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The Noble Peace Prize and the Forgotten Genocide

Foreign Policy Blogs - Thu, 18/10/2018 - 14:40

Yazidi Refugee Ashwaq Haji Hami decided to leave Germany after she was left unprotected from her ISIS captor in her town in Germany.

Nadia Murad was honoured with a Nobel Prize recently for her work with women and genocide survivors. She is Yazidi from Iraq and survived a kidnapping and rape by ISIS, upon her escape she was able to get her story out to the international community. She became a representative for her community in 2016 and worked diligently to bring some light to the genocide of minority people Iraq, Syria and the wider Middle East. Her story is one of a survivor, but many women and girls are still held in captivity by ISIS, even though many ISIS fighters have already started returning to a peaceful life in their countries of origin.

Within Iraq there is a big debate on the benefits of the Nobel Prize given to Nadia Murad for the Yazidi and other minority communities. While minorities communities in Iraq may only exist for one more generation, it is up to the Iraqi government and people on how they wish to address the possible end of some of the oldest communities in the world. While the Nobel Prize serves as much to honour Nadia Murad as it does to bring attention to the struggle she and her community is facing, the kidnapping, rape, torture and organised genocide of Yazidi women and children has been almost wholly ignored by the international community and media. The values and legal precedents set by the trials at Nuremberg have most likely been violated, with Yazidis still being ignored in refugee camps, being helped but placed living with those that have committed genocide against them, and generally being forgotten even with the Nobel Prize being given to their UN representative. If the most basic tenets of the UN Declaration of Human Rights will not be applied by the signatories of the Declaration, then justice will never be served and the lessons of the Nuremberg Trials have truly been lost.

There are some stark cases of injustice outside of the Middle East in dealing with Yazidi survivors having been put living near those that raped and assaulted them. The earliest reported case occurred in Ontario, Canada when two Yazidi women ran into their torturer from Iraq. He might have been a Canadian who returned from fighting with ISIS, and in one case he harassed the Yazidi survivor he himself had a role in torturing. Upon running into him on more than one occasion, she notified those who were helping her resettle in Canada and she was told to keep quiet about the incidents. She is fighting for her story to be heard with little to no media coverage about these incidents in Canada or abroad. Recently the RCMP, Canada’s national police service, said that the government was unaware on how they could charge returning ISIS fighters when they bring them back to Canada. For some reason committing genocide against foreign nationals does not have a legal precedent in Canada, and while the Canadian justice system is based on the British system, including the application of the laws of equity to ensure justice is served in the application of justice in the legal system, the Canadian government will not help the few Yazidi refugees they are assisting be fully protected in Canada itself.

The wider known case of Yazidi survivors not being protected came from Germany when a young Yazidi survivor went to the police and told them of her ISIS torturer from Mosul, Iraq harassing her in the city she settled in in Germany itself. While she reported the incidents to authorities, the police just gave her a number to call in case of emergency and set upon a red tape laden investigation to find and charge her harasser. This widely reported story is just one of many being claimed in Germany and likely all over Europe itself. The lack of security she felt in Germany lead her to decide to end her future there and return to Iraq, where she felt safer in the end. Like with the Canadian incident, she felt local officials would not keep her secure in Germany. With the lacklustre response of many governments to the very recent aftermath of the Yazidi genocide, one that effectively is still taking place and being almost completely ignored, protections for those persecuted in a genocide seems to have no legal application or political will from modern, western governments. While there is an academic debate on how to apply local laws to crimes against humanity, having no application of law or protections is simply contributing to the future persecution of the genocide victims and survivors. Apologizing for past atrocities does nothing if you continue to ignore those of your own generation. Giving a Nobel Prize while ignoring survivors like Nadia Murad does nothing to save the children still in captivity. Those ignored girls are the most brutalised human beings in modern history.

The post The Noble Peace Prize and the Forgotten Genocide appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Not His Father’s Saudi Arabia

Foreign Affairs - Thu, 18/10/2018 - 06:00
Khashoggi's death has made the need to reassess the US-Saudi relationship urgent and unavoidable.

La base de Diego-Garcia, sur la route des pétroliers et des cargos

Le Monde Diplomatique - Wed, 17/10/2018 - 19:07
Oui « Partez, sinon on ne vous nourrit plus. Il faut laisser la place pour les Américains »… C'était il y a dix ans, à Diego-Garcia, un atoll de 28 kilomètres carrés isolé au beau milieu de l'océan Indien, à 1 200 milles au sud de la pointe de l'Inde et à distance sensiblement égale des côtes (...) / , , , , , , , - 1976/12

Le dilemme des archives

Le Monde Diplomatique - Wed, 17/10/2018 - 17:07
Avant l'invention de la photographie par Nicéphore Niépce, en 1816, l'enregistrement le plus significatif d'un visage humain a été l'ensemble des 80 autoportraits réalisés par Rembrandt. Les travaux du peintre hollandais ont duré quarante ans, alors qu'une caméra de cinématographe, dès 1895, (...) / , , , - 2004/10 La puissance sans la gloire

Un pays criblé de balles

Le Monde Diplomatique - Wed, 17/10/2018 - 15:06
Malgré la guerre qui fait rage, un débat sans concessions est engagé à Managua entre les divers partis représentés à l'Assemblée nationale. Son enjeu ? Elaborer un avant-projet de Constitution pour ce pays profondément bouleversé par six années d'une révolution à laquelle contribuèrent, au début, la (...) / , - 1985/12

The Legal Option to Stop Nord Stream 2

Foreign Policy Blogs - Wed, 17/10/2018 - 14:53

Kjell Nilsson-Maki via CartoonStoc

In Soviet mythology, the health of a country’s economy, national power, and influence in the world are directly linked to the performance of its oil and gas industries. The famous Russian gas project, Nord Stream 2, threatens to disturb the European Union family, emphasizing the contrasting interests of various EU nations. The Castro 10 vessel has already laid the first pipes off the German shore, spanning a total of 30 kilometers (18.6 miles), a 32 feet deep construction project expected to be completed in 400 days. The case for Nord Stream 2, a project highly touted by Germany, is aimed at rearranging the Ukrainian route of Russian gas pipelines, an uncomfortable situation for Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries that are to lose transit fees and related privileges. Nevertheless, the original relevance of this pipeline is a political one, since it can bring Russian gas to Germany bypassing Ukraine and Poland, and magnifying German energy security and geopolitical influence. There are also economic reasons: with the doubling of Nord Stream’s capacity Eastern European countries such as Hungary or Slovakia which previously held significant influence  in Russia-Western European gas transit, would find its influence dramatically reduced in the European gas game. Apart from the fact that Gazprom is the only supplier and a major shareholder in the $11bn Nord Stream 2 project, it is also headquartered  in Zug, Switzerland which is  known for being one of the most aggressive tax cutters among Switzerland’s 26 cantons. This fresh pipeline extension is being developed by five other Russian-European energy consortia , each of them funding up to 1 billion dollars each: Shell (Anglo-Dutch company), BASF (Germany), E.ON (Germany), Enti (France) and OMV (Austria). Even if Eastern European countries argue that the project contradicts the EU’s aim of diversifying energy sources, Germany is accused of ignoring that and promoting their own interests, as well as the values of a Russian energy addicted Europe. The Nord Stream 2 project calls for the laying of two pipelines with a total capacity of 55 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea. Its first deliveries are expected in 2019, which corresponds with the expiration of the current agreements between Russia and Ukraine and in 2022 between Russia and Poland. This project is  assessed as completely neglecting the interests of Poland as well as the unity of the European Union,  especially within the context of Russia’s previous actions in Ukraine.

To this global aspect is added a complex economic process: the Russian energy sector is monopolistic since the denationalization movement initiated by Putin and focused on Gazprom’s extension while the European gas sector was going through market liberalization and opening up to new players. This duality creates a situation that pits the  concept of openness and competition amongst European authorities and the Russian gas giant on the other. The main counterpart that the Kremlin should concede in order to hope to take its share of the pie would then lie in two perspectives: an opening of the national market (hardly conceivable for its leaders) or accepting Russia’s monopolistic influence in a part of the Eurasian sphere, which seems more coherent but which would mean a disturbance by Moscow’s influence. Finding the right equilibrium is all the more challenging as over the next 20 to 30 years, the percentage of the European Union’s energy needs from imports will increase from 50% to 70%.

Although divergent positions are relevant in the debate within the EU, European rules and laws seem to vary when it comes to the energy issue. The Nord Stream 2 project, in addition to the non-applicability of EU rules on free market and price transparency, goes against the European Energy Security Strategy presented by the European Commission in 2014, which primarily focused on gas security and the desire to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. The legal component of the European Council believe that the EU could violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea if it decides to apply its own rules to offshore pipelines. Additionally, as this is an underwater project, the legality of this project is  completely determined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, known as the Montego Bay Convention and in particular Article 79 pertaining to Submarine Cables and Pipelines on the Continental Shelf. The European Commission proposed last year to amend their EU gas directives so that an import gas pipeline cannot be owned directly by gas producers, that it doesn’t apply discriminatory tariffs and that it can be used by third parties. The Nord Stream 2 project, fully controlled by Gazprom’s monopoly, is far from respecting these different rules. By undermining incentives to develop new interconnectors and terminals, Nord Stream 2 will also make it more difficult for the EU to meet one of the main Energy Union objectives of completing the single market in gas. Trying to create endless diversification pipelines is anachronistic given the development of EU energy law and an increasingly integrated European gas market. Gazprom as a gas supplier cannot expect to control pipeline routes and isolate markets as it did a decade ago in a now increasingly liberalized European market. The legal framework is therefore perfectly clear and discordant to the European Commission’s claims. The European Union must respect the choices of its Member States with regard to their energy supply requirements. Whatever the legal aspect envisaged, the principle of subsidiarity is applicable. Consequently, the legal matter, concerning the regulatory aspects applying to the Nord Stream 2, can become, through its instrumentalization into the agenda-building process, an element of soft power for Poland. However, we must think in the long term. From the gas reserves on the Cyprus side, there will now be a European gas supply from the south. Turkey is likely to come forward, but it will rebalance Gazprom’s pre-eminence in the European energy supply market. It should also not be forgotten that 50 to 60 billion cubic meters of natural gas is produced annually in Algeria and Tunisia . We must find a fine balance between being able to ensure agreements with  major turbulent neighbors such as Russia, rather than leave it isolated and uncontrollable, while ensuring European energy independence.

The post The Legal Option to Stop Nord Stream 2 appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The Price of Prestige

Politique étrangère (IFRI) - Wed, 17/10/2018 - 09:30

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°3/2018). Guilhem Penent propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Lilach Gilady, The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous Consumption in International Relations (University of Chicago Press, 2018, 232 pages).

Depuis plusieurs années, un certain nombre d’internationalistes venus d’horizons théoriques variés (réalisme, constructivisme, etc.) travaillent à remettre au goût du jour la notion classique de prestige. Deux tendances se dessinent : ou les efforts visent trop haut et prétendent expliquer toutes les relations internationales (RI), ou ils visent trop bas et se révèlent n’être tout au mieux qu’un recueil d’anomalies et de curiosités. Le concept de prestige est difficile à opérationnaliser et à mesurer. Marginalisé par les théories dominantes en RI, il est aussi sous-théorisé, victime d’attributs à la fois compétitifs, hiérarchiques et sociaux qui le placent dans un entre-deux paradigmatique inconfortable. À cela, on ajoutera la réticence des acteurs à justifier leurs politiques par une référence explicite au prestige, impliquant de s’appuyer sur une méthodologie et des évaluations indirectes.

Cet ouvrage reprend à son compte ces interrogations, tout en proposant un cadre original et inhabituel en RI, inspiré par l’intérêt renouvelé dont les travaux sur la « consommation ostentatoire » et « l’effet Veblen » font l’objet dans le domaine des sciences économiques. L’objectif de l’auteur est en effet de développer une analyse des relations internationales fondée sur la consommation, dans laquelle le prestige est considéré comme une marchandise comme les autres, que les États peuvent choisir ou non de mettre dans leurs paniers.

L’ouvrage, qui fait son miel de la fausse dichotomie entre rationalité et logiques symboliques, se concentre ainsi sur la notion de « biens Veblen », ces biens de nature positionnelle pour lesquels les acteurs sont prêts à payer plus cher dans l’espoir que cette dépense supplémentaire – le « prix du prestige » – leur permette de signaler publiquement leur statut social supérieur. Par ce biais, l’analyse explique de manière convaincante pourquoi certains pays choisissent d’investir dans l’acquisition de programmes de défense comparativement sous-optimaux (à l’image des porte-avions), se mobilisent en faveur d’activités pro-sociales en apparence davantage orientées par le souci de l’autre que le self-help, comme les opérations de maintien de la paix, ou encore développent, sous couvert de science, de coûteux et extravagants programmes spatiaux alors qu’ils pourraient allouer leurs ressources à d’autres activités moins onéreuses sur le plan économique et surtout plus efficaces sur le plan instrumental.

En appliquant à la politique internationale les leçons socio-économiques souvent oubliées de Thorstein Veblen – pour qui la crainte était que l’économie, en faisant l’impasse sur le social, n’en vienne à s’éloigner de la vie réelle et à perdre sa pertinence –, Gilady fait œuvre utile. À regarder les dynamiques actuelles de la hiérarchie internationale, cette entreprise qui s’appuie sur un travail de thèse soutenue en 2006, arrive en effet à point nommé pour confirmer combien le prestige constitue une force qui compte, et peut aider notre compréhension des enjeux de défense et de sécurité. D’autant que la critique constructive de la rationalité qui est la sienne suggère d’intéressantes pistes de travail, en particulier sur la dimension « stratégique » du prestige.

Guilhem Penent

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Is Going It Alone the Best Way Forward for Europe?

Foreign Affairs - Wed, 17/10/2018 - 06:00

Since the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, Europeans have struggled to come to terms with his confrontational style and policies. From Trump’s tariffs to his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris agreement to calling the EU a “foe,” no U.S. president since World War II has appeared so distant, even hostile, to European interests. Early on, many European leaders attempted to cultivate a good relationship with Trump, hoping that a personal connection could help calm the increasingly turbulent waters of the transatlantic alliance. Some, such as French President Emmanuel Macron and EU President Jean-Claude Juncker, succeeded, while others, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister Theresa May, fared less well.


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Is Going It Alone the Best Way Forward for Europe?

Foreign Affairs - Wed, 17/10/2018 - 06:00
With U.S. untethering a continuing trend, a Europe whole, free, and at peace means a Europe able to fend for itself on the world stage

Is There Hope for Reform in Post-Election Iraq?

Foreign Affairs - Wed, 17/10/2018 - 06:00
Iraq has a new president and prime minister, but the way they gained power strongly suggests that their appointments were the result of muhasasa dealings rather than the functioning of parliamentary democracy. If this turns out to be true, any efforts they make to reform Iraq’s corrupt government will be hampered by the debts they owe to the powers that put them in place.

De la valeur ignorée des métiers

Le Monde Diplomatique - Tue, 16/10/2018 - 19:02
Une étude britannique compare la rémunération de certains métiers, sélectionnés aux deux extrémités de l'échelle des revenus, à la « valeur sociale » qu'engendre leur exercice. Instructif... / Royaume-Uni, Banque, Entreprise, Femmes, Fiscalité, Inégalités, Publicité, Santé, Société, Travail - (...) / , , , , , , , , , - 2010/03

Vladivostok gagnée par la fièvre sociale

Le Monde Diplomatique - Tue, 16/10/2018 - 17:02
Recul de la production industrielle et du produit intérieur brut, baisse des salaires et montée du chômage : la Russie est frappée par la récession. Mais la crise affecte de façons très différentes les villes et les régions. / Europe de l'Est, Russie, Économie, Politique, Commerce, Crise économique - (...) / , , , , , - 2009/12

Has the Transatlantic Alliance Been Irreparably Damaged?

Foreign Affairs - Tue, 16/10/2018 - 15:30
We asked dozens of experts to weigh in on whether the transatlantic alliance has been irreparably damaged.

A Tijuana, la mauvaise fortune des «<small class="fine"> </small>maquiladoras<small class="fine"> </small>»

Le Monde Diplomatique - Tue, 16/10/2018 - 15:02
Symboles de conditions de travail d'un autre âge, les usines d'assemblage tourmentent aussi les populations quand elles ferment ou fonctionnent au ralenti, comme à Tijuana. La sélection à l'embauche se fait plus impitoyable tandis que s'allongent les files d'attente pour un travail à la journée. / (...) / , , , , , , - 2009/11

African Regimes at a Crossroads

Foreign Policy Blogs - Tue, 16/10/2018 - 14:47

2017 Protests in South Africa (Reuters)

New hope is blowing across the African continent against the backdrop of toppled heads of government and state in South Africa and Zimbabwe and a rejuvenated government that is pursuing ambitious reforms in Ethiopia. Other recent examples of transitions from long-sitting governments have also played out in Burkina Faso and The Gambia where the sitting presidents’ ambitions to remain in power (beyond their constitutional mandates) sparked a popular uprising in the former, and a military intervention by regional forces in the latter.

However, with this new dawn comes growing risks of instability and conflict which threaten to derail any attempts at moving the region towards more inclusive democracy and lasting peace; gains which could eventually facilitate better development prospects for the ordinary population, most of whom were not even born when their presidents took office.

Angola, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Uganda are all countries where the incumbents have held power since at least the 1980s. All of their leaders oversee authoritarian regimes; two of them took power by force, while the other two succeeded governments with dictatorial tendencies.

Aristide Zolberg, an influential U.S.-based academic on migration, who passed away in 2013, warned early on, in the post-colonial context, that liberation struggles could quickly translate into civil conflict. This was due to the inability of new governments to move their countries in the direction of national unity and integration and ensure a trajectory of progressive socioeconomic development. Instead, local elites have in many places across post-colonial Africa simply replaced the former patronage networks that were in place under European colonial powers.

A number of aged leaders across Sub-Saharan Africa are now nearing their natural end. In addition, all four governments are dependent on rents and revenue from crude oil and gas extraction. Although Angola holds the second-largest proven commercial reserves on the continent after Nigeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea together produce almost 400,000 barrels per day (bpd). To join the club, Uganda discovered commercially viable oil reserves in 2006 and is expected to produce 230,000 bpd when production is at full capacity, likely after 2020. Despite their natural resource wealth, their societies remain highly unequal.

In Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos stepped down as head of state and relinquished his chairmanship of the ruling party earlier. In his departing speech, he admitted to making ‘mistakes’ during his rule of almost 40 years, a tenure which has been characterized by the centralization of power and national wealth. This fact underscores dos Santos clan’s control of the country’s wealth and political power. His successor, former general João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, has promised to clamp down on corruption. At the same time, Lourenço has hit out at Portugal in relation to accusations since 2012 by Portuguese prosecutors that Manuel Vicente, a former vice president and current advisor to the incumbent president, has committed acts of bribery and money laundering.

Cameroon’s president, Paul Biya (in office since 1982) is increasingly under pressure to bring back stability to the far-northern regions, where the Nigerian Islamist terrorist group, Boko Haram, has terrorized the local population for years, as well as to the south-western Anglophone regions of Northwest and Southwest, where a secessionist political movement last year took up arms against the central government. Accusing the Francophone authorities in the capital Yaoundé of ethnic discrimination and attempting at reducing their cultural autonomy within the federation, the Anglophone  ‘Ambazonia’ (a term used locally to describe what was formerly known as the Southern Cameroons) independence movement could be one of Biya’s toughest tests so far.

With Biya being the only candidate with a realistic chance of winning the presidential election in October—thanks to his patronage networks and the continued dominance of his ruling RDPC party—the prospect of instability once Biya eventually vacates office can only increase. While it is pretty clear that Biya will still be Cameroon’s leader, the lack of apparent successor and the likely power vacuum that will emerge means there is a real stability risk in Cameroon.

Although the quality of GDP data across Sub-Saharan Africa is often limited, Biya’s Angolan and Equatoguinean counterparts will leave behind a somewhat better legacy. In Equatorial Guinea, per capita GDP has increased from USD208 in 1979 to USD8,333 (compared to Cameroon’s GDP per capita which has remained stagnant at just over USD1,000), making it the highest income country of the continent. But despite this apparent success, 76.8% of Equatorial Guinea’s population continues to live in poverty, while political elite figures such as the president’s son and vice president, Teodoro ‘Teodorin’ Nguema Obiang Mangue, lives in opulence. Obiang Mangue has been investigated by both U.S. and French authorities for embezzlement and money laundering; and last October, a court in Paris sentenced the vice president in absentia to 3 years in prison, with EUR30 million in fines for laundering EUR150 million between 1997 and 2011.

Finally, in Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni is entering his 34th year in office and has removed a 75-year age limit on presidents in the constitution, which means that he could run for another term in 2021. Meanwhile, many are suspicious that he is slowly promoting his son to be his heir, particularly after he was promoted as a special advisor last January. However, Museveni’s authority has also come under increased pressure from musician-turned-politician, Robert Kyagulanyi (more commonly known by his stage name Bobi Wine) who is appealing to Uganda’s young population, which is increasingly frustrated by Museveni’s regime and possibly, dynastic ambitions.

Angola, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Uganda are now approaching critical inflection points where the liberalization of strategic sectors of the economy could bring about new opportunities for better wealth distribution. However, this also carries significant risks of fueling corruption in some of the world’s worst-ranking countries, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2017). Equatorial Guinea ranks at 171 (out of 180); Angola at 167; Cameroon at 153; and Uganda is the best ranked at 151.

The longevity of these governments means that local elites have benefitted from patronage for many years, and the end to such revenue streams is likely to motivate some actors into more unpredictable actions, such as taking power by force. This could, in turn, fuel local armed strife between competing groups, exacerbating the security situation in the various jurisdictions.

As tired old post-colonial local elites leave the stage one by one, the question to be asked is what will replace them? Will it simply be new local elites, equally focused on self-aggrandizement and creating networks of patronage? Or will it be a new breed of leaders, young, charismatic and genuinely committed to inclusivity and socioeconomic development?

While staunch criticism has been directed against all these four governments, one cannot but admit they have all emerged out of extremely challenging contexts. Most of their experiences carry similarities, but the mixed performance of their recent governments should also be taken into account when attempting to understand their countries’ future trajectory. Where power networks have been more opportunistic, and where wealth has been spent carelessly, instability risks are likely to continue growing.

While maintaining sustainable growth is problematic, it is likely that more diversified economies will be more resilient to short-term shocks, most likely as a result of regime changes. This is the challenge facing many parts of western Africa’s Atlantic coast. Its outcome will determine whether the region embraces new hope or descends deeper into instability and conflict.

The post African Regimes at a Crossroads appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Journey Into Europe: Islam, Immigration, and Identity

Foreign Affairs - Tue, 16/10/2018 - 14:30
This sprawling book by a Pakistani diplomat and anthropologist examines why relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe are so contentious—and what might be done about it. 

Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in the Regulation of Armed Conflict

Foreign Affairs - Tue, 16/10/2018 - 06:00
Ever since World War II, countries have been reluctant to officially declare war on one another, even after they appear to be fighting one. Because a declaration of war brings burdensome legal consequences, the simplest approach is to find a euphemism to describe the conflict.

Weekly Quiz!

Foreign Policy Blogs - Mon, 15/10/2018 - 15:32

http://www.quiz-maker.com/QLF3CTF

The post Weekly Quiz! appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Doomsday Delusions

Foreign Affairs - Mon, 15/10/2018 - 14:30
Anyone glancing at a newspaper these days finds a litany of woes: war, crime, disease, terrorism, and environmental disasters, all sandwiched between predictions of the coming collapse of market capitalism and liberal democracy. U.S. politicians on both the right, such as President Donald Trump, and the left, such as Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, warn that the United States and the world are sliding toward calamity. Pessimism rules the day. The world does indeed face challenges. Yet by almost any measure, life for most people has been getting better in almost every way. Levels of war and conflict are near historic lows. People are living longer and healthier lives and are better educated than ever before. Incomes for most families are higher than at any time in history. One billion people around the world have been lifted out of extreme poverty in the last two decades, and although...

The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft

Foreign Affairs - Mon, 15/10/2018 - 13:30
Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew and former State Department Principal Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy Richard Nephew argue that since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ use of unilateral economic policy, particularly sanctions, has threatened to alienate other countries and undermine U.S. power. Under President Donald Trump, that threat has become a reality.

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