Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

In a dialogue with Martin Kochan (GIZ), Anna Pegels outlines a step by step process to develop a recycling system which enables and motivates households to contribute, for example by separating their waste.

In a dialogue with Martin Kochan (GIZ), Anna Pegels outlines a step by step process to develop a recycling system which enables and motivates households to contribute, for example by separating their waste.

In a dialogue with Martin Kochan (GIZ), Anna Pegels outlines a step by step process to develop a recycling system which enables and motivates households to contribute, for example by separating their waste.

Recent protests following the death of people in a blaze in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital raise questions about Beijing’s claimed efficacy of China’s zero-Covid strategy three years into the pandemic. According to many, recent lockdowns in Urumqi led to rescue delays to save the lives of people trapped in a building on fire. This sad event under strict lockdown measures combined with stress, anxiety, fear, insecurity, and unsafety among the majority of the population in China has led to protests across the country. Beijing’s continuous repressive and drastic zero-Covid strategy anytime new cases are declared in Chinese cities has contributed to the ire of the population vis-à-vis the Chinese government as families are disrupted, jobs are lost, and social contacts are broken, without forgetting the psychological impacts of lockdown measures to confine people in barricaded districts. This piece explores China’s zero-Covid strategy, its causes for recent public protests in major Chinese cities and its consequences for the world economy.

Recent protests following the death of people in a blaze in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital raise questions about Beijing’s claimed efficacy of China’s zero-Covid strategy three years into the pandemic. According to many, recent lockdowns in Urumqi led to rescue delays to save the lives of people trapped in a building on fire. This sad event under strict lockdown measures combined with stress, anxiety, fear, insecurity, and unsafety among the majority of the population in China has led to protests across the country. Beijing’s continuous repressive and drastic zero-Covid strategy anytime new cases are declared in Chinese cities has contributed to the ire of the population vis-à-vis the Chinese government as families are disrupted, jobs are lost, and social contacts are broken, without forgetting the psychological impacts of lockdown measures to confine people in barricaded districts. This piece explores China’s zero-Covid strategy, its causes for recent public protests in major Chinese cities and its consequences for the world economy.

Recent protests following the death of people in a blaze in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital raise questions about Beijing’s claimed efficacy of China’s zero-Covid strategy three years into the pandemic. According to many, recent lockdowns in Urumqi led to rescue delays to save the lives of people trapped in a building on fire. This sad event under strict lockdown measures combined with stress, anxiety, fear, insecurity, and unsafety among the majority of the population in China has led to protests across the country. Beijing’s continuous repressive and drastic zero-Covid strategy anytime new cases are declared in Chinese cities has contributed to the ire of the population vis-à-vis the Chinese government as families are disrupted, jobs are lost, and social contacts are broken, without forgetting the psychological impacts of lockdown measures to confine people in barricaded districts. This piece explores China’s zero-Covid strategy, its causes for recent public protests in major Chinese cities and its consequences for the world economy.

Die EU-Energieminister*innen haben sich am Montag auf einen europäischen Gaspreisdeckel von 180 Euro pro Megawattstunde geeinigt. Karsten Neuhoff, Leiter der Abteilung Klimapolitik im DIW Berlin, kommentiert den Gaspreisdeckel wie folgt:

Die jetzige Entscheidung der EU-Energieminister*innen, einen Gaspreisdeckel einzuführen, ist ein kleiner Schritt in die richtige Richtung, um Gas für Unternehmen und private Haushalte in ganz Europa günstiger zu machen. Allerdings werden die angesetzte Höhe von 180 Euro pro Megawattstunde und die Beschränkung auf die Börsenhandelsplätze weder die Gasimporte günstig machen, noch die russischen Einnahmen aus den verbleibenden Exporten schmälern. Um effektiv wirken zu können, hätte der Gaspreis bei 70 Euro pro Megawattstunde gedeckelt werden müssen. Ein Preis, der immer noch ein Vielfaches über dem durchschnittlichen historischen Preis von 20 Euro liegt, aber deutlich geringer ist als die Preise, die wir in diesem Jahr gesehen haben. Er würde somit weiterhin Gasproduzenten weltweit motivieren, Produktion und Liefervolumen zu maximieren.

Die Sorge, ein zu niedriger Preis und eine solche Deckelung könnten verhindern, dass knappes Gas nach Europa fließt und sich damit das Risiko einer Gasmangellage erhöht, ist weitgehend unbegründet. Denn fast alle Gaslieferungen über Pipelines, vor allem aus Norwegen, könnten schon technisch nicht anderswo hin geliefert werden. Auch bei Flüssiggas wird die Produktion weiterhin maximiert. Was den internationalen Wettbewerb um das Gas angeht, hat die Erfahrung in diesem Jahr gezeigt, dass hohe Gaspreise bei den großen asiatischen Gasimporteuren vor allem zu einer Umstellung der Strom- und Industrieproduktion von Gas auf Öl und Kohle führten – dafür schaffen auch Gaspreise ab rund 50 Euro/MWh ausreichend Anreize. Die Energieminister*innen hätten also weitaus mutiger sein sollen, einen relevanten Gaspreisdeckel zu definieren und dabei auch verbindliche Gaseinsparziele zu verhandeln. Das trägt sowohl zur Versorgungssicherheit als auch zur Finanzierbarkeit bei.

The worldwide wave of autocratization is doing away with many of the democratic achievements made since 1989. Scholarship on international democracy promotion is yet to theorise how democracy can be protected from autocratization. Such a theory must account for different democratic and autocratic trajectories as well as integrate theoretical approaches from international relations and comparative politics in the study of democracy promotion. However, such a combined perspective is still missing. One reason for this is that the field lacks a clear concept of “protection” and does not yet systematically integrate evidence from democratization research. This paper addresses this research gap. It is the first attempt to develop a concept theory of democracy promotion, which includes support and protection of democracy. Coupling this with a depiction of six phases of regime change, this paper makes a second contribution: based on the proposed conceptual and theoretical integration, it generates a series of testable anchor points for further empirical analysis on what strategies are most likely to be effective during the various phases of regime change.

The worldwide wave of autocratization is doing away with many of the democratic achievements made since 1989. Scholarship on international democracy promotion is yet to theorise how democracy can be protected from autocratization. Such a theory must account for different democratic and autocratic trajectories as well as integrate theoretical approaches from international relations and comparative politics in the study of democracy promotion. However, such a combined perspective is still missing. One reason for this is that the field lacks a clear concept of “protection” and does not yet systematically integrate evidence from democratization research. This paper addresses this research gap. It is the first attempt to develop a concept theory of democracy promotion, which includes support and protection of democracy. Coupling this with a depiction of six phases of regime change, this paper makes a second contribution: based on the proposed conceptual and theoretical integration, it generates a series of testable anchor points for further empirical analysis on what strategies are most likely to be effective during the various phases of regime change.

The worldwide wave of autocratization is doing away with many of the democratic achievements made since 1989. Scholarship on international democracy promotion is yet to theorise how democracy can be protected from autocratization. Such a theory must account for different democratic and autocratic trajectories as well as integrate theoretical approaches from international relations and comparative politics in the study of democracy promotion. However, such a combined perspective is still missing. One reason for this is that the field lacks a clear concept of “protection” and does not yet systematically integrate evidence from democratization research. This paper addresses this research gap. It is the first attempt to develop a concept theory of democracy promotion, which includes support and protection of democracy. Coupling this with a depiction of six phases of regime change, this paper makes a second contribution: based on the proposed conceptual and theoretical integration, it generates a series of testable anchor points for further empirical analysis on what strategies are most likely to be effective during the various phases of regime change.

This empirical analysis investigates whether and to what extent social cohesion and the coverage of social protection schemes influence governments’ decisions about the stringency of COVID-19 containment policies during the first and second waves in 2020 in Africa. Our results indicate that societal and social factors influenced the stringency of containment policies. Social cohesion has a negative effect on the stringency of containment policies in response to COVID-19 over time. Social protection coverage has a positive effect on the stringency of containment policies in response to COVID-19 over time. States implemented more stringent containment policies in less cohesive societies if they already had social protection schemes in place before the pandemic. Contextual factors mediated these effects. While stringency of containment policies softened over time where levels of democracy, poverty, and inequality were higher, social protection made a mediating difference only in autocratic states and societies with higher poverty. Three contributions of the empirical analysis stand out. First, the conceptual integration of societal and social factors (“societal triangle”) provides a novel basis from which to analyse policy responses during external shocks like a global pandemic. Second, to overcome the limitations of current measurements of social cohesion, we use a novel measurement to determine pre-pandemic levels of social cohesion. Third, this is the first cross-national study that addresses a world region, Africa, which has gained little attention in the study of policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

This empirical analysis investigates whether and to what extent social cohesion and the coverage of social protection schemes influence governments’ decisions about the stringency of COVID-19 containment policies during the first and second waves in 2020 in Africa. Our results indicate that societal and social factors influenced the stringency of containment policies. Social cohesion has a negative effect on the stringency of containment policies in response to COVID-19 over time. Social protection coverage has a positive effect on the stringency of containment policies in response to COVID-19 over time. States implemented more stringent containment policies in less cohesive societies if they already had social protection schemes in place before the pandemic. Contextual factors mediated these effects. While stringency of containment policies softened over time where levels of democracy, poverty, and inequality were higher, social protection made a mediating difference only in autocratic states and societies with higher poverty. Three contributions of the empirical analysis stand out. First, the conceptual integration of societal and social factors (“societal triangle”) provides a novel basis from which to analyse policy responses during external shocks like a global pandemic. Second, to overcome the limitations of current measurements of social cohesion, we use a novel measurement to determine pre-pandemic levels of social cohesion. Third, this is the first cross-national study that addresses a world region, Africa, which has gained little attention in the study of policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

This empirical analysis investigates whether and to what extent social cohesion and the coverage of social protection schemes influence governments’ decisions about the stringency of COVID-19 containment policies during the first and second waves in 2020 in Africa. Our results indicate that societal and social factors influenced the stringency of containment policies. Social cohesion has a negative effect on the stringency of containment policies in response to COVID-19 over time. Social protection coverage has a positive effect on the stringency of containment policies in response to COVID-19 over time. States implemented more stringent containment policies in less cohesive societies if they already had social protection schemes in place before the pandemic. Contextual factors mediated these effects. While stringency of containment policies softened over time where levels of democracy, poverty, and inequality were higher, social protection made a mediating difference only in autocratic states and societies with higher poverty. Three contributions of the empirical analysis stand out. First, the conceptual integration of societal and social factors (“societal triangle”) provides a novel basis from which to analyse policy responses during external shocks like a global pandemic. Second, to overcome the limitations of current measurements of social cohesion, we use a novel measurement to determine pre-pandemic levels of social cohesion. Third, this is the first cross-national study that addresses a world region, Africa, which has gained little attention in the study of policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Die heute vom Rat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) beschlossene Leitzinserhöhung kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die Europäische Zentralbank zieht die geldpolitischen Zügel weniger hart und schnell an als bisher: Die Erhöhung des Leitzinses um 0,5 weitere Prozentpunkte ist geringer als vielfach gefordert. Mit dem Leitzins von nun 2,5 Prozent dürfte der größte Teil der Zinserhöhungen hinter uns liegen. 

Auch das Versprechen der EZB, ihre Wertpapierbestände zu reduzieren und einen Teil wieder in den Markt zurückzugeben, signalisiert einen eher vorsichtigen Kurs der Normalisierung. Ich erwarte eine Reduktion um höchstens 200 Milliarden Euro der insgesamt knapp fünf Billionen Euro an Wertpapierbeständen in den Bilanzen der EZB und der nationalen Zentralbanken im kommenden Jahr. Damit scheint sich eine Mehrheit der Mitglieder des Zentralbankrates gegen die Forderung der Bundesbank nach einem sehr viel schnelleren Abbau der Bilanz zu stellen. Die Bundesbank und andere Zentralbanken werden sich in den kommenden Jahren auf erhebliche rechnerische Verluste einstellen müssen. Dies ist nach vielen Jahren sehr hoher Gewinne die logische Kehrseite der Politik der quantitativen Lockerung. Die Bundesbank und andere Zentralbanken stellt das zwar vor keinerlei finanzielle Probleme, es könnte jedoch als ein Malus für ihre Reputation angesehen werden. 

Die EZB hat erkannt, dass die Risiken einer zu schnellen und zu harten geldpolitischen Reaktion mehr Risiken als Vorteile bergen. Die Zinserhöhungen dürften sich bereits jetzt negativ auf die Wirtschaft auswirken und die vorhergesagte Rezession nochmals ein wenig vertiefen. So ist beispielsweise der Rückgang der Bautätigkeit auch ein Resultat des erheblichen Anstiegs der Zinsen. Dagegen werden die Zinserhöhungen kaum etwas an der zu hohen Inflation in den kommenden 18 Monaten ändern können, da der größte Teil der Inflation durch höhere Kosten für Energie und andere Rohstoffe importiert und daher kaum beeinflussbar ist. Ich halte die neue EZB-Prognose, mit einer Rückkehr zur Preisstabilität und einer Inflationsrate um die zwei Prozent Ende des Jahres 2024, für zu optimistisch. Ich sehe die Inflation im Euroraum bei über sechs Prozent im Jahr 2023 und in den kommenden fünf Jahren im Durchschnitt eher bei drei Prozent oder mehr – mit erheblichen Schwankungen.

Nucleus-outgrower schemes (NOSs) are supposed to be a particularly effective private-sector mechanism to support smallholder farmers and contribute towards mitigating the problematic aspects of pure large-scale agricultural investments. This discussion paper uses panel household survey data collected in two rounds in Zambia to analyse some agro-ecological and socio-economic impacts of the outgrower programme of one of the largest agricultural investments in Zambia: Amatheon Agri Zambia (AAZ) Limited. The descriptive results show that the type of participation in the programme varies across participants and components, with most participating in trainings. Econometric results suggest the following key findings. First, although the overall impact of the AAZ outgrower programme on the uptake of conservation agriculture practices is robust and promising, impacts on the adoption of other agricultural technologies is less obvious and the effect depends on the type of support provided. Second, the programme has had a significant impact on maize productivity promoted in the initial phase but not on the other crops – mainly oilseeds – promoted later. Third, the initially less productive farmers seem to benefit slightly more than already better performing ones. Fourth, although the impact on overall household security was insignificant, there is some suggestive evidence (although the effect is weak) that the programme has a positive effect on improving women’s uptake of micronutrients. Finally, our findings show that the three components of the programme (trainings, seed loans and output purchases) have different effects on the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices and productivity, and to some extent on food security. Overall, the results suggest that NOSs, with all their risks, can play a role in the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices, improving farm-level agricultural technologies, providing input credit, and thereby improving productivity and smallholder livelihoods. However, this is not automatically the case, as it crucially depends on the design and management of the project; the availability of good policies and institutions governing the rules of operation; the types of crops promoted; the duration of the project; and the political commitment of host countries, among others.

Nucleus-outgrower schemes (NOSs) are supposed to be a particularly effective private-sector mechanism to support smallholder farmers and contribute towards mitigating the problematic aspects of pure large-scale agricultural investments. This discussion paper uses panel household survey data collected in two rounds in Zambia to analyse some agro-ecological and socio-economic impacts of the outgrower programme of one of the largest agricultural investments in Zambia: Amatheon Agri Zambia (AAZ) Limited. The descriptive results show that the type of participation in the programme varies across participants and components, with most participating in trainings. Econometric results suggest the following key findings. First, although the overall impact of the AAZ outgrower programme on the uptake of conservation agriculture practices is robust and promising, impacts on the adoption of other agricultural technologies is less obvious and the effect depends on the type of support provided. Second, the programme has had a significant impact on maize productivity promoted in the initial phase but not on the other crops – mainly oilseeds – promoted later. Third, the initially less productive farmers seem to benefit slightly more than already better performing ones. Fourth, although the impact on overall household security was insignificant, there is some suggestive evidence (although the effect is weak) that the programme has a positive effect on improving women’s uptake of micronutrients. Finally, our findings show that the three components of the programme (trainings, seed loans and output purchases) have different effects on the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices and productivity, and to some extent on food security. Overall, the results suggest that NOSs, with all their risks, can play a role in the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices, improving farm-level agricultural technologies, providing input credit, and thereby improving productivity and smallholder livelihoods. However, this is not automatically the case, as it crucially depends on the design and management of the project; the availability of good policies and institutions governing the rules of operation; the types of crops promoted; the duration of the project; and the political commitment of host countries, among others.