Central Europe

This report is for the media and the general public.

Around 11:20 on 22 June, an SMM patrol consisting of six members and two armoured vehicles was driving eastwards through the village of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) on a road last used by the SMM on 20 February 2018. About 10m east of the crossroads inside the village, the first vehicle drove over a freshly dug but well camouflaged ditch extending across the road and filled with rubble when it noticed a suspicious object at the northern end of the ditch, half-covered by rubble in a shallow pit about 1m away from the road. The first SMM vehicle immediately stopped about 5m east of the object and the second vehicle stopped about 10m west of it at the crossroads. The patrol assessed the object as a TM-62 anti-tank mine with a command wire extending from the undergrowth on the northern side of the road to the mine and continuing further south across the road into the freshly dug ditch which consisted of a series of shallow circular depressions filled with rubble. The object was located 300m east-south-east of the SMM camera in Petrivske and 500m east of the eastern edge of the disengagement area.

While the patrol was considering the possibility for the first vehicle to drive east away from the mine and for the second vehicle to turn around and drive north to safely leave the area, a member of the armed formations carrying an assault rifle (AK-74) and displaying signs of intoxication approached the first SMM vehicle from the east and told the patrol to leave the area immediately and that it would not be permitted to proceed any further east. Despite the SMM pointing out the presence of the mine, he refused to let the first vehicle drive eastwards, thus leaving the first vehicle no choice but to drive back westwards once again across the freshly dug ditch filled with rubble near the identified mine. The first SMM vehicle then drove on the southern side of the road towards the crossroads as far as possible from the visible mine.

At the crossroads, while leaving the area, the patrol saw additional ditches filled with rubble across the road, respectively 5m west and 5m south of the crossroads, and a command wire extending from the rubble-filled ditch on the western side of the crossroads. The patrol returned safely to its base in Donetsk city and informed the armed formations about the incident.

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VIENNA, 22 June 2018 - From 18 to 22 June 2018, a group of 24 Permanent Representatives to the OSCE visited Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The trip, the first in several years in this format, aimed at reconfirming the ambassadors’ strong interest in peace, stability and prosperity in the region, in line with OSCE commitments and principles, as well as their support for stronger OSCE engagement in each of the three countries.

The ambassadors met with high-level government officials, parliamentarians from a wide range of political parties and representatives of civil society in Yerevan, Tbilisi and Baku. Questions of security, conflicts and recent political developments featured prominently during the talks.

Ambassador Véronique Roger-Lacan from France conveyed joint messages from the group throughout the visit, stressing support for “increased OSCE co-operation, in the interest of our common security. The OSCE is eager to step up its links with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, with a view to benefit their societies and the organization across all dimensions of security.”

Discussions in Armenia with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Zohrab Mnatsakanyan focused on the importance of Armenia’s continued engagement with the OSCE. In these meetings, and in consultations in the National Assembly, interlocutors expressed appreciation for the work of the OSCE over the years, and interest in continuing co-operation. A meeting was also held with OSCE project beneficiaries and former implementation partners.  

In Georgia, Ambassadors were received by President Giorgi Margvelashvili. They also met with Deputy Foreign Minister Vakhtang Makharoblishvili and representatives of the parliament. Discussions with the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly George Tsereteli underlined the importance of the parliamentary dimension of the OSCE’s work. In Mtskheta, the group was briefed by the European Union Monitoring Mission – which, with the OSCE, co-facilitates the regular Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meetings on the ground - before visiting an OSCE water management project in Sobisi. They also travelled to Odzisi, near the administrative boundary line, to gain an impression of the security situation on the ground and of the living conditions of the local population.

In Azerbaijan, the Ambassadors met with Mahmud Mammad-Guliyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as with representatives of the parliament, the Milli Mejlis, including Deputy Speaker Bahar Muradova and Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Azay Guliyev. The trip concluded with discussions with Prime Minister Novruz Mammadov , which provided the group with perspectives for future dialogue and co-operation within the OSCE framework.

“I return to Vienna deeply inspired by this important trip to the three countries of the South Caucasus,” Ambassador Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council, said. “Our objective was to enhance trust and to stress our wish to intensify the engagement of the countries with the OSCE. They remain high on the OSCE agenda and there is a lot for us to share with each other in order to strengthen our mutual security.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it again observed military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, and was also restricted in Luhansk city and at a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled part of Luhansk region. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Hirske and Novookhtyrka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. It also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and to the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering outside a patrol police headquarters.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (115), compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions).

On the evening and night of 20-21 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, six projectiles in flight from west to east, two projectiles from east to west and two undetermined explosions, followed by totals of 18 undetermined explosions and 117 projectiles (22 from north-east to south-west, 58 from east to west, six from south-east to north-west, one projectile from south-south-east to north-north-west, four projectiles from south to north and 26 from west to east), all 0.3-5km south-south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 20-21 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from east to west, two projectiles from west to east and two undetermined explosions, followed by totals of four undetermined explosions, 99 projectiles (24 from north to south, 26 from east to west, eight from south to north, 40 from west to east and one projectile from north-west to south-east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 2-5km east-north-east.

On the evening of 20 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, nine projectiles in flight from west-south-west to east-north-east, two undetermined explosions and another projectile from west-south-west to east-north-east, followed by totals of 20 projectiles (14 from east-north-east to west-south-west and six from west-south-west to east-north-east), all 4-8km south-south-east. On 21 June, positioned 1km north-north-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk for about 30 minutes, the SMM heard and saw three explosions assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 3-4km south-east and heard 17 undetermined explosions at undetermined distances south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 20-21 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw an outgoing explosion 3-4km north-west (in the north-western outskirts of Horlivka) and a burst assessed as a tracer round of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) 5-6km west. At the same location, the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions and 36 shots and bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-6km south-west, west and north-west. On 21 June, positioned on the northern edge of Horlivka for about seven hours, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 2-5km north-west and north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (11 explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 20 June, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an IFV (BMP variant) on the north-western edge of the Zolote disengagement area. On 21 June, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw three vans with military licence plates carrying two, three and four people in military-style clothing respectively near Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). (See SMM Daily Report 21 June 2018.)

On 21 June, positioned 0.6km north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 2-3km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the same day, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 21 June, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and 11 towed howitzers (D-20 Lyagushka, 152mm) near Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 20 June, the SMM saw two tanks (T-64) near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and a towed howitzer (D-20) near Kreminna (97km north-west of Luhansk).

On 21 July, the SMM saw a piece of artillery (type undetermined) south-west of Novoaidar (49km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 19 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 43 tanks (36 T-72 and seven T-64) near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 21 June 2018). On 17 June, aerial imagery revealed the presence of 21 tanks (type undetermined), nine pieces of self-propelled artillery (type undetermined) and 35 pieces of towed artillery (type undetermined) at a training area in Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see, for example, SMM Daily Report 14 June 2018).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw ten self-propelled howitzers (eight 2S19 Msta-S, 152 mm and two 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and noted that 27 self-propelled howitzers (eight 2S5 Giatsint-B, 152mm, 11 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and eight 2S1) and six towed howitzers (D-20) were missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[2] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 20 June, the SMM saw an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 20 June, an SMM mini UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined), two IFVs (one BMP-1 and one BMP variant), three APCs (one undetermined, one probable MT-LB and one BTR variant) and an APC (probable MT-LB) mounted with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (one BRM-1K and one BRDM-2) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) and two APCs (an MT-LB and an MT-LB-S) near Zolote. On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three IFVs (two BMP-2 and one BMP variant) and an APC (MT-LB-S) near Nelipivka (40km north-east of Donetsk).

On 20 June, an SMM mini UAV spotted at least recent 30 craters assessed as caused by mortar or artillery rounds fired from a southerly direction (not visible in imagery from 7 June 2018) and a trench extended by 80m north-north-west along a railway (not visible in imagery from 27 May 2018) near Novotoshkivske, as well as three recent craters assessed as caused by mortar or artillery rounds fired from a south-easterly direction near Orikhove (not visible in imagery from 29 May 2018).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 20 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least 300 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows near Nelipivka (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for ceasefire violations).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (26km north of Luhansk) and the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering of some 80-100 people (90 per cent men under 25 years old) taking part in a pre-announced protest by Right Sector and other groups outside a police headquarters (3/2 Fedora Ernsta Street). The SMM observed participants waving flags associated with various groups. It saw about 20 police officers present. Speakers among the participants criticized the police’s response to their protest to the Kyiv “March of Equality” on 17 June (see SMM Daily Report 18 June 2018). The gathering ended without incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 19 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• An armed member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from entering a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• On four occasions, members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to military-type compounds in Luhansk city.

 

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. 4

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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ANKARA, 22 June 2018 – The international observers for the early presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey will present their preliminary post-election statement at a news conference on Monday, 25 June, in Ankara.

The international observation mission is a common endeavour involving the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

The statement will be delivered by Ignacio Sanchez Amor, Special Co-ordinator and Leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission, followed by Olena Sotnyk, Head of the PACE delegation, Peter Osusky, Head of the OSCE PA delegation, and Ambassador Audrey Glover, Head of the ODIHR election observation mission.

The international election observation mission comprises some 330 observers from 44 countries, including 231 long-term and short-term observers deployed by ODIHR, 67 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE PA and 33 parliamentarians and staff from PACE.

Live stream of the press conference will be available on the ODIHR homepage at www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/381448, and on the OSCE PA homepage at www.oscepa.org.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Monday, 25 June, at the Sheraton Hotel & Lugal Luxury Collection Centre (Tulipia 2), Şehit Ömer Haluk Sipahioğlu Sok., Kavaklidere, Cankaya, Turkey. 

For further information contact:

Nat Parry, OSCE PA, +90 (0)538 579 46 30 or +45 60 10 81 77, nat@oscepa.dk

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR, +90 (0)537 236 12 80 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Nathalie Bargellini, PACE, +90 (0)544 568 12 38 or +33 (0) 6 65 40 32 82, nathalie.bargellini@coe.int

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WASHINGTON DC, 22 June 2018 - OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir concluded a three-day visit to the United States of America today, during which he met with representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Justice, members of the US Congress and its Helsinki Commission and press freedom organizations to discuss the freedom of expression and the media in the United States and the OSCE region. 

The Representative insisted that “due to its historical commitment to free speech and press freedom enshrined in the Constitution, the USA needs to continue to play a leading role in promoting media freedom in the OSCE region and domestically”. According to the Representative, “this is even more necessary at a time where there is a global increase of threats against the media”.

“I praise the strong constitutional protection of freedom of the press in the United States with the First Amendment,” added Désir. "However, I see a need for the improvement of rules and regulations that would offer stronger protection of journalists in specific situations and better respect for the role of the press.” 

In his meetings with state officials, Congress and civil society groups, Désir discussed issues concerning US legislation and policies including: the safety of journalists during protests and public events; the protection of journalistic sources; electronic device searches of journalists at borders; the recent decision to end the rules on net neutrality and considerations regarding the regulation of social media platforms; and the impact of the Foreign Agents Registration Act upon the concerned media.

“There is a need for stronger protection of journalists’ confidential sources, especially when covering leaks on sensitive issues such as national security,” said Désir, following his talks at the Department of Justice. He also insisted that, in line with international standards, the journalists' right to protect their sources is an important element of media freedom.

The Representative noted that the repeal of the rules on net neutrality could affect the plurality of information sources online. “Users should be able to access information without being limited by their service providers. Media and other sources should be able to offer their information unhindered. This is a concern for the future of media pluralism and for the right of access to information,” Désir said.

With increasing concentration of telecom and media ownership in the United States as well as in other OSCE participating States, the Representative expressed his concern over media pluralism and media freedom especially when companies own both the infrastructure and the media. 

Concluding the visit Désir thanked the US Helsinki Commission for its continued support to the OSCE, to its principles and commitments and to the autonomy of its institutions, including the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.

During his visit, Désir met with several members of the Helsinki Commission, including Senator Benjamin Cardin and Representative Alcee Hastings. At the State Department, Désir met with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Elizabeth I Millard; Acting Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Michael Kozak; and Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of South and Central Asia, Jonathan Kessler. The Representative also met with senior staff from the House Freedom of the Press Caucus, and with officials at the Department of Justice. Désir also met with press freedom civil society organizations Committee to Protect Journalists, ARTICLE 19, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, Reporters without Borders (RSF), Access Now, Freedom House, Internews and the Wilson Center.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, twitter @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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385551 Communication and Media Relations Section

A two-and-a-half day training course on detecting forged documents and imposters concluded on 22 June 2018 for 15 first- and second-line border and customs officers from Montenegro’s international airports. The course, held at Podgorica’s airport, was organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Montenegro.

By learning the theory and participation in practical exercises, the participants were familiarized with Interpol databases, the available tools and services for identifying foreign terrorist fighters, techniques for printing travel documents, machine reading devices for official travel documents and gathering advance passenger information.

Following the training, eight specialized magnifiers to enhance the professional capability of border officers to identify forged documents and impostors were donated by the OSCE to the international airports of Podgorica and Tivat.

“In light of the latest increase of mixed migration flows reported along the Mediterranean coast, this training course will help to strengthen the capacity of the Montenegrin border and customs personnel at both Podgorica and Tivat international airports, in particular to detect forged documents and  impostors,” said Ambassador Maryse Daviet , Head of OSCE Mission to Montenegro.

This training was organized as part of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s project on airport security in Montenegro, which was launched in co-operation with the OSCE Mission in 2017. This project aims at developing and implementing the Border Community Security Programme of Montenegro. The programme is designed to improve information exchange and co-operation between law enforcement and private sector personnel in order to reduce criminal and terrorist threats and, in particular, to counter the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and returnees at Montenegro’s international airports.

Communication and Media Relations Section

A specialized workshop on combating misuse of Darknet and cryptocurrencies for corruption and financial crimes, organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),  was held on 21 and 22 June 2018 in Vienna.

Senior level officials of the Department of Financial Investigations attended the workshop aimed at enhancing the technical skills of participants in investigating economic crimes that use Darknet and cryptocurrencies.

“Modern technologies allow fast and efficient use of economic and transactions aimed at enhancing financial operations worldwide,” said Andrei Muntean, Senior Economic Adviser at the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities

The participants discussed the different patterns of cryptocurrencies use, as well as mechanisms to investigate corruption crimes in Darknet and cryptocurrencies. Workshop participants also discussed experiences and best practices of Austria and other EU countries in countering misuse of cryptocurrencies.

Criminals also learn the techniques of cyber operations, Muntean pointed out. “Relevant government agencies must be equipped with state-of-the-art capabilities to understand, investigate and prevent financial crimes that use cyber technologies.  Our specialized workshop aims at achieving these goals.”

The workshop is a continuation of the discussion on combating corruption and financial crimes, organized in partnership with the Department of Financial Investigations of the State Control Committee of Belarus last year in Minsk.

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Innovative methods and tools for analysing and monitoring water and land resources in Central Asia were the focus of an eleven-day OSCE-supported annual summer school which concluded on 22 June 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Some 25 Master and PhD students as well as junior university teachers and researchers from the Central Asian countries and Afghanistan took part.

Organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the German-Kazakh University and the Regional Research Network Central Asian Water, the programme has been implemented for the fifth consecutive year.

During the training modules, participants were familiarized with the principles of geographic information systems (GIS), monitoring practices of land and water resources, climate data analysis and the principles of glaciology.

An OSCE-supported national expert from Kazakhstan’s national space agency delivered a presentation on using remote sensing software and provided practical examples of interpreting satellite imagery to monitor environmental factors.

The German-Kazakh University has been implementing the summer school programmes since 2014 as part of the regional Berlin Process initiative launched by the German Federal Foreign Office in 2008.  The event is a follow-up to the Programme Office's earlier activities aimed at promoting sustainable water governance.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Providing Rehabilitation to Victims of Torture and Other Ill-Treatment

The rehabilitation of victims of torture was the main focus of a workshop organized in Vienna on 21 June 2018 by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, the Government of Denmark, the Government of Switzerland, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the inter-governmental Convention against Torture Initiative (CTI) and the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT).

“The rehabilitation of victims of torture requires a multi-disciplinary, participatory, and holistic approach that is integrated with programmes of empowerment aimed at improving personal skills in order to strengthen positive social relationships,” said Ambassador Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council. “The rehabilitation of victims also means helping them to restore their lives and dignity.”

As a core group member of the CTI, Carsten Staur, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations in Geneva, had underscored that “rehabilitation supports survivors of violence to rebuild their lives and livelihoods. For Denmark, rehabilitation services are positive investments benefiting the individual, his or her family as well as the wider community.”

During the workshop, ODIHR and the CTI launched a joint tool to help OSCE participating States better ensure the right to rehabilitation of victims of torture. The tool, Providnig Rehabilitation to Victims of Torture and Other Ill-treatment, provides an overview of how a number of states have implemented the right to rehabilitation through a collection of practices, supplemented with experiences from non-state rehabilitation providers.

“OSCE participating States have committed to fighting and preventing torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” said Stephanie Selg, ODIHR Adviser on Torture Prevention. “To give full support to comprehensive, victim-centred and long-term rehabilitation services is a core obligation of states. We hope that the implementation tool will assist participating States in their efforts to fully implement the right to rehabilitation of each survivor of torture in the OSCE region, and thereby enable them to regain their dignity as human beings.”

Alice Edwards, Head of the CTI Secretariat, said: “Assisting torture survivors in recovering from their trauma and re-starting their lives in peace allows not only the individual, but also families, communities and societies to heal and rebuild. In capturing 20 positive examples of state-led or supported rehabilitation practices, we hope the latest in CTI’s series of implementation tools will inspire governments worldwide to consider adopting similar arrangements tailored to their own national contexts.”

Delegations from OSCE participating States also discussed their countries’ practices and potential challenges in relation to legislation and policy guidance, funding models, the actual delivery of rehabilitation services to torture victims and their co-operation with civil society organizations. The discussion was facilitated by practitioners and experts working with victims of torture in different countries.

VIENNA, 21 June 2018 – The 2018 Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC), organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, will take place from 26 to 28 June 2018 in Vienna, under the motto “Dialogue, ownership and responsibility to foster security in the OSCE area”.

This annual high-level OSCE conference provides a forum for a deep and wide-ranging discussion on current security threats and challenges for Europe and the role of the OSCE in successfully addressing them.

The opening session in the morning of 26 June 2016 will be addressed by Italian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Guglielmo Picchi. Other keynote speakers at the opening session will be: OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Grushko and European External Action Service Managing Director Thomas Mayr Harting. A video address by UN Under-Secretary General Rosemary DiCarlo will also be delivered.

Journalists are invited to follow the addresses of the opening session from 9:30 to 10:30 on Tuesday, 26 June, at the Hofburg Conference Centre's Neuer Saal.

 Media interested in attending the opening session should register by e-mail to press@osce.org, by 17:00, Monday, 25 June. 

The opening address will be streamed live.  

Further information and the agenda are available here.

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BIHAĆ, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21 June 2018 - The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) presented a first assessment of issues negatively impacting the quality and effectiveness of the judicial response to corruption in BiH to representatives of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies today in Bihać. 

The report, titled Trial Monitoring of Corruption Cases in BiH: A First Assessment, is based on the observation of 67 completed corruption cases between January 2010 and September 2017. It was released in February this year.

“Judges, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies from Banja Luka, Bihać, Prijedor, Gradiška, Sanski Most, Cazin, Bosanska Krupa and Velika Kladuša gathered to discuss the processing of corruption cases in the forthcoming period,” said Legal Advisor at the OSCE Mission to BiH, Francesco De-Sanctis. “Combating corruption is a long-term process and it requires action from all of us.”

The main shortcomings identified in the report relate to the insufficient harmonization of criminal legislation, inadequate capacity of prosecutors in drafting indictments and gathering evidence as well inconsistencies in the interpretation of the law by courts.

The President of the Cantonal Court in Bihać, Fata Nadarević, said that the report in essence recognized shortcomings of the substantive laws focusing on the criminal offences of corruption, as well as weaknesses observed in the relevant courts, and shortcomings of the procedural laws, which are often overlooked by legal professionals in BiH.

“The report finds that the BiH judiciary is currently not capable of handling corruption cases. It suggests that a large number of rulings resulted in acquittals. However, had all of the relevant pieces of evidence been collected during the investigation phase to substantiate both the character of the criminal offences and their description, it is unlikely that the rulings would have resulted in that many acquittals,” said Nadarević.

The Prijedor District Court President, Duško Miloica, said that the recommendations were relevant not only for the courts and prosecutors’ offices, but also for the BiH High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and for the legislative and executive authorities in BiH. “They are realistic and actionable, and their future application would resolve many structural problems,” he said. Miloica added that the report recognised most of the issues burdening the judiciary in BiH in the processing of the most complex cases, and that it will certainly contribute to improving the quality and efficiency of the judiciary’s response.

The report was developed within the framework of the project, Assessing Needs of Judicial Response to Corruption through Monitoring of Criminal Cases. It was supported by the United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

The report is part of the ongoing efforts by the OSCE Mission to BiH to conduct thorough analysis of the key issues affecting the functioning of the judicial system of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty near Trokhizbenka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it observed ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted at a checkpoint in Kozatske. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. It also facilitated and monitored repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema, to the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska and to an electric transformer station near Vasylivka. In Kharkiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the City Council building and saw smoke inside the building.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 90 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 185 explosions).

On the evening and night of 19-20 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from west to east and a projectile from south-west to north-east, followed by totals of four undetermined explosions, two muzzle flashes and 31 projectiles (27 from west to east and four from south-east to north-west), all 1-3km south.

On the evening and night of 19-20 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from south-west to north-east, an undetermined explosion, a projectile from south-west to north-east, five projectiles from north-west to south-east, an undetermined explosion, two projectiles from north-west to south-east and two projectiles from south-east to north-west, followed by totals of 22 undetermined explosions, about 200 projectiles (about 100 from south-east to north-west, about 70 from north-west to south-east and about 30 from south-west to north-east) and 16 bursts, all 4-6km east.

On the evening and night of 19-20 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, a projectile in flight from north-west to south-east and two projectiles from north-east to south-west, followed by 12 projectiles (six from east to west, four from west to east, one from north to south and one from north-west to south-east), all 3-6km south.

During the day on 20 June, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about seven hours, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an outgoing round 3-5km south-east, followed by an explosion assessed as an impact 2-3km south-east. The SMM also heard six undetermined explosions 2-5km east and south-east.

The same day, positioned on the western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about seven hours, the SMM heard about 25 undetermined explosions and about 150 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km at directions ranging from south to north-north-west.

Positioned on the eastern edge of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and 30 shots and bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) and small-arms fire, all 2-7km at directions ranging from south-west to north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 11 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (ten explosions).

During the day on 20 June, positioned in Vrubivka (government-controlled, 72km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts 1.5-2.5km north-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty near Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk). On 20 June, representatives of an international organization told the SMM that a resident of Trokhizbenka (man in his forties) had been injured in an explosion of an unidentified device on the morning of 20 June while he had been driving a car with three passengers on an unpaved road from the town towards the Sieverskyi Donets river. Medical staff at a clinic in Trokhizbenka told the SMM that at around 06:30 on 20 June, a man (in his forties) had been brought with multiple injuries to his legs and then transferred to a hospital in Novoaidar (government-controlled, 49km north-west of Luhansk). Medical staff at the hospital in Novoaidar told the Mission that at around 09:15 on 20 June, a man (in his forties) had been admitted with serious injuries to his legs and had immediately undergone surgery. The staff said that the man’s injuries had been caused by an explosive device that had gone off in the area of Trokhizbenka in the early morning of the same day. The SMM was unable to access the explosion site due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 19-20 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three undetermined explosions 5-10km east-north-east, east and south (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 20 June, positioned in Zolote, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 5-10km south-south-west and west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The same day, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two armed Ukrainian Armed Forces members leave the Zolote disengagement. The SMM also observed a vehicle with four Ukrainian Armed Forces members drive out of the disengagement area and later saw the same vehicle with five Ukrainian Armed Forces members enter the area (the SMM did not observe weapons in the vehicle).

During the day on 20 June, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 19 June, an SMM mini- unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in the yard of a house in Zolote, and an SMM long-range UAV spotted four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) loaded on a stationary truck in Katerynivka (37km west of Donetsk), nine towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Vodiane (42km south-west of Donetsk) and seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) on the eastern edge of Bohoiavlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 19 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk). On 20 June, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 19 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted ten tanks (T-64) positioned on firing ranges and 21 additional tanks (20 T-72 and one T-64) stationary in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) as well as ten tanks (T-72), a surface-to-air missile system (9K35), three towed howitzers (D-30) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Pokrovka (41km east of Donetsk). On 20 June, the SMM saw four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a training area near Pokrovka.

In government-controlled areas, on 19 June, the SMM saw two tanks (T-64) each loaded on a stationary truck in Yelyzavetivka (40km south-west of Donetsk). On 20 June, the SMM saw three tanks (types undetermined) and a surface-to-air-missile system (type undetermined) in a compound near Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk), two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) each loaded on a flatbed trailer travelling south-east near Krasna Poliana (73km south-west of Donetsk) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that 15 towed howitzers (nine 2A65 and six D-30), five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), nine anti-tank guns (MT-12) and 28 mortars (12 M120 Molot, 120mm, 15 2B11 and one BM-37, 82mm) were again missing.

In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six towed howitzers (2A65), and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were again missing. It also noted that one such site continued to be abandoned, with seven towed howitzers (2A65) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 19 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP-2) in northern Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk), and an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Zolote as well as another APC (BTR-variant) in the yard of a house in Zolote.

The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two recently dug firing positions (assessed as at least 20 days old) and four recent craters assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds on the north-eastern edge of Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk), as well as four persons in camouflage clothing and two military vehicles in the village (for previous observations of this area, see SMM Daily Report 20 June 2018). The UAV also spotted a recently built roadblock on a road in northern Dolomitne (not visible in imagery from 25 May 2018).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 19 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two recently dug trenches, both assessed as having been dug between 25 and 27 May 2018: one about 700m south-east of Travneve and the other in southern Dolomitne (about 400m south-east of the abovementioned roadblock).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 19 June, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 16 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road between Travneve and Dolomitne, about 200m east of the eastern edge of Travneve. (See SMM Daily Report 21 December 2017.) The same day, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted 16 anti-tank mines (TM-62) on road M03 between Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) and Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report 13 January 2018.)

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for ceasefire violations).

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (26km north of Luhansk), the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska and to an electric transformer station near Vasylivka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for one hour, the SMM saw 24 cars (six with Ukrainian, 14 with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) and five covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and 11 cars (eight with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw ten cars (five with Ukrainian licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

In Kharkiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the City Council building at 7 Konstytutsii Square. At around 09:15 on 20 June, the Mission saw 100 people (mostly men, various ages), some of whom were known to the SMM as members of the Samopomich political party, of National Corps, and of anti-corruption organizations. The members of National Corps told the Mission that they were requesting the cessation of construction of a building in the city. There was no police presence. The SMM saw scuffles between some of the people and security guards as the former were refused entry into the building by the latter. At around 10:00, inside the building, the SMM observed smoke and that the city council hall on the third floor was filled with smoke. The Mission saw about 150 people inside the hall coughing and later an empty smoke grenade on the second floor. The SMM also saw that a man (in his fifties) was yelling at the mayor of Kharkiv city and then immediately taken away by city council members. About one hour later, the Mission noted that the smoke had dispersed and saw furniture blocking the corridor leading to the hall (the furniture was subsequently removed). There were about 50 police officers in the corridor. Outside the building, a press officer of the local police told the SMM that the police had launched an investigation under Article 296 (hooliganism). The Mission did not observe further incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 19 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations in Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed man in military-style clothing denied the SMM passage, saying that they had orders not to allow the SMM to pass through the checkpoint.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]

 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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KYIV, 21 June – Alexander Hug, Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, will hold his regular news briefing on Friday, 22 June, in Kyiv.

He will talk about the security situation throughout Ukraine and the Mission’s recent activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 22 June, at 13:30 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at the Ukrainian House, 2 Khreshchatyk Street.

Live streaming of the news briefing will be available at http://uacrisis.org/ru/stream/#eng

 

 

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385320 Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

Over 40 young people from all over the Western Balkans gathered on 20 June 2018 in Tirana to participate in Youth Trail 2018. The event is being organized for the second year in a row by the OSCE Presence in Albania, the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) and Tirana Municipality. For four days, the young people will connect, explore, discuss for democracy, peace and security in the region.

Speaking at the Youth Trail opening ceremony, the Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania, Ambassador Bernd Borchardt, said that the success of Youth Trail in 2017 was the reason to organize it again. “There are still many scars in this region, but at the end of Youth Trail last years the participants told us that they learned they had many more things that unite them than separate them,” he said.

Talking about his experience, Borchardt said: “I am from the post-war generation in Germany and in the early 70s I went to France. I was about your age and I still remember the very warm welcome I received there despite the fact that relations between both countries were affected by the terrible conflict during the World War II, which caused an enormous number of victims and cruelties. This convinced me why is it so important to get young people from different countries with different experiences together and we want to facilitate that.”

Italian Ambassador Alberto Cutillo said that Italy has supported this initiative, being fully convinced of the key role youth can play, through personal engagement and co-operation, in fostering peace, security, good governance and democracy. “This is even more important in the Western Balkans, where, after the dramatic events of the past, it is fundamental to build a new generation devoted to peace and co-operation. And the first step along this path is mutual knowledge, dialogue and therefore mutual comprehension,” he said.

RYCO Secretary General, Djuro Blanusa, said: “RYCO believes that young people equipped with principles of understanding, co-existence, tolerance and respect for human rights are creating a brighter future for our region. Moreover, we believe that they should be active contributors to democratic development, social and economic prosperity, and European integration in an increasingly open Western Balkans.”

The Deputy Minister for European and Foreign Affairs, Artemis Dralo, spoke about the importance of an open dialogue in the region, not only among governments, but also among societies and generations.

During the next days, the Youth Trail participants will engage in numerous activities and workshops on topics ranging from democratic participation, gender equality, and anti-corruption to topics such as dealing with the past, regional co-operation and cultural heritage.   

385302 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Efforts to address anti-Semitism, discrimination and intolerance through coalition-building and to create networks and coalitions to better report on hate incidents were the focus of an event organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on 20 and 21 June 2018 in Warsaw.

Through a series of panel discussions and interactive group-work sessions, activists working on preventing and reporting hate crimes explored coalition- and network-building methods and common issues and concerns, which can best be addressed by joining forces at both the national and regional levels. The participants – 19 men and 22 women – also discussed means of widening the reach of their initiatives.

"The goal of this event is two-fold: to bring civil society together to help build strong and diverse coalitions to address intolerance and discrimination; and to gather input on how to improve hate crime data collection and reporting,” said Cristina Finch, Head of ODIHR's Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department.

The event is the third in a series of workshops organized as part of the ODIHR project, Turning Words into Action to Address Anti-Semitism. The project promotes dialogue between different communities, focusing on specific topics and contexts for coalition-building. Its recommendations are intended to contribute to building more cohesive and inclusive societies for all communities in the OSCE region.

385275 Communication and Media Relations Section

On 20 June 2018, the OSCE Mobile Training Team concluded a three-day interactive training course on identifying foreign terrorist fighters in Lviv, Ukraine The training, organized by the OSCE Transnational Threats Department with the support of the Project Co-ordinator’s Office in Ukraine was attended by 14 border and security officers from Ukraine. 

The programme focused on international, regional and national legal frameworks, the effective use of Interpol databases and the identification of potential foreign terrorist fighters at borders, in compliance with international human rights standards.

“Such courses not only provide important knowledge but =also an opportunity to open new channels of communication in the fight against the threat of foreign terrorist fighters,” said Gorancho Stojkovski, the OSCE Border Security and Management Unit Customs Adviser.

The importance of improved knowledge regarding risk analysis models as applied to foreign terrorist fighters as well as the history, background, trends and current cases were emphasized during the course. Ukrainian border and security officers also engaged in a practical training session on travel document security, including the detection of forged documents and impostors as well as in interactive exercises to deepen their understanding of indicators in the behavior of foreign terrorist fighters.

The course was delivered by members of the OSCE Mobile Training Team from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, and Ukraine. Expert speakers from INTERPOL and the OSCE shared their knowledge and expertise in the identification of foreign terrorist fighters at the borders.

The OSCE Mobile Training Team was established by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in 2016. It is composed of 17 selected border and counter-terrorism experts from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation.

 

385272 Kunduz Rysbek

A roundtable discussion to mark the completion of the development of recommendations for a large-scale regulatory reform of business practices in Kyrgyzstan, hosted by the Kyrgyz Government’s Council on Regulatory Reform and the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, took place at the event to mark the launch of the reform on 18 June 2018 in Bishkek.

The finalization of recommendations for a “Systemic Regulatory Reform”, developed during the past three years, is an important milestone for the country. When implemented, the reform will simplify the legal framework for doing business and reduce excessive red tape that hinders private sector growth.

The Minister of the Economy, Oleg Pankratov, Head of the Secretariat of the Business Council under the Speaker of the National Parliament, Umbriel Temiraliev, relevant state bodies, independent experts, the business community, international organizations and mass media participated in the discussion.  

For instance, the reform document recommends cancelling many of the requirements for the provision of documents by state bodies in the process of obtaining public services (106 documents in all, 16 certificates and 90 licenses and permits). According to preliminary estimates, this recommendation will facilitate and accelerate the provision of 43 services provided by state bodies, with a potential saving for citizens and businesses in the amount of  433 million KGS, or 5.5 million EUR and 2.5 million hours.

The document also recommends simplifying procedures for obtaining architectural and planning conditions/documents. The proposed recommendation will fully implement the so-called single window principle, whereby a set of documents can be obtained from one state body.  The potential saving for businesses is at least 25.2 million soms or 320,000 EUR.

According to experts’ assessment, the expected total saving for businesses and citizens resulting from the proposed recommendations may amount to 2.3 billion soms or 29 million EUR, and 10.8 million hours.

Following the adoption of the Systemic Regulatory Reform, the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the government of Kyrgyzstan, in co-operation with the analytical centre BizExpert, will work together to monitor the implementation of the recommendations. 

The implementation of some 110 normative-legal recommendations has already started. Another 51 normative-legal acts are under consideration in the Office of the Prime Minister, the National Parliament, and the President's Office.

385281 Ioanna Lachana, OSCE Mission to Skopje Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje

A two-day workshop aimed at assisting representatives of law enforcement bodies to combat corruption concluded on 21 June 2018 in Skopje.

The workshop, which was co-organized by the OSCE Mission to Skopje, the Interior Ministry and the Italian Embassy in Skopje, gathered some thirty participants from the Interior Ministry, the Financial Police, Customs, and Public Prosecution. They learned how to better prevent, identify, investigate and prosecute corruption-related cases.

The Acting Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, Jeff Goldstein, said: Corruption decreases citizens’ trust in institutions, including the police. The citizens expect the system to fight corruption more efficiently. You have a very important role in this fight.”

During the workshop, participants discussed ways to enhance the authorities’ understanding of relevant jurisdictions, responsibilities, and best practices in the fight against corruption.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Zholobok. The Mission observed damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Orikhove. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it continued to observe mines inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted near Holmivskyi and Markyne as well as at a heavy weapons holding area in an area of Donetsk region outside of government control. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. It monitored and facilitated repairs to the Zolote-Popasna water pipeline, the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska, the Voda Donbassa network in Holmivskyi and a fibre optic line south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored public gatherings.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including 185 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 105 explosions).

On the evening and night of 18-19 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two undetermined explosions, 18 projectiles in flight from west to east and two projectiles from north-west to south-east,  followed by totals of 17 undetermined explosions, two illumination flares in vertical flight, seven muzzle flashes, 46 projectiles (24 from east to west, seven from north-west to south-east, seven from south to north, six from north to south and two from west to east), all 1-3km south.

On the evening and night of 18-19 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from south to north, an undetermined explosion and six projectiles from south to north, followed by totals of 14 undetermined explosions, two illumination flares in vertical flight, five muzzle flashes, eight bursts (five from south-east to north-west, two from north-west to south-east and one from north to south) and 280 projectiles (89 from south-west to north-east, 83 from north-west to south-east, 59 from south-east to north-west, 25 from south to north, 15 from north to south and nine from west to east), all 3-5km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 18-19 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, three muzzle flashes, two projectiles in flight from east to west and seven projectiles from west to east, followed by totals of eight undetermined explosions, two illumination flares in vertical flight, six bursts (three from east to west and three from north-west to south-east) and 235 projectiles (98 from east to west, 80 from west to east, 45 from north-east to south-west, 11 from north to south and one from north-west to south-east), all 3-7km south.

On the evening and night of 18-19 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 58 undetermined explosions and about 180 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-5km south-east. During the day on 19 June, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 4-5km south-east.

Positioned in Fedorivka (government-controlled, 32km north-east of Mariupol) during the day on 19 June for about 20 minutes, the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions at unknown distances east-north-east.

Positioned 1.1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of small-arms fire 1-3km at directions ranging from south to north-north-west.

Positioned 1.6km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and nine bursts and shots of small-arms fire 1-7km at directions ranging from east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including the same number of explosions (ten), compared with the previous reporting period.

Positioned in Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 3-5km west, assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty.[2] At a hospital in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), a woman (63 years old), who had bruises on her forearms, told the SMM that while in her home at 36A Sevastopolska Street in Zholobok (non-government-controlled, 47km west of Luhansk) on 17 June around 21:00 she had heard an explosion and the roof of the house had collapsed on her. She added that her house and nearby hutch had burned entirely. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the woman had been admitted to the hospital around midnight on the night 17-18 June and was being treated for a concussion, shock and other complications resulting from high blood pressure due to stress. The SMM could not access the site of the alleged incident due to security considerations.

The SMM observed damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk). At 9 Kolkhozna Street, the SMM saw two holes (around 30cm in diameter each) in the south-west-facing side of the roof of a one-storey house and observed that about one-third of the roof tiles had been blown off on the north-east-facing side of the roof. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by an undetermined weapon round fired from a south-westerly direction. The resident (woman, 50-60 years old) told the SMM that the damage had occurred during the night of 31 May-1 June while no one was present in the house.

On 18 June, on the western side of road T-1317 near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a fresh oval-shaped crater with shrapnel inside the crater and in the surrounding area, assessed as caused by an undetermined weapon round fired from a northerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 18 June, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted at least six craters (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018) near a position of the armed formations on the south-eastern edge of the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM assessed the craters as caused by mortar (82mm) rounds fired from a westerly direction. The UAV again spotted 86 anti-tank mines (TM-62) inside the Petrivske disengagement area (on its south-eastern edge) (see SMM Daily Report 28 March 2018).

On 18 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

On 19 June, positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 18 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Donske (57km south of Donetsk). On 19 June, the SMM observed a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Oknyne (53km north-west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 17 June aerial imagery revealed the presence of 18 howitzers (type undetermined) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 17 June aerial imagery revealed the presence of 14 tanks (type undetermined) near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and 18 tanks (type undetermined) near Buhaivka.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage in government-controlled areas, on 18 June, the SMM saw eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) towed by armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk), three self-propelled howitzers (2S3) near Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk) and a tank (T-64) near Mariupol.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 18 June, aerial imagery revealed the presence of an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk). On 18 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk). On the same day, the SMM observed three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (a BTR-variant and two BMP-variants) parked near residential buildings in Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk). On 19 June, the SMM saw five stationary APCs (MT-LB) in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

In government-controlled areas, on 18 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk), four IFVs (BMP-1) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP-1) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk) and two APCs (BTR-variant) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

Aerial imagery revealed the presence on 18 June of recent 15m-long, 50m-long and 110m-long extensions of trenches on the south-eastern edge of Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk) as well as another recent 15m-long extension of a trench on the southern side of a road between Travneve and Hladosove (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk) (all not visible in imagery from 27 May 2018).

The SMM observed the presence of mine hazard signs. In the Proletarskyi district of Donetsk city, at a large walled compound to the east of Lypetska Street, the SMM saw for the first time red-and-white mine hazard signs with “Danger Mine” written in Russian on them.

On 17 June, the SMM saw that an armed formations checkpoint in the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (non-government controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) had been moved 900m north-west along road T-0513, approximately 500m south-east of the armed formations’ forward position on this road. The SMM observed no traffic through the checkpoint. On 19 June, about 15 civilians (mixed genders, 30-60 years old) told the SMM that buses were not being allowed beyond the previous location of the checkpoint thus making civilians walk a longer distance to its new location as well as having to wait for long periods of time in the sun.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for ceasefire violations).

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to the Zolote-Popasna water pipeline, the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska, a fibre optic line south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the Voda Donbassa network in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) which were completed.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored public gatherings in front of the Parliament building. At 5 Hrushevskoho Street, the SMM saw 600-800 people (mostly men, aged 50-70) gathered in three groups. The Mission saw participants in three groups holding flags with messages related to Soviet-Afghan war veterans, the Chernobyl disaster and coal-miners, respectively. The SMM observed some of the participants remove fences and scuffle with about 200 National Guard and police officers on the steps outside the Parliament building, including by throwing plastic bottles at them, releasing tear gas as well as removing helmets and batons from them and hitting them. The number of law enforcement officers subsequently increased to about 500. The Mission saw bruises on the face of some of the eight law enforcement officers who were being treated for tear gas irritation. The SMM heard a police officer onsite announcing that a young individual, who was not a participant in the gatherings, had been detained for provoking the scuffles (the Mission saw his detention). Shortly thereafter, two members of Parliament appeared on the steps to address the crowd which then started chanting “Shame, shame”. The SMM noted that the situation calmed down over the next hour and did not observe further incidents during its presence.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate[4]

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 19 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations requested that an SMM patrol move at least 500m from its position, citing security reasons.
• At a non-government-controlled checkpoint about 1km west of Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations requested that the SMM turn around and leave the area.
• Two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from entering a heavy weapons holding area in an area of Donetsk region outside of government control.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [5]

 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Addendum: In reference to SMM Daily Report published on 14 June 2018, the relevant part should read “medical staff told the SMM that two patients were still being treated for injuries sustained while on a bus due to an explosion near the same bus on 7 June”, not “medical staff told the SMM that two patients were still being treated for injuries sustained during an explosion in a bus on 7 June”.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] Addendum: In reference to SMM Daily Report published on 15 June 2018, the relevant part should read “On 14 June, a woman in Holubivka stated she could not provide the SMM with additional information regarding the alleged shelling of a school in Donetskyi without permission from an “LPR” member”, not “On 14 June, a woman in Holubivka stated she could not provide the SMM with additional information regarding the alleged shelling of a school in Donetskyi without permission from a “DPR” member”.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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GENEVA, Switzerland, 20 June 2018 - The 44th round of the Geneva International Discussions has just concluded.

In Working Group I, the participants reviewed the security situation on the ground, which they assessed as relatively calm and stable. The need to conduct a proper investigation into the tragic death of Archil Tatunashvili in February 2018 was reiterated, with the Co-Chairs emphasizing the need to avoid any perception of impunity. The participants were encouraged to continue exchanging information on this and other cases, such as the killing of Giga Otkhozoria in May 2016, in the framework of the relevant Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms.

Given the divergent positions expressed by the participants on a draft joint statement on non-use of force, the Co-Chairs proposed to continue working further on that matter.

In Working Group II, the participants discussed issues relating to missing persons, freedom of movement, healthcare, documentation, education, livelihoods and environmental concerns. It was again not possible to complete discussion of all agenda items given long-standing divergent approaches to the issue of IDPs/refugees.

In light of the exchanges among the participants during the session, the Co-Chairs and co-moderators reiterated their call for a constructive and result-oriented approach by all participants on all agenda items. The Co-Chairs informed the participants about their ongoing efforts aimed at making the Geneva format more effective and productive. They appreciated the views expressed by the participants in this regard.

The participants reiterated their commitment to this format as a unique dialogue platform and agreed to hold the next round on 9-10 October 2018.

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