In many arid and semi-arid regions, rural women are at the heart of water-related dynamics – and therefore greatly affected by its scarcity. This scarcity affects their daily lives, farming activities, economic initiatives and solidarity networks, which are directly dependent on the availability of this resource. These women are often more vulnerable to climate change because of the difficulties they sometimes experience in accessing public services, land, water and institutions. At the same time, they play a central role in the rural development of the oases, in particular through their know-how, initiatives and ability to adapt. This policy brief analyses the experiences of women in the oases of south-eastern Morocco. It shows that water stress acts as a multidimensional factor which redefines women’s domestic tasks, agricultural practices, economic opportunities and forms of sociability, as well as their contribution to development. It highlights three major challenges facing women in vulnerable rural areas: (a) limited access to resources (land, credit, infrastructure and education); (b) training that is often ill-suited to rural realities and their needs; and (c) social norms that restrict their participation in decision-making bodies and spaces. The heterogeneity of the women encountered and of their needs underlines the necessity for targeted and diverse approaches. The example of Moroccan oases also shows the importance of considering water in all its dimensions: domestic, agricultural, economic and institutional. This would provide a better understanding of both women’s vulnerabilities and their contributions to sustainable development. The lessons learnt from the Moroccan oases provide a benchmark for other arid countries, highlighting four action areas for Moroccan institutions and development policies:
1. Produce and disseminate gendered data
• Collect information disaggregated by gender, age, socio-economic status and other factors.
• Map women’s vulnerabilities, resources and skills.
• Ensure better circulation of these data between the field and decision-makers to provide appropriate support.
2. Support women’s access to public services, land and credit
• Promote access to health and education services according to specific needs, as well as access to credit and land.
3. Support women’s initiatives
• Support collective and individual initiatives through appropriate training, access to finance, and product development and marketing.
4. Support changes in social norms and institutional representation
• Integrate the cultural and social dimensions into development policies and programmes.
• Promote changes in the social representations of women’s roles and abilities.
• Promote the diversity of women’s initiatives and facilitate the participation of women in governance institutions, including water governance, through training and awareness-raising.
Hind Ftouhi is a senior researcher at the Institut National d’Aménagement et d'Urbanisme (INAU-Rabat).
Lisa Bossenbroek is a senior researcher at the Centre de Recherche sur les Sociétés Contemporaines (CRESC-Rabat).
Amal Belghazi is a doctoral student at l’Université Hassan II, Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines et sociales Ain Chock in Casablanca.
In many arid and semi-arid regions, rural women are at the heart of water-related dynamics – and therefore greatly affected by its scarcity. This scarcity affects their daily lives, farming activities, economic initiatives and solidarity networks, which are directly dependent on the availability of this resource. These women are often more vulnerable to climate change because of the difficulties they sometimes experience in accessing public services, land, water and institutions. At the same time, they play a central role in the rural development of the oases, in particular through their know-how, initiatives and ability to adapt. This policy brief analyses the experiences of women in the oases of south-eastern Morocco. It shows that water stress acts as a multidimensional factor which redefines women’s domestic tasks, agricultural practices, economic opportunities and forms of sociability, as well as their contribution to development. It highlights three major challenges facing women in vulnerable rural areas: (a) limited access to resources (land, credit, infrastructure and education); (b) training that is often ill-suited to rural realities and their needs; and (c) social norms that restrict their participation in decision-making bodies and spaces. The heterogeneity of the women encountered and of their needs underlines the necessity for targeted and diverse approaches. The example of Moroccan oases also shows the importance of considering water in all its dimensions: domestic, agricultural, economic and institutional. This would provide a better understanding of both women’s vulnerabilities and their contributions to sustainable development. The lessons learnt from the Moroccan oases provide a benchmark for other arid countries, highlighting four action areas for Moroccan institutions and development policies:
1. Produce and disseminate gendered data
• Collect information disaggregated by gender, age, socio-economic status and other factors.
• Map women’s vulnerabilities, resources and skills.
• Ensure better circulation of these data between the field and decision-makers to provide appropriate support.
2. Support women’s access to public services, land and credit
• Promote access to health and education services according to specific needs, as well as access to credit and land.
3. Support women’s initiatives
• Support collective and individual initiatives through appropriate training, access to finance, and product development and marketing.
4. Support changes in social norms and institutional representation
• Integrate the cultural and social dimensions into development policies and programmes.
• Promote changes in the social representations of women’s roles and abilities.
• Promote the diversity of women’s initiatives and facilitate the participation of women in governance institutions, including water governance, through training and awareness-raising.
Hind Ftouhi is a senior researcher at the Institut National d’Aménagement et d'Urbanisme (INAU-Rabat).
Lisa Bossenbroek is a senior researcher at the Centre de Recherche sur les Sociétés Contemporaines (CRESC-Rabat).
Amal Belghazi is a doctoral student at l’Université Hassan II, Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines et sociales Ain Chock in Casablanca.
Policy makers and experts from EU institutions, the UN, Member States, civil society and academia will come together to exchange views about their findings and experiences, and explore ways to improve responses to TNR, including through policy initiatives, synergies and collaborations. This is a concrete follow-up action by DROI on the recently adopted by the Parliament report on Addressing TNR of Human Rights Defenders (HRDs).
TNR constitutes an increasing danger both by posing systemic threats to human rights, civic space, democratic institutions and the rule of law and by frequently undermining national security, sovereignty and legal order of host states.
Policy makers and experts from EU institutions, the UN, Member States, civil society and academia will come together to exchange views about their findings and experiences, and explore ways to improve responses to TNR, including through policy initiatives, synergies and collaborations. This is a concrete follow-up action by DROI on the recently adopted by the Parliament report on Addressing TNR of Human Rights Defenders (HRDs).
Le couperet attendu depuis des mois est tombé. La raffinerie NIS de Pančevo, la seule de Serbie, à quelques kilomètres de Belgrade, est presque à l'arrêt depuis mardi 25 novembre, privée d'approvisionnement en pétrole brut à la suite des sanctions des Etats-Unis contre la Russie.
- Articles / Serbie, Relations internationales, Énergie Balkans, Russie BalkansLe couperet attendu depuis des mois est tombé. La raffinerie NIS de Pančevo, la seule de Serbie, à quelques kilomètres de Belgrade, est presque à l'arrêt depuis mardi 25 novembre, privée d'approvisionnement en pétrole brut à la suite des sanctions des Etats-Unis contre la Russie.
- Articles / Serbie, Relations internationales, Énergie Balkans, Russie BalkansNigerians at a newspaper stand with headlines reflecting the Trump versus Nigeria saga. Credit: Promise Eze/IPS
By Promise Eze
ABUJA, Nigeria, Nov 26 2025 (IPS)
Diplomatic relations between Nigeria and the US have continued to sour after US President Donald Trump threatened ‘military’ intervention over what some American lawmakers have called “Christian genocide” in Africa’s most populous country.
In a series of posts on his social media platform on October 31, Trump accused the Nigerian government of ignoring the killing of Christians by “radical Islamists.” He warned that Washington would suspend all aid to Nigeria and would go into the “disgraced” country “guns-a-blazing” if Abuja failed to respond.
“Christianity is facing an existential threat in Nigeria. Thousands of Christians are being killed. Radical Islamists are responsible for this mass slaughter,” Trump wrote.
He went on to declare Nigeria a “country of particular concern” for alleged violations of religious freedom, instructing the US Department of War to prepare for “possible action” and warning that any strike would be “fast, vicious, and sweet.”
Trump’s remarks follow years of lobbying by American evangelical groups and conservative lawmakers who accuse the Nigerian government of complicity in attacks on Christians in the country.
This is not the first time Trump has accused an African country of genocide. Earlier this year, he claimed that South Africa was committing genocide against white farmers.
Recently, the US stayed away from the G20 summit in South Africa, apparently because of these widely disputed claims that white people are being targeted in the country.
Disputed Narratives
According to an organization that claims to track persecuted Christians, Open Doors International, Nigeria remains one of the world’s most dangerous places to be a Christian, ranking seventh on its 2025 World Watch List of nations where believers face the most persecution.
A report by the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law estimated that jihadist groups killed more than 7,000 Christians and abducted 7,800 others in 2025 alone. The organization asserts that since 2009, they have killed over 125,000 Christians, destroyed 19,000 churches, and displaced more than 1,100 communities.
Open Doors’ data suggests that Christians in northern Nigeria are 6.5 times more likely to be killed and five times more likely to be abducted than Muslims.
However, the Nigerian authorities have rejected claims of a state-sponsored Christian genocide, insisting that both Christians and Muslims suffer from extremist violence.
Analysts caution that portraying Nigeria’s insecurity as purely religious oversimplifies a crisis rooted in political and economic failure.
With its 230 million citizens divided almost evenly between Christians and Muslims, the country faces multiple overlapping threats, from Boko Haram’s Islamist insurgency and farmer-herder conflicts to ethnic rivalries and separatist agitations in the southeast.
While Christians are among those targeted, researchers note that many victims of armed groups are Muslims living in Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim north, where most attacks are not driven solely by religion.
Data from the US-based Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) show that between January 2020 and September 2025, 20,409 civilians were killed in 11,862 attacks across Nigeria. Of these, only 385 incidents were explicitly linked to victims’ Christian identity, resulting in 317 deaths, while 196 attacks targeted Muslims, leaving 417 dead.
“Trump’s comment has certainly drawn global attention to the problem of insecurity in Nigeria, but it also raises questions about foreign influence and national sovereignty,” said Oludare Ogunlana, Professor of National Security at Collin College in Texas. “What I’ve observed is that many who present themselves as experts on African or global security often lack a nuanced understanding of Nigeria’s realities.”
He described Trump’s claims as misguided, stressing that Nigeria’s insecurity is multifaceted and should not be given a religious coloring.
“If you examine the situation closely, it is not a religious war. It reflects systemic governance failures, economic inequality, and weak law enforcement,” he said. “Citizens of all faiths—Christians, Muslims, atheists, and traditional believers—have suffered from kidnapping, organized crime, and other forms of violence. These criminal activities emerge from disparities in wealth and control over resources, resulting in loss of life across communities.”
Religious Tensions
Trump’s remarks have already inflamed tensions at home and analysts have cautioned that framing Nigeria’s insecurity as a religious conflict risks deepening divisions.
Several Muslim groups have condemned Trump’s comments as an attack on Islam and an attempt to demonize Nigeria’s Muslim population. They argue that Trump, who has long enjoyed support from evangelical Christians, is ill-suited to address the complexities of Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north.
Days after Trump’s comments, members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria marched through Kano to protest the threat of US military action. Chanting “Death to America” and burning the US flag, demonstrators carried placards reading “There is no Christian genocide in Nigeria” and “America wants to control our resources.”
Northern states like Kano have a long history of bloody religious riots, and observers warn that renewed rhetoric could deepen sectarian divides in a region where relations between the two faiths remain fragile.
Christian and non-Muslim groups, on the other hand, maintain that persecution is real. They cite reports noting that more than 300 Nigerians have been killed over alleged blasphemy since 1999, with few perpetrators prosecuted. They call out government officials who support religious extremism and enforce shariah law on non-Muslims.
“It is an honor to be called an Islamic extremist,” wrote Bashir Ahmad, a former aide to ex-President Muhammadu Buhari, in a since-deleted post on X. Ahmad has previously called for the death penalty for blasphemy.
Deborah Eli Yusuf, a peace advocate with Jugaad Foundation for Peace and Nation Building, expressed concern that ongoing arguments could spill into real-world violence, making tensions difficult to contain.
She told IPS that the government should collaborate with stakeholders to maintain peace.
“This is an opportunity for the government to take the lead in facilitating honest interfaith conversations and dialogues that can lead to mutually agreeable resolutions. The government is best positioned to organize discussions that bring together critical stakeholders, including both religious and traditional leaders.
“Many of these conflicts also intersect with ethnic divisions, which further complicate the situation. The conversations happening now present a chance to address these divides. If left unchecked, rising tensions could deepen fragmentation in a country already divided along tribal, ethnic, and class lines,” she said.
Abba Yakubu Yusuf, Coordinator of the Reves Africa Foundation, believes that while Nigeria faces various forms of violent conflict orchestrated by multiple armed groups, it is misleading for the government to deny that Christians are being specifically targeted by some for their faith. He argues that acknowledging this reality is the first step toward finding solutions.
“Since as far back as 2009, the killings in southern Kaduna, Plateau, Benue, and parts of Kano states have been largely religiously motivated,” he claimed. “There was a massacre in Plateau state that saw an entire village wiped out with no survivors. In the northeast, while attacks target Muslims, there are exceptions. In southern Borno, for example, a largely Christian population has suffered the most. Overall, I would say there is a genocide occurring in Nigeria, and we should not lie to ourselves.”
Yusuf warned that continued denial by the government of systematic attacks on Christians, without addressing the root causes, could have serious consequences for the country’s economy.
“We need investors to come to our country, but they are hesitant. This creates a climate of fear and threatens economic growth,” he said.
IPS UN Bureau Report
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
A háború kitörésekor Németországnak két cirkálója, és három segédcirkálója tartózkodott az Atlanti-óceánon. A Dresden néhány heti portyázás és két teherhajó elsüllyesztése után áthajózott a Csendes-óceánra, így az eredetileg az ő leváltására érkezett Karlsruhe maradt az egyetlen német hadihajó a térségben.
A 139 méter hosszú, 4.900 tonnás Karlsruhe vadonatúj, alig fél évvel korábban szolgálatba állított hajó volt, a német haditengerészet egyik legkorszerűbb egysége. A négykéményes cirkáló 26 ezer lóerős turbináinak köszönhetően elérhette a 28 csomós sebességet is, fegyverzete azonban ugyanúgy csak 105 mm-es ágyúkból állt, mint a korábbi német cirkálóknak.
A hajó augusztus hatodikán Pernambuco közelében találkozott a Kronprinz Wilhelm utasszállítóval, melyet a berlini utasításoknak megfelelően fel kellett fegyvereznie, hogy a hajó a továbbiakban segédcirkálóként tevékenykedjen a térségben. A cirkáló által hozott fegyvereket átszállították a Kronprinz Wilhelm fedélzetére, és éppen arra készültek, hogy üzemanyagot vételeznek az utasszállító tágas széntárolóiból, amikor váratlanul feltűnt a láthatáron az angol Suffolk cirkáló, a brit Negyedik Cirkáló Kötelék parancsnokának, Sir Christopher Cradock ellentengernagynak a zászlóshajója. A két német hajó az éppen megkezdett szenelést azonnal félbeszakítva menekülni kezdett, a Karlsruhe északra, a Kronprinz Wilhelm délre. A Suffolk a német cirkálót követte, és közben rádión riadóztatta a közelben tartózkodó Berwick és Bristol cirkálókat is. A Berwick túl lassú volt ahhoz, hogy a német hajót utolérhesse, a gyors járatú Bristol könnyűcirkáló viszont jó helyzetben látszott lenni ahhoz, hogy elvághassa a németek menekülési útvonalát.