What could have been for the USAF: The M-346:
Security Sector Reform in Conflict-Affected Countries: The Evolution of A Model
By Mark Sedra
KITCHENER, CANADA – The Centre for Security Governance (CSG) is pleased to announce the publication by Routledge of a new book written by CSG Executive Director Mark Sedra. The book examines the evolution, impact, and future prospects of the security sector reform model in conflict-affected countries in the context of the wider debate over the liberal peace project. It is part of the series “Routledge Studies in Conflict, Security and Development”.
Learn More at Routledge Store SummaryThis book examines the evolution, impact, and future prospects of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) model in conflict-affected countries in the context of the wider debate over the liberal peace project.
Since its emergence as a concept in the late 1990s, SSR has represented a paradigm shift in security assistance, from the realist, regime-centric, train-and-equip approach of the Cold War to a new liberal, holistic and people-centred model. The rapid rise of this model, however, belied its rather meagre impact on the ground. This book critically examines the concept and its record of achievement over the past two decades, putting it into the broader context of peace-building and state-building theory and practice. It focuses attention on the most common, celebrated and complex setting for SSR, conflict-affected environments, and comparatively examines the application and impacts of donor-supported SSR programing in a series of conflict-affected countries over the past two decades, including Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The broader aim of the book is to better understand how the contemporary SSR model has coalesced over the past two decades and become mainstreamed in international development and security policy and practice. This provides a solid foundation to investigate the reasons for the poor performance of the model and to assess its prospects for the future.
This book will be of much interest to practitioners, analysts, academics and students of international security, peacebuilding, statebuilding, development studies and IR in general.
Speaking before the Security and Defence (SEDE) subcommittee of the European Parliament on 25 January, Denis Roger, the EDA’s Director for European Synergies and Innovation (ESI), hailed the good and effective cooperation between the European Commission and the European Defence Agency on preparing the upcoming Preparatory Action (PA) on defence research which is close to its official launch. “The EDA now stands ready to sign a new Delegation Agreement with the Commission relating to the PA and building on the positive experience of the Pilot Project”, he said. Philippe Brunet, the Commission’s Director for Space Policy and Defence within DG GROW, who also participated in the SEDE debate, indicated that the delegation agreement should be signed quickly, if possible in March 2017.
Mr Roger recalled the importance of the Pilot Project (PP) on defence research which is currently being implemented through a delegation agreement signed in November 2015 between the Commission and the EDA, has proved a great opportunity to test the interface between the Commission and the EDA in the implementation of a centrally-funded defence research scheme at EU level.
Several ‘lessons learned’ from the PP are being applied in the preparation for the PA, for instance the need to have some more innovative and adapted to defence specificities Intellectual Property Rules (IPR) or to have a wider pool of evaluation experts available. “For the Preparatory Action, the basic rule should be to draw the lessons already learnt from the Pilot Project, to keep the way of working when it demonstrated to be satisfactory and to improve what needs to be improved, while adapting to the increased scale”, Mr Roger said. In particular, he referred to the key ‘upstream role’ the EDA has in consulting all stakeholders (government, industry and RTOs) about key research priorities and consolidating them with Member States. He also mentioned the execution and exploitation (‘downstream’) roles the Agency played in the PP and which it would also have to play in the PA implementation.
Focusing on priority military needsMr Roger stressed the need to make sure that collaborative defence research undertaken under the Preparatory Action will be linked to priority military capability needs of Member States: “I must insist on this point, which is a key specificity of Defence Research. Since the market is a monopsony, the only buyer being the Ministries of Defence, it is absolutely essential to make sure that the technical requirements of the projects match the future Capability needs defined by Member States and reflected in the Capability Development Plan endorsed at the level of the Ministers of Defence”. “In accordance with article 45 of the Treaty on the European Union, EDA has a key role to play in guaranteeing this consistency between Capability and Research priorities”, he stated.
EDA prepares for PA implementation roleImplementing the PA means that the EDA will also have to adapt its own structures because compared to managing a relatively small Pilot Project (three projects with a total budget of €1.4 million), the task of managing a substantially bigger Preparatory Action (€90 million budget over three years with probably more than a dozen projects in total) will be much more of a challenge.
That’s why the EDA has already set up a dedicated PA Unit in order to manage EDA’s ‘upstream role’ and its forthcoming implementation role. It already includes four people and additional growth is anticipated once the delegation agreement is signed. The first short term task of that new unit will be the practical implementation of the Preparatory Action Work Programme: launch of the calls, organisation of the evaluation and signing of the grant agreements. “But we also need to have a longer term vision: a key success indicator of the preparatory Action will be the usefulness of the results for Member States’ future Capability Development Programmes”, Mr Roger said.
EDA’s existing structures (CapTechs, Project Teams, Working Groups) will contribute to make sure that the PA results are fully taken into account and to promote follow-on projects and programmes.
The PA unit could also have a key role, in permanent coordination with the European Commission, to draw, in real time, the lessons learnt from the Preparatory Action that can benefit to the setting up of a potential wider future European Defence Research Programme (EDRP) after 2020.
More information:
A study by EDA has concluded that considering the complexity of defence supply chains and long lifecycles of military equipment, REACH (and associated CLP) regulation, as they stand now, may impact the actual operability of Member States’ Armed Forces.
EDA outsourced a dedicated study to examine what impact the EU’s regulations on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) and on the Classification, Labelling and Packaging of chemical substances and mixtures (CLP) have had on the European defence sector (governments and industry) since they entered into force in 2007 and 2009 respectively. Further to assessing the impact of REACH (and associated CLP) regulation on defence, the study aimed to develop recommendations for further improvement of REACH regulation and its current implementation regime.
The basis for the study, which was finalised in December 2016, aimed for a win-win solution achieving two principle goals: a high level of health and environmental protection, as well as ensuring the operational effectiveness of Member States’ Armed Forces and enhancing the competitiveness and innovation of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.
The study’s consultation facilitated input from a wide range of European defence stakeholders including, in particular, the EDA Member States’ Ministries of Defence (MoD), European Commission, European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), Member States’ Competent Authorities on REACH and CLP and the defence industry.
The main conclusions propose several improvements and related actions for stakeholders, broadly grouped into the three main areas:
EDA has informed the competent stakeholders (Member States’ MoDs, European Commission, ECHA and the defence industry) on the outcome of the study and is now in the process to further liaise with them, and to support further examination and implementation of the study proposals.
The study recommendations addressed to the Commission also serve as EDA input to the upcoming Commission review of the REACH regulation in 2017.
Pakistan claims successful Ababeel ballistic missile test:
Aerial Refueling of the PAK FA/T-50:
The C-17 has had more money-driven last hurrahs than The Who. Even so, FY 2010 featured the USAF’s last planned orders of C-17 Globemaster III short field, heavy-lift transport jets.
The Pentagon had been trying to end the program for years, but 3 factors led Congress to keep adding new C-17s to the budget, year after year: (1) deep doubts about the premises, pre-9/11 vintage, and quality of the Pentagon’s mobility studies; (2) uncertainty concerning the C-5 Galaxy super-heavy transport’s upgrade programs; and (3) a fleet wear tempo much higher than originally forecast, driven by constant requests from theater for C-17s.
All things end, and there were no new C-17s bought in the FY 2011 or FY 2012 budgets. That would leave the USA with a total ordered fleet of 223, once they’re all under contract. At long last, they are.
Final USAF C-17 purchases, by year, are 15 in FY 2008, 8 in FY 2009, and 10 in FY 2010. Foreign orders have kept the production line alive, and in 2012, a single C-17 was ordered to replace an aircraft that had been destroyed. Order placement may not conform exactly, depending on the progress and timing of negotiations. Those numbers, coupled with greater certainty in the cut-down C-5 upgrade program, and a looming budget crises in the USA, make it likely that the end has finally come. Enhancements and maintenance will continue to attract significant budgets, but USAF production will end. In response, Boeing is throttling back annual C-17 production. In order to keep the C-17 production line and sales cycle alive, they’ll have to depend on foreign orders from export customers like the UAE, India, etc., orders for a civilian transport version to provide outsize cargo and/or remote equipment delivery, or some other contingency.
The expected total of 223 USAF C-17s sits just above the program’s original goal of 210 planes, which may be a fortunate thing. The Global War on Terror created very heavy demand for C-17s, resulting in increased flying hours that are wearing out the fleet early. Adding additional aircraft will help the fleet as a whole last longer, by distributing flight hours across more planes. At the same time, US vehicle programs continue to exceed the weight limit of lesser transports, ensuring robust future demand.
Unless otherwise noted, Boeing Defense, Space and Security’s Global Mobility Systems unit in Long Beach, CA executes the contracts, which are issued by by the 516th AESG/PK at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Note that separate contracts exist for F117 engines, and for other “government furnished equipment” that is part of the final, operational aircraft.
No more comingJanuary 25/17: Besides Trident, the UK has been unsurprisingly cleared to receive continued C-17 logistics support services, and equipment from the US. Valued at an estimated cost of $400 million, provisions in the contract include continued support for eight RAF C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft once the previous deal expires in September.
February 25/16: C-17 transport aircraft used by the UAE military are to be fitted with infrared countermeasure systems in a program that could cost up to $225 million. The provision of AN/AAQ-24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) equipment, and logistics support was approved by the US State Department as a Foreign Military Sale. Eight C-17s will receive a LAIRCM system which includes three Guardian Laser Transmitter Assemblies (GLTA), six Ultra-Violet Missile Warning System (UVMWS) Sensors AN/AAR-54, and one LAIRCM System Processor Replacement (LSPR).
December 1/15: Boeing has finished production of the final C-17 Globemaster III aircraft and it will make its way to Qatar next year. The completion of the plane will see the Long Beach plant close at a loss of 400 jobs. Since its inception in 1991, 279 Globemasters have been produced at the California facility, but lack of international demand for the plane has rendered keeping the plant open financially unfeasible. C-17 fleets are currently operational in UK, Canada, Qatar and Australia.
April 27/15: Boeing took a flyer and privately financed the production of 10 C-17A Globemasters. With a series of Commonwealth countries expressing interest, five are still left unsold.
Sept 12/13: Era ending. Boeing delivers the USAF’s 223rd and last C-17A Globemaster III, which flies off to its assignment at Joint Base Charleston, SC. It marks the end of an era that began with the C-17’s 1st flight, on Sept 15/91.
In a follow-on release, Boeing says that C-17 production for all customers will end in 2015, with the closure of the Long Beach, CA assembly line after the last 22 C-17s are delivered. It’s possible that a couple of additional orders might materialize, but that’s not enough. As Boeing Defense, Space & Security President Dennis Muilenburg put it:
“Our customers around the world face very tough budget environments. While the desire for the C-17’s capabilities is high, budgets cannot support additional purchases in the timing required to keep the production line open…”
Boeing will take a charge of < $100 million this quarter, and expects to begin the layoff process in 2014 for nearly 3,000 employees in Long Beach, CA; Macon, GA; Mesa, AZ; and St. Louis, MO. They had throttled back production to try and keep the line open for foreign sales, but the number of customers with the budget to buy them was always limited, and so was the amount of extra time those orders could give the production line. Sources: Boeing video feature | Boeing releases, Sept 12 and Sept 15/13.
Final USAF delivery, Plant shutdown announcement
June 19/12: One more. Boeing receives a $169.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for 1 USAF C-17A replacement aircraft. Boeing has confirmed that this contract is for the USAF.
It is needed to replace the C-17 lost in the 2010 accident, but the contract doesn’t include important “government-furnished” items like engines (another $35-38 million), military communications and defensive systems, etc. See the February 2011 entry for average C-17 costs.
Work will be performed in Long Beach, CA, and will be complete by May 23/13. The ASC/WLMK at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract (FA8614-06-D-2006, DO 0010).
+1 C-17
Jan 23/12: Finis. Boeing in Long Beach, CA receives a $693.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to delivery order (DO) 0006, for 5 more USAF C-17s. DO 0006 is noted on May 16/11, and bought the 1st 5 aircraft of the USAF’s FY 2010 order. This agreement and contract is confirmed as closing the books on USAF C-17 production, by bringing the order to its expected 10.
+5 C-17s
Work will be performed in Long Beach, CA, and is expected to be complete by March 20/13. The ASC/WLMK at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract (FA8614-06-D-2006, DO 000603).
May 16/11: A $962.5 million firm-fixed-price delivery order against the basic C-17 production contract, for 5 of the FY 2010 C-17A aircraft. At this time, $471.6 million has been committed.
Boeing representatives said that a contract for the other 5 is expected later in 2011 (FA8614-06-D-2006, DO 0006).
+5 C-17s
February 2011: According to the USAF’s FY 2012 budget documents [PDF], flyaway costs for the last set of FY 2010 C-17s is around $193 million each, rising to a full operational cost per aircraft of about $256 million once spares, site support, training, etc. are also factored in.
All planned USAF orders (incl. FY 2010) and existing export orders would see the C-17 production line end at the end of November 2012, with the USAF taking the final delivery. [Addendum: A subsequent order from Australia pushes this to the end of December 2012.]
Jan 20/11: Boeing announces the 2nd phase of C-17 Program Production Rate and Work Force Reductions. 1,100 employees cut, 900 in Long Beach, CA, as production drops from its high-water mark of 15 C-17s per year down to 10 per year.
Boeing hopes to keep the line open longer this way. The tradeoff is added fixed costs from running the line for more years, vs. the potential for new orders each extra year the line is still running. Recent experience with export orders shows latent demand around the globe, and once the C-17 line stops, strategic airlift options will shrink to rented Russian/Ukrainian AN-124s, or the medium-heavy lift Airbus A400M.
Planes are replaceableJuly 28/10: Crash. A USAF C-17A (tail number 00-0173) crashes at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, killing all 4 crew aboard. The crew were preparing for Elmendorf’s Arctic Thunder Air Show, which went ahead on July 31/10. The crash is attributed to pilot error.
Crash
June 22/10: A $1.5 billion contract modification to buy 8 more C-17 aircraft for the USAF. At this time, $734.4 million has already been committed (FA8614-06-D-2006).
February 2010: Budgets. The USAF’s FY 2011 budget submission [PDF] gives an average C-17 flyaway cost to date of around $201 million over the entire program, rising to a full “weapon system cost” of $267.5 million once required spares and support are also factored in. Despite this, it also notes that:
“The FY2010 appropriation of $2.5B “for the procurement of ten C-17 aircraft, associated spares, support equipment and training equipment as required” is not sufficient for this requirement. Shortfall estimated at $530M.”
These 10 aircraft would push total USAF buys to 223. That’s 13 more than the original program goal of 210, and far more than the 180 plane fleet the USAF would have had without Congressional intervention. On the other hand, the 223 were built over a longer manufacturing time frame than originally planned, and in the face of a fleet whose first C-17s are going to be retiring early due to heavy usage.
Feb 6/09: FY 2009. A firm-fixed-price contract to McDonnell Douglas Corporation of Long Beach, CA for an amount not to exceed $2.95 billion. This is an unfinalized contract to buy 15 more C-17A Globemaster III strategic transport aircraft in FY 2009, and separate contracts can be expected for engines and government furnished equipment that is part of the final, operational plane. At this time, $114.6 million has been committed. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH will manage the contract (FA8614-06-D-2006).
Budgets to the end of FY 2008 would bring the American fleet to 205 aircraft, and the FY 2009 budget calls for 8 more.
+15 C-17s
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