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SAKO M95

Military-Today.com - Mon, 07/11/2016 - 21:45

Finnish SAKO M95 Assault Rifle
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ADS

Military-Today.com - Mon, 07/11/2016 - 21:00

Russian ADS Assault Rifle
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Cobham Group Video

Naval Technology - Mon, 07/11/2016 - 15:32
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Highlights - Public hearing ”Afghanistan: the future of the EUPOL mission” - Subcommittee on Security and Defence

The EUPOL police mission in Afghanistan is a major and long-standing contribution of the European Union to the rebuilding of the Afghani state. However, its current mandate will expire in December 2016 and discussions are currently ongoing about the possible future modalities of EU engagement to which the hearing on 9 November could make a valuable contribution.
Further information
Draft programme
Background documents
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

First steel cut for UK Navy’s Type 26 GCS to take place in summer 2017

Naval Technology - Mon, 07/11/2016 - 01:00
UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon has confirmed that the first steel cut for the UK Royal Navy’s next-generation Type 26 Global Combat Ship (GCS) will be held in summer 2017.
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UK Royal Navy's HMS Albion enters next phase of refit programme

Naval Technology - Mon, 07/11/2016 - 01:00
The UK Royal Navy's Albion-class amphibious command ship HMS Albion has entered into the next phase of its refit programme, with its own generators powering lighting and computer systems of the vessel.
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US Navy’s MUOS-5 Satellite successfully deployed in operational orbit

Naval Technology - Mon, 07/11/2016 - 01:00
The US Navy’s fifth Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite has successfully deployed its arrays and antennas after reaching operational orbit.
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USAF Presents Boeing $479M Contract on EPAWSS for F-15 | Elbit’s C-MUSIC Anti-Missile Goes to France | MBDA Awarded $125M for Sea Ceptor Air Defense System

Defense Industry Daily - Mon, 07/11/2016 - 00:58
Americas

  • Live-fire exercises have been conducted on the USS Carl Vinson in order to test its RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) and Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS). The nuclear-powered super carrier fired at two drones using the ship’s aft RAM launcher and fired the CIWS as part of a pre-aim calibration firing evolution during Carrier Strike Group 1’s Composite Training Unit Exercise. Crew on board said the CIWS PAC fire served a dual purpose, allowing Carl Vinson Sailors to perform a maintenance check as well as readying the mounts for a rogue drone situation.

  • A Canadian CH-148 Cyclone has conducted its first anti-submarine warfare testing with the HMCS Windsor off the coast of Nova Scotia. The Sikorsky-made naval helicopter was tested as part of its Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) carried out by the Helicopter Test and Evaluation Facility (HOTEF). Crews onboard the CH-148 employed Expendable Mobile ASW Training Targets (EMATTs) to simulate submarine movements and noise patterns, which allowed HOTEF crews to further develop those tactical procedures that will be used by operational crews following CH148 Release to Service.

  • Boeing landed a $479 million USAF contract for engineering, manufacturing, and development of the Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System for the F-15 Eagle fighter jet. The system will provide advanced aircraft protection, significantly improved situational awareness and support for future F-15 mission requirements, replacing the jet’s Tactical Electronic Warfare Suite and keeping the aging aircraft in scheduled service through 2040. As 413 F-15Cs and F-15Es will be upgraded under the program, the expected costs may run to $7.6 billion.

Middle East & North Africa

  • Israeli news outlets have reported the presence of the Elbit Systems’ C-MUSIC anti-missile defense system on France’s Presidential Jet. Priced at $1 million per unit, the system consists of smart thermal cameras that identify an incoming missile and target the missile with a laser beam. The specialized beam interferes with the missile’s targeting system, deflecting it off its trajectory and allowing it to explode at a safe distance from the plane. A French official confirmed the reports.

Europe

  • MBDA has been awarded a $125 million Demonstration and Manufacture contract by the British MoD for the Sea Ceptor air defense system for the Type 26 (T26) Global Combat Ship (GCS). The company said the deal will last for 10 years and involves support to the T26 design as well as the manufacture of the electronics equipment required for the class of eight ships. News of the deal comes following the announcement by BAE Systems that the first steel for the frigate will be cut in Glasgow next summer.

  • Patriot upgrades for Germany could be underway within a year if Berlin decides against selecting the rival Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) offered by Lockheed Martin and MBDA. Raytheon made the announcement as contract negotiations between the government and MBDA slow due to the cost of MEADS’ acquisition which was recently revealed to be higher than the $4.5 billion initially proposed. The company claims that upgrading their existing Patriot system would save Germany money in the short and long term, allowing them to continue to benefit from upgrades and reliability improvements funded by all 13 countries that operate the system.

Asia Pacific

  • India’s government is expected to approve the purchase of 12 US-2 amphibious aircraft from Japan today. The Defense Acquisitions Council, chaired by Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar, will green light the acquisition prior to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan later this week. It’s believed that Modi will sign a memorandum of understanding during the trip.

  • Boeing is expecting a new request for information (RFI) to be released by India to build twin-engine fighters in the country. President of Boeing India Pratyush Kumar said the company had received an RFI for a single-engine fighter but could not offer any solutions to the requirement. In preparation for a twin-engine competition, however, Boeing is prepared to establish a state-of-the-art facility in order to build 200 F/A-18 Super Hornets in country.

Today’s Video

Elbit’s C-MUSIC:

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Canada’s CH-148 Cyclones: 4th Time Lucky?

Defense Industry Daily - Mon, 07/11/2016 - 00:55
CH-148 Cyclone
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Canada’s Maritime Helicopter Replacement Program has been a textbook military procurement program over its long history. Unfortunately, it has been a textbook example of what not to do. While Canada’s 50-year old Sea King fleet aged and deteriorated to potentially dangerous levels, political pettiness and lack of concern turned a straightforward off-the-shelf buy into a 25+ year long odyssey of cancellations, lawsuits, rebids, and more. Eventually, the Canadian military settled on Sikorsky’s H-92 Superhawk as the basis of its new CH-148 Cyclone Maritime Helicopter, which will serve from the decks of Canada’s naval ships and bases.

The civilian S-92 has gone on to some commercial success. To date, however, Canada has been the H-92’s only military customer – with all of the associated systems integration and naval conversion burdens that one would expect. After a long series of badly missed milestones and delivery delays, there are also deeper questions being raised concerning both the machines’ fitness, and DND’s conduct of the program as a whole. This article covers the rationale for, history of, and developments within Canada’s Maritime Helicopter Program.

CH-148 MHP: Systems & Program CH-149: Rescue me!
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The 5-bladed EH101 had been the New Shipboard Aircraft Program’s initial winner in July 1992, and serves in a naval and anti-submarine helicopter role with the British and Italian navies. A civilian version currently serves Canada in a search-and-rescue role as the CH-149 Cormorant, but they were bought long after the naval helicopter contract was canceled for political reasons. Reliability and readiness issues with the Canadian CH-149s have added further strains to Canada’s relationship with AgustaWestland.

Canada chose a different naval helicopter platform when they restarted the Maritime Helicopter Replacement Program, but the ride has been rough and the delays have been long. Many of those delays arose because a project touted as an off-the-shelf buy became nothing less than the development of a new helicopter platform for the global military market, with specifications that no existing off-the-shelf machine could meet.

The MH-92/ CH-148 Naval Helicopter CH-148: DND rendering
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The H-92 Superhawk platform Canada chose for its “CH-148 Cyclone” maritime helicopters is a larger derivative of the ubiquitous H-60 family that comprise most of the US Navy’s current fleet. it makes heavier use of rust-proof composite materials, and also sports uprated engines, a rear ramp, and other features that place it in a similar class to Europe’s delayed NH90 NFH model, whose schedule has also slipped until it is also expected to become fully operational around 2013.

Initial Cyclone specifications called for GE’s 3,000 hp class CT7-8C engines, but helicopter weight growth will force another engine upgrade before the final design is ready. Standard self-sealing fuel tanks can carry up to 3,030 kg of fuel, and an in-flight refuelling probe allows in-air refueling for extended range flights.

The 17 cubic meter cabin is fitted with a cargo handling system with a centerline 1,814 kg/ 4,000 pound capacity cargo winch, floor rollers, and cargo tie-down points. A 6 foot-wide aft ramp allows easy and fast loading and unloading of cargo and troops. A 272 kg/ 600 pound capacity hydraulic rescue hoist can reportedly be added to the helicopter if necessary.

A Telephonics APS-143B radar, a HELRAS active dipping sonar system supplemented with launched sonobuoys, and a Star SAFIRE-III day/night surveillance turret, offer a good mid-level sensor set by the standards of new western naval helicopters.

Mk.46 loading, CH-124
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Armament has not been discussed. Other naval helicopters generally hold 2-4 mounting points for some combination of lightweight torpedoes, depth charges, and light anti-ship missiles. Some, such as the Cyclone’s smaller MH-60 cousins, can also mount machine guns, rockets, or short-range anti-armor missiles on their wing stubs. Canada’s history suggests that a minimalist approach is likely, involving only Canada’s Mk46 torpedoes. On the other hand, enough re-use of existing MH-60 family systems could leave the Cyclones fitted “for, but not with” a wider variety of weapons. Sikorsky is known to be eyeing potential exports, and would benefit from having a wide range of available weapon options.

Survivability will be handled using the helicopter’s AN/ALQ-210 radar warning and locator system, linked to the AN/ALQ-144Av5 countermeasures suite. The nature of their missions, however, means that these helicopters’ most dangerous enemy is likely to be… nature. This is also true for their crews. If the worst should come to pass, Canada’s frigid waters challenge sailors to survive long enough to be rescued. To address that, the CH-148 includes emergency flotation systems under the cockpit and in the tailboom; they’re deployed automatically, and are expected to work up to Sea State 5 conditions. If they fail, or aren’t practical, a 15-man life raft is installed in each side wheel sponson.

A number of CH-148s won’t be fielded to this standard, at least initially.

Program delays eventually pushed Canada’s DND to accept “interim” helicopters that could be used for some training, but weren’t ready for service. Overall, the CH-148 interim helicopters will be deficient in 4 areas:

1. Mission system software which controls all weapons and sensors won’t be ready.

2. Messaging functionality/ tactical data exchange capability (automated data-link exchanges of tactical data between designated units, including the ships and aircraft) won’t be fully installed.

3. Mission flight endurance will be 21 minutes less than the contracted requirements.

4. The ability to operate on a single engine, even at high temperatures that cost helicopters their lift.

The first 2 issues will be solved with software and electronics upgrades. The latter 2 issues are expected to be solved by uprated turboshaft engines. All of these upgrades will, of course, require extensive testing of their own.

The CH-148 Program CH-148: Developmental
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In 2000, Canadian program costs for 28 maritime helicopters were estimated at C$ 2.8 billion. That escalated to C$ 3.1 billion in 2003. By 2010, the program had hit C$ 6.2 billion, including purchase costs, 20 years of in-service support, training, and extra spending in order to keep the CH-124 Sea King fleet operational during project delays.

Those delays have also been substantial. Initial CH-148 delivery was originally scheduled for November 2008, but that was pushed back twice, and the new December 2010 milestone would be for “interim” helicopters that were missing key capabilities. Those standards were relaxed even further to eliminate night or over-water flights, but Sikorsky still missed the delivery date.

In the wake of a very vague announcement about contract renegotiation and further program delays, observers began questioning whether the program’s initial dates were ever realistic, and whether even the revised dates could be depended upon. As of September 2013, the program hasn’t even had a single interim helicopter accepted. It has missed every milestone so far, and shows no signs of changing that record. The timeline below captures most of the program’s shifting dates and promises, along with its progress to date:

Meanwhile, the H-92 seems likely to become the base helicopter for the USA’s new Presidential helicopter fleet, but hasn’t been able to secure other military sales. If Canada collapses as a customer, the USA’s VXX program could still go ahead, because the civil S-92 is already the base machine for several heads of state. Its military future beyond that would become very tenuous, however, and the S-92 would likely join the S-76 as proposed military machines that became reasonably successful civil-only platforms.

Plan B: Other Options Dutch NH-90 NFH
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In September 2013, Canada’s government confirmed that they were seriously considering other helicopters for their naval needs, in conjunction with cancellation of the CH-148 contract. By January 2014, they decided to renegotiate the CH-148 contract one more time. While sunk costs should be discounted, all alternatives to the H-92/CH-148 would have involved some type of cancellation fee, even if Canada terminates for breach of contract. Beyond that, each model had its own strengths and drawbacks.

AW101. AgustaWestland’s AW101 naval serves in a full anti-submarine role with Britain and Italy. The British are upgrading their fleet to a stable Merlin Mk2 configuration, and the helicopter is more advanced and proven than it was when the S-92 beat the AW101 in 2004.

The flip side is that Canada’s AW101/ CH-149 search and rescue machines have had consistent issues with reliability and demand for spare parts, and Britain’s figures indicate that the problem isn’t limited to Canada. The Mk.2 hopes to improve that situation, but there isn’t enough operational data yet to know how much improvement has actually been delivered. AW101s would also require an associated weapons buy, or a sub-project to integrate the helicopter with American weapons in Canada’s stocks.

AW159 Lynx Wildcat. If Canada is willing to consider a significantly smaller helicopter, the new AW159 variant of the globally popular Lynx family offers them more versatility for shipboard deployment, without major structural upgrades.

The new AW159s are very capable anti-submarine helicopters, but won’t have the same utility helicopter versatility as Sea Kings, S-92s, or other large counterparts. They also wouldn’t have space for Canada’s extra TACCO (tactical control officer) in back to monitor the sensors and make tactical decisions. Their purchase cost would be lower, but like the AW101, they’d require added weapons integration or purchases, as well as an investigation of flotation options.

EC725 Super Cougar. Eurocopter’s machine lacks a folding tail boom for storage aboard navy ships, and would need to integrate naval equipment (radar, dipping sonar, sonobuoys, weapons). Canada has been there and done that with the S-92, and they’re deeply unlikely to do it again.

MH-60R & ALFS,
Bermuda
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MH-60R Seahawk. Sikorsky’s smaller but proven MH-60R has been in service with the US Navy for several years, and Australia won’t be its last export customer. It offers great interoperability, compatibility with Canada’s existing weapons is assured, and deliveries would take place quickly from a full-rate production line.

MH-60Rs could be an option if Canada decides to negotiate them as part of a broader settlement with Sikorsky. Its problem is that it won’t qualify unless Canada scraps the flotation requirements, which exist because Canadian crews have to fly over a lot of lethally cold water. Canada also wouldn’t have space to include their extra TACCO (tactical control officer) in back, to monitor the sensors and make tactical decisions.

NH90 NFH. The European NHI consortium’s helicopter has an strong installed base within NATO, and offers Canada the advantage of ongoing modernization investments from multiple partner countries. The NH90 NFH variant was very developmental in 2004, but as of 2013, the naval version is finally being delivered in its operational configuration. NHI is publicly unclear re: integrated weapons options, and so Canada would need to investigate that.

The NH90’s problem has been late, late delivery, and the company remains backlogged. Given cutbacks in orders from their core customers, they’d certainly welcome the business. The questions are: Can NHI deliver? And how much stock can Canada place in a helicopter that doesn’t have much operational history in its operational configuration?

CH-148 Industrial Partnerships

The basic S-92 helicopter is assembled in Stratford, CT, but key parts are made elsewhere. It is used in industries like offshore oil & gas, and has carved out a niche as a government VIP helicopter. Industrial partners for the S-92 civil helicopter and CH-148 maritime patrol helicopter include:

CH-148 MHP: Contracts & Key Events 2016

At Paris 2011

November 7/16: A Canadian CH-148 Cyclone has conducted its first anti-submarine warfare testing with the HMCS Windsor off the coast of Nova Scotia. The Sikorsky-made naval helicopter was tested as part of its Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) carried out by the Helicopter Test and Evaluation Facility (HOTEF). Crews onboard the CH-148 employed Expendable Mobile ASW Training Targets (EMATTs) to simulate submarine movements and noise patterns, which allowed HOTEF crews to further develop those tactical procedures that will be used by operational crews following CH148 Release to Service.

2014

June 23/14: Concessions. What trade-offs did Canada’s government make, in order to get a CH-148 helicopter that could be built and accepted? CBC News reports that they traded away:

  • The ability to secure the helicopter’s ramp in various positions during flight.
  • Crew comfort systems that could handle extreme temperature operations, as in Afghanistan or Libya.
  • Unobstructed hand and foot holds for technicians to conduct maintenance.
  • The ability to self start in very cold weather.
  • Cockpit ergonomics factors.
  • A system to automatically deploy personnel life rafts in emergency situations.

That last concession could be an issue in Canada’s lethally cold oceans, but the biggest concession is that the Canadian military will default to FAA civilian standards under “FAR Part 29,” instead of insisting on on 30-minute “run dry” capability if the main gearbox loses all of its oil. That’s exactly what happened in the S-92 crash off of Newfoundland (q.v. March 11/09), causing Canada’s Transportation Safety Board to recommend that the FAA do away with FAR Part 29’s “extremely remote” loophole. Other competitors, like the AW101, have proven this capability. Sources: CBC News, “Sea King replacements: $7.6B Cyclone maritime helicopters lack key safety requirement”.

June 18/14: Agreement #4. Sikorsky parent firm United Technologies:

“United Technologies Corp. (NYSE: UTX) today announced Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.’s signing of a contract amendment with the Government of Canada on the Canadian Maritime Helicopter Program, pursuant to the previously disclosed Principles of Agreement [q.v. April 15/14]. The amended contract enables Canada’s Department of National Defense to take delivery of operationally relevant CH148 Cyclone helicopters and facilitates retirement of the Sea King fleet starting in 2015.

As a result of the amended agreement, Sikorsky will record sales of approximately $850 million and a charge of $440 million in the second quarter of 2014 reflecting the cumulative effect of progress to date toward completion of the program, as modified [see also $157 million charge taken Jan 23/13].”

It has been a good quarter for the S-92, as Sikorsky received an $1.245 billion contract on May 7/14 to develop the S-92 into the next US Presidential helicopter. Sources: UTC, “United Technologies Announces Agreement With Government of Canada for the Maritime Helicopter Program; Reaffirms 2014 EPS Expectations of $6.65 to $6.85 Per Share”.

April 15/14: Agreement #4. Canada and Sikorsky have reportedly reached an agreement regarding the CH-148 program, but it isn’t public yet. Anonymous sources are telling CP that Canada won’t pay more money, will accept up to 8 interim capability helicopters, and will pay only for “the delivery of capable aircraft.” The catch is that Canada had to be realistic about what that meant, and distinguish between capabilities they needed to have, vs. capabilities they wanted to have. It’s amazing that this hadn’t been done during previous contract amendments, but there you have it. CP adds:

“Documents obtained under the Access to Information Act show that in addition to a report by consultants, officials also conducted an independent analysis of the financial implications of the existing program on the country’s defence industry. [Competitors] were also asked what they might be able to provide…. Internal documents showed last January that more than $1.7 billion has already been spent in preparing to receive the troubled choppers.”

Sources: The Canadian Press, “Ottawa and Sikorsky agree on new terms for Cyclone choppers: sources”.

3rd contract amendment

April 14/14: FAA on S-92. The FAA issues a warning that may have some bearing on the CH-148 program:

“The FAA has issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin… [re:] the possibility of salt encrustation and engine performance degradation while operating the Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. S-92A in a heavy salt spray environment. At this time, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition…. For operations that take place in a heavy salt spray environment, the pilot should monitor turbine gas temperature (TGT) relative to engine torque. Any abrupt rise in TGT might indicate salt encrustation and possible engine power degradation or imminent compressor stall. If a rise in TGT is observed while maintaining constant engine torque, the pilot should give priority to exiting the heavy salt spray environment. Flight through precipitation may help to reduce salt encrustation on engine components.”

Sources: HAI Rotor News, “Sikorsky S-92A: Heavy Salt Spray Environment”.

Jan 3/14: 4th time lucky? Canada will negotiate a 4th contract with Sikorsky to deliver the CH-148:

“Today, the Government of Canada and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation announced that a Principles of Agreement (POA), which will form the basis of formal contract negotiations…. Canada will see delivery of helicopters with operational capability sufficient to begin retirement of Sea Kings in 2015, and a program to enhance those capabilities culminating in a fully capable CH 148 Cyclone Maritime Helicopter in 2018…. Sikorsky has committed to deliver the needed helicopter capability at no additional cost to Canada… the Government of Canada will only issue further payment to Sikorsky upon capability delivery…. Sikorsky has agreed to pay Canada $88.6 million in liquidated damages for non-delivery.”

Shifting risk to Sikorsky makes for an attractive offer, under circumstances where other options would either have great difficulty delivering anything earlier, or create significant integration problems on their own. The question was whether the CH-148’s remaining problems could be solved, without jettisoning important operational and safety features. Hitachi seems to think so (q.v. Sept 4/13), but that has yet to be proven. Initial training and testing will continue in Shearwater, and Hitachi Consulting will retain some role in the project. Sources: Public Works Canada, “Government of Canada to continue with Maritime Helicopter Project and begin retiring Sea Kings in 2015” | Halifax Chronicle-Herald, “Ottawa won’t scrap Cyclone purchase, Sea Kings retirement starts next year”.

2013

Initial delivery not until 2015 now – if it ever happens, with Canada looking elsewhere; Serious tech issues with CH-148 detailed; Sikorsky takes financial hit, losing money on each initial helicopter; CCPA-Rideau report; Procurement a general problem within Canada. Keep fixing ’em…
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Dec 13/13: The Canadian Press reports that Canada is back in talks with Sikorsky to salvage the CH-148 program, which remains their primary option:

“[UTC CEO] Louis Chenevert… told analysts in a conference call on Thursday that the company is having “productive discussions with the Canadian government” on the Cyclone program and that the talks are in the “advanced stages.” Public Works Minister Diane Finley conceded the government “is in discussions” with Sikorsky to see if they can put together a plan to go forward.”

Oct 4/13: Other Options. The Canadian Press reports that the the Canadian government is actively putting together a “Plan B” for the maritime helicopter program.

“The attempt to chart a new course for the long-delayed Sea King replacement program took place in Ottawa on Thursday at an unusual meeting that involved not only government officials and executives of AgustaWestland and NH Industries, but also Cyclone manufacturer Sikorsky.”

Helicopters of interest reportedly involve the AW101 Merlin, NH90 NFH, and MH-60R Seahawk. Source: Global Post, “Official met with Cyclone rivals as Tories consider ditching chopper program”.

Nov 8/13: Tech issues. The Official Opposition’s defence critic Jack Harris [NDP, St. John’s East] formally asks Conservative Party Defence Minister Rob Nicholson to confirm that (a) the MHP still has a requirement to run for 30 minutes with no lubrication; and (b) that the CH-148 either has this capability, or will have it when Sikorsky delivers its helicopters.

Harris specifically references an S-92’s fatal 2009 crash off of Newfoundland (q.v. March 11/09), which was blamed in part on the helicopter’s failure to run after a mechanical failure drained its oil.

The government, and Sikorsky, both refuse to answer his questions. CBC News, “Sea King helicopter replacement standard questioned by NDP”.

Oct 17/13: Small is complicated. While DND is supposedly considering smaller machines like the MH-60R or AW159 as CH-148 alternatives, Canada would either have to change the way it uses helicopters, or place a difficult upgrade aboard its ships.

The biggest problem is Canada’s habit of using a TACCO (tactical control officer) in back to monitor the sensors and make tactical decisions, up to and including firing weapons. The MH-60R and AW159 wouldn’t have space for one. Canada could then do 1 of 2 things. It could rely on modern electronics to eliminate the TACCO, and let the pilot team handle that. Or, it could try to retrofit a TACCO space and equipment into the operations rooms of its current and future ships. Sources: CBC, “Smaller Sea King replacements would mean big changes to navy”.

Sept 12/13: Tech issues. The CBC reports that current CH-148’s engines and cockpit are at risk because of certified “E-3” vulnerabilities to powerful electromagnetic waves (q.v. July 2013). Their source is “defence sources with intimate knowledge of the troubled program”, and E-3 fixes could be a real problem:

“The aircraft was not designed from the ground up with this kind of shielding in mind,” said the source. “Military aircraft, the skin of military aircraft, are sometimes embedded with a fine copper screen or mesh to prevent the intrusion of electromagnetic interference.” One solution could involve retroactively installing screens around sensitive electronics, but that could add as much as 136 kilograms to the weight of the helicopter. That worries engineers who have long been concerned whether the Cyclone’s engine is powerful enough to comfortably lift its existing weight.”

The article also claims that the CH-148’s flight limitations over water stem from “separate, unresolved concerns about the flotation system”. Sources: CBC News, “New Cyclone choppers beset with technical snags”.

Sept 5-6/13: Other Options. June 2013 statements by Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose seemed to hint that Canada was looking for a way out of the contract. That’s no longer just a hint. Public Works spokesperson Amber Irwin says that the report from Hitachi Consulting “is not yet finalized,” but she does confirm that:

“We are conducting an analysis of price and availability of other aircrafts manufactured by other vendors….” …sources inside National Defence said the effort is “quite serious” and more than just a warning to Sikorsky…”

Canada has reportedly sent a team to Britain to look at their AW101 Merlin naval helicopter, which is a militarized counterpart to the CH-149 search and rescue helicopters that Canada already operates. It was also the naval helicopter that Canada originally ordered in the 1980s, at the beginning of this whole sorry saga. An AgustaWestland spokesperson says that they’ve conducted an internal analysis, and believe the AW101 is “more compliant today than we were at the time of bidding.” Other potential options, including Sikorsky’s smaller MH-60R Seahawk, Europe’s NH90 NFH, and AgustaWestland’s AW159 Lynx Wildcat, also have their pros and cons discussed in the “CH-148 Program” section. Sources: CDFAI, “Canadian Cyclone Maritime Chopper Never to Rotate in Service?” | Canadian Manufacturing, “Timing of acquisition unclear if Ottawa changes course on maritime helicopter” | CBC News, “‘Other options’ sought for Sea King helicopter replacements” | Global News, “Harper government now evaluating helicopters ‘other’ than troubled Cyclones”.

Sept 4/13: Report. Hitachi Consulting delivers its CH-148 Program Report to the Canadian government. They say that there is a “reasonable expectation” that the project is salvageable, but only if the government treats it like the developmental project it is, and reorganizes how the project is managed within 3 months. Most of all, the government needs to let go of a specification set that couldn’t be met by any existing naval helicopters, and create the authority for “trade space” that will give up some of those specifications in return for cost, space, and time improvements. That, says Hitachi, has been the project’s fundamental flaw from Day 1. The 3-month period would see the governance model changed, and the specification trades negotiated with Sikorsky and the RCAF. Sources: Hitachi Report PPT summary | CBC, “Cyclone helicopter contract revisions urged by report”.

Aug 4/13: The Canadian Naval Review delivers a hard body-check to recent Canadian defense reporting, on the dubious occasion of the CH-124 Sea King’s 50th anniversary in service. CNR:

“It is highly likely that the movement on the Cyclone file came from developments in the United States, not in Canada, and particularly relate to the renewed competition for the presidential helicopter. According to a report in the New York Times, “Few Suitors to Build a New Marine One” by Christopher Drew (28 July), Sikorsky will be the sole bidder for the contract to replace the presidential Sea Kings. This contract, along with a potential order for the USAF Combat SAR helicopter, both using the Cyclone airframe/engine combination, has effectively created a “critical mass” which makes the prospect of the resolution of whatever technical (as opposed to legal) issues affect the Cyclone more attractive to Sikorsky.”

July 2013: E-3 XX. DND’s directorate of air worthiness gives the interim CH-148s a restricted flight certificate, and imposed restrictions on the helicopter’s operations because of electromagnetic compatibility, electromagnetic vulnerability and electromagnetic interference (E-3 concerns). Civilian helicopters aren’t designed to take the full brunt of emissions from a high-power naval radar or similar source, while military machines design resistance in from the outset. Sources: CBC News, “New Cyclone choppers beset with technical snags”.

July 28/13: Deal, v4.0? Sikorsky has reportedly reached agreement with the Canadian government to begin fight testing with the 4 helicopters it has delivered as of early August 2013, without having Canada formally accept them as meeting requirements.

They’re also proposing a deal that would retire the 50-year old Sea Kings sooner, in return for CH-148s that would be below previously-agreed standards, then phase them into full service over time using software upgrades. Sources: CTV News, “Sea King choppers could retire sooner under U.S. aircraft-maker’s proposal”

July 15-20/13: Sea Kings. Canada’s Sea King helicopter fleet is grounded, after a CH-124 accident at CFB Shearwater near Halifax. It had landed after a 5-hour training mission and taxied to a hangar, then stopped and tipped forward while the rotors were still spinning. The blade fragments dented walls and broke glass on surrounding buildings, but didn’t hurt anyone. The helicopter sustained extensive damage, and the operational fleet may shrink to 22 machines.

Canada rules out mechanical failure as an issue, and the fleet begins flying again while investigations continue. Winnipeg Free Press |QMI, via Sun Media.

June 25/13: What’s Canada preparing for? As maintenance of Canada’s CH-124 Sea King fleet continues to get harder, CBC News reports that Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose has hired an outside consultant to study Sikorsky’s work, and Canada’s contract. The question? Whether it’s even possible to deliver the aircraft Canada ordered. Minister Ambrose:

“I have employed the services of an independent consultant and contractor to undertake a review of the ability of this company to deliver this to the government…. I am very disappointed in Sikorsky…. They have not met their contractual obligations to date. They have missed every deadline and every timeline…”

Which is partly because Canada kept changing the specifications, a fact that places Canada in a weaker legal position than it might otherwise enjoy. Ambrose adds that the 4 / 6 interim helicopters delivered to date don’t even meet minimum interim specifications, and offered that gap as an explanation for her department’s refusal to allow Canadian Forces personnel to train with them. That’s astonishingly bad defense policy, but refusing to take any delivery does make sense if you’re thinking of escaping the contract altogether. Come to think of it, so does removing the planned deck strengthening for some frigate updates, and hiring an independent consultant to examine what amounts to a question of contractor default. CBC News.

Feb 21/13: 2015? RCAF head Lt.-Gen. Yvan Blondin tells a Postmedia interview that: “In the short term, the Sea King can fly.” The report adds that:

“That flexibility will likely be needed amid recent reports that the air force won’t receive the first of its planned Sea King replacements, U.S. aerospace giant Sikorsky’s Cyclone maritime helicopters, until 2015 – seven years later than scheduled.”

Feb 17/13: Why so long? A DND analysis obtained by Postmedia says that as of 2011, it takes an average of 199 months/ 16.5 years for military acquisitions over 55 sampled projects. This has been a long term problem. the average was 190 months in 1998, but assistant deputy minister Alan Williams at the Defence Department implemented initiatives that dropped it to 89 months under Liberal prime ministers Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin. Does the report offer an explanation? No:

“It is impossible to pinpoint what is delaying the cycle time, further in-depth analysis needs to be conducted to review the whole acquisition process. Progress has not been made in reducing the overall acquisition cycle time.”

Williams, who left the public service in 2005, offers a fairly simple explanation: sole-source procurements give the upper hand to the vendor, so contract negotiations drag on indefinitely. That probably part of it, but Canada’s balkanized responsibilities, consistent insistence om specifications not met by anything in the marketplace, and an unaccountable public service culture which has included deceiving Parliament, must also be considered as factors. Ottawa Citizen.

Feb 11/13: CCPA & Rideau. The left-wing CCPA and Rideau Institute issue a joint paper about the CH-148 program, which borrows its title from minister MacKay’s July 2012 comments. “The Worst Procurement in the History of Canada” chronicles Canada’s maritime helicopter replacement efforts since 1990, and notes the recent 50th anniversary of CH-124 Sea King operations. With respect to those Sea Kings:

“Sea King operations suffer because of a lack of spare parts, increasing maintenance hours, and concerns resulting from accidents. Between 1995 and 1998, the Auditor General found the Mission Capable Rate (MCR) of Sea Kings fell from 42% to 29%.18 The number of “aborts” increased substantially — to more than 60 aborts per 1,000 flight-hours — between 1990 and 2000.19 By the year 2000 an average of 30 hours of maintenance was required per flight-hour.20”

Another 12 years hasn’t helped matters. Meanwhile, the CH-148 has become a Mexican standoff. As CCPA explains:

“One reason for the lack of collection [on late delivery fees] seems to be that DND and Public Works introduced new requirements for the helicopter after the contract was signed. Sikorsky therefore might have a basis for legal action against the government if they are fined. This may also explain why Public Works reduced the penalty from $250,000 per day in the original Request for Proposal to $100,000 a day, and why it capped that penalty at one year.94 Canada thus finds has itself between a rock and a hard place, unable to secure new helicopters without pressuring Sikorsky, and unable to pressure Sikorsky for fear of being sued.”

CCPA recommends that Canada explore alternatives to the CH-148s, including AgustaWestland’s AW101 naval, Eurocopter’s EC725 Super Cougar, Europe’s NH90 NFH, or Sikorsky’s smaller but proven MH-60R. Unfortunately, as noted above, every one of these options is problematic. With that said, CCPA is correct in pointing out that looking elsewhere would strengthen their recommendation to toughen negotiations with Sikorsky, who won’t want the S-92’s only military customer to ditch it.

They’re on more fanciful ground with their 1st recommendation, for “full transparency on the Maritime Helicopter Project, so that the public can judge the appropriateness of any approach to dealing with the crisis.” Not going to happen – certainly not from this government, and probably not from any other party’s government, either. The culture of denial and coverup in Canada’s public service is too established and too deep, and none of the 3 major parties shows any signs of challenging it. See also Epoch Times | National Post | Reuters.

CCPA report

Jan 23/13: Sikorsky Finance & Forecast. Parent firm UTC holds its Q4 2012 conference call for investors, which includes references to the Canadian Maritime Helicopter program. The company is taking a USD $157 million charge related to costs associated by expected program delays, or about $5.6 million per helicopter.

They’re maintaining their projection of 8 helicopters delivered in 2013, which would make 12 total at Shearwater, but don’t offer any definitive forecast regarding requirements compliance and acceptance. What they do say is that they’ll lose $14 million on each CH-148 delivered in 2013. Sikrosky IR – Webcasts.

2012

Late fees an issue now for “worst procurement in Canadian history”; Helicopters at Shearwater, but no formal delivery as milestones missed; is 2017 the real delivery date? CH-124 Sea King
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Sept 25/12: #4 in. Technically, it could be argued that MH-806 was #1, since it first arrived in May 2011. It left that same month, however, and has just returned after a round of modifications at Sikorsky’s West Palm Beach facility. Source.

Aug 3/12: #3 in. A new CH-148, MH-807, arrives at CFB Shearwater. That makes 3 helicopters on site, but the government still hasn’t taken delivery. Sikorsky still operates and maintains the machines.

Training for CH-148 technicians also begins this month. Source.

July 12/12: Worst. Procurement. Ever. That’s the opinion of… Defence Minister Peter MacKay. His exact words:

“Unlike shipbuilding, that was a brand new design that was put in place through negotiations by a prior government. We inherited this contract. This is an example of how procurement can go badly wrong. This is the worst procurement in the history of Canada, including the $500-million cancellation costs that are attached to the Maritime helicopter program [cancellation by the Liberal Chretien government in the 1990s] and then the costs of further maintenance to fly 50-year-old helicopters…. I saw a Sea King aboard the Charlottetown when we were in the [Persian] Gulf and that aircraft has been replaced piece by piece, almost in its entirety, so there is urgency to get the Maritime helicopter program on track…”

July 4/12: 2017? CBC News reports:

“Canada’s long-promised fleet of new Sikorsky naval helicopters… likely won’t be delivered and ready for combat for up to another five years, informed industry sources tell CBC News…. industry insiders familiar with the Sikorsky project say the Cyclone helicopters being built for Canada are a new design with a lot of sophisticated electronics and military mission systems that aren’t yet even installed, all of which will take years to integrate and become combat-ready.

….Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose, whose department is responsible for enforcing deadlines in the contract with Sikorsky, tells CBC she wouldn’t even guess when the company might deliver the entire fleet. “They haven’t given us a date…. As we know, their dates – the promises they have made to us – have shifted numerous times.” “

July 2/12: Nothing, Still. Canada’s Globe and Mail reports that the deadline to begin delivering fully operational helicopters has now passed, without even interim helicopters that have been accepted for service.

“Sikorsky and the federal government are remaining vague about the problems with the Cyclone program, but it is clear the company is struggling to obtain the “airworthiness certification” that is mandatory for the helicopters to fly off on military missions. In addition, the company is still working to ensure the helicopters have the necessary engine power to meet the government’s mandatory endurance requirements… Public Works and National Defence are stating that they expect the delivery of the interim helicopters to occur “later this year.” This suggests the delivery of the fully compliant helicopters – initially scheduled for 2008 – will not happen until 2013.”

June 16/12: #2 in. A new CH-148, MH-808, arrives at CFB Shearwater. That makes 2 helicopters on site, but the government still hasn’t taken delivery. Source.

June 7/12: #1 in. A new CH-148, MH-805, arrives at CFB Shearwater to replace MH-806 in the initial training role. We’re calling it #1, because it’s the first one that’s staying. Source.

May 17/12: CH-148 out. The Navy’s lone CH-148 training helicopter, MH-806, leaves CFB Shearwater and flies to Palm Beach, FL, for modifications. Source.

Jan 27/12: More delays, more penalties. The Winnipeg Free Press reports that things are about to become more difficult for the CH-148 program. The CH-148 safety certification process, and other delays, make it very unlikely that Sikorsky can begin delivering fully capable CH-148s with all mission software, for acceptance by June 2012.

Instead, an unnamed defense source says they’re only committed to 5 interim training helicopters in 2012. That would trigger another C$ 80 million in contract penalties, on top of the C$ 8 million levied for not delivering the interim helicopters on schedule.

“But senior defence officials said that penalty and the anticipated additional $80 million be deducted… out of reduced [maintenance] payments and in-service support over time… said the senior official. “If you beat them up now, you disincentive the company from giving you completed aircraft. If you take it out of in-service support costs, it’s easier for them to manage and it lowers our operating costs.”

Jan 3/12: Late fees. The Ottawa Citizen reports that Public Works and Government Services Canada still intends to get the much-reduced $8 million in late fee damages from Sikorsky, but has no timeline for when. That mirrors the helicopter itself, which still has no interim status CH-148 flying, even though they were supposed to have begun flying in summer 2011:

“In its attempts to help Sikorsky along, DND officials reduced the criteria for the interim aircraft to receive a military airworthiness certification… [that] would have allowed for safe flying of the aircraft but the helicopter would have been restricted in what it could do. It would not have been allowed to fly over water or at night… Sikorsky has sent an interim helicopter to Shearwater, NS but DND has not accepted delivery of that aircraft. “The CF (Canadian Forces) will take formal delivery and assume ownership of the helicopter once a Canadian military airworthiness clearance is granted and once initial aircrew flight training is conducted,” DND noted in an email. DND will not say when that first interim helicopter will be accepted but noted that Sikorsky has maintained that it plans to deliver maritime helicopters to Canada sometime in 2012.”

2011

1st interim CH-148 arrives, but not fit for flight training; Infrastructure investments; Flight testing. CH-148: Waiting to fly
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Nov 28/11: No flight training. The Canadian Press reports that the helicopter flown to Shearwater AB in Halifax earlier is still being used to train ground crew. Despite defense minister MacKay’s promises of an operational flight training helicopter by summer 2011, DND spokeswoman Tracy Poirier says they don’t have it yet:

“Critical work remains outstanding before the Defence Department can take official delivery and assume ownership of the interim helicopter in accordance with the contract”… the federal government will only accept the helicopter when it receives a Canadian military air worthiness certificate.

A spokesman for the federal Department of Public Works said in an email that Ottawa has assessed $8 million in penalties against Sikorsky for delays with the Cyclone procurement program — the maximum that can be applied. But Sebastien Bois declined to say whether the fines have been paid.”

May 12/11: Interim CH-148 Arrives. The first interim CH-148 Cyclone model, MH-806, arrives at 12 Wing Shearwater in Nova Scotia. It will be used to support ground-based training of Canadian Forces (CF) aircrew and technicians, and will remain under Sikorsky ownership and control for now.

The Canadian Forces will take formal delivery, and assume ownership of the helicopter, once a Canadian military airworthiness certificate is granted, and once initial aircrew flight training is conducted. That formal delivery is expected before the end of summer 2011 – but that isn’t what happens. Canada DND | CASR.

“Interim” CH-148 arrives

March 7/11: Rotorhub reports from Heli-Expo in Orlando, FL, where Sikorsky CEO Jeff Pinto says that despite yet another delay (vid. Jan 7/11 entry), the firm is “weeks rather than months away” from finally delivering the first interim CH-148. That delivery was scheduled for November 2010, under a June 2010 agreement that ratified long-standing delays and set out a new baseline. Key milestones completed so far include 750 flight hours, and finalized certification. The publication adds:

“Pino said although the delays in delivery had resulted in penalty payments, these could be ‘rationalised’ [DID: written off in stages] over the life of the programme. ‘This is a very interesting and lucrative contract where the Canadians want to pay to fly and leave the rest to the OEM,’ Pino said. The company was working with the Canadian government on the possibility of a bigger transmission for the CH-148, although it may take six months for the final configuration to be determined.”

In the wake of the Cougar Helicopters crash (vid. March 11/09 entry), the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) had raised issues with the certification of the civilian S-92’s gearbox. Pino said that no S-92 changes were planned in response to that incident, however, adding that the new transmission mount is unrelated. For the military version, a bigger transmission would be a likely follow-on from engine power upgrades the Canadians are requesting. The civilian S-92 changes are focused on weight, reliability, and operating cost improvements, plus electronics upgrades, and an internal auxiliary fuel certification for the SAR configuration.

Feb 22/11: Infrastructure. The government of Canada announces a C$ 155 million project to replace a 60-year-old hangar near Victoria International Airport on Canada’s west coast, with a 20,000-square-meter merged operations and support facility at Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt, British Colombia. Given the requirement for more space, and the need for an appropriate fire-suppression system, it was cost effective to build a new facility, rather than renovate the current 60-year-old hangar.

CFB Esquimalt is the home of Canada’s Pacific Fleet. The facility will be ready by 2014, in order to house 443 Squadron’s 9 new CH-148 helicopters. The project includes the hangar, an exterior aircraft parking apron for up to 5 CH-148s; a taxiway linking this apron to the runway; a re-fuelling and wash area; parking for up to 300 vehicles; and a guard house with security barriers and a perimeter security fence. At least one existing building will be demolished during the project, and the new facility is expected to accommodate 350 people. No contractors have been picked yet. Prime Minister’s Office | Postmedia | Rotorhub.

Jan 31/11: Testing. Canada’s DND announces that a CH-148 Cyclone, which arrived at Shearwater base on Jan 6/11, will be undergoing several weeks of testing on board the frigate HMCS Montreal, under the direction of Sikorsky International Operations Inc.

The tests will revolve around its operational limits in ship-borne use, and “the vessel has undergone considerable modification so that the tests may be conducted in optimal fashion.” Since the modifications were made, HMCS Montréal has successfully completed Air Work-Ups, which tested the abilities of the crew to conduct routine flying operations, respond to in-flight emergencies and to a helicopter crash, and combat shipboard fires.

Jan 7/11: Sikorsky:

“We have notified the Canadian government that there will be a short delay in delivery of the first aircraft due to an issue outside of our control. Our contract contains provisions for such events, and we are now in discussions with the Crown in keeping with those provisions.”

2010

Auditor General report faults DND for evading rules, not being honest with Parliament; 2nd contract renegotiation involves “interim” helicopters now; CH-148 prototype arrives for SHOL testing.

Oct 28/10: OAG Report. Canada’s Office of the Auditor General (OAG) releases its 2010 Fall report. The report’s main focus is on Canada’s C$ 61 billion economic stimulus program, which rates an unusual verdict of being well managed. Canada’s CH-148 program, on the other hand, rates a far more negative verdict. The biggest issues involve huge cost and time inflation, but the 2008 contract amendment also comes in for criticism because the original procurement strategy was based on a lowest price bid, giving no credit to bids offering more capability. OAG points out that by signing a contract to upgrade the S-92’s engines in 2008 (q.v. Dec 23/08 entry), DND effectively acknowledged that its contracting strategy had misled bidders on 2 key counts: the importance of an off-the-shelf platform, and the requirements themselves. Key excerpts:

“In 2000, total indicative costs of the 28 maritime helicopters were estimated at $2.8 billion and revised to $3.1 billion in 2003, exclusive of the cost of providing in-service support. The cost of purchasing and providing in-service support for the helicopters, and of training personnel, is currently estimated to be $5.7 billion over 20 years. This estimate does not include costs related to contracted Sea King support, new infrastructure, Canadian Forces personnel, and ongoing operating costs [which raise the program to C$ 6.2 billion for 28 helicopters]. In addition, the project has experienced delays. Delivery of the first fully capable Cyclone, initially expected in 2005, was delayed to 2008 and is now expected to occur in 2012.

“We found that National Defence has been slow to assess the full life-cycle costs, and some elements of these costs have still not been completely determined. As early as 2000, information provided to National Defence’s Program Management Board for preliminary project approval described the proposed acquisition project as non-developmental… [but] The project specifications included nearly 3,000 technical requirements. The winning bid by Sikorsky was to convert an existing commercial helicopter (the S-92) to military service, adapt it for marine use, and integrate numerous individual existing mission components and new technologies. According to National Defence officials, this will result in a state-of-the-art helicopter that has never existed before. The initial acquisition contract reflects this complexity in that it included $612 million for one-time engineering costs… The developmental nature of the Cyclone helicopter, along with its novel features, also has implications for certifying its airworthiness.

“…the full life-cycle costs were not–and some still have not been–presented to decision makers at key decision points… Moreover, without sufficient funds, National Defence may have to curtail planned training and operations… On the basis of the bid received from Sikorsky, $2.3 billion in estimated costs for contracted in-service support for 16 years (based on flying 10,000 hours annually) was presented for effective project approval in 2004. By this time, National Defence realized that personnel, operations, and maintenance costs would exceed those associated with the Sea King by $1.1 billion over 20 years. This is significant because National Defence did not seek additional funding for the in-service support provisions, so these incremental costs will need to be covered by its existing operations and maintenance budget… National Defence initially assumed that, despite known deficiencies, the hangars and other facilities used for the Sea King helicopters could be used for the new helicopters… In 2005, however, National Defence determined that there was a need for significant investment in new infrastructure. It has since initiated approximately $340 million in projects for maintenance, spare parts warehousing, training, and squadron facilities… There was also a need to extend the life of the Sea King helicopters longer than originally anticipated… An option to extend the period was exercised in November 2007 for an additional $168 million to cover the period up to 2014. The extension coincided with the notification that the delivery of the Cyclone helicopters would be delayed.”

See: Canadian OAG Release re: military helicopters | Media Statement | Full report || Parliamentary Hansard transcript re: defense questions | Canadian Press | CBC | Global News timeline | National Post | National Post op-ed | Toronto Sun | Vancouver Sun || Agence France Presse | China’s Xinhua || Defense News.

Key Report: Canada’s OAG

July 26/10: New deal. Canada’s Department of National Defence clarifies the new arrangements with Sikorsky, and the state of the program.

The first 4 phases of Ship/Helicopter Operating Limitations (SHOL) trials (vid. April 19/10 entry) successfully tested and validated the design of hangar and flight deck modifications aboard Canadian ships, maintenance support, developed standard operating procedures for ship and flight crew personnel, and defined safe flight parameters. Subsequent SHOL trials will be conducted in extreme weather conditions to define those parameters.

Mission software development has become an issue for the program, and Sikorsky’s inability to meet contract requirements forced a contract amendment, so the Navy could take delivery of interim CH-148s with partially-functional mission systems.

The interim helicopters will not be deployed on operations, Instead, they’ll be used for initial cadre training of aircrew and maintenance personnel, and initial operational testing and evaluation (IOT&E) to develop procedures for the Cyclone’s flight and operations, and to develop support systems like supply chains for spare parts, and maintenance processes and procedures. Once delivery of the fully compliant CH-148s begins in 2012, the interim helicopters will be retrofitted and returned by December 2013.

June 30/10: The Canadian government and Sikorsky sign an agreement to amend their CH-148 contract. In return for changes to acceptance criteria for the initial helicopter set, to the overall delivery schedule, and to milestone payments and liquidated damages provisions, Sikorsky will:

  • Withdraw an existing arbitration claim against the government;
  • Invest another C$ 80 million in contracts/ R&D work with Canadian firms;
  • Offer payments for any future MH-92 maritime helicopter sales that could amount to more than US$ 30 million;
  • Charge reduced interim helicopter in-service support rates until acceptance of the fully compliant helicopters in June 2012.

Liquidated damages requirements will now be triggered only by failure to deliver interim helicopters starting in November 2010, and for failure to deliver the fully compliant helicopters beginning in June 2012. The C$ 3.2 billion 20-year in-service support contract will run until March 2028. Source.

2nd contract amendment

Shearwater arrival
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June 8/10: From late to later. Sikorsky will deliver its CH-148s to the Canadian Armed Forces late, even by the revised schedule. Borrowing a leaf from the NH90 NFH’s playbook, Sikorsky will begin delivering only “interim helicopters” for testing and training by the renegotiated date of November 2010. Then, instead of delivering at a rate of one per month, Sikorsky will deliver only 6 helicopters by June 2012.

The remaining 22 helicopters will be fully operational versions, including upgraded engines. They are promised as of June 2012, and as they arrive, the initial 6 helicopters will be pulled back for engine retrofits and any other required modifications. Recall that the original contract’s initial delivery date for the CH-148 was November 2008. Halifax Chronicle-Herald | CTV.

June 7/10: German exports? Canada may not wind up alone. Germany is the NH90 TTH’s biggest customer, but the helicopters have had problems, and it has delayed any NH90 NFH anti-submarine helicopter buy. Now Sikorsky is looking to pursue a 30-helicopter bid to replace Germany’s H-3 Sea Kings with their MH-92 Cyclone instead of Eurocopter’s NH90 NFH. They also want to compete with the H-92 for an 8-19 helicopter Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) opportunity to replace German UH-1Ds. A German decision is expected in late 2010, if proposed budget cuts don’t derail the programs.

At the ILA 2010 airshow in Berlin, Sikorsky signed a Memorandum of Understanding “to explore opportunities” in aftermarket support involves their long-standing partner ZF Luftfahrttechnik GmbH (ZF Aviation Technology), while the other involves Switzerland’s RUAG, and will explore “Maintenance and Repair Operation as well as integrated logistics support and completion capabilities.” Rheinmetall and MTU are also reputed to be involved in discussions.

The H-92 might be operational in a maritime role before the NH90 NFH, and the firm has some H-92 CSAR design experience from its participation in the aborted American CSAR-X competition. Their bid remains something of a long shot, but Sikorsky representatives are quoted as saying that the partnerships and experience will stand them in good stead to bid the future CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter for the Franco-German HTH program. Sikorsky has reportedly secured American export approval for the Cyclone, and would conduct final assembly in Germany. Aviation Week | Flight International | Shephard Group.

April 16/10: Testing. The CH-148s have begun SHOL (Ship Helicopter Operational Limitations) testing off of Nova Scotia. Testing started shortly after the test helicopter arrived in Feb 19/10 and is taking place in 4 phases:

Phase 1 tests confirmed that the prototype aircraft’s flight test instrumentation systems could operate in close proximity to the electromagnetic emitters of the ship.

Phase 2 evaluated how the test helicopter and the Canadian Recovery, Assist, Securing and Traversing (C-RAST) work together. The C-RAST moves the helicopter in and out of the hanger, and locks the helicopter in place on the ship so it doesn’t slide off.

The 3rd phase was completed earlier in April and involved take-offs, departures, landings and utility evolutions conducted during the day, in order to establish the standard operating procedures for the aircraft.

The 4th and final phase is expected to be complete by the end of April. These tests will be conducted at sea in the North Atlantic under increasingly challenging weather conditions and sea states, in order to determine a safe envelope for the helicopter to operate from the Halifax class ship with medium winds and deck motions. Further testing is planned later in the program to test the full capabilities of the aircraft at high winds and high deck motions.

Feb 19/10: Testing arrival. Sikorsky’s prototype CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopter arrives at CFB Shearwater, Nova Scotia, for several weeks of “ship helicopter operational limits” trials with the Halifax-class frigate HMCS Montreal. “Aircraft 801” reportedly first flew in November 2008. Canadian Navy | Aviation Week Ares.

2009

Pattern of government dishonesty begins to surface; Civil S-92 crash off Newfoundland has implication for CH-148. CH-148 first flight
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Nov 8/09: The Ottawa Citizen’s David Pugliese reports on the CH-148’s slow progress. While the first helicopter is scheduled to arrive at CFB Shearwater in December 2009, actual sea trials aren’t scheduled until February 2010 or later, and even when those are done, other steps are required before Canadian pilot training can begin:

“…sources say while the first helicopter is expected to arrive in early December from Sikorsky, it is not being actually accepted by the Canadian Forces… The first Cyclone (MH02) has just finished being painted at West Palm Beach in Canadian Forces colors… The sea trials should have been completed almost 20 months ago according to the delivery schedule contracted with Sikorsky in 2004.

Successful completion of the sea trials, followed by development and approval of the ship-helicopter operating limitations (SHOL) for the new helicopter, which will require several months at least, are a MHP contractual obligation that must be met long before Canada accepts delivery of the first aircraft and can begin training its own pilots on the Cyclone…”

Cougar Helis S-92
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March 11/09: S-92 accident. An S-92 operated by Cougar Helicopters goes down in the sea off of Newfoundland, Canada with 18 people aboard, while ferrying workers to one of the offshore oil rigs. In the end, only 1 of the 18 passengers survives. Standard procedures give all passengers immersion suits, but winds were running between 25-35 knots, with a 3m/ 9-10 foot swell, and water temperatures near freezing.

The problem ends up involving shearing in some of the helicopter’s titanium studs, which caused the loss of all oil. The helicopter crashed about 10 minutes after that, which calls the 30-minute “run dry” requirement into serious question. The Globe and Mail | See also CBC and Flight International report & photos re: later Canadian TSB findings.

Feb 20/09: The Ottawa Citizen’s David Pugliese continues to investigate the specifics behind the December 2008 announcement of a contract settlement with Sikorsky. In “New Engnes for the Troubled Cyclone Helicopter?” he quotes Canada’s DND:

“Sikorsky is making a number of improvements to the current design of the helicopter to meet the performance requirements specified in the current contract. An improvement being made that was not in the original contract will provide the helicopter with growth potential for the engine and main transmission.”

Pugliese points out that this is a problem, for 2 reasons:

“The weight growth requirement was actually stated in the MH Statement of Operational Requirement (SOR) and was initially included in the RFP Requirements Specification but was later removed at Sikorky’s request… [however,] In order to use a [Lowest Cost Compliant ] selection methodology, PWGSC and DND both had to assure the Auditor General in 2003 that the MH performance and equipment requirements (as stated in the RFP) would be finite and that no extra funds would ever have to be allocated for additional capability over the entire life of the aircraft, otherwise a Best Value selection methodology whereby additional capability could be acquired at minimal additional cost was mandated.”

DND responses add that they are also looking at technological improvements that will become available as a spin-off from Sikorsky’s R&D. They include “an enhanced rotor blade design, larger tail rotor and a new 5-bladed rotor hub”, which could add another 500-600 pounds of payload capacity. Aerospace analysts contacted by Pugliese respond that:

“The new rotor design that the response refers to is the one being considered for Sikorsky’s bid for the USAF’s CSAR helicopter. It involves very significant structural changes to the aircraft including a substantial increase in the aircraft’s overall length both with rotors turning and when folded which would raise major issues for ship compatibility. Since DND and PWGSC are inexplicably avoiding the engine question, we suggest you dig further.”

Winter 2009: SNAFU. Plain Talk: The Process of (Not) Acquiring Maritime Helicopters [PDF format] is published in the Canadian Naval Review by Jane’s Canadian correspondent Sharon Hobson. Hobson reports that Sikorsky was exempted from key performance requirements during the bidding phase, unlike its competitors NIH Industries (NH90) and Lockheed Martin/ AgustaWestland (EH101). Additionally:

“…In order to speed things up during the bidding process, the project office only required that the bidders provide proof of compliance for 475 [mandatory technical requirements]. The bidders were allowed merely to state that they would comply with the other 1,000. When things started to go wrong – and they started to go wrong fairly quickly – the project office went into crisis management mode.

When I interviewed the project manager in February 2006, he told me that the preliminary design review (PDR) had been completed in January, and that the critical design review (CDR) would be completed by the first week of June. However, in September 2006, the same official conceded to another reporter that the PDR was not yet complete. The project office does not appear to have given a media interview since then. Moreover, it turns out that because Sikorsky was unable to complete fully each milestone within the PDR and CDR, the project office subdivided the milestones so that the payments would continue to flow…

2007 – 2008

Reports of impossible schedule prove true – contract renegotiated; RWR & ESM picked. Canadian Parliament
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Dec 23/08: Contract failure, change. Canada’s government announces that they have renegotiated the contract with Sikorsky. DND will now begin receiving helicopters by November 2010, allowing necessary operational testing and training to begin prior to the delivery of mission-ready helicopters beginning in 2012, and all helicopters by 2013.

The effect of these changes is to delay operational use of the helicopters for 2 years. The original contract had penalty clauses for late delivery, but those clauses appear to have been waived in exchange for these contract amendments. The government release also took pains to state that it “…has determined that the delays experienced were largely outside the control of the Contractor.”

Most of the contract modifications appear to concern “upgrades.” These have not been specified, except to say that they have an estimated value of $77 million for the 28 helicopters, and $40 million for the 20 years of In-Service Support contract, based on the Canada/ US currency exchange rate of December 2008. The release adds that contract amendments will be funded from within the original project budget. Canadian government announcement | CBC report.

Contract renegotiated

Nov 20/08: Dev flight. A CH-148 Cyclone makes its first flight at the Sikorsky Flight Development Center in Florida. Source.

1st flight

Nov 5/08: The Ottawa Citizen’s defense reporter David Pugliese publishes some comments from his sources, suggesting the program’s schedule was never realistic, that further delays to 2012 or even 2014 are possible, and that vague statements from Sikorsky and Canada’s DND are omitting important pieces of information. One key excerpt:

“Your blog notes that Sikorsky is now claiming the first article will fly “before the end of the year”. Rumors in the industry suggest that any such flight will be without the mission system, which is still not in formal lab testing. Compare this to Sikorsky’s original (public) promise to fly a fully equipped first article by September 2007.”

January 2008: Sikorsky formally advises the Canadian government of delays in the original schedule.

April 18/07: RWR/ESM. Lockheed Martin announces a $59.4 million U.S. Navy Foreign Military Sales contract to provide the helicopters with Radar Warning Receiver (RWR)/Electronic Support Measure (ESM) systems derived from its AN/ALQ-210 system, which will also be deployed on the US Navy’s new MH-60R multi-mission naval helicopters.

The ALQ-210 passively detects, identifies and geo-locates hostile radar transmitters. The systems provided to Canada’s Department of National Defence will also feature new functionality designed to meet specific Canadian Forces requirements. Honorary Col. Rick Mercer of 423 Maritime Helicopter Sqn will be relieved, we’re sure.

Jan 23/07: Strike! The Globe and Mail reports that CH-148 delivery will be at least 5 1/2 weeks late because of a strike at Sikorsky’s factory. Canada’s federal government deems the delay to be reasonable, and they are reportedly foregoing the late penalty provisions in the contract. Those terms could allow Canada to charge up to $100,000 a day for late delivery, to a maximum of $36 million.

2004 – 2006

Contract for 28; Radar & surveillance turret picked. CH-148 concept
(click to view full)

Dec 6/05: Sikorsky Aircraft opens the company’s new MH-92 helicopter fly-by-wire system integration lab with a ribbon cutting ceremony in Stratford, CT. The new lab will develop, integrate and test the fly-by-wire and avionic systems for the MH-92, and the CH-148 Cyclone will be the system’s inaugural customer.

BAE Systems will be Sikorsky’s team-mate on this sub-project, which is expected to lead to companion fly-by-wire integration labs for Sikorsky’s H-60, CH-53K, and X2 aircraft.

Fly-by-wire differs from traditional helicopter flight control systems by replacing the mechanical linkages to the cockpit controllers with a redundant, purely electrical system that is more responsive, more survivable if hit, saves weight, and reduces maintenance costs. Europe’s competing NH90 already has fly-by-wire built in, so Sikorsky is playing catch-up in this area. Sikorsky release.

Fly-by-wire lab open

June 14/05: FLIR. FLIR Systems, Inc. announces a “competitively awarded” subcontract from General Dynamics Canada of Ottawa, Ontario, for its popular Star SAFIRE III airborne multi-sensor imaging systems with multi-year in-service support. The total subcontract value, including potential option awards, is in excess of $20 million (USD). Deliveries will commence within 9 months of contract award, and continue until 2009.

FLIR’s Star SAFIRE III is used on a wide variety of systems, and has options to include laser rangefinding and targeting features.

June 5/05: Radar. Griffon Corp. subsidiary Telephonics announces a subcontract award from General Dynamics Canada. They will supply 31 ship sets of their APS-143Bv3 multi-mode imaging Maritime Surveillance Radar, fully integrated with their Mark XIIA Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) interrogator sub-system hardware. The contract also contains options for initial spares and 20 years of in-service support for the Canadian Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP), and could exceed $50 million in value if all options are exercised.

The internal, fully integrated Mark XIIA IFF interrogator has been designed to be compatible with the IFF interrogators being supplied for the US Navy’s MH-60R LAMPS helicopter, the Canadian CP-140 Aurora upgrade program, and the US and International Air Force’s AWACS platforms.

This program will be managed from Telephonics’ facilities in Farmingdale, NY, with a portion of the work being performed in Canada as defined in the Industrial Regional Benefit plan included in Telephonics proposal. The first test aircraft system is scheduled for delivery in July 2007.

April 21/05: Infrastructure. L-3 Communications MAS launches the construction of a new $45-million Maritime Helicopter Training Centre for the Canadian Forces in Shearwater, Nova Scotia. L-3 MAS has lead responsibility for the Cyclone’s in-service support, which includes provision of the training facility and training.

The actual construction is subcontracted to PCL Constructors Canada Inc., and the center is expected to be operational in April 2008. It is expected that over 160 new jobs will be created directly and indirectly during construction of the 3-storey facility, which will be LEED(Leadership in Energy and Environment Design) Silver Certificate certified. The building will include flight and mission simulators, and serve as the home for 406 Squadron. Sikorsky release.

April 12/05: Project office open. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. and Canadian government officials today formally inaugurate a new Canadian Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP) office located here in the company’s main manufacturing facility in Stratford, CT.

The newly renovated 25,000 square-foot space includes a 5,000 square-foot secure area to accommodate a detachment of 17 Canadian government employees overseeing the project. The remainder of the space houses Sikorsky Aircraft, General Dynamics Canada and L-3 MAS Canada personnel assigned to the MHP. Sikorsky release.

Project office

Nov 23/04: Deal signed. The Government of Canada signed contracts with Sikorsky International Operations Inc. for the Maritime Helicopter Project, to provide 28 helicopters (C$ 1.8 billion), as well as 20 years of in-service support and a training facility (C$ 3.2 billion), including construction of a training facility and a simulation and training suite.

Sikorsky had joined with L-3 MAS (in-service support) and General Dynamics Canada (systems integration) to form The Maritime Helicopter Team. CBC report.

28 CH-148s

Additional Readings

Background: Helicopters

Background and Views

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

CVN 70 Carl Vinson’s Mid-Life RCOH Refueling & Maintenance

Defense Industry Daily - Mon, 07/11/2016 - 00:55
CVN 70: Homecoming
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Osama Bin Shot, Osama Bin Buried. (May 3/11)

In November 2005, Northrop Grumman Newport News in Newport News, VA was awarded a $1.94 billion cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for accomplishment of the FY 2006 mid-life refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH) of the Nimitz Class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson [CVN 70]. The ship was commissioned in 1982, and this effort shall provide for the accomplishment of the overhaul, alterations, repair, maintenance, and refueling of CVN 70 and its nuclear reactor plants to ensure continued safe operation of the ship. According to GlobalSecurity.org, the Carl Vinson is scheduled to remain in service until 2032.

It’s interesting to note that the US DoD comptroller’s FY 2007 “Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System” document lists split-funding of the CVN 70 RCOH over FY 2006-2007, with a total cost of $2.89 billion. So, how does this $1 billion discrepancy resolve itself? What about all those contracts before FY 2006? And how did the program go, now that the USS Carl Vinson has returned to the fleet at last?

The RCOH and the Damage Done CVN 70 with destroyer
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During an American Nimitz Class carrier’s 50 year life span, it has 4 Drydocking Planned Incremental Availabilities and 12 Planned incremental availabilities. It has only one Refueling and Complex OverHaul, however, which is the most significant overhaul the ship receives during its 50-year life span. After nearly 25 years of service, the USA’s current nuclear aircraft carriers must undergo a 3-year maintenance period to refuel their nuclear reactors, upgrade and modernize combat and communication systems, and overhaul the ship’s hull, mechanical and electrical systems.

NAVSEA’s official cost figure for the CVN 70’s entire RCOH is $3.1 billion. As of April 2007, they told DID that the program was on budget, and releases marking the ship’s re-delivery make the same claim for the now-complete program.

In addition to the years of advance procurement, advance planning, and then installation work conducted by Northrop Grumman and the government, the other billion dollars or so is used for the development, procurement and installation of Government Furnished Equipment and Government Furnished Information. Examples of major systems that will be developed or procured for the USS Carl Vinson include new communications systems, new navigation systems, radar replacements or refurbishments, new ship self defense missile systems, new oxygen and nitrogen generating systems, modifications to air conditioning plants, new catapult control systems, new environment oil pollution control system and upgrades to aviation landing and recovery systems.

Note, also, that the cost of the replacement nuclear power units is not covered under the Newport News contracts. The power units used to refuel a CVN during RCOH cost about $510 million in FY 2007 dollars.

Hence $1.94 billion in contracts to Northrop Grumman’s Newport News, within a $2.89 billion split-year appropriation over FY 2006-2007, and other contracts as well to bring it to $3.1 billion overall.

The new CVN-21 Gerald R. Ford Class will have a redesigned nuclear power plant that’s expected to make use of advances from the USA’s Seawolf and Virginia Class submarine reactors, in order to eliminate expensive reactor refueling entirely. It will also have more modular, “open architecture” computer systems that will simplify modernization of the ship’s combat and communication systems. These changes are expected to significantly lower RCOH time and costs for the new carrier class, and allow many electronics upgrades to take place in earlier phases.

USS Carl Vinson RCOH: Contracts & Key Events Seagoing again
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Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC.

November 7/16: Live-fire exercises have been conducted on the USS Carl Vinson in order to test its RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) and Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS). The nuclear-powered super carrier fired at two drones using the ship’s aft RAM launcher and fired the CIWS as part of a pre-aim calibration firing evolution during Carrier Strike Group 1’s Composite Training Unit Exercise. Crew on board said the CIWS PAC fire served a dual purpose, allowing Carl Vinson Sailors to perform a maintenance check as well as readying the mounts for a rogue drone situation.

May 2/11: Osama Bin Shot, Osama Bin Buried. Less than a day after a SEAL team raid into a fortified compound in Abbotabad, 40 miles from the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, the body of Osama Bin Laden is buried at sea, from the deck of the USS Carl Vinson. San Diego Examiner.

Dec 4/09: Northrop Grumman Corporation re-delivers USS Carl Vinson to the U.S. Navy, after the ship successfully completes sea trials, 2 days ahead of schedule. The redelivery follows the completion of modernization, maintenance, and guarantee work accomplished during the ship’s post shakedown availability (PSA) and selected restricted availability (SRA), 2 stages that generally follow the RCOH. Northrop Grumman release.

July 31/09: The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson [CVN 70] is returning to Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding in Newport News, VA for $50 million worth of post-RCOH maintenance work via a modification to a previously awarded contract (N62793-03-G-0001). Northrop Grumman expects to complete the work by December 2009, and $30.7 million in contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year on Sept 30/09. The Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair in Newport News, VA manages the contract. See also Northrop Grumman release.

July 11/09: USS Carl Vinson is re-delivered to the US Navy, and accepted back into active service, marking the formal completion of its $3.1 billion, 20+ million man-hour RCOH process. The ship is now working towards a flight deck re-certification.

USS Carl Vinson is the 3rd Nimitz-class aircraft carrier to complete RCOH at Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News. USS Theodore Roosevelt [CVN 71] will begin her RCOH later in summer 2009, advance Planning is currently underway for the USS Abraham Lincoln’s [CVN 72] RCOH. US Navy release | NGC release.

RCOH done

July 1/09: USS Carl Vinson completes initial sea trials, the last stage of the RCOH process. The carrier, which departed on June 28/09, returned to Naval Station Norfolk flying the traditional broom on its mast to signify a sweep of all trials.

The RCOH project was performed by the company’s Shipbuilding sector in Newport News, VA, and is projected to complete within budget. The ship is scheduled to be delivered to the U. S. Navy next week. NGC release.

Oct 28/08: Northrop Grumman announces a $2.1 million contract from U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). NGC’s Sperry Marine business unit will upgrade the steering control systems for USS Carl Vinson [CVN 70] – but not as part of the RCOH.

Sperry Marine will replace the steering units and helm control console on the bridge and install new electronics and software, during the ship’s first scheduled maintenance period following its RCOH. The contract also provides for engineering support and documentation.

Drydock to Pierside
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May 9/07: Northrop Grumman Corporation completes the dry dock portion of work for the USS Carl Vinson 5 days ahead of schedule. Tugboats moved the ship from dry dock to a new multi-level shipyard pier where it will undergo final outfitting and testing. This is approximately the half-way point of the RCOH.

Work accomplished while the ship was in dry dock includes removing, refurbishing and reinstalling the propellers, propeller shafts and rudders; painting the carrier’s massive hull and replacing thousands of valves, pumps, and piping components. Shipbuilders also removed the top two levels of the island and mast and replaced it with a reconfigured island structure and new mast to provide enhanced capability.

So, what work remains between now and redelivery to the Navy in 2009? Installation and testing of updated combat and electronic systems; overhaul and energization of electrical distribution systems; overhaul, repair, and testing of propulsion plant systems; habitability upgrades and modernization; crew move-aboard; and installation and testing of aircraft launch and recovery equipment. See Northrop Grumman Newport News release.

March 30/07: U.S. Congressman Duncan Hunter (R-CA), ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, issues a release re: the US Navy’s announcement that USS Carl Vinson will shift its home port to San Diego once it re-enters service. According to Rep. Hunter’s release, San Diego was selected on the basis of several factors, including existing infrastructure, family support facilities, and proximity to training areas. The carrier will join its fellows USS Nimitz [CVN 68] and USS Ronald Reagan [CVN 76].

Screwed.
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Jan 7/07: Workers finish installing Carl Vinson’s 4 new propellers (“screws”) at Northrop Grumman Newport News. The installation marks the achievement of a milestone in the work outside the ship’s hull, preparing her for undocking from the shipyard’s Drydock 11 to Pier 3 later in 2007. See US Navy release.

The screws are close to 21 feet in diameter and weigh about 65,000 pounds each. They are very similar in size, weight, and material to the propellers on previous ships of the Nimitz Class, but the blades are shaped differently to reduce wear and erosion. The propellers have been outfitted with a protective covering that will be removed later in the construction process. The new propellers are also planned for use on the future-generation CVN-21 Gerald R. Ford Class carriers, and were recently installed on the last Nimitz Class carrier George H. W. Bush [CVN 77].

Dec 29/06: AMSEC LLC in Virginia Beach, VA received a $10.2 million firm-fixed-price contract for program management, material procurement, and installation of shipboard equipment for the USS Carl Vinson [CVN 70]. This effort supports work performed under the previous contract for Phase I: Planning and developing processes, procedures, preliminary Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M), and timelines for the accomplishment of re-outfitting of Vinson. This effort also supports Phase II: Program Management, to include material/ equipment procurement from Phase I and final installation on board the ship.

Work will be performed in Newport News, VA and is expected to be complete by May 2009. This contract was not competitively procured by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair in Newport News, VA (N62793-07-C-A022).

Into Drydock
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Nov 29/05: Northrop Grumman Newport News in Newport News, VA is awarded a $1.94 billion cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for the FY 2006 mid-life refueling and complex overhaul of the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Work on Northrop Grumman’s portion of the RCOH effort will be performed in Newport News, VA and is expected to be complete by March 2009, as detailed further in this Northrop Grumman release. Funding is provided and work is authorized in accordance with Public Law 109-77 and Public Law 109-104. The contract was not competitively procured (N00024-06-C-2115).

Dec 13/04: Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. in Newport News, VA received a $215.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-01-C-2103) for FY 2005 advanced planning and material procurement for the Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) of the USS Carl Vinson [CVN 70]. Work will be performed in Newport News, VA (99%) and Puget Sound, WA (1%), and is expected to be complete by November 2005.

Feb 6/04: Northrup Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. in Newport News, VA received a $139.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee modification to previously awarded contract N00024-01-C-2103, for fiscal 2004 advanced planning and material procurement for the refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH) of the USS Carl Vinson [CVN 70]. Work will be performed in Newport News, VA (99%), and Puget Sound, WA (1%), and is expected to be complete by November 2004.

CVN 70: Turnaround
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Dec 11/02: Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. in Newport News, VA received a $143 million cost-plus-fixed-fee modification for FY 2003 advanced planning and material procurement for the refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH) of the USS Carl Vinson [CVN 70]. Work will be performed at Newport News, VA (97%) and Puget Sound, WA (3%), and is to be complete by November 2003. This contract was not competitively procured (N00024-01-C-2103).

March 29/02: Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. in Newport News, VA received a $42.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee modification to previously awarded contract N00024-01-C-2103, a May 15/01 cost-plus-fixed-fee $9.3 million contract for advanced planning and engineering services for “future aircraft carrier availabilities.”

Under this modification, they will perform advanced planning, design, documentation, engineering, procurement, ship checks, fabrication and preliminary shipyard work in order to prepare and make ready for alterations, repairs, maintenance and routine work on the USS Carl Vinson [CVN 70], and its reactors. Work will be performed in Newport News, VA (98%) and Puget Sound, WA (2%), and is to be complete by November 2002. This contract was not competitively procured.

Additional Readings and Sources

Many thanks to US NAVSEA for working with DID to clarify key figures.

Categories: Defence`s Feeds

Britain’s Future Frigates: Type 26 Global Combat Ships

Defense Industry Daily - Mon, 07/11/2016 - 00:52
Type 26 concept
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In the late 2000s Britain slated to replace its existing fleet of Type 22 Broadsword Class and Type 23 Duke Class frigates with 2 new ship classes under a program known then as “Future Surface Combatant” (FSC). By the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the FSC’s C1 (T26) and C2 (type 27) tentative variants were merged into a single Type 26 Global Combat Ship (GCS) class.

Outside attention often focuses on big-ticket ships like aircraft carriers, submarines, and advanced destroyers – but the frigate is the real backbone of most modern navies.

Lord Nelson loved his HMS Victory and her fellow first-rate ships of the line, but he asked the admiralty for more cruisers because he knew their versatile value as the “eyes of the fleet.” Modern multi-role frigates that can engage threats on the water, under water, and in the air fill that same role today, protecting other navy ships or undertaking independent action away from their task group.

The Type 26 GCS will have to fill that niche – but first, its requirements and design must be defined.

Britain’s Future Surface Combatants Type 23 frigate:
HMS Northumberland

Of Britain’s 30 frigates built – 14 Type 22s and 16 Type 23s – 17 (4 Type 22s, 13 Type 23s) still serve in the Royal Navy, and some of the Type 23s have received modern refits to keep them going a bit longer. All remain outclassed by more modern designs. Another 10 frigates of these types have been sold abroad to Brazil, Chile, and Romania, and 3 Type 22s have been deliberately scrapped or sunk. The 2010 SDSR decided that the rest of the Type 22s will join their fellows abroad, or in the scrapyard, leaving just the Type 23 Duke Class. Fortunately, the Type 23s have been doing a lot of sailing in less strenuous environments than the treacherous North Atlantic seas they were designed for. That has helped them to last longer, but no ship lasts forever, and replacements are needed.

Type 26, 2013
click for video

Key Type 26 design criteria include multi-role versatility, flexibility in adapting to future needs, affordability in both construction and through-life support costs, and exportability. In reality, these requirements represent a set of key trade-offs. Some can be complementary, such as cost and exportability. Other pairings usually come at each other’s expense, such as the desire for high-end multi-role capability within a small ship footprint, versus the desire to keep initial purchase costs low.

The current Assessment Phase was designed to make many of these trade-offs, and the program was timed so it can take the 2010 Strategic Defence Review into account. Initial reports indicate an imagined cost of about GBP 400 million per ship, but the Royal Navy is no better than the American Navy at shipbuilding cost estimates.

The first ships of the Type 26 class are due to enter service in the early 2020s, and Britain envisions at least 12-13 of them. The current Type 26 plan involves 5 basic frigates, and another 8 ships with additional anti-submarine warfare equipment.

By the 2030s, around half of front line Royal Navy personnel are expected to operate on Type 26 frigates.

Type 26: Design T26 concept, 2012
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At present, there is no full detail design, and hence no defined equipment set for the Type 26. BAE’s original working baseline reportedly involved a 141m, 6,850t ship, but reductions in target cost led them to publish figures of 148m but just 5,400t. The crew would be just 118, with room for 72 embarked troops.

The ship will use a CODOG (Combined Diesel Electric or Gas Turbine) propulsion system, with a 36MW MT30 turbine from design partner Rolls-Royce, unspecified MTU diesel generator sets, and a gear box via David Brown Gear Systems Ltd. GE will be the overall integrator for the diesel-electric system. Current plans state a top ship speed of 28+ knots, with 60 days endurance and a range of 7,000 miles/ 11,000 km) at normal steaming speed of 15 knots/ 28 kmh.

MK45 Mod 4

Armament will include a 127mm gun, where according to Jane’s BAE’s Mk 45 Mod 4 has an edge over Oto Melara for the Maritime Indirect Fire System requirement. The new MBDA/Thales CAMM (Common Anti-air Modular Missile) will replace the current Seawolf system for short range air defense. CAMM/FLAADS-M benefits from carrying an active radar seeker, reducing the need to rely on a ship’s own radar illumination for targeting during saturation attacks. The Ministry of Defence has also reiterated that the ship would have a mission bay for “unmanned air, surface and underwater vehicles, or additional boats.”

Little is certain beyond that. The big outstanding questions involve radars, the combat system, and secondary weapons.

T26 mission bay, 2012
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Radars. Based on the drawings of the May 2012 design, the long-range volume search radar atop the integrated mast would be a Type 997 Artisan system, which is also slated to equip Britain’s future carriers and upgraded Type 23 frigates. The drawings also show the compact antenna faceplates of an active array radar mounted around the integrated ship’s mast, however, similar to Australia’s CEAFAR/ CEAMOUNT solution. At the very top end, a dedicated air defense variant of the ship could use the SMART-L derived S1850M radar that equips British Type 45 destroyers.

VLS. The May 2012 design’s 48 illustrated vertical launch missile silos combine 24 larger Mk.41 or Sylver cells and 24 shorter cells. The VLS systems do come in different lengths, and the smaller cells would probably be slated for the short-range CAMM air defense missile. By October 2014 it appeared Mk.41 was the UK’s choice.

Combat system. The use of CAMM means that at least some aspects of the PAAMS combat system will find their way onto the ship, but that area is still very unclear. What is clear, is that the ships will lack America’s Cooperative Engagement Capability, which allows participating ships to see, track, and even fire on targets illuminated by any other CEC-equipped ship or plane. CEC makes a big difference to roles like wide-area air defense, and to ship’s potential for use in anti-ballistic missile networks. Its presence would have pushed the Type 26 toward a positioning as a high end frigate, especially in conjunction with a very long-range radar like the S1850M. Instead, the Type 26 looks set to become a versatile mid-budget “value play” within the global export market.

Secondary Weapons. The displayed layout shows a last-ditch CIWS gatling gun, and its positioning would allow Thales’ through-deck 30mm Goalkeeper. On the other hand, Britain has now used Raytheon’s smaller, bolt-on 20mm Phalanx system on its Type 45 destroyers, so either choice would just expand existing buys. The Goalkeeper has more stopping power, but the Admiralty could decide that Phalanx’s expandability makes it the more desirable option. The ability to convert a MK15 Phalanx mount into an 11-missile “MK15, MOD31” SeaRAM launcher, or some kind of future “laser Phalanx,” is something Goalkeeper doesn’t have.

Helicopters. Merlin helos will provide maritime force protection and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, while AW159 Lynx Wildcats HMAs (Helicopter Maritime Attack) will play a variety of attack and utility roles. The Wildcats will share Stingray torpedoes and Mk11 depth charges with the Merlins, and they will also sport Martlet (light) and Sea Venom (heavy) missiles.

Industrial Team

BAE Systems has made 10 selections so far, and expects another 19-20 agreements in 2014, before the production contract is signed. Official selections so far include:

Targeting Exports F124 fires SM-2
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Britain intends to develop its frigates with an eye to export orders, in hopes of to spreading development costs over more vessels, getting more benefit from the manufacturing learning curve, reducing costs per ship thanks to volume orders, and sustaining the UK’s naval shipbuilding industry.

Rumored design options for export customers include a choice of gas turbine engines for maximum speed, or a slower but more efficient all-diesel design; as well as optional ship equipment fit-outs focused on either anti-submarine warfare (ASW) or air defense.

So far, countries that have been reported as expressing some level of interest have included Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Turkey.

DSEi report

Talks do not a deal make, however, and Britain will have a formidable set of established competitors to contend with.

While the Americans have more or less abandoned this field, the Franco-Italian FREMM program offers a fully modern design, using the same MBDA PAAMS air defense missiles and DCNS SYLVER vertical launch systems as Britain’s Type 45 air-defense destroyers. Meanwhile, variants of France’s Lafayette Class stealth frigate design remain popular around the world.

The German-Dutch F124 air defense frigates offer stealth and advanced air defense via active array radars, while using the ubiquitous American Mk.41 vertical launch system for their missiles. Lower down the scale, ThyssenKrupp Marine’s globally popular MEKO Class family of ships provides a budget alternative. So does Damen Schelde’s modular Sigma Class, which can be built as anything from an Offshore Patrol Vessel to a full-size frigate.

Beyond the standard competitors, and countries like Russia with their own separate set of naval clients, China has recently begun exporting frigates in Asia. They will soon be joined by South Korea’s very capable naval shipbuilding industry, which has demonstrated success in fielding modern domestic warships, and has a very strong commercial shipbuilding base to draw from.

Contracts & Key Events 2015 – 2016

Long-lead production contracts; first ship timetabled late 2016.

November 7/16: MBDA has been awarded a $125 million Demonstration and Manufacture contract by the British MoD for the Sea Ceptor air defense system for the Type 26 (T26) Global Combat Ship (GCS). The company said the deal will last for 10 years and involves support to the T26 design as well as the manufacture of the electronics equipment required for the class of eight ships. News of the deal comes following the announcement by BAE Systems that the first steel for the frigate will be cut in Glasgow next summer.

March 23/16: BAE Systems and the UK government have signed a contract extending the company’s development of a new class of Type 26 anti-submarine frigate. The $670 million deal will run from this April for 15 months, and follows a previous 12 month extension of demonstration phase which comes to an end next month. Work will now be carried out to further maturing the frigates design, and manufacturing of equipment for the first three of eight ships scheduled to be built by BAE. However, neither BAE or the MoD commented on whether a full scale production will follow the end of the latest contract.

March 9/16: BAE Systems and the UK MoD are currently in discussions to agree on to the next tranche of work, and establish a revised production schedule that could delay the start of building a fleet of new anti-submarine warfare/general purpose frigates. An initial contract under the Type 26 program was to build 13 of the vessels, however this was cut to eight last November by the Conservative government. To fill the capability gap, the Type 31 program looks to build five cheaper, smaller general purpose frigates. The current discussions aim to decide on how these programs will go forward with a revised schedule expected for the early fall.

August 7/15: The Royal Navy’s future frigate program, the Type 26 Global Combat Ship has received a boost with the announcement of a number of long-lead production contracts totaling $265 million. The subcontracts were placed with principal suppliers for the delivery of key system components. Prime contractor BAE Systems is executing a $1.3 billion, one-year demonstration contract awarded in February, with negotiations on the production and delivery schedule of the thirteen Type 26 ships planned still underway. Manufacture of the first ship is provisionally timetabled to begin in late 2016, with the first ships in class thought to be scheduled to enter Royal Navy service in the early 2020s. Other states have reportedly taken an interest in the Type 26, including Australia, Canada and Germany.

2013 – 2014

Design changes; Export prospects; Sub-contractors picked; CAMM-M Sea Ceptor missile confirmed.

Dec 1/14: Industrial. In the run-up to the September referendum on Scottish independence, then defence secretary Philip Hammond had made clear that UK naval ships were made in the Union, meaning that an independent Scotland couldn’t build future ships such as T26 frigates. Now that the Scots have voted to remain within the UK, Michael Fallon defence secretary confirms that Type 26 frigates will be built on the Clyde.

Fallon hopes to announce long lead contracts in early 2015. That would assuage for good Scottish voters who were distressed by statements made last month by the head of the Royal Navy who implied that a foreign procurement may be in the cards. BAE is improving infrastructure at the Scotstoun yard as well as recruiting more than 200 people there and at Govan. An OPV contract awarded in August was a first step to secure future work for these yards.

Sources: E&T: Frigates to be built on Clyde, Fallon confirms | The Herald: Boost for Clyde yards as BAE to take on 165 apprentices | The Telegraph: MoD announces new £348m shipbuilding contract for Clyde [OPVs].

Nov 9-13/14: Negotiations. A Defense News interview with First Sea Lord Adm. George Zambellas creates a bit of a firestorm, and underscores the difficult state of negotiations for the planned 13-ship contract. Which means approval could be delayed until at least mid-2015, making it hard to begin cutting steel in 2016. Adm. Zambellas stirred up a lot of passion in Scotland when he seemed to say that Britain may turn away from the Type 26 altogether, right after a referendum that dangled the shipbuilding contract as a major reason for a “no” vote on independence:

“The acquisition process looks for a solution …. to be able to give us what we need. The affordability question that comes from that depends on the best that industry can deliver. You’ll notice, I haven’t necessarily said that that’s the British industry, because the decision has not been made as to exactly what that solution to the requirement will be, and we wait to see what comes of it… But the Navy knows what it wants. It wants a credible platform with global reach and the sort of quality, particularly in anti-submarine warfare to keep us right up there.”

Key problems seem to revolve around the Type 26’s cost, and are made more difficult by reports that Type 26 ship size is creeping up to 6,500t / 8,000t full displacement. If true, that’s destroyer size, which would makes a per-ship cost target under GBP 400 million (about $650 million) almost impossible to achieve. Meanwhile, McKinsey’s consultants have been brought in to undertake a GBP 1.9 million program cost review.

The 6,000t Franco-Italian FREMM is mentioned by outside observers as the most obvious alternative, given its combat system and VLS compatibility with the Type 45s. On the other hand, even if Britain moved past its policy of only building warships in the UK, the French Senate’s 2013 report pegged per-ship program cost at EUR 605 / GBP 480 million. GBP 6.24 billion for 13 is far beyond Britain’s budget, and even paying less than the French paid for development is unlikely to bridge a gap near GBP 2.25 billion. Sources: Defense News, “Britain Struggles With Costs for New Frigates” | The Scotsman, “MoD considers pulling [GBP] 4bn Clyde frigate contract”.

Oct 27/14: Sub-contractors. The Type 26 will use CODOG hybrid propulsion of an MT30 gas turbine for sprinting, and diesel-electric systems for patrolling and cruising at lower speeds. General Electric is responsible for the diesel-electric propulsion system (q.v. June 3/14), and they have deployed a team of noise and vibration specialists using 3-D software to model its acoustic dynamics.

The goal for any sub-hunting frigate is to create a system that is somehow shock-proof, compact, and extremely quiet. It isn’t easy, but it’s one of those underrated characteristics that makes as much difference to the ship’s long-term performance as any carried weapon. Sources: Manufacturing.NET, “A Warship So Quiet, It Sneaks Up On Submarines”.

Oct 9/14: components. Defence Secretary Michael Fallon writes in answer to a question from the House of Commons that T26 GCS will use Mk41 as its vertical launch system, which has the benefit of accommodating a large number of missiles. Another tidbit is that the light LMM to be used by the Royal Navy on Wildcat helicopters will be dubbed Martlet. Source: MoD/House of Commons [PDF].

Aug 18/14: The Royal Navy is looking to acquire 13 Type 26 frigates in all, at an estimated cost of about GBP 4 billion (US $6.6 billion). The initial order is expected to involve 8 ships as a “phased commitment,” but one must wonder if a cash-strapped government will really be able to order the rest.

The main investment decision is supposed take place around the end of 2014, and BAE is very focused on getting a contract in place before the May 2015 elections. Meanwhile, a potential “yes” vote in the September 2014 referendum on Scottish independence threatens to derail the contract entirely. Sources: Defense News, “New UK Frigate Proposals Coming Together”.

June 24/14: Sub-contractors. Imtech Marine announces that a contract from BAE Systems will supply the frigates’ complete low-voltage electrical distribution systems, and a climate control system that includes protection against chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear threats (CBRN).

Imtech Marine’s HVAC specialised division Schiffbau-/Dockbautechnik will design, manufacture, install and test the HVAC system. For naval applications Imtech Marine has developed a standard switchboard IMAS design, which is capable of adaptation with respect to voltages of 440V/690V, current ratings up to 4000A/5000A, head height restrictions, maintenance access, internal partitioning/separation, tolerance to flooding, arc flash detection, tolerance to shock and vibration, EMI & EMC tolerance and emissions, CO2 injection ports and top and bottom cable entry. Britain’s Bay Class LSDs use it, and so will the new Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers. Sources: Imtech Marine, “Imtech Marine selected by BAE Systems to provide key systems for the Type 26 Global Combat Ship Programme”.

CAMM-M launch
(click to view full)

June 6/14: Australia. Australia’s new Liberal government announces funding for initial studies around their 8-ship SEA 5000 future frigate program. The initial commitment is A$ 78.2 million, for design & engineering studies around installation of the CEAFAR/ CEAMOUNT radar faces and associated electrical & cooling systems, Saab’s 9LV combat system, and the RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow [ESSM] – to be mounted on the same Navantia 7,000t hull used for the Hobart Class air defense destroyer.

That’s a very big ASW frigate, and that size introduces extra costs. If that remains the chosen approach, the Type 26 will be out of the running, but Australia has to be able to afford these choices. On which point, the Liberal Party government is also making serious threats about buying their ASW frigates abroad if ASC can’t improve its productivity, which the Minister says stands at 150 man-hours per tonne instead of the global benchmark of 60.

That leaves an opening, but the decisions here also introduce technical complications to a Type 26 bid. The CEAFAR/ CEAMOUNT active-array radar faces are very different from the rotating Type 997 Artisan that’s currently planned for the Type 26, and would require significant changes to the existing mast and superstructure. The 9LV is a very popular global combat system, and that might make it a good choice if Britain wants to export Type 26s, but it would add extra costs to integrate Britain’s chosen CAMM-M Sea Ceptor air defense missile. Likewise, Australia’s insistence on the RIM-162 ESSM requires the American Mk.41 vertical launch system, not the French SYLVER A50 on board the Type 45s. Adopting those would also be good for export prospects, but now the Type 26s can’t share the Type 45’s Aster-15 missile as a long-range air defense option. Each of these incompatibilities creates extra costs for someone. Read “Australia’s Future ASW Frigates: Warfare Down Under” for full coverage.

June 3/14: Sub-contractors. BAE Systems announces a 2nd set of sub-contractor awards for the Type 26 program (q.v. Sept 11/13 for the 1st set). The new members include:

  • Babcock for the ship’s Air Weapons Handling System. they also do this for submarines.
  • DCNS for work on the vessel’s propulsion shaftlines
  • GE Energy Power Conversion for the Electric Propulsion Motor and Drive System
  • Imtech for the Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System, and the Low Voltage Electrical equipment
  • Raytheon to develop the Integrated Navigation and Bridge Systems
  • Tyco Fire & Integrated Solutions for the ship’s Fixed Firefighting Systems

BAE is expecting a manufacturing contract by the end of 2014, so they expect to sign on about 25 suppliers this year. Sources: BAE, “Type 26 Programme Welcomes New Suppliers On Board”.

Feb 7/14: Industrial. BAE’s preferred plan for the Type 26 project involves closing the Govan shipyard on the Clyde river once carrier and OPV construction ends in 2018, and investing about GBP 200 million to upgrade the Scotstoun yard in Glasgow as the sole GCS build facility. After comparing processes with 34 leading shipyards around the world, they’ve come to the conclusion that they need to be building by module, indoors, while using a number of techniques and technologies.

BAE Systems director of business and transformation Charlie Blakemore argues that Scotstoun requires more up-front work, but leaves the company with a more advanced facility that would allow speed production by 33%, and lower costs compared to a 2-shipyard build. The GBP 200 million investment’s centerpiece would be a 360 yard-long new dock hall capable of building 2 ships at once indoors. The investment would also create steelwork preparation & fabrication facilities, a paint cell, supporting offices and employee welfare facilities, and a quay. Construction would take place from 2015-2017.

In addition to lowering Type 26 costs, Blakemore also believes that the Scoutson plan would leave BAE in a better position to compete with modernized foreign shipyards for exports.

Plan B would invest GBP 100 million across both, and split shipbuilding between them, building partly in the open and moving completed sections between them by barge. Either plan uses the same number of workers, so the union is cautiously leaning toward the Scoutson plan. As GMB union steward John Dolanm reportedly put it: “If we stand still, we will fail in five years”. Sources: Herald Scotland, “Revealed: the £200m plan for a frigate factory on the Clyde” | BBC, “Govan shipyard likely to close in BAE revamp of Clyde facilities” | UPI, “BAE Systems seeks public comment on shipyard plans”.

Nov 6/13: Sea Change. BAE and the UK government agree on a big restructuring of military shipbuilding. The new agreement will replace the Terms of Business Agreement (ToBA) that restructured the sector (q.v. May 20/08, Oct 29/09), as a condition of the carrier contracts. This is just an agreement in principle, so far, but its outlines include changes to the CVF aircraft carrier program, designation of Glasgow shipyards as the site for Type 26 construction (barring a successful independence referendum), a government commitment to pay extra costs involved in shrinking the shipbuilding sector as a whole, and a bridge buy of OPVs.

The original agreement had made BAE responsible for financing slack shipbuilding periods, but if government delays to the Type 26 are the reason for the slack, industry argued that the government should pay. Rather than paying termination and industrial costs to keep the shipyard idle, the UK government is ordering 3 Ocean Class OPV vessels, for delivery by 2017. The River Class OPVs HMS Tyne, HMS Severn and HMS Mersey will probably be retired at the same time. The difference between the 2 classes? The larger Ocean Class adds a flight deck that can handle AW101 Merlin helicopters. Sources: BAE Systems, “UK Naval sector restructuring” | Royal Navy, “New ships for Royal Navy secure UK shipbuilding skills”.

Major shipbuilding restructuring

Nov 2/13: Industrial. BAE removes the dockside portal cranes at Govan shipyard, which sets of a lot of speculation and uncertainty about the shipyard’s future.

Industrially, the firm says the portal cranes haven’t been used for 5 years, as they’ve been replaced by better mobile cranes. The reason for all the nervousness is leaked reports that BAE is considering consolidation, including the closure of one shipyard. Sources: BBC, “Govan: A shipbuilding history” | BBC, “New fears for Govan shipyard’s future”.

MT30

Sept 11/13: Sub-contractors. BAE Systems announces the ship’s initial set of sub-contractors, but doesn’t offer specifics regarding the equipment.

The ship will use a CODOG (Combined Diesel Electric or Gas Turbine) propulsion system, with an MT30 turbine from design partner Rolls-Royce, unspecified MTU diesel generator sets, and a gear box via David Brown Gear Systems Ltd. The 36MW MT30 has already been picked for Britain’s new Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers, so the choice creates future fleet commonality.

Rohde & Schwarz has been selected to design the Integrated Communications System. Sources: BAE, Sept 11/13 release | Defense News, “BAE Selects 4 Firms for Type 26 Frigate Program”.

Type 26, 2013
click for video

Sept 9/13: Lots of news. The Royal Navy unveils the latest concept design for their Type 26 frigate, as well as a short video concept. They confirm that the Type 26 will be 15m longer than the Duke Class at 148m, and add about 500 tonnes at 5,400t. Noticeable changes from the 2012 illustrations include centering the helicopter hangar rather than mounting it on the port side, and moving the mission module space from the stern to a space behind the helicopter hangar.

At the same time, BAE Systems tells Bloomberg that they are pursuing interest from 8 countries for up to 30 ships, including a new air defense variant that Britain isn’t planning to buy. They’ve been burned before by naming countries, however, and won’t offer any details. Supplier selection is underway, with detail design expected to begin in 2014, and construction in 2016.

The UK MoD makes the day a trifecta by signing a GBP 250 million production contract for the Sea Ceptor missile, and confirms that they’ll deploy it on Type 23 ships beginning in 2016. Their move will ensure that the missile will enter service aboard the Type 26 as a proven weapon, but the Type 26’s margin for error is slim: the Type 23s will retire between 2023 – 2026. Sources: Royal Navy, Sept 9/13 release | Bloomberg, “BAE Systems New Global Combat Ship Draws Export Buyer Interest” | DID: I Think I CAMM: Britain’s Versatile Air Defense Missile.

Latest design, Exports & a Missile buy

May 14/13: Mk-41 + MBDA. MBDA signs an MoU with Lockheed Martin to jointly explore the market for the integration of MBDA naval missile systems into Lockheed Martin’s MK-41 Vertical Launch System, and ExLS VLS/cell insert. They’ll begin with a late 2013 demonstration involving Britain’s new CAMM-M Sea Ceptor missile, which makes the Mk-41 system a possible inclusion on board Britain’s forthcoming Type 26 frigates.

That’s also the right move if Britain is positioning its ships for export, and MBDA + MK-41 is a pairing that has the potential to shake up the global naval missile industry. Read “CAMM Opener for the Naval Missile Market: MBDA & LMCO’s MoU” for full coverage.

Jan 18/13: Australia. Britain signs a defense cooperation treaty with Australia. The Type 26 frigate is explicitly discussed, along with broader areas cyber security, defense procurement reform, personnel exchanges, and science and technology generally.

Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper includes a plan to buy 8 frigates with an anti-submarine focus, but construction isn’t expected to begin until late in the decade. Britain’s invitation includes possible design work, however, which could start earlier. UK MoD | Australian DoD | Joint press conference transcript.

2012

Basic design approved, without CEC. Turkish loss. T26: 2012 design
(click to view full)

August 20/12: New Design Iteration. The Ministry of Defense and BAE release graphics of the latest Type 26 design from the Assessment phase. What this isn’t, is a detailed design, complete with a defined array of systems and weapons. It’s just the basic requirements and general characteristics – here’s what we know:

“With a basic displacement of around 5,400 tonnes, the Type 26 Global Combat Ship will be around 148m in length (the equivalent of around 15 double decker buses), and one of the most advanced vessels in the Royal Navy’s fleet. It is expected to feature: vertical missile silos capable of housing a range of different weapons; a Medium Calibre gun; a hangar to accommodate a Merlin or Wildcat Helicopter and a Flexible Mission Space for Unmanned Air, surface and underwater Vehicles, or additional boats; and the most advanced sensors available to the fleet.”

The big outstanding questions involve radars, the vertical launch system (which helps determine eligible missiles), the combat system, and secondary weapons. UK MoD | BAE Systems.

Basic design approved

July 5/12: No Portsmouth work? Portsmouth’s The News reports that BAE is leaning toward building the Type 26 frigates in Scotland, which could put thousands of local shipbuilding and sub-contractor jobs at risk, once Portsmouth’s sub-contracted work on Britain’s new carriers finishes around 2014. Apparently, the Portsmouth yard would require additional investment, while the Scottish yards would not.

BAE is said to be pushing for all 13 of the Type 26 frigates to be based in Portsmouth from 2020, which would boost its fleet repair and maintenance operations within the naval base.

June 11/12: No CEC. Speaking during question period in the House of Commons, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond said the Royal Navy had identified Co-operative engagement Capability as a “lesser priority” during the Planning Round 12 process, and decided not to spend around GBP 500 million to implement it on their 6 Daring Class destroyers and forthcoming Type 26 frigates. Media coverage criticized the decision, and the UK MoD’s blog responded that:

“The MoD’s comprehensive assessment of CEC informed the decision made during PR12 that it was not necessary to commit to purchasing the capability at this stage. As the Defence Secretary made clear last month, the MoD budget has headroom of £8bn over the next 10 years for potential new programmes. The Armed Forces Committee will prioritise which projects to commit to when necessary, and not before.”

The American CEC system gives fitted ships the ability to see what other CEC-equipped ships, aircraft, or land stations see, and to fire at targets the launching ship’s radars cannot see. It’s vital for wide-area anti-air defense, and for ballistic missile defense. That makes CEC more important to the Type 45 air defense destroyers, but its absence will push the Type 26 toward an international positioning as a mid-tier frigate, instead of a high-end ship. Daily Telegraph | Defence Management.

No CEC for British ships

May 21/12: Turkish loss. Turkey decides that the Type 26 project doesn’t meet its requirements for the $3 billion, 6-frigate TF-2000 program. Hurriyet Daily News:

“The Defense Ministry last month sent a letter informing their British counterparts that Turkey was “no longer interested” in BAE Systems’ offer, [said] an official familiar with the tender… “BAE has already started the [Type 26] project. It was late to join. Our needs would have increased the cost. Or we would have had to review our requirements in accordance with the British Navy, but our requirements are different. BAE had also asked for a ‘license fee.’ The partnership offer would have become a model in which Turkey was financing BAE’s project,” the source told the Daily News.”

The question is whether the remaining bidder, Lockheed Martin, can do any better. Turkey reportedly wants to take a frigate design, add Aselsan’s Multifunctional Phased Array Radar project (CAFRAD) to Lockheed’s AN/SPY-1 to create what would essentially be a new radar, and use Havelsan’s Genesis combat system from Turkey’s FFG-7 upgrade project instead of Lockheed Martin’s Aegis. Then they want all of this equipment to work with Raytheon’s SM-3 long-range ballistic missile defense missile, assuming that the USA agrees to sell that to them. Making all of these changes is a major development contract in itself. Tying them together so they work properly, and then testing them fully, is another expensive project. Integrating them with Turkey’s ship design is the 3rd project, and could also prove to be rather expensive if required fixes from the previous projects are too far beyond initial ship specifications for space, weight, or power. Time will tell if this is another example of Turkey’s wish lists being too big for their budgets, if negotiations will lead to compromises on the wish list, or if Turkey will give BAE another opening by backing off and re-thinking its program.

Turkey

May 17/12: Alba gu brath – but not shipbuilding. The Scottish National Party’s independence bid gets a setback, as procurement minister Peter Luff and the Prime Minister’s office tell union leaders that an independent Scotland won’t get any future warship contracts. Since Scotstoun, Govan and Rosyth only deal with military orders, and aren’t working on any export orders, that would be it. Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions’ regional secretary, Kenny Jordan, estimates that up to 16,000 jobs are at risk in the Scottish defense industry and its local supply chain.

This is a matter of regulation as well as preference. Even if Britain changed its mind, and wanted to outsource shipbuilding work beyond its borders, EU article 346 would force them to bid that work at least across Europe. Those Scottish jobs are currently protected, because there’s an exemption that allows strategic defense projects to be kept in-country. Leaving the country would place Scotland beyond that exemption.

A Scottish decision to buy into the Type 26 program for its own navy could create a way out of the bind, by allowing negotiated work-sharing offsets. That would still be a far smaller share of work on the Type 26, and skills decay could complicate even that plan. If there’s much delay between independence and serious ship orders, the layoffs and exodus of skilled workers could leave the Scottish shipbuilding industry struggling to execute even a reduced role. Defence Management | The Scotsman.

April 10/12: Design. QinetiQ touts BAE’s use of its Paramarine advanced marine design software for the Type 26’s early stage design and structural development, as they work to model various configurations and estimate costs.

That may have something to do with the fact that UK MoD picked Paramarine as its chosen “stability software” some time ago, and uses it for certification. That pushed BAE to use it for the new Astute Class fast attack submarines, Type 45 air defense destroyers, and Britain’s CVF aircraft carrier programs, before they began using it for the Type 26.

2011

CAMM. Canada out? Prospects in Brazil, India? CAMM-M/ Sea Ceptor
(click to view full)

Sept 13/11: FLAADS-M. MBDA touts recent milestones in its Future Local Area Air Defence System (FLAADS) program, whose CAMM missile will equip Type 26 and Type 23 frigates at sea (FLAADS-M), and also replace the Rapier missile system on land (FLAADS-L).

FLAADS’ Command and Control system currently involves >75% re-use of Sea Viper software from the Type 45 destroyer, and the Platform Data Link is undergoing trials at MBDA. The CAMM missile’s “soft vertical launch” concept has worked in trials, including a successful ejection and turnover trial at Bedfordshire on May 20/11. Finally, MBDA touts “significant progress” with the CAMM radar seeker in air carry trials. Read “I Think I CAMM: Britain’s Versatile Air Defense Missile” for full coverage.

CAMM missiles

Sept 5/11: Requirements. UK magazine The Engineer discusses the process underway to define the Type 26 and its systems. Brian Johnson of BAE surface Ships says that “the requirement specifies eight ships capable of ASW and five ships equipped for more general duties,” with the first few British ships receiving systems from the current fleet of Type 23s, as a way to lower costs and risks. The timeline involved means that some of this “legacy equipment” hasn’t even been installed on the Type 23s yet, during their planned refits and upgrades.

Right now, about 200 engineers and other personnel are working on capability tradeoffs and fine-tuning design, in anticipation of a Capability Decision Point scheduled for November 2011.

Aug 11/11: India. Could India be interested in the Type 26? Their current and planned frigate projects are all Russian designs, but India’s Project 17-A, and Britain’s budget squeeze, might create an opening. Pitches to Brazil and India are showing a common theme: invitations to be part of the ship’s design phase.

“BAE Systems has described to Business Standard how Whitehall envisages the designing and building of the GCS. The countries that eventually form the consortium would join heads to frame broadly common specifications for the warship. Presently, the GCS is planned as a flexi-role frigate. This means each vessel could be optimised for any one of the three traditional frigate roles: anti-submarine, air defence or general-purpose. To cater for these different roles and the different requirements of participating countries, the basic GCS design would have 80 per cent commonality in design and components, with 20 per cent remaining flexible.”

See: India’s Business Standard | Think Defence.

March 6/11: Canada. Jay Paxton, a spokesman for Defence Minister Peter MacKay in Canada’s current Conservative Party minority government, is quoted as saying that:

“Canada will not be pursuing collaboration with the United Kingdom on our new surface combatant fleet.”

This comes after a long set of political questions and industry lobbying by Canada’s shipbuilders, triggered by British admissions that talks were taking place. Soon after this announcement, the government fell on a no-confidence motion, triggering an election that gave the Conservative Party a Parliamentary majority. That could give the government the freedom to re-consider. Or, it could simply set their earlier position in stone. CTV News | Defence IQ | Ottawa Citizen.

Canada out?

Feb 6/11: Brazil. MercoPress refers to Brazilian and British media reports that a GBP 2.9 billion deal (about 7.85 billion Reals, or $4.68 billion) may be about to buy 6 Offshore Patrol Vessels at GBP 60-80 million each, and 5-6 Type 26 frigates at GB 300-400 million each. While the new Rousseff administration is reviewing both the F-X2 fighter purchase and naval plans, the paper cites Brazil’s growing deepwater oil production as a compelling driver for the Marinha do Brazil. MercoPress adds that:

“The articles mention that according to the agreement with BAE Systems and following on Brazilian policy of ‘technology transfer’ the first patrol and frigate units would be built in the UK and the rest in Brazilian yards… Developed countries are most aware of defence dynamics in Brazil since the country’s long term policy is to increase defence expenditure from the current 1.5% of GDP to 2% of GDP by 2030. Since the country’s economy is forecasted to grow a sustained 5% in the coming decades, defence investments will also expand strongly. With a nominal Brazilian GDP of 1.57 trillion US dollars, – IMF figures – if defence expenditure was now 2.2% of GDP, it would represent 34 billion USD.”

See also UPI.

Jan 31/11: Canada. U.K. Defence Minister Gerald Howarth responds to Parliamentary questions by saying:

“I am delighted to say that we are in close discussion with the Canadians [regarding the Type 26]. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has just returned from an extremely profitable visit to Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and Turkey. All those countries have expressed interest in joining the United Kingdom in a collaborative programme that would have the benefit of bringing together not only members of the Commonwealth but some of our key allies, while also driving down costs for the Royal Navy.”

Both Canada and Australia have plans for a “future frigate” competition in their 20-year defense procurement strategies, and BAE can expect strong competition on both fronts. Canada may be a better bet than Australia, where Spain’s Navantia has established a very strong foothold with its current Hobart Class destroyer and Canberra Class LHD programs. UK Hansard transcripts | Defense News.

2010

Assessment phase, requirements. T26: original concept
(click to view full)

Nov 29/10: Requirements. Rumors surface that the UK government is looking to sharply slash target costs for the Type 26 frigates, from GBP 500 million to GBP 250-350 million ($400 – 550 million), in order to field a large enough Royal Navy fleet.

If the project is properly managed, and British shipyards can be cost-competitive, global precedents suggest that this is still enough to field a capable multi-role frigate. The question is what capabilities get removed, or become options that the frigates are fitted “for, but not with.” The latter approach has been popular in Britain, but it has resulted in expensive ships that lack key capabilities – such as the lack of anti-ship missiles on the Navy’s billion-pound Type 45 destroyers. The Scotsman | Reuters

Oct 26/10: Brazil bid. BAE Systems submits a detailed proposal to the Brazilian Navy for an 11-ship fleet renewal package that include Type 26 frigates, but goes beyond. They are certain to face competition from shipbuilders like France’s DCNS (FREMM/ Gowind), and possibly other competitors like Spain’s Navantia (F100), Royal Dutch Schelde (Sigma), and even South Korea’s Daewoo.

In addition to having Brazil join the Global Combat Ship (Type 26/27) program at the design stage, BAE’s proposal would supply a modified Wave Class fleet tanker and a variant of BAE’s River Class Ocean Patrol Vessel that’s similar to ships being built under technology transfer in Thailand. All ships would be built in Brazil, and BAE Systems Surface Ships division Managing Director, Alan Johnston says that:

“We are in discussions regarding the naval proposal with a number of potential industry partners in Brazil, including shipyards and combat systems developers… and will provide further details in due course.”

See: BAE Systems | Southern Daily Echo.

Sept 14/10: Brazil. Britain and Brazil sign a Defence Cooperation Agreement, which includes an “assured warship procurement package” of BAE Systems’ Type 26/GCS frigates and its 90m blue-water Ocean Patrol Vessels. If Brazil joins early, they can even influence the Type 26/27’s design. BAE Systems’ Managing Director for the West, Dean McCumiskey:

“This [package] is based on proven and versatile ship designs and includes an invitation to become an international partner in our new Global Combat Ship programme. If BAE Systems is selected to support Brazil’s ambitious naval re-equipment programme, the ships we develop will be built at a partner shipyard in Brazil, with maximum content sourced from the wider Brazilian industry.”

The opportunity to provide maintenance etc. for the ships’ 20-30 year lifespan might be even more significant than the order itself. BAE can expect competition from DCNS’ FREMM frigates first and foremost, as well as other contenders like the Dutch Sigma family, Korea’s shipbuilders, et. al. The fact that all of Brazil’s current frigates are British designs (6 Niteroi Class, 3 Type 22) may work in BAE’s favor. UK MoD | BAE Systems | Andover Advertiser | Financial Times |Reuters.

March 25/10: The UK Ministry of Defence signs a 4-year, GBP 127 million contract with BAE Systems, to conduct the Type 26’s Assessment Phase. A team led by BAE Systems Surface Ships, working with the MOD, will consider requirements and design proposals for the new multi-role frigates. An 80 strong joint MOD and BAE Systems team has already been established out of Bristol and this will rise to 300 over the next 4 years.

Britain’s First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope:

“These programme announcements are welcome news for the Royal Navy. You simply cannot have an effective Navy without capable frigates, and the Type 26 combat ship will form the future backbone of the Royal Navy’s surface combatant force, alongside the new Type 45 destroyers. These ships will be highly versatile, able to operate across the full spectrum of operations, from war-fighting to disaster relief.”

See: UK MoD | BAE Systems | BBC

Type 26 Assessment Phase

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

Background: The GCS

Background: Ancillary Equipment

Background: Related Ships & Equipment

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