Diplomacy & Crisis News

India’s prime minister will balk at needing allies to stay in power, but coalition rule has proved to have benefits for large democracies.

Summary and Key Points: Houthi rebels recently claimed to have struck the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Red Sea using unmanned aerial vehicles, a claim denied by U.S. Central Command.

-The incident is part of a broader disinformation campaign by the Iran-backed group, which has been targeting international shipping in retaliation for U.S. and UK military actions against them.

-Supported by Iran, the Houthis have increased their attacks in strategic waterways, posing significant risks to global trade and regional stability.

-Despite the claims, there is no evidence that the USS Eisenhower or any U.S. vessel was hit.

Houthi Rebels' False Claims: No Hit on USS Dwight D. Eisenhower

Houthi rebels claimed they achieved a “direct hit” on a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Red Sea over the weekend. 

A spokesman for the Iran-backed militant group said Houthi forces targeted USS Dwight D. Eisenhower with unmanned aerial vehicles on Saturday in retaliation for Israel’s ongoing military operation against Hamas in Gaza. 

Chinese and Iranian state-run media outlets circulated the rumor, publishing a clearly doctored photograph of the American ship on social media (we have compiled several example photos in this article). However, U.S. Central Command denies the claim. According to Voice of America, a CENTCOM official asserted that, “There is no truth to the Houthi claim of striking the USS Eisenhower or any U.S. Navy vessel,” adding that “This is an ongoing disinformation campaign that the Houthis have been conducting for months.”

The Houthis Continue to Barrage Ships in the Red Sea

Over the last few months, the U.S. and the United Kingdom have been carrying out frequent barrages against Houthi assets in the Middle East in an effort to further degrade the group’s capabilities. 

The Iran-backed militants continue to cause headaches in the Gulf of Oman and Red Sea, attacking international shipping routes frequently. Since the October 7 Hamas massacre in Israel, the Houthis have partnered with regional affiliates to strike vessels they claim are linked to the Jewish state and the West. From October to March alone, the Houthis carried out at least 60 attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. 

How Iran Is Fueling the Conflict

In a direct response to these unwarranted barrages, UK and U.S. forces target Houthi assets and weapons depots in Yemen. The Houthis have embroiled Yemen in civil war since 2014 after they seized control of the country’s northern Sana’a province and forced out the government. The conflict evolved into a larger and quite lethal war. 

Just as the Islamic Republic supports Gaza-based Hamas terrorists via weapons transfers, funding, training and propaganda, so it also backs the Houthis in Yemen. Tehran is proficient in exploiting regional instability to exert control. As detailed by War on the Rocks, “They assemble these parts into working weapons with technical assistance from Hezbollah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps advisers. This approach has allowed the Houthis to now field short and long-range drones and an increasingly diversified fleet of missiles capable of striking deep inside Saudi Arabia.” 

The Houthis’ increased barrages targeting ships in the Gulf of Oman are a dangerous escalation, according to U.S. officials. Approximately one-fifth of the world’s crude oil traded by sea passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iran-backed group knows it can interrupt the flow of the global economy using  lethal UAVs, missiles, rockets and other projectiles. The rebels may claim to only target ships linked to Israel, but the Pentagon has refuted this claim and provided evidence indicating the group also targets multinational ships. As explained by a Department of Defense spokesperson, “The Houthis continue to endanger commercial shipping that goes through that region, continue to put at risk U.S. forces, other countries’ forces in the region who want to see commerce continue to flow in a very crucial area in the Middle East.”

Although Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree claims that the Eisenhower was damaged in recent barrages, this narrative is clearly pure fiction. However, the militant group is well supplied with UAVs thanks to Iran, and eliminating the Houthis’ weapons depots should remain a top priority for U.S. and Israeli forces alike.

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Images of fake aircraft carrier attack via social media screenshots. 

Summary and  Key Points: The Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, has been plagued by persistent operational failures and extensive repairs, casting doubt on its future effectiveness.

-Originally launched during the Soviet era and designed to project power, the Kuznetsov has suffered from technical issues and accidents, including aircraft losses and fires.

-Despite these challenges, Russia claims it will rejoin the fleet soon.

-Historically, Russia's naval ambitions have faced setbacks, and the Kuznetsov’s troubled legacy highlights ongoing struggles.

Admiral Kuznetsov: Russia’s Troubled Aircraft Carrier Faces Uncertain Future

As Russia inches closer to commissioning its second Gerald R. Ford-class carrier, the gap in capabilities between Russian and Western naval power remains stark.

While the U.S. Navy is inching closer to commissioning its second Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier, Russia remains dependent on its semi-defunct Admiral Kuznetsov for sea-based power projection. Despite the former Soviet Union’s military prowess and development during the Cold War, the completion of robust aircraft carriers never came to fruition. Once the USSR collapsed in 1991, any hopes for the Soviet’s carrier aspirations came crumbling down. Due to poor planning and timing over the years, Russia possesses a singular aircraft carrier in its naval fleet. To make matters worse, Admiral Kuznetsov has proven to be a massive disappointment.

The history of Russia’s Navy:

Following the death of Peter the Great in the early 18th century, the Imperial Russian Navy sharply declined. In fact, between 1726-1730, only 54 ships were constructed. During the second half of this century, Russia saw an uptick in its naval development due to its domination of the Black Sea. By the turn of the 19th century, Russia’s progress on this front ramped up quickly. The Russian Navy became the second most powerful naval force across the globe at this time, second to the United Kingdom.

However, the naval might Russia possessed was soon nixed following the Russo-Japanese War, which resulted in a tremendous loss of Russian ships. To rectify this downfall, Tsar Nicholas II launched a hefty shipbuilding development program, which granted Russia a larger sea-based fleet than its Central Power enemies when the First World War broke out.

The trajectory of the Russian Navy would remain tumultuous for years to come. During the Russian Civil War, which would ultimately lead to the rise of the new Soviet Union, Russia’s naval fleet was completely weakened as a fighting force. With the Bolsheviks in charge, a renewed interest in building up the naval fleet was prioritized.

Although the USSR worked hard to quickly develop advanced battleships, destroyers, and cruisers around the WWI era, the U.S., Japan, and Great Britain pivoted toward adopted aircraft carriers. In a sense, the Soviets missed the boat on taking advantage of these years to build up their career potential.  

The rise of the Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier

It wasn’t until the late 1930’s that aircraft carriers would be prioritized by the Soviets in one of Stalin’s five-year plans.

The “Project 71” class, however, was largely put on hold when the Second World War broke out. Over the next few decades, additional carrier class prototypes were introduced, yet they never came to fruition due to frequent changes in the country’s political leadership. By the mid-1980s, the push to develop a homegrown aircraft carrier was finally fruitful.

Admiral Flota Sovetskoho Soyuza Kuznetsov was constructed at Chernomorskiy Shipyard and officially launched by the middle of the decade. Initially, the ship was named Riga before being redesignated as Leonid Brezhnev, Tbilisi, and finally Kuznetsov over the years.

Kuznetsov was designed to be the lead ship of the Admiral Kuznetsov-class of aircraft carriers. However, when the USSR collapsed, Kuznetsov’s sister ship- Varyag- was not complete. The Kuznetsov became the sole carrier to sail for the new Russian Federation in 1991, serving as the flagship of its navy. In addition to helicopters, the Kuznetsov can carry an array of Sukhoi Su-33 and MiG-29 fighters. The carrier has a complement of a dozen long-range surface-to-surface anti-ship P-700 Granit cruise missiles, giving it its “heavy aircraft-carrying missile cruise” designation.

On paper, Kuznetsov displaces roughly 60,000 tons and can sail at speeds in excess of 30 knots. The carrier is also fitted with anti-submarine warfare capabilities. As detailed by Naval Technology, “The ship is equipped with an Udav-1 anti-submarine system with 60 anti-submarine rockets. Udav-1, supplied by the Splav Research and Production Association in Moscow, protects surface ships by diverting and destroying incoming torpedoes. The system also provides defence against submarines and saboteur systems, such as underwater vehicles. The system has ten barrels and is capable of firing 111SG depth charge projectiles, 111SZ mine-laying projectiles and 111SO diverting projectiles. The range of the system is up to 3,000m and the submarine engagement depth is to 600m.”

Despite these abilities, Kuznetsov has suffered from a litany of failures and mishaps over the years. In fact, Russia’s sole carrier has remained dry-docked for the better part of the last decade. During the carrier’s first-ever deployment to aid the government-backed forces in the Syrian Civil War in 2016, two aircraft were lost, partaking in carrier operations. Faulty arresting wires were reportedly to blame for losing one Su-33 and one MiG-29K.

Following these mishaps, Kuznetsov was rendered useless as the carrier ceased launching and landing airframes. In addition to this tragic deployment, Kuznetsov has suffered from many incidents onboard, including fires, falling cranes and deck holes.

Even if Kuznetsov sets sail again as the flagship of Russia’s Navy, the carrier is limited in its capabilities when compared to its foreign counterparts.

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: The Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, plagued by a history of technical failures and mishaps, has been out of service since 2017.

-Initially built in the Soviet era and intended for high-profile roles, the carrier's outdated mazut fuel system and subpar construction have led to operational issues, including a fatal fire and a crane collapse that caused significant damage.

-Despite Russian claims that Kuznetsov will return to service, its history of limited deployments and continuous setbacks suggests that retiring the vessel might be a more practical option.

Why Russia’s Admiral Kuznetsov Might Never Sail Again

Russia’s sole aircraft carrier should be relegated to the scrapyard.

For years, Admiral Kuznetsov has been dry docked undergoing frequent repairs. The ship’s history is marred with unfortunate events, causing some to refer to the carrier as a complete failure. From abysmal deployment performance to fire outbreaks and falling cranes, bad luck just seems to engulf the Kuznetsov. Russia’s carrier has remained out of service since 2017, however, state-run news outlets allege that Kuznetsov could re-commission with the fleet by the end of this year. Considering the ship’s history and Moscow’s tendency to over-exaggerate, this timeline seems murky at best.

The History of Russia's Admiral Kuznetsov Aircraft Carrier :

During the Cold War, Admiral Kuznetsov was designed to serve as the lead ship of the two-ship Admiral Kuznetsov class in the Soviet Navy. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, however, the second planned ship- Varyag- was not fully constructed. Ultimately, Ukraine sold this incomplete carrier to China and it was commissioned as the People’s Liberation Army’s Liaoning. The carrier was built within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic at Chernomorskiy Shipyard during the late 1980’s to early 1990’s. Initially, the carrier was named Riga, which was eventually changed to Leonid Brezhnev and later Tbilisi. It was not until 1990 that the ship was designated Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza N.G. Kuznetsov (shortened to Admiral Kuznetsov.

Specs & Capabilities

Admiral Kuznetsov has at least two dozen rotary-style vertical launch systems, with eight missile cells each. According to The Drive, these systems could potentially fire 192 SA-N-9 “Gauntlet” point air defense missiles, which would be instrumental in defending the carrier against anti-ship missiles, aircraft, and surface ships in wartime. Additionally, Russia’s sole carrier is fitted with several anti-submarine defenses with two UDAV-1 anti-submarine/anti-torpedo rocket systems.

While Western ships developed around this time typically used gas turbines or nuclear power for energy, Kuznetsov was conventionally powered by mazut. This fuel source is notoriously black and tarry, giving off a heavy and visible trail of dark smoke when used. For an aircraft carrier, this fuel source is subprime, considering enemy warships can view the mazut from miles away. To make matters worse, mazut is a particularly challenging fuel source that requires proper boiler and piping installations to ensure adequate preheating and pressurization. When the Kuznetsov was constructed, however, insufficient piping incorporated on the ship made it challenging for its boilers to operate at full capacity simultaneously.

In addition to its shoddy construction and difficult power source, the carrier has underperformed in its intended role. Over Kuznetsov's 30-year career, it has only been deployed one time. In 2015, Russia deployed its sole carrier to the Syrian coast as part of the Kremlin’s campaign in support of the government forces in the civil war. During this operation, both a MiG-29 and an Su-33 fighter jet were lost.

As detailed by USNI News, “A fighter assigned to the Russian carrier operating in the Eastern Mediterranean crashed during a landing approach on Sunday. The Mikoyan MiG-29K was part of a trio of MiGs that had sortied from Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov headed over Syria. At one point, for unknown reasons, one of the fighters turned back to the carrier and crashed while on approach to the carrier, the official said.”

Russian state-run media outlets also verified these claims, asserting that a “technical fault during the approach landing” was to blame for the two losses.

Following these mishaps, the rest of the airframes positioned on the carrier were moved to an airbase in Syria, essentially rendering the presence of the ship useless. This incident appeared to be the first of many unfortunate mishaps that would plague the aircraft carrier. In 2018, a floating crane fell onto the carrier’s deck, killing one worker and injuring several others. Since the crane opened up a 200-square-foot hole in the flight deck, it took some time for the wreckage to be cleared. While waiting to be delivered to dry dock, another incident occurred.

A fire caused by a welding error in the ship’s engine room killed two workers and injured more than a dozen others. Overall, the repair bill for this mishap alone ballooned to roughly $8 million. Kuznetsov has not been impervious to additional incidents since being relegated to dry dock, however.

In 2022, another fire erupted onboard. Alexei Rakhmanov, head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, said that "All the relevant fire systems worked normally. There was no damage and no casualties.”

While the Kremlin claims that Kuznetsov will re-enter service with its naval fleet sometime this year, the prospects for this remain dim. In fact, Moscow may want to consider scrapping its sole carrier altogether.

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: The fighting in Ukraine's Donbas region sees slow Russian advances, but their large-scale offensive in the Kharkiv Oblast has failed, leading to heavy casualties and little strategic gain.

-The failed offensive, launched in May, has rallied international support for Ukraine and led to the deployment of advanced weaponry like HIMARS and ATACMS.

-Despite high casualties, with estimates of 320,000 to 515,000 Russian soldiers killed, wounded, or captured, the Kremlin continues to mobilize replacements.

-Russia’s attritional strategy involves costly, small-scale wave attacks, reflecting a focus on quantity over quality in its military operations.

Failed Russian Offensive in Kharkiv Sparks Increased Support for Ukraine

The fighting in Ukraine continues, with Russia making very slow but steady gains in the Donbas. Village after village, the Russian military advances forward. But that is not the case in the east, where a large-scale Russian offensive has failed to achieve anything meaningful at the cost of tens of thousands of casualties.

A Failed Offensive?

In May, the Russian military launched a large-scale offensive in the Kharkiv Oblast, in eastern Ukraine. The goal was to approach Kharkiv, the second-largest city in Ukraine and about 25 miles from the border with Russia, and also stretch the Ukrainian forces and their resources.

After several weeks of heavy fighting, it looks like that the offensive has failed. The Russian forces failed to make any meaningful progress, and Ukrainian counteroffensives have been liberating some of the territory lost. Currently, there are two large pockets of fighting but they are a good distance away from Kharkiv.

But the Russian offensive was a disaster on more than one level. Beyond the tactical and operational defeats, the failed offensive rallied international support for the Ukrainian cause and pushed the United States and several NATO countries, including Germany, to greenlight the use of long-range precision weapon systems against targets within Russia.

Now, the Ukrainian forces can use the advanced weaponry at their disposal, including M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), and MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), against high-value targets inside Russia.

However, the Russian offensive in the east was also very costly in terms of casualties.

Russian Casualties in Ukraine are Massive 

In the few weeks that the offensive lasted, the Russian forces lost tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of heavy weapon systems.

Indeed, over the past 24 hours, the Ukrainian military claims to have killed, wounded, or captured approximately 1,300 Russian troops and damaged or destroyed around 63 tactical vehicles and fuel tanks, 51 artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems, 41 unmanned aerial systems, 40 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 22 main battle tanks, 7 pieces of special equipment, and 1 anti-aircraft weapon system.

Overall, the Russian casualties continue to rise and range between 320,000 to 515,000 men killed, wounded, or captured.

“The elevated casualty rate is highly likely a reflection of Russia’s ongoing attritional offensive which is being conducted across a wide front,” the British Military Intelligence estimated in a recent operational assessment.  

Although those numbers start to resemble those of the two world wars, the Kremlin has shown an impressive force generation capability. For every Russian soldier killed or maimed in Ukraine, Moscow finds two others to replace him.

“It is highly likely that most Russian forces receive only limited training, and they are unable to carry out complex offensive operations. As a result, Russia employs small-scale but costly wave attacks in an effort to weaken Ukrainian defenses,” the British Military Intelligence added.

Quality might be an issue, but the vast quantity that the Kremlin pours into the war covers any training deficiencies.

About the Author 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: Northrop Grumman's X-29, developed during the Cold War to compete against Soviet fighters, is one of aviation history's most unique experimental aircraft.

-Introduced in the 1980s, it featured forward-swept wings, providing exceptional maneuverability and supersonic performance.

-The aircraft required advanced composite materials and a computerized fly-by-wire system for stability.

-Although only two prototypes were built and the program was eventually discontinued, the X-29's innovative design and capabilities left a lasting impact.

-Russia later attempted a similar design with the Sukhoi Su-47, which faced significant issues and was also shelved after producing just one prototype.

The X-29: Northrop Grumman's Revolutionary Jet with Backward Wings

Manufacturer Northrop Grumman may be best known for developing the F-14 fighter popularized by the blockbuster film Top Gun, however, the company is behind one of the most obscure experimental airframes in aviation history. In fact, the X-29 never even made it past its testing phase. This airframe was developed more than four decades ago, yet it remains a fan favorite for aviation experts. 

An overview of the X-29’s history

When the Cold War was heating up back in the 1970s, the U.S. military began seeking a dynamic fighter platform to better compete against the Soviet’s own aerial fleet.

The X-29 was submitted to fulfill this need, going up against the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon. When this prototype was introduced, it became the first airframe of its kind to feature forward-swept wings that made it appear as though they were installed backward.

Incorporating this unique feature was new. However, the concept driving it dated back further. Both the U.S. and Nazi Germany experimented with forward-swept wings during the Second World War. Like design issued that would persist to plague the X-29, these earlier conceptions were also flawed.

The X-29 notably achieved the ability to fly supersonically with this unique wing design.

As detailed by NASA – “The complex geometries of the wings and canards combined to provide exceptional maneuverability, supersonic performance, and a light structure. Air moving over the forward-swept wings tended to flow inward toward the root of the wing instead of outward toward the wing tip as occurs on an aft-swept wing. This reverse airflow kept the wing tips and their ailerons from stalling at high angles of attack (direction of the fuselage relative to the airflow).” 

NASA and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency collaborated to make sure the wing design functioned on the X-29. Advanced composite materials enabled the wing structures to be lightweight and rigid. While the X-29 was very agile even flying at fast speeds, it required a computerized fly-by-wire control system for stability.

More specs and capabilities:

The X-29 measured roughly 48 feet long and its unique wingspan stretched to just over 27 feet.

The fighter was powered by the General Electric F404-GE-400 engine, which produced 16,000 pounds of thrust.

Additional details surrounding the X-29’s specs were outlined by NASA:

“The aircraft had a maximum operating altitude of 50,000 feet, a maximum speed of Mach 1.6 and a flight endurance time of approximately one hour. The only significant difference between the two aircraft was an emergency spin chute deployment system mounted at the base of the rudder on aircraft No. 2. External wing structure is primarily composite materials incorporated into precise patterns to develop strength and avoid structural divergence. The wing substructure and the basic airframe itself are aluminum and titanium. Wing trailing edge actuators controlling camber are mounted externally in streamlined fairings because of the thinness of the supercritical airfoil.”

In the mid-1980s, the X-29 took its first flight from Edwards Air Force Base. Northrop Grumman’s Chief Test Pilot Chuck Sewell flew the airframe.

A second X-29 prototype flew two years later. In total, both aircraft were in the air 242 times between 1984 and 1991. The first X-29 to fly was relegated to display duties at the Research and Development Gallery of the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force on Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio.

The Second airframe found its way back to the Armstrong Flight Research Center on Edwards Air Force Base.

What about Russia's "copycat" X-29 fighter?

Roughly five years after the X-29s flew on their final missions, Russia debuted its own version of a fighter jet with forward-swept wings. This copy-cat airframe was designated the Sukhoi Su-47.

Like its American counterpart, the Soviet fighter has many issues. Without munitions, the Su-47 weighed a whopping 18 tons. This added pressure on its wings, which were already over-worked when flying high-speed movements. Two D-30F-11 turbojet engines powered the Soviet fighter, enabling the aircraft to fly at speeds of Mach 1.65, comparably slower than the U.S. X-29. 

 Ultimately, the experimental plane was nixed, and only one was ever built. 

About the Author: Maya Carlin 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: The B-47 Stratojet, the U.S.'s first jet bomber, was introduced in 1951, marking a significant transition in military aviation.

-Designed for high-altitude, long-range missions to deliver nuclear weapons, it featured advanced technologies like swept wings and powerful jet engines.

-Despite early issues with stability and maintenance, the B-47 became a pivotal aircraft in the Cold War, with over 2,000 units produced.

-Its role extended beyond its initial design, including electronic intelligence missions.

-The B-47 set the stage for subsequent jet bombers and represented a critical leap in U.S. strategic bombing capabilities.

The Forgotten Pioneer: The B-47 Stratojet’s Impact on Cold War Strategy

A slew of U.S. bomber aircraft have transcended the military community to become iconic weapons of war in the eyes of the general public.

The stable of World War II bombers, for example, like the B-17 Flying Fortress, B-24 Liberator, and B-29 Superfortress, which are typically associated with the liberation of Europe and Asia.

Then you’ve got the B-52 Stratofortress, a massive eight-engine brute that has been in service for seven decades without any plans for retirement.

But there were also machines that debuted in the small window between the iconic classes of U.S. bombers; after World War II but before the B-52 became a mainstay of U.S. aerial power. And generally, understandably, those bombers have been forgotten as relics of a transitional period in military technology.

But one such example is particularly important: the B-47 Stratojet, the U.S.’s first jet bomber. 

Research and Development of the Early Jet Bomber

The B-47 Stratojet was introduced in 1951 as a long-range, high-altitude, jet-powered strategic bomber. The B-47 was designed to avoid enemy interceptor aircraft and deliver nuclear weapons deep within the Soviet Union’s territory. 

In 1943, the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) made an informal request for the design of a jet-powered reconnaissance bomber. Jet technology was sparkling new in 1943 and had not yet been applied to a bomber platform – but the merits of such an application were obvious. Several aerospace companies responded to the USAAF’s request, and began conducting research into jet bomber technology.

By 1944, the USAAF had formalized its request, asking for proposals for a jet bomber with impressive specifications: 550 mile per hour top speed; 450 mile per hour cruising speed; 3,500 mile range, and; 45,000 foot service ceiling. North American Aviation, Convair, Boeing, and the Glenn Martin Company each submitted proposals – and all four companies were awarded study contracts. NAA and Convair were asked to focus on four-engine designs – which would become the B-45 and XB-46 respectively. Boeing and Martin were asked to focus on six-engine designs – which would become the B-47 and XB-48 respectively.

Design Influence from German Aeronautics

In 1945, the Army Air Forces Scientific Advisory Board inspected a secret German aeronautics lab. Embedded with the inspection team was George S. Schairer, the chief of Boeing’s technical staff. During the inspection, the team found German airplane models incorporated something novel, something rumored but unconfirmed: swept wings. Extensive wind tunnel data confirmed that the swept wing design was quite effective. Urgently, Schairer wired back to Boeing.

“Stop the bomber design,” Schairer wrote. The new bomber, under development back home with Boeing, featured straight wings. But Schairer was now a convert; he wanted the new bomber to have swept wings.

Back home, Boeing redesigned its jet bomber to include wings and tail that swept back at 35 degrees. Further revisions were to follow, especially with respect to engine placement and landing gear placement. 

By April 1946, Boeing was satisfied with all of its tweaks. The USAAF ordered two prototypes, which were designated as the XB-47. The XB-47s rolled off the assembly line, ready for flight testing, just a few days before the USAAF separated from the U.S. Army to become a distinct service, the U.S. Air Force. The newly formed USAF set to work, exhaustively testing the new XB-47.

A New Jet Bomber in the New Air Force

Because the new jet bomber incorporated so many cutting-edge technologies, the platform was heavily tested. Test pilot Robert Robbins, who helped debut the XB-47, was initially skeptical about the new bomber. “Oh God, please help me through the next two hours,” Robbins prayed before the XB-47’s first flight. Robbins' fears were alleviated, however; the XB-47 could fly. 

There were some problems, however. The prototype had a tendency to “Dutch roll,” or weave side to side in an uncontrolled yawing motion. A “yaw damper” control system was installed to prevent such yawing. The bomber also had a habit of pitching up at maximum speed – a dangerous flight characteristic caused stalling due to upward pitching of the outboard section of the wing. To remedy the upward pitching, Boeing installed “vortex generators” to prevent the airflow separation that led to upward pitching and stalling. And tragically, during an early test flight, pilot Scott Osler was killed when the XB-47’s canopy ripped off at high speed. The co-pilot managed to land the bomber safely – and Boeing redesigned the canopy. 

Stratojet in Service

The exhaustive tweaking and testing paid off in dividends – although the finished B-47 Stratojet still had problems. 

The finished B-47 Stratojet was regarded as the fastest bomber in the world. USAF Col. Walter Boyne described the new bomber as a “sleek, beautiful outcome that was highly advanced.” The B-47 was said to fly with a light touch, more like a fighter jet than a bomber. The B-47 was so aerodynamically clean that high-speed landing gear (180 knots) was required; the landing was assisted, however, with a ribbon-like drag chute that would slow the bomber down. And because of the hazards associated with such high-speed landings, the B-47 was the first mass-produced aircraft to be equipped with an anti-skid braking system (ABS). 

Still, the B-47 was criticized for its high landing speed – which, when paired with the bomber’s sluggish takeoff performance made for a dangerous combination. The B-47 was also very particular about its landing attitude. If landed at the wrong attitude, the bomber would porpoise – and sometimes skid onto one wing before cartwheeling. Another serious problem: the wings flexed in flight, which had a tendency to affect flight control. Also, the B-47 was a “maintenance hog.” 

Despite the drawbacks, over 2,000 B-47s were produced. The standard variant served proudly until 1969, while the electronic-intelligence variant, the EB-47, served until 1977. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a prolific defense writer with over 1,000 published articles posted online and around the world. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, he joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. He lives in Oregon and listens to Dokken. Follow him on Twitter @harrison_kass.

Image Credit: Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

Summary: The Lockheed S-3 Viking, retired by the U.S. Navy in 2016 after over four decades of service, was a versatile, carrier-based aircraft renowned for its anti-submarine capabilities.

-Initially developed to replace the Grumman S-2 Tracker, the S-3 featured a four-person crew and advanced sensor integration.

-Although it was later repurposed for surface detection, ground attack, and in-flight refueling, its retirement has left some defense planners nostalgic for its submarine detection abilities, especially amid rising naval tensions with China.

-Despite interest in reviving the S-3, modern replacements like the V-22 Osprey have taken over its roles.

Why the S-3 Viking's Retirement May Have Been Premature

A few years ago, NASA retired the Lockheed S-3 Viking, which had been in service with the U.S. Navy until 2016 – over four decades after the jet’s introduction in 1974.

The S-3, nicknamed “War Hoover” for the vacuum cleaner-like sound it made, was originally developed as a submarine killer – and was distinct for its four-person crew.

Building the S-3 Viking

To replace the aging, prop-driven Grumman S-2 Tracker, the Navy developed the VSX program to procure an anti-submarine successor.

The winning design, the S-3, was a carrier-based, all-weather aircraft capable of subsonic, long-range flight. The S-3 was very much a conventional-looking plane, with a slightly swept leading edge and two GE TF-34 turbofan engines mounted under the wings. Whereas most military jets required ground service equipment to assist with the engine start, the S-3 housed an auxiliary power unit (APU) and could perform unassisted starts.  

Four-Man Crew

Unlike most carrier-capable jet aircraft measuring around 50 feet long, the S-3 carried a four-person crew – rather than a two-person, or one-person crew. Upfront sitting side-by-side was the pilot and the copilot/tactical coordinator (COTAC).

In the back, also side-by-side, were the tactical coordinator (TACCO) and the sensor operator (SENSO). The SENSO was enlisted, whereas the other three crew members were commissioned officers. The four-person configuration came with an odd ejection protocol: if the pilot or COTAC initiated ejection, all four crew members would be ejected, with the backseaters firing 0.5 seconds before the frontseaters to allow for separation.

If TACCO or SENSO, sitting in the back initiated ejection, the pilots up front would not be ejected – no, they had to initiate their own ejection. 

Sensors and Displays Allowed Teamwork

The S-3 was renowned for its sensory integration; the S-3 was the first anti-submarine aircraft to integrate all of its sensor systems into a single General Purpose Digital Computer (GPDC). The integration allowed crew members, who were each seated in front of a Multi-Purpose Display (MPD) screen, to consult and collaborate with each other by analyzing the same data at their own station simultaneously. Alternatively, each crew member could assess separate data.

The end result: the S-3 was a powerful detective, with sensory capabilities considered equivalent to the P-3 Orion, a 116-foot plane with a crew of 12. 

Despite the S-3’s adeptness at sleuthing out enemy submarines, by the 1990s, with the Soviet Union folded, there just weren’t many enemy submarines left to sleuth.

Accordingly, the S-3’s mission profile was modified, from anti-submarine operations to sea surface detection, ground-attack, and in-flight refueling operations. For the S-3’s updated, less sophisticated function, the backseat crew was removed, leaving just a pilot and COTAC to operate the S-3 for most missions. The S-3 served reliably until 2016 when it was retired.

Still, some interest in the S-3 has remained, including rumors of a “comeback.” South Korea’s Navy, for example, expressed interest in purchasing the S-3. Even the U.S. Navy has spitballed the idea of bringing a few S-3s back from storage to perform anti-submarine duties.

For a moment, it appeared as though Lockheed was going to refurbish the S-3, rename it the C-3, and use it to replace the C-2 Greyhound for carrier onboard delivery (COD). Instead, the V-22 Osprey was chosen as the C-2’s replacement.

But the lingering interest in the S-3 serves as a testament to the jet’s functionality and reliability.

And now, in light of China’s naval build-up and aggressive behavior, some war planners are longing for the S-3’s vaunted submarine detection abilities, and wondering if the Viking’s retirement was premature. 

About the Author

Harrison Kass is a prolific defense writer with over 1,000 articles published. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons. 

If Biden can avoid the temptation to be a warrior defending allies abroad, he might have a better chance at winning his battles at home.

Does the United States need the ability to fight more than one major war at a time? 

The Senate Armed Services Committee has been asking this question of late, and it is right to do so.

Today, according to official Pentagon planning doctrine, the United States could not. One need not believe literally in a “new axis of evil” that includes Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China to worry that if America and its allies wound up in a fight against one of these four states, another one might consider opportunistic aggression. This could be particularly concerning if the potential adversary believed it could win fast, creating a fait accompli that the United States would be challenged to reverse even after concluding war in another theater. 

For many decades, seeking to ensure deterrence and prevent opportunistic aggression by a second foe if engaged already against a first, the United States aspired to some variant of a two-war capability. During the Cold War, the United States generally aimed to be able to fight a major war alongside NATO allies against the Soviet bloc in Europe and at least one other simultaneous conflict (like the Korean or Vietnam war) elsewhere. Accordingly, the U.S. military during the Cold War was generally 60 to 100 percent larger than it is today.

Once the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the United States cut back its armed forces but kept a two-war planning goal. However, those two wars were imagined to be against much less capable foes:  the likes of Iraq, Iran, North Korea, or perhaps Syria. In fact, the United States wound up fighting two overlapping wars for many years in Iraq and Afghanistan—though they differed from the typical scenarios envisioned in these force-sizing paradigms since they were long and moderate in scale rather than short and big (like Operation Desert Storm in 1991). Because of their duration, the United States had to stagger its peak efforts in those wars, emphasizing Iraq under President George W. Bush and Afghanistan in the first term of President Obama. 

Starting around 2015, things changed again. Pentagon planners, starting with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Joseph Dunford, created a “4+1” threat framework with Russia and China joining Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorism on the Pentagon’s list of top concerns. Then, under Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Secretary Mark Esper during the Trump years, the Pentagon prioritized Russia and China; the Biden administration under Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has kept a very similar National Defense Strategy.

According to official doctrine [media.defense.gov], today’s U.S. military should have the capacity to do the following all at once:

-Together with allies, fight and defeat China or Russia (but not both at the same time), presumably in conflicts centered on the western Pacific region and eastern European region, respectively,

-Defend the American homeland while also maintaining a nuclear deterrent,

-Deter North Korea and Iran (without specifying exactly how), and

-Maintain momentum against transnational violent extremist organizations as part of the so-called “war on terror.”

But this is still just a one-war framework. Is that enough military for today’s world? 

Before jumping to the conclusion that we need a big defense buildup, a few other considerations are in order. Leave aside the fact that, at nearly $900 billion, America’s national defense budget already exceeds the Cold War peak and is roughly triple China’s and six times Russia’s—at a time when the U.S. structural federal deficit of more than $1 trillion a year makes a big defense buildup challenging to imagine. More to the point, the four nemeses mentioned above, while certainly in cahoots with each other already on some issues, are not likely to fight literally for each other. For any of them, going to war deliberately against the United States would be a decision of huge consequence not likely to be reached just because America seemed temporarily preoccupied elsewhere. In addition, the Army today cannot even recruit to fill out the currently desired troop strength and most of the other services have been struggling to make personnel targets as well.

Most of all, for both the Trump and Biden administrations, the quality of the armed forces has been rightly seen as a higher priority than their size. Defense planners have wanted to focus on improving military lethality, survivability, sustainability, resilience, and adaptability in an era of rapid technological change. 

The United States does need to buttress its deterrence of simultaneous, opportunistic aggression. But the right standard for doing so is probably to ensure that the country has sufficient key capabilities for each of the four key potential foes that—with allies—it could prevent a quick, successful aggression by any of them even while concentrating most of its forces on a single big war.  As recently argued compellingly by Thomas Mahnken as well, another key benefit of a multi-war planning framework is that it would, in effect, create a strategic reserve of munitions. By producing and pre-stationing ordnance for several wars at once in key overseas theaters on a larger scale than today, the United States would, in effect, create a hedge against a single war going longer or taking more weaponry than initially expected. This policy would also buy time to start manufacturing more weapons to restore a rock-solid multi-theater capability if and when a war broke out in one place. Fortunately, these are attainable and affordable goals that the National Defense Strategy already pays lip service to. We need to ensure that we have the capabilities, not just the right words.

Some of the key additional capabilities that might be needed to support such a strategy include a couple of squadrons of dedicated “fifth generation” fighter aircraft for Korea (to attack North Korean missile launchers early in any war, limiting damage to Seoul); unmanned submarines stationed in the western Pacific with anti-ship sensors and missiles to help Taiwan resist a Chinese invasion attempt; vertical-lift aircraft on Okinawa with ordnance usable for the same purpose; dedicated missile defense systems for the Middle East of the type that helped stymie Iran’s recent missile and drone barrage against Israel; and a brigade of U.S. ground troops backed up by fighters and attack helicopters in the Baltic states as a permanent deterrent against Russian aggression there.  Again, augmentations of some sensor networks and munitions stockpiles also make sense.

The price tag for this sort of modest force expansion would hardly be trivial but would not exceed tens of billions of dollars a year. It could be partially funded by selective cuts in the defense budget elsewhere.  As we gear up for a presidential election this fall and a new defense review next year, these issues of possible simultaneous war—but simultaneous deterrence—should be front and center in the American strategic debate.

About the Author: Michael E. O'Hanlon 

Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He directs the Strobe Talbott Center on Security, Strategy and Technology, as well as the Defense Industrial Base working group, and is the inaugural holder of the Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy. He co-directs the Africa Security Initiative as well. He is an adjunct professor at Columbia, Georgetown, and George Washington universities, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He also serves as a member of the Defense Policy Board at the U.S. Department of Defense. O’Hanlon was a member of the external advisory board at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2011-12. O’Hanlon’s latest book, “Military History for the Modern Strategist: America’s Major Wars Since 1861” (Brookings and Rowman & Littlefield, 2023) was published in January 2023.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

Summary: The resurgence of tank warfare in Ukraine has spotlighted the importance of anti-tank weapons, including the Swedish AT4.

-This shoulder-fired, disposable anti-tank missile system, initially adopted by the Swedish Army and later by the U.S., is effective against lighter armored vehicles and buildings.

-While less versatile than its peers like the Javelin and NLAW, the AT4 has played a crucial role in Ukraine, reportedly taking out Russian T-90 tanks.

-Its ease of use and widespread availability have made it a valuable asset in the conflict, despite its limitations in urban settings due to a significant back-blast.

Swedish AT4: The Unsung Hero of Ukraine's Anti-Tank Arsenal

The revival of tank warfare in Ukraine has coincided with a resurgence of interest in anti-tank weapons.

Throughout Russia’s invasion, Western nations have provided Ukrainian forces with sophisticated anti-tank missile systems to aid the country’s defensive efforts.

While news surrounding the role the American-made FGM-148 Javelin and Swedish-made Next Generation Light Anti-tank Weapon have played in the Eastern European conflict has circulated widely over the last year, one anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) is also seeing good use in Ukraine.

The AT4 Swedish shoulder-fired weapon has proven to be a major pain to Moscow’s armored vehicles. 

Introducing the AT4: History and Specs

The Swedish Army adopted the predecessor to its indigenous AT4 in the late 1960s.

Within a decade, the weapon’s manufacturer began researching a more advanced variant that would be singularly capable of penetrating heavily armored main battle tanks in frontal engagements. With this design priority in mind, the AT4 was created. The ATGM was conceptualized to be a weapon that could engage lighter armored Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) from any direction and heavily armored MBTs from the sides or rear. In addition to tanks, the AT4’s manufacturer wanted the weapon to be an effective tool against buildings and fortifications.  

Prior to the AT4’s introduction to the Swedish army, the AT4 was observed by the U.S. Army after Congress mandated an ATGM competition to replace the M72 LAW. Out of the competition’s six participants, the AT4 was recognized as the winner. The Swedish-made ATGM is a disposable, single-shot unguided launcher that fires an 84mm round. The AT4 is light, portable, and can be easily slung on a soldier’s shoulder. 

As outlined in a previous work, “The AT4 is a little over 3 feet (roughly 1 meter) in length and weighs around 15 pounds (6.80 kilograms). The round has a muzzle velocity of 820 feet (250 meters) per second and can penetrate 16 inches (40.64 centimeters) of armor at a maximum effective range of roughly 1,000 feet (305 meters). The projectiles can be high-explosive anti-tank, dual-purpose delayed penetration, high-penetration, and anti-structure for urban combat.”

The AT4 Hosts Many Similarities to the Carl Gustaf

The AT4’s manufacturer, Saab Bofors, implemented many of the same design features that the Cal Gustaf hosts. As a true supergun, the Gustaf can effectively target bunkers, thinly-armored personnel carriers, and even main battle tanks. Like the AT4, the Gustaf is man-portable and shoulder-fired.

However, unlike the Gustaf, the ATF is not reusable. Both weapons are of the same caliber and weight, but the AT4 is intended for two-person operation, unlike the Gustaf. 

Despite its Downsides, the AT4 Has Been Used Prominently in Ukraine

Perhaps the AT4’s best quality is that it can be easily used.

The weapon’s simplicity and durability have led to its export across the globe and 20 countries today readily deploy this ATGM. The U.S. military alone has procured more than 600,000 AT4 ATGMs over the years. While the Swedish-made weapon is user-friendly, it also comes with some cons. 

One major flaw that the AT4 possesses is that it develops a large back-blast behind the weapon, which could injure the weapon’s operator and nearby friendly forces, according to Army Technology.

Therefore, the AT4 is not as versatile as other portable ATGMs, since it cannot be used in restricted areas frequently present in urban warfare settings. Due to this flaw, in addition to the AT4’s inability to take out main battle tanks easily, the Swedish-made weapon lags behind its Javelin and NLAW near-peer ATGMs. Despite this fact, the weapon has been used effectively in Ukraine.

According to Ukrainian officials, its soldiers were reportedly able to use the AT4 to take out some of Moscow’s top-of-the-line T-90 tanks.

In January of last year, Ukrainian-American journalist Viktor Kovalenko shared a clip of an alleged AT4 attack on social media.

In the footage, plumes of grey smoke can be seen billowing from a damaged T-90 tank.

While the Javelin and NLAW systems will continue to take center stage in Ukraine’s ATGM use, the AT4 should not be dismissed. 

About the Author: Maya Carlin 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary: The Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, named after Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, have been pivotal to the U.S. Navy's power projection since the mid-1970s.

-Despite plans to replace them with the Gerald R. Ford-class, delays and production issues have extended the Nimitz-class service life beyond past stated end dates, with the Navy spending $200 million on extensions.

-These carriers are vital for maintaining U.S. military presence in key regions like the Red Sea and South China Sea.

-Known for their robust capabilities, including advanced armament and large air wings, Nimitz-class carriers will continue to operate into the 2050s, supporting critical naval operations worldwide.

The Legacy and Future of Nimitz-Class Carriers Amid Ford-Class Delays

The Nimitz-class aircraft carriers have remained the backbone of the U.S. Navy since their introduction in the mid-1970’s. Named to honor World War II Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, these nuclear-powered carriers represented the largest warships to ever be built for the service until the introduction of the USS Gerald R. Ford in 2017.

From the Cold War to the War on Terror, the Nimitz class has a proven track record of power projection. More recently, the service has revealed that this carrier class will remain commissioned for longer than initially planned. The Navy’s fiscal 2023 budget called to prolong the service life of the lead ship of the class beyond 2025.

The Nimitz-class’ planned Ford successors are experiencing delays and other production issues, forcing the Navy to maintain these carriers past their service lives.

According to a 2023 report to Congress, the Navy plans to spend $200 million on extension work to preserve the Nimitz ships’ life spans.

As stated by Director of Air Warfare Division N98 Rear Adm. Michael Donnelly, “Carriers are the linchpin of everything we do in naval aviation. Our requirements are designed and aligned within our air wings to provide the capability out to the [combatant commands] for our ability to conduct the mission. Our ability to get the carriers out on time, whether it is new procurement or maintenance, is essential.”

The Navy must keep a sufficient number of carriers out at sea to project military might abroad. As tensions in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and South China Sea continue to spike, the presence of U.S. carriers is even more vital. Until the Ford ships all enter service, their Nimitz predecessors will remain deployable.

The history of the Nimitz-class

The Navy first ordered the Nimitz-class carriers as replacement vessels for the older Kitty Hawk and Enterprise-classes. Powered by two A4W pressurized water reactors instead of the typical gas turbines or diesel-electric systems used previously on ships, the Nimitz are more sophisticated than their predecessors. Specifically, this class can carry 90% more aviation fuel and to% more ordnance than the earlier Forrestal carriers. The U.S. Navy prioritized developing a carrier class capable of withstanding more than three times the damage inflicted on the Essex ships during the Second World War. To fulfill this need, the Nimitz hangers are divided and more protected to restrict the spread of fire.

Armament-wise, the Nimitz carriers are well-equipped. Each ship in this class carries two or three RIM-7 Sea Sparrow or RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile Mk29 missile launchers for use against aircraft and anti-ship missiles, in addition to Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS). The Phalanx is used to defend against incoming missiles, aircrafts and small boats. The weapon consists of a radar-guided Vulcan cannon. It is deployed on every class of surface combat ship except the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock and Zumwalt-class destroyer.

While these weapons are formidable, the true strength of an aircraft carrier is its air wing. During the Cold War, the Nimitz carriers typically carry 85-90 aircraft, including E-2 Hawkeyes, S-3A Viking antisubmarine planes and A-6 Intruder attack bombers.

Today, the Nimitz carriers host the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft and F-35C Lightning fighters.

The ten Nimitz-class carriers were constructed at Newport News Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia, between 1968 and 2006. Nimitz was commissioned in 1975, followed by Dwight D. Eisenhower, Carl Vinson, Theodore Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, John C. Stennis, Harry S. Truman, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush in subsequent years.

Operational history:

The Nimitz first saw combat during Operation Eagle Claw over the Indian Ocean, when hostages were taken in the U.S. embassy in Tehran. During the Gulf War and Operation Southern Watch in the 1990’s, USS Theodore Roosevelt played a critical role in combat operations. Roosevelt and sister-ship Carl Vinson were among the first U.S. warships to operate in Operation Enduring Freedom following the September 11th attacks. Since then, essentially every Nimitz ship has supported air operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

While the Nimitz-class certainly retains an honorable service history, certain limitations require a next-generation carrier-class that can better adapt to technological advances. The Gerald R. Ford-class was ordered in 2008 and is expected to replace its Nimitz predecessors.

However, delays are pushing back the projected timeline of the Ford ships’ entry to service, rendering the need to maintain the Nimitz ships. Recent reports suggest that the Nimitz-class ships will sail through the 2050s and perhaps later to prevent a gap in capability from forming.

About the Author: Maya Carlin

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons and Shutterstock. 

Summary: The U.S. Air Force has deployed F-22 Raptors to the Middle East to counter Russia's escalating provocations, including harassment of American MQ-9 Reaper drones in Syrian airspace, in years past.

-This follows a history of aggressive behavior, such as a 2012 incident where Iranian pilots attempted to shoot down a U.S. Predator drone, leading to the decision to escort drones with F-22s.

-The F-22, the world's first fifth-generation fighter, is unmatched in capability, making Russian aircraft vulnerable in its presence.

-The deployment sends a clear message to Russia to reconsider its hostile actions in the region.

F-22 Raptors: The U.S. Air Force’s Answer to Russian Drone Harassment

The U.S. Air Force recently deployed F-22 Raptors to the Middle East as part of a broader effort to combat Russia’s increasingly provocative behavior in the region.

Over the last year, Russian fighters have engaged in malign behavior targeting American unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) quite frequently. This week, the U.S. military said that Moscow’s fighters have “harassed” American drones over Syria for the third day in a row.

Three MQ-9 Reaper drones were the target of Russia’s harassment, versatile primary offensive strike UAVs for the Air Force. According to the head of the U.S. Air Forces Central Command Lt. Gen. Alex Grynkewich, “Russian aircraft flew 18 unprofessional close passes that caused the MQ-9s to react to avoid unsafe situations.” While these types of provocations over Syrian airspace are significant, Russian fighters have also intercepted a Reaper drone over the Black Sea last year. 

By sending over Raptors in response to Russia’s hostile behavior in the region, the U.S. military is telling Moscow to watch out.

As the world’s first ever fifth-generation fighter platform, the F-22 is widely considered to be the most sophisticated of its kind to ever fly the skies. Russian pilots should consider another time in history when these formidable fighters were sent to protect American spy drones against Soviet aircraft one decade ago. 

F-22 Tells Iran F-4 'You Really Ought to Go Home' 

In 2012, a pair of Iranian Air Force Su-25 pilots attempted to shoot down the U.S. drone which was operating roughly 16 miles from Iran’s coastline. The U.S. Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator UAV was designed primarily for patient reconnaissance and did not pose a threat to any airframes.

In fact, if attacked, the drone would struggle quite a bit to defend itself. For this reason, the Iranian pilots considered the Predator to be an easy target. Flying Soviet-era Su-25 “frogfoots,” the Iranian pilots reportedly closed in on the drone and opened fire using their 30mm cannons. The Su-25s failed to destroy the drone.

However, the message they were sending was received by the U.S. Going forward.

The Pentagon decided to send F-22 Raptors or F-18 Hornets to escort Predator drones involved in intelligence surveillance reconnaissance missions on the move. 

In 2013, Iranian pilots would again try to take down a Predator drone close to the Iranian shoreline. This time, however, F-22 Raptors were nearby. A pair of Iranian F-4 Phantom pilots began to close in on the Predator, likely scoping out how to best take it down.

Unbeknownst to the Iranian pilots, an F-22 piloted by Lt. Col. Kevin “Showtime” Sutterfield was eying the F-4 Phantoms the whole time.

Then-Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh explained what happened next:

“He [the Raptor pilot] flew under their aircraft [the F-4s] to check out their weapons load without them knowing that he was there, and then pulled up on their left wing and then called them and said ‘you really ought to go home.’” 

While Russia does fly more modern fighters than the Su-25 these days, no airframe in its arsenal would be completely safe around an F-22 Raptor tasked with protecting an American UAV. The redeployment of Raptors to the Middle East does not bode well for Moscow’s future provocations in Syria’s airspace. 

About the Author: Maya Carlin 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. Email the Author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

On April 10, 2024, amid the high-pitch and polarising campaign for the upcoming national elections, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi gave a crucial interview with Newsweek. Generally, BJP election campaigns put a high premium on hyper-nationalistic rhetoric on security issues. However, this time, Modi took an unexpected stance and softened his previously tough posture on India-China ties. In his Newsweek interview, he said, “Through positive and constructive bilateral engagement at diplomatic and military levels, the two countries will be able to restore and sustain peace and tranquillity at the borders.” While emphasizing that the relationship with China is “important” and “significant,” he stated, “It is my belief that we need to urgently address the prolonged situation on our borders so that the abnormality in our bilateral interactions can be put behind us. Stable and peaceful relations between India and China are important for not just our two countries but the entire region and world.” Reacting positively to Modi’s statements, China also assured that “sound and stable” relations are in both nations’ interests.

In the diplomatic quarters, Modi’s statements have signaled a breakthrough toward achieving a thaw in the stiff and estranged bilateral ties between India and China. However, the question arises whether it is possible to achieve a lasting peace in the Himalayan borders, given the fact that twenty-one rounds of core commander-level meetings and twenty-nine meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China border affairs have failed to achieve any breakthrough. 

After the Galwan crisis in June 2020, which resulted in causalities on both sides, the bilateral ties worsened. Following the Galwan standoff, both sides amassed 50,000 troops in a mirror deployment pattern in the Ladakh sector. After four rounds of disengagement in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso, Gogra (PP-17 A), and Hot Springs (PP-15), and continuing tensions in Depsang and Demchok, the deployments remain in a standoff on both sides of the border. Today, bilateral relations are at a nadir not seen since the 1962 war.

Nevertheless, focused as it is on the goal of a $5 trillion economy, India cannot afford to bait China into a major conflict and has no intention of doing so. On the other hand, amid rumors of China occupying further Indian territory and India forfeiting patrolling rights in some parts of Ladakh, the Chinese threat to Indian territorial integrity cannot be ignored. Further, the specter of a united China-Pakistan front will be a strategic nightmare for New Delhi. Bearing all of this in mind, how should India address the China question?

Understanding India’s Mind and its Dilemmas 

The greatest puzzle torturing Indian security czars is how to decode China’s intentions. In my interaction with several eminent Indian geostrategic experts, both practitioner diplomats and academic scholars, I found that there is hardly any agreement on what China wants. Does Beijing want to amicably settle the boundary issues and make further progress in trade and cultural ties, or simply grab India’s territory? 

Notably, in the perceptions of the Indian strategic community, the boundary issue constitutes a bottleneck preventing the improvement of bilateral relations. As many told me, India-China ties will take an upward trajectory once there is a breakthrough on the boundary front. However, regarding China’s intent, many Indian scholars and diplomats believe India can do business with China and resolve the boundary issues through bilateral diplomatic initiatives. They argue that from 1988 to 2020, both countries signed bilateral agreements in 1993, 1996, and 2005, ratifying the 1962 ceasefire line as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border and focus more on building robust trade relationships. As a result, no significant differences existed on the LAC, even if the exact demarcation remained unsettled. Further, they argue that over the last three decades before 2020, India and China had discovered a successful modus vivendi to live together peacefully as neighbors, enhance commercial ties, and de-hyphenate the long-standing boundary issues from the commercial and business arena. 

The opponents of the abovementioned line of thought ask if China wanted peace, why did it unleash the Galwan conflict without provocation, spoiling the trust-building measures of the last three decades? Even before Galwan, China’s intent was never transparent and fair. In 2009, China constructed a road from Sumdo to Patrol Point 13 in the Depsang plains. The PLA’s 2011 and 2013 incursions into the Depsang plains led to a face-off with the Indian army. In 2014, PLA made incursions in Chumar (Eastern Ladakh), followed by a long-drawn standoff between the two armies in Doklam on the India-Bhutan-China trijunction in 2017. Except for the 2011 incursion, which the military leadership resolved, the remaining ones required negotiations with the civilian leadership. 

Additionally, on various occasions, China irked India by handing stapled visas to the citizens of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh and blocking the designation of Pakistan-sponsored and based terrorist commanders as global terrorists in the UN. Further, China’s rigid and intransigent attitude on the boundary issues after twenty-one rounds of core commander-level talks following the Galwan deadlock, coupled with its heavy investment in the dual-use infrastructure in the border regions, raises serious suspicions about China’s long-term intent.

Another line of thought argues that the boundary issue in itself is irrelevant to China. A few remote tracks of land pale in significance to Beijing’s larger bid for regional and global power. As such, Beijing seeks to use the issue to subordinate India into acceptance of its status as an inferior power vis-à-vis the mighty “middle kingdom.” The 1962 war was, in part, intended to downsize India’s prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, under whose leadership India was emerging as a leader of the non-aligned countries. In China’s grand strategy, a strong, confident India cannot exist as an equal civilizational state in its own backyard and challenge its status as a world power.

Furthermore, the border issue serves to counter India’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which could threaten China’s shipping routes in the Malacca Strait. Beijing aims to keep India boxed in on land either by propping up the Kashmir issue with its all-weather friend Pakistan and its array of proxy terrorist groups or by salami-slicing incursions on the India-China border. Also, China may want to keep the borders vague at this stage, create confusion and ambivalence through occasional incursions, and finally settle the border under more favorable geopolitical conditions. These scenarios could include China’s attainment of decisive military and technological superiority over India, Indian isolation in global politics, or the erosion and weakening of Western capabilities and intent to support India against China.

This uncertainty and unease hovering around China’s long-term designs in the Himalayas is helped by the scarcity of information. Chinese political and military institutions are famously opaque, unlike those of democratic countries. Additionally, Indian intelligence agencies have devoted most of their attention and resources to Pakistan and its proxy terrorist networks in the last several decades. Consequently, they do not have robust intelligence capabilities and reliable assets within Chinese decision-making institutions. In fact, India relies on U.S. satellite imagery for intelligence about China’s troops’ deployment, infrastructure build-up, and other developments in the border areas. Academic scholars mostly rely on official documents from the Chinese government that are available in the public domain and articles published in prominent Chinese newspapers and media portals.

Mapping Escalation Scenarios

In 1962, when the Indian and Chinese armies were locked in a standoff in Himalayan borders over the boundary question, Chairman Mao, drawing his lessons from the classical Chinese tradition, told his commanders that China and India had fought “one and a half wars” throughout history, furnishing Beijing with valuable lessons. He narrated two instances of Chinese military intervention in India to his generals. The first war happened 1300 years earlier during the rule of the Tang dynasty (618-907 AD), when China sent its military to support a legitimate Indian king fighting against an usurper. After the first war, India and China enjoyed a long period of peace and vibrant cultural, economic, and religious exchange. The “half-war,” according to Mao, occurred when Timur the Lame, a Mongol king, plundered and raided Delhi in 1398, killing at least 100,000 people.

In Mao’s understanding, the critical lesson from the two abovementioned historical incidents was that India and China were, in Kissinger’s words, “not doomed to perpetual enmity,” and they could enjoy sustained periods of peace and prosperity again. However, for this to take place, Beijing had to “knock” India forcefully to bring it to the diplomatic negotiations.

Weeks later, China invaded India and inflicted a devasting defeat, almost occupying the entire state of modern-day Arunachal Pradesh before retreating to the previous line of control and even returning the captured heavy weaponry. The defeat of 1962 is still a major humiliation for the Indian collective psyche.

The incident mentioned above reveals the deep historical roots in China’s strategic subconscious. Hence, if history is the best way to understand China’s underlying philosophy and forecast its future actions, then there is a strong likelihood of a 1962-style swift invasion in some sectors and major skirmishes in the other sectors. One recent report from the Royal United Services Institute predicts a Second India-China war between 2025 and 2030. In such a scenario, India cannot rule out the possibility of a quick surge of Chinese troops seven to eight kilometers inside the Indian territory. 

At the same time, Pakistan may activate the Line of Control and incite terror incidents in Kashmir and communal violence in India as a diversion tactic and facilitate the execution of Beijing’s game plan as swiftly as possible. In another scenario, China may continue embarrassing and pressuring India with its periodic salami-slicing incursions. Coupled with such military adventures, India may have to face cyber-attacks on its critical infrastructure, military and civil installations, financial institutions, and stock markets. 

An invasion may happen where India least expects it. Though most recent incursions and encroachment have taken place in the Ladakh region, New Delhi cannot assume that an attack can only occur in the western sector. Minor and periodic Chinese incursions could act as diversion tactics to hide the real game plan of a mid-sized invasion in the eastern sector of the India-China border, Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing claims as “South Tibet.” To add more to the prevailing confusion, China may initiate incursions in the middle sector, encourage Nepal to be more aggressive on the Indian border and claim Kalapani, and create intense pressure in Bhutan either by deployment, increased patrols in disputed areas, or by infrastructure build-up. 

Reportedly, the Chinese may believe this middle path of swift and mid-sized invasion is feasible in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. First, the invasion will likely be very swift, giving minimum response time to the Indian side. Against the backdrop of existing uncertainty and ambiguity, by the time New Delhi realizes Beijing’s intent, the PLA would have secured most of its intended outcomes. Second, Indian communications and road infrastructure in the Himalayan region are developing fast; however, there is a long way to go before they catch up with China. 

I have discussed in a previous article that China has constructed a sophisticated network of axial roads in the border areas, which makes troop and equipment movement much easier and rapid vis-à-vis movement on the Indian side. In such a scenario, Americans can help only by providing intelligence, minor communications equipment, and technological support, enabling smooth logistics. They are unlikely to put their boots on the ground. Political will aside, the Himalayan terrain is harsh, and the American soldiers are not accustomed to it.

The battles in the Himalayan region are likely to be infantry and artillery-centric, in which the road infrastructure will play a critical role, and China has a clear short-term advantage on that front. Additionally, China can utilize its drones and rocket force. Lastly, in such a scenario, India’s relationship with Russia would be of little value once a conflict erupts. Due to Moscow’s increased dependence on Beijing after the Ukraine war, its capabilities are limited. By the time they can influence Chinese policymakers, Beijing will have secured its gains, after which the world powers will intervene, urging restraint and diplomacy.

The chances of such a swift, embarrassing, and destabilizing attack and the periodic accidental or deliberate skirmishes escalating into a full-fledged conventional war are minimal at this stage. If the conflict escalates beyond a point and gets longer, China will be embroiled in a long-drawn and protracted conflict in rugged Himalayan terrain. India has also come a long way from where it was in 1962. Today, India is a nuclear power and a leader in advanced space programs. In addition to its robust scientific, technological, and industrial base with the fourth largest military and fifth largest GDP, it has a much stronger and credible standing in global geopolitics. Hence, if it can neutralize the initial brunt of a Chinese attack, Indians could give a robust defense and counterattack, bringing massive embarrassment to China. 

Such a scenario will be a major setback to China’s long-term ambitions to become a world power and contend with the United States. Also, following such a scenario, India would likely abandon its neutrality and switch to the American side, get closer to Quad countries and the Western camp, and cause hurdles for China’s supply lines in the Malacca straits with its strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It can reject the “One China” theory in principle, take a strong anti-China stand by joining forces with Vietnam, Japan, Philippines, and Indonesia, and in theatres like the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the South Caucasus, where it has emerged with a robust strategic footprint. Also, it can be more active with the Quad countries in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

Dr. Abhinav Pandya is a founder and CEO of Usanas Foundation, an India-based geopolitical and security affairs think-tank, and the author of Radicalization in India: An Exploration and  Terror Financing in Kashmir. He has a Ph.D. from OP Jindal University and an MPA from Cornell University.

Image: Natalia Davidovich / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: Logan Nye's article revisits the restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) imposed on U.S. combat aviators by President Lyndon B. Johnson during the Vietnam War, which severely hampered their effectiveness.

-These rules prevented preemptive strikes against enemy anti-aircraft units, contributing to significant American losses.

-Under President Nixon, more aggressive tactics, exemplified by Operation Linebacker II, significantly shifted the war's dynamics.

-The lesson learned carried into the 1991 Persian Gulf War, where President George H.W. Bush allowed military leaders to conduct operations with minimal interference, resulting in the successful and decisive Operation Desert Storm.

A  somewhat recent article comments on the absolutely ludicrous rules of engagement (ROE) imposed on American combat aviators by Lyndon B. Johnson during the Vietnam War. 

The article in question, written by Logan Nye for We Are The Mighty, doesn’t offer a new premise. But seeing how this year marks the 50th anniversary of the official end of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, his timing is certainly apropos.

Ceding the Initiative in Vietnam

In his bestselling 1995 mea culpa autobiography In Retrospect, Robert S. McNamara — secretary of defense under both JFK and LBJ — claimed that the latter president’s “instructions were clear: ‘Win!’” But the actions of McNamara and LBJ belied the expressed desire to win. 

The on-paper technological superiority of American warplanes like the F-4 Phantom — which garnered sixteen world speed and altitude records between 1959 and 1962, and held five of those records until the advent of the F-15 Eagle in 1975 — was negated by arbitrary ROEs that gave a distinct advantage to the enemy and wasted the lives of American aircrews. How so? By allowing the North Vietnamese Communists to take the initiative during American air raids.

LBJ and McNamara dictated that our fighter and bomber crews couldn’t proactively hunt the Communists’ anti-aircraft units — their anti-aircraft artillery guns and surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Our flyboys couldn’t even attack the gun batteries and SAM sites until the enemy unit fired, or at least activated radar against them. In other words, never bleeping mind that we’re already actively engaged in a shooting war, we’re going to allow the enemy to fire the first shot every time.

Johnson even went so far as to brag that no single piece of ordnance could be placed on an American warplane in Vietnam without his personal approval.

Talk about micromanagement. And talk about murdering your own countrymen and wasting your material assets: A total of 1,737 U.S. fixed-wing aircraft were lost in combat during the war, including 40 percent of the total production of F-105 Thunderchiefs and one out of every eight F-4 Phantoms ever made. Two-thousand five-hundred eighty U.S. Air Force personnel lost their lives.

Along Came Kissinger and Nixon

LBJ’s White House successor, Richard M. Nixon, finally allowed American aviators to take the proverbial gloves off in their prosecution of the Vietnam War effort.

The difference became most glaringly obvious at the strategic level, specifically Operation Linebacker II, the so-called “Christmas bombing” of Hanoi in December 1972 that sent the North Vietnamese back to the peace table and nearly won the war for America.

But it applied at the tactical level as well, to fighter jocks as well as B-52 “BUFF” bomber drivers. This was thanks in no small part to U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. John D. Lavelle, then commander of the Seventh Air Force.

As Mr. Nye elaborates:

“Lavelle went to the Pentagon for permission…He says that approval came, with a caveat. Nixon was working on thawing relations with China in 1972. The Pentagon supported Lavelle coming up with his own ‘interpretation’ of the rules. ‘Secretary [of Defense Melvin] Laird told me he agreed, but the climate was just not right in Washington for any changes,’ Lavelle said. ‘He told me I should make a liberal interpretation of the rules of engagement in the field and not come to Washington and ask him, under the political climate, to come out with an interpretation; I should make them in the field, and he would back me up’…Lavelle came up with, ‘Yup, you can attack the guns under certain conditions,’ and his men destroyed 11 guns. They got a special thank you from the Thai prime minister on the same day Lavelle’s boss fired him.”

Lavelle may have been fired, but he still retired honorably from the Air Force with two stars on his shoulder boards. And soon enough, the official ROEs were changed for the better and made Operation Linebacker II possible.

Lesson Learned

Fast-forward to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, AKA Operation Desert Storm, and luckily America again had a POTUS in George H.W. Bush, who, like Richard Nixon, took to heart the need to let his generals fight the war as the latter saw fit — with minimal White House meddling. Thus, it was that Air Force Gen. Chuck Horner, commander of U.S. and coalition allies’ air assets during that war, was able to wage “Instant Thunder,” a refreshing contrast to the gradualism of LBJ’s “Rolling Thunder” — not only in semantics, but in terms of speed, intensity, ferocity, accuracy, and most importantly, freedom of decision-making, from Gen. Horner on down to the individual coalition fighter and bomber crews doing the actual fighting, killing, and dying.

The contrasting final results of “Instant Thunder” vs. “Rolling Thunder” speak for themselves.

Author Expertise 

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch and The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). 

Summary and Key Points: Israel is set to receive 25 additional F-35I Adir aircraft, bolstering its capabilities amid escalating conflicts with Iranian-backed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

-These fifth-generation stealth fighters are crucial for Israel's defense and potential long-range strikes, including deep inside Iran.

-The acquisition underscores the importance of maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge (QME) in a region fraught with hostilities.

-The F-35I’s advanced technology provides Israel with significant tactical advantages, essential for countering threats and conducting precision strikes, especially as tensions with Iran and its proxies intensify.

F-35I Adir: Israel's Key to Countering Iranian Threats

The F-35I Adir is Israel's Ace-in-the-Hole for Striking Iran

It’s official. The Israel Air Force (IAF) is getting 25 additional F-35I warplanes that are to be delivered in batches of three-to-five per year until 2028, according to the Times of Israel. The deal, worth $3 billion, comes at a time of extreme peril—and controversy—for the tiny Jewish democracy. 

Since the October 7 attacks, Israel has been at war with the Iranian-backed terrorist group, Hamas. 

Multiple offensives into Gaza, where Hamas is based, has turned international opinion against Israel, as civilian casualties among the Palestinian Arab population of Gaza mount (Hamas hides its personnel and equipment among the civilians of Gaza). 

And the longer that Israel continues its offensives deep into Gaza, the more exposed their northern flank against the far more powerful Iranian-backed terrorist organization in neighboring Lebanon is. 

Israel Needs Force Multipliers

Israel undoubtedly has the most powerful indigenous military in the Mideast. Yet, its small geographical size means it has a relatively small population base. So, the very worst thing that could happen for Israel would be to find itself surrounded by multiple hostile powers that have numerical advantages. To offset these potential numerical advantages, Israel needs advanced technology. 

In this context, Israel has purchased a variant of the US military’s fifth-generation warplane, the F-35. Known as the “Adir,” which means “Mighty” in Hebrew and is derived from the Book of Psalms in the Holy Bible. The initial tranche of F-35I’s were purchased back in 2010 and delivered in 2016 to the Nevatim Air Base. 

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proclaimed that, “Our long arm has now become longer and mightier.” The inclusion of the F-35 in Israel’s arsenal gives them a decisive advantage, especially over enemies, such as those found in Syria, Lebanon, and much farther afield, in Iran.

Interestingly, the Israelis were most displeased with the fact that the United States authorized the sale of a tranche of F-35s to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This is because Israeli leaders understandably feared that the sale could pose a “threat to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME).” 

Essentially, the spread of F-35s to UAE might lessen Israel’s military heft in the region (degrading Israel’s technological superiority over their neighbors). Ultimately, the Israel government accepted the sale because, at the same time, the US government was helping Israel modernize its military, too.

The Importance of the F-35I Adir

The F-35I Adir is such an important piece of Israel’s advanced arsenal that the Iranian military targeted the Nevatim Air Base in their shocking missile attack against Israel in April of this year. 

Nevatim was targeted specifically because it was home to Israel’s F-35I fleet, as my colleague, Maya Carlin, elaborated in these pages at the time of those strikes. The missiles were deflected. But the fact that Iranian forces were targeting Nevatim indicates how important of an asset the F-35I is for Israel—and how much fear these systems instill in Israel’s regional rivals, such as Iran.

For its part, the F-35I was a critical component for Israel’s air defense the night of the Iranian missile attack. Multiple units were deployed as the missile fusillade approached Israel from Iranian territory. The F-35Is that were deployed successfully intercepted the missiles. 

And, for good measure, those F-35Is bombed a few Hezbollah targets next door in Lebanon. 

The additional F-35Is going to Israel is in keeping with Israel’s defense needs. Considering that the F-35I is being targeted by Iranian missile attacks, given that Hezbollah and Hamas, both groups that possess large (and growing) missile capabilities, Israel needs to ensure that they have backups to their existing fleet of Adirs. In the event their arsenal of F-35Is is damaged, another tranche of these birds from the United States would help prevent any loss in capabilities for the Israeli Air Force.

Of course, the real question is, will the presence of these planes be enough to stop the chaos currently encircling Israel? 

A Perfect Plane for Escalation

Israeli forces have understandably moved hard against Hamas after the terrorist attacks on October 7. Israel’s military has penetrated deep inside Palestinian Arab territories in Gaza, pushing as far south as the Philadelphi Corridor which borders Egypt. 

The only problem for Israel is that Hamas embeds itself among civilian populations. 

Very often, for Israeli forces to capture or kill Hamas fighters, they must do their utmost to avoid innocent civilians in Gaza, and, if lives are lost, Israel loses their standing in the court of international public opinion. When Israeli forces took the Philadelphi Corridor, they were fired upon by twitchy Egyptian border guards. Israeli forces returned fire, killing the Egyptian border guard in question. But this has complicated the already tense Israeli-Arab relations (a relationship the Israeli government desperately needs to maintain as it battles Iran for regional power). 

Meanwhile, sensing weakness, Hezbollah moves hard against Israel. It’s all part of Iran’s plan. And one of the only countermeasures against the all-out regional war that Iran seeks to wage upon Israel are the F-35Is that Israel has. 

Israel Can Use the F-35I to Strike Iran

Along with advanced interception capabilities and air-to-ground abilities, the F-35I provides Israel with long-range strike capabilities. In fact, the F-35I is one of only two warplanes in the IAF’s arsenal (the other being the F-15I Ra’am) that could reliably conduct a bombing mission against targets deep inside Iran. 

And that’s another important point here. 

Because the Israelis are not just going to sit back and watch as Hezbollah and Hamas move to encircle them. They understand all too well that Iran is the real culprit behind the violence in the region. Israel’s government just might decide to take matters into their own hands and directly strike Iranian targets inside of Iran. 

The F-35I Adir will allow them to do this. That’s why Israel wants the plane. And that’s why they understandably love it so much. 

About the Author

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons. 

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