Diplomacy & Crisis News

Tuesday’s presidential election represents just the latest clash in an ongoing epic struggle in America and throughout much of the West between the globalist elites of our time and a growing anti-elitist movement spawned and nurtured in the United States by Donald Trump. Despite his often outlandish manner and brutish expression, or perhaps in part because of them, he has forged a true national political movement bent on upending the elites and leading America in a new direction.

Before Trump’s emergence on the political scene back in 2015, both major parties had largely embraced an ethos of globalism, lenient immigration (including illegal immigration), free trade (even when it savaged domestic employment), anti-nationalism, identity politics, and cultural liberalism. Democrats embraced these attitudes avidly, while Republican leaders did so defensively out of a fear that the emerging world of ethnic diversity would leave them behind if they didn’t get with the program.

Then along came Trump with his blanket condemnation of the entire leadership class and his stark pronouncements denoting his intent to apply a political wrecking ball to the status quo. Political leaders of both parties were aghast, but, lo and behold, it turned out there was a serious constituency waiting for such a leader to emerge. Trump’s followers carried him into the White House, and the first big clash in the epic struggle ensued.

Trump lost that first clash. Part of the reason could be attributed to his own political naivete and inability to navigate the labyrinthine corridors of Washington, as well as his own egotistical temperament and narcissistic ways. He never managed to build upon the knot of political sentiment he had summoned during the 2016 campaign and create the kind of governing coalition that every president needs for success–and reelection. He lacked the intellectual tools, political acumen, rhetorical touch, and perhaps the fundamental decency to effectuate that. It often seemed that he simply had no interest in talking to people who weren’t already wearing MAGA hats.

Of course, he also was undermined by one of the most outrageous political maneuvers of recent memory: the bogus allegations of Russian collusion (treason) leading to a special counsel investigation that, in turn, severely undermined Trump’s political standing with much of the electorate. The nefarious nature of this stealthy assault is well documented in the report filed by special counsel John Durham in the spring of 2023.

In any event, Trump’s first term came a cropper when he failed to win reelection in 2020. A president who fails to win reelection is, by that criterion, a failed president, and Trump seemed to undermine his future political prospects even further with his actions on January 6, 2021, in relation to the repugnant Capitol riots. He seemed to be finished as a political figure.

But his followers didn’t go away because they had nowhere to go. And they rebelled when they saw President Biden doubling down on the globalist vision, already so entrenched within the top echelons of American society--the federal bureaucracy, the media, academia, big corporations, big finance, Hollywood, think tanks, and nonprofit NGOs with easy access to federal money. With all these institutions arrayed against the Trump followers, it wasn’t difficult for the Trumpists to see that all they had on their side was Trump himself. So they rallied to his banner throughout the year’s campaign with the aim of continuing the fight.

What are they fighting for? Their beliefs include:

-America’s experiment in nation-building, with an attendant propensity for regime change, has been a failure and needs to be replaced. America must be in the world but shouldn’t try to dominate it.

-Nationalism is a hallowed sentiment tied to old-fashioned patriotism and shouldn’t be denigrated or rejected.

-Identity group politics is eroding national cohesion and, through political correctness, is threatening free speech on the country’s college campuses; that threat will grow throughout society if not checked.

-Borders matter; countries without clearly delineated and enforced borders soon cease to be countries. Immigration should be calibrated to ensure smooth absorption and assimilation.

-Free trade, as practiced in the post-Cold War era, is killing the middle class, hollowing out the country’s industrial base and devastating its middle class. There needs to be more balance in trade relations.

-Islamic radicalism represents a potential threat to the homeland and needs to be monitored closely.

All this is anathema to the globalist leadership class, which had been seeking to fashion a governing coalition along the lines of political analyst Ron Brownstein’s concept of a “coalition of the ascendant,” encompassing racial minorities, immigrants, millennials, and highly educated whites. And one more: “just enough blue-collar Midwestern whites to put the president over the top.” With enough of those blue-collar whites, Brownstein figured, the Democrats could control the “Blue Wall” of crucial Great Lakes states and dominate the Electoral College. It was a nice theory, even after Trump’s 2016 triumph, because Joe Biden pulled that coalition together in 2020 in ousting Trump from the White House.  

But this week’s election results shattered that coalition concept and maybe forever. The Blue Wall didn’t hold, and minorities didn’t stick with the Democratic Party in the numbers needed for democratic victory. Trump built upon his numbers from previous elections, while Democrat Kamala Harris slipped below her party’s previous vote levels.

That leaves the Democratic Party in a political bind. It lost the White House Tuesday largely because Biden’s performance in office was so bad as to make the incumbent party ineligible for rehire. The border mess, the inflation surge, the fiscal promiscuousness (which contributed to the inflation), the foreign policy fiasco in Afghanistan, and the bumbling in Ukraine – all left the incumbent and his party looking hapless and incompetent. Exit Kamala Harris; enter Donald Trump.

However, Trump won’t succeed unless he can consolidate his constituency and build on his base through effective governance and deft political maneuvering. He needs, and his country needs, an effective governing coalition. He didn’t manage to build one last time around. This time might be different–or maybe not.  

Robert W. Merry, former Wall Street Journal correspondent and Congressional Quarterly CEO, is the author most recently of Decade of Disunion: How Massachusetts and South Carolina Led the Way to Civil War (Simon & Schuster). Merry is the former Editor of this publication.   

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

What You Need to Know: Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has suffered severe losses since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with about half of its fleet damaged or destroyed. Ukraine’s effective use of asymmetrical tactics—maritime drones and anti-ship missiles—has crippled Russian naval operations, including key vessel losses like the Moskva cruiser.

-This attrition has allowed Ukraine to secure shipping lanes, notably for grain exports, while forcing Russia to shift naval resources away from Sevastopol.

-With Russian resources stretched across multiple fronts, rebuilding its navy may not be a priority, leaving it unable to mount significant naval power in the near future.

The Russian Navy has not fared well since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. About half of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has been damaged or destroyed since hostilities began, severely impacting Putin’s naval abilities in a war that has cost Russia egregiously in troops and equipment.  

Putin’s naval losses are hardly an outlier. Russia’s figures for troop casualties, armored vehicle losses, and aircraft losses have all turned heads. And while the ground-based war has drawn focus away from the war’s naval element, Putin’s naval losses are head-turning, too. 

“The Ukrainians have destroyed or damaged roughly half of the Russian fleet’s warships, including one submarine, per publicly available information,” Business Insider reported.  

Curiously, the Ukrainians have not used their navy to destroy Russia’s navy, but instead, have relied upon maritime drones and long-range anti-ship missiles. Ukrainian tactics, and the success of those tactics, suggest that asymmetrical warfare may be an efficient way to thwart traditional naval power consisting of battleships and submarines. Naval action elsewhere, specifically, off the coast of Yemen, suggests similarly, where Houthi rebels using drones and missiles have disrupted operations for American supercarriers.  

The implications are huge: low-tech weaponry can disrupt and, in some cases, destroy multi-billion dollar vessels loaded with high-tech firepower.  

At the onset of the Russo-Ukraine War, Putin’s Black Sea fleet consisted of eighty warships. However, the Ukrainians are boasting that, “the Black Sea fleet operations have been greatly complicated, if not paralyzed.”  

Ukraine’s efforts have had practical benefits; Ukraine has been able to resume the use of shipping lanes to transport grain for export,  a crucial development given the importance of grain export to Ukraine’s economy, and to food stores globally. Further, Ukraine’s effectiveness at targeting the Black Sea fleet has required Russia to reallocate naval resources away from the homeport of Sevastopol.  

The list of ships that the Ukrainians have sunk is long. The most glaring and significant ship on the list is the Moskva guided missile cruiser. The Moskva had been the flagship of the Black Sea fleet; her sinking, in spring 2022, was one of the first suggestions that the Russians may be in for a longer, and more difficult, process than originally expected. 

Other sunk vessels include the Saratov amphibious landing ship, the Vasily Bekh rescue tugboat, the Ivan Golubets minesweeper, and the Rostov-on-Don submarine. 

There are more. “Several Russian ships that Ukraine claimed to have destroyed have yet to be fully identified, but reportedly among them are Raptor-class patrol boats, a BK-16 high-speed assault boat, Serna-class and Akula-class landing craft, and a Stenka-class patrol vessel,” Business Insider reported. 

Cumulatively, the losses mean that Putin is incapable of fielding a proper navy. And given the more pressing need to regenerate stores of lost armored equipment and aircraft, the navy is unlikely to receive the attention that would be required to regenerate itself.  

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. 

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

What Does Trump Victory Mean For NATO?: NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte congratulated President-elect Donald Trump on Wednesday, saying he looked forward to working to "advance peace through strength" via the international military alliance. Rutte highlighted the threats from a "more aggressive Russia" and from an "increasing alignment of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran."

Rutte also reminded the former and now future president that the U.S. could be far stronger thanks to its commitment to the organization.

"Through NATO, the US has 31 friends and Allies who help to advance US interests, multiply American power and keep Americans safe," said Rutte. "Together, NATO Allies represent half of the world's economic might and half of the world's military might."

By working with NATO members, Rutte further suggested that it will support the greatly intertwined economies, and that President-elect Trump should understand that NATO is now "stronger, larger, and (a) more united Alliance." Rutte also stressed that the members have fulfilled their commitment to reach spending goals.

"Two-thirds of Allies now spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence, and defence spending and production are on an onward trajectory across the Alliance," Rutte added.

The question being asked the day after Trump won a historic election is whether Trump will remain committed to NATO. On the campaign stump, he often talked about how America would not only turn its back on its allies but would allow Russia and other nations to essentially do "whatever the hell they want" as in perhaps invade, annex, or otherwise take over a NATO member that failed "pay its fair share."

At a South Carolina rally in February, Trump told attendees, "I said: Everybody's gotta pay. They said: Well, if we don't pay, are you still going to protect us? I said: Absolutely not. They couldn't believe the answer."

It remains unclear when that conversation occurred, or what nation's leader Trump made the comment to, and Trump further claimed he was asked if the U.S. would support a nation attacked by Russia if they failed to meet the 2% GDP spending requirements.

"No, I would not protect you," Trump said at the rally. "In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You gotta pay."

Trump's apparent "friendship" with Russian President Vladimir Putin has also been seen as a concern, and as to whether the U.S. will simply allow Russia to prevail in its ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Moreover, the president-elect has called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky "one of the greatest salesman" for the military aid he received from Washington under the Biden administration.

That doesn't mean Trump would actually pull out of NATO.

"To be perfectly blunt, no one knows. He has no deep commitment to NATO and he has long argued that Europe should do much more to defend itself," Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School told Newsweek. "But he may prefer to stay in NATO in order to have influence over its policies, while constantly complaining about what the Europeans are doing and using the threat of withdrawal to coerce them on both economic and security matters."

The final questions that really need to be asked is not whether the United States should leave NATO, or even if Europe is paying its fair share, but whether the U.S. can afford to leave NATO.

The U.S. Navy is a rusting mess that will need a decade or longer to reach its ship strength goals, while the U.S. Air Force is also struggling to fund its expensive programs. Even if the U.S. were to adopt a more isolationist stance, the military has only reached recruiting goals for the first time in nearly a decade.

The U.S. military needs allies in NATO, as well as in the Indo-Pacific to stand up to Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and other global threats.

An America First agenda could be a step backward. While the oceans once kept America safe that likely won't be the case in the day of stealth aircraft, hypersonic weapons, and China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Won't Happen?: Russia’s long-delayed Tupolev PAK DA bomber, codenamed “Poslannik,” aims to replace aging bombers like the Tu-95 Bear. Although slower than other bombers, the PAK DA focuses on advanced stealth capabilities and can carry nuclear payloads and hypersonic missiles.

-However, its development has faced consistent setbacks since 2007, compounded by engine issues and resource diversions to the Ukraine conflict.

-With deployment expected by 2027, Russia faces a growing strategic gap as U.S. and Chinese stealth bombers advance. Despite delays, Russia may prioritize the PAK DA, driven by necessity in an increasingly competitive global arms race. However, Moscow has a long history of making big military platform claims and never delivering. 

Codenamed “Poslannik,” (which means “envoy” or “messenger” in Russian), Russia’s Tupolev PAK DA bomber is the Russian Aerospace Forces’ newest toy. It is a long-range, stealth strategic bomber that is intended to ultimately replace the aging Tu-95 Bear bomber. The Poslannik has a projected range of 12,000 km (7,500 miles) and can stay airborne for 30 hours while carrying a nuclear payload. 

Russia’s new warbird is a bit of a slowpoke. It cannot reach supersonic speeds. But, according to the designers of the Tu PAK DA, their emphasis was less on speed and more on stealth capabilities. 

In fact, the plane’s designers have argued that the plane’s slower speed allows it to carry a larger payload package that not only includes nuclear weapons, but Russia’s innovative hypersonic missiles. The Poslannik bomber is rumored to have a payload capacity of 30 tons, which exceeds the US Air Force’s B-2 stealth bomber maximum payload capacity. In fact, the PAK DA bomber has elements that stealth plane geeks would recognize from America’s B-2 stealth bomber plane. 

Like American stealth bombers, the Russian Tu-PAK DA is commanded by a powerful suite of sophisticated computers that do everything from maintaining flight control to monitoring enemy movements. 

The Tupolev designers believe that the PAK DA’s superior stealth technology coupled with its ability to launch hypersonic payloads negates the need to outrun enemy air defenses. Although, it should be noted that a persistent problem in Russian bomber design has been its engines. When Tupolev designed the Tu-95, for example, they opted to make the long-range nuclear-capable bomber a turbo-prop-driven plane rather than a turbojet-driven plane, as the American B-52 Stratofortress is. 

It is possible that the Russians are again having issues with their engines for this new, fifth-generation stealth bomber and they are simply opting out of acquiring more powerful engines altogether.

Looking like something that a Marvel Comic book villain would fly, the Tupolev PAK DA is probably Russia’s best attempt at employing stealth technology. I say “probably” because the warbird has yet to take flight. Russian sources report that Moscow plans to deploy the Tu-PAK DA Poslannik in service at some pointbetween now and 2027, with most acknowledging that it’ll be closer to 2027. The issue at hand for Russia is the longer the stealth bomber’s deployment is delayed, the greater the capabilities gap exists in Russia’s offensive air capabilities.

In the meantime, the Russians have upgraded their Tu-160 “White Swan” bombers to continue fulfilling mission critical roles. Although, these planes are not of the fifth-generation series and, therefore, Moscow wants to ultimately place the Tu-PAK DA’s as their lead bomber in today’s age of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) warfare. This has led to some speculation in the West that the Tu-PAK DA Poslannik will never fly. 

After all, it has been in development since 2007. 

Faced with delays for 17 years (and still counting), whatever progress has been made on the planes, now that the Ukraine War has erupted and is diverting considerable Russian resources away from such projects, like the Tu-PAK DA bomber, one can anticipate more delays.

The Russians have been lying for a few years about how far along they are with the Tu-PAK DA’s development. After all, the Russians were supposed to have a demonstration plane ready for use by 2023. Now, Russia’s defense ministry says it won’t be until next year, two years after it was originally supposed to be ready for use, that a demonstration Tu-PAK DA will be available.

And the longer the delay lasts for the deployment of the Tu-PAK DA, the greater the capabilities gap is for Russia’s air force. Not only have the Americans outpaced the Russians with the recent successful demonstration of the B-21 bomber, but the Chinese have gotten their own long-range stealth bomber, the H-20, which Beijing claims can “out-bomb” US Air Force facilities in the Indo-Pacific.

One thing that is working in Russia’s favor is the fact that the Ukraine War has forced its manufacturing sector to go on a war-footing—where it will likely remain for some time to come. 

Still, Russian aerospace firms are having difficulty meeting increased demand for their products. This has especially been felt in the Su-35 series, a “fourth-generation ++” warplane. Nevertheless, the Russians have remained in the fight. What’s more, as I have noted previously, the Russians are winning and are likely to defeat Ukraine (and their NATO backers) simply through attrition. 

Inevitably, the Russians will have to prioritize the creation of their Tu-PAK DA bomber. 

Otherwise, they will have left a significant strategic gap for the Americans to fly through with their B-21. 

As an American, I hope this remains the case. Although, after two years of the Ukraine War, the Americans should learn never to underestimate the Russians. Theirs is a society that is compelled by necessity, the kind of necessity that total war brings. At some point, they’ll get the Tu-PAK DA right.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is out now from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons. 

When should you hazard pricey, hard-to-replace capital ships in battle? That question has vexed wartime naval commanders as long as there have been navies to command. Nor is it hard to see why. Societies sink inordinate resources into ships of war. Cruisers, destroyers, and submarines are what economists term “lumpy capital,” costing taxpayers upwards—commonly well upwards—of $1 billion per copy. Aircraft carriers are the lumpiest of them all. Any sane commander would think twice before sending a $13.3 billion ship of the line like a Ford-class nuclear-powered carrier in harm’s way.

That’s a lot of public capital to wager—and perhaps lose—in an afternoon. That America’s standing in the world depends on sea power only compounds commanders' qualms before giving the order dispatching major combatants into a fleet action.

That being the case, fashioning a risk calculus ahead of time is no idle exercise. Senior uniformed and civilian leaders warn that the balloon could go up in the Western Pacific in the next two or three years. Many within the Beltway bandy about 2027 as the prime danger zone. When and if it breaks out, a new Pacific war would presumably see a domineering China mount a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. Chinese Communist Party supremo Xi Jinping has certainly ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready for military action by 2027, while confounding aggression and preserving the island’s de facto independence would be the point of U.S. and friendly military intervention.

Predominant trendlines, then, make the waters, skies, and landmasses shoreward of Asia’s second island chain today’s likeliest oceanic battleground. That’s where commanders and their political masters may have to gauge whether to risk the U.S. Navy battle fleet. Some pivotal questions they must ask themselves:

Who wants it more? Naval historian and theorist extraordinaire Alfred Thayer Mahan explains how to size a fleet or fleet contingent for high-seas success. Simply put, a fleet must boast enough combat power to win the fight it seems likely to fight. A “broad formula,” writes Mahan, is that the fleet “must be great enough to take the sea, and to fight, with reasonable chances of success, the largest force likely to be brought against it . . . .”

An easy formula to state, a hard one to implement. We’ll come back to the operational part—reasonable chances of success, to borrow Mahan’s phrasing—below. For now let’s estimate, or at least ponder how to estimate, how large a share of its navy each antagonist seems likely to commit to battle in the Western Pacific. What each contender commits sets the standard of adequacy for its opponent. This is a geopolitical question. Answering it is largely subjective. In the Western Pacific, it involves estimating how much American and Chinese societies treasure conflicting goals in a war over Taiwan. The more ardently each contestant craves its goals, the more generously it will apportion forces to obtain those goals.

How much you want something governs how much you're willing to pay for it, and for how long.

China covets Taiwan a great deal indeed, which is why Beijing tends to keep the bulk of the PLA Navy and affiliated joint forces concentrated close to home. The leadership is prepared to invest heavily in conquest of the island, and to sustain the investment for as long as it takes. The United States, on the other hand, ranks Taiwan’s de facto independence as one desirable goal among many scattered across the globe. U.S. leaders could waffle in times of strife as they debate priorities. Whether they would stomach the opportunity costs of leaving, say, the Red Sea uncovered for Taiwan’s sake appears doubtful judging from the fleet’s current disposition. Fleet units are dispersed on various errands, chiefly around the Eurasian periphery. They are not concentrated in the Indo-Pacific, the theater successive presidential administrations have assigned paramount importance.

Advantage: China.

That being the case, it seems clear that a fraction of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, operating alongside the Air Force, the Army, and whatever allied forces join in, will confront the combined weight of the Chinese armed forces on China’s home ground. As the lesser combatant, at least at the outset, Washington will court severe risk to the fleet should it take a Mahanian approach to shielding Taiwan from assault. The White House must consult with Congress and the American people, appraising—and, if necessary, combusting—popular passion on behalf of the island’s defense. No liberal society can sustain a strenuous war effort for long absent such fervor.

Better to forego the endeavor if popular sentiment fails to catch fire. The White House should reject wagering precious ships and crews for a cause about which ordinary citizens and their elected representatives care little. Conserve the fleet for another day.

Think grand strategically. Admiral Chester Nimitz had it easy by comparison to today’s leadership, and the reason why was industrial in nature. When Nimitz assumed command of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in late December 1941, he knew that shipwrights were riveting together a shiny new fleet back home, courtesy of the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 and past naval expansion laws. In effect America was constructing a second complete U.S. Navy. New hulls would start appearing in Pacific waters in mid-1943. Knowing that allowed Nimitz to gamble with the remnants of the fleet battered at Pearl Harbor. He might lose the remains of the prewar armada, but defeat would be temporary and reversible. In the meantime he might do the cause some good.

If you have a spare of something on the way, why not roll the dice with the one you have?

The outlook is less sanguine today. Nimitz’s distant successor, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the joint U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, will fight with the fleet he has. That’s because an atrophied U.S. maritime-industrial complex is struggling to manufacture and maintain surface combatants in peacetime. How will shipbuilders cope when battle losses mount up, imposing extra demand on the system? If Admiral Paparo cannot count on industry to repair or replace damaged ships, a risk-averse posture seems like his best bet.

The ability to regenerate strength after a fight cushions against catastrophe, and permits risk-taking with the force. That is not a luxury Paparo enjoys. Circumstances will compel him to husband his capital ships while his PLA Navy antagonists, backed by China’s mammoth industrial complex, could choose to fling caution to the wind.

But winning might not demand a Mahanian fleet-on-fleet engagement. The upside to this dreary prognosis is that the U.S. Navy might not have to wage a titanic fleet engagement early on in order to vanquish China’s strategy. Heck, conceivably it might not need to risk a high-seas engagement at all. Wise strategic and operational design could spare the fleet a decisive battle until such time as the U.S. military can amass combat power in the theater sufficient to win a Mahanian encounter. Risk postponed is risk managed if commanders play things right.

Success requires that commanders keep their priorities straight. Sinking the PLA Navy in battle is not the point of U.S. Western Pacific strategy, desirable though it might be. Defeating China’s strategy is the point. Ensuring Taiwan’s survival means preventing an invasion fleet from crossing the Taiwan Strait, mounting amphibious landings, and occupying the island. And many implements out of the martial panoply—not just capital ships—could stymie an amphibian offensive.

Chief of Naval Operations Lisa Franchetti alludes to this in her recent “Navigation Plan,” where she exhorts the sea service to gird itself for “nontraditional sea denial.” Admiral Franchetti tacitly and correctly admits that the U.S. Navy will be the lesser contender on day one of a Western Pacific maelstrom. After all, sea denial is a strategy of the weaker pugilist, designed to balk a brawnier foe by denying it the fruits of maritime command. Fruits such as the ability to move amphibious shipping across the sea to land on hostile beaches.

That sounds discomfiting for a force like the U.S. Navy, accustomed as it is to ruling the waves. But take heart: the weak sometimes prevail in warfare provided they do things right.

And indeed, embracing a sea-denial strategy in the Western Pacific should comfort fretful stewards of the U.S. Navy battle fleet. It doesn’t necessarily take a capital ship to bar the PLA’s access to vital seaways. Missile- and torpedo-laden submarines are sea-denial assets par excellence. So are surface missile patrol craft such as those deployed by allies. Moreover, fighting jointly spreads risk across the entire force, encompassing not just the seagoing but land-based arms of maritime might. Missile-toting aircraft can strike out to sea, lending their firepower to the sea-denial mix. Unmanned aerial, surface, and subsurface craft have a growing part to play. Strategically placed minefields can encumber Chinese maritime movement.

And don’t neglect ground forces. Bodies of missile-armed troops dispersed along the island chains can cut loose against naval and merchant shipping, obstructing access to waters Chinese vessels must traverse to help China fulfill its war aims. The U.S. Marine Corps and Army are planning to do just that.

U.S. military lingo awkwardly dubs nontraditional implements of sea power “riskworthy.” They are the opposite of lumpy capital. Some—uncrewed vehicles in particular—are altogether expendable. In short, commanders can take a venturesome attitude toward platforms that are plentiful and inexpensive by contrast with high-tech destroyers or lumbering, scarce, über-capital-intensive flattops. Sea denial lets maritime overseers delay risking the capital-ship fleet until a more favorable correlation of forces beckons. Once U.S. naval and joint forces have gathered in the theater and outmatch the foe, then commanders may opt to launch into an offensive culminating in a—yes, risky, no escaping it—decisive Mahanian engagement.

In short, senior leaders can conserve lumpy capital through sea denial—expending lesser assets as an interim measure pending more auspicious times.

Embrace “calculated risk” at the operational level. Depending on how their sea-denial strategy unspools, U.S. commanders may ultimately bid for maritime supremacy in the Western Pacific. Enfeebling the PLA Navy would solve many problems. They are far from the first to face the quandary of whether to risk the fleet. On the eve of the Battle of Midway in mid-1942, Admiral Nimitz instructed task-force commanders Rear Admiral Raymond J. Spruance and Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher to engage the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Kidō Butai, or mobile aircraft-carrier striking force, based on the “principle of calculated risk.” In effect Admiral Nimitz told Spruance and Fletcher to attack if they expected to do worse to the Japanese fleet than the Japanese fleet would do to them.

U.S. commanders appraising the People’s Liberation Army should undertake calculations similar to Nimitz’s. If they expect to get worse than they give, they should refrain from risking the fleet. If they expect to give worse than they get, they should act. They should also bear in mind the sage but caustic words of another World War II sailor, Rear Admiral Daniel Gallery, who reputedly wisecracked that “the definition of a calculated risk is a gamble which military men take when they can’t figure out what else to do and which turns out to be right. When it turns out wrong, it wasn’t a calculated risk at all. It was a piece of utter stupidity.” Gallery's words should temper any impulse at derring-do.

Commanders should strike the golden mean between foolhardiness, meaning an excess of risk-taking, and timidity, meaning excessive aversion to risk, when debating how to deploy precious assets.

The best strategic offense is a good tactical defense. A final consideration is tactical in nature. If the U.S. Navy can defend its capital ships effectively, carrier groups in particular, then commanders can afford to strike a daring attitude vis-à-vis the foe. If not, they should exercise restraint. Navy weapons tactics specialists seem remarkably comfortable with the sea service’s ability to protect itself against antiship missiles and drones. The campaign against the Houthis in the Red Sea has been indecisive in the strategic sense, falling short of its goal of restoring merchant traffic through that swathe of the nautical common. But it has been a resounding success in the tactical sense. No warship has absorbed a hit in almost a year of warfare. Moreover, new defensive weaponry—not just extended-range precision munitions but directed energy, more robust electronic warfare, counter-drone drones, and so forth—is making its way out to the fleet. Things are looking up.

Newfangled weaponeering could hold down the risk to the fleet—making the decision whether to hazard lumpy capital more palatable. Commanders can take a more offensive stance if they repose confidence in the fleet’s ability to withstand punishment.

Naval commanders have an unenviable lot in the Pacific. They have to prevail with the force they have against a more numerous antagonist that’s able to rebound after taking heavy blows. But if they harness the assets at their command cleverly, they might yet face down or defeat aggression.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

What You Need to Know: Russia's only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, is known for thick black smoke emissions due to its outdated Mazut fuel system, adding to its long list of mechanical issues.

-Currently in dry dock for extensive repairs since 2018, the vessel has faced numerous setbacks, including multiple fires, crane accidents, and allegations of budget embezzlement.

-With a damaged dry dock delaying repair work further, the Kuznetsov's return to operational status seems unlikely.

-The carrier's infamous smoke, a relic of its obsolete fuel system, is a testament to its troubled history and Russia's struggling carrier program.

As if the deadly mishaps and accidents were not bad enough, this ship belches out an embarrassing amount of thick, black smoke that reminds everyone how clunky the vessel is. I’m talking about Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, that is now in dry dock for many months.

It may not even go out to sea again due to all its maladies.

It seems like the Russians are not making carrier operations a priority, which is good for the United States and NATO as the Russian Black Sea fleet currently idles off the coast of Ukraine in danger from further hits from Ukrainian anti-ship missiles.

One aspect of Russia’s struggling aircraft carrier program is the Kuznetsov’s propensity to throw out a plume of dark smoke when sailing.

The smoke is a telltale sign the ship is steaming when it’s not in hung up in maintenance. This is a curiosity that prompts further investigation.

The Kuznetsov runs on a thick, smelly, and toxic substance called Mazut. The only other Russian naval ships that are fueled by Mazut are the Sovremenny-class destroyers. Mazut is a heavy oil product that has varying amounts of sulfur which is harmful to the environment.

After the fuel refining process, it has a sludge-like residue. Mazut is also classified in the West as “Bunker-B or Bunker-C” very heavy fuel oils. 

Mazut requires a complicated system of boilers and pipes to process.

It is long out-of-date as Western ships began to move away from heavy fuel oils to adopt gas turbine engines for propulsion in the 1960s and 1970s. More advanced navies converted to nuclear power as well.

When the Kuznetsov underwent sea trials in the 1990s there were problems with propulsion. Pipes were defective and this contributed to more issues with the boilers. At one point, the Kuznetsov had only one functioning boiler that resulted in a languishing speed of 4-knots.

The boilers are still a problem, and the carrier has resorted to being pulled by tugboats in embarrassing spectacles that happened as recently as 2016. 

The boiler difficulties have led to Mazut not being fully combusted and this has been the culprit of all the black smoke. Excess engine lubricant contributes to the problem as well.

The Russians hoped to replace the boilers and the primary diesel generator to help the combustion in 2020, but it remains to be seen if this work has been accomplished.

What’s more humiliating is that the Kuznetsov has been in re-fit mode since 2018. Little has gone right.

A crane fell on the flight deck in an accident that killed one laborer that year. There was a fire in the engine room in 2019 and two people perished while 14 others were injured. To add to the difficulty, a shipyard director was charged in 2021 for embezzling around $600,000 from the repair budget at the Polyarny Yard. 

The dry dock itself is also damaged which means those repairs will elongate the time horizon for ship-work. The carrier may not hit the seas for trials for many months or even years. 

There was another fire as well back in 2022. 

As for the black smoke, it will likely not be addressed by workers before the dry dock is fixed. It seems that Mazut is the least of the ship’s worries. The Admiral Kuznetsov is under plenty of duress that will make its return unlikely any time soon. The black smoke is just a reminder that the carrier has led a cursed life.

Brent M. Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer. You can follow him on Twitter @BMEastwood.

All images are Creative Commons. 

What You Need to Know: At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. secretly acquired 21 MiG-29 warplanes from Moldova to prevent their potential sale to Iran, fearing that the nuclear-capable MiG-29C variant might end up destabilizing the region.

-The U.S. transported these aircraft to Ohio in 1997, where they became invaluable for intelligence and training.

-Both American and Israeli pilots tested the MiG-29, gaining critical insights into Russian aerial tactics.

-The MiG-29’s thrust and helmet-mounted cueing system impressed pilots, providing Western forces with an understanding of Russian capabilities and refining U.S. and Israeli combat tactics for today’s air battles.

The Soviet-made MiG-29 warplane was equal to and, in some cases, surpassed the capabilities of the American F-15 and F-16 fighters. That was the conclusion of one of the American test pilots who flew the MiG-29 at the end of the Cold War. That pilot was one of many Americans. 

No, that test pilot was not brought over to consult with the post-Soviet Russian government like so many Westerners were back in the 1990s. That test pilot flew the MiG-29 at an American military base. Because, unbeknownst to the public, the US military had purchased 21 MiG-29 warplanes at the end of the Cold War. 

Moldova is a tiny country that sits dangerously near to Russia. 

After the fall of the USSR, the tiny country found itself in possession of a fleet of 34 MiG-29s and eight Mi-8 Hip Soviet helicopters. Moldova could not afford to maintain this arsenal. Washington feared that the Moldovan government, desperate for funds, and with little else of value to sell, would sell these planes to Iran. 

Specifically, America’s leaders were concerned that Moldova would sell the MiG-29C variant to the Iranians. This is the MiG-29 that is equipped to carry nuclear weapons. Since Iran has been dedicated to acquiring nuclear weapons since the 1980s - at least, according to many experts -  and the Americans believe such a move would be highly destabilizing for the Middle East region, Washington has striven to prevent such developments. 

So, America bought a large tranche of these warplanes and shipped them covertly back to the United States aboard C-17 transports. They arrived in Dayton, Ohio, in 1997.

At that point, these birds became a favorite new, exotic toy for the US Air Force to play with (in secret, of course).

More than that, though, the Americans were able to glean significant intelligence on a warplane that it had otherwise had only limited working knowledge of. What was learned was helpful, especially now that, unfortunately, Russo-American relations are at their lowest point since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. 

Russian warplanes are a continual threat to US and NATO forces operating in Europe. 

For American pilots to have an understanding of what their possible rivals in the Russian Air Force are trained to do, it could help them understand how to survive—and win—against them in a dogfight.

It wasn’t only the Americans who gained access to MiG-29s. The Israelis did, too. Likely out of concern that the Iranians might someday gain access to the MiG-29, the Israelis wanted to know what they were possibly up against. So, they also trained on these birds. The Israelis fell in love with the warplane. Like the Americans, they determined that the MiG-29 is a very difficult plane to dogfight with—unless it is in the hands of an experienced pilot.

That’s because the thrust on those birds is phenomenal. 

What’s more, it lacks many of the accoutrements that pilots in American warplanes rely on. Although, the MiG-29 is not entirely lacking in high-technology. In fact, many reports suggest that the MiG-29’s helmet-mounted cueing system was more advanced than anything in either the American or Israeli arsenals when the MiG-29s were first tested by the West. This system the MiG-29 pilots to have more accurate targeting at greater angles than their American rivals. 

Ultimately, that advantage would go away by 2003. But for more than a decade, the Russian MiG-29 had a better targeting capability than any American warplane did. The American acquisition of the MiG-29 might have even helped enhance the American warplane targeting systems. After all, exploitation units for the Air Force were given the MiG-29 to experiment with. The entire purpose of those units is to identify foreign technologies that might be useful and reverse-engineer them.

The acquisition of MiG-29s at the end of the Cold War was a bold and brilliant bit of intelligence work. It likely had immeasurable assistance in getting the Air Force to understand what they might be up against. Further, the Air Force probably perfected technologies that are now essential for US pilots in combat today. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is out now from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

What You Need to Know: The USS The Sullivans, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer named in honor of five heroic brothers lost in World War II, has been deployed to the Middle East.

-The ship has recently been active in the Mediterranean, providing ballistic missile defense amid the Israel-Hamas conflict and supporting other U.S. Navy vessels, including the USS Gerald R. Ford and USS Bataan. As a tribute to the Sullivan brothers’ bravery and commitment, the vessel operates with a motto symbolizing unity and dedication.

-A previous USS The Sullivans ship, now a museum, is scheduled for restoration in 2025.

The United States Navy deployed the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS The Sullivans (DDG-68) to the Middle East, where it will join with other U.S. military assets. It is the warship's fifth deployment in just three years, including the most recent to the Mediterranean Sea.

While deployed in the region, the vessel "provided Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) for Commander, U.S. European Command amidst the Israel-Hamas conflict," the U.S. Navy announced. "The Sullivans, alongside USS Delbert D. Black (DDG 119), additionally provided on-station relief for USS Thomas Hudner (DDG 116) and USS McFaul (DDG 74)," which allowed those two warships to return home following multiple deployment extensions. 

During the deployment to the Eastern Mediterranean, DDG-68 also provided escort to two U.S. flattops – including the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) and her carrier strike group (CSG) and the USS Bataan Amphibious Readiness Group. When CVN-78 conducted a port of call visit to Souda Bay, Crete, last December, USS The Sullivans acted as "Surface Action Group Commander" with the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

"The Sullivans' crew is trained and ready to engage in a variety of activities, from escorting ships to participating in joint exercises with allied and partner navies in the Middle East," the sea service added.

America's adversaries should take note of the motto of USS The Sullivans – "Courage Honor Commitment We Stick Together." The Arleigh Bukre-class (Flight I) guided-missile destroyer is named to honor the five Sullivan brothers – George, Francis, Joseph, Madison, and Albert – who served together on the Atlanta-class light cruiser USS Juneau (CL-52).

All five were killed when USS Juneau was sunk in November 1942 during the naval Battle of Guadalcanal.

DDG-68 is actually the second vessel named to honor the Sullivan brothers, who had volunteered to serve in the U.S. Navy just days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Fletcher-class destroyer (DD-537) was the first warship commissioned by the U.S. Navy to honor more than one person, and she has also been preserved as a museum ship – along with the World War II cruiser USS Little Rock (CL-92) – at the Buffalo and Erie County Naval & Military Park in Buffalo, New York.

Time and the elements have been cruel to the first USS The Sullivans, and in 2022 damage to the hull was so significant the ship began to list. It was announced in August that both USS The Sullivans and the Gato-class submarine USS Croaker (SS-246) will head to dry dock in Lake Erie in September 2025, with a scheduled return in the spring of 2026. New York Governor Kathy Hochul has pledged to provide $10 million to the destroyer's and submarine's restoration, while local, state, and federal funding will also help ensure the historic warship that honored the brothers will be saved for future generations.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

What You Need to Know: The Ford-class aircraft carrier, designed to be the future of U.S. naval airpower, is facing scrutiny over its durability and readiness for high-stakes combat.

-While equipped with advanced technology and immense firepower, the $13 billion vessel has encountered reliability issues, including problems with its catapults, arresting gear, and radar.

-As anti-ship defenses advance, questions arise about the wisdom of risking such an invaluable asset.

-The Ford class is built to withstand severe damage, yet whether the U.S. Navy and the American public are prepared for the potential losses in a large-scale conflict, such as with China, remains uncertain.

The new Ford-class carrier is billed as the future of U.S. naval airpower. As it gradually replaces the 50-year-old Nimitz class, the Ford class will soon become the primary supercarrier of the U.S. Navy. But the first-in-class USS Gerald R. Ford has suffered from a slew of reliability problems. And as anti-ship defense systems improve, the question is being raised: How durable will the Ford class be under wartime conditions?

Ford-class Aircraft Carrier: Built for Battle?

It is difficult to picture a scenario in which the U.S. exposes its $13 billion supercarrier to enemy fire. Of course, the Ford class is built explicitly for combat. But the Navy hasn’t placed an aircraft carrier in an existential situation in decades – not since World War II, really, when lightweight aircraft carriers like the Essex class were made quickly and efficiently.

Today, American supercarriers are almost immeasurable vessels of resources. The Ford class is loaded with thousands of sailors, a hundred or so aircraft (each costing $60 million or so), the very latest technology, and a nuclear reactor. 

The investment alone is a significant deterrent for American war planners. And there’s another thing causing hesitancy: American expectations. Americans don’t have a tolerance for wide-scale loss of American lives or property. That is a good thing. But that low tolerance threshold is often in conflict with the self-imposed global police mandate – a mandate for which the supercarrier is a vital instrument. Americans would be shell-shocked if one of their supercarriers, carrying a few thousand sailors, went down. The political blowback would be immense. The will to continue fighting might collapse.

America has waged war with half-measures for decades in places like Grenada, Panama, Somalia, and Kosovo. America was able to get by with minimal investment and zero disruption to the daily lives of everyday Americans. Similarly, the expectations for casualties in these conflicts fell to almost zero. Iraq and Afghanistan represented more significant investments in American warmaking, but not nearly enough to put an aircraft carrier on the line. 

A war with an adversary like China could be very different. Such a conflict might require putting an aircraft carrier and her sailors in direct danger. Is America ready for such a commitment? Is the Ford class?

American supercarriers are hard to kill. The Navy could not sink USS America with torpedoes and missiles and instead had to rig the ship with explosives at critical structural points. The Ford is likely no different – built to last and built to take a beating.

But the Ford has had some problems. Testing of USS Ford’s catapults, arresting gear, and jet blast deflectors resulted in delays. The radar system also had problems. And testing suggested the ship had significant EMI and radiation hazards.

Does any of this tell us whether the Ford can or cannot withstand enemy fire? No, but anytime one system doesn’t work as planned, it becomes natural to wonder whether another system might have the same problem.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Give It to the Army: The A-10 Warthog has proven indispensable for close air support, saving countless lives with its ability to loiter over battlefields and deliver devastating firepower.

-Despite the advanced capabilities of newer platforms like the F-35, the A-10’s unique attributes—such as its heavy armor, long endurance, and potent weapons—make it irreplaceable for supporting ground troops.

-The Air Force's consideration to retire the A-10 could create a critical gap in capabilities. Transferring the A-10 program to the U.S. Army, which aligns more closely with its mission, could preserve this vital asset for future conflicts.

While working on Capitol Hill, I was asked to participate in discussions over funding for the F-35 Lightning II and the A-10 Warthog. During those days of defense budget sequestration, funds were limited by an agreement made between Congress and then-President Barack Obama. Because of the limits, the Pentagon was being forced to choose between funding pre-existing systems, such as the A-10, or newer systems that would define the future, such as the F-35. 

Walking into the first meeting, my bias was toward the F-35. The meetings changed my mind.

As part of our meetings, proponents for both platforms were asked to make their cases for why one of these systems should be prioritized over the other. The most impressive arguments came from the A-10 supporters. A group of former Special Forces operators came armed with gun camera footage from an A-10 to describe in detail how the Warthog saved their lives during an ambush conducted by the Taliban against their unit in the dusty foothills of Afghanistan. 

For hours, the A-10 hovered over the battlespace, getting within virtual spitting distance of the entrenched Taliban positions, and rained down a hellfire of molten lead and explosives. 

According to the Special Forces operators who were recounting their tale to us, the A-10’s persistent presence over their heads saved their lives. What’s more, that platform allowed the commandos to achieve their objectives. 

Similar stories can be found in just about every ground campaign this country has been involved in since the A-10 Warthog first flew. As one of the Special Forces operators quipped to us, “No other bird – not even an F-35 – can do for ground forces what the A-10 can.”

The A-10 Warthog II is an interesting warplane. It first hit the unfriendly skies in May 1972. A total of 713 units were produced by Fairchild Republic, which is now part of Northrop-Grumman, and the A-10 production line ended in 1984. Boeing was given contracts by the Air Force in 2013 to modernize the planes. For example, new wings were added, extending the lifespans of these aging birds by many years. 

The A-10 was designed to conduct “close-in air support” missions. As such, it is not exclusively an Air Force plane. Tactical Air Control Party airmen work on the ground to coordinate A-10 airstrikes directly with American ground forces who need the air support. This creates a symbiotic relationship between ground personnel fighting, and the Air Force operating the A-10. 

To ensure these planes survive such dangerous missions, they are heavily armored ground-pounders. The cockpit, for example, is surrounded by what’s known as a titanium bathtub that is up to 3.8 cm thick, to better protect the pilot from enemy ground fire. Similar protections are afforded to the plane’s flight systems, to ensure that an enemy doesn’t score a lucky shot, given how low and vulnerable to enemy ground fire the A-10 is. 

The A-10 is known for its endurance as a fighting aircraft. As the Special Forces operators explained to me, these planes can dish out an unbelievable amount of firepower while loitering over a battlefield for protracted periods of time – far longer than any other plane. The firepower, the armor, and the duration in combat are decisive factors justifying the continued operation of this bird. 

No other warplane can operate as close to the enemy for as long as the A-10 can. Most other birds, such as the F-35, would need to leave the battlespace to refuel. And for all the talk about the F-35’s capabilities at a distance, when you’ve got U.S. ground troops at risk, there’s nothing quite like having a warplane that can get right into the enemy’s face and give it to him good and hard.

A-10s are mean warthogs indeed. They are armed with their iconic 30 mm GAU-8/A cannon, as well as a mixed ordnance package. The bird is a bomb carrier of epic proportions. It has three under-fuselage pylon stations along with eight under-wing stations. These carry weapons such as the 500-pound Mk-82 and the 2,000-pound Mk-84. They can also fly with the AGM-65 Maverick and the AIM-9 sidewinder missile.

The A-10 trades speed for endurance. It can barely reach Mach 0.75. The F-35 is considerably faster. But the A-10 has an astounding range of 2,580 miles. What’s more, the A-10 can fly in degraded environments. These birds can take off and land from short runways at forward operating bases. Given the kind of wars the U.S. military found itself fighting, such as in Afghanistan, it’s astonishing that the Pentagon even thought to retire this bird. And if a great power war erupts between the United States and a near-peer rival like China or Russia, the A-10 will be instrumental in punching holes through enemy air defense bubbles.

While the F-35 is a modern marvel and can conduct similar mission sets to the A-10, the fifth-generation warplane lacks the kind of endurance and durability that the A-10 has proven time and again it possesses. 

Back when I was in government, some A-10 enthusiasts suggested the Air Force should simply transfer the A-10 program over to the U.S. Army. The Army possesses a limited aircraft fleet. Although culturally the Army eschews an air role – especially a fixed-wing air role – the A-10’s mission and capability is less of an Air Force mission set and more of a ground support role. Thus, to save the storied warbird, the Army should take over the program. It should do this before the A-10 is retired and a critical capabilities gap is created – just when a great power war is around the corner.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

What You Need to Know: The UK's Ministry of Defence (MoD) is reportedly leaning towards purchasing additional F-35B Lightning II aircraft instead of expanding its fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons.

-The F-35B’s advanced capabilities, including its short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) feature, make it ideal for both the Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth-class carriers and airbase operations. While the Eurofighter will continue to receive upgrades, the F-35 is considered more viable long-term.

-London has also earmarked funds for the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) to develop a sixth-generation fighter in partnership with Italy and Japan.

A week after it was reported that aerospace giant Lockheed Martin has been pressing the UK to increase its commitment to the full 138-unit procurement of the fifth-generation F-35B Lightning II, it seems that London may opt for more of the stealth fighters. According to international military analyst firm Janes, the UK's Ministry of Defence "is inclined to increase its combat aviation forces through an" F-35 follow-on buy "rather than acquiring more Eurofighter Typhoons."

The MoD is reported to be considering its long-term requirements, and that is where the F-35B could offer an advantage. The UK's Royal Air Force (RAF) operates the short takeoff vertical landing (STOVL) variant, which allows it to be employed as the airwing on the Royal Navy's Queen Elizabeth-class carriers as well as from air bases.

Moreover, the F-35B could remain in operation until the 2070s, far longer than the Eurofighter could be expected to see service.

"We have a foot in both [the F-35 and Eurofighter] camps, and for the RAF I very much see that the F-35 is where we are looking at to add combat mass. We are committed to an onward buy [of the F-35], so that is where we are looking," a British official told Janes from the sidelines of the IQPC International Fighter Conference (IFC) 2024 in Berlin on 6 November.

The official told the analyst firm under "the Chatham House Rule" (meaning with anonymity) the Eurofighter Typhoon will still remain a "core component" of the RAF, and that will include receiving upgrades and other enhancements to maintain its "operational capabilities." Yet, the MoD now appears to be "leaning" towards the Lightning II as part of the air service's longer-term requirements.

The UK has been negotiating terms for the acquisition of the second tranche of F-35s, which would see the fleet size grow to 74 aircraft – but that was later scaled back after London cited the program's rising costs during the previous Conservative government. The MoD had also expressed using money saved from the F-35 acquisition to fund the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) to develop a sixth-generation optionally-manned fighter and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The UK is part of an international consortium that also includes Italy and Japan, with the partners working to field the GCAP fighter by the mid-2030s.

At issue is the size of the current RAF fighter force. A September 2023 parliamentary report published by the House of Commons Defence Committee warned that the UK has fewer than 160 combat jets. Complicating issues for the Labour government is how the RAF's and RN's fighters can be employed. Each of the UK's Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers can operate with up to 36 F-35Bs, so in theory, the entire fleet of the Lightning IIs could be dedicated to just that mission. While that would allow the Royal Navy to maintain a powerful airwing on its flattops, it would deprive the RAF of aircraft to carry out its own missions.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

What You Need to Know: Ukrainian forces have encountered North Korean troops in Russia's Kursk Oblast, marking a significant development as Pyongyang sends thousands of soldiers to support Moscow. While initial clashes are reportedly mild, Ukrainian officials expect more intense engagements as North Korean forces integrate with Russian troops.

-Currently, around 11,000 North Korean soldiers are believed to be in Russian service, primarily intended to help repel Ukrainian advances without entering occupied Ukraine to avoid further international backlash.

-Meanwhile, Russian forces are experiencing heavy losses in equipment and personnel as the conflict intensifies.

The Ukrainian defense minister revealed that Ukrainian forces have already gone up against small numbers of North Korean troops in the Kursk Oblast.  

Pyongyang has sent thousands of troops to Moscow’s aid as the intense fighting continues to deplete the Russian forces.  

“The first North Korean forces have likely officially engaged in combat against Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest estimate of the war.  

On Tuesday, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov said that the Ukrainian military has been engaged in small-scale combat with North Korean troops in the Kursk Oblast. Speaking to a South Korean news outlet, Umerov said that the fighting with the North Korean troops is relatively mild for the time being but that he expects that to change once the full contingents of North Korean forces arrive. Ukrainian, South Korean, and Western intelligence estimates put the number of North Korean forces in Russian service to around 11,000.  

As we have assessed here at The National Interest, it is likely that the Kremlin will initially limit the presence of North Korean troops to within Russia. The Ukrainian salient in the Kursk Oblast is an ideal testing bed for the North Koreans because it wouldn’t require them to deploy into occupied Ukraine and risk further wrath from the West and South Korea.  

To be sure, if Moscow perceives a need, it will most certainly deploy the North Koreans into occupied Ukraine as well. There is already reporting that some North Korean support troops are inside Ukraine. But the fact that they are not involved in direct fighting and their small numbers are enough for their presence to pass without much attention for the time being.  

“ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely leverage North Korean manpower to first and foremost repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, and that in return, North Korean troops hope to gain combat and military-technical experience in the conditions for a contemporary and technologically driven war,” the Institute for the Study of War added.  

Interestingly, it seems that the Russian military is integrating the North Korean troops into its own structure as opposed to having them fight as separate units. The Ukrainian defense minister said in his interview with the South Korean outlet that it has been difficult to ascertain North Korean casualty numbers because the Russian military has mixed Russian and North Korean troops together in the same outfits.  

Meanwhile, the Russian forces continue to take heavy casualties in the fighting. Over the past twenty-four hours, the Russian military, paramilitary outfits, and pro-Russian separatist forces lost approximately 1,250 troops killed or wounded, as well as fifty-seven unmanned aerial systems, fifty-five tactical vehicles and fuel trucks, twenty artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems, eleven infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, six main battle tanks, and one piece of special equipment damaged or destroyed.  

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Hours before polls closed in the United States on November 5, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu informed Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant that he was fired from the cabinet. Gallant had become a well-known face throughout the war on Hamas. Gaunt and black-clad in the wake of the Hamas 10/7 massacre, he often visited soldiers in the field and kept his hand firmly on the helm of military operations.

Netanyahu said that he dismissed Gallant because trust had eroded between them. They had different priorities for the war effort and different visions for Israeli strategy. Gallant preferred a hostage deal and pushed for a day-after plan for Gaza. He also wanted to draft ultra-Orthodox Jews, who historically have an exemption from the army in Israel. This put him at odds with other members of Netanyahu’s coalition government. “...During the past several months, this trust between myself and the Defense Minister has begun to crack,” Netanyahu said.

With Gallant gone, there will be a shakeup in Israel’s political landscape. This is because Gallant brought with him many decades of experience as a soldier and officer to the position. He will likely be replaced by a politician rather than a former general, putting the war effort more firmly in Netanyahu’s hands. During the first months of the war in Gaza, Israel had a war cabinet that included two former generals (Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot). They left the war cabinet in June.

Netanyahu’s decision comes as former U.S. President Donald Trump celebrates his election victory. That means that the period from November to January will be a window of opportunity for Israel in its operations. Similarly, there may be a spotlight from the Biden administration as it moves into its lame-duck era.

There are many balls in the air in the Middle East. Iran is threatening more direct attacks on Israel. Hezbollah has a new leader named Naim Qassem, who has spoken out about the U.S. elections, claiming it won’t change Hezbollah’s war on Israel. Israel began a ground operation against Hezbollah in October. Hezbollah launched missiles at central Israel on November 6, as if to show that the U.S. election would not deter its attacks.

Nevertheless, the region will be watching Trump’s statements closely, and they will likely affect the next phase of the war. This is clear because leaders in the region have been quick to call the president-elect. Netanyahu has spoken with Trump, as has the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh expects that the incoming administration will strengthen ties. The Saudis have been critical of Israel’s war in Gaza and publicly expressed their wish for a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, they also likely know that Iran supported the October 7 Hamas attack in order to harm the Abraham Accords, the normalization deal Trump helped cement between the UAE and Israel. 

Iran wanted to weaken regional integration and stability through a proxy war with Israel. Iran pushed its proxies, such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, to attack Israel in order to create a regional war. Saudi Arabia has been affected because the Houthis in Yemen have previously fought Riyadh. Qatar hosts Hamas. During the first Trump administration, Saudi Arabia led Bahrain, the UAE, and Egypt to break relations with Qatar soon after a major meeting with Trump at the Riyadh Summit in May 2017. Saudi Arabia is thus keenly aware of the changes in the region that a new U.S. administration could help invigorate.

Meanwhile, in Israel, the war effort on two fronts will be in the initial spotlight. The IDF recently helped facilitate a polio vaccination campaign in Gaza. In addition, the IDF is winding down a month-long operation in Jabalia in northern Gaza. Jabalia is a large neighborhood north and northeast of Gaza City where Hamas maintains a presence. The IDF had fought Hamas in this area twice during a year of conflict but never cleared it of terrorists. In October, the IDF struck again. After a month of fighting, it has defeated Hamas. Yet, the slow operation illustrated how difficult it is to uproot the terrorists. Israeli soldiers use drones and unmanned M113 vehicles in operations to try to flush out the enemy and eliminate threats. However, it takes time, and the neighborhood is a jumble of ruined multi-story buildings.

The slow tactical war is grinding on in Gaza and Lebanon. In Lebanon, the IDF has four divisions deployed, and they have spent more than a month fighting Hezbollah in a series of border villages less than a mile or two from the Israeli border. This is a slow process because Hezbollah festooned the area with munitions and hide-outs. The IDF’s 8th brigade, for instance, has killed “dozens” of terrorists in recent operations in Lebanon. “Additionally, the troops located and confiscated numerous weapons, including Kornet missiles, grenades, and explosive devices hidden inside civilian homes and underground infrastructure,” the IDF said on November 6. Hezbollah is also not relenting in its attacks. It fired more than 120 rockets on November 6 at Israel.

Israel will need to decide how to conduct a multi-front war over the next months as a new U.S. administration prepares to enter office. This means looking at the next phase of operations in Gaza and Lebanon. Can Hamas or Hezbollah be decisively defeated now that they have been ground down through ground operations? Both terror groups lost their leaders, but they kept fighting. In addition, the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq continue to threaten Israel. Iran also threatens more direct attacks but may be deterred by Trump’s return to the White House. The Iraqi militias remember that Trump ordered the airstrike that killed IRGC Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in 2020.

On the other hand, the Iranians could judge that they have a short window now to strike harder at Israel before Trump takes the oath of office. They will likely suspect that Israel intends to take the gloves off after the U.S. election. The question will be whether they do. A year of war has left Israeli reservists exhausted and left many questions about the long-term strategy in Gaza and Lebanon.

Seth Frantzman is the author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Image: Creative Commons. 

Taiwan is known for its low crime rates, partly due to the high standards of our law enforcement. Taiwan’s National Police Agency has much expertise to contribute to the fight against transnational crime, having effectively tackled issues ranging from fraudulent phone scams to terrorism. According to the Taiwanese police commissioner, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) issued a report under its anti-piracy initiative citing Taiwan’s efforts against illegal Olympic broadcasts. Interpol later requested Taiwan officials to share insights on how to combat digital piracy.

The irony is that Interpol has consistently barred Taiwan from participating in its organization’s activities. Taiwan’s police agencies are excluded from fully contributing to or benefiting from Interpol, which also creates a considerable gap in Interpol’s own objective of fighting transnational crime.

Taiwan’s inability to access Interpol’s I-24/7 database keeps Interpol’s member countries from having timely access to Taiwan’s own criminal intelligence. It also keeps Taiwan’s police with one hand tied behind their back, as was made evident in 2022 when Taiwanese law enforcement discovered a human trafficking scheme unfolding in Cambodia and Myanmar. Victims from all over the world, including an estimated 5,000 from Taiwan alone, had traveled to Cambodia and Myanmar, lured by false promises of lucrative employment. But upon arrival, they were instead held against their will and subjected not only to harsh, forced labor but also extensive abuse and violence.

Unfortunately, Taiwan was not allowed to collaborate with Interpol or make use of Interpol’s extensive resources. Taiwan’s law enforcement instead had to cooperate indirectly with separate countries, which needlessly and frustratingly slowed down the process of justice.

Taiwan has made the most of this unfortunate reality. We have proven ourselves to be reliable partners to the world in tackling organized crime syndicates. In 2020, Taiwanese and Montenegrin law enforcement worked together to take down fraudulent phone scam operations. Earlier this year, our police worked with U.S., South Korean, and other international police forces to bust a Taiwanese drug syndicate, from which thirteen arrests were made.

Taiwan clearly has much to offer Interpol. The only reason we continue to be excluded is politics.

Ever since Taiwan lost its decades-long status as an Interpol member in 1984, when the organization switched its recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China, our law enforcement agency has been barred from participation. In 2022, a high-level Interpol official claimed that China’s status as an Interpol member impedes Taiwan from being granted observer status in the organization’s General Assembly.

This is, again, an unfortunate but familiar story for Taiwan. As with other international organizations, Beijing’s undue influence regrettably keeps Taiwan on the outside looking in. Often, Taiwan’s exclusion results from the PRC’s bogus claim that UN General Resolution 2758—a document that doesn’t mention Taiwan or its official name, the Republic of China, even once—endorses its false assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan. Through this intentional misrepresentation of the resolution, China has prevented Taiwan’s participation in international organizations like the World Health Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization. They have similarly moved to deny Taiwan access to Interpol.

Only a democratically elected government has the right to represent the 23 million people of Taiwan on the world stage. When those voices are silenced, everyone suffers—not just Taiwan.

We cannot afford to let politics get in the way of countering global crime any longer. Taiwan’s police have proven to be reliable law enforcement partners with much expertise to offer the world. Yet Taiwan’s exclusion from Interpol and its database continues to create real-time gaps in global criminal intelligence, allowing cracks for international outlaws to slip through. This is an unconscionable risk to take. It is time for Interpol to incorporate Taiwan into its intelligence-sharing network so that international criminal activity can be kept at bay more efficiently.

Alexander Tah-Ray Yui is the Taiwan government’s representative to the United States.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Total Beast: The F-16I Sufa, Israel’s customized F-16 variant, forms a critical part of the Israel Defense Forces’ air capabilities, with over 300 airframes. This two-seat model, equipped with conformal fuel tanks, extended range, and double the weapon capacity, was tailored for the unique requirements of Israel’s military operations.

-The Sufa includes advanced Israeli avionics and an electronic warfare suite, with systems like the Elbit Dash IV for helmet-mounted targeting.

-It has played key roles in operations, notably during the 2021 conflict with Hamas, where it was essential in targeting enemy tunnel networks, and is expected to serve for years.

The Israel Defense Forces fly the largest contingent of the F-16 outside of the U.S. Air Force, with more than 300 airframes in their arsenal.

Nicknamed Sufa, or thunderstorm in Hebrew, the two-seat variant of the F-16 – the F-16I Sufa – was specifically designed to meet the requirements of Israel's Air Force.

While the platform has some shortcomings, Israel’s Sufa variant boasts unique modifications that make it a critical part of the Jewish state’s military program. 

 Originally developed by General Dynamics (now Lockheed Martin), the F-16 Fighting Falcon took its first flight in 1976. The fighter jet was designed to rectify some of the shortcomings in the aircraft that flew in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Falcon’s increased thrust-to-weight ratio and smaller frame made it an air-superiority platform, with improved air-to-air training for fighter pilots. Similar to the F-15, the Fighting Falcon was also a premier airframe for withstanding higher g-forces. 

An initial contract between Lockheed-Martin and Israel allocated up to 110 new F-16Is by 2003. According to former Lockheed Martin Vice President John Bean, “[The Sufa program] illustrates the strong bond between Lockheed Martin and Israel; we hope to strengthen that relationship through our continuing commitment to this program." 

The first fleet arrived in Israel in 2004 and featured a range of specialized modifications, including changes to the Falcon’s avionics, instrumentation, and weapons support systems. The F-16I is fitted with Israeli-designed conformal fuel tanks that extend the jet’s flight range by increasing the fuel it can hold by 50%. The placement of the tanks also allows the wings’ inner store stations, which are typically utilized for external tanks, to be available for weapons storage. This variation alone doubles the Sufa’s air-to-ground weapons capacity.

The F-16I’s Elbit Dash IV display shortens the lock-on process time for engagements, and the aircraft uses a helmet-mounted cueing system. This Israeli development can link aircraft information such as height and speed to the system, enabling weapons to target enemy aircraft using sight only. Dash IV allows the pilot to locate targets at high angles off the nose of the fighter, providing 360-degree information to the pilot everywhere they look. 

Arguably the most significant modification made to the F-16I Sufa is in its electronic warfare suite and avionics. Approximately half of the Falcon’s avionics were replaced with Israeli innovations including the aerial towed decoy. The Sufa’s electronic warfare suite incorporates radar warning systems and jamming capabilities, including the Elisra SPS 3000 self-protection jammer.

The F-16I Sufa has been active in Israel’s air force missions for nearly two decades, and the platform remains a critical asset. It continues to carry out important tasks. During a 2021 Israel-Hamas flare-up in Gaza, Sufas comprised the majority of the aircraft responsible for striking the terror group’s underground tunnel network and other weapons depots. With the help of the F-15I Ra’am and F-35I Adir stealth fighters, Operation Guardian of the Walls was successful.

The F-16I Sufa will likely remain in Israel’s aerial arsenal for years to come.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel.

Image Credit: All Images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Total Failure: The Russian MiG-35 “Fulcrum-F” was initially touted as a "4+++ generation" fighter, boasting advanced radar and optical systems for high-intensity conflict. However, the platform's underwhelming performance, high cost, and limited combat history have hindered its export success, with only Russia operating the model today.

Despite possessing improved RD-33MKB engines and AESA radar, the MiG-35 failed to secure buyers, falling short against global competitors like the F-16 and Rafale.

As Russia focuses on its prolonged conflict in Ukraine, limited resources and dwindling military assets further constrain MiG-35 production, making extensive deployment and export of the fighter unlikely.

Back in 2017, shortly after the MiG-35 debuted, the President of Russia’s Aircraft-Building Corporation, Yuri Slyusar, boasted that the new fighter platform would lead the way in the aerial arena.

The executive added, "The fighter aircraft has been specially designed for warfare amid increased intensity conflicts and highly dense air defense. The available high indicators have been achieved thanks to a set of onboard equipment mounted on the plane along with a new optical location system and radar signature reduced by several times.”

No matter what the Kremlin would like to purport, the true capabilities of the Mikoyan MiG-35 have proved to be underwhelming.

Designated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the Fulcrum-F, the MiG-35 is marketed by Russia as a “4+++ generation fighter” platform. Back in 2007, Moscow marketed the jet prototype at the Aero India air show in an attempt to acquire client states for the platform.

The Fulcrum-F was displayed alongside the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon and the Saab JAS 38 Gripen. However, by 2011 the MiG-35 was nixed from the contest due to failures concerning its radar and engines.

The MiG-35 is powered by a pair of RD-33MKB engines that generate 7% more power compared to the baseline model, providing a thrust of 9,000kgf. The Fulcrum-F was primarily derived from the MiG-29, however, its incorporation of an AESA radar manufactured by Mikoyan gives it an edge over its predecessor. In fact, the MiG-35 is the first Russian fighter to be equipped with active electronically scanned array radar.

As detailed by Air Force Technology, “The Zhuk-MA’s antenna consists of 160 modules, each with four receive-and-transmit modules. It is believed to offer a 160km (85nm) air target detection radius and 300km for surface ships. Like radar, OLS allows the MiG-35 to detect targets and aim weapon systems. But, unlike radar, OLS has no emissions, meaning it cannot be detected.”

In terms of armaments, the MiG-35 can carry a range of missiles, bombs and rockets with its nine hardpoints, including the Kh-31A anti-ship missiles, the Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, the Kh-29TE missiles and the KAB-500Kr TV-guided bombs. Additionally, the Fulcrum’s 30mm cannon can lug roughly 150 rounds of ammunition.

Perhaps the MiG-35’s hefty price tag and lack of combat experience has led to its shoddy export history. From India and Egypt to Argentina and Bangladesh, the Fulcrum-F has been difficult to export.

Today, only Moscow flies the MiG-35. Even if this platform was as formidable as the Kremlin would like to tout, Russia is in no financial position to produce enough of them to export. Since February 2022, Moscow has poured the majority of its resources into its ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Russian forces have struggled to gain advances in the conflict considering it is running out of essential military equipment like main battle tanks, fifth-generation airframes and munitions. Considering this pace, Moscow won’t possess additional Fulcrum-F fighters for a while.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

The main image is from Shutterstock. All others are Creative Commons. 

What You Need to Know: The U.S. Navy faces significant challenges as it seeks to extend the service lives of Nimitz-class carriers to maintain its eleven-carrier fleet amid Ford-class production delays. Originally designed with a 50-year lifespan, many Nimitz carriers are reaching their limit, with retrofitting complicated by unforeseen repairs, including major steam turbine damage.

-The USS George Washington and USS John C. Stennis, both undergoing lengthy overhauls, have experienced extensive delays, straining Navy deployment schedules.

-Additionally, poor living conditions for sailors aboard retrofitting vessels, such as the George Washington, have led to serious morale issues, including several sailor suicides, raising urgent concerns.

The U.S. Navy has been forced to rely on their Nimitz-class aircraft carriers for longer than expected. The Nimnitz-class, which first debuted in 1975, has a fifty-year service life. For the namesake vessel, the first-off-the-line USS Nimitz, that fifty-year threshold is fast approaching. The remaining Nimitz carriers were rolled out over thirty-five years, and now many more are also approaching their fifty-year thresholds.

Yet, the Navy has been slow to produce the Nimitz’s replacement, the Ford-class. To date, only one Ford-class, the USS Gerald R. Ford, has been commissioned, while a second is on the way. To maintain current fleet levels, eleven active aircraft carriers, the U.S. Navy is working to extend the lifespans of their Nimitz-class carriers. 

The process has not gone smoothly.

The Pentagon is committed to maintaining current levels for their carrier fleet. One could argue that the U.S. Navy does not need eleven supercarriers. Restraint advocate Barry Posen argues that seven to nine supercarriers would probably be sufficient to address all of America’s national security concerns. But the Pentagon feels otherwise, obviously, flare-ups in the Middle East, and rising tension throughout the Indo-Pacific, no doubt partially inspiring the commitment to maintaining current fleet levels. Delays to the Ford-class are no doubt another reason. 

The forthcoming USS Enterprise, the third Ford-class carrier, will be delayed eighteen months. 

“Extending Nimitz, extending Ike, it’s going to happen for every Nimitz-class carrier. At least one extension,” Vice Admiral Kenneth Whitesell said last year. 

Yet the Nimitz extensions have not gone smoothly. Delays in the retrofitting process have been common.

“Extensive delays to the mid-life refueling and complex overhauls of two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers were due to damage to the steam turbines that power the ship,” the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) reported. The two carriers in question were the USS George Washington and the USS John C. Stennis. Each carrier was supposed to undergo a four-year overhaul. But the Washington needed nearly six years; the Stennis will need five and a half.

“The change in redelivery schedule for [Stennis] is primarily a reflection of growth work discovered after the ship arrived at Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) and subsequent challenges within the supply base,” Huntington Ingall’s Industries (HII) NNS said in a statement. “We are applying lessons learned from both George Washington and John C. Stennis to what we are doing to prepare USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) for refeuling and complex overhaul”

The delays have complicated the Navy’s ability to deploy carriers, and have also degraded the quality of life for the sailors aboard the vessels being retrofitted; a 2023 Navy investigation found that sailors aboard the George Washington, “endured some of the toughest living conditions of any members in the military.” Several of Washington’s sailors committed suicide.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

What You Need to Know: China’s newest stealth fighter, the J-35 (also known as the FC-31 Gyrfalcon), has officially arrived, marking another step in the nation’s fifth-generation aviation capabilities.

-Distinct from the U.S. F-35 in several ways, including a twin-engine design, the J-35 incorporates features that may have drawn inspiration from the F-35’s configuration and aesthetics.

-Expected to carry 18,000 pounds of munitions, including both internal and external loads, the J-35 is offered in two variants: the land-based J-35A and a carrier-based J-35. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has celebrated its debut as a significant addition to China’s strategic aviation assets.

Generally, when one thinks of the number thirty-five in the context of 5th Generation stealth fighters, chances are that person thinks of the U.S.-made F-35 Lightning II, one of a long line of innovative warbirds from Lockheed Martin’s legendary “Skunk Works” division. 

Yes, Russia has the Sukhoi Su-35 “Flanker-E,” but that isn’t a stealth fighter, and neither is the Swedish Air Force’s Cold War-era Saab 35 “Draken.” Meanwhile, when one thinks of “China” and “stealth fighter” in the same sentence, chances are that person thinks of the Chengdu J-20 Weilong.

Well, it turns out that they also have an up-and-coming stealth fighter known as the J-35, more specifically the Shenyang J-35, AKA the FC-31 Gu ying. 

As recently as November 4, 2024, my colleague Harrison Kass reported for The National Interest that the J-35A was expected to debut at the Zhuhai Airshow: China’s premier aerospace trade expo, on or about November 12, 2024. But now an even more recent report indicates that the Gyrfalcon won’t even have to wait that long for her unveiling.

At least, the greatest if you’re part of the pro-China lobby; otherwise, not so great.

The most up-to-date source that this writer is aware of is a November 5 2024 article penned by Thomas Newdick and Tyler Rogoway for The Warzone, “The front three-quarter view of the jet, seen taxiing, reveals several new details and sheds more light on features that were previously more hidden…Critical outright differences exist, including its twin-engine powerplant compared to the F-35’s large single turbofan engine. While the F-35 was designed from the start to accommodate a short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) version, this requirement is absent from the Chinese design. Many elements were at least heavily inspired if not cribbed from the F-35, including its DSI inlets, canopy, and basic configuration.”

Messrs. Newdick and Rogoway wish to emphasize that, contrary to prior allegations and assertions, the J-35A is not a complete carbon copy/knockoff of the F-35, the multiple similarities notwithstanding.

The earliest indications of the J-35 program date back to circa September 2011, in the guise of a photograph of a model labeled “F-60.” In September of the following year, unofficial and poor-quality photos of a possible fully assembled aircraft made an appearance on the Internet. On October 31, 2012, the prototype made its maiden flight, and the following month the J-31 airframe was publicly revealed at the 2012 edition of the Zhuhai Airshow.

Presumably, the J-35 will pack a payload of 18,000 pounds (8,164 kilograms). Including four internal munitions weighing a total of 4,400 pounds. (1,995 kilograms). The external arsenal consists of six hardpoints with a capacity of 13,000 pounds. (5,896 kilograms). Primary armament includes the PL-10 “Thunderbolt-10;” NATO reporting name CH-AA-9, short-range missile and the PL-12 Thunderbolt-12” AKA Pen Lung; NATO reporting name CH-AA-7 Adze, medium-range beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missile.

The PLA released some additional useful information, clarifying that the J-35A designation is being bestowed upon the land-based version of the fighter, with the carrier-based version being dubbed simply the J-35; the two versions have different rudder sizes & configurations. 

The land-based iteration logically omits the catapult launch bar and uses a single nose wheel, as opposed to the twin wheels found on the naval variant, as well as larger tailfins.

As a P.R. gesture, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) announced that, “The J-35 officially announced that the hanging tail seventy-five is painted to celebrate the birthday of the Air Force!”

There remain some unanswered questions, such as how far advanced the PLAAF’s plans for the J-35A might be. It will also be interesting to see if the final operational versions of the J-35 and J-35A omit a cannon like the J-20 already does.

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.