Central Europe

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 11,647 to 11,702 per day for both BCPs compared to last week. The average net flow for both BCPs went from plus 272 to plus 169 (i.e., more entries into the Russian Federation).

The Donetsk BCP continues to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for 36.2 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region[1].

Persons in military-style outfits                                                                                                                                       

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions was 21 at both BCPs compared to 38 last week; 11 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, ten into Ukraine. Sixty-seven percent of these crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP, while the other 33 per cent occurred in Gukovo BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continue to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, seven families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and another seven were observed crossing to Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when seven families were observed crossing the border into Russian Federation and eleven into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continue to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed 346 buses crossing the border at both BCPs (compared to 450 observed during the previous week), 185 of them were bound for the Russian Federation and 161 for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv and Luhansk - Sevastopol.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed an increase in the number of trucks crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 835 to 909 (323 at the Gukovo BCP and 586 at the Donetsk BCP); 541 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 368 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                          

Among them, the OTs continued also to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased from 95 to 84 (compared to the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks have hazard signs, indicating that they are transporting propane or a mix of propane with butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks. At the Donetsk BCP the OTs observed 102 X-ray checks: out of the total number of trucks scanned during the reporting period, 59 trucks (58 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 43 trucks (42 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation.

As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 150 to 127; 71 crossed into the Russian Federation and 56 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 35 occasions, compared to 38 last week; the OTs assessed that 19 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 16 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions, as were vehicles with Belarusian and Georgian licence plates; vehicles with “DPR” and “RSO (Republic of South Ossetia)” plates were also observed crossing the border.

On 19 June at 14:32, the OT in Donetsk BCP observed a helicopter flying over the BCP from the north-west before heading away in a north-easterly direction. The helicopter remained inside the Russian Federation airspace during the whole time it was visible. That same day in Donetsk BCP, at 17:22 an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates came from the Russian Federation and stopped at the front of the line of vehicles exiting the Russian Federation. The ambulance went back to the Russian Federation at 17:33. The OT could not observe if there were any passengers on board.

On 21 June at 22:00, the OT in Donetsk BCP observed a police vehicle which came to the BCP from the Russian Federation side and after seven minutes, they returned to RF without crossing the border. The OT was not able to observe if they undertook any activities during those few minutes due to the intensive traffic.

On 22 June at 10:55 the OT at Donetsk BCP observed an ambulance with “LPR” plates which entered the BCP from Ukraine side. While undergoing border formalities the OT observed a driver, one female medical personnel and a woman in plain clothes inside the vehicle. At 11:05 the ambulance crossed into the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 22 May to 26 June 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Rostov-on-Don Regional Administration.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                      

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Hungary, Parliamentary Elections, 8 April 2018: Final Report

Greater efforts to guarantee a level playing field for candidates are needed to improve the electoral process in Hungary, says the final report by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the country’s 8 April 2018 parliamentary elections.

The report, published on 27 June 2018, states that the elections were efficiently administered and offered voters a wide range of political choices. It also says, however, that the main governing party enjoyed an undue advantage because of a pervasive overlap between state and ruling party resources, biased media coverage and opaque campaign financing regulations.

The report recommends measures to provide a fully democratic basis for the conduct of elections, including by removing unreasonable hindrances on civil society. A public and inclusive review of current legislation, with an emphasis on freedoms of expression and association and access to information, is among the suggested measures. In this respect, the report recommends revising the rules for lawmaking to ensure opportunities for meaningful public consultation and to reconsider the possibility for individual members of parliament to propose amendments that are not subject to public scrutiny.

Noting the increasing ownership of media outlets by party-affiliated entrepreneurs and the allocation of state advertising only to certain outlets, the report recommends amending legislation to prevent the governing party from having an undue campaign advantage. It further recommends that government information activities avoid any appearance of seeking to influence voting. In addition, concrete steps should be taken to strengthen the financial and editorial independence of the public broadcaster, which include ensuring an open and inclusive appointment of the management and a transparent and sustainable financing system.

The report further recommends introducing limits on individual campaign donations, improving regulations on financing of election-related campaigns by third parties and introducing measures to enhance the transparency of campaign finance.

Other recommendations include permitting observation by non-partisan civil society organizations, decriminalizing defamation, reviewing legislative and practical aspects of national minority participation in elections, and introducing temporary special measures to promote women candidates.

CHISINAU, 26 June 2018 – Concluding his first visit to Moldova, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) lauded recent achievements in the Transdniestrian settlement process and encouraged both Chisinau and Tiraspol to sustain the momentum of progress in the coming months to create the necessary conditions for a comprehensive and peaceful resolution of the conflict.

“In a period when European security and stability are threatened, Chisinau and Tiraspol are setting a positive example for the rest of the OSCE area, where conflict resolution has most often been characterized by lack of progress,” said President Tsereteli. “The local ownership and leadership demonstrated by Chisinau and Tiraspol in advancing the settlement process, which I have witnessed in my meetings, goes to show that dialogue and persistence produce concrete results and are the way forward.”

PA President Tsereteli and Secretary General Roberto Montella met in Chisinau on Monday with a range of officials, including President Igor Dodon, Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Cristina Lesnic, Secretary General of State for Foreign Affairs and European Integration Mihail Capatina and the Moldovan delegation to the OSCE PA led by Serghei Sirbu. Today, in Tiraspol, they held meetings with Transdniestrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky and the Speaker of the Transdniestrian legislature, Alexander Shcherba.

To visit the left bank of the Dniester/Nistru River, the PA delegation travelled through the Gura Bicului – Bychok bridge, which reopened last November after being closed to traffic since the 1992 conflict. In Tiraspol, the PA delegation also visited a joint vehicle registration office, which will allow for the participation of vehicles from Transdniestria in international traffic starting on 1 September 2018. Three additional practical issues identified in the so-called “package of eight” – apostilization of Transdniestrian university diplomas, access to the Dubasari farmland, and the functioning of the Moldovan Latin-script schools on the left bank – were agreed to at the end of 2017 and are currently being implemented. Technical discussions continue on laying out the implementation steps and timeline for reconnecting the telecommunication networks between the two banks.

“As a result of these agreements, people on both sides of the Dniester/Nistru River can already notice tangible improvements to their daily lives and gradually realize that their futures are linked. These concrete results also demonstrate that both Chisinau and Tiraspol can mutually benefit from this process,” explained President Tsereteli. “In the coming months, I hope the Sides will continue to display such resolve to overcome remaining differences and ensure a long-term and comprehensive settlement.”

In visits to the premises of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in Chisinau and Tiraspol, the PA President praised the valuable work of its team led by Ambassador Michael Scanlan, as well as the constant engagement of successive OSCE Chairmanships, for moving the process forward. President Tsereteli expressed his desire to accelerate the Parliamentary Assembly’s engagement with Moldova and offered the political weight of the PA to highlight OSCE efforts in peacefully resolving conflicts, which are expected to feature prominently at the OSCE PA’s upcoming Annual Session in Berlin (7-11 July 2018).
 
The OSCE PA President also met the Governor of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, Irina Vlah, to discuss the importance of promoting an inclusive Moldovan identity and society, as well as good governance and the rule of law, through a fully functioning autonomy in accordance with the 1994 Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia. 

In meetings, President Tsereteli expressed concern over the nullification of the Chisinau mayoral race and its negative effect on the public’s trust in democratic institutions and processes, stressing the need to reinforce the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. President Tsereteli and Secretary General Montella also addressed these issues with extra-parliamentary opposition leader Maia Sandu, as well as civil society representatives and members of the international community. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Trokhizbenka. It observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Pikuzy. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as in Zaichenko and at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as a water pumping station in Artema and a water pipeline in Stanytsia Luhanska. In Lviv, the SMM continued to follow up on media reports of an attack on and killing of a member of the Roma community in the city.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 190 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 280 explosions).

On the evening and night of 24-25 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from east to west, two projectiles from west to east, a projectile from south-west to north-east and an undetermined explosion, followed by totals of 12 undetermined explosions, 48 projectiles (eight from east to west, seven from west to east, four from south-west to north-east, two from north-east to south-west, seven from east-south-east to west-north-west, ten from east-north-east to west-north-west and ten from west-south-west to east-north-east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-4km south.   

During the day on 25 June, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and about 15 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-3km south-east.

The same day, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and five shots of small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 24-25 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from north-west to south-east, two projectiles from north to south, a projectile from south-west to north-east, two projectiles from south to north and an undetermined explosion, followed by totals of five undetermined explosions, 303 projectiles (one from south-east to north-west, 99 from south to north, 78 from south-south-west to north-north-east and 125 from north-west to south-east), 32 bursts, three muzzle flashes and an illumination flare from south-east to north-west, all 1-2km east.

On the evening of 24 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 14 undetermined explosions and about 50 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-8km west. 

On the evening and night of 24-25 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of mortar (120mm) fire, eight explosions assessed as impacts of artillery (122mm) rounds and 50 shots of small-arms fire, all 5-6km south-west, followed by ten explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire, 20 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds and 160 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 6-10km south-east and south-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 25 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 100 explosions).

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. In Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk), a man (43 years old) told the SMM that his right ankle had been injured in a small explosion on 22 June, about 200m north of his home on Stepan Razin Street, near a creek. He said that he had heard some popping and had seen smoke and fire near his feet, and that then he had noticed his leg was covered in blood. He said that he had gone to a nearby shop also on the same street for help and had then been taken by ambulance for treatment at the central regional hospital in Novoaidar (government-controlled, 49km north-west of Luhansk) and released the same day. The shopkeeper in Trokhizbenka told the SMM that the man had come into the shop with blood on his leg. At the hospital in Novoaidar, a doctor told the SMM that on 22 June the man had been treated for burns to his right ankle and then released. 

The SMM again saw fresh shelling impacts in a residential area of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). (See SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018.) At 18 Akhmatova Street, the SMM saw an impact on the west-facing metal wall of a garage as well as grenade shrapnel and scorched grass at the base of the wall. The SMM assessed that the impact and damage was caused by a rocket-propelled grenade fired from a westerly direction. Approximately 5m west of the wall, the SMM observed remnants of a second grenade twisted around a metal rod supporting a vine and noted that the grass was scorched at the base of the metal rod. The resident of the house at 18 Akhmatova Street (woman in her sixties) told the SMM that she had heard two explosions around 19:00 on 24 June from inside her house, and a neighbour (woman in her fifties) said she had heard one explosion around the same time.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 23 June, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area. (See SMM Daily Report 20 June 2018.)

On the night of 24-25 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, six projectiles in flight from north to south 2-4km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), five undetermined explosions 8-13km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area), an illumination flare in vertical flight 4-7km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and eight projectiles from east to west 8-12km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the Zolote disengagement area on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) on 25 June, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 4-7km south-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in Zolote-4 (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 4-6km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). 

Positioned in Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 explosions 2-4km south (assessed as outside the Petrivske disengagement area). Positioned about 4km south of Styla for about 40 minutes, the SMM heard 29 undetermined explosions 1-3km south-east and south (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and 40 explosions 1-3km south-west (unable to assess whether inside the disengagement area), as well as heard and saw one explosion assessed as an impact about 300m south (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Due to security considerations, the SMM then left the area.

While present at the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area on 25 June, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 23 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Vyskryva (76km west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 23 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted at least five armed men firing four outgoing mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) rounds near Pakhalivka (40km west of Luhansk) in a northerly direction toward a Ukrainian Armed Forces position.  

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw two tanks (T-64) at a checkpoint outside of Krasne (65km north of Donetsk) and 17 self-propelled howitzers (ten 2S1 and seven undetermined), ten tanks (four T-80B and six undetermined) and seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM noted that five such sites continued to be abandoned and that the following weapons continued to be missing: 64 towed howitzers (58 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and six 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and 11 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm).

In non-government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region,* the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and continued to note as missing five mortars (four PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11).

The SMM revisited three permanent storage sites whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and noted that one such site continued to be abandoned and that the following weapons were again missing: 26 tanks (14 T-72 and 12 T-64), 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 120mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 23 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Trokhizbenka. On 24 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-70) and an IFV (BTR variant) in Zolote-4.  On 25 June, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) loaded on a transporter near Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 23 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) about 3.5km north-west of Berezivske (53km north-west of Luhansk) and an APC (BTR-80) near Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk). On 25 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-80) near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed mine hazard signs as well as demining. At a government-controlled checkpoint on road H-20 near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk), for the first time, the SMM saw a mine hazard sign with white lettering indicating “Mines” in Ukrainian on a red square board nailed to a tree about 2m east of the side of the road. Near Kozachyi (government-controlled, 41km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a group of eight people wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization demining along the east and west sides of road P-22.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS as well as demining activities around the station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for ceasefire violations). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and monitored repair works to a water pipe in Stanytsia Luhanska.  

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. At a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (102km south of Donetsk) for thirty minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates), a minivan (with Ukrainian licence plates) and a covered cargo truck (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine, and four cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and five covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued to follow up on the physical attack on members of the Roma community on 23 June in Lviv city (see SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018). At the site of the attack, in a forested area along Truskavetska Street on the southern edge of Lviv, the SMM saw a blood-stained mattress and pillow and burn traces on the ground. At a hospital in Lviv, the SMM spoke with a man (19 years old) who said he was originally from Mukacheve in Zakarpattia region (157km west of Ivano-Frankivsk). According to medical staff, he had sustained seven stab wounds to his chest. The man told the SMM that the group who had assaulted him on the night of 23 June had visited the settlement where he was living twice in the days before the attack. According to him, at around midnight on 23 June, a group of ten young men entered the settlement and began hitting tents and setting a fire and attacking people, which he said had led to the death of his brother-in-law. At the Lviv Regional Forensic Medical Examination Bureau, where the SMM followed up on the reported fatality, it was told information could not be provided on the incident since there was an ongoing investigation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 19 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, after waiting for about 35 minutes, two men in military-style clothing, one armed, denied the SMM access to the site and told the SMM that it would need to get “approval” from armed formations in Donetsk city for future visits.
• An armed man prevented the SMM from entering a military-type compound in Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk), where the SMM saw fresh tracks assessed as left by a tank (T-72).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel north across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. An armed man in military-type clothing south of the bridge told the SMM that the area was still mined. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While the SMM was conducting a mini-UAV flight near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the signal was immediately interrupted upon launching the UAV on two separate occasions. The SMM recovered the mini-UAV in both instances.[4]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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Edita Buçaj

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo is hosting the third edition of its Junior Basketball Tournament from 25 to 30 June 2018 at the Recreational Centre in Germia Park, Prishtinë/Priština.

This year, 45 young basketball players from the ages of 12 to 16, representing different communities and junior basketball clubs from Gjakovë/Đakovica, Prishtinë/Priština, Prizren and Štrpce/Shtërpcë, are training and exercising together, practising different basketball techniques under the supervision of accredited trainers.

Besides playing basketball, participants will also attend thematic workshops that aim at promoting dialogue, tolerance, confidence and mutual understanding among youth. The workshops cover topics of human rights, inter-cultural dialogue, gender and social inclusion. They will be delivered by experts from the Know Your Rights campaign, Pl4y International, the Peer Educators Network (PEN) and the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo has organized the Junior Basketball Tournament every year since 2016 with the generous support of the Municipality of Prishtinë/Priština. More than 200 players from basketball schools from different Kosovo municipalities have so far been part of the tournament.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Understanding hate crimes against Muslims and developing guidelines to address the security needs of Muslim communities was at the centre of regional stakeholder consultations for Western Europe co-organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Frankfurt, Germany on 25 and 26 June 2018.

During the event, which was held in co-operation with the Goethe University's Academy for Islam in Science and Society, participants provided input and suggestions on a draft practical guide being developed by ODIHR on understanding hate crimes against Muslims and addressing the security needs of Muslim communities.

"This is an opportunity for participants, including representatives of law enforcement agencies, government agencies working on human and minority rights and Muslim communities to share their experiences and needs as we prepare the guide," said Dermana Seta, ODIHR Adviser on Combating Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims.

The guide will support governments in assessing the specific security needs of Muslim communities and improving responses to hate crime by local authorities and law enforcement agencies. The guide will also include specific recommendations on improving co-operation between local authorities and Muslim communities as a means to strengthen the security of community members.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The importance of observing human rights standards to improve the effectiveness of counter-terrorism policing was the focus of a training workshop held by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) with the support of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan in Tashkent on 25 and 26 June 2018.

Twenty men and two women from the Uzbek police and security services participated in the training, the first of this kind ODIHR has delivered in Central Asia. The dynamic and interactive training programme focused on a broad range of human rights questions connected to the operational aspects of counter-terrorism and law-enforcement activities. Participants analysed practical setbacks that may affect counter-terrorism policing if it is implemented in violation of human rights, and explored how the observance of international human rights standards can contribute to the overall effectiveness of policing.

Among other topics, the training touched upon the impact of human rights violations on officers, suspects and their families, the use of interviewing techniques that create trust and respect, the negative effects of stereotypes in counter-terrorism policing, as well as the importance of interacting with communities in countering terrorism to increase their support.

“Ongoing reform of the country’s institutional and normative frameworks, including in the security sector, is needed to fully guarantee human rights while countering terrorism. We stand ready to assist Uzbekistan in this endeavor,” said Johannes Heiler, ODIHR Adviser on Anti-Terrorism Issues. “A long-term commitment to human rights training for law-enforcement officers is an important element of any successful reform in this area. We invite the Uzbek authorities to benefit from the assistance we can offer, including technical advice on terrorism-related legislation and policies, to ensure their human rights compliance and support the reform agenda promoted by the authorities in these fields.”

ODIHR delivered the course on the basis of its standard training curriculum for counter-terrorism law-enforcement officers, Complying with Human Rights Standards and Effectively Countering Terrorism, following a pre-training assessment visit to Tashkent to tailor the course to the local context and needs.

ALMATY, Kazakhstan, 26 June 2018 - The twelfth annual OSCE Central Asian Youth Network (CAYN) seminar began today in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The three-day event, dedicated to the theme of “Innovating Central Asia” is organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana for some 40 top university students and CAYN alumni from Central Asia, Afghanistan and Mongolia. Other OSCE regional field missions provided support for the event. Nariman Mukushev, Deputy Minister for Labour and Social Protection of Population of Kazakhstan, representatives of the OSCE as well as experts from Georgia and Kazakhstan, and leading representatives of the private sector and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are taking part.

In addition to learning about innovation and new technologies in Central Asia, the participants will discuss key challenges to comprehensive security in Central Asia and beyond and explore ways to address them in their communities and together with neighbouring countries. They will also explore the role of digitalization in promoting transparency and opportunities for business in the region.

Award-winning writer Guzel Yakhina, author of “Zuleikha Opens Her Eyes” and “My Children” will join to discuss the opportunities and challenges of being a published author and ways to motivate young people to create and innovate.

“Your youth and willingness to branch out to young leaders in Central Asia are key advantages in addressing the challenges faced by young people in the region, and indeed the rest of the world. These issues require fresh perspectives and new regional co-operative approaches – that is at the heart of the OSCE’s mission,” said Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, Ambassador György Szabó.

The Deputy Head of the Italian Embassy in Astana, Matteo Petrini, spoke about the priorities of Italy’s 2018 OSCE Chairmanship, including the focus on youth. Riccardo Pozzi, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Youth and Security, discussed the value of new technologies in the modern era. Gustavo Araujo, Chief of Recruitment at the OSCE, discussed professional development and ways for individuals to engage in innovative thinking in the workplace and how international organizations can innovate.

The seminar will be followed by a two-day training workshop focused on finding solutions to challenges and conceptualizing design concepts.  

The event is part of the Office’s efforts to enhance young people’s understanding of contemporary security threats and challenges and to explain the OSCE’s role in addressing them.

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Communication and Media Relations Section

The role of the OSCE in promoting economic diplomacy and connectivity was the focus of an expert workshop organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) and the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham on 25 June 2018 in Vienna.

Experts from academia, the private sector and representatives of OSCE structures discussed the opportunities and modern challenges in promoting economic connectivity, including in the fields of energy co-operation and the digital economy. They explored the potential role of the OSCE in promoting economic diplomacy to enhance relations among the OSCE’s participating States.  

The expert meeting was an integral part of a joint project aimed at identifying the objectives and mechanisms within the OSCE area to promote the existing and available tools of economic diplomacy. The final research report will provide a set of recommendations for concrete steps to enhance economic connectivity and economic diplomacy within the OSCE area.

VIENNA, 26 June 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed alarm after a van was driven into the offices of the De Telegraaf newspaper in the Netherlands, and the vehicle then set on fire.  

“I strongly condemn this deliberate attack against the largest daily newspaper in the Netherlands,” Désir said. “I express my full solidarity with the newspaper. This is a heinous crime which strikes at the core of press freedom and democracy in the country.”

On 26 June at around 04.00am local time, security cameras filmed how a suspect deliberately drove a van into the head office of De Telegraaf on the outskirts of Amsterdam. According to reports, the driver then set the van on fire, and fled by car with another suspect. Although employees were present in the building at the time of the attack, nobody was injured. Both suspects remain at large.  

According to the editor-in-chief of De Telegraaf, the motive behind the incident remains unclear. This attack comes only five days after an anti-tank rocket was fired at the offices of the weeklies Panorama and Nieuwe Revu in Amsterdam. 

The Representative welcomed Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s immediate condemnation of the attack who described it as “a slap in the face for the free press and Dutch democracy.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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VIENNA 26 June 2018 – High-level representatives of the 57 OSCE participating States,  Partners for Co-operation and partnering organizations convened in Vienna today for deep and wide-ranging discussions on current security threats and challenges for Europe and the OSCE’s role in addressing them. The three-day Annual Security Review Conference is being hosted by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship under the motto “Dialogue, ownership and responsibility.”

“The OSCE is the world’s largest regional security organization. This is why we need to fully exploit its potential, with a renewed sense of commitment and collective ownership,” said Italian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation Guglielmo Picchi, opening the conference.

“We have come together at a moment when our security order is in an intense state of flux. Despite different views on how we ended up in this dangerously unstable situation, we have a common interest in finding a way out,” said OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger. “We need more dialogue and other trust-building steps, including more opportunities like the ASRC for interaction between the military and diplomatic communities.”

United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary General Rosemary DiCarlo, who addressed the opening session via video, said that the OSCE and its participating States have a central role to play in realizing the UN Secretary-General’s vision of prevention focused on building and sustaining peaceful, equitable and resilient societies.  “The OSCE’s conflict resolution and confidence-building mechanisms stand as palpable evidence of how we can come together to promote long-term stability and sustainable development,” she said.

Topics being discussed during the conference include: conflict and crisis situations in the OSCE area; lessons learned and the way ahead in addressing the conflict cycle; conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures; challenges and opportunities arising from migration; and current and future trends regarding transnational threats.

A special session this morning was devoted to the crisis in and around Ukraine, one of the main security challenges in the OSCE area.

“A solution to the crisis in and around Ukraine is among the priorities of the Italian Chairmanship. A new commitment to improve the situation is needed, considering some non-encouraging reports from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. All parties need to take full responsibility to respect the ceasefire and to relaunch the political process within the Trilateral Contact Group and the Normandy Format,” Deputy Minister Picchi stated.

Another special session tomorrow will focus on the Structured Dialogue, a process launched by OSCE participating States last year to explore new ways of addressing politico-military challenges and reversing the negative trends in the European security architecture. 

 

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported three-day training seminar “Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Inhuman Treatment in Accordance with the Istanbul Protocol” concluded on 23 June 2018 in Shymkent, Kazakhstan.

The seminar aimed at helping practitioners to enhance their professional skills and put in practical use effective approaches in the investigation of torture cases.

Over 30 prosecutors, defence lawyers and forensic experts from the Turkestan Region learned about different aspects of human rights and definitions of torture, ill-treatment, inhumane and degrading treatment and punishment. International and national experts provided a detailed overview on the criteria for investigating, collecting evidence and documenting findings in relation to torture cases, in accordance with the Istanbul Protocol, which serves as an international standard in the medical and psychological examination of the alleged victims of torture. Participants were also engaged in the examination of concrete scenarios and mock exercises.

The event was the third in a series of annual seminars on Istanbul Protocol organized by the Law Enforcement Academy under the Prosecutor General’s Office in cooperation with the UNDP Kazakhstan and the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, as part of the Office’s continuous efforts to combat torture in the host country.

385833 Participants in a panel discussion on the role of civil society in promoting tolerance and non-discrimination organized as part of the launch event. Brussels, 26 June 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Coalition Building for Tolerance and Non-Discrimination: A Practical Guide

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) released a new guide to assist civil society organizations in building lasting coalitions to promote tolerance and non-discrimination and to address anti-Semitism in the OSCE region. The launch event took place in Brussels on 26 June 2018 and was hosted by the European Jewish Community Centre.

The guide, Coalition Building for Tolerance and Non-Discrimination, offers a practical basis for building successful coalitions to address discrimination and build more peaceful and tolerant societies. By providing multiple tools, online resources and good practices, the publication serves as a starting point not only for civil society organizations and communities setting out to join forces to strengthen anti-discrimination laws and norms, but also for all civil society members wishing to establish coalitions to advance their goals.

The publication is the third in a series prepared by ODIHR as part of its project “Turning Words into Action to Address Anti-Semitism”.

"Among other objectives, the Words into Action project aims to strengthen joint civil society advocacy to improve responses to anti-Semitism and all forms of intolerance and discrimination,” said Cristina Finch, Head of ODIHR's Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department. “We emphasize the need for a comprehensive, gender-mainstreamed and human rights-based approach that helps organizations work together to achieve common goals.”

The project’s coalition-building component promotes dialogue between different communities, focusing on specific topics and contexts for building coalitions. Its recommendations are intended to contribute to building more cohesive and inclusive societies for all communities in the OSCE region.

WARSAW, 26 June 2018 – “Torture cannot be justified under any circumstances,” Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), said on the occasion of today’s International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, while calling on all OSCE participating States to make it clear that no form of ill-treatment is permitted.

“Despite the recognition in OSCE commitments of torture as a most serious crime, the eradication of torture and other ill-treatment remains a challenge in the region,” the ODIHR Director said. “It must be clear that there can be neither impunity nor justification for torture. I call on all OSCE participating States to redouble their efforts to effectively investigate, prosecute and punish all acts of torture or ill-treatment.” 

She noted that 70 years after the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the first international text prohibiting torture in absolute terms, there are still attempts to authorize or acquiesce to torture on grounds of national security and counter-terrorism efforts. Instead, Gísladóttir said, states have to further work to provide for a solid legal anti-torture framework and show political will to implement torture-prevention measures, such as providing for unhindered access by independent monitors to all places of detention in their countries.

“In the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ODIHR will continue to assist the OSCE participating States in the implementation of their commitments to prohibit torture and to work closely with other international and regional bodies and civil society actors towards the eradication of torture and other ill-treatment in the region,” Gísladóttir said.

Since 2016, ODIHR has reinforced its efforts to prevent torture and other ill-treatment, and in the area of the treatment of persons deprived of liberty in particular, including by promoting the independent preventive monitoring of all places of detention, safeguards in the early stages of police custody and the effective implementation of the right to rehabilitation of victims of torture in the OSCE region.

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VIENNA, 25 June 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today condemned the physical attack and death threat against a journalist, Hrvoje Bajlo, last night in Zadar.

“I condemn this brutal beating of the journalist Hrvoje Bajlo in Zadar. Attacks against media professionals are an attack on the public’s right to be informed as well as on a state’s democratic values,” Désir said.

Hrvoje Bajlo, the owner of portal “Zadar News” and a correspondent of “Index” and “Nacional”, was beaten up last night, sustaining severe injuries. The perpetrator reportedly threatened to kill Bajlo if he continued to write articles about him and "his friends". These threats were followed by physical beatings, which resulted in Bajlo being hospitalized.

“I welcome a very prompt reaction by Croatian authorities who, according to available information have detained the accused perpetrator,” Désir said expressing hope that this incident will be properly sanctioned. “Any kind of violence against media professionals and their work is simply unacceptable and must not be tolerated. “

The Representative welcomed the reaction of the Croatian Journalists’ Association (HND) who also condemned this incident, and noted that this is not the first time Bajlo was threatened and attacked.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, however more in Luhansk region between the evenings of 22 and 23 June compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 23 and 24 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Yasynuvata and Dokuchaievsk. It observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Pikuzy. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded an explosion inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and three projectiles inside the Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including Nova Marivka. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Novoaidar. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. In Lviv, the SMM followed up on media reports of a physical attack against members of the Roma community in the city.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 66 explosions, between the evenings of 22 and 23 June, compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). Between the evenings of 23 and 24 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations and more explosions (280) compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 22-23 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from west-north-west to east-south-east and three projectiles from east-south-east to west-north-west, followed by totals of eight explosions (six undetermined, one assessed as impact and one as outgoing), about 40 projectiles (the majority from east-south-east to west-north-west), four bursts and a muzzle flash, all 0.3-3km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west as well as four projectiles in flight from east-north-east to west-south-west 100m-500m south-south-west. On the evening and night of 23-24 June, the same camera recorded an undetermined explosion and six projectiles in flight from east to west, followed by 13 explosions (11 undetermined and two assessed as impacts), 67 projectiles (the majority from east to west) and two illumination flares, all 0.2km-3km south.   

On the evening and night of 22-23 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, four undetermined explosions and four projectiles in flight (two from south to north and two from north to south), followed by totals of 12 undetermined explosions, 225 projectiles (the majority from south to north), 65 bursts, two muzzle flashes and three illumination flares, all 2-4km north-east, east-north-east and east. On the evening and night of 23-24 June, the same camera recorded four projectiles in flight from south to north followed by totals of 18 undetermined explosions, 125 projectiles (the majority from south to north), 13 muzzle flashes, two illumination flares and about 55 bursts, all 2-4km east.   

On the evening of 23 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 120 undetermined explosions and about 215 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 4-6km south-west and west. 

On the evening and night of 22-23 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 135 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 4-5km south-east and south. On 23 June, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and about 215 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-5km south-east.

During the day on 24 June, positioned 2.5km south-east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 62 explosions (42 undetermined, ten assessed as impacts and ten as outgoing) 1-5km in easterly directions, as well as 12 undetermined explosions and three shots of small-arms fire at unknown distances east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations between the evenings of 22 and 23 June, including about 14 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). Between the evenings of 23 and 24 June, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 23 June, while in Sievierodonetsk (government-controlled, 74km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions 25-35km south.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. At the railway hospital in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), medical staff told the SMM that a woman (33 years old) had been admitted on 12 June with haematoma and scratches on her back and chest from a bullet that had likely ricocheted off a surface before hitting her. On a previous visit to her home, the woman had told the SMM that a bullet had hit her in the upper side of her back while she had been outside her house in Yasynuvata with her children and a neighbour.

In Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), on 24 June, a woman (76 years old) who had her head covered in bandages, told the SMM that the previous day she had been walking from her house on Lenina Street to a bus stop on 35 Tsentralna Street when shelling had begun, forcing her to take cover next to the wall of a nearby building. The woman said she had then felt something hit her and realized she was bleeding from the back of her head. Shortly after, the woman said she had been given first aid in a shop and was taken to Dokuchaievsk city hospital. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the woman had been brought to the hospital with a shrapnel wound to her head and released the same day. 

On 23 June, the SMM observed fresh shelling impacts in a residential area of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). In the Kirpoty area on the eastern edge of Pikuzy, a location where the SMM had observed fresh damage from shelling in recent weeks (see SMM Daily Report 18 June 2018), the SMM saw two fresh craters in the ground about 40-45m east of a house, both assessed to be caused by artillery rounds of an undetermined calibre fired from a westerly direction. The SMM saw fresh damage to trees and a severed high-voltage power line 5-10m from the craters. Three local residents told the SMM that the area had been damaged from shelling on the evening and night of 22-23 June and they said that the towns of Pikuzy, Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 93km south of Donetsk) and Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) had been left without electricity due to it.  

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 22 June, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in the garden of a house 400m inside the south-western edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.

On the night of 22-23 June, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 3km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). On 24 June, positioned just north of the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint and north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an explosion 0.8-1km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 24 June, while at a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a mini-UAV flying from north to south over the checkpoint at an altitude of 50 to 70m.

On the evening and night of 22-23 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 11 undetermined explosions 5-15 km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the evening of 23 June, the same camera recorded ten undetermined explosions, three projectiles in flight from north to south, nine tracer rounds and eight bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-10km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area), as well as three projectiles (two from south-west to north-east and one from east to west) 3-5km south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 23 June, the SMM saw a soldier of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside the Zolote disengagement area, driving towards Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). Later the same day, the SMM saw five soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (three walking who were armed, two driving in a civilian van) inside the disengagement area on a road towards Katerynivka.

On 1 June, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded an explosion and 12 tracer rounds from east-south-east to west-north-west, all 0.5km-1.5km south-west and west-north-west, all assessed as inside the disengagement area.  

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 23 June, the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) loaded on two flatbed trucks travelling west on road T1306, about 7km west of Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 23 June, the SMM saw a stationary tank (T-72) mounted on a military flatbed truck and two surface-to-air-missile systems (9K33 Osa) east of Sievierodonetsk, two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in Sievierodonetsk, two surface-to-air-missile systems (9K33) moving west on road T-1306 near Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk), six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) moving west on road H-21 about 6km south-east of Novoaidar, nine tanks (T-72) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) moving east near Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk). On 24 June, the SMM saw nine self-propelled howitzers (eight 2S1 and one 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and five tanks (T-72) at the train station in Rubizhne and two tanks (T-64) on flatbed trailers in the southern outskirts of Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns[2], new trenches and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 23 June, the SMM saw two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM) on the eastern outskirts of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 22 June, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) 400m inside the south-western edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area (see above).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 22 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 1.5km of new trenches and 13 empty revetted positions (not visible in imagery from 29 April 2018) near Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk). The next day, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (type undetermined) stationary near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk) and an anti-aircraft gun (type undetermined) near Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk). On 24 June, the SMM saw an APC (type undetermined) stationary near a group of people wearing military-style clothing in the southern outskirts of Donetsk city. On 24 June, the SMM saw a mini-UAV flying from north to south over a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (see above).

The SMM observed unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine hazard signs. On 23 June, about 200m from the southern entrance to Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed for the first time a tailfin protruding from the ground in the middle of the road and another non-imbedded projectile on the east side of the road, both assessed as from 82mm mortar rounds, as well as a small, red-coloured, square-shaped sign on the side of the road with white lettering indicating “mines” in Russian.* The same day, on a road about 2.6km east of Novo Marivka, the SMM saw for the first time a tree lying across the road, as well as two tailfins protruding from the ground on both sides of the tree, assessed as from 82mm mortar rounds. At this location the SMM also saw a mine hazard sign with identical description as above attached to the tree.* On 24 June, the SMM observed for the first time a red mine hazard sign with “Stop Mines” in Russian, hanging from a rope across an access road 1km south-east of Lyman (non-government-controlled, 12km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS as well as demining activities around the station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire on 23 and 24 June. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for ceasefire violations). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), and monitored repairs on 22 and 23 June to recently damaged high-voltage power lines in the Kirpoty area on the eastern edge of Pikuzy (see above).

In Lviv on 22 June, at the Memorial of Glory to Heroes Fallen in the Second World War on Pasichna Street, the SMM followed up on media reports of the vandalism of several tombs on 21 June. The SMM saw that yellow tridents and other markings had been spray-painted on three tombs in the memorial; it also saw a man attempting to remove the paint from one of the tombs. A police spokesperson told the SMM that an investigation was ongoing.    

On 24 June, the SMM followed up on media reports of a physical attack on members of the Roma community on 23 June in Lviv city. In a forested area along Truskavetska Street in the southern area of Lviv, the SMM saw three makeshift shelters that appeared to have been abandoned and ten police officers. A police spokesperson told the SMM that a man (24 years old) had been killed and four other members of the Roma community living in a temporary settlement near Truskavetska Street (two men 19 years old, a woman 30 years old, and a boy ten years old) had been injured after being attacked by a group of men (16-20 years old), seven of whom were arrested. The SMM will continue to follow up.  

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 19 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 23 June, about 200m from the southern entrance to Nova Marivka, the SMM was unable to continue on the road to reach the village due to visible UXO, as well as mine hazard signs seen for the first time.
• On 23 June, on a road about 2.6km east of Nova Marivka, the SMM could not enter the village due to a tree lying across the road and two visible UXO near the tree, as well as mine hazard signs seen for the first time.
• On 24 June, at a security post 3km south of Syvash (162km south-east of Kherson), two members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces prevented the SMM from entering and demanded the SMM leave the area, even after the SMM explained its mandate. The SMM has been granted access to this area regularly, however this was the second restriction in the past month at the same location (see SMM Daily Report 29 May 2018).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 23 and 24 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[3]
• On 23 and 24 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.4
• On 23 and 24 June, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]    For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]    The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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ALMATY, 26 June 2018 - Labour migration practices, with the aim to leverage the economic potential of migrant workers in Central Asia and in the Russian Federation, were discussed at a two-day event supported by the  OSCE  and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which concluded today in Almaty.

The workshop titled “Enhancing Effectiveness of Migration Policies as a Tool for Regional Economic Stability, Development and Growth in Central Asia”, focused on the role of government authorities, workers’ and employers’ associations, civil society and the private sector in shaping effective labour migration practices and addressing the challenges of irregular migration.

Some 60 representatives of migration authorities, the interior and labour ministries, civil society and academia from Central Asia and the Russian Federation as well as international organizations, including the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union, participated in the discussion. 

“Making migration a means to foster socio-economic development requires trust and co-operation between countries of origin and destination,” said Teresa Albano, Economic Affairs Officer of the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities. “We want to identify ways to work together, to improve the lives and prospects of all stakeholders involved, governments, migrants, hosting communities, the private sector.”

“What we have learned in our 57 years of action in this field is that dialogue and co-operation need to be nurtured constantly,” said Dejan Keserovic, IOM Co-ordinator for the Central Asian Sub-Region. “We are ready to continue supporting governments, civil society and the private sector in identifying proper responses to the many challenges of a fast-evolving migration scenario in the region.”  

The participants agreed to continue annual discussions, hosted in the participating countries on a rotating basis, thus offering the opportunityto discuss pilot initiatives carried out in the region and draw lessons learned for the benefit of all. 

The workshop was organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) and the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the IOM and the Committee on Labour, Social Protection and Migration of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Kazakhstan, with the support of the OSCE field operations in Central Asia.

The event is part of the OSCE’s activities to promote good governance in labour migration management through capacity building and sharing of best practices.

 

 

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ANKARA, 25 June 2018 – Voters had a genuine choice in the 24 June early presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey, but the conditions for campaigning were not equal, with the incumbent president and ruling party enjoying an undue advantage, including in excessive coverage by government-affiliated public and private media outlets, the international observers concluded in a preliminary statement today.

The restrictive legal framework and powers granted under the ongoing state of emergency restricted the freedoms of assembly and expression, including in the media. Nonetheless, citizens demonstrated their commitment to democracy by participating in large numbers in campaign rallies and on election day, the observers said. Election day procedures were generally followed, although important legally prescribed steps were often omitted during the counting and tabulation of ballots.

“The restrictions we have seen on fundamental freedoms have had an impact on these elections. I hope that Turkey lifts these restrictions as soon as possible,” said Ignacio Sanchez Amor, Special Co-ordinator and Leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “I expected more co-operation from the Turkish authorities on such an important election observation mission, as we always act in good faith and in Turkey’s best interest.”

Six presidential candidates – one woman and five men – including the incumbent, ran for president and the Supreme Board of Elections (SBE) registered eight parties to contest the parliamentary elections.

The campaign was vibrant and took place in a highly polarized political environment; contestants campaigned by various means; and social media were an important tool to reach younger voters and to overcome campaign restrictions. There were a number of attacks and disruptions of campaign activities, mostly against the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), whose presidential candidate remained in pre-trial detention and could not campaign freely. The misuse of state resources by the ruling party contradicted the separation between state and party, the statement says.

“Our delegation welcomed the high voter turnout, which bears witness to the wish of Turkey’s citizens to express their will and to their awareness of the crucial character of these elections,” said Olena Sotnyk, Head of the PACE delegation. “We noticed a more intrusive presence of the police in polling stations than in previous elections, which contributed, in some cases, to creating a climate of insecurity, and possibly pressure against the electorate and, on occasion, international observers.”

A restrictive legal framework hinders media freedom and induces self-censorship, and the state of emergency has been used to further limit this freedom. Most popular broadcast media outlets are seen as affiliated with the government, something reflected in the campaign coverage, the observers said. The ruling party and the incumbent were covered by these more often and more favourably, including by the public broadcaster, limiting the balanced information about the contestants available to voters.

The statement says that fundamental rights and freedoms are not fully guaranteed by the Constitution and laws, and the freedoms of assembly and expression are further restricted in practice, particularly as a result of decisions by provincial governors under the state of emergency. Key amendments to election laws, perceived as favouring the ruling party, were introduced shortly before the elections, and without consultation.

“It is important to address the limitations and challenges posed by the legal framework,” said Peter Osusky, Head of the OSCE PA delegation. “Equally important, legislation related to elections has to be implemented fully and consistently.”

Ambassador Audrey Glover, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission, said: “There is some work to be done by the authorities to ensure that future elections in Turkey are in line with democratic standards and commitments. We will propose recommendations in our final report to help this process. As the citizens energetically demonstrated their commitment to democracy, the authorities need to step up and meet their demands.”

Some of the amendments weakened important safeguards by replacing political party representatives with civil servants as chairpersons of the ballot box committees (BBCs), by allowing the relocation of polling stations on security grounds, by increasing the authority of law enforcement personnel at polling stations, and by ruling that ballots missing important safeguard stamps would still be valid. The Constitutional Court dismissed the main opposition party’s challenge to the amendments. The changes also legalized election coalitions. Positively, independent presidential candidates were allowed for the first time, in line with previous recommendations.

Technical preparations were generally administered in an efficient manner. BBC chairpersons, however, were not always chosen by lottery, as prescribed by law, which raised concerns about their impartiality. At least 1,090 polling stations were moved and merged based on security considerations, which was seen by the opposition as a measure aiming to lower voter turnout in specific areas. Sessions of election boards at all levels were closed and decisions were not published in a systematic or timely manner. These decisions and the lack of transparency eroded confidence in the election administration at all levels, the observers said. The majority of complaints received by the SBE concerned its own decisions, and most were rejected. The few campaign-related complaints received by the SBE were denied consideration on technical grounds.

Women remain underrepresented in political life. While the Constitution guarantees gender equality, there are no special legal obligations for the parties to nominate women candidates. Positively, some parties implemented gender quotas. Some 20.5 per cent of candidates on party lists were female.

The law does not establish rights for non-party citizen observers and does not provide for international observation. Two potential members of the delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly were precluded from participating as observers. Civil society groups, however, were actively involved, and some conducted parallel voter tabulation on election day. As in previous elections and due to legal constraints, their representatives had to either register on behalf of political parties or candidates, or to observe the counting as ordinary citizens. The international observers faced some restrictions during observation, and their negative assessments were frequently linked to the presence of unauthorized people, often police, who sometimes interfered in the process.

For further information contact:

Nat Parry, OSCE PA, +90 (0)538 579 46 30 or +45 60 10 81 77, nat@oscepa.dk

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, +90 (0)537 236 12 80 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Nathalie Bargellini, PACE, +90 (0)544 568 12 38 or +33 (0) 6 65 40 32 82, nathalie.bargellini@coe.int

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Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A study visit to Belarus for Tajik state officials and representatives of free economic zones was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe from 18 to 24 June 2018.

A group of six representatives from the Executive Office of the President of Tajikistan, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and the free economic zones of Dangara, Pyanj and Ishkashim took part in the visit, whose purpose was to exchange best practices of the free economic zones of Belarus and Tajikistan and to extend and deepen mutual interaction and bilateral trade relations for further economic growth.

“This well-timed study visit has made a considerable contribution to improving the economic relations between the free economic zones of the two countries,” said Aslambek Sadulloev, Head of Administration of Free Economic Zone Dangara, who headed the Tajik delegation.

The study visit began with a meeting of the Tajik delegation with the representatives of the Ministry of Economy of Belarus in particular, Valentin Shatravko, Head of the General Directorate for Sustainable Development and Olga Bondar, Head of the Department for Infrastructure Development.  

The officials emphasized the importance of free economic zones for improving the competitive advantages of their countries in the process of their further integration into the regional and global economy. The Tajik delegation visited several free economic zones in Minsk, Mogilev and Grodno as well as the industrial park Velikiy Kamen and the Belarus High Technologies Park.

“Learning from foreign experiences is always beneficial for free economic zones and the government entities regulating them,” noted Edward Safaryan, Economic Officer at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe. “Free economic zones can encourage dynamic firms to be internationally competitive and, if properly managed, may help to reduce regional economic inequalities.”

The visit became a good opportunity to renew the bilateral economic relations between Tajikistan and Belarus. By visiting Belarussian Free Economic Zones, the industrial park Velikiy Kamen and Belarussian High Technologies Park, the members of Tajik delegation have had an opportunity to learn about the new marketing tools on attracting the potential investors as well as about the comprehensive approaches in building and expanding the infrastructure and modernization of the existing technologies utilized by the Free Economic Zones, industrial and technoparks in Belarus for improved quality of the goods produced and services provided.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. In Petrivske, the SMM was forced to drive on a mine-contaminated road by an armed member of the armed formations. The Mission observed shelling impacts in a residential area of Pikuzy. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including in residential areas. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. It also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema, to the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska and to high-voltage power lines in Novoazovsk. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering outside the Parliament building.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 110), compared with the previous reporting period (115 explosions).

On the evening and night of 21-22 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 44 undetermined explosions, 118 projectiles in flight (85 west to east, 22 east to west, nine north to south and one south to north) and a burst from west to east, all 1-4km south.

On the evening and night of 21-22 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded eight undetermined explosions, ten bursts from west to east, two illumination flares in vertical flight, and 271 projectiles in flight (171 from east to west and 100 from west to east), all 3-6km north-east.

On the evening and night of 21-22 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 31 undetermined explosions and 160 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-east and south. The following day, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and eight bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-5km south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded five ceasefire violations (all explosions).

The SMM was forced to drive on a mine-contaminated road by an armed member of the armed formations in Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk). While driving eastwards through Petrivske, the SMM noticed a suspicious object, half-buried in a shallow pit at the end of a ditch extending across the road, 300m east-south-east of the SMM camera in Petrivske. The first SMM vehicle stopped about 5m east of the object and the second vehicle stopped about 10m west of it. The patrol assessed the object as an anti-tank mine (TM-62) with a command wire extending from the undergrowth on the northern side of the road to the mine and continuing further south across the road into the freshly dug ditch, which consisted of a series of shallow circular depressions filled with rubble. While the patrol was stopped, a member of the armed formations carrying an assault rifle (AK-74) and displaying signs of intoxication approached from the east and told the patrol to leave the area immediately and that it would not be permitted to proceed any further east. Despite the SMM pointing out the presence of the mine, he refused to let the first vehicle drive eastwards, thus leaving the SMM no choice but to drive back westwards across the freshly dug ditch filled with rubble near the identified mine. The SMM drove as far as possible from the mine on the southern side of the road and then returned safely to its base in Donetsk city. (See SMM Spot Report 23 June 2018.)

The SMM observed shelling impacts in a residential area of the Kirpoty neighbourhood of eastern Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM saw four fresh craters along Akhmatovoi Street – three in the tarmac and one on the side of the road – at the far eastern end of Pikuzy, 30-70m from the nearest houses. At one of these houses, the SMM observed members of the armed formations going in and out and military-type vehicles parked in its yard. In one of the craters, the SMM observed the tailfin of a 120mm mortar embedded in the asphalt. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction.                                                                                       

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 20 June, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded five undetermined explosions 2-4km south-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 22 June, the SMM saw a tank (T-80) loaded on a truck near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 20 June, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and 31 tanks (type undetermined) at a compound in a residential area of Donetsk city, four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) west of Vasylivka (47km south of Donetsk) and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk). On 21 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a compound on the eastern edge of Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk), and 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 22 June, the SMM saw six tanks (T-64) loaded on train cars at the railyard in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 20 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six self-propelled howitzers (2S1), three towed howitzers (D-30), an anti-tank gun (MT-12) and ten tanks (T-72) in a training area near Pokrovka (non-government-controlled, 36km east of Donetsk). On 21 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four tanks (T-64) in a compound on the eastern edge of Perevalsk (see above) and 22 tanks (type undetermined), six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and eight mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that four surface-to-air missile systems (three 9K33 Osa and one 9K35) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were again missing.  

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In a government-controlled area, on 21 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (type undetermined) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 20 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 18 IFVs (14 BMP-1 and four BMP-2), three armoured recovery vehicles (BTS-4A) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-80 and MT-LB) in residential areas of Donetsk city, as well as an APC (BTR-80) in a residential area of Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

The SMM continued to observe mines and mine hazard signs. On 21 June, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted about 300 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two longitudinal rows to the east of positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted 25 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road on the south-western edge of Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report 31 March 2018.) On 22 June, the SMM observed two light blue mine hazard signs near Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk) for the first time.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska and to high-voltage power lines in Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for ceasefire violations).

In Luhansk city, the SMM monitored a large gathering. The Mission observed an estimated 3,000 people (aged 20-50) gathered in Theatre Square listening to speeches by a senior “LPR” member, various activists and about 30 civilians who recounted their experiences of the conflict. At the end of the gathering, the moderator announced that a “tribunal” had “sentenced” eight current and former Ukrainian politicians. The event ended without incident.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a pre-announced protest. On 22 June, at 5 Hrushevskoho Street, the SMM saw about 1,000 people (mixed gender and ages, including children) gathered in front of the Parliament building, some holding banners displaying statements critical of the “March of Equality” held on 17 June. (See SMM Daily Report 22 June 2017.) There were about 200 law enforcement officers in front of the building and in nearby areas. The protest ended without incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 19 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• An armed member of the armed formations displaying signs of intoxication prevented the SMM from travelling eastwards through Petrivske, thus leaving the SMM no choice but to drive over a mined segment of a single-lane road (see above).

 

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.4

Other impediments

Medical staff at a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to give the SMM information regarding a civilian casualty, claiming the need for approval from the armed formations.

 

[1]    For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

*   Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]   This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]    The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

 

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