Europäische Union

Kallas estime que la pression doit s'exercer sur l'agresseur, et non sur la victime

The post L’UE à Kiev : une unité de façade face aux tensions sur le soutien à l’Ukraine appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Également dans l'édition de mercredi : la clause de défense de l'UE, Tsikhanouskaya, Euronews, les retours de migrants, Ormuz, EPSO

The post La saison de la trahison appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Credit: UN Photo/Pasqual Gorri

By UN Development Programme
AMMAN / NEW YORK , Apr 1 2026 (IPS)

New estimates by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) suggest the military escalation in the Middle East, now into its fifth week, may cost economies in the region from 3.7 to 6.0 percent of their collective Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

This represents a staggering loss of US$120-194 billion and exceeds the cumulative regional GDP growth achieved in 2025. Coupled with an estimated rise in unemployment of up to 4 percentage points or 3.6 million jobs lost—more than the total jobs created in the region in 2025, these reversals will push up to 4 million people into poverty.

The assessment — “Military Escalation in the Middle East: Economic and Social Implications for the Arab States region” — exposes the concerning reality of structural vulnerabilities characteristic to the region, which enable a short lived military escalation to generate profound and widespread socio economic impacts that may persist over a long-term.

“This crisis rings alarm bells for countries of the region to fundamentally reevaluate their strategic choices of fiscal, sectoral, and social policies, representing an important turning point in the development trajectory of the region,” said Abdallah AlDardari, UN Assistant Secretary General and Director of the Regional Bureau for Arab State in UNDP.

“Our findings underline the pressing need to strengthen regional collaboration to diversify economies—beyond reliance on growth driven by hydrocarbons, and to expand production bases, secure trade and logistics systems, and broaden economic partnerships, to reduce exposure to shocks and conflicts.”

The assessment employs Computable General Equilibrium modelling to capture the magnitude of disruptions caused by a four-week conflict, and models its effects through key transmission channels, including increased trade costs, temporary productivity losses, and localized capital destruction.

It conducted five simulation scenarios, representing escalating levels of conflict scenarios, ranging from a “moderate disruption,” where trade costs increase by tenfold, to an “extreme disruption and energy shock,” where trade costs increase a hundred-fold, intensified by a stop of hydrocarbon production.

The findings highlight that impacts are not uniform, varying significantly across the region due to structural characteristics of its main subregions. Estimates suggest that the largest macroeconomic losses are concentrated in Gulf Cooperation Council and the Levant subregions, where strong exposure to trade disruptions and energy market volatility drives significant declines in output, investment, and trade.

Both subregions stand to lose 5.2-8.5 percent and 5.2-8.7 percent of their GDP, respectively. Increases in poverty rates are concentrated in the Levant and Least Developed Arab Countries, where baseline vulnerability is highest and shocks translate more strongly into welfare losses. In North Africa, impacts remain moderate but still significant in absolute terms.

In the Levant, the crisis is expected to increase poverty by 5 percent, pushing an additional 2.85-3.30 million people into poverty—accounting for over 75 percent of the rise in poverty across the region. Across the region, human development as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) is expected to decline by approximately 0.2 to 0.4 percent, corresponding to a setback of roughly half a year to nearly one year of human development progress.

Footnote

• The Assessment will be available online—through the following link.
• This Assessment if part is part of a series of rapid assessments that UNDP is producing on the impacts of the Middle East military escalation on Iran, the Arab States in the region, Africa, the Asia Pacific region and on the global development outlook.
• Results presented in this brief should be interpreted as illustrative estimates of potential outcomes under different shock intensities, rather than realized impacts.
• Impact estimates are presented for four Arab States subregional groupings, including:
• Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
• The Levant, including Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the State of Palestine and Syria
• North Africa, including Algeria, Egypt, Libya Morocco and Tunisia
• Least Developed Arab countries (LDCs), including Sudan and Yemen—insufficient data did not allow for simulating impacts on Djibouti and Somalia.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Die SVP ist heute erfolgreicher denn je. Doch sie hat den Kleinstaat, den Christoph Blocher ursprünglich retten wollte, für immer verändert.

Bei den heutigen Rahmenbedingungen sei die Integration der rasant wachsenden Photovoltaik ins Schweizer Stromnetz kaum machbar, hält die nationale Netzbetreiberin fest. Es brauche einen grundlegenden Umbau der Netzregelung.

ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE 1 - 403 - Entwurf eines Berichts Bericht 2025 der Kommission über Nordmazedonien
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Thomas Waitz

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

« Le prix à la pompe est le principal responsable », a fait remarquer un analyste

The post L’inflation bondit en zone euro, dopée par la flambée des prix de l’énergie appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Tensions à Euronews alors que le site d’information censure un article sur des entreprises et oligarques liés au dirigeant hongrois

The post Élections en Hongrie : Euronews accusée de « violation manifeste de l’intégrité éditoriale » appeared first on Euractiv FR.

“The Highly Respected President of China”? To better anticipate Trump’s China policy, it is essential to understand his rhetorical strategy.

India must redesign its structures of dependence on external sources of fertilizer in the face of the ongoing Gulf war.

Lukashenko’s visit reflects a broader evolution in North Korea’s foreign policy, which is slowly expanding in the post-COVID era and is increasingly influenced by ties with the Kremlin.

The members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) gathered for the past few days in the capital of Cameroon for their biennial ministerial conference. Before the 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), sober pragmatism seemed possible. After four days of tense but fruitless negotiations in Yaoundé, sobering pragmatism carried the day. And both assessments still sit at the positive end of the evaluative spectrum.

ENTWURF EINES BERICHTS über den Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Schaffung eines Rahmens für Maßnahmen zur Erleichterung des Transports von militärischer Ausrüstung, militärischen Gütern und militärischem Personal innerhalb der Union
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung
Ausschuss für Verkehr und Tourismus
Roberts Zīle, Michał Szczerba

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

A delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) will visit Seoul and Tokyo from 31 March to 2 April, led by Committee Chair David McAllister (EPP, Germany).
During the visit, MEPs will discuss how to further strengthen the EU's strategic cooperation with South Korea and Japan, two of its key like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Discussions will focus on issues of mutual interest against the backdrop of a rapidly shifting global landscape and challenges to the rules-based international order, shaped by evolving dynamics across the Indo-Pacific region, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and conflict in the Middle East.
Press release
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

For the past few weeks, residents living in and around Dal Lake in Indian Kashmir have witnessed “a different phenomenon” as a green sludge has accumulated on the once pristine water. Photos circulating widely on social media triggered a public outcry. Some citizens and environmentalists warned that the transformation reflects heavy sewage pollution in this […]

It has about 226 field artillery regiments today and plans to increase that to 270 regiments.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, carrying around a quarter of global seaborne oil trade and significant volumes of liquefied natural gas and fertilizers.

By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Mar 31 2026 (IPS)

Trump’s Iran war has left the Gulf shattered: US bases turned into targets, economies battered, and the “oasis” myth destroyed. Gulf rulers now confront a harsh reckoning over their reliance on Washington and the uncertain search for a new, fragile security order.

As Trump assembled major US naval and air assets in the eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and others quietly urged Washington to avoid a full-scale assault on Iran, fearing a direct blowback on their territory and energy infrastructure.

Nevertheless, the US–Israeli air campaign began on February 28, 2026, without a clearly defined and publicly articulated political endgame beyond “crippling” Iran’s capabilities. This disconnect between military escalation and strategic purpose now lies at the core of Gulf leaders’ anger and sense of betrayal toward Washington.

Trump’s Strategic Miscalculation

Trump’s decision to launch joint US–Israeli strikes on Iran has produced far higher strategic costs than his administration appears to have anticipated, from energy shock and disrupted shipping to heightened regional fragmentation and anti-American sentiment.

Even if Iranian capabilities are significantly degraded, the war has exposed vulnerabilities in US power projection, unsettled allies, and invited greater Russian and Chinese diplomatic activism in the Gulf. The long-term “price” for Washington will be measured less in battlefield metrics than in diminished trust and leverage among its traditional Arab partners.

US Bases Turned to Liabilities

From a Gulf perspective, US bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE were meant to deter Iran and guarantee regime security; instead, they became priority targets once the war began. Iran explicitly framed its strikes on these facilities as retaliation against Washington, but their location in densely populated and economically vital areas meant that nearby civilian infrastructure also suffered severe damage.

This experience is reinforcing a view in Gulf capitals that foreign basing arrangements draw fire without delivering the reliable protection they assumed for decades.

A Nightmare Realized

Gulf leaders long warned that a war with Iran would shatter their security and economies, a nightmare that has now materialized as Iranian missiles and drones hit oil facilities, ports, power plants, and cities across the region. They blame Washington for launching the campaign and Israel for pressing to “neutralize” Iran regardless of collateral damage in neighboring Arab states.

The sense in Gulf capitals is that their caution was dismissed, while they have paid a disproportionate price in physical destruction, economic setback, disrupted exports, and heightened domestic anxiety.

Shattered Oasis Narrative

The image of Gulf hubs like Dubai, Doha, and Riyadh as insulated “oases” open to business, tourism, and investment has been badly damaged by missile alerts, strikes on ports and airports, and the closure of key sea lanes.

Restoring confidence will require visible reconstruction, enhanced civil defense, improved air and missile defenses, and credible diplomacy that lowers the perceived risk of another sudden war. Investors and tourists will demand proof that the region can manage Iran-related tensions, not just high-end events and mega-projects.

Trump’s Misreading of Iranian Escalation

Trump publicly argued that overwhelming force would quickly coerce Iran and usher in regime change while keeping fighting “over there,” yet he appears not to have anticipated the breadth of Iranian retaliation against neighboring Gulf states or a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The IRGC’s effective shutdown of the strait, including attacks and threats against commercial shipping, has produced global energy shocks and exposed the fragility of US planning assumptions. For Gulf leaders, this underscores how inadequate Washington’s war planning was in accounting for second- and third-order consequences.

Calculated Decision Not to Retaliate

Despite heavy damage, Gulf rulers have so far avoided direct retaliation against Iran, calculating that further escalation would expose their cities and infrastructure to even more punishing strikes. Publicly, they stress restraint and international law, but privately, officials acknowledge their enduring geographic reality: they must coexist with a powerful and proximate Iran long after this US-led campaign ends.

By holding their fire, they hope to preserve space for postwar de-escalation and avoid being locked into a permanent state of open conflict.

Recasting Security Arrangements with Washington

Given their limited strategic alternatives, Gulf monarchies are unlikely to sever ties with Washington but will seek more conditional, transactional security arrangements. They are pressing for clearer US commitments on defense of their territory, better integration of regional missile defenses, and greater say over decisions that could trigger Iranian retaliation.

At the same time, they will hedge by deepening ties with China, Russia, Europe, and Asian energy importers, thereby reducing exclusive reliance on the US while keeping the American security umbrella in place.

Gulf Options to Prevent Future Conflagration

To prevent a repeat, Gulf states are also exploring limited de-escalation channels with Tehran, tighter regional crisis hotlines, and revived maritime security arrangements that include non-Western actors such as China and India. They may push for new rules of engagement around energy infrastructure and shipping lanes, seeking informal understandings that keep these off-limits even in crises.

Internally, they are reassessing missile defense, hardening critical facilities, and considering more diversified export routes that reduce dependence on Hormuz. None of these options are fully reassuring, but together they offer partial risk reduction.

Prospects for Normalization with Iran

Speculation about full normalization, including a non-belligerency pact between Iran and Gulf states, builds on prewar trends of cautious dialogue and economic engagement. Whether this is truly “in the cards” depends on war outcomes, Iran’s internal politics, and Gulf threat perceptions: if Tehran’s regime survives but remains hostile, Gulf states will likely revert to hedging—combining deterrence, limited engagement, and outreach to outside powers.

A more pragmatic Iranian leadership could make structured security arrangements and phased confidence-building measures more plausible over time.

No Return to Status Quo Ante

The Gulf States will not return to the prewar status quo; instead, they are likely to pursue a more diversified security architecture, combining a thinner US shield with expanded ties to China, Russia, and Asian importers. This shift will gradually dilute Washington’s centrality in Gulf security, complicating US force posture and Israel’s assumption of automatic Arab backing against Iran.

For Israel, a more cautious, risk-averse Gulf may limit overt strategic alignment, while for the US, enduring mistrust will make coalition-building for future crises far more difficult.

Trump’s Iran adventure is not an isolated blunder but the latest, and perhaps most explosive, expression of his assault on an already fragile global order. By discarding restraint, sidelining allies, and weaponizing American power for short-term political gain, he has accelerated the erosion of US credibility, fractured Western alliances, and opened new strategic space for Russia and China. The Gulf States are simply the newest casualties of this disorder: their cities struck, economies shaken, and security assumptions shattered.

Whatever emerges from this war, it will not be a restored status quo, but a more fragmented, volatile Middle East in which Israel and the United States confront a diminished margin for error and a far narrower circle of willing, trusting partners.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations, most recently at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (NYU). He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.

alon@alonben-meir.com

IPS UN Bureau

 

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By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Kuhaneetha Bai Kalaicelvan
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Mar 31 2026 (IPS)

While media coverage of Iran’s restrictions on passage through the Hormuz Straits focuses on fuel prices, partial closure is also disrupting crucial fertiliser and other supplies, risking catastrophe for billions worldwide.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Hormuz chokepoint
Since the war began, only a few of the hundred or so vessels, previously passing through the narrow Straits of Hormuz daily, still do so.

Hormuz is not just a chokepoint on a shipping lane for oil and gas; it has strategic implications for fertiliser, helium, and other energy-intensive exports as well as for food and other imports to the region.

Higher energy costs affect most transportation and farming requirements, such as tilling and harvesting, as well as fertiliser supplies.

Wars, especially protracted ones, have lasting effects, including for agrifood systems. Without earlier investments, output elsewhere cannot be easily increased.

Alternative fertiliser supply sources are not readily available, especially as agro-ecological options have rarely been seriously pursued despite their proven viability.

As with renewable energy generation to reduce the need for petroleum imports, it is unclear whether the looming food crisis will accelerate the needed and feasible agro-ecological transition for enhanced food security.

Disrupted food supplies
Shipping delays and port congestion disrupt food supplies, trade and availability.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

The Gulf’s populations, augmented by millions of migrant workers, have become reliant on food imports for wheat, rice, soy, sugar, cooking oil, meat, animal feed and more.

Many states have recently tried to improve their food security, expanding strategic reserves, investing in food agriculture and alternative supply routes.

Such measures have improved resilience but cannot address a prolonged blockade of the Persian Gulf. About 70% of the food for Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Gulf emirates passes through Hormuz.

Replacing disrupted food imports for about 100 million people would require moving almost 100 million kilograms (kg) of food into the region daily by other means.

Supplying food to the Gulf region under blockade would require an unprecedented operation, possibly through contested airspace.

In 2024, the UN World Food Programme delivered about 7 million kg of food daily to 81 million people in 71 countries.

Weather-driven food shortages and price spikes triggered political instability in 2008 and 2010-11. With food systems worldwide increasingly vulnerable to climate shocks, food insecurity threatens regimes everywhere.

Fertilisers
Farmers worldwide need stable supplies of fertilisers and fuel.

The Iran war threatens to disrupt these supplies, so crucial to agricultural production. Staple crops like wheat, rice and maize rely heavily on fertilisers.

Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Bahrain all ship petroleum products through Hormuz, including a fifth of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG).

As LNG is key to producing many fertilisers, Gulf exports have become more significant, especially after the war cut Ukraine’s exports, and China and Russia reduced theirs as well.

In 2024, the Middle East accounted for almost 30% of major fertiliser exports, including nitrogen, phosphate and potash.

The Gulf alone exported 23% of the world’s ammonia and 34% of its urea, while 30-40% of the world’s nitrogen fertiliser exports pass through Hormuz!

In mid-2025, Kpler estimated that a Hormuz closure could reduce fertiliser supplies by 33%, with sulphur-based ones falling by 44% and urea by 30%.

Reduced nitrogen-based fertiliser exports would hurt major food exporters such as Brazil, the US, Thailand, and India, all heavily reliant on fertiliser imports. However, the impact of shortages may be delayed until imported stocks run out.

As the war drags on, farmers may cut fertiliser use by planting less or switching to crops requiring less. Poorer harvests would, in turn, adversely affect later investment, planting and fertiliser use.

Who suffers most?
The economic consequences of the unprovoked US-Israeli assault on Iran and Tehran’s responses are spreading fast and catastrophically, especially for the most vulnerable.

Iran’s new leadership mistrusts Washington and will keep Hormuz closed – choking fuel, food, and fertiliser flows through it – to secure the guarantees it needs to reduce its vulnerability.

As attacks on Iran continued, Tehran stepped up targeted attacks on infrastructure in the Gulf kingdoms hosting US military facilities. US-led efforts have provided little relief to its allies.

The worldwide impact is uneven, with the poorest taking the brunt. Asia and Africa have been hard hit by heavy reliance on oil, gas, and fertiliser imports.

Rich nations’ aid cuts to increase military spending have worsened poverty and hunger for millions, many of whom are also victims of war and aggression.

Unlike the rich, many migrant workers in the Gulf who cannot leave will struggle to make ends meet and send money home to their families.

And as the world’s attention has turned to the Gulf, Israel has worsened conditions in Gaza while taking over southern Lebanon and increasing Yemen’s pain.

Concerned about retribution in November’s mid-term elections, the White House is keen on a ceasefire.

But it has not offered terms acceptable to Iran, which remains suspicious of the US commitment to its own promises, let alone the rule of law.

Hence, the Iranian leadership is unlikely to agree to a ceasefire without credible guarantees for its future security from renewed Israeli and US aggression.

The Iran war has highlighted, yet again, the collateral damage of war and the food system’s vulnerability. Meanwhile, the suffering of the more vulnerable is ignored by the greater powers, who pay little heed to their plight.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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The country of 8 million is still dealing with the impacts of a post-COVID crisis that was marked by high inflation and a collapse in the value of the kip.

Le Commissariat central de Police de la ville de Léo a mis fin aux agissements d'un groupe de malfaiteurs spécialisés dans les vols à main armée et les cambriolages, ce lundi 30 mars 2026. Ce réseau ciblait principalement les domiciles et les commerces, profitant de l'absence des occupants ou de la nuit pour y accéder à l'aide de cisailles et de barres de fer.

L'intervention des forces de l'ordre, largement facilitée par la collaboration citoyenne, a permis d'appréhender le membre le plus actif du groupe, un multirécidiviste, et de récupérer un important lot d'objets volés comprenant une moto, des bidons d'essence, des bidons d'huile, des chaises en plastique. Tout en saluant cette coopération exemplaire, la Police nationale exhorte les populations à maintenir cette vigilance en signalant tout individu suspect via les numéros verts 17, 16 et 1010.

Lefaso.net
Source : Police nationale du Burkina Faso