Defence`s Feeds

The Iranian-backed Lebanese group Hizbullah showed off its recently established armoured unit in a parade held in the Syrian town of Al-Qusayr on 11 November. Held to mark the group's annual Martyrs' Day, the parade involved dozens of armoured vehicles, including T-72 and T-54/55 tanks, BMP-1

Indonesia's Ministry of Industry has said it will support defence exports from state-owned aerospace firm PT Dirgantara (PTDI) by providing its prospective customers with access to credit from the Indonesian Export Financing Agency, otherwise known as the Indonesia Eximbank. "We [will] give

The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) contracted Damen Shipyards Group to build two new Stan Patrol 4207 vessels to replace the core of the JDF Coast Guard's fleet, the yard announced on 16 November. Damen said the new vessels will replace the JDF Coast Guard's three Damen County-class offshore patrol

Syria's longest range surface-to-air (SAM) systems have been refurbished and are now contributing to the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) network in the Eastern Mediterranean region, Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu said on 15 November. "We have repaired the Syrian S-200 [air defence]

Key Points TALONS is a low-cost, elevated sensor mast based on a fully automated parafoil system DARPA is now transitioning TALONS to the USN The US Navy (USN) is planning further at-sea testing of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA's) Towed Airborne Lift of Naval Systems

The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) is working with industry to develop a deployable 3-D printing capability. A concept demonstrator is currently under development, with the ultimate aim being to reduce the logistical footprint, time, and resources required to replenish components used in military

The Uruguayan Navy lacks "the necessary resources" to carry out its missions, Admiral Leonardo Alonso, commander of the Uruguayan Navy, declared on 15 November. The statement was made during the navy's 199th anniversary celebrations, with President Tabaré Vásquez in attendance.

The US State Department has approved the sale of the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc (GA-ASI) Certifiable Predator B (CPB) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to the United Kingdom, the Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on 16 November. The approval covers the sale of 16 of

Key Points USN and industry officials have acknowledged that alternatives to LRLAP are being considered as projectiles for the Zumwalt destroyers' main guns The navy says no official decision has been made on whether to cancel the LRLAP buy for Zumwalt The US Navy (USN) and industry are

Key Points NAVAIR plans a contract award to Raytheon in early 2017 for JSOW ER all-up-round test support Scope of work includes adding a production-representative engine/fuel/inlet system, and software modifications to optimise mid-course/endgame performance The US Navy (USN) is finalising plans

A delegation from the SEDE Subcommittee of the European Parliament, led by Subcommittee Chair Anna Elżbieta Fotyga MEP, held discussions with EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq on defence-related research and the EDA’s role in the implementation of the EU Global Strategy.

Welcoming the MEPs to the EDA, Chief Executive Jorge Domecq expressed his appreciation for the SEDE Subcommittee’s support to the EDA and especially “with regard to the Pilot Project and Preparatory Action for defence-related R&T”. During the meeting Mr. Domecq and the SEDE members discussed current developments in relation to the Security & Defence Implementation Plan of the EU Global Strategy, progress on defence-related research, and on-going EDA activities and projects. 

Ms Anna Elżbieta Fotyga, Chair of the SEDE Subcommittee on Security and Defence, commented; “I think I speak for all our members when I say that we are impressed with the work the EDA has done on the development of the EU Member State's security and defence capabilities. This is particularly important in a time of challenges for global security."

In working to enhance the relationship between the EDA and the SEDE subcommittee, Mr. Domecq said; “I believe that regular EDA participation at the SEDE meetings, as well as visits of Members of the SEDE Subcommittee to EDA, will improve transparency and information-exchange on EDA activities, at a time when European Parliament support in defence matters is key.” 

Members of the SEDE subcommittee also received presentations on some of the Agency’s capability projects and programmes, such as the Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (JDEAL) and the Multinational Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) Fleet (MMF).
 

More information:

• European Parliament Subcommittee for Security and Defence website

Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election is historical. Without any political experience, in defiance of the political establishment and the mainstream media, relying mostly on his own political instincts, he beat all the odds. Change is indeed coming to Washington, however, whether his presidency will be truly transformational remains to be seen. Here are my top 7 takeaways:

The most important dividing lines in the election were urban – rural, rich – poor and racial contrasts. Note that from the top ten richest states per capita only two went for Trump (rarely populated Alaska and North Dakota, rich because of petrol-industry), while he won all of the ten poorest states except for Maine. There are scores of indicators pointing at the economic hardships of rural America, here I would like to point to just one: while between 2002-2006 50 percent of the new jobs that were created in the US were dispersed throughout 120 counties– out of the 3143 -, between 2010 - 2014 the same figure dropped to 73 counties in and around only a handful of major cities, mostly in blue states.

Although the democrats lost, the American electoral map is changing: none-white votes, especially the Latino ones will matter more and more. The problem for the Clinton campaign was that the democrats forgot about their traditional hinterland: rural – industrial America, “the rustbelt”, populated mostly still by working class-whites. The democrat’s agenda of too much focus on minorities and liberal social issues has failed, and will fail again if more attention will not be given to the economic inequalities between classes and regions all across the board.
Trump will seek to balance between his radical right base and the republican establishment. Without the first he will lose popular support, without the latter he cannot govern. His first appointments and his backtracking on some major policy issues confirm this dual approach. However, with so conflicting ideas and world views in the White House, we can expect intensified conflicts to come within the Trump administration and the Republicans.

It will not be the end of America’s global engagement, but expect change. To potential adversaries such as China and Russia, the glass is half full, half empty: likely less American ‘World policing’, less scrutiny on human rights, but more problems on trade and arms buildup. There could be deeper cooperation with Russia on certain issues, but no one should set high hopes on a successful Reset 2.0. There is one thing Donald Trump likes better than making good deals: win. And the list of issues for potential conflict with President Putin or with China is long. As for NATO, it will not be dissolved, but if Europeans will not deliver much more on defense, instead of the other organization in Brussels, it will be just another organization.

Trump’s election does not mean much good for multilateralism, for trade liberalization, for arms control, for fighting climate change, for open door on migration – signature issues of the Obama presidency. Many of these issues will spark strong debates with European partners. A Trump administration might be good news for parties striving to gain back powers from Brussels into purely national hands. But how far would this nationalist wave go in terms of European disintegration? And what would this mean for Europe’s power structure and for small European countries? Complex questions with highly uncertain answers.

The success of Trump’s presidency will be measured primarily on how he tackles economic inequality, the urban-rural dived in American society, its budget deficit, the challenges of illegal immigration and terrorism. If President Trump would succeed in making progress on some of these issues, that would make America stronger, but the foundation of the transatlantic Alliance stronger.

Language Undefined Tag: USelectionsTrump

Exercise BLACK BLADE is hosted by Belgium at Florennes airbase and takes place from the 14th of November to the 2nd of December. Over 400 personnel will take part in this exercise, with a total of 14 air assets from 4 Member States being deployed. This edition marks the 10th helicopter exercise under the umbrella of the EDA Helicopter Exercise Programme (HEP).

The European Defence Agency is working to provide Member States with a framework to develop, consolidate and share best practices in order to meet the challenges of flying helicopters in a modern operational environment. In consultation with Member States (MS), several factors were identified which were thought to contribute to the non-employability of helicopters; a lack of training for the crews, a lack of technical equipment for the aircraft, and the challenges of logistic support to deployed operations.

The EDA is helping participating MS address these issues with the training element being the main focus. Exercises such as BLACK BLADE are fundamental to the EU capability development process.
 

Exercise BLACK BLADE

BLACK BLADE marks the 10th helicopter exercise under the umbrella of the Helicopter Exercise Programme (HEP). BLACK BLADE is a Special Operations Forces oriented helicopter exercise, focusing on enhancing interoperability at a tactical level in a realistic and challenging environment. Over 400 personnel will take part in this exercise programme. A total of 14 air assets from 4 Member States (13 helicopters from Belgium, Slovenia and Austria and one Falcon aircraft from the UK) will be used.

BLACK BLADE will deliver tactical training, over a three week period, offering participants a unique opportunity to plan and execute missions within a joint combined framework. The seamless coordination and integration of the Belgium Special Operations Ground Forces into individual scenarios for the benefit of training will be one of the specific focuses of the exercise.

Commenting at the start of exercise BLACK BLADE, EDA Chief Executive, Jorge Domecq pointed to the significance of this edition: 

“The 10th edition of the Helicopter Training Exercise Programme, comes at a moment when European defence is high on the political agenda. The 10th edition is a milestone for this programme, the EDA and the Member States involved. Exercise BLACK BLADE is European defence cooperation in action. It represents a dynamic and tangible example of what cooperation among the Member States can achieve. It also highlights the importance of joint training as a prerequisite to enhance interoperability and a key enabler to ensure readiness to deploy. A positive step forward for European defence”.

The ultimate goal for BLACK BLADE is to develop and improve immediate output through pooling and sharing, enhance training skills among European countries for flying in different environments, and to train for future European crisis management operations.BLACK BLADE is a real-world example of what can be achieved through European defence cooperation and highlights that at very low cost, immediate operational output can be realised.
 

New milestone for the EDA

The HEP is one of the EDA’s helicopter training projects and programmes. By enhancing the operating skills of helicopter crews across Europe, the HEP plays a part in increasing the deployable helicopter capability for contingency operations. The exercises focus on individual, environmental and multinational training, increasing interoperability through practical experiences, sharing operational experience and developing common tactics, techniques and procedures. HEP is a ten-year programme, a concrete indication that training together is an integral part of enhancing European capability and interoperability.
 

EDA Helicopter Training In Numbers

Between 2009 and 2016 : 206 helicopters, 1320 aircrew members and almost 13000 infantry from 19 Member States have deployed to the exercises which were held in France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Belgium.
 

Future Events

A Distinguished Visitors Day (DVD) will be held on November 30th , which the Head of the EDA, High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini will attend.
 

More information:

• Helicopter Initiatives (EDA project page)

PONARS Eurasia has just published my memo on Russia’s Strategic Calculus from our September policy conference in Washington. I’m reposting it here. Lots of other very interesting memos are available on the PONARS website.

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Russian foreign policy is driven by the political elites’ search for a new basis for national self-esteem after the collapse of the Soviet Union disrupted old Soviet identities. The collapse did not discredit the Soviet Union’s status as a great power, which has thus remained a core aspiration for Russian political elites. As a result of their perception of Russia’s appropriate status in the world and in their region, they have also sought to maintain Russia’s role as a guiding force among the newly independent states that formerly made up the Soviet Union. This combination of Russia as a global great power and regional hegemon is seen as providing the ruling elite with a source of legitimacy with their domestic constituency.

Most of Russia’s immediate foreign policy goals are focused on its immediate neighborhood. These include maintaining friendly or at least compliant governments in neighboring states and, failing that, keeping unfriendly neighboring governments weak and off balance. All of this is placed in a global context because in addition to securing its periphery, these goals also serve to prevent encroachment by Western states in Russia’s desired geographic sphere of influence.

Beyond these overarching goals, Russian leaders are focused on ensuring Russia’s domestic stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. These are primarily defensive goals that seek to ensure the survival of the state and its ruling elite in their current form, rather than aggressive goals that seek to expand Russia’s territory or its sphere of influence. Most of Russia’s military and security policies are designed to secure the state and its current territory against potential attacks and to counter the threats that Russian leaders see facing their country. Moreover, Russian leaders do not really have a well-developed strategy on how to achieve this in their immediate neighborhood. Instead, they have a toolkit of political and military tactics and are open to opportunities to use this toolkit.

Russia’s Threat Perception

The main threats to Russian security, as identified by Russia’s political and military leadership, are spelled out in the most recent edition of the country’s military doctrine announced in December 2014 (see the English translation of the doctrine). According to these guidelines, the most serious military risk that Russia faces is the expansion of NATO. The potential of NATO enlargement to include former Soviet republics has been seen as a threat by Russian leaders for many years, with concern about Ukraine and Georgia resulting in Russian involvement in conflicts in both of those countries.

While this concern remains uppermost in Russian leaders’ minds, in recent years they have also come to focus on the expansion of NATO military infrastructure in existing member states near Russia’s borders. The doctrine accordingly identifies military risks associated with “bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries near the borders of the Russian Federation” and with the “deployment (build-up) of military contingents of foreign states (groups of states) on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters, including for exerting political and military pressure on the Russian Federation” (Russian Military Doctrine, 12a and 12c).

The 2014 military doctrine was the first official document to highlight the military threat posed to Russia by externally organized regime change. In recent years, this has been repeatedly mentioned as the most serious threat facing the Russian government, but it had not previously been portrayed as a military threat. By mentioning the “destabilization of the situation in individual states and regions and undermining of global and regional stability” and the “establishment of regimes whose policies threaten the interests of the Russian Federation in states contiguous with the Russian Federation, including by overthrowing legitimate state administration bodies” as external military risks, Russian leaders highlighted their perception that regime change originates in secret plans organized abroad, primarily by the United States and its allies (Doctrine, 12b and 12m).

These plans, Russian leaders argue, include a number of aspects. The establishment of hostile regimes in neighboring states through the destabilization of legitimate governments is seen as being part of a campaign to eliminate Russian influence over neighbors that are of vital importance to Russia’s security. In addition, Russia’s adversaries are willing to sow chaos in foreign states in order to create excuses to intervene and establish pro-Western governments there. Finally, even though these efforts mostly take place outside Russia itself, their ultimate goal is to weaken the Russian government in order to create an opportunity to replace the Putin regime with one more amenable to Western dictates. In addition to military and political means to achieve these goals, Russian leaders are concerned about the use of information warfare to weaken Russian sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity (Doctrine, 12l). This is part of an overall emphasis on internal threats and the role of state policy in countering Western interference in Russian domestic affairs.

A third set of security risks faced by Russia concern threats to its nuclear deterrence capability. Missile defense remains at the top of this list, as Russian leaders do not believethat the United States can make a credible commitment to refrain from using such defenses against Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability. They are convinced that if the United States were able to develop an effective and financially viable form of defense against ballistic missiles, domestic political pressure would result in it being expanded to counter Russian missiles, regardless of any promises that the leaders of the United States might make in the interim that missile defense is aimed only against rogue states such as Iran and North Korea.

Russian leaders’ concerns about threats to Russian nuclear deterrence capabilities have in recent years moved beyond missile defense to include a variety of new technologies, such as the Prompt Global Strike concept for the development of conventional strategic precision-guided munitions and weapons fired from space. The 2014 military doctrine adds these weapons to the list of military risks faced by Russia (Doctrine, 12d). As with missile defense, the concern is that the United States might use such weapons to eliminate Russian nuclear deterrent capability, rendering it defenseless against a NATO or U.S. attack.

Finally, Russian leaders express a genuine concern about the threat posed to Russia by radical Islamist organizations. This concern is usually articulated through the discussion of global terrorism and extremism. The Russian military doctrine highlights the links between radical international armed groupings and inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tensions in the context of a lack of effective international anti-terrorist cooperation (Doctrine, 12j and 12k). The significance of this concern for Russian leaders is highlighted by its choice as the main theme of the 2016 Moscow Conference on International Security. Given Russia’s recent history with Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus and terrorist acts committed throughout Russia by extremists over the last 20 years, Russian leaders recognize the potential for a renewed wave of attacks to destabilize the Russian state.

As is usually the case, the Russian military doctrine does not mention any threats posed by China. Ostensibly, this is because Russia considers China a strategic partner rather than a potential threat. Nevertheless, Russian experts regularly discuss the potential long-term risk of Chinese designs on Russian territory in the Far East and regularly contemplate the short-term danger of Russia becoming excessively dependent on China and being reduced to a Chinese junior partner and energy supplier. Furthermore, the Russian military regularly conducts exercises that are designed to counter a land invasion by a major power in the Far East and Siberia. Although no country is mentioned as the target of these exercises, China is the only country that could threaten Russia with a land invasion from the east.

Overall, in recent years, Russian leaders have become more concerned about the threats they feel are emanating from NATO and the United States. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and especially after the electoral protests that took place in Russia in 2011-12, they started to emphasize the danger to Russia posed by externally fomented domestic protests and regime change. These combined changes in Russian threat perceptions contributed to a serious deterioration in Russia’s relations with the West even before the Ukraine conflict erupted in 2014.

Western planners need to keep in mind that Russian leaders see Russia as weaker than its adversaries and very much on the defensive. This does not preclude a concurrent belief that Russia needs to be proactive and to initiate conflict when critical state interests are threatened and opportunities to seize the initiative present themselves. As a result, Western observers often see Russia as having an aggressive and revanchist mindset, even as Russian leaders perceive their actions as aimed entirely at shoring up their vulnerable security position.

Regional Priorities

Russian foreign policy remains focused on Europe and the United States. Since the international system remains centered on Euro-Atlantic institutions, Russia’s drive for respect in the international system and the geographic proximity of its main population centers to Europe means that Europe remains the primary geographic region of focus for Russian foreign policy. Russian interests in Europe are both economic and political. Economic interests are related primarily to energy sales, while politically Russia seeks to weaken European institutions in order to work bilaterally with individual states.

Russia’s second area of concern is its vulnerable southern border. Russian policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus has in recent years been shaped by three divergent perspectives: 1) great power competition in the region, which leads Russian politicians to view the region’s problems through a geopolitical and military lens; 2) energy, with a focus on securing exclusive rights for gas and oil transit from the region to Europe; and 3) concern about transnational security threats, such as radical Islamism, terrorism, and drug smuggling.

The internal tension among these perspectives has been the main source of inconsistency in Russian policies in the region. Depending on which perspective is in ascendance, Russian officials alternate between a) focusing on soft security threats, which are best dealt with through the development of cooperative mechanisms with states both in and outside the region, and b) taking steps to limit the influence of outside states in the region as part of an effort to retain a monopoly on energy transit and to come out on top in its rivalry with the United States. In recent years, with the fading of U.S. involvement in Central Asia and the decline in energy prices, Russia has become more focused on ensuring that the region is ruled by friendly regimes and supporting their efforts to prevent internal uprisings and infiltration by Islamist extremists.

In recent years, the Middle East has become more important for Russian foreign policy. Russia’s key goals in the region are to reduce instability while increasing its own influence and reducing that of the United States. Russian leaders see U.S. policies that promote democratization as being the main cause of chaos and instability throughout the region. At the same time, Moscow’s interests in the Middle East have clearly benefited from overreach by the United States. Russia has worked to use local dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Iraq war and U.S. support for popular protests against local autocrats to restore some of the influence it lost in the Middle East after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Russian operation in Syria has done even more to this end, showing that Russia has the interest and resources to be a serious player in the region. The establishment of a permanent military presence in Syria over the last year has further increased Russian influence in the Middle East, to the extent that some analysts argue that Russia now has a commanding position in Syria and perhaps in the region as a whole.

Russia’s involvement in the Middle East is fraught with risks as well. The de facto Shia alliance with Iran, Iraq, and Syria has led to tension with Gulf states and (in the recent past) with Turkey and also brings Russia into direct confrontation with ISIS, potentially exposing it to a higher risk of terrorist attacks against Russian interests and/or on Russian territory.

Finally, Russia’s turn toward Asia has so far been expressed more in rhetoric than in actual policy. Russian elites are starting to realize that Asia matters in its own right, not just as an adjunct or counterbalance to the West. But so far they have been more adept at recognizing the importance of Asia than in developing effective strategies for engaging with it. In part, this is because old stereotypes of Asia as inferior still dominate. But mostly it is because it is hard to reconcile the pursuit of Russian security and economic interests in Asia with the Russian political elite’s Western-centric worldview.

Even in Asia, U.S. behavior in large part determines how Russia responds, since containing and balancing the United States is one of the key missions of Russian foreign policy around the world. This stems in large part from Russian leaders’ belief that Russia can be a global power only by limiting the influence of the United States. In Asia, it has tried to do so (with limited success) by building an anti-hegemonic consensus with China and India. At the same time, despite the currently positive relations with China, Russian leaders remain concerned about China’s increase in power and long-term intentions, particularly given China’s efforts to develop the Silk Road project. They worry that China could replace Russia as the dominant “other” in U.S. foreign affairs, leaving Russia marginalized. For this reason, despite ongoing tension with the United States, Russian leaders are not averse to having the United States work to constrain Chinese ambitions in Asia and around the world. On the whole, Russian objectives in Asia are preventative in nature: containing the United States and China, maintaining Russian influence in the region, and eroding US-led alliances without destabilizing the region, all while staying out of local conflicts.

Conclusion

The election of Donald Trump as president of the United States is unlikely to change Russia’s strategic calculus. Russia will continue to seek to maximize its status in the world, possibly by proposing a deal where the United States recognizes its sphere of influence in its immediate neighborhood in exchange for a more cooperative relationship globally. Such a trade would legitimize Russia as a global great power while avoiding the need to expend scarce resources on a global fight for influence with the United States.

The People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN's) first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, is ready for combat operations, according to Chinese media reports. Senior Captain Li Dongyou, the political commissar of the Soviet-era Admiral Kuznetsov-class carrier, was quoted by the state-owned Global Times

The US and Malaysian Armed Forces have jointly conducted Exercise Tiger Strike 16 in Lahad Datu, Malaysia, to increase combat readiness and conduct amphibious operations.

Technology solutions provider Black Box has received an award to upgrade the US Marine Corps’ (USMC) existing telecommunication network architecture and systems to a high-availability Unified Communications solution at MCB Camp Lejeune, North Carolin…

The US Navy has deployed its maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA) to support recovery operations in the earthquake-hit South Island of New Zealand.

THE Galacia Spirit, a LNG Spanish-flagged tanker vessel operated by Teekay Shipping Glasgow Ltd, was damaged when a small craft attacked it with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small-arms near Yemen's Perim Island, which overlooks Bab al-Mandeb Strait, on 25 October, Reuters reported. Reports

A major boost in the size of the US military flagged by the incoming administration of Donald Trump could bring with it "remarkable" opportunities for Australia's defence industry, Australian minister for defence industry Christopher Pyne said on 16 November. He was referring to comments