Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Bonn, 5. Dezember 2022. Vom 7. bis zum 19. Dezember 2022 wird die 15. Vertragsstaatenkonferenz (COP) des Übereinkommens über die biologische Vielfalt (CBD) im kanadischen Montreal unter dem Vorsitz von China stattfinden. Trotz der schwierigen geopolitischen Weltlage wird erwartet, dass sich die Regierungen auf ein neues „globales Rahmenabkommen für Biodiversität“ (GBF) einigen werden. Viele Beobachter*innen hoffen auf eine bahnbrechende Vereinbarung zum Schutz der biologischen Vielfalt. Manche sprechen gar von der „letzten Chance für die Natur“.

Der aktuelle Entwurf des GBF steht ganz im Zeichen der Agenda 2030 und des Pariser Abkommens, fordert er doch einen Wandel in den „Beziehungen der Gesellschaften zur biologischen Vielfalt“. Die zugehörige Erklärung von Kunming, die auf der ersten Sitzung der COP15 im Oktober 2021 in China verabschiedet wurde, betont die Notwendigkeit eines „transformativen Wandels in allen Wirtschaftssektoren und allen Teilen der Gesellschaft“ und die „Sicherstellung von Nachhaltigkeit in Produktion und Konsum“. Es scheint, dass Regierungen zunehmend anerkennen, was Wissenschaftler*innen und Umweltaktivist*innen schon seit Jahrzehnten fordern: Wir müssen aus nicht nachhaltigen Formen der Produktion und des Konsums aussteigen.

Viele politische Entscheidungsträger*innen, NGOs und Naturschützer*innen sind sich zwar einig, dass tiefgreifender Wandel notwendig ist – doch der Entwurf des GBFs spiegelt dies nur in Teilen wieder. Das GBF zeichnet sich überwiegend, wie viele multilaterale UN-Dokumente auch, durch technokratische Vorgaben und Zielen aus. Das mag viele Experten*innen nicht überraschen, doch ist dies eine der wesentlichen Schwächen des künftigen GBF. Die politische Ökonomie des Naturschutzes bleibt weitestgehend außen vor. Regierungen sollten aus unserer Sicht die progressiven Elemente der Erklärung von Kunming ernst nehmen und anerkennen, dass wir eine sozial-ökologische Transformation benötigen, um den Verlust von Biodiversität zu stoppen. Wenn wir unser aktuelles Wirtschaftssystem nicht grundsätzlich infrage stellen, bleibt der Erfolg des neuen GBF höchst unwahrscheinlich.

Die wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse sind eindeutig, alarmierend und enttäuschend. Trotz einer wachsenden Zahl von Schutzgebieten und marktorientierter Naturschutzinstrumente ist die biologische Vielfalt seit 1970 weltweit um 68 Prozent zurückgegangen. Dennoch bleibt unendliches Wirtschaftswachstum das vorherrschende Paradigma – den verheerenden Auswirkungen auf die Ökosysteme zum Trotz. Darüber hinaus machen komplexe Wertschöpfungsketten und die damit verbundene Trennung der Produktion (z.B. Holzeinschlag im Regenwald) vom Konsum, das Artensterben in unserem täglichen Leben schwer greifbar. Die Verluste finden anderswo statt und bleiben für uns unsichtbar.

Nichtmenschliche Lebewesen sind nicht Teil unserer „communities of justice“ (Gerechtigkeitsgemeinschaften). Sie sind meist nur dann relevant, wenn sie unseren Interessen dienen (z.B. als Nahrung oder zur Bestäubung), als Faktoren von Kosten-Nutzen-Rechnungen und im Rahmen von vorgeschriebenen Kompensationsmaßnahmen, etwa bei großen Infrastrukturprojekten. So warf eine große deutsche Tageszeitung Gegner*innen der Elbvertiefung und des Ausbaus der Fahrrinne einst vor, dass sie gefährdeten Arten wie dem Schierlings Wasserfenchel mehr Wert beimessen würden als Arbeitsplätzen und Steuereinnahmen. Der Schutz der Artenvielfalt scheint also nur solange erwünscht, wenn er sich nicht auf unsere Volkswirtschaften auswirkt. Hier stellt sich folglich die Frage: Wie viele Arbeitsplätze ist uns das Aussterben von Arten wert?

Was ist nötig, um den Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt zu stoppen und den Trend umzukehren? Was müssen wir tun, um das neue GBF erfolgreich umzusetzen? Zunächst müssen wir anerkennen, dass unser Wirtschaftssystem und sein inhärentes und permanentes Streben nach Expansion zu einer verstärkten Ressourcennutzung, zur Zerstörung von Lebensräumen und zum Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt führt. Folglich erfordert das GBF eine sozial-ökologische Transformation hin zu einer Wirtschaft, die ohne permanentes Wachstum von Produktion und Konsum auskommt. Das Wirtschaften in einer solchen Gesellschaft sollte nicht der Kapitalakkumulation dienen, sondern einen Zustand anstreben, in dem Wohlstand und eine intakte biologische Vielfalt vereinbar sind. Dies erfordert eine durchschnittliche Verringerung der Produktion und des Konsums in einigen Wirtschaftssektoren, während es in Bereichen wie erneuerbare Energien, Bildung, Gesundheit und Pflege Wachstum erfordert. Ein solcher Wandel würde dem Wohlergehen der Menschen, dem Bewahren der biologischen Vielfalt, Vorrang vor Kapitalakkumulation und Profit einräumen. So könnten wir einige der Ursachen für den Verlust der Artenvielfalt aus dem Weg räumen.

Zweitens müssen wir beim Schutz der Biodiversität neue Ansätze verfolgen, die über marktorientierte Instrumente, Kosten-Nutzen-Ansätze und Schutzgebiete, die den Menschen getrennt von der Natur betrachten, hinausgehen. Schutzstrategien sollten die Rolle indigener Gruppen und lokaler Gemeinschaften anerkennen und jene Akteur*innen unterstützen, die seit Jahrhunderten zur Erhaltung der biologischen Vielfalt beitragen. Ein bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen für den Naturschutz ist hier ein vielversprechendes Instrument. Es würde Menschen zugutekommen, die in Gebieten leben, in denen dem Erhalt der Biodiversität eine große Rolle zukommt. Die Zahlungen würden die Grundbedürfnisse indigener Gruppen und lokaler Gemeinschaften (IPLC) decken. Sie können außerdem als eine Form der „Wiedergutmachung“ für IPLCs angesehen werden, da sie im Zuge der Einrichtung neuer Schutzgebiete häufig von ihrem traditionellen Land vertrieben wurden.

This paper offers a comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese partnerships with the United Nations (UN) as a mechanism and channel for policy transfer. In international policy travel flows, China and Brazil currently hold privileged places as hubs from which development-related policies travel and through which they circulate. Both countries have invested in systematising their development experience and transferring development policies within their regions and beyond – often through triangular cooperation, i.e. South–South cooperation supported by third actors such as UN entities. So far, however, this variegated engagement has remained under the radar of scholarly attention. To address this gap, we examine 35 policy transfer partnerships – 17 for Brazil and 18 for China – forged with different parts of the UN system over the last two decades. In order to offer a first systematic account of partnership trajectories, we provide an overview of partnership types (namely projects, programmes and policy centres) and transfer dimensions (including the policies themselves, transfer agents and governance arrangements). Our comparative mapping presents an evolving landscape: while Brazil was first in institutionalising robust policy transfer partnerships with numerous UN entities and then slowed down, China started more cautiously but has significantly expanded its collaboration with the UN system since 2015. The partnerships analysed cover a substantial range of sectors, with a particular focus – for both Brazil and China – on agricultural policies. While Brazilian partnerships with the UN primarily engage with linkages between agriculture and social protection, however, China–UN partnerships focus more on productivity and market linkages. As the first comprehensive mapping and comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese policy transfer partnerships with the UN, this paper contributes to a better understanding of (triangular) cooperation schemes between international organisations and their member states, as well as debates about how policies deemed as successful travel around the globe.

This paper offers a comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese partnerships with the United Nations (UN) as a mechanism and channel for policy transfer. In international policy travel flows, China and Brazil currently hold privileged places as hubs from which development-related policies travel and through which they circulate. Both countries have invested in systematising their development experience and transferring development policies within their regions and beyond – often through triangular cooperation, i.e. South–South cooperation supported by third actors such as UN entities. So far, however, this variegated engagement has remained under the radar of scholarly attention. To address this gap, we examine 35 policy transfer partnerships – 17 for Brazil and 18 for China – forged with different parts of the UN system over the last two decades. In order to offer a first systematic account of partnership trajectories, we provide an overview of partnership types (namely projects, programmes and policy centres) and transfer dimensions (including the policies themselves, transfer agents and governance arrangements). Our comparative mapping presents an evolving landscape: while Brazil was first in institutionalising robust policy transfer partnerships with numerous UN entities and then slowed down, China started more cautiously but has significantly expanded its collaboration with the UN system since 2015. The partnerships analysed cover a substantial range of sectors, with a particular focus – for both Brazil and China – on agricultural policies. While Brazilian partnerships with the UN primarily engage with linkages between agriculture and social protection, however, China–UN partnerships focus more on productivity and market linkages. As the first comprehensive mapping and comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese policy transfer partnerships with the UN, this paper contributes to a better understanding of (triangular) cooperation schemes between international organisations and their member states, as well as debates about how policies deemed as successful travel around the globe.

This paper offers a comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese partnerships with the United Nations (UN) as a mechanism and channel for policy transfer. In international policy travel flows, China and Brazil currently hold privileged places as hubs from which development-related policies travel and through which they circulate. Both countries have invested in systematising their development experience and transferring development policies within their regions and beyond – often through triangular cooperation, i.e. South–South cooperation supported by third actors such as UN entities. So far, however, this variegated engagement has remained under the radar of scholarly attention. To address this gap, we examine 35 policy transfer partnerships – 17 for Brazil and 18 for China – forged with different parts of the UN system over the last two decades. In order to offer a first systematic account of partnership trajectories, we provide an overview of partnership types (namely projects, programmes and policy centres) and transfer dimensions (including the policies themselves, transfer agents and governance arrangements). Our comparative mapping presents an evolving landscape: while Brazil was first in institutionalising robust policy transfer partnerships with numerous UN entities and then slowed down, China started more cautiously but has significantly expanded its collaboration with the UN system since 2015. The partnerships analysed cover a substantial range of sectors, with a particular focus – for both Brazil and China – on agricultural policies. While Brazilian partnerships with the UN primarily engage with linkages between agriculture and social protection, however, China–UN partnerships focus more on productivity and market linkages. As the first comprehensive mapping and comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese policy transfer partnerships with the UN, this paper contributes to a better understanding of (triangular) cooperation schemes between international organisations and their member states, as well as debates about how policies deemed as successful travel around the globe.

As the EU repositions itself in a multipolar world, it should strengthen its strategic autonomy by forging cooperative alliances with a diverse range of partners and aligning its external policies to the global common good. Already in 2016, The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (European External Action Service, 2017) spoke of ‘times of existential crisis’ and set out to navigate a ‘difficult, more connected, contested and complex world‘. While nurturing ‘the ambition of strategic autonomy’ and calling to strengthen the Union on security and defense, the strategy also recognised that Europe ‘cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats’: the EU needed to ‘invest in win-win solutions, and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game‘. The Strategy not only noted that ‘our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders’ but also that ‘prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals worldwide, including in Europe‘. In 2022, for most of Europe the world looks quite different from that of 2016. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been acknowledged as a ‘watershed moment in global politics’ (von der Leyen, 2022), but this and its political ramifications should also be seen as part of a broader and long-term global sea change that was already becoming palpable when the Global Strategy was conceptualised.

As the EU repositions itself in a multipolar world, it should strengthen its strategic autonomy by forging cooperative alliances with a diverse range of partners and aligning its external policies to the global common good. Already in 2016, The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (European External Action Service, 2017) spoke of ‘times of existential crisis’ and set out to navigate a ‘difficult, more connected, contested and complex world‘. While nurturing ‘the ambition of strategic autonomy’ and calling to strengthen the Union on security and defense, the strategy also recognised that Europe ‘cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats’: the EU needed to ‘invest in win-win solutions, and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game‘. The Strategy not only noted that ‘our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders’ but also that ‘prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals worldwide, including in Europe‘. In 2022, for most of Europe the world looks quite different from that of 2016. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been acknowledged as a ‘watershed moment in global politics’ (von der Leyen, 2022), but this and its political ramifications should also be seen as part of a broader and long-term global sea change that was already becoming palpable when the Global Strategy was conceptualised.

As the EU repositions itself in a multipolar world, it should strengthen its strategic autonomy by forging cooperative alliances with a diverse range of partners and aligning its external policies to the global common good. Already in 2016, The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (European External Action Service, 2017) spoke of ‘times of existential crisis’ and set out to navigate a ‘difficult, more connected, contested and complex world‘. While nurturing ‘the ambition of strategic autonomy’ and calling to strengthen the Union on security and defense, the strategy also recognised that Europe ‘cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats’: the EU needed to ‘invest in win-win solutions, and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game‘. The Strategy not only noted that ‘our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders’ but also that ‘prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals worldwide, including in Europe‘. In 2022, for most of Europe the world looks quite different from that of 2016. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been acknowledged as a ‘watershed moment in global politics’ (von der Leyen, 2022), but this and its political ramifications should also be seen as part of a broader and long-term global sea change that was already becoming palpable when the Global Strategy was conceptualised.

Due to the strong interconnectedness between the ocean and our societies worldwide, improved ocean governance is essential for sustainable development in the context of the UN Ocean Decade. However, a multitude of different perspectives—ecological, societal, political, economic—and relations between these have to be understood and taken into consideration to foster transformative pathways towards marine sustainability. A core challenge that we are facing is that the ‘right’ response to complex societal issues cannot be known beforehand as abilities to predict complex systems are limited. Consequently, societal transformation is necessarily a journey towards the unknown and therefore requires experimental approaches that must enable the involvement of everyone with stakes in the future of our marine environment and its resources. A promising transdisciplinary research method that fulfils both criteria—being participatory and experimental—are real-world laboratories. Here, we discuss how real-world labs can serve as an operational framework in the context of the Ocean Decade by facilitating and guiding successful knowledge exchange at the interface of science and society. The core element of real-world labs is transdisciplinary experimentation to jointly develop potential strategies leading to targeted real-world interventions, essential for achieving the proposed ‘Decade Outcomes’. The authors specifically illustrate how deploying the concept of real-world labs can be advantageous when having to deal with multiple, overlapping challenges in the context of ocean governance and the blue economy. Altogether, we offer a first major contribution to synthesizing knowledge on the potentials of marine real-world labs, considering how they act as a way of exploring options for sustainable ocean futures. Indeed, in the marine context, real-world labs are still under-explored but are a tangible way for addressing the societal challenges of working towards sustainability transformations over the coming UN Ocean Decade and beyond.

Due to the strong interconnectedness between the ocean and our societies worldwide, improved ocean governance is essential for sustainable development in the context of the UN Ocean Decade. However, a multitude of different perspectives—ecological, societal, political, economic—and relations between these have to be understood and taken into consideration to foster transformative pathways towards marine sustainability. A core challenge that we are facing is that the ‘right’ response to complex societal issues cannot be known beforehand as abilities to predict complex systems are limited. Consequently, societal transformation is necessarily a journey towards the unknown and therefore requires experimental approaches that must enable the involvement of everyone with stakes in the future of our marine environment and its resources. A promising transdisciplinary research method that fulfils both criteria—being participatory and experimental—are real-world laboratories. Here, we discuss how real-world labs can serve as an operational framework in the context of the Ocean Decade by facilitating and guiding successful knowledge exchange at the interface of science and society. The core element of real-world labs is transdisciplinary experimentation to jointly develop potential strategies leading to targeted real-world interventions, essential for achieving the proposed ‘Decade Outcomes’. The authors specifically illustrate how deploying the concept of real-world labs can be advantageous when having to deal with multiple, overlapping challenges in the context of ocean governance and the blue economy. Altogether, we offer a first major contribution to synthesizing knowledge on the potentials of marine real-world labs, considering how they act as a way of exploring options for sustainable ocean futures. Indeed, in the marine context, real-world labs are still under-explored but are a tangible way for addressing the societal challenges of working towards sustainability transformations over the coming UN Ocean Decade and beyond.

Due to the strong interconnectedness between the ocean and our societies worldwide, improved ocean governance is essential for sustainable development in the context of the UN Ocean Decade. However, a multitude of different perspectives—ecological, societal, political, economic—and relations between these have to be understood and taken into consideration to foster transformative pathways towards marine sustainability. A core challenge that we are facing is that the ‘right’ response to complex societal issues cannot be known beforehand as abilities to predict complex systems are limited. Consequently, societal transformation is necessarily a journey towards the unknown and therefore requires experimental approaches that must enable the involvement of everyone with stakes in the future of our marine environment and its resources. A promising transdisciplinary research method that fulfils both criteria—being participatory and experimental—are real-world laboratories. Here, we discuss how real-world labs can serve as an operational framework in the context of the Ocean Decade by facilitating and guiding successful knowledge exchange at the interface of science and society. The core element of real-world labs is transdisciplinary experimentation to jointly develop potential strategies leading to targeted real-world interventions, essential for achieving the proposed ‘Decade Outcomes’. The authors specifically illustrate how deploying the concept of real-world labs can be advantageous when having to deal with multiple, overlapping challenges in the context of ocean governance and the blue economy. Altogether, we offer a first major contribution to synthesizing knowledge on the potentials of marine real-world labs, considering how they act as a way of exploring options for sustainable ocean futures. Indeed, in the marine context, real-world labs are still under-explored but are a tangible way for addressing the societal challenges of working towards sustainability transformations over the coming UN Ocean Decade and beyond.

Der Präsident der UN-Generalversammlung hat Deutschlands Botschafterin und Namibias Botschafter zu Verhandlungsführern für den »Summit of the Future« ernannt. Dieser für September 2024 geplante Reformgipfel  soll die UN und mithin Strukturen des Weltregierens besser für alte und neue Herausforderungen aufstellen. Dazu zählt, die Umsetzung der internationalen Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung bis 2030 voranzubringen.  Wegen der angespannten Weltlage ist dies kein leichtes Unterfangen. Wichtig ist jetzt, den Prozess gut aufzugleisen, um Unterstützung zu gewinnen sowie öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit für und Vertrauen in ihn zu  schaffen.

Der Präsident der UN-Generalversammlung hat Deutschlands Botschafterin und Namibias Botschafter zu Verhandlungsführern für den »Summit of the Future« ernannt. Dieser für September 2024 geplante Reformgipfel  soll die UN und mithin Strukturen des Weltregierens besser für alte und neue Herausforderungen aufstellen. Dazu zählt, die Umsetzung der internationalen Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung bis 2030 voranzubringen.  Wegen der angespannten Weltlage ist dies kein leichtes Unterfangen. Wichtig ist jetzt, den Prozess gut aufzugleisen, um Unterstützung zu gewinnen sowie öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit für und Vertrauen in ihn zu  schaffen.

Der Präsident der UN-Generalversammlung hat Deutschlands Botschafterin und Namibias Botschafter zu Verhandlungsführern für den »Summit of the Future« ernannt. Dieser für September 2024 geplante Reformgipfel  soll die UN und mithin Strukturen des Weltregierens besser für alte und neue Herausforderungen aufstellen. Dazu zählt, die Umsetzung der internationalen Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung bis 2030 voranzubringen.  Wegen der angespannten Weltlage ist dies kein leichtes Unterfangen. Wichtig ist jetzt, den Prozess gut aufzugleisen, um Unterstützung zu gewinnen sowie öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit für und Vertrauen in ihn zu  schaffen.