view of politics promote a preference for isolationism. Based on this, he is skeptical of the value of alliance commitments. He is highly skeptical of the value of free trade.

Finally, he admires authoritarian leaders, not because we need them as allies in particular situations (a common justification for supporting authoritarian regimes in the past), but precisely because of their authoritarian characteristics. These perspectives have appeared consistently in Trump’s statements not only throughout the campaign but over the course of decades. While consistent, however, this worldview does not necessarily lead to a sensible foreign policy.

First, although it should not be necessary to point it out, I must say that the notion that it is vital to say the words “radical Islamic terrorism” is such utter nonsense that it barely deserves the minimal effort required to refute it. Even the people who repeat this assertion have not come up with a reason why it matters, nor have they even tried. It is simply something to say when you have nothing of substance to offer.

Moreover, it is practically designed to offend Muslim allies (the ones who do the actual fighting on the ground in the Middle East, including ones whom some might consider radical) and the millions of Muslims who may be sitting on the fence. In any event, “moderate” and “radical” are our terms, not theirs, and the notion that we can decide who is a moderate Muslim and that moderate Muslims will not be offended by all this is simply wrong. The suggestion that the terrorists represent Islam offends them. Constantly repeating this assertion amounts to doing the terrorists a favor.

Now, let’s examine just one of the positions rooted in Trump’s consistent worldview. In an interview with the New York Times in July 2016, Trump discussed his position on NATO. He stressed that he did not want to say whether he would come to the assistance of NATO members under attack, regardless of treaty obligations, because he saw it as better to keep the Russians guessing about his intentions.

He also complained: “Many NATO members are not making payments, are not making what they’re supposed to make. That’s a big thing. You can’t say forget that.” He then suggested that the United States should come to their assistance only if “they fulfill their obligations to us.”

There are problems with this on many levels. It is true that the issue of burden-sharing has been argued and debated within NATO for as long as NATO has existed. The current standard is that each NATO member should contribute 2 percent of its GDP to its own defense budget, and nearly all—not all, but nearly all—fall short of the mark.

The burden-sharing issue is rooted in the common problem of collective goods: The smaller countries in a deterrent, or collective-defense, alliance often invest suboptimal amounts in their own defense if they believe that a large ally is going to defend them anyhow. They will often argue that they have other fiscal obligations, cannot afford large military outlays, and could not contribute enough to have a meaningful impact on the collective defense in any event. This has given rise to years of debate, negotiation, and deal-making within NATO and other U.S. alliances.

Trump seems to be addressing this issue, and many analysts view his statements from this perspective. Yet, while it is often difficult to ascertain what Trump is thinking from what he says, that does not appear to be what he means here. In this and related statements, he seems to expect allies to make cash payments to the U.S. Treasury in return for our defending them. If they don’t make those payments, we will not be there for them.

This questioning of commitments undermines the very purpose of a deterrent alliance. (Without any evident recognition of the irony, in a speech in April, right after making this argument—“The countries we are defending must pay for the cost of this defense, and if not, the U.S. must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves. We have no choice.”—he then went on to complain that under Obama, “our friends are beginning to think they can’t depend on us.”)

Elsewhere he has spoken more specifically of how much the United States spends on bases overseas to defend allies and has suggested that we should bring those troops back home to save money.

Yet even as a narrow fiscal calculation, this argument does not make sense. He is not talking about demobilizing those troops; he intends to expand the military, so they would have to be stationed here in the United States. According to a 2013 RAND report, it does cost $10,000 to $40,000 extra per person per year to station troops abroad, but the host countries cover most of it.

Regardless of what Trump suggests, countries like Germany, Japan, and South Korea (the countries where most U.S. overseas bases are located) actually do spend considerable amounts to defray the costs of the U.S. military presence, albeit in the form of free land, tax and fee waivers, or in-kind payments of services, supplies, and facilities, not direct payments to the Treasury. Last April, the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea told the Senate Armed Services Committee that, all things considered, it is actually cheaper to keep our troops in Korea than to bring them home.

Yet all of this still misses the main point. There is a reason for stationing troops overseas—even if it were to cost more. The purpose is to show a commitment to the common defense; the purpose is deterrence. A single U.S. battalion stationed in, say, Poland or a Baltic state, cannot defeat a Russian invasion directly, but it can convince the Russians that an attack on that state automatically means a larger war with the United States—something best avoided.

The United States benefits from the maintenance of peace and stability. It costs far less not to fight a war because it never happened then to let it happen and then get dragged into it. (See World Wars, I and II.) If Putin were to consider Trump’s frequent praises of him, put them together with Trump’s questioning of the U.S. commitment to NATO, and then conclude—mistakenly—that he could intervene with impunity in the Baltic states, you could very well end up with World War III.

As a businessman, Trump is accustomed to negotiating about dollars, maximizing revenues and minimizing expenditures, but national security, and politics more generally, is a different kind of beast. The goal is rarely in the form of dollars or anything else that can be quantified and calculated in the same way. Nor can success be measured easily or precisely when success means the absence of action (e.g., not being invaded).

Deterrence, stability, peace—these are valuable goals, but they are achieved through perceptions and other amorphous psychological processes as much as through hardware; and the key perceptions, being the perceptions of the other side, cannot be precisely manipulated. Trump may think he is being clever and improving his bargaining leverage by keeping his commitments vague and fostering an image of unpredictability, but such tactics can easily backfire.

Remember, in 1950 Kim Il Sung had been pestering Stalin for a year to let him invade South Korea, claiming both that he had prepared uprisings in the south and that his military could seize the entire peninsula before anyone had time to react. Stalin put him off repeatedly—until a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops and a speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson put into doubt our commitment to the south’s defense.* The result was the Korean War. Would something similar happen in the Baltics today? We should make an effort to assure that we never find out, and Trump’s approach is not the best way to go about it.

So, in conclusion, it is worth repeating: It is difficult to know what Trump will actually do as president. On the one hand, it seems that he doesn’t really mean many of the things he says. On the other hand, the underlying beliefs of his worldview have such dangerous implications that they might never get through the foreign-policy bureaucracy. At least, that’s what I like to tell myself.

*Other factors were the failure of the United States to intervene in the civil war in China, which was generally considered more significant than Korea, and the Soviet testing of its first atomic bomb.

The post The Donald J. Trump Foreign Policy Enigma appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

La revue Politique étrangère est présente sur Cairn, le portail des revues francophones, depuis plusieurs années maintenant. Un nouveau record a été établi grâce à vous, chers Lecteurs, avec plus de 523 000 articles en accès libre consultés en 2016 ! Découvrez en exclusivité la liste des 10 articles de la revue les plus lus sur Cairn cette année !

10e  place : Abdou Diouf, « Afrique : l’intégration régionale face à la mondialisation »
(PE n° 4/2006)

9e place : Alice Ekman, « Asie-Pacifique : la priorité de la politique étrangère chinoise » (PE n° 3/2014)

8e place : David M. Faris, « La révolte en réseau : le « printemps arabe » et les médias sociaux » (PE n° 1/2012)

7e place : Archibald Gallet, « Les enjeux du chaos libyen » (PE n° 2/2015)

6e place : Boris Eisenbaum, « Négociation, coopération régionale et jeu d’influences en Asie centrale : l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai » (PE n° 1/2010)

5e place : Mohammad-Reza Djalili et Thierry Kellner, « L’Iran dans son contexte régional » (PE n° 3/2012)

4e place : Pierre de Senarclens, « Théories et pratiques des relations internationales depuis la fin de la guerre froide » (PE n° 4/2006)

3e place : Pierre Jacquet, « Les enjeux de l’aide publique au développement »
(PE n° 4/2006)

2e place : Thierry Kellner, « La Chine et la Grande Asie centrale » (PE n° 3/2008)

1ère place : Asiem El Difraoui et Milena Uhlmann, « Prévention de la radicalisation et déradicalisation : les modèles allemand, britannique et danois » (PE n° 4/2015)

Tous ces articles sont accessibles gratuitement sur Cairn. N’hésitez pas à les lire ou à les relire en cliquant directement sur les liens !

* * *

Merci à tous nos abonnés et lecteurs pour leur fidélité et bienvenue à tous les futurs abonnés et lecteurs de Politique étrangère !

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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère (n°4/2016). Alain Antil, responsable du programme Afrique subsaharienne de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Felwine Sarr, Afrotopia  (Éditions Philippe Rey, 2016, 160  pages).

Le texte de cet économiste et enseignant sénégalais est une réflexion sur l’avenir de l’Afrique et la nécessité pour le continent de trouver sa propre voie vers la modernité, sans s’enfermer dans des modèles exogènes (celui des colons hier, celui des institutions internationales et des agences d’aide aujourd’hui), conduisant irrémédiablement à une impasse. Pour ce faire, la première étape est de ne plus se laisser définir par d’autres mais de se définir soi-même.

Ainsi, l’Afrique doit-elle fixer ses propres objectifs, puiser dans ses potentialités, renouer avec son passé précolonial sans toutefois l’idéaliser, ni s’extraire de la mondialisation par un afrocentrisme clos sur lui-même. Il faut enfin fonder une utopie : « L’Afrotopos est ce lieu autre de l’Afrique dont il faut hâter la venue, car réalisant ses potentialités heureuses. » Le projet est donc de contribuer à « réparer » un continent meurtri par des siècles de traite, de colonisation et de domination néocoloniale, pour qu’il recouvre sa dignité et son estime de soi. L’auteur va dresser la liste des chantiers à mettre en œuvre, et des atouts sur lesquels s’appuyer.

Pour travailler à un « décentrement épistémique », à une réflexion s’éloignant méthodiquement de la « bibliothèque coloniale », l’auteur s’inscrit dans des parrainages de penseurs incontournables comme Valentin-Yves Mudimbe, Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, Achille Mbembé, ainsi que des figures tutélaires comme Cheikh Anta Diop ou Franz Fanon. Le plus grand mérite de ce livre est d’ouvrir au lecteur une série de débats intellectuels très vifs en cours sur le continent, sur la place des langues africaines dans l’éducation, la nécessaire « décolonisation » des sciences humaines, la refondation de l’université ou encore le refus d’un individualisme forcené… Pourtant, malgré les indéniables qualités de cet ouvrage, et en particulier de son questionnement central, son propos est affaibli par plusieurs travers.

Comme l’écrivain s’accorde la licence poétique, Felwine Sarr s’arroge parfois le droit d’avoir un rapport distancié avec la réalité puisqu’il situe son projet dans les essences et veut contribuer à l’utopie. Du flou de certains de ses propos doit pouvoir sourdre une pensée salutaire. Mais, fatalement, celle-ci se retrouve parfois fâchée avec l’histoire, ou en tout cas une histoire précise et étayée scientifiquement. Ainsi, comment aujourd’hui parler de la traite esclavagiste en évoquant la seule (et évidemment importante) traite atlantique ? Comment peut-on affirmer, sans s’enfermer dans une pensée performative, que toutes les nations « d’Alger au Cap » ont la « même histoire récente » ? La posture de l’ouvrage conduit parfois l’auteur à des raccourcis (« l’Homme africain »), voire à des clichés (« l’énergie ou la vitalité africaine »).

Le deuxième problème se situe au niveau de la relation qu’entretient le continent africain avec le reste du monde, et que l’auteur veut contribuer à refonder. Par « reste du monde », il est quasi exclusivement question de l’Occident, présenté comme le Golem malveillant de l’Afrique. Or, il semble que c’est précisément en échappant à ce tête-à-tête postcolonial que l’auteur pourrait produire une réflexion vraiment décentrée. Enfin, très curieusement, cet ouvrage fait totalement l’impasse d’une réflexion sur le pouvoir, qui pourrait pourtant être utile à la construction d’une utopie. Au final, ces manquements, qui procèdent à l’évidence d’un véritable souci d’édition, nuisent à l’économie d’un texte par ailleurs foisonnant d’idées.

Alain Antil

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Christopher Hill, foreign policy in The Twentieth Century, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016 (2d édition)
(Observatoire de la politique étrangère - UCA)
L’ouvrage de Christopher Hill, Professeur à Cambridge – et l’un des maîtres incontestés de l’analyse de la politique étrangère – vient à point nommé pour relancer l’étude de cette politique publique dangereusement délaissée en France, et même en Europe.
Dans cette seconde édition de son Changing Politics of foreign policy (2003), l’auteur donne d’ailleurs le ton dès l’introduction (et reprend l’argument à la fin de l’ouvrage), incriminant l’absence cours de politique étrangère en Europe comme une démission dangereuse de la communauté académique. Démission souvent volontaire dans la mesure où le jargon abscons mis au point par les professionnels de la recherche interdit aux acteurs véritables (diplomates, politiques…) de s’intéresser à leur travail et donc de l’évaluer.


Moins systématique que le foreign policy : Theories, Actors, Cases de Smith, Hadfield et Dunne (auquel il a néanmoins contribué), ce travail est plus riche de réflexions personnelles. Il pose la question de la définition de la politique étrangère dans le monde qui vient, autour de quelques axes : l’intentionnalité de l’acteur, la contrainte du système, la responsabilité et la légitimité dans un monde aux enjeux et aux acteurs multiples. Si Hill ne croit pas à une approche unique, il croit en revanche à nécessité d’un retour aux définitions cohérentes (la politique étrangère, l'Etat, la puissance…), à l’histoire, et aux études de cas. Ses pages fourmillent d’exemples, récents ou anciens. Une question le taraude : la politique étrangère est faite par qui, pour qui, et avec quel résultat ? C’est, là encore, l’interrogation sur la responsabilité, fil rouge de plusieurs de ses livres récents. Christopher Hill croit surtout à la comparaison, et donc à la politique étrangère comparée, qui a connu pourtant bien des aventures infructueuses dans le passé. Mais, avec d’autres (comme Juliet Kaarbo), il plaide à nouveau, à raison, pour cet exercice irremplaçable.
Si les entrées principales de la foreign policy analysissont présentes (l’acteur, sa rationalité limitée, son entourage, la bureaucratie, l'opinion publique, la société, le transnational… des originalités nombreuses parsèment le livre, notamment sur le phénomène de linkage, qui peut être à la fois réactif (une société réagit, par exemple par affect, à ce qui se passe ailleurs : ainsi des manifestations de soutien à la Palestine), émulatif (une vague qui se propage par imitation d’un phénomène extérieur – comme les révolutions arabes en 2011) ou pénétrant (une intention extérieure délibérée de déclencher un phénomène dans une société donnée). La préoccupation pédagogique est toujours forte (comme dans le graphique de la page 147 qui recense les ressources, capacités et instruments de la politique étrangère, ou surtout dans l’excellente bibliographie, sélective en fin de chaque chapitre, exhaustive à la fin de l’ouvrage). L’ensemble en fait naturellement un livre de chevet pour les étudiants de relations internationales.

The UN Security Council adopted a resolution to impose sanctions on the DPRK in order to curb the country’s nuclear and missile programs. (Xinhua/Li Muzi)

Of all Donald Trump’s transitional appointments, perhaps the least controversial has been his choice of South Carolina governor Nikki Haley for UN ambassador.

Haley, who will need to be confirmed by the Senate, is a seasoned politician at the national level but has far less foreign policy expertise, an experience gap that could quickly make itself felt as the governor juggles dealing with the UN bureaucracy while handling major rivals like Russia and China.

First on Haley’s plate will be turning her boss’s mostly unarticulated views on the United Nations into a coherent approach to the global body. During the campaign, Trump indulged in strident criticism of the UN, denouncing it in a speech to AIPAC as “not a friend” of freedom, democracy, the US, or Israel.

In that same vein, the President-elect has threatened to dismantle some of the Obama era’s key multilateral accomplishments. He pledged to pull the US out of the Paris climate and tear up the nuclear deal with Iran, fatally undercutting two of the UN’s banner accomplishments. This would anger the other members of the Security Council, who backed the Iran agreement unanimously, as well as the UN leadership who helped bring both to fruition.

Trump has also denounced Obama’s rapprochement with Cuba, widely supported at the UN, and vowed to “veto any attempt by the U.N. to impose its will on the Jewish state.”

For diplomats used to Obama-style multilateralism, Trump’s victory has been a harsh shock. The UN has long had a fraught relationship with Republicans, but Obama had mostly shielded the organization from their reach.

Even Obama, though, has at times found himself at odds with the UN. He has consistently shielded Israel from UN criticism, and is the only president since 1967 to not allow a single Security Council resolution specifically condemning Israel. During Obama’s tenure, the US also defunded UNESCO after the agency admitted Palestine to its ranks.

Where Obama’s approach to the UN has been muted, the Congressional Republicans who will need to confirm Haley’s nomination have been far more outspoken. To that end, Florida representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced a United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act in 2015 that would have pushed for voluntary US funding of the UN and required an itemized justification of the funds the US government was contributing to the UN budget. Those demands aren’t new: Marco Rubio introduced an identical bill in the Senate in 2011.

The opaqueness of American contributions to the UN, as described by Rubio and Ros-Lehtinen, is a major sticking point. The most recent example involves the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), which operates as part of the World Health Organization and receives substantial funding from the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Jason Chaffetz, Chairman of the House Oversight Committee, is currently leading a Congressional inquiry into NIH’s funding of IARC,  which has been criticized by other scientific bodies over a series of controversial findings that break from those of regulators in both the US and Europe.

These include glyphosate, a common herbicide IARC determined “probably carcinogenic” in contradiction of recent findings issued by the EPA and international health authorities. Alongside glyphosate, however, IARC has also found itself on the defensive for its evaluations of processed meats and especially coffee, which it insinuated was carcinogenic for well over two decades before changing its mind this year. The agency’s critics, Chaffetz among them, say the agency lacks transparency and scientific rigor and is too quick and too liberal with the carcinogenic label.

With a fellow skeptic replacing Obama in the White House, initiatives like the Chaffetz investigation are likely to pick up steam. While a stricter approach to America’s share of the UN budget will ruffle diplomatic feathers, the new administration and its Congressional allies have a strong hand to play.

Namely, the US is the single largest contributor to the UN budget, with its mandatory and voluntary payments amounting to about $8 billion annually. With Washington on the hook for 22% of the UN’s regular budget and 28% of the peacekeeping budget, American lawmakers have considerable power of the purse: UNESCO, for example, had to forego over a fifth of its operating budget when it lost US funding.

As US ambassador, Haley will be the embodiment of America’s attitude to the UN apparatus. After all, one of the main sources of relief among diplomats in New York at the news of the Haley appointment was that Donald Trump would not be sending another “angry white man” in the mold of John Bolton.

That honeymoon might not survive an era of intensified Congressional scrutiny and lower contributions, but the measure of influence that the US maintains over the UN structures will depend in large part on Haley and her ability to channel her gubernatorial experience in dealing with an entrenched bureaucracy.

Unfortunately, the US in general and Haley in particular will be bringing far less firepower to the UN Security Council. The new ambassador will have to navigate pressure from both Russia and China; Moscow has repeatedly reminded the rest of the Security Council who calls the shots in the Syrian war, stonewalling resolutions from the other permanent members and agreeing to UN observers in Aleppo only after its allies took most of the city.

Of course, the new president-elect’s professed willingness to work with Russia on Syria could mean Haley spends less time arguing and more time acquiescing. In either event, Beijing will continue quietly gaining ground on Washington and Moscow within the UN bureaucracy, making moves like increasing its funding for UN peacekeeping operations to increase its influence while its main rivals focus on mutual recriminations in the Middle East.

While the particulars of Nikki Haley’s ambassadorship will remain a matter of conjecture until she takes her seat, one thing is for certain: come January, things are going to get interesting in New York.

The post Nikki Haley Steps into the Turtle Bay Meat Grinder appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Anastasia Lin (Wikimedia Commons)

Recent events surrounding Chinese Canadian beauty queen and human rights activist Anastasia Lin‘s participation in this year’s Miss World pageant illustrate the negative effects of China’s growing global influence. Nominated twice to represent Canada in the pageant, Lin was banned from participating in the 2015 contest held in China; and has now been barred from speaking on human rights at this year’s contest in the United States (See Boston Globe, Epoch Times, New York Magazine, New York Times, Toronto Star, Washington Post).

A native of mainland China who immigrated to Canada as a teenager, Ms. Lin has been outspoken in her criticism of China’s atrocious human rights record. As a practitioner of the Falun Gong spiritual practice banned in China, she has dedicated herself particularly to fighting religious persecution in China. China’s efforts to silence her have included threats by Chinese authorities against her father in China. In 2015, Lin was denied entry to China to participate in the contest held in Sanya on Hainan Island.

“The Chinese government has barred me from the competition for political reasons,” said Lin when she was banned from the 2015 contest, “They are trying to punish me for my beliefs and prevent me from speaking out about human rights issues…. The slogan of the Miss World competition is ‘Beauty with a purpose.’ My purpose is to advocate for those who cannot speak for themselves—those who suffer in prisons and labour camps, or whose voices have been stifled by repression and censorship.”

This year’s contest was held in Washington D.C., where free speech is guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. Under Chinese corporate sponsorship, however, the pageant’s U.S. organizers and the London-based Miss World Organization have now become enforcers of Chinese censorship.

Lin has been barred from speaking with the media, and even a U.S. State Department official was refused access to Lin unless “accompanied by a pageant employee, who insisted on attending the meeting.” A friend of Ms. Lin’s reported: “They have specifically told her not to talk about human rights during the pageant, even though that is her official platform…. She is very frustrated.”

Boston Globe writer Jeff Jacoby describes the scene in a Washington DC hotel lobby, as pageant officials behaved exactly like Chinese government thugs when he tried to interview Lin: “A Miss World employee saw us talking, and demanded an explanation…. The employee instantly called in reinforcements. Soon there were three officials. Two of them hustled Lin from the lobby, angrily accusing her of breaching the rules and causing trouble. The third blocked me from talking to Lin, and assured me that my interview would be scheduled the next day. It wasn’t, of course.”

The increasingly “long shadow of Chinese censorship” has been noted for several years. China’s efforts at silencing its critics around the world have included harassment of exiled Chinese dissidents, pressure on international film and literary festivals to bar works by Chinese dissidents, economic pressure on international news media to produce more “positive” China coverage, and cyber-attacks on news and human rights websites. Now even the Hollywood movie industry appears ready to submit to Chinese censorship for access to the Chinese market.

“We all live under threat from the Chinese regime,” Lin wrote in 2015, “Too easily we accept this kind of coercion as the social norm, blaming those who speak out rather than those who wield the batons…. Leaving China doesn’t make one free, not when friends and family there become hostages. Freedom comes when we stop accepting tyranny and challenge those who would preserve it.”

The post Chinese Censorship Comes to Miss World Pageant appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Following are brief summaries of some of today’s news stories from around the UN system. Click on the links provided for more detailed coverage.

(Own report) - In light of the western powers' possible massive loss of influence in the Middle East, German foreign policy-makers are intensifying their threats of sanctions on Moscow. Norbert Röttgen (CDU), Chair of the Foreign Policy Committee of the German parliament calls for economic punishment to be imposed for suspected or actual war crimes committed by the Russian military in East Aleppo. The renowned British Middle East correspondent, Robert Fisk, strongly criticizes the rampant propaganda campaign raging - also here in Germany - around the hard fought battle for East Aleppo. Fisk notes that it is remarkable that the militias in East Aleppo are being euphemized as "rebels," because one of the most powerful among them is an Al Qaeda subsidiary. After all, that embellishes and is protective toward those responsible for 9/11. Besides, the large number of civilian casualties caused by western air raids in the war against IS is being ignored. A renowned NGO source in the USA estimates currently more than 2,000 civilians killed. The notorious double standards of western propaganda are accompanying the US and European powers' unsuccessful efforts to thwart Russia's rising influence in the Middle East.

The Islamic State's South Asia branch looks doomed to fail.

The Indian Air Force intends to procure at least 100 new radar systems for its latest fighter jet.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has condemned the killing of a peacekeeper from South Africa deployed with the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in North Kivu earlier today.

Amid growing tensions and increasing despair among South Sudan’s population, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today warned that the international community’s failure to act now could put the country on a trajectory towards mass atrocities.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today commended decisions by a bloc of West African countries to take all necessary actions to enforce the outcome of the presidential election in Gambia, guarantee the protection of President-elect Adama Barrow, and attend the new leader’s inauguration ceremony on 19 January 2017.

Strongly condemning the assassination today of Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov in Ankara, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the United Nations Security Council emphasized that there is no justification for targeting diplomatic personnel and civilians.